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the more legible of the the two choices (between Exhibit 14 and 15) from which to draw his choice
for Exhibit 16. Further, King's Exhibit 12 and 13 were not admitted.
It is the duty of the clerk of the municipal court to file notice of appeal whether presented in
time or not; the determination of the question whether the appeal was properly taken is the province
of the Appellate Term on motion to dismiss. People ex rel. Trost v Bird, 184 App Div 779, 172 NYS
412. Footnote 24. Alexandria Naval Stores Co. v J. F. Ball Bro. Lumber Co., 128 La 632, 54 So
1035. Footnote 25. Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237. Footnote 26.
State v Gillette's Estate (Tex Com App) 10 SW2d 984 (use of words "at law").
24 Custody and care of records: It is the duty or function of a clerk of court to make and keep an
accurate record 27 of the proceedings in his court 28 and of what the court orders and adjudges. 29
In the performance of these duties the clerk acts ministerially 30 and under the exclusive jurisdiction
and direction of the court, 31 and has no power to pass on or contest the validity of any act of the
court which purports to have been done in the performance of its judicial function. 32 Where re-
quired by statute the clerk must make some record of the filing of a paper presented to him, 33 keep
a current general index of recorded instruments, 34 and keep a trial 35 or special proceeding docket.
36 It is the clerk's duty to carefully preserve in his office papers filed with him and not to permit their
withdrawal or removal, 37 except with leave of court. 38 A retiring clerk of court must turn over to
his successor in office all records, books, and property of his office. 39 While it is recognized that a
clerk of court may maintain mandamus proceedings to obtain from his predecessor in office books
and papers in the latter's possession belonging to the office, 40 it has been held that mandamus will
not lie against a private individual acquiring possession of the records sought to be recovered, though
possession was obtained under a pretended claim to the office of clerk, where no de jure or de facto
status was accorded to the claimant. 41 It is the ordinary duty of the clerk of a court of record to ex-
tend the records of the court from the processes and pleadings on file, and he cannot resort to extrin-
sic evidence for that purpose. 42 He has the right to regard as correct, the entries made and the pro-
cesses issued by his predecessors, and if, from the inaccuracy of his predecessors, errors are found in
the records as extended by the incumbent clerk, the fault is not his. 43 He has only the powers inci-
dent to his duties as custodian of the records, and consequently he has no authority to make altera-
tions therein. 44 In fact, he cannot alter the record of his own acts, since the making of the record
has exhausted his authority, and his only remaining powers are to keep and preserve the record safe-
ly. 45 It is the province of the court alone to correct clerical errors, to effect the restoration of papers
which have been improperly altered or defaced, and to provide for the substitution of new ones when
the originals are lost or stolen. 46 The clerk, as custodian of the records, is subject to the general rules
governing custodians of public records with respect to the rights of abstracters and members of the
public generally to inspect or copy. 47 Footnotes Footnote 27. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265,
451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Long v Sphaler, 89 Fla 499, 105
So 101; Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; State v Furry, 252 Ind
486, 250 NE2d 590; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168; McKay v Coolidge, 218 Mass 65, 105
NE 455; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269, 217 SW 524; People ex rel. Harris v Lindsay,
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21 App Div 2d 102, 248 NYS2d 691, affd 15 NY2d 751, 257 NYS2d 176, 205 NE2d 312; State ex
rel. Journal Co. v County Court for Racine County, 43 Wis 2d 297, 168 NW2d 836. The court will
take judicial notice that the clerk of court is the legal custodian of the records in his office. Maroon v
Immigration & Naturalization Service (CA8) 364 F2d 982, 2 ALR Fed 292. Footnote 28. State v
Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247;
Robertson & Wilson Scale & Supply Co. v Richman, 212 Mich 334, 180 NW 470; State ex rel. Mor-
ris Bldg. & Inv. Co. v Brown, 228 Mo App 760, 72 SW2d 859; Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs
228, 143 NE2d 641. Footnote 29. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396
US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Henderson v Freeman, 205 Ark 856, 171 SW2d 66; Stanton v
Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark 135, 106 SW2d 584; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168;
Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs 228, 143 NE2d 641; Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183
Pa Super 204, 130 A2d 226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124;
Humphrey v Mauzy, 155 W Va 89, 181 SE2d 329. A prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to
properly index all judgments and his failure to do so renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth
use of Orris v Roberts, supra. Footnote 30. State ex rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905; People
ex rel. Pardridge v Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269,
217 SW 524; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 31. People ex rel. Pardridge v
Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 32. State ex
rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905. Footnote 33. State v Brubaker, 352 Mo 414, 177 SW2d
623. Footnote 34. Land v Lewis, 299 Ky 866, 186 SW2d 803, 159 ALR 601 (clerk not required to go
back prior to his term of office and make up general index which should have been but was not kept
up currently). Footnote 35. Little v Employer's Casualty Co. 180 Okla 628, 71 P2d 687. Footnote 36.
State Trust Co. v Toms, 244 NC 645, 94 SE2d 806. Footnote 37. Brelsford v Community High
School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; Ohio Farmers Co-op. Milk Ass'n v Davis, 59 Ohio App 329, 13
Ohio Ops 116, 25 Ohio L Abs 551, 17 NE2d 924. Footnote 38. All papers in a cause should be pre-
served by the clerk and should not be taken from the office except with leave of court. Brelsford v
Community High School Dist., supra. Footnote 39. Underwood v Watson, 223 NC 437, 27 SE2d 144.
Footnote 40. See State ex rel. Wells v Cline, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767 (by implication). Footnote 41.
State ex rel. Wells v Cline, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767, where the relator alleged that ever since the or-
ganization of the court he had been the de jure and de facto clerk. Footnote 42. Frink v Frink, 43 NH
508. Footnote 43. Frink v Frink, supra. Footnote 44. Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508. The duties of a clerk
will vary with the nature of the court and its requirements; thus, in the Supreme Court of the United
States, which exercises an almost entirely appellate jurisdiction, the copies of the record of the case
are an essential part of the procedure, and the clerk is responsible to the court for the correct-
ness and proper indexing of the printed copies of the record, for their presentation to the jus-
tices in the form and size prescribed by the rules, and for their delivery to the parties entitled
thereto. Bean v Patterson, 110 US 401, 28 L Ed 190, 4 S Ct 23. Such a duty would rarely be per-
formed by the clerk of a trial court. Footnote 45. Elliott v Lessee of Peirsol, 26 US 328, 7 L Ed 164.
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Footnote 46. Lewis v Ross, 37 Me 230; Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508; Remick v Butterfield, 31 NH 70;
Chichester v Cande (NY) 3 Cow 39; Hollister v Judges of Dist. Court, 8 Ohio St 201. Even the court
cannot direct the alteration of a true record of what has been said or done, even though perjured tes-
timony is a part thereof. Coppock v Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 NW 382, 10 ALR 1407. Footnote 47.
See 1 Am Jur 2d, Abstracts of Title 8-11; 66 Am Jur 2d, Records and Recording Laws 19 et
seq. Enforcement of right of inspection by mandamus, see 37, infra.
27 Effect of breach of duty on rights of litigants:
Those dealing with the clerk of a court concerning an action or matter then pending have a
right to expect that he will perform the ministerial duties connected with his office, and his neglect or
failure to do so should not prejudice their rights. 75 This principle has been frequently applied in
cases where a party seeks relief from a judgment rendered against him by reason of some mistake or
default of the clerk. 76 However, where no duty exists, 77 or where the negligence of the attorney
or suitor intervenes, 78 relief will be denied them, even where they relied on promises or statements
of the clerk, 79 or where the clerk failed to answer letters of inquiry about the status of the case and
judgment was rendered without their knowledge. 80 It may be noted here that the improvident exer-
cise of authority by the clerk, as where an order of sale is issued by him without the direction of the
party entitled thereto, may not prejudice the rights of innocent purchasers. 81 But where a writ of
assistance is granted by the clerk, without action of the court, to the holder of a sheriff's deed on a
mortgage foreclosure, the writ is void and should be vacated on direct attack. 82 A clerk of court is,
generally speaking, liable personally and on his official bond to a litigant injured as a result of his
negligence or misconduct. 83 Footnotes Footnote 75. Williams v Tyler, 14 Ala App 591, 71 So 51,
cert den 198 Ala 696, 73 So 1002; Hogs Back Consol. Mining Co. v New Basil Consol. Gravel Min-
ing Co. 65 Cal 22, 2 P 489; Silverman v Childs, 107 Ill App 522; May v Wolvington, 69 Md 117, 14
A 706; Thompson v Sharp, 17 Neb 69, 22 NW 78; Hopkins v Niggli (Tex) 6 SW 625; Black v
Hurlbut, 73 Wis 126, 40 NW 673. Footnote 76. Ivester v Mozeley, 89 Ga App 578, 80 SE2d 197.
Annotation: 164 ALR 552 et seq., III. Failure of the clerk to notify an appellant of completion of
the transcript is good cause for refusing to dismiss an appeal on the ground that a certified copy of
the judgment and the granting of the appeal was not filed in the appellate court by the clerk, in the
time required by statute, particularly where the clerk affirmatively stated that illness of a deputy and
rush of business had prevented him from completing the transcript in time to file it. Parks v Marshall,
322 Mo 218, 14 SW2d 590, 62 ALR 835. Footnote 77. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254
A2d 249; Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27 NE 113; Jackson v Jones (Ky) 336
SW2d 565; Valley Finance Co. v Campana, 112 Ohio App 405, 13 Ohio Ops 2d 472, 83 Ohio L Abs
577, 167 NE2d 654, motion overr. Footnote 78. Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27
NE 113. Footnote 79. Bernier v Schaefer, 11 Ill 2d 525, 144 NE2d 577; Libert v Turzynski, 129 Ill
App 2d 146, 262 NE2d 741 (deputy clerk); Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, supra. A clerk of court
is not liable, because a party relied upon his gratuitous advice on a matter having no relation to the
duties of his office. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254 A2d 249. Footnote 80. Williams v
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Wescott, 77 Iowa 332, 42 NW 314; First Nat. Bank v Wentworth, 28 Kan 183; Ganzer v Schiffbauer,
40 Neb 633, 59 NW 98; Pulaski Oil Co. v Conner, 62 Okla 211, 162 P 464. Footnote 81. Sowles v
Harvey, 20 Ind 217, plaintiff obtaining judgment in mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not set
aside sheriff's sale by reason of clerk's unauthorized issue of order of sale on judgment. Footnote 82.
Williams v Sherman, 35 Idaho 169, 205 P 259, 21 ALR 353, wherein a motion to vacate writ on the
ground that it was granted by the clerk without notice was held to be a direct, not a collateral, attack.
Footnote 83. 28 et seq., infra.
28 Negligence or misconduct:
The principle that a public officer should be held to a faithful performance of his official duties and
made to answer in damages to all persons who may have been injured through his malfeasance, omis-
sion, or neglect 84 applies to the negligence, carelessness, or misconduct of a clerk of court. 85 As
a public ministerial officer, the clerk is answerable for any act of negligence or misconduct in office
resulting in injury to the complaining party. 86 In order to render the clerk of court and the sureties
on his official bond liable for the clerk's misfeasance, both a breach of duty and consequent damage
must be shown. 87 Moreover, to warrant relief, the wrong and the resulting injury must concur; the
clerk's misconduct or negligence must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. 88 If the injury
would have followed notwithstanding the misconduct, or if the injured party contributed to the result
in any degree by his own fault or neglect or that of his attorney, he has no legal ground of complaint
and the clerk cannot be held responsible. 89 Under applicable statutory provisions, a clerk of court
may be held liable on his bond for failure to issue a writ, citation, or process; 90 for the improper is-
suance of letters of guardianship whereby an unauthorized person was able legally to procure funds
of another and squander them; 91 for negligence or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest; 92 for
failure properly to docket a judgment; 93 for failure to properly index a judgment; 94 for failure to
enter an attachment within the time fixed by law; 95 for failure to tax costs; 96 for failure to include
a judgment on a mortgage certificate furnished in connection with a partition sale; 97 for failure to
reject a surety bond executed by a person ineligible to act as surety under the statute; 98 for not re-
quiring a surety to qualify upon a bond executed by him as such surety; 99 or for failure properly to
keep records of a case and for informing the court inaccurately of its status. 1 In those jurisdictions
where a clerk of court serves also as recorder of deeds and mortgages, breach of his duties as a re-
cording officer may give rise to an action on his official bond as clerk, 2 such as his failure to rec-
ord an instrument lodged with him for recording.
28 ----Negligence or misconduct Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court under
state law, 34 ALR4th 1186. Case authorities: A county clerk of court did not have sovereign im-
munity against an action for indemnity by a title insurance company where the an employee of the
clerk's office improperly indexed a document which affected the title to a parcel of real estate because
the clerk had a statutory duty to properly record and index documents in the public records and public
policy considerations favor accountability by the clerk for negligence. First American Title Ins. Co. v
Dixon (1992, Fla App D4) 603 So 2d 562, 17 FLW D 1708, review den (Fla) 613 So 2d 3. Sovereign
immunity did not protect state from liability for failure of county clerk to timely docket judgment
since act of recording judgment was not discretionary. National Westminster Bank v State (1989, 1st
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Dept) 155 AD2d 261, 546 NYS2d 864, app gr 75 NY2d 706, 552 NYS2d 929, 552 NE2d 177 and
affd 76 NY2d 507, 561 NYS2d 541, 562 NE2d 866. A clerk of court is liable in a civil action for a
negligent omission to perform a statutory duty which proximately causes injury to another, unless the
injured party was contributorily negligent. Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio
Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. The failure of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas to docket and in-
dex a certificate of judgment for several days after it is delivered and filed constitutes negligence.
Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. 752 SW2d 118.
Footnotes Footnote 84. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees 287 et seq. Footnote
85. Lick v Madden, 36 Cal 208. Footnote 86. Eslava v Jones, 83 Ala 139, 3 So 317; Clerks of the Su-
perior Court are no less liable for the negligent performance of their official duties than for a failure
to perform such duties. Touchton v Echols County, 211 Ga 85, 84 SE2d 81. Footnote 87. Neal-Blun
Co. v Rogers, 141 Ga 808, 82 SE 280. Footnote 92. Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168,
holding that the clerk of court was liable in damages for false arrest based on his negligence or mis-
conduct in issuing a warrant of arrest. . Footnote 94. Shackelford v Staton, 117 NC 73, 23 SE 101. A
prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to properly index all judgments and his failure to do so
renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183 Pa Super 204, 130 A2d
226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124. Footnote 98. People v May,
251 Ill 54, 95 NE 999, error dismd 232 US 720, 58 L Ed 814, 34 S Ct 602.See, Stephen v Drew
(DC Va) 359 F Supp 746, involving an action against a clerk of court and others for wrongful com-
mitment of the plaintiff for mental illness, wherein the court stated that, although some decisions
have articulated a "quasi-judicial" immunity of clerks of court, clerks of court enjoy no immunity at
all. There is no immunity from suit for clerks of court in the performance of their ministerial duties,
such as the filing of papers. McCray v Maryland (CA4 Md) 456 F2d 1.
As such, Bar Counsel 11/2/12 argument within his Ex Parte Emergency Motion to Quash
Coughlin's subpoena on Clerk of Court Peters should not benefit from an SCR 106 application (nor
should a subpoena on bar counsel, really, especially where Coughlin was repeatedly forced to testify,
while acting as his own counsel in self representing, to the very sorts of matters to which Coughlin
sought to question King and Peters, including whether they received this or that, what the envelope
on the 10/9/12 filed Notice of Intent To Take Default indicated (Coughlin witnessed downtown
USPS Clerk Tim make a handwritten notation thereon upon refusing to provide such certified mail-
ing to Coughlin due to the insufficient postage the SBN had affixed to mailing, one for which the
SBN sent to Coughlin by one, and only one method, a single certified mailing (in steadfastly refusing
to acquiesce to Coughlin's requests that the OBC/Clerk of Court/NNDB/Panel copy Coughlin on eve-
ry such filing or communication via fax or email or both (domestic violence victim issues, USPS Of-
ficial Change of Address Issues, Coughlin essentially being to scared of local law enforcement for
some time to make his physical address public, etc.).
PETERS AND THE sbn violate whitman, sullivan, donoho, barnes and their progeny where
refusing to file coughlin's submission and NRCP 5(e).
SCR 105(2)(f) does note permit the SBN to fail to transmit the Respondnet the ROA's volume 3:
(f) Court reporter. All formal hearings shall be reported by a certified court reporter, which
cost may be assessed against the attorney pursuant to Rule 120. Any party desiring to have any other
disciplinary proceedings reported must arrange in advance for a certified court reporter at the partys
own expense.
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scr 105(3). Review by supreme court.
(a) Time and manner of appeal. A decision of a hearing panel shall be served on the at-
torney, and service shall be deemed Notice of Entry of Decision for appeal purposes. Except
as provided in Rule 105(3)(b), a decision is final and effective 30 days from service, unless an
appeal is taken within that time. To the extent not inconsistent with these rules, an appeal from a
decision of a hearing panel shall be treated as would an appeal from a civil judgment of a district
court and is governed by the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure
In titling the 12/14/12 FOFCOL as it did (the title of the filing under the caption indicates it to
be a Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law...failing to identify such, in any way, as a Recommenda-
tion, Decision, Ruling, Order, or any other similar designation sufficent to invoke SCR 105(3), the
Panel has failed to enter a decision sufficient to satisfy SCR 105(3), making the SBN's filing of ei-
ther version of the ROA premature, as, also, is the issuance of any Briefing Schedule. Further, Chair
Echeverria clearly provided for, on the record, during the 11/14/12 formal hearing, for the submission
of post-hearing briefs, and King, and SBN Clerk of Court Peters have failed to faithfully included
such and the exhibits attached thereto in the ROAs that they have submitted to this Court.
Is it that NNDB/panel/ and obc's psoition that motions for new trial are impermissible? does
the sbn /clerk of court have the authority to unilaterally not filethem in? (scr
oh, and there is definitely a part to the conversation with Laura Peters of 9/11/12 where Couglin
expessly, specifically makes clear to her that he is not indicating one way or the other whether he re-
ceived the Complaint (that that actual receipt of the Complaint mattered much in 60302 when it came
to Elcano and Washoe Legal Services...parties are entitled to demand strict and actual compliance
with service rules vis a vis complaints.
will you please stipulate to the 5 day extension at least, and more preferably the 30 day extension?
Couglin has sought to finally be provided something in writing from each the SBN, SBN Clerk
of Court, Panel Chair and Chair of the NNDB representing the actual state of the law in this Discipli-
nary District under SCR 105(5), please? i don't think it is acceptable to go inserting in page 216 in
the ROA, nor is it acceptable only mail Appellant two of the three volumes.. How is it permissible to
just place an RJC TPO/EPO in RJC RCP2012-000607 into the ROA in 62337 disciplinary matter, not
even as an attachment to some filing in 62337, but just as some odd stand alone fixture placed into
the ROA? How is it okay to suddenly decide to put a 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters in the file
where reodering the Alphabetical index according to chronology reveals that Affidavit (which lacks a
caption, and a proof of service, etc., etc)...there is no division between the
NNDBPANELSBNCLERKOFCOURTOBC....May I please have a file stamped copy of the cover
page and of the cd/dvds attached to the motion for new trial and the supplment/amended mtn for new
trial, etc.?
Is it that NNDB/panel/ and obc's psoition that motions for new trial are impermissible? does the
sbn /clerk of court have the authority to unilaterally not filethem in? The SBN is apparently resting
upon some contention that Coughlin violated a TPO and EPO in RJC RCP2012-000607 in the al-
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leged manner in which he submitted for filing on 1/3/13 a Motion for New Trial, etc. and an amended
or supplemental version thereof (in compliance with NRCP 15) on 1/17/13 or thereabouts (and prior
to any Opposition thereto being filed by the SBN or the expiration of the time period in which such
was permitted). Even if Coughlin's allegedly submitting a filing by fax on 1/17/13 (and, to be clear,
the SBN/Panel/NNDB/OBC had previously communicated to Coughlin that such was a permissible
method of submitting filings, and at no point was it ever communicated to Coughlin that such proce-
dure had been altered or any permission to do so withdrawn...and the curious and unexplained ap-
pearance of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters, and the shuffling of the positioning thereof in con-
sidering its placement in the 11/8/12 delivered 3,200 page production to Coughlin of a sort of conso-
lation for the the SBN violation SCR 105(2)(c) in forbidding Coughlin the access he was entitled to
(allegedly, pursuant to Chair Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order), then in the first ROA filed herein on
12/24/12, then, again, in a third different position in the second ROA filed on 2/13/12. That 10/9/12
Affidavit of Laura Peters is an unique thing indeed. How it got in the file is unexplained. To what
filing it belongs or was attached is never made clear, nor is the matter of why it lacks a caption or
Proof of Service on Coughlin.
Almost as troubling as Judge Gardner's failure to disclose that L. gardner is hsi sister incident to the
2/2/12 hearing in the criminal trespass case upon Coughlin's prompting in 26405.
http://www.law.indiana.edu/instruction/pmpurcel/vault/In_Re_Beckner.pdf
778 ne 2d 806. motion for new trials, alter amend reconsider, etc. are accepted in disciplinary mat-
ters.
SCR RULE 119. ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.... 3. OTHER RULES OF PROCEDURE.
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THESE RULES, THE NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE APPLY IN DISCIPLINARYCASES.
COUGHLIN FILED SEVERAL TOLLING MOTIONS A ALA NRCP 59(A)-(E) SUFFICINET TO AUGUER
TOWARDS STRIKING THE 12/24/12 FILINGS AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN 62337. POST-JUDGMENT TOLL-
ING MOTIONS NRAP 4(A)(4) SHOULD APPLY TO SCR 105 IDENTIFIES THE FOUR RECOGNIZED TYPES OF
TOLLING MOTIONS: 1. AMOTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 50(B); 2. AMOTION UNDER RULE 52(B)
TO AMEND OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 3. AMOTION UNDER RULE 59 TO ALTER OR AMEND
THE JUDGMENT; AND 4. AMOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59. ACCORDING TO NRCP 50(B),
52(B) AND 59, THESE TOLLING MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THE WRIT-
TEN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER. ASIDE FROM TIMELY FILING A TOLLING MOTION,
THE FILING PARTY MUST ALSO SERVE THE MOTION WITHIN THE 10-DAY PERIOD. 7 OTHERWISE, THE
TOLLING MOTION IS NOT TIMELY, AND THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AN
UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION. 8 TOLLING EFFECT OF SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS JUST BECAUSE
POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE TIME TO APPEAL THE PRINCIPAL
JUDGMENT IS AUTOMATICALLY TOLLED. RATHER, ONLY SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE A TOLL-
ING EFFECT AND OTHER MOTIONS, WHICH ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY TOLLING, HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT
ONLY WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER PENDING TOLLING MOTIONS. FOR THE MOST PART, HOWEVER, THE
ONLY TOLLING MOTIONS ARE THE FOUR LISTED IN NRAP 4(A)(4). MOTION FOR RELIEF FROMJUDG-
MENT A MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED ACCORDING TO NRCP 60(B) MUST BE FILED WITH-
IN SIX MONTHS UNLESS SOME EXCEPTION TO THE RULE APPLIES, SUCH AS: (1) THE ACT COMPLAINED OF
CONSTITUTES FRAUD UPON THE COURT, IN WHICH CASE THERE IS NO SIX-MONTH DEADLINE; 4 (2) THE
JUDGMENT IS VOID; 5 OR (3) THE JUDGMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED, RELEASED, DISCHARGED OR A PRIOR
JUDGMENT UPON WHICH IT IS BASED HAS BEEN REVERSED OR OTHERWISE VACATED, OR IT IS NO LONGER
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EQUITABLE THAT AN INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION. 6 AS LONG AS A MOTION
UNDER NRCP 50(B), 52(B) OR 59 HAS BEEN PROPERLY AND TIMELY FILED AND SERVED, IT HAS A TOLL-
ING EFFECT UNDER NRCP 50(B), 52(B) AND 59. HOWEVER, AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION HAS NO
TOLLING EFFECT UPON THE TIME TO APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON
WHETHER THE POSTJUDGMENT MOTION WILL HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT, IT IS BEST TO FILE A NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT SO AS TO NOT POTENTIALLY WAIVE APPEAL RIGHTS. MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION/REHEARING HISTORICALLY, MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION HAVE BEEN CATE-
GORICALLY TREATED AS NOT HAVING A TOLLING EFFECT UPON A FINAL JUDGMENT. IN FACT, EDCR
2.24(B), AND OTHER SIMILAR LOCAL RULES, STATE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DOES NOT TOLL
THE 30- DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT. HOWEVER,
THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY TAKEN A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING SHOULD BE TREATED AS TOLLING: [W]E
HOLD THAT SO LONG AS A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS IN WRITING, TIMELY
FILED, STATES ITS GROUNDS WITH PARTICULARITY, AND REQUEST[S] A SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATION OF
THE JUDGMENT, NOT MERELY THE CORRECTION OF A CLERICAL ERROR, OR RELIEF OF A TYPE WHOLLY
COLLATERAL TO THE JUDGMENT, ... THERE IS NO REASON TO DENY IT NRCP 59(E) STATUS, WITH TOLL-
ING EFFECT UNDER NRAP 4(A)(4)(C). 12 AS LONG AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEAR-
ING MEETS THESE CONDITIONS, IT DOES HAVE A OTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN EARLIER CASE LAW,
THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE CAN BE NO APPEAL FROM A POST-JUDGMENT ORDER
DENYING RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE NO STATUTE OR COURT RULE EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED SUCH AN
APPEAL. 17 HOWEVER, MORE RECENT CASE LAW HOLDS THAT THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL RE-
VIEW AN ORDER DENYING A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE COURSE OF AN AP-
PEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT WHEN (1) THE DISTRICT COURT ELECTS TO DECIDE THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON ITS MERITS; AND (2) THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS FILED
AFTER THE ORDER RESOLVING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 18 POST-JUDGMENT TOLLING MO-
TIONS OF THE FOUR TOLLING MOTIONS LISTED IN NRAP 4(A)(4), NOT ALL ARE INDEPENDENTLY AP-
PEALABLE. AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FILED UNDER NRCP 50(B) IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY APPEAL-
ABLE, BUT SINCE THE MOTION IS TOLLING, THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL CONSIDER THE 50(B)
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. 20 THE SAME HOLDS TRUE
FOR AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND FILED UNDER NRCP 59(E). 21 HOWEVER, AN
ORDER RESOLVING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS INDEPENDENTLY APPEALABLE, 22 BUT ONLY IF THE
ORDER IS ENTERED POST-JUDGMENT. 23 WHEN IN DOUBT OF WHICH ORDER TO NAME IN THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL, IT IS BEST TO NAME ADDITIONAL ORDERS THAT MAY NOT BE APPEALABLE INSTEAD OF FAILING
TO IDENTIFY THE PROPER ORDERS. AND IF A SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS REQUIRED BY THE RULES,
IT SHOULD BE A NEW AND SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL INSTEAD OF AN AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.
24 IN CONCLUSION, FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES GOVERNING POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS CAN BE
POTENTIALLY FATAL TO A CASE. HOWEVER, A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THESE RULES WILL ENSURE
THAT POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE TIMELY FILED, HAVE THE DESIRED TOLLING EFFECT AND ARE
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR NEVADA SUPREME COURT REVIEW IF AN APPEAL IS NECESSARY 1 NRS
18.110(1). 2 SEE EBERLE V. STATE EX REL. NELL J. REDFIELD TRUST, 108 NEV. 587, 836 P.2D 67
(1992). 3 WINSTON PRODS. CO. V. DEBOER, 122 NEV. 517, 134 P.3D 726 (2006). 4 NC-DSH,
INC. V. GARNER, 218 P.3D 853 (NEV. 2009). 5 NRCP 60(B)(4). 6 NRCP 60(B)(5). 7
MORRELL V. EDWARDS, 98 NEV. 91, 640 P.2D 1322 (1982); SEE ALSO DRAFTERS NOTE FOR NRCP 59,
2004 AMENDMENT: SUBDIVISION (E) IS AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND A
JUDGMENT MUST BE FILED, NOT JUST SERVED, WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD. (EMPHASIS ADDED).
8 OELSNER V. CHARLES C. MEEK LUMBER CO., 92 NEV. 576, 555 P.2D 217 (1976) (STATING
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THAT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION
FILED UNDER NRCP 59(E)). 9 DEBOER, 122 NEV. AT 526, 134 P.3D AT 732. 10 ID. 11 ID. 12 AA
PRIMO BUILDERS, LLC V. WASHINGTON, 245 P.3D 1190, 1195 (NEV. 2010) (CITATION OMITTED). 13
CONSUL. GENERATOR-NEVADA, INC. V. CUMMINS ENGINE CO., INC., 114 NEV. 1304, 1312,
971 P.2D 1251, 1256 (1998). 14 GUMM V. MAINOR, 118 NEV. 912, 59 P.3D 1220 (2002). 15 SEE
DEBOER. 16 SEE THOMAS V. CITY OF N. LAS VEGAS, 122 NEV. 82, 90, 127 P.3D 1057, 1063 (2006);
SEE ALSO LEE V. GNLVCORP., 116 NEV. 424, 426, 996 P.2D 416, 417 (2000) (HOLDING THAT A POST-
JUDGMENT ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS MAY BE APPEALED AS A SPECIAL ORDER
MADE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT). 17 PHELPS V. STATE, 111 NEV. 1021, 900 P.2D 344 (1995). 18 SEE
ARNOLD V. KIP, 123 NEV. 410, 168 P.3D 1050 (2007). 19 BRUNZELL CONSTR. CO., INC., OF
NEVADA V. HARRAHS CLUB, 404 P.2D 902, 81 NEV. 414 (1965), SUPERSEDED BY STATUTE ON OTHER
GROUNDS BY, CASINO OPERATIONS, INC. V. GRAHAM, 86 NEV. 764, 476 P.2D 953 (1965). 20 KRAUSE
INC. V. LITTLE, 117 NEV. 929, 34 P.3D 566 (2001). 21 SEE AAPRIMO BUILDERS, 245 P.3D AT
1197. 22 NRAP 3A(B)(2). 23 RENO HILTON RESORT CORP. V. VERDERBER, 121 NEV. 1, 106
P.3D 134 (2005). 24 WEDDELL V. STEWART, 261 P.3D 1080 (2011)
CONCLUSION
PLEASE GRANT THIS MOTION TO STRIKE THE DEFECTIVE AND DEFICIENT, AND CURIOUSLY SO,
2/13/13 RECORD ON APPEAL IN 62337.
DATED THIS 3/19/13
__/s/ Zach Coughlin_____
Zachary Barker Coughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
FOREGOINGMOTION TOSTRIKE 2/13/13 RECORDONAPPEAL WAS PLACED IN A SEALED EN-
VELOPE AND SENT BY U.S. REGULAR MAIL AND CERTIFIED MAIL, POSTAGE FULLY PREPAID THEREON,
TO:
Patrick O. King, Esq.
Nevada Bar No 5035
9456 Double R BLVD
Reno, NV 89421
Tel: 775 329 4100
patrickk@nvbar.org
and was electronically served through the Nevada Supreme Court's eflex system on:
David Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, registered on this Court's eFlex system
However, pursuant to the 1/4/13 EPO issued to the SBN in SBN v Zach Coughlin by the Reno Justice
Court in RJC RCP2012-000607, it is possible that Coughlin will again be arrested following having
Reno PD Officers track unannounced into his back yard with guns drawn, soon to be pointed at
Coughlin's head from four feet away, incident to some rather dubious allegation that such electronic
service through the Eflex system somehow amounts to a contact violative of the 1/4/13 EPO in
607...
Dated 4/25/13
____________
ZACH COUGHLIN
APPELLANT
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INDEXTO EXHIBITS:
1. EXHIBIT 1: DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
2. EXHIBIT 2: VARIOUS OTHER RELEVANT MATERIALS
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DECLARATIONOF ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN:
I, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, SWEAR UNDER PENALTYOF PERJURY, NRS 53.045 THAT THE FOL-
LOWING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE:
1. The ROA in 62337 has had a very troubled history. Now, the second version of the ROA, file
stamped 2/13/13 (though the SBN has continued misaddressing the ROA is sends to Coughlin
(which, this time, did include the Transcript from the formal hearing and Hearing Exhibits, unlike
what the SBN mailed to Coughlin in connection with the ROA filed on 12/24/12...(page 1098 of the
12/24/12 ROA contains a Certificate of Service By Mail wherein the SBN's Laura Peters wrote: I
hereby certify that I served a copy of the attached Record on Appeal, Vol. 1&2, by placing a copy in
an envelope addressed to Zachary.... That 12/20/12 Certificate of Service By Mail contains nothing
indicating that there existed a Vol. 3 in said ROA file stamped 12/24/12 upon all three volumes being
submitted to the Clerk of Court of the Nevada Supreme Court).
Now, in the 2/13/13 ROA, the order of presentation of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters,
and the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence is
switched from the order those filings appeared in in the 12/24/12 ROA, in an attempt by the SBN
to ameliorate the impropriety apparent in the 12/24/12 ROA where the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura
Peters appeared at bates stamp pages 33-34, immediately before the appearance, at pages 35-39 of
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence by the
SBN's King, where the bates stamping in that ROA and order of pleadings on file is chronologically
arranged from earliest (beginning with the 8/23/12 Complaint) to most recent (ending, in contrast to
the 2/13/13 ROA, on page 1098 with a Certificate of Service By Mailing by Peters of only Vol 1&2
of the ROA (ie, missing the Formal Hearing Transcript and Hearing Exhibits).
Obviously, the SBN finally figured out that it looks suspicious to suddenly depart
from the placement of the 10/9/12 AOLP as appearing in the 11/8/12 3,200 page bates stampe pro-
duction as the last entry most recent filing in the chronologically arranged Formal Hearing Plead-
ings folder and the immediately preceeding entry being bates stamped 02797 being the Panel Chair
Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order.. That is, the 10/9/12 AOLP appeared at bates stamp page 02795, and
the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; DoWSoE appeared at 02716, with a multitude of filings in
between, including Coughlin's 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss at 02911, which the SBN had yet to put a
file stamp on at that point (where the file was sent to the printers on 11/1/12 according to Peters
and King's email of 11/1/12 informing Coughlin that he would not be permitted his rights to inspect
the file up to within 3 days of the hearing as required by SCR 105(2)(c). In the 12/24/12 ROA,
however, that 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss is finally file stamped, appearing at bates stamp page 40.
Couglin's 10/15/12 Motion for Order To Show Cause in 0204 remains without a file stamp in both
version so fthe ROA, despite it being ruled on in the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echverria? King's fail-
ure to oppose Coughlin's argument that the 8/23/12 Complaint should be dismissed along lines simi-
lar to those Couglin's wrongful termination Complaint against WLS was dismissed under a NRCP
12(b)(3)-(5) line of argument given how blurry and illegible the Complaint and Exhibits thereto actu-
ally are (versus in 60302 and 60317 (a case featuring Judge Elliott failing to disqualify himself or
disclose his Board Presidency for one of Hearing Witness Elcano's co-defendants (Judge Elliott was
then assigned Coughlin's criminal appeal in of the matter underlying 60838, in CR11-2064, and
thereafter was assigned numerous other competency evaluation and or criminal appeal matters where-
in Coughlin is a party (with the transcripts from teh 4/19/12 and 4/26/12 competency hearings being
particularly relevant to the NRS 178.405 stay violations (and effect thereof upon Coughlin's ability to
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avoid a DCR 13(3) application in connection with Hill's 4/19/12 post-judgment Motion to For Attor-
ney Fee sanctions (especially where NRCP 11's safe harbor procedural requisites had not been fol-
lowed...to say nothing of Bar Counsel possessing the 8/28/12 Order by Judge Flanagan in that matter
that conclusively proves the 6/25/12 attorney fee award the subject of Hearing Exhibit 2 was not a
sanction, but rather an application of DCR 13(3), thereby evincing some RPC violations of his own
by King...NRCP 11 was not followed incident to the closing argument Motion for Sanctions by
Springgate in DV08-01168, leading to the 4/13/09 Order (subsequently subsumed by a 6/19/09 Final
Decree that vitiates any suggestion that Coughlin's contentions therein lacked merit where alimony
was, in fact, awarded...and where that Hearing Exhibit 3 applies NRS 7.085 where it would seem the
Judge would have rather made a contempt finding, but didn't, as such, the lack therof is conclusive
proof that Coughlin's conduct therein was not misconduct) the opposing side, CAAW's Excecutive
Board, then going on to sanction Coughlin under NRS 7.085 and or 18.010(2)(b) despite a 12(b)(5)
dismissal necessarily meaning the Court never got to the merits of the Complaint, no 21 day safe har-
bor motion being served, and no actual hearing ever being held to satisfy the requirement for one in
NRS 18.010(2)(b), oh, and Judge Elliot managed to get all of Couglhin's criminal appeals (5!) where
the actual process Couglin had served the defendnats was exponentially more legible than the fiddle
with the scanner dpi settings and other contrast, obfuscation settings in Acrobat or other scanning ap-
plication approach taken by Gonsalves, Garin, et al....(it really is remarkable how scandalous the
approach was there when viewing the actual 9 page per page printed on a 1200 dpi laser printer ver-
sion of the attached Exhibit in those cases compared to the completely illegible and blurry doctored
versions attached as Exhibits to the various Motions to Dismiss...an approach absolutely implemented
by the SBN in fraudulently making as many of Couglin's filings in the representations thereof in the
ROA's in 62337 be similarly doctored up to be so blurry as to lack an utility whatsoever). Judge El-
liott's 1/9/13 Order granting Coughlin IFP status in CR12-2025 and for the preparation of the Tran-
script of the matter, RJC RCR2011-063341 mentioned in King's 8/23/12 Complaint and so connected
to this matter given the extreme proximity of that 11/19/12 trial date therein, the questionable in the
extreme 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing involving the Reno City Attorney the day before the formal
hearing in this matter, and the cumulative prejudice to Coughlin and SCR 102.5 mitigation support
attendant to the arrest therein, on 8/20/11, which was the first of 15 incarcerations of Coughlin since,
along with approximately 11 different No-Cause evictions of rather dubious jurisdictional prerequi-
sites, with all the attendant conflicts of interest and basis for disqualification one might expect to arise
therein (see King's 11/2/12 Motion to Quash Coughlin's RMC Subpoenas, RCA Christensen's letter,
the 11/13/12 objection by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, etc., etc.. An extension of time to file Coughlin's
Opening Brief would allow for the transcript in CR12-2025 (RJC RCR11-063341) to be finished, and
such is necessary to this matter.
Specifically, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters (a very material document that goes
to whether the SBN Clerk of Court/OBC/NNDB/Panel provided Coughlin an indication that he was
permitted to submit filings via fax (considering NNDB Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written instruction
to Coughlin (see below) and King's numerous instances of directing Coughlin to communicate with
SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (including an instruction to Coughlin by King to do so made dur-
ing the 3/26/12 appearance by Coughlin at the SBN Double R Office where Coughlin presented to
take King up on his offer to allow Coughlin to review the grievances and materials submitted in con-
nection therewith...at which time King refused to allow Coughlin to review any such materials and
only briefly allowed Coughlin to read the two page 2/14/12 written grievance letter to the SBN re-
garding Coughlin by RMC Judge Nash Holmes. At that time, King indicated that Coughlin should
have that 2/14/12 Nash Holmes letter, to which Coughlin protested that he had not received any such
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letter (to be expected considering the well documented problems Coughlin was experiencing during
that period of time in accessing mail addressed to him at the 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address). Peters ex-
press indications to Coughlin on 9/11/12 were expression of the policies and procedures in play in
light of SCR 105(4) and Susich and King's representations to Coughlin (combined with Peters own
express representations that she was the SBN Clerk of Court and entitled to make the calls on mat-
ters such as when and under what circumstances a Default would be taken (she indicated several
things in this respect to Coughlin). To whatever extent Peters 9/11/12 express indications to Cough-
lin that she would file stamp in an filings he faxed to the SBN are considered to not be expressions of
the rules and policies in play under SCR 105(4), Coughlin entitled to rely upon such indications, and
reasonably did so, considering the totality of the circumstances. Especially with respect to the
12/14/12 FOFCOL's express recommendation that as a matter of default the alleged violation may
be deemed admitted... with respect to numerous alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct,
even those for which the FOFCOL found the SBN put on no evidence whatsoever or or those
So, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters becomes a very important filing. Such
filing (it is file stamped 10/9/12, and notarized no less, with a date of 10/9/12) was never sent to
Coughlin until it was included in the 3,200 page box of documents provided on 11/8/12 as a consola-
tion by the SBN for refusing to follow SCR 105(2)(c). That 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters
appearaed within the bates stamped 3,200 page document production by the SBN within a section
labeled Formal Hearing Pleadings, and appeared numerically after King's 10/24/12 Opposition and
before NNDB Chairman Susich's 10/30/12 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel. This indicates
that either Peters and the SBN back dated the file stamping on some Affidavit of Laura Peters to
indicate it was filed in on 10/9/12, or, that Peters and or the SBN file stamped such an Affidavit of
Laura Peters on 10/9/12, but did not place it in the Formal Pleadings File at that time. Regardless,
there is no indication that such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters was ever mailed to Coughlin, as
there exists no dedicated Certificate of Service for it, nor is said 10/9/12 AOLP identified in any In-
dex to Exhibits or otherwise referenced in any other filing by the SBN. The fact that that 10/9/12
AOLP contains numerous easily disproven misstatements in more troubling, particularly where such
misstatements relate to just when and how the SBN and or Peters had one of Coughlin's Motions to
Dismiss submitted for filing. Coughlin had digitally verifiable proof confirming he submitted for fil-
ing to the SBN his initial Motion to Dismiss the 8/23/12 file stamped Complaint on 9/17/12 by both
fax and email.
Peters absolutely indicated to Couglin that he was permitted to file be fax in a 9/11/12 com-
munication with Coughlin, and that she would file stamp any filings that Coughlin submitted via fax.
Both Peters and King have been dancing around this fact. This is especially clear where the 10/9/12
AOLP only
SUBJECT: RE: MOTION TO DISMISS SBN V. COUGHLIN FROM: LAURA PETERS
(LAURAP@NVBAR.ORG) SENT: WED 9/26/12 11:54 AM TO: 'ZACH COUGHLIN'
(ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM) I NEVER SAID THAT YOU COULD FILE ITEMS VIA E-MAIL...
THE 10/9/12 AOLP READS:
CUSTODIANOF RECORDS
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LAURAPETERS, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSES AND
SAYS AS FOLLOWS:
That Affiant is employed as a paralegal for the discipline department of the State Bar
of Nevada and in such capacity is the custodian of records for the State Bar of Nevada;
That on September 11, 2012, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin called Af-
fiant to confirm that a hearing was still scheduled to take place on September 25, 2012. Affiant ex-
plained that the hearing would not take place on September 25th and that date had been scheduled
prior to the filing of a formal Complaint.
Mr. Coughlin reacted as if he had no knowledge of a Complaint. Affiant then ex-
plained that, in fact, a copy of the Complaint, sent via certified mail on August 23,2012, from the Re-
no office of the State Bar, had been returned and marked "unclaimed".
Affiant further explained that since service had not been affected, a new certified copy would
go out the next day. Affiant requested that when Mr. Coughlin received said copy, he should return
the postcard attached to the mailing and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Com-
plaint would start running at that point.
However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was determined that
personal service should be affected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno Carson messenger service was engaged
to attempt personal service despite Mr. Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address.
On September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno office of the State Bar al-
legedly expecting a hearing to take place. At that time, Mr. Coughlin was again told, both by Affiant
and Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, that no hearing would be taking place that day and that an
answer to the State Bar's Complaint had not been received.
Affiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy of the Complaint on his visit to
the Bar office on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an employee of the State Bar. Mr.
Coughlin insisted that the hearing which had been previously scheduled for that day should be taking
place because he needed to be removed from temporary suspension.
Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King that he
cannot file pleadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he continues to attempt. The Motion to
Dismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists should be granted as it has gone unopposed by the State
Bar, was never presented to Affiant for filing but was rather emailed prior to Affiant's conversation
with Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms told Affiant that
he had not yet received the Complaint.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated this 9th day of October, 2012: Laura Peters, Paralegal, Office of
Bar Counsel (notarized as SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 9TH
DAYOF OCTOBER, 2012 by Notary Public Angeline A. Radley and af-
fixed with her Notary Seal).
In consideration of the representations and indications made to Coughlin by NNDB Chairman
Susich (especially his 7/27/12 email to Coughlin and his assistant Sherri Hornsbey's indications to
Coughlin), Asst. Bar Counsel King, and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (a title that both Peters
and King had referred to Peters as being bestowed with on numerous occasions, including by Peters
during a 9/11/12 telephone conversation with Coughlin and by King on 9/25/12 in person, upon
Coughlin appearing at the SBN's Double R Office on 9/25/12 at 9 am for the hearing Peters had con-
firmed in writing to Coughlin and to which Susich's 7/27/12 email to Couglin indicated the SBN was
in charge of scheduling.
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KING CURIOUSLY FAILED TO OFFER INTO EVIDENCE THAT 3/16/12 LETTER BY KING TO
COUGHLIN (TO WHICH WAS ATTACHED, AS INDICATED BY A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN FROMSBN
CLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS, WHICH COUGHLIN ONLY FOUND IN HIS JUNK EMAIL FOLDER AFTER
KING INDICATED DURING THE 3/26/12 INTERACTION WITH COUGHLIN AT THE SBNDOUBLE R OFFICE
WAS PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN BY EMAIL AS WELL...LEADING TO AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN KING AND
COUGHLIN WHEREIN KING ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT EMAIL COUGHLIN A COPY OF THE 3/16/12
MAILING (DESPITE HIS 3/16/12 LETTER INDICATING HE WAS SO COPYING COUGLIN ON VIA EMAIL, BUT,
STRANGELY, NOT FAX), BUT, RATHER, KING INDICATED HE HAD LAURA PETERS EMAIL COUGLIN A
COPY OF THAT MAILING. DURING THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH KING COUGHLIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THE SBNHAD SENT COUGHLIN ANYTHING RELATING TO ANY GRIEVANCES
OTHER THAN THE 2/14/12 MAILING TO COUGHLIN BY KING (WHICH INCLUDED KING'S ONE PAGE LET-
TER TO COUGHLIN AND HILL'S FIVE PAGE 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN), WHICH COUGHLIN
ONLY RECIEVED ON 3/16/12 DUE TO NO FAULT OF COUGHLIN'S OWN, BUT RATHER, TO MALFEASANCE
BY COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AND PERHAPS, THE USPS, AND OR THE USPS'S RESPONSE TO THE MAL-
FEASANCE OF COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AS CONFIRMED BY THE YELLOW STICKERS AFFIXED TO ENVE-
LOPES MAILED TO COUGLHIN (SUCH AS THOSE BY THE SBNON 2/14/12 AND 3/16/12 AND NUMEROUS
MAILINGS BY THE RMC TO COUGLHIN BETWEEN FEBRUARY-APRIL 2012). COUGHLIN WAS FURTHER
SURPRISED TO HEAR FROMKING THAT THE SBNHAD COPIED COUGLHIN ON A 3/16/12 MAILING TO
COUGHLIN OF AN ADDITIONAL GRIEVANCE BY A JUDGE BY ALSO SENDING IT TO COUGHLIN VIA EMAIL.
COUGHLIN QUERRIED KING AS TO WHAT EMAIL ACCOUNT SUCH AN EMAIL WOULD HAVE EMANATED
FROM. KING, LACKING AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EMAILS ARE SENT FROM ACCOUNTS RATHER THAN
FROM THE STATE BAR'S WEBSITE, ULTIMATELY INDICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT HE DELEGATED THE
COPYING TO COUGLIN BY EMAIL OF THE 3/16/12 MAILING TO LAURA PETERS. FROM THAT COUGHLIN
DEDUCED SUCH AN EMAIL WAS LIKELY SENT FROMPETER'S EMAIL ACCOUNT, AND, SURE ENOUGH, IN
COUGHLIN'S JUNK MAIL FOLDER, CHECKED SUBSEQUENT TO THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH
KING, WAS A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN CONTAINING A 17 PAGE PDF (KING'S ONE PAGE 3/16/12
LETTER, HOLME'S TWO PAGE 3/14/12 LETTER, AND L. GARDNER'S 14 PAGE OAT OF 4/13/09).
That 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin by the SBN included a one page letter to Coughlin from
King of 3/16/12, to which was attached Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 two page grievance against
Coughlin, and the 4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner from 01168. In that mailing,
the Judge Nash Holmes letter is stamped by the SBN as received on 3/14/12, and, curiously, the
4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge L. Gardner is stamped as received by the SBN on 3/15/12, with
the 5 in the 15 being drawn in by hand...which is even more curious given King's repeated ob-
structionist and evasive, even misleading, attempts to avoid admitting that Judge Nash Holmes and
the RMC included that 4/13/09 Judge L. Gardner Order After Trial in the materials submitted on
3/14/12 along with Holmes' 3/14/12 letter to the SBN).
HOLMES ADMITTED TO SO INCLUDING IN THE OAT IN HER 3/14/12 SUBMISSION TO THE SBN
DURING THE FORMAL HEARING ON 11/14/12. ON THE CERTIFIED AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF A 4/10/12 TRI-
AL DATE IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS TRIAL AGAINST COUGHLIN STEMMING FROMHILL'S FRAUDULENT
11/13/12 CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, L. GARDNER'S BROTHER, JUDGE NASH HOLMES' FELLOWRMC
JUDGE, RMC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WILLIAMGARDNER, ADMITTED TO HAVING RECEIVED THAT
4/13/09 ORDER AFTER TRIAL BY HIS SISTER, FROM HI SSI STER, AND THEN HAVING PASSED THAT OR-
DER AFTER TRIAL RECEIVED FROM HIS SISTER AROUND TO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES, THOUGH THE
TIMING OF W. GARDNER'S RECEIPT OF THE 4/13/09 OATFROM HIS SISTER WAS SOMETHING W.
GARDNER OFFERED PARTICULARLY STRANGE AND EVASIVE COMMENTARY TO ON THAT 4/10/12 AUDIO
TRANSCRIPT, AS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF HIS PASSING ON THAT 4/13/09
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OATTO HIS FELLOWRMC JUDGES) AT THE 11/14/12 HEARING, UNLIKE HIS 2/14/12 LETTER TO
COUGHLIN (FOR WHICH KING FAILED TO INCLUDED THE 5 PAGE 1/14/12 WRITTEN EMAILED GRIEVANCE
AGAINST COUGHLIN BY HILL, WHEREIN HILL PURPORTS TO BE SATISFYING HIS AND HIS ASSOCIATES
RPC 8.3 DUTY IN ACCUSING COUGLIN OF GHOSTWRITING FOR JOHN GESSIN, WHOMHILL WAS STILL
LISTED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR IN AT LEAST ONE MATTER AT THE TIME, DESPITE HILL DISPAR-
AGING GESSIN AND BETRAYING ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES, APPARENTLY, WITH RESPECT TO
GESSIN, IN HIS 1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN, MORE ON THAT LATER).
Subject: RE: referral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board From: Tom
Susich (tsusich@nvdetr.org) Sent: Fri 7/27/12 8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Cc: 'PatrickK@nvbar.org'
(PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before the
Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request to the Ne-
vada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please communicate directly
with the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones who will process
your request and set up any appropriate hearings. If you have questions you
can contact Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas
Susich, Esq.
ALSO, CONSIDER:
ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
FROM: PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG
TO: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
SUBJECT: RE: DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE
DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:57:26 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
PLEASE COME TO SEE ME AND I WILL SHOW YOUTHE LETTER AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE COURT.
PATRICK KING
FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM]
SENT: FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 2012 10:39 AM
TO: PATRICK KING
SUBJECT: RE: DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE
MR. KING,
THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME YOUALLEGE ANYONE OTHER THAN MR.
KING FILED OR ALLEGED A GRIEVANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY DOCUMEN-
TATION OR PROOF RELATED TO THESE APPARENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM
JUDGES THAT YOU ARE ONLY NOW BRINGING UP. SINCERELY, ZACH
COUGHLIN, ESQ., POBOX60952, RENO, NV, 89506, TEL: 775 338
8118, FAX: 949 667 7402; ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM NEVADA
BAR NO: 9473
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FROM: PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG
TO: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
SUBJECT: RE: DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE
DATE: FRI, 23 MAR 2012 17:18:34 +0000
DEAR MR. COUGHLIN,
I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED MY INTEREST IN HAVING A MEETING WITH YOU TO DISCUSS
THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU. YOUCLAIM TO BE TOO BUSY TO MEET WITH ME, YET YOUHAVE TIME
TO WRITE LENGTHY E-MAILS AND APPARENTLY TO DO LEGAL RESEARCH.
YOUASKED IF MR. HILL HAS STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE AGAINST YOU. NOT ONLY DOES
HE HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE, AS A LAWYER IN NEVADA HE MAY HAVE AN ETHICAL OBLI-
GATION TO REPORT TO THE STATE BAR. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, THE GRIEVANCES AGAINST YOU
CAME NOT ONLY FROMMR. HILL BUT ALSO FROMJUDGES FROM DIFFERENT COURTS. THESE GRIEV-
ANCES, AND THE EVIDENCE ATTACHED WITH THEM, RATHER CLEARLY PUTS INTO QUESTION YOUR COM-
PETENCE TO PRACTICE LAW. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU, I WILL MAKE THE EVIDENCE AND EXHIBITS
AVAILABLE TO YOU WHEN YOU COME TO INSPECT THEM AT MY OFFICE. I WILL NOT SEND YOUREPORTS
OR DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE YOU CLAIM YOUR MAIL IS BEING COMPROMISED.
AS FOR THE GRIEVANCES YOU HAVE MADE, NOTHING THAT YOU HAVE SUBMITTED APPEARS
TO SHOW AN ETHICAL VIOLATION THAT COULD BE PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
WHICH IS THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS. AS SUCH, AT THIS TIME
WE HAVE NOT OPENED ANY FILES BASED ON THE INFORMATION YOUHAVE SUBMITTED. SINCERELY,
PATRICK KING
JUDGE FLANAGAN ONLY ENTERED 6/25/12 ORDER AGAINST COUGHLIN AS A LITIGANT NOT AS
AN ATTORNEY HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADOPT NRS 7.085 ARGUMENT SET FORTH. POSITION
THAT ULLOA DID NOT STEAL RENT, BUT RATHER SHE MADE A DEAL WITH MERLISS UPON HIS BRING-
ING IT UP, HOWEVER, MERLISS, HILL, AND BAKER PERSISTED IN PURSUING THE RENT PORTIONS TO
WHICH A DEAL HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN MERLISS AND ULLOA THAT ABSOLVED COUGHLIN OF ANY
JOINT LIABILITY FOR WHAT, BETWEEN COUGHLIN AND ULLOA, WAS ALWAYS ULLOA'S CONTRIBUTION
TOWARDS THE RENT.
11/8/12 SCR 105(2)(c) consolation at bates 02792 contains a USPS Track & Confirm that proves
King knew his certified mailing to Coughlin of his 3/14/12 Letter (attached as Exhibit X at the formal
hearing, though missing the two items attached to it (Nash letter letter to SBN of 3/1in Laura Peters
3/19/12 email to Coughlin, which resided in Coughlin's junk folder unbeknownst to him until it was
later discovered there:
Subject: RE: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7)
versus SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.
From: Laura Peters (LauraP@nvbar.org)
Sent: Wed 10/10/12 6:01 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
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Please don't put words in my mouth, Zach. You are the one that indicated that you had not re-
ceived the Complaint when we talked on the phone. Why, then, would I file in a Motion to
Dismiss? I am responsible for my own actions.
- Laura (aka Clerk Peters)
-----
From: Zach Coughlin [zachcoughlin@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, October 10,
2012 11:51 AM
To: tsusich@nvdetr.org; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;
nvscclerk@nvcourts.nv.gov
Subject: FW: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versus
SCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.
Dear Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees himself as a the Director of this
movie, placing you two in the scenes where he sees fit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility to
comply with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at this point, you need to send a
clear message to Bar Counsel that "the kid stays in the picture", and inform Mr. King that he is not
to attempt to take your job or duties from you. Same goes for Clerk Peters, especially vis a vis her
admission that King told her not to file Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on Sep-
tember 17th, 2012, which has now gone unopposed, and therefore, shall be granted. Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961...
By subverting this Court's 6/7/11 Order and the express dictates in SCR 111(8) and
SCR 102(4)(a) by effectively extending the temporary suspension in 60838 (killing Coughlin's
law practice for the time being and making it overly difficult for Coughlin to earn a living while
also defending against an inordinately overbroad SCR 105 Complaint and impresive, if not ra-
ther questionable displays of teamwork between the SBN, RJC, WCDA, RPD, WCSO, RMC,
and Reno City Attorney's Office...(including two more recent arrests of Coughlin, bringing the
total since 8/20/11 to 13, with an arrest on 2/2/13 for an alleged violation of his Dept. of Alterna-
tive Sentencing probation requirement to check in by 3 pm on Wednesdays, where Coughlin
presented at 2:54pm but was detained by security (pursuant to an RJCAdministrative Order
12-01) sufficiently long enough to result in the DAS office closing prior to Coughlin being per-
mitted to access it for a check in (also, DAS Officer Brown, in an email the next day, excused
such circumstances, and it was not until a 2/1/13 email to WCDA ADA Helzer seemed to
wrankle, that, suddenly, DAS arrested Coughlin has his residence after 7 pm, in violation of
NRS 171.136. A week later, on 2/8/12, Coughlin was treated to have a gun pointed at his head
by the RPD upon Offficer Waddle departing from procedure and entering the back yard of
Coughlin's residence, failing to announce themselves as law enforcement (a voice called to
Coughlin while he was walking in his back yard, saying only Zach Coughlin? to which
Coughlin did not turn around or respond but rather walked to the corner of the back yard and
stood behind a shed...only to have Officer Waddle jump out moments later from behind the
shed's wall pointing a 45 a Coughlin's head, his partner, Officer Wilson asking, are you Zach
Coughlin to which Coughlin said something, and Waddle, who had called out to the back of
Coughlin's head moments before, was only then able to announce that's him upon hearing
Coughlin's voice and recognizing it from a previous conversation with Coughlin on the tele-
phone, thereby indicating the RPD lacked probable cause to pull their guns and inch around
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back yard sheds without so much as announcing the presence of law enforcement and or issu-
ing a single lawful order.
Now, the RMC has picked up the EPO/TPO SBN violation prosecution where the
WCDA's Office chose not to....Coughlin was charged with violating a TPO granted to, appar-
ently, and entire County, Washoe County for his email to his DAS Officer explaining the de-
tention by security on 1/23/13 in a 1/24/13 email to his DAS probation officer (and, apparently,
the institutional TPO application and subsequent TPO are being read by the RPD to apply to
any employe off Washoe County, not just those in the WC Public Defenders Office, much less
just to Jim Leslie, Esq., whom did not seem all that fearful of Coughlin on the numerous occa-
sions when he smugly, and purposefully, an callow callous manner sought to deprive Coughlin
of each and every inviolable right of a criminal defendant, and also refused to providee 911 au-
dio cd discovery discs...Also, Coughlin moved for a TPO against Leslie on 9/5/12, well before
the application on Leslie's behalf by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial (whose 11/13/12 4:41 pm last mi-
nute fax to Coughlin represented an apparent attempt to Object to the SCR 110 subpoenas
Coughlin had served by an appropriate non-party on 10/30/12 upon 2JDCJudges, Administra-
tors, and the Custodian of Records, none of which appeared or propounded for the 11/14/12
formal hearing, to which Panel Chair Echeverria failed to hold them in contempt or grant a
continuance despite Coughlin's express request that he do so, and despite the fact that it is the
Board Chair, Susich, not the Panel Chair, Echeverria, whom has jurisdiction to rule on Mo-
tions to Quash Subpoenas (even, one would think, the impermissible sua sponte one's that Panel
Chair Echeverria made on 11/14/12, in yet another in a exceedingly long line of examples of
Echeverria displaying evident and marked impartiality against Coughlin, and particularly, in
favor of WLS's Elcano and local law enforcement entitites). resulting from a petty theft convic-
tion of $14.00 worth of a candy bar and some cough drops into what has now become and 8
month suspension (particularly curious given the lack of even a temporary suspension in In Re
Stephen R. Harris, Esq. 57507, and the eventual three month suspension Ordered therein,
where Harris was actually suspending from late February 2012 to November 8
th
, 2012, around
9 months. Coughlin's temporary suspension for 0.0000018543%the amount of money Harris
admittedto misappropriating from a client versus where Coughlin disputes the legitimacy of his
conviction of a de minimis amoutn of foodfrom Wal-Mart. To punish Coughlin for defending
himself or failing to provide a false coerced confession just seems wrong.
SCR 102(4) Temporary suspension by the supreme court: (a) On the petition
of a disciplinary board, signed by its chair or vice chair, supported by an af-
fidavit alleging facts personally known to the affiant, which shows that an at-
torney appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm to the pub-
lic, the supreme court may order, with notice as the court may prescribe, the
attorneys immediate temporary suspension or may impose other conditions
upon the attorneys practice. If a petition is filed under subsection 3 of this rule,
a separate petition under this subsection must be filed with the supreme court as
soon thereafter as possible...
(d) The attorney may request dissolution or amendment of the tempo-
rary order of suspension by petition filed with the supreme court, a copy of
which shall be served on bar counsel. The petition may be set for immediate
hearing before a hearing panel, to hear the petition and submit its report and
recommendation to the court within 7 days of the conclusion of the hearing.
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Upon receipt of the report and recommendation, the court may modify its order,
if appropriate, and continue such provisions of it as may be appropriate until the
final disposition of all pending disciplinary charges against the attorney.
Basically, Coughlin was prejudiced by Bar Counsel's end run around the requirements in SCR
102(4)(a), where the 8/23/12 SCR 105 Complaint avoided the requirements of SCR 102(4)(a) in that
it was not on a petition of the disciplinary board and signed by its chair, but rather was upon a Com-
plaint by Bar Counsel, and it was not supported by an affidavit alleging facts personally known to
the affiant, which shows that an attorney appears to be posing a substantial threat of serious harm
to the public... That is important. Rather, King's 8/23/12 Complaint contains a multitude of
unsworn, often unattributed hearsay lacking in foundation.
(X) THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT IN THE MERLISS EVICTION ACTION, COUGHLIN'S CONDUCT
WAS SO VEXATIOUS AND FRIVOLOUS AS TO RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL SANCTION OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES. SUPRA 21 SEE HEARING EXHIBIT 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L4 -11. ACTUALLY, THAT IS COM-
PLETELY UNTRUE. BEYOND THE FACT THAT JUDGE FLANAGAN'S 6/25/12 ORDER AWARDING THE AT-
TORNEY'S FEES SOUGHT BY HILL AND BAKER IN THEIR POST-JUDGMENT ATTORNEY FEE MOTION OF
4/19/09 SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT COUGHLIN FAILED TO FILE AN OPPOSITION (TO WHICH COUGHLIN
HAS SHOW GOOD CAUSE EXPLAINING, AND WHERE COUGHLIN FILED A PREEMPTIVE OPPOSITION ON
1/19/12 IN 03628), AND THEREFORE, UNDER DCR 13(3), JUDGE FLANAGAN WAS FORCED TO TAKE SUCH
A LACK OF AN OPPOSITION BEING FILED AS A BASIS FOR GRANTING THE ATTORNEY FEE MOTION, PAR-
TICULARLY IN LIGHT OF PAST RULING BY JUDGE FLANAGAN IN OTHER MATTERS WHEREIN, DESPITE THE
DISCRETIONARY LANGUAGE (MAY) IN DCR 13(3), SUCH A PRACTICE HAS BECOME JUDGE
FLANAGAN'S ESTABLISHED CUSTOM. THAT 6/25/12 ORDER, FURTHER, DID NOT CONTAIN ANY SPECIFIC
FINDING THAT COUGHLIN HAD ASSERTED NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIMS, DEFENSES, OR CONTENTIONS,
JUDGE FLANAGAN DID NOT FEEL COMPELLED TO REPORT COUGHLIN TO THE SBN, DESPITE THE IMPROT
OF NCJC CANON 2.15'S DICATE, AND A SUBSQUENT ORDER BY JUDGE FLANAGAN ON 8/28/12 IN 03628
MAKES EXPLICILTY CLEAR THAT JUDGE FLANAGAN DID NOT AWARD THE ATTORNEY'S FEES IN HIS
6/25/12 ORDER UPON ANY ALLEGED FINDING OF FRIVOLITY OR OTHER SANTIONABLE CONDUCT BY
COUGHLIN. FURTHER, THE 3/30/12 ORDER DENYING COUGHLIN'S APPEAL IS NOTICEABLY ABSENT OF
ANY SORT OF REMONSTRATIVE TONE OR LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO COUGHLIN'S CASE, BUT ACTUAL-
LY SEEMS TO SUGGEST THAT, HAD COUGHLIN HAD THE BENEFIT OF A CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT AND BEEN
ABLE TO PUT FORWARD CITATION TO SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE ARGUMENTS
SET OUT IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF, COUGHLIN'S OWN CONTENTIONS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN MERITORIOUS.
At page 2 of a 8/28/12 Order in 03628, Judge Flanagan himself attempts to relitigate or redo
(outside the 10 days under NRCP 59(a) wherein such a sua sponte alteration of one's ruling may be
permissible) his previous Orders (including the Order of 3/30/12, which he characterizes as a final
judgment...which brings up the problematic aspect of the voidness of any sanctions based attorney
fee award based upon a Baker and Hill's post-judgment motion for attorney fees sanctions of
4/19/09), where that Order reads:
Again, as was the case in Coughlin's attempt to set aside Merliss's award
of costs Coughlin's Motions here attempts to re-litigate substantive issues
this Court has already decided, or frivolous claims this Court has previous-
ly ignored. This Court has entered final judgment on the merits of Coughlin's
underlying claim and awarded attorney's fees and costs to Merliss. Thi Court
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will not revisit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothing
that would satisfy the requirements of NRCP 59 or NRCP 60.
It is not at all clear how Coughlin could be said to be attempting to re-litigate substantive is-
sues when the 6/25/12 Order itself notes that Coughlin did not file an Opposition to Hill's 4/19/12
Motion for Attorney Fees. Particularly where substantive issues would, necessarily be intimately
intertwined with any attempt to have any the legitimacy of such an outrageous $42,050 attorney fee
award for just the appeal (ie, not tedious trial court fact finding sorts of attorney work involved, but
the mere filing of a legal brief speaking to rather dry legal issues only...so, just who is attempting to
re-ligitate(or re-adjudicate, rather) things here?
Would that not be Hill and Baker seeking to relitigate their humiliating defeat in the trial
court in 1708 where, at first, Baker sought a ridiculous $18,060 in attorney fees for representing the
landlord in a No Cause Summary eviction Proceeding (a whoopsie posture, Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
sheepishly had to adopt upon being forced to admit that there exists no basis for awarding attorney's
fees (certainly not the statute Baker cited to allow such fees where no such manufacture of con-
trolled substances exception had been alleged or broached in any way whatsoever by the landlord at
any point in this matter, though Hill did manage to cook up an particularly suspect allegation of hav-
ing found a crack pipe and bag of weed...large quantity of pills and a vial of something shortly
after Coughlin merely restated, verbatim, what RPD Officer Carter had said to Coughlin shortly after
arresting him in response to Coughlin asking him if he was on Richard G. Hill's payroll) under Ne-
vada law incident to a summary eviction proceeding (NRS 69.030, in light of JCRCP 2 (which char-
acterizes landlord tenant matters as outside the purview of those civil actions to which such fee
awards may issued).
So, to recap, Baker moved for $18,050 in attorney's fees for the summary eviction...which
Judge Sferrazza downsized to a mere $1,500, until, ultimately, Baker and Hill were forced to admit
that Coughlin was absolutely correct in asserting that there moving for any attorney's fees at all was,
itself, a fine example of a violation of RPC 3.1's Meritorious Claims requirement...and that fee award
was set aside (though, of course, Coughlin, as a practical matter, was treated to being ordered, by
Judge Flanagan, to pay a fee award, a relevant portion of which was well in excess of that amount in
consideration of the fees Hill and Baker racked up in defending against Coughlin pointing out the
RPC 3.1 violation they themselves ultimately were forced to admit in joining Coughlin in seeking to
have that $1,500 attorney fee award set aside (how fees related to such matters could reasonably be
said to relate to the appeal in 03628, is not clear, nor is how such does not present yet another RPC
3.1 violation by these two lycans (ie, not lichens as Chair Echeverria incorrectly noted, a distinc-
tion which would have been clear to him had he bothered to read any of the materials Coughlin pro-
vided in his filings and Exhibits attached thereto before plunging headlong into a particularly odious
attempt to take away one's law license under the most illegitimate of circumstances.)
Its really not at all clear just how Judge Flanagn could find an assertion that $42,050 in attor-
ney's fees were reasonably incurred in relation to the appeal of this summary eviction. Regardless,
Nevada law does not seem to hold that JCRCP 73(b) is applicable to an appeal of such an informal
summary proceeding, but rather, is only applicable to a formal eviction (ie, a plenary unlawful de-
tainer civil action, particularly given the explicit language of JCRCP Rule 2).
NEVADA JCRCP RULE 2: THREE FORMS OF ACTIONS THERE
SHALL BE THREE FORMS OF ACTION IN JUSTICE COURTS TO BE KNOWN AS
CIVIL ACTIONS, SMALL CLAIMS ACTIONS AND SUMMARYEVICTION AC-
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TIONS. RULES 3 THROUGH 87 GOVERN CIVIL ACTIONS. RULES GOVERNING SMALL
CLAIMS ACTIONS BEGIN WITH RULE 88 AND END WITH RULE 100. RULES GOVERN-
ING SUMMARY EVICTIONS COMMENCE WITH RULE 101.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS,
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS
RULE 3. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court.
It was Hill's associate Baker, whom Hill alternately alleges to have spent an inordinate
amount of time reviewing, only to then seek to allege that he wasn't there for the trial court pro-
ceedings, so he can't be held accountable for his repeated baseless, sworn assertions that Coughlin
failed to raise the matter of his being a commercial tenancy (home law office, and or mattress busi-
ness) impermissibly subject to a No Cause Summary eviction where the non-payment of rent was
neither pled nor alleged, in violation of the explicit prohibition against the utlization of such a No
Cause summary proceeding against a commercial tenant under NRS 40.253. Further, JCRCP 73 has
no application to the appeal of a summary eviction. Rather, as the Two Roads v. Venetian case and
trial court transcript therein makes clear (or at least makes ridiculous any claim that the position
Coughlin took at various points, including on 12/22/12, as Hill, asserted, in his testimony was some-
how, demonstrative of violations of various RPC's or indicative of a lack of candor or fairness to op-
posing counsel by Coughlin), the supersedeas bond
i
, particularly where the rent is under $1,000,
is statutorily set at $250, and the RJC's threes times the rent approach is not permissible.
Nor is characterizing the 10/25/11 court date as a Trial, only to assert that JCRCP 19 (requir-
ing 20 days to respond to a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in such a plenary matter) is in-
applicable to a summary eviction).
Further, it is not at all clear why Coughlin should pick up the tab for the confusion and fallout
inevitable given the then state of the law in Nevada and the consequences of Judge Sferrazza's
10/13/11 Order requiring the rent escrow deposit and Judge Clifton's response to Coughlin's
10/17/11 filing seeking a stay, continuance, and or relief therefrom:
RJC Judge Clifton's 10/17/11 Order in 1708 reads:
ORDER This matter has come before the Court upon De-
fendant's Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate
eviction Hearing Order filed on today's date. An Opposition by
Plaintiff was also filed today. These pleadings follow a Sum-
mary eviction hearing held October 13, 2011, before Judge
Sferrazza. The court's minutes indicate that Defendant's eviction
from the premises would only occur on today's date if he failed
to post the rental amount of $2,275.00 by October 17, 2011 with
the court. A trial date was then set for October 25, 2011. De-
fendant has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on loday's date.
Therefore, the instant motion is now moot and the trial date of
October 25,2011 stands. Is it therefore HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendant's Emergency Motion, Stay, Set Aside, Vacate
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eviction Hearing Order is DENIED. DATED this 17
th
day of
October, 2011.
Alongside the numerous procedural violations Coughlin has committed in filing his pa-
pers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss contends Coughlin's litigation tactics-
including Coughlin's instant attempt to set aside the attorney's fees award-have been employed
not to pursue arguments in good faith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contends Coughlin's be-
havior has been not only abusive but costly, requiring Merliss to contest each an every allegation
Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. page 2 of 8/28/12 Order in 03628.
Speaking of following rules, how about the 21 day safe harbor in NRCP 11? Hill never did
serve Coughlin a filing ready sanction motion. Coughlin, however, did serve Hill at least one such
21 day safe harbor motion. Hill and Flanagan seem to run the ol' frivolous fee sanction pick and roll
with at least an equal elan as that demonstrated by Judge L. Gardner and opposing counsel Springgate
(also, not a fan of 21 day safe harbor filing ready sanction Motions, even where invoking NRS
7.085, which itself invokes NRCP 11, which so requires service of just such a 21 day safe harbor mo-
tion...) in the Joshi Divorce Trial in 01168.
Further, neither Judge Flanagan, his then law clerk Zelalem Bogale, Esq., Hill, nor Baker
managed to ever cite to any authority supporting the apparent sua sponte (contrary to the 4/19/12 Or-
der in Carpentier by Flanagan speaking to the adjudicatory boundaries limitations placed upon courts
respecting the arguments put forward and citations in support thereto by the parties) contention that
Coughlins' alleged failure to file a timely Opposition to Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees is
a procedural violation. Further, there is not procedural rule setting page limits in the 2JDC.
Sure, there was an Order setting a page limit of 5 pages (which Baker himself exceeded), but
Couglhin did not ignore such Order. Rather, Coughlin addressed the fact that his Brief was in ex-
cess of said page limitation ordered, and argued a basis showing good cause for why is ought be per-
missible to exceed it. Certainly, no citation has ever been provided by Baker, Hill, or Judge Flanagan
to support a finding that Coughlin somehow was able to manufacture a set of circumstances requir-
ing Merliss to contest each an every allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. Cer-
tainly, a more conservative approach could have been taken by Hill or Baker, such as filing a 5
page Answering Brief addressing the main points at issue, with a request for leave to later ex-
ceed any such page limitation, which is essentially what they did anyways...so where is all this
$42,050 in attorney's fees being rung up, if not in impermissible areas no the appropriate sub-
ject matter of such an attorney fee award motion...ie, filings related to the supersedeas
bond/stay on appeal issue arguably do not come within the purview of NRS 69.050, nor do those
(and the associated court time and preparation) related to the 11/7/11 hearing on Couglin's Mo-
tion to Set Aside, etc., in 1708, or the 12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/12 Motion to Con-
test Personal Property Lien.
Certainly, Baker and Hill never presented any citation to support a contention that such
matters fall within the language of NRS 69.050. Further, with respect to all fees incurred in re-
lation to the personal property lien issue, Judge Flanagan's Order denying Coughlin's appeal of
3/30/12 makes clear that such matters (including the Order ResolvingDefendant's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien by Judge Sferrazza of 12/21/11...which was definitely not a
'consent Order' and which the transcript and record make clear Coughlin in no way consent-
ed to) were not included in the appeal in 03628. As such, the voluminous attorney fee billing
entries related thereto (impermissibly obscured somewhat by the excessive redacting of entries
in the allegedely detailed bills, where no legitimate privilege was ever asserted or proved to
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justify such obstructionist tactics...which now become of material relevance to the extent that
Baker, in his sworn testimony on 6/18/12 admitted to interactions with the WCSO Civil Divi-
sion on 10/28/11, and that Hill's law office definitely reliedupon the Reno Justice Court to
transmit the various eviction Orders to the Sheriff's Office for processing. The specter of both
the 10/25/11 and 10/27/11 eviction Orders here being void or stale where violative of the statu-
tory dictate that such an Order included language (and neither Order herein did) ordering the
Sheriff to remove from the premises within 24 hours or receipt (apparently the Sheriff's
receipt of such Order...though several counties in Nevada apparently view the relevant language in
NRS 40.253 as applying to the tenant's receipt, and, accordingly, have policies which require the
Sheriff or constable to post to a tenant's door such an Order, then allow at least 24 hours to pass
before conducting any such lockout.
One thing that certainly is interesting is that the eviction Order the WCSO posted to the
door of Coughlin's former home law office on 11/1/11 lacked any fax header (in contrast to all
other such eviction orders Coughlin had seen posted and Baker's testimony on 6/18/12 that the
RJCwas responsible for transmitting such an eviction Order, though its not clear that Baker
did not first fax the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE that the RJC faxed to him (as shown in the attach-
ments to Hill's TPO application of 1/12/12 against Coughlin) at 4:41pm to the WCSO along
with the Order of 10/27/11 granting Baker's unnoticed Emergency Motion to Inspect Cough-
lin's former home law office during the weekend during which, apparently, Coughlin was ex-
pected to recover for a grueling six weeks of litigating, and hire movers and rent trucks to move
both a home and a law office, even where the RJCwas still retaining the $2,275 in rent es-
crow that it demanded from Coughlin in the 10/13/11 Order in violation of Nevada law? Post-
ed with the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE on 11/1/11 by WCSO Deputy Machen was just that 10/27/11
Order allowing such an inspection, though that Order, curiously, did have two fax headers atop
it (one indicating the RJC faxed Hill's law office that inspection Order at 4:39 pm on
10/27/11), and a second header indicating the WCSO Civil Division received a fax nearly im-
mediately thereafter from Hill's office that transmitted the inspection Order (with RJCfax
header freshly printed thereon) to the WCSO Civil Division....What it not clear is why the RJC,
WCDA, WCSO Civil Division, Hill, and Baker are so reticient, and, some might say obstruction-
ist about responding to Coughlin's various requests (including NRS 239 Open Records Requests)
seeking documentation related to and copies of the fax logs of the RJC for the relevant time period
involved here, especially considering Baker's sworn testimony at the criminal trespass trial of Cough-
lin on 6/18/12 relative to just how such eviction Orders were received by the WCSO Civil Divi-
sion, and just what means of transmitting those Orders was utilized.
The law is unclear in Nevada and this is a matter of legitimate public concern involving both
the safety of law enforcement and tenants, but also the enormous social costs of ill advisedly carried
out summary eviction lockouts that are bound to resultin consequential damages far exceeded the rel-
atively small sum of money landlord's would save by having such lockouts done even one day earlier
than current usual custom and practices (to quote Hill's statement of the state of the law therein) of
the Washoe County Sheriff's Office. The judiciary has an obligation here as well as nearly all judi-
cial campaigns in Washoe County (particulary those at the Justice Court level) openly tout the en-
dorsement of a myriad of local law enforcement organizations (though, never, any that espouse ten-
ants rights or civil rights in general). Is there a Lawyer's Protection Association to mirror the Po-
lice Protective Association that nearly all successful judicial candidates in Washoe County so openly
flaunt having the endorsement of? Does that encourage the rampant Soldal v. Cook Co., style depri-
vation of 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights that is evinced in the 15 or so wrongful summary eviction Cough-
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lin has been subjected to since the initial wrongful 8/20/11 arrest and seven day incarceration occur-
ring while an eviction notice was placed on his former home law office's door just two months after
his domestic partner of four years absconded with two months of his rental contributions, secretely,
failed to pay one month of her own (though she did obtain, arguably, assent from the landlord to an
arrangement whereby any joint obligation thereto of Coughlin's was absolved with respect to one to
two months Ulloa's rental shares...), where Coughlin then could not afford his anti-depressants or
ADHD medications starting on or about August 2nd, 2011 (an also where an appointment with his
pyschiatrist, Dr. Yasar, had to be cancelled due to his not being able to afford the office visit, and
where NNAHMS indicated it would never cover ADHD medications, and that Coughlin would not be
permitted to have MDD medications covered where taking such ADHD medications, upon Coughlin
confidentially inquiring as to such matters with NNAHMS).
In contrast to allegedly billing up $42,050 in addressing Coughlin's allegations (its not
clear that the misconduct of Hill and Baker and their damage self interested damage control in-
stincts are an appropriate basis for racking of billable hours to charge Merliss or to later seek
(in a procedural violation of their own, given the dictates against seeking post-judgment at-
torney fee sanctions, particularly where no attempt to comply with the 21 day safe harbor re-
quirements in NRCP 11 where ever made by Hill or Baker) an award of such attorney's fees
What is most striking is the utter lack of specifics from either Baker, Hill, or Judge
Flanagan as to just which positions taken or arguments made by Coughlin evince any sort of
frivolity or why...Further, Hill and Baker themselves clearly conducted no novel legal research
in this matter, aside from citing to Anvui and the then recent CG Wallace case, and they
demonstrate any utter paucity of insight into landlord tenant law and summary evictions in
particular, which are, as the CG Wallace case points out, truly rare species in the law, having
unto themselves and entirely unique set of considerations and procedures.
DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not: (k)nowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
The certified audio transcript Coughlin purchased from the RMC of the Trial reveals Cough-
lin openly declaring to Judge Howard, following the Court issuing Coughlin a contempt warning a
scant five minutes into the trial, just such an open refusal where Coughlin is heard addressing the
Court as follows: I am not going to be bullied out of my rights. 7:24 mark.
ii
(EE) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has a clear
and continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructionsfrom the
Court. Instructions or suggestions like those made on 3/12/09 by Judge L. Gardner are different
than obligations. Further, Coughlin's former supervisor at WLS, Elcano, admitted to having instilled
Coughlin with the teaching that when you walk into that courtroom, its not the judges courtroom, its
not opposing counsel's courtroom, its YOUR courtroom.
iii
T115:22
(FF) IN HIS ORDER OF CONTEMPT, JUDGE HOWARD FOUND THAT COUGHLIN REFUSED TO OBEY
DIRECTIVES OF THE JUDGE AND CONTINUED LINES OF QUESTIONING AFTER BEING INSTRUCTED TO RE-
FRAIN FROM DOING SO. SUPRA 4 THERE IS A MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT OF HOWARD'S ORDER IN THE
FOFCOL WHERE IT READS: THE JUDGE FOUND COUGHLIN'S CONDUCT TO BE DISORDERLY AND
WAS EITHER CONTEMPTUOUS OR BEHAVIOR INSOLENT TOWARD THE JUDGE IN THAT
COUGHLIN REFUSED:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being
advised by the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with
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statements such as "WOW" in response to court rulings; laughing during
testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
Howard's Order actually reads WHEREAS such individual committed the following act(s)
in the immediate view and presence of the Court: (blank with check mark) Disorderly, contemptu-
ous or insolent behavior toward the judge while he is holding court, or engaged in his judicial duties
at chambers,
Also, the ROA in the appeal of 22176 demonstrates no legally sufficient service of the
11/15/11 Notice of Setting Bench Trial date of November 30, 2011. Further, two non-judicial court
holidays days (Thanksgiving and Family Day) occurred between the filing of that 11/15/11 Notice
and the 11/30/11 Trial, therefore, a jurisdictional bar makes void the 11/30/11 Order.
ADDITIONALLY, THE ROAIN 2064 IS DEFICIENT WHERE COUGHLIN WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO
AND DID SUBMIT FOR FILING ON 12/12/11 HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND SERVED IT UPON THE RCA
IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE RULES, DESPITE WHATEVER SUA SPONTE, TOO EARLY, OBJEC-
TIONS JUDGE HOWARD MADE ON 12/16/11 ON THE RCA'S BEHALF, AND THE RCA'S FAILURE TO OPPOSE
SUCH MOTION SHOULD TAKEN AS AN ADMISSION UNDER POLK V. STATE THAT THE MOTION SHOULD BE
GRANTED.
Similar the the argument that a judges decision that any conduct did not rise to the level to
require reporting under Canon 3d is the fact that that there are some blanks the the form order used to
prepare the 11/30/11 JCCO that lack check marks, and what important blanks those turn out to be
given the conclusiveness that bar counsel so enjoys under SCR 111(5) now operates to defeat the
Complaints allegations respecting a violation of ANYRPC in connection with 22176, where the
JCCO reads (and this is where the rubber stamp signature :
A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the Court, or in
its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt due to the course of the trial or other judicial proceeding,
__ Refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness,
__ Disobeying a lawful writ/order/rule/process issued by the Court/judge at chambers, and
WHEREAS such conduct:
__ Demeaned the Court...
A Marshal writing refused an initialing the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court
Order does not meet the service requirements to start the running of the deadlines to file a Motion for
New Trial and or Notice of Appeal, especially where the final key three minutes of Judge Howard's
Order as rendered were made in absentia with respect to RCA Roberts, whom had left the building by
that point. The RMC's failure to mail Coughlin that JCCO (reference emails and calls between Ve-
ronica Lopez and Coughlin wherein RMC admits to not doing so) makes the Order Affirming Ruling
of RMC (attached as Exhibit 1 to Complaint) void for lack of jurisdiction as well. That's where the
Marshals getting angry with Coughlin and taking away the Order was attempting to discern prior to
considering signing the blank after I UNDERSTAND AN PROMISE TO OBEY THIS ORDER.
DEFENDANT: ____, and then rippign it away from Coughlin in an awesome display of authority
and dominance, and then failing to put said Order in Coughlin's laptop case, refusing to allow Cough-
lin to hit save on his netbook to retain his trial notes prior to the Marshal powering it down and
packing it in Coughlin's bag, and Judicial Assistant Lopez refusing to provide Coughlin another
copy of said Order, the failing to follow through on her representation that she would fax it to Cough-
lin necessarily makes the JCCO stale or Coughlin's subsequent motions victorious under Polk.
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ROA in 22176 at page 13 missing page thereafter with not a jailable offense interlinea-
tion by Judge Howard.
As for any SCR 102.5 analysis, can Coughlin meet a clear and convicing evidence standard by
merely placing check marks after each subsection on mitigation and ceasing to check all subsections
addressing aggravation? Can Coughlin say yes in response to a SBN King style regurgitation of
the language of a rule or statue followed by a generalized, circular prompt? If so, then yes and
check all blanks for mitigation and leave uncheck those for aggravation. Prior to his current tempo-
rary suspension Coughlin had been a member in good standing with both the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) (since May 2003) and State Bar of Nevada (since 3/29/05) with abso-
lutely no disciplinary history whatsoever. So...speaking of that, how does King's DowSoE not violate
8.1, 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, and, uh, oh, hang on my RPC Uzi jammed for a sec...where was I?
The FOFCOL attempts to characterize a civil summary contempt finding by Judge Howard as
clear and convincing evidence of a violation of various RPC's; however, Judge Howard assessment
that nothing Coughlin did during that Trial invoked a duty to report under judicial canons must be
viewed as creating, at the very least, a presumption (if not res judicata on the issue) that no such pro-
fessional misconduct occurred. Further, Judge Howard specifically delineated his Order, at 1:16 as
applying to Coughlin in his role as a DEFENDANT and not in any professional capacity such that
the Rules of Professional Conduct would apply to any such finding or ruling. Actually, its interest-
ing, that Order reads: NAME: ZACHERYCOUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT ______ Party;
_____ Witness; ______ Spectator.
Granted, its basically a form order with scantly filled in blanks mentioning Coughlin laugh-
ing during testimony, saying WOW following Howard refusing to grant a continuance (even
where so very many factor weighed in favor of doing so (RCA Roberts had stipulated to one in writ-
ing; Judge W. Gardner granted one that same day to the RCA due to Hill's going on vacation in
26405, Coughlin had not previously sought nor received a continuance, the first continuance was a
result of no fault of Coughlin's (and Howard admitted in the last 2 minutes of the transcript to having
been mistaken about that); Coughlin alleged Hill was withholding exculpatory materials supportive
of Coughlin's contention that Wal-Mart has previous to the 9/9/11 arrest threatened to abuse process
against Coughlin in retaliatory for his exposing and criticizing Wal-Mart's suspect practices with re-
spect to honoring its stated, written Return Policy, the RCA cited no prejudice it would endure as a
result of a continuance, all three witnesses were likely be receive compensation from their employers
for attending the trial, and all three witness stayed until the conclusion of the trial at 8:20 pm, where
they had been there prior to the start of the 1:00 pm stacked docket, so their time was obvious-
ly not being taken from them or preventing them from doing anything else of their choosing).
Relations with Opposing Counsel
(NN) RPC 3.5A states "When a lawyer knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer
representing an opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any
default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention
to proceed." (?Judge Linda Gardner's former employer Gayle Kern, Esq. in RJC Rev2012-000374,
perhaps? "It is absolutely fair, Your Honor..." to RJC Judge Jack Schroeder when he entered a de-
fault summary eviction on 3/15/12 against Coughlin despite Coughlin having filed a Tenant's Answer
of substantial length and substance and Coughlin appearing, perhaps even on time, on 3/15/12 for the
Hearing (and an unlawful interruption of essential services hearing had already taken place against
Kern's client, though only the property manager showed up to play lawyer for PTTHHOA).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the State Bar failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue as an
evidentiary matter but fmds that as a matter of default the violation may be deemed admitted. (this is
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a nonsense argument, especially where the Panel and SBN pat themselves on the back for, allegedly,
providing sufficient due process to Coughlin/fulfilling SCR 105...its one or the other...but the Panel
doesn't get to purport that Coughlin defaulte where it is also trumpeting the feats of due process it en-
abled....).
Respect for the Rights of Third Persons
(RR) RPC 4.4(a) states '"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person... "
(uh...like Hill's allegations of finding a "crack pipe and a bag of weed" or a "vial of some-
thing" and "a large quantity of pills"?). However RPC 4.4 relates to third persons, not op-
posing parties or counsel, and a court itself has never been deemed a third person in a matter
it is presiding over.
irst, while there have been no formal prior disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar, the
record establishes that Coughlin has been disciplined by way of sanctions on at least four prior occa-
sions.
Any such sanctions rendered against Coughlin are void: 10. [3.61] Postjudgment Motion for
Sanctions A judge lacks authority to grant a partys postjudgment motion for sanctions. Such a mo-
tion does not comply with the safe harbor provision of CCP 128.7(c)(1). Barnes v Department of
Corrections (1999) 74 CA4th 126, 129135, 87 CR2d 594. A sanctions motion that is served and
filed after the action has been dismissed is also untimely. Hart v Avetoom (2002) 95 CA4th 410, 413
415, 115 CR2d 511. A party must serve any motion for sanctions before the final disposition of the
claimed sanctionable conduct in order to give the opposing party an opportunity to correct the alleg-
edly offending conduct and avoid sanctions. 74 CA4th at 130, 132133, 135. For example, an order
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend does not bar a motion for CCP 128.7 sanctions unless
the order is reduced to a judgment before the sanctions motion is served and filed. Banks v Hathaway,
Perrett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman (2002) 97 CA4th 949, 954, 118 CR2d 803. If the motion is
served before the entry of judgment, and the safe harbor time expires before judgment is entered, the
motion can be filed after the judgment is entered. Day v Collingwood (2006) 144 CA4th 1116, 1124,
50 CR3d 903.
In the summary eviction appeal in 03628, a 3/30/12 Order by Judge Flanagan Denied Cough-
lin's appeal, and it was not until Hill's associate Baker, on 4/19/12 filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees,
wherein only then a request for sanctions and citation to NRS 7.085 was made, that the landlord
sought sanctions. Such a Postjudgment Motion for Sanctions may not be a basis for awarding an at-
torney fee sanctions.
Further, to the extent Sellers would prohibit Coughlin from being awarded his own attorney
fees as a self represented attorney litigant in 1708, it would be impermissible to allow the counter of
that, were it even the case that any such sanctions that might have issued were awarded against
Coughlin as his own attorney versus against Coughlin as a litigant or appellant.
California Judges Benchguide 366 [3.60] Attorneys Fees
The award of sanctions may include attorneys fees to the movant. CCP 128.7(d). However,
a self-represented attorney who responds to a filing abuse may not recover sanctions under CCP
128.7 in the form of attorneys fees. Musaelian v Adams (2009) 45 C4th 512, 516520, 87 CR3d
475 (expressly disapproves Laborde v Aronson (2001) 92 CA4th 459, 112 CR2d 119 and
Abandonato v Coldren (1995) 41 CA4th 264, 48 CR2d 429, to the extent that they are inconsistent).
As to SCR 102.5 mitigation respecting previous disciplinary record, Coughlin has none, peri-
od. Further, as set forth in exquisite detail in Coughlin's 11/19/12 filing in 61383 and a 10/31/12 fil-
ing in the instant matter (which is curiously absent from the ROA and the SBN's Alphabetical Index
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of Documents, particularly suspect given it is perhaps the singularly most damaging filing by Cough-
lin to Hill and the SBN's approach and contentions in this matter...and Coughlin had a file stamped
copy of that filing, so...). NRCP 56(j).
iv
Coughlin's case, had the Panel or Bar let him put on evidence related thereto, is actually quite
strong on an SCR 102.5 mitigation analysis:
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE AS DEFENSE OR MITIGATING FACTOR IN ATTORNEY DISCIPLI-
NARY PROCEEDING, 46 AMJUR POF 2D 563:
4. Nature of disturbanceNeuroses
[Cumulative Supplement]
LITERALLY MEANING "ABNORMAL OR DISEASED CONDITION OF THE NERVES," THE TERM
"NEUROSIS" HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN USED TO REPRESENT A GROUP OF FUNCTIONAL DIS-
ORDERS[50] HAVING IN COMMON THE PRESENCE OF, OR AN INEFFECTUAL DEFENSE
AGAINST, ANXIETY. IN CONTRAST TO PSYCHOTICS,[51] NEUROTICS MAINTAIN INSIGHT AND
ARE LESS AFFECTED IN THEIR DAY-TO-DAY LIVING.[52]
Observation:
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S LATEST DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
("DSM-III") HAS OMITTED THE FORMER MAJOR CLASS OF "NEUROSES,"[53] REPLACING IT
WITH SEVERAL CATEGORIES: AFFECTIVE, ANXIETY, SOMATOFORM, DISSOCIATIVE, AND PSY-
CHOSEXUAL DISORDERS.[54] THE RATIONALE FOR THIS SIGNIFICANT CHANGE WAS THAT NO
CONSENSUS PRESENTLY EXISTS IN THE PSYCHIATRIC FIELD AS TO HOW TO DEFINE THE TERM
"NEUROSIS," WITH SOME CLINICIANS CONFINING THE TERM TO ITS DESCRIPTIVE MEANING (AS
INDICATING A PAINFUL SYMPTOM IN SOMEONE WITH INTACT REALITY-TESTING) AND OTHERS
EMPLOYING IT TO INCLUDE ALSO THE CONCEPT OF A SPECIFIC ETIOLOGICAL PROCESS (AN UN-
CONSCIOUS CONFLICT AROUSING ANXIETY, LEADING TO THE MALADAPTIVE USE OF DEFENSE
MECHANISMS, AND RESULTING IN SYMPTOM FORMATION).[55] THE GUIDE DOES GIVE "NEU-
ROTIC DISORDERS" AS AN ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIVE TERM FOR SEVERAL OF THE AFFECTIVE
AND OTHER DISORDERS MENTIONED ABOVE; FOR INSTANCE, HYPOCHONDRIASIS, ONE OF THE
SOMATOFORM DISORDERS, IS REFERRED TO PARENTHETICALLY AS "HYPOCHONDRIACAL NEU-
ROSIS."[56]
Historically, the neuroses have been named according to their predominant symptom pat-
terns, having names such as anxiety neurosis, hysterical neurosis, phobic neurosis, obsessive-
compulsive neurosis, depressive neurosis (dysthymic reaction), and hypochondriacal neuro-
sis. For instance, the depressive neurosis has been said to be characterized by excessive and
prolonged despondency coupled with feelings of incapacity and helplessness, usually follow-
ing some real or symbolic loss, and unresolved internal conflict, or a drop in self-esteem.[57]
Several of the foregoing neuroses have been redefined by DSM-III as anxiety disorders. For
example, one of the anxiety disorders falling within the subcategory of anxiety states (or anx-
iety neuroses) is the obsessive-compulsive disorder (referred to parenthetically as the obses-
sive-compulsive neurosis).[58] According to the manual, this disorder's essential features are
enduring obsessions or compulsions. Obsessions are defined as recurrent and persistent ideas,
thoughts, images, or impulses which are ego-dystonic (experienced not as voluntarily pro-
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duced, but rather as senseless or repugnant invasions of consciousness); compulsions are de-
fined as repetitive and ostensibly purposeful behavior which is performed according to vari-
ous rules or in stereotyped fashion.[59] The compulsive behavior is said not to be an end in
itself, but is designed to produce or to prevent some future event or situation; however, either
the behavior is not tied in a realistic way to what it is designed to bring about or prevent, or it
may be clearly excessive. Depression and anxiety are common with the obsessive-compulsive
disorder; often there is phobic avoidance of situations which involve the subject of the obses-
sions, such as dirt or contamination. Although the obsessive-compulsive disorder ordinarily
begins in adolescence or early adulthood, it may begin in childhood; its course is typically
chronic, with waxing and waning of symptoms. Impairment of the individual is generally
moderate to severe, although in some instances compulsions may become a major life activi-
ty.[60]
Diagnostically neurotic lawyers, defending charges or proffering mitigating factors at disci-
plinary proceedings on the basis of the reported neuroses, have been disbarred,[61] suspended
for a fixed period of time,[62] suspended for a definite period of time and thereafter until re-
habilitated,[63] and indefinitely suspended.[64] In one case the court dismissed the discipli-
nary proceeding against an obsessive-compulsive attorney who had been convicted of failing
to file federal income tax returns on the ground that (1) counsel was subject to discipline only
if he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude or an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption; (2) the federal conviction was not predicated on and did not require
any intent to defraud since it rested on a finding of "bad purpose" inferred from his voluntary
deliberate failure to file the tax returns with knowledge that there was no reasonable justifica-
tion for his not doing so; and (3) his psychiatric problems were not considered as justifying
any acts of moral turpitude, but rather as tending to negate any fraudulent intenta state of
mind on which a finding of moral turpitude might be based.[65]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDER: ATTORNEY WHO WAS SUSPENDED FOR MAKING
FALSE STATEMENTS TO CLIENT AND FOR FAILING TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE WOULD BE REIN-
STATED SUBJECT TO A THREE YEAR PERIOD OF PROBATION WITH CERTAIN CONDITIONS, IN-
CLUDING THE CONDITIONS OF MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND ATTORNEY'S FORMAL AGREE-
MENT TO REPAY DEBT; DOCTOR DIAGNOSED ATTORNEY AS SUFFERING FROM PROFOUND MA-
JOR DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDER WITH SEVERE PHOBIA AND STATED THAT ATTORNEY
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HAD MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS, AND DOCTOR OPINED THAT ATTORNEY PRESENTED A VERY
LOW RISK FOR RECIDIVISM AND THAT HE DID NOT REPRESENT A DANGER TO THE PUBLIC. IN RE
SULLIVAN, 801 A.2D 933 (DEL. 2002); WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ATTORNEY AND CLI-
ENT K61.
Attorney's misappropriation of client funds, through six separate deposits into his law office's
operating account, which account was overdrawn during periods of commingling of operating
funds with client funds, was negligent rather than intentional, and thus, suspension rather than
disbarment was appropriate disciplinary sanction; when attorney discovered that a check to
client exceeded the balance in operating account, he promptly covered the shortage, and when
the misconduct occurred during one-year period, attorney had been undergoing psychothera-
py. West's F.S.A. Bar Rules 5-1.1(a, b), (g)(2), 5-1.2(b, c); Bar Rules 4-1.15(a, b, d), 5-1.1(a,
d), (e)(2) (2001). The Florida Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2006); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
A 2-year suspension and probationary terms were imposed on attorney convicted of making
obscene phone calls, where the referee, after considering attorney's chemical and alcohol de-
pendency, his diagnosed sexual disorder, and a previous criminal conviction for the same of-
fense, as well as attorney's enrollment in counseling and therapy programs and the absence of
previous bar discipline, recommended a 90-day suspension along with probation for an indef-
inite time, while the Bar recommended a 3-year suspension even though attorney's offense
did not relate to the practice of law. The Florida Bar v Helinger (1993, Fla) 620 So 2d 993, 18
FLW S 347.
Bipolar disorder: Attorney's disability for practice of law, occasioned by his diagnosed bipo-
lar disorder, warranted acceptance of his petition for voluntary discipline, which petition
called for five-year removal from practice of law, in light of attorney's lack of prior discipli-
nary record, lack of dishonest or selfish motive, existence of personal and emotional prob-
lems, timely good faith effort to make restitution and rectify consequences of misconduct, full
and
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free disclosure to disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward proceedings, good character
and reputation, mental disability or impairment, interim rehabilitation, and remorse. State Bar Rules
and Regulations, Rule 4-104(a). In re Rand, 279 Ga. 555, 616 S.E.2d 452 (2005); West's Key Num-
ber Digest, Attorney and Client 58.
DEPRESSION: EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FINDING THAT ATTORNEY'S UNETH-
ICAL CONDUCT WAS NOT SOLELY RELATED TO ONSET OF HIS UNDIAGNOSED MAJOR DEPRES-
SION AND WAS OTHERWISE UNCHARACTERISTIC OF HIS MANNER OF PRACTICE, YET, GROWING
STATE OF ATTORNEY'S DEPRESSION PLAYED SOME ROLE IN ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT IN VAR-
YING DEGREES, SO AS TO BE CONSIDERED AS A MITIGATING FACTOR IN THE IMPOSITION OF
DISCIPLINE; ATTORNEY TESTIFIED HE WOULD GO TO WORK AND BE UNABLE TO MEANINGFUL-
LY PERFORM ANY TASKS FOR WEEKS AT A TIME, AND WAS UNABLE TO EVEN GO TO WORK AT
TIMES, WHICH EXPLAINED HIS NEGLECT OF CLIENT MATTERS, ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE DID NOT
SIMILARLY EXPLAIN THE SAME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEPRESSION AND ATTORNEY'S
MISREPRESENTATIONS, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THE TWO CIRCUMSTANCES WERE CO-
EXISTENT. I.C.A. RULE 32.DR 1-102(A)(4-6), DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 7-101(A). IOWA SUPREME
COURT BD. OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CONDUCT V. GROTEWOLD, 642 N.W.2D 288
(IOWA 2002); WEST'S KEY NUMBER DIGEST, ATTORNEY AND CLIENT K53(2).
Six-month suspension from the practice of law, with attorney's reinstatement conditioned on
demonstrating that he was fit to resume practice of law, was the appropriate sanction for at-
torney's misconduct in failing to complete his representation of estate, as attorney's depres-
sion continued to impact attorney and his ability to practice law, attorney's misconduct caused
actual serious injury to estate of $37,659.56, and attorney failed to diligently represent estate
for an 11-year period. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a),
3.2. In re Foster, 258 P.3d 375 (Kan. 2011).
Significant depression, personality disorder, and mood disorder did not render attorney
utterly unable to conform his conduct in accordance with the law and the rules of professional
conduct so as to mitigate punishment for his intentional dishonesty and misappropriation of
client funds, where attorney maintained a successful law practice during the relevant period
of time, and he worked 70 to 80 hours per week. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v.
Zakroff, 387 Md. 603, 876 A.2d 664 (2005); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client
58.
When an attorney raises psychological disability as a mitigating factor contributing to mis-
conduct, the attorney must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has a severe
psychological problem, that the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct, that
he or she is undergoing treatment and is making progress to recover, that the recovery has ar-
rested the misconduct, and that the misconduct is not apt to recur. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Otis, 1998 WL 469820 (Minn. 1998).
Bipolar disorder: Attorney showed that recovery from his bipolar disorder arrested his mis-
conduct of misappropriating client funds and that a recurrence of his misconduct was unlike-
ly, as required for attorney's bipolar disorder to constitute mitigating factor in attorney disci-
plinary proceeding; physician stated that attorney was compliant with his medication and that
if he continued taking it, a recurrence was unlikely, and physician stated that he would con-
tinue to monitor attorney, and attorney agreed in his brief to continued monitoring of his con-
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dition for a five-year probationary period. In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. 2008); West's Key
Number Digest, Attorney and Client k59.5(5).
Mental disability can be considered in mitigation of discipline only if attorney's recovery
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from his condition can be demonstrated by "a meaningful and sustained period of successful re-
habilitation." Accordingly, attorney's "chronic depression" could not be considered as mitigating fac-
tor in imposing discipline on attorney for failure to act diligently on behalf of his clients and his fail-
ure to communicate with them, where attorney admitted he still suffered from his mental disability,
chronic depression, and that his counselor had concluded that practicing law aggravated his depres-
sion. In re Smith (1993) 115 NM 769, 858 P2d 857.
ATTORNEY CONVICTED OF PETIT LARCENY WAS SUFFICIENTLY IMPAIRED TO CAUSE HER
ABERRATIONAL CONDUCT, AND SINCE SHE SOUGHT AND OBTAINED APPROPRIATE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL HELP FOR HER PROBLEM, CENSURE FOR MISCONDUCT WAS PROPER. IN RE MONGIOI
(1995, 2D DEPT) 213 APP DIV 2D 107, 631 NYS2D 77.
Public censure was proper discipline for attorney who neglected several estate matters and
had prior admonitions, but who had psychological condition during relevant period, sought
treatment, and tried to hire additional personnel to avoid placing her in jeopardy of repeating
conduct which precipitated disciplinary proceeding. In re Erda (1995, 1st Dept) 209 App Div
2d 147, 625 NYS2d 165.
Highly compensated partner in major law firm who overcharged clients to pay for luxury pur-
chases would be disbarred, despite repayment of converted funds, since repayment was made
only after misconduct was disclosed and he failed to establish causal connection between al-
leged psychological problems he was undergoing and conversions. Re Gieger (1991, 1st
Dept) 170 App Div 2d 134, 572 NYS2d 11, app den 79 NY2d 755, 581 NYS2d 665, 590
NE2d 250.
Attorney's health conditions would not be considered as a mitigating factor in disciplinary
proceeding, since attorney failed to demonstrate that his traumatic head injury, chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disease, diabetes, and anxiety was linked to his conduct in neglecting cli-
ent matters, failing to maintain a record documenting his receipt of a client's fee, failing to
promptly comply with a reasonable client requests for information, failing to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of the client's legal matter. Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn.
v. Kaplan, 124 Ohio St. 3d 278, 2010-Ohio-167, 921 N.E.2d 645 (2010).
While Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court may
properly consider attorney's mental illness at the time of alleged misconduct as a mitigating
factor in determining what sanction should be imposed, the mental illness provisions for
summary suspension are not intended to be used by attorney in a disciplinary action to avoid
suspension for violations. Government of the Bar Rule V, 7. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v.
Komarek, 84 Ohio St. 3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62 (1998).
Where an attorney had failed to disclose on her bar application her shoplifting incidents and
psychological counseling for bulimia, mild anxiety, and depression, the attorney was sus-
pended for an indefinite period of practice of law; this suspension is to terminate upon a
showing of her compliance with a thorough psychological evaluation and, if necessary, treat-
ment, followed by further review by the board of her character, fitness, and moral qualifica-
tions for admission to the practice of law. In re Salisbury, 69 Ohio St 3d 403, 632 NE2d
1288.
Mitigating factor to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who failed to make nu-
merous filings and made false filings while representing bankruptcy clients, failed to communicate
with clients, failed to determine effect of bankruptcy filings on clients' property transfers, and failed
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to cooperate with disciplinary investigation, was that attorney suffered from depression during the
relevant time periods, but subsequently obtained treatment for that
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CONDITION. IN RE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MERRIAM, 2010 WI 21, 780
N.W.2D 150 (WIS. 2010).
Emotional stress: Attorney's eventually admitting to using client's $3000 cashier's check
to purchase a television for her family and claim that her failure to have made admission
timely was result of emotional stress were insufficient to render improper conclusion that she
engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the matter, given attorney's mis-
representations to client's successor attorney regarding funds and accounting methods used to
explain how check was used. Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 20:8.4(c). In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gilbert, 227 Wis. 2d 444, 595 N.W.2d 715 (1999); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k44(2).
Section 4 Footnotes: [FN50] A functional disorder is a disturbance affecting function but not
structureone largely originating in the mind or the emotions. In contrast, an organic mental disor-
der is a transient or permanent dysfunction of the brain caused by a disturbance of the physiologic
functioning of brain tissue at any level of organizationstructural, hormonal, biochemical, or electri-
cal. Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Lawyer's Manual for Case Preparation
and Trial (2d ed.) 621, 628 [hereafter referred to as Blinder, Psychiatry in Practice of Law].
[FN51] See 5. [FN52] White & Watt, Abnormal Personality 751. [FN53] American Psychiatric As-
sociation, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 9 (3d ed 1980) [hereafter referred to
as DSM-III]. [FN54] Id., p 10. [FN55] Id., p 9.
NOTE: TO AVOID THIS AMBIGUITY, THE ASSOCIATION HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE
TERM "NEUROTIC DISORDER" BE USED ONLY DESCRIPTIVELY, WHEREAS THE TERM "NEUROTIC
PROCESS" SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHENEVER THE CLINICIAN DESIRES TO DESIGNATE THE
CONCEPT OF A SPECIFIC ETIOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVING THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE: UN-
CONSCIOUS CONFLICTS BETWEEN OPPOSING WISHES OR BETWEEN WISHES AND PROHIBITIONS,
WHICH CAUSES UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION OF ANTICIPATED DANGER OF DYSPHORIA, WHICH
LEADS IN TURN TO USE OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS THAT RESULT IN EITHER SYMPTOMS, PER-
SONALITY DISTURBANCE, OR BOTH. ID.
[FN56] Id., pp 18, 249. [FN57] Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Lawyer's
Manual for Case Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 2.1. [FN58] DSM-III, 18, 234. [FN59] Id., p 234.
[FN60] Id. [FN61] Re Freiburghouse (1959) 52 Cal 2d 514, 342 P2d 1 (compulsive-obsessive neuro-
sis); Re Burka (1980, Dist Col App) 423 A2d 181 (anxiety neurosis with associated depression); At-
torney Grievance Com. v Burka (1981) 292 Md 221, 438 A2d 514 (identical diagnosis). 26 A.L.R.
4th 995 6[a]. [FN62] Re Satta (1979, 1st Dept) 71 App Div 2d 292, 422 NYS2d 418. 26 A.L.R. 4th
995 6[b]. [FN63] Louisiana State Bar Asso. v Stevenson (1978, La) 356 So 2d 408. 26 A.L.R. 4th
995 6[b]. [FN64] Re Cohen (1983, 1st Dept) 92 App Div 2d 139, 459 NYS2d 434 (indefinitely
suspending attorney who, diagnosed as having "adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features,"
was suffering from anxiety, paranoia, depression, and fantasies); State v Ledvina (1976) 71 Wis 2d
195, 237 NW2d 683. 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 6[b]. [FN65] Re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal 3d 842, 106 Cal Rptr
313, 505 P2d 1369, 63 ALR3d 465. As to the propriety of disciplining counsel for tax-related mis-
conduct, see A.L.R. Library Federal income tax conviction as involving moral turpitude warranting
disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3d 476; Federal income tax conviction as constituting
nonprofessional misconduct warranting disciplinary action against attorney, 63 A.L.R. 3D 512.
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6. NATURE OF DISTURBANCEOTHER DISORDERS[77]
Like their alcoholic, drug-dependent, neurotic, and psychotic counterparts,[78] attorneys
with other mental and emotional maladies have claimed, with different degrees of success,
that their disturbance should qualify as a defense to charges of unethical conduct or as a fac-
tor mitigating the extent of discipline to be imposed.[79] These other types of disturbances
will be discussed in the following order: amnesia, epilepsy, the so-called "burned out" syn-
drome, and generic disorders.
[FN77] For consideration of character or personality disorders, such as Type "A" personality
and narcissistic personality, see Blinder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law: A Law-
yer's Manual for Case Preparation and Trial (2d ed.) 2.1[d]; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 19, 305 (3d ed 1980); T. Millon,
Disorders of Personality, DSM-III: Axis II (1981). [FN78] See 2 5, supra. [FN79] See, for
example, Re Fitz Gibbons (1931) 182 Minn 373, 234 NW 637 (disbarring epileptic attorney); Re
Fallick (1936) 247 App Div 176, 286 NYS 581 (suspending amnesiac lawyer); Re Conduct of Loew
(1982) 292 Or 806, 642 P2d 1171, 26 ALR4th 987 (suspending counsel with "burn out syndrome");
Re Crist (1971) 258 Or 88, 481 P2d 74, (probating psychiatrically troubled deputy district attorney);
Re Rosenblatt (1972) 60 NJ 505, 291 A2d 369 (reprimanding attorney allegedly suffering from psy-
chological block). A.L.R. Library: Mental or emotional disturbance as defense to or mitigation of
charges against attorney in disciplinary proceeding, 26 A.L.R. 4th 995 10.
[FN80] DISSOCIATION IS THE TERM COMMONLY USED TO DEFINE THE PHENOMENON BY WHICH A GROUP
OF MENTAL PROCESSES SPLITS OFF FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, OR BY WHICH BEHAV-
IOR LOSES ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE REST OF THE PERSONALITY. DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS ARE DIS-
TURBANCES IN WHICH THE NORMAL INTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY, OR IDENTITY IS AB-
RUPTLY AND TEMPORARILY ALTERED. G. DAVISON &J. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EXPER-
IMENTAL CLINICAL APPROACH 771 (3D ED 1982) [HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS DAVISON &NEALE,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY]. [FN81] AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATIS-
TICAL
ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER: ATTORNEY WHO NEGLIGENTLY COMMINGLED CLIENT
AND PERSONAL FUNDS WOULD BE PUBLICLY CENSURED, WHERE ATTORNEY HAD NOT ACTED
WITH DISHONEST MOTIVE, CLIENTS HAD NOT SUFFERED ACTUAL HARM, AND PHYSICIAN TESTI-
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FIED THAT ATTORNEY'S ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER, WHICH WAS CURRENTLY BEING SUC-
CESSFULLY TREATED WITH MEDICATION, WAS MAJOR CAUSE OF MISHANDLING OF FUNDS.
PEOPLE V SHIDLER (1995, COLO) 901 P2D 477.
Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder: A psychiatrist's opinion that an attorney suf-
fered from a "Passive-Agressive Personality Disorder," and a "Dysthymic Disorder," alt-
hough indicating that the attorney may have suffered from the disorders, would not alone
constitute a defense to charges of misconduct on grounds of mental incompetence, and would
not serve to mitigate the disbarment. Although the attorney may have suffered from the dis-
orders, the psychiatrist testified that the disorders were not of such magnitude as to render
him totally incompetent to practice law, or unable to understand the nature of the disciplinary
charges against him. In addition, because the violations were numerous, diverse, and serious
(multiple violations of six rules of professional conduct), the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances. Re Rich (1989, Del Sup) 559 A2d 1251.
Domestic emotional distress: Suspension of attorney from practice of law for 30 days, fol-
lowed by 18-month period of probation, was appropriate discipline, though attorney gave
false statement to police officer in connection with incident that resulted in attorney's being
arrested for stealing automobile (charges that were later not pursued), since attorney had not
been subject of prior disciplinary action, and there was mitigating evidence showing that he
acted under emotional distress of broken marriage. Additionally, many witnesses offered their
opinion that attorney had begun significant rehabilitation. The Florida Bar v Poplack (1992,
Fla) 599 So 2d 116, 17 FLW S 565.
Domestic emotional distress: An attorney would be suspended for two years after he im-
properly signed his name and that of his client to a settlement check and withheld payment to
the client for more than three months while using the funds for his own purposes. The attor-
ney's claim that he had no recollection of the events during this three month period due to ex-
treme emotional distress brought on by his wife and children leaving him and in-laws harass-
ing him, would not mitigate the discipline where the attorney, despite the alleged distress,
was able to write numerous checks payable to himself and other payees indicating that he was
able to transact business and conduct his practice. Re Altman (1989) 128 Ill 2d 206, 131 Ill
Dec 549, 538 NE2d 1105.
Attorney's depression and financial difficulties were not mitigating factors for disciplinary
purposes, given that attorney did not comply with American Bar Association (ABA) Standard
setting forth four factors that must be shown in order for mental disability to qualify as a mit-
igating factor; attorney failed to make a showing as to any of these elements, and he had am-
ple notice and opportunity to submit evidence about his condition, but came to the disci-
plinary hearing unprepared to do so. In re Woodring, 210 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2009).
Serious emotional and physical problems: Attorney who was guilty of failing to keep one
client reasonably informed about status of matter and to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information and, with respect to another client, to respond to motion for summary
judgment and to inform client of dismissal, and to comply with client's requests for infor-
mation, would only be publicly reprimanded where there were significant mitigating circum-
stances. Attorney suffered from serious emotional and physical problems; premature child,
death of second newly born child, divorce, temporary sole custody of child; pulmonary blood
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clot, diabetes, kidney stones and corneal abrasions. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v Starnes (1993, Ky)
864 SW2d 907.
Impulse control disorder: Record did not establish that there was any significant causal
connection between attorney's impulse control disorder and his misappropriation of funds
from law firms, and thus Supreme Court would give little weight to the alleged mental disa-
bility in determining the appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct; although psychiatrist
testified attorney was not motivated by greed, the testimony of attorney's law partners uni-
formly established that it appeared attorney was living beyond his means, attorney's methods
of misappropriating funds evolved over time in order to allow him to avoid detection, sug-
gesting his actions were not purely impulsive, and attorney admitted that he knew his actions
were wrong. In re Bernstein, 966 So. 2d 537 (La. 2007); West's Key Number Digest, Attor-
ney and Client k59.5(5).
Fugue or dissociative state: Attorney's long-standing financial problems, exacerbated by
gambling large sums of money over a substantial period of time, rather than a medical or psy-
chological disability, caused her to misappropriate client funds, and thus no mitigating factors
warranted a reduction of the presumptive sanction of indefinite suspension; although attorney
claimed that she suffered from a fugue or dissociative state during the period of misappropria-
tion, attorney's methodical and systematic misuse of funds for personal purposes was incon-
sistent with any conclusion that attorney was operating under a cognitive disability. In re
Johnson, 452 Mass. 1010, 893 N.E.2d 783 (2008); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and
Client k59.5(5). DXM is a potent dissociative in the dosages Wal-Mart accused Coughlin
of consuming on 9/9/11 in connection with 60838.
Dysthymia with secondary anxiety: Disbarment was proper discipline for attorney who
misappropriated funds belonging to clients and law firm over period of time, despite fact that
he suffered from dysthymia with secondary anxiety, where record suggested that attorney's
dysthymia was not severe psychological problem and only vaguely contributed to miscon-
duct. In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Shoemaker (1994, Minn) 518 NW2d 552.
Clinical depression: Attorney who, in handling estate, converted estate's funds, filed inaccu-
rate accounting, and failed to respond to client's repeated requests to close estate would be
suspended from practice of law for 2 years, given mitigating factors of attorney's prior un-
blemished record and his suffering from clinical depression. In re Bennett (1995, 4th Dept)
214 App Div 2d 206, 632 NYS2d 737.
Attorney's alleged depression and poor overall poor physical health were not mitigating factors
to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who failed to file documents necessary
to close estates in multiple probate cases, failed to file accounting in guardianship matter, and
failed to submit settlement entry for approval in bankruptcy adversary proceeding; attorney's
medical records showed sporadic visits for assorted ailments and general malaise over the
years, but did not substantiate an ongoing chronic condition, and Ohio Lawyers Assistance
Program (OLAP) counselor stated that while attorney suffered from depression and anxie-
ty, she did not render an opinion as to whether attorney's depression and anxiety actually con-
tributed to his neglect of the legal matters entrusted to him over the time period in question.
Erie-Huron Grievance Commt. v. Stoll, 2010-Ohio-5985, 939 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 2010).
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Mitigating factors to be considered in determining sanction for attorney who misappropri-
ated over $7,000 from his employer law firm, resulting in theft conviction, were attor-
ney's lack of a prior disciplinary record, payment of restitution, cooperative attitude toward
the disciplinary proceedings, imposition of other penalties or sanctions, good character and
reputation, diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed conduct and emotion, cessation
of criminal activity before he was caught, and expression of sincere remorse at disciplinary
hearing. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010-Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 2010).
Conditionally stayed two-year suspension from practice was appropriate sanction for attorney
who failed to do any work on case and to return unearned fee to client, failed to return money
to another client when directed to do so by bar association after arbitration of fee dispute, and
failed to respond to a certified letter of inquiry from bar association concerning issues raised
during arbitration proceeding; factors in mitigation included that attorney practiced law for 35
years without disciplinary incident and had distinguished career that included ten years in
state Attorney General's office, was diagnosed with major depression for which he was re-
ceiving treatment, and had shown much remorse for his misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v.
McShane, 121 Ohio St. 3d 169, 2009-Ohio-746, 902 N.E.2d 980 (2009).
Major depressive disorder: Two-year suspension, with one year stayed on conditions that
attorney continue his psychiatric treatment for major depressive order and that attorney suc-
cessfully complete two years of conditional probation if he attains reinstatement, was appro-
priate disciplinary sanction for attorney's misconduct, which included neglect of multiple
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clients' legal matters, where attorney, despite taking a series of antidepressant medications
including a prescription regulated for its addictive qualities, persisted in drinking beer, wine,
and perhaps even more potent alcoholic beverages that also acted as depressants, and attorney
appeared largely unconcerned about the perils his drug and alcohol use potentially posed to
effective representation of clients. Code of Prof.Resp., DR 6-101(A)(3). Disciplinary Counsel
v. Shaw, 110 Ohio St. 3d 122, 2006-Ohio-3821, 851 N.E.2d 487 (2006); West's Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client k59.13(3).
Depression: Attorney's mishandling of his personal injury client's funds warranted sus-
pension from the practice of law for one year with entire year stayed, conditioned upon his
continued treatment for depression due to his father's death by a psychologist/psychiatrist for
duration of suspension, where misconduct was an isolated incident in his nineteen years of
practice and attorney settled accounts of client's medical bills, showed remorse, and cooperat-
ed fully with investigation. New York DR 9-102(A), (B)(3, 4). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer,
89 Ohio St. 3d 321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client
58.
DEPRESSION: AN ATTORNEY'S ALLEGED SEVERE STATE OF DEPRESSION AT THE TIME OF
HIS MISCONDUCT WOULD NOT SERVE AS A SHIELD FROM AMENABILITY TO DISCIPLINARY
SANCTION, NOR WOULD IT SERVE TO MITIGATE AGAINST HIS DISBARMENT. A CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGIST FOUND THAT THE ATTORNEY SUFFERED THIS DEPRESSION AND SUBSEQUENT LACK
OF RECOLLECTION AS A RESULT OF JOB-RELATED STRESS FROM ASSUMING AN EXCESSIVE RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR WORK. THE ATTORNEY'S WORKAHOLIC BEHAVIOR WAS ALLEGEDLY DUE TO
A PERSONALITY TYPE THAT WAS VERY CONSCIENTIOUS AND SENSITIVE TO GUILT LEADING TO
AN INABILITY TO REFUSE ADDED RESPONSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH THE COURT CONSIDERED THE
ATTORNEY'S EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL STATE OF MIND AS A MITIGATING FACTOR, DISBAR-
MENT WOULD STILL BE IMPOSED GIVEN THE ATTORNEY'S FIVE-YEAR PATTERN OF HIGHLY DE-
CEPTIVE PRACTICES THAT CAUSED SERIOUS FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES TO HIS CLIENTS AND
OTHERS. THE ATTORNEY HAD FORGED ADVERSE PARTIES' APPEARANCES, FRAUDULENTLY OB-
TAINED THE SIGNATURES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, NEGLECTED CLIENTS' LEGAL MATTERS, AND
HAD MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF CASES. STATE EX REL.
OKLAHOMA BAR ASSN. V COLSTON (1989, OKLA) 777 P2D 920.
Emotional response to two family deaths: Attorney who inexplicably began to overlook
scheduled appearances and to fail to communicate with clients after 30 years' unblemished
service would be suspended from practice of law for 2 years, despite attorney's claim that
misconduct occurred due to his emotional response to deaths of two family members. In re
Discipline of Wehde (1994, SD) 517 NW2d 132.
ADD: Psychiatrist's prescription of psychostimulant to attorney for attention deficit disorder
(ADD) was not a cause-in-fact or a foreseeable cause of attorney's impulsive and manic be-
havior that led to misappropriation of client funds while on gambling spree, though attorney's
expert-psychiatrists testified that attorney should not have been prescribed the
psychostimulant because of his history of abuse of addictive drugs and psychiatrist acknowl-
edged that the use of prescribed psychostimulant would result in destructive consequences if
attorney was using amphetamines and other drugs, where attorney had scored high on ADD
diagnostic test, attorney did not disclose to psychiatrist his current abuse of amphetamines
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and other drugs and instead told psychiatrist that he had eight years of sobriety with one re-
lapse, and psychiatrist believed that the prescribed psychostimulant was the only
psychostimulant that attorney was taking. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code
74.001(a)(13). Price v. Divita, 224 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2006), reh'g
overruled, (Sept. 26, 2006) and review denied, (Jan. 12, 2007); West's Key Number Digest,
Health k823(13).
Attention deficit disorder: Attorney failed to show a direct causation between attention def-
icit disorder (ADD) and his misuse of client funds, as was required before the mental disabil-
ity could be considered as a mitigating factor in imposing disciple; attorney's ADD did not
explain his loaning client funds to other clients without permission, lying to clients, attorneys,
and a judge about client funds, or using client funds to make loans and payments for his per-
sonal benefit. ABA Code of Prof. Resp., DR 1-102(A)(3). In re Hunter, 769 A.2d 1286 (Vt.
2000); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
Depression and anxiety: Medical evidence presented by attorney in disciplinary matter
concerning her depression, anxiety, and unresolved medical condition did not demonstrate
that attorney's medical condition caused her to commit misconduct, and thus imposition of
lesser penalty for misconduct was not warranted, where psychologist never offered clear
opinion of causality with respect to majority of misconduct issues, and attorney had been able
to maintain and represent other clients during period when she was purportedly suffering
from anxiety and depression. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Karlsson, 2001 WI 126,
635 N.W.2d 771 (Wis. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client k53(2).
For the Reno City Attorney Office Prosecutor, Bar Counsel, and various WCDA DDAs: Discipli-
nary action against attorney for misconduct related to performance of official duties as prosecuting
attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605.
EVIDENCE OF PANEL'S EVIDENT PARTIALITY:
Bar Counsel was permitted to seek to have FHE 3 (4/13/09 L. Gardner OAT) admitted after
he had concluded his examination of Elcano. However, Coughlin was refused the opportunity to ask
one more question of Judge Nash Holmes or Elcano upon the Panel indicating his time was up or
Coughlin making an indication similar to King's where, with Elcano, King pass(ed) the witness.
... MR. KING: I very much appreciate your testimony and candor. I'll pass the witness.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Mr. King. Mr. Coughlin, it's now 11:31. You have 15
minutes. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Thank you. MR. KING: I apologize. I meant to have this
admitted. Did I lay a proper foundation? I would move for Exhibit 3 to be admitted. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Any objection now, sir? MR. COUGHLIN: I didn't hear the foundation. I'm sorry.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The foundation was Mr. Elcano attended the hearing, reviewed this order, and
determined it to be -- This is a true and correct copy of the order that you looked at following the
hearing? Page 113 THE WITNESS: Yes. The one that was transmitted to us by the judge....Page 114
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focused on whether or not this is a true and correct copy of the order issued
by Judge Gardner. And have you determined this to be the true and correct copy? THE WITNESS:
Yes. It's the order I relied on. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It will be admitted. (Exhibit 3 admitted.)MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 125:19 to 127:6)
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Q Did you have a communication with me incident to some of these complaints or a com-
plaint, I don't know if it was the Tahoe one or CAAW one or if it was Rhonda or something,
in about January-February 2009, wherein you said, you know what? I asked Master Ed-
mondson about you, and I asked Judge Gardner -- might have been it was Judge Gardner by
that point -- and they both gave you thumbs up, or something similar to that? A No. I don't think
you're characterizing what I said correctly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your time has expired, Mr.
Coughlin. Do you want to ask one more question? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. I would like him to
clarify as to where I'm amiss there. What it is that he might have said. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Go ahead, if you can, Mr. Elcano. THE WITNESS: Periodically I ask judges how our employees
are doing, and especially if there's a complaint. And somewhere early on or to the middle of Mr.
Coughlin's employment I asked one or two judges if he was doing okay, and they said he was
doing okay. So as a result, I did not pursue the complaint of the two shelter organizations. So I
stood by my employee at that time MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further, Mr. King? MR.
COUGHLIN: Was one of those judges, Judge Gardner? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin,
your time has expired. MR. KING: I don't know if the panel has any questions, but I don't. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Any questions from the panel members? May Mr. Elcano be excused? MR.
KING: Thank you for your time today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Call your next witness. MR. KING:
I'm going to see if I can get Judge Holmes on the phone.
Coughlin was afforeded not opportunity to call Judge Beesley as a witness in his case in chief,
despite his express desire to do so, given, as bar counsel indicated, Judge Beesley was only available
between 9:00-9:30 am and the Panel's avowed, expressed indication that the formal hearing would
conclude by 5:30 pm that day, regardless of whether Coughlin was done with his case in chief or still
had relevant, material, admissible evidence he sought to put on.
HEARING- VOL. I, (PAGES 299:3 TO 301:8) MR. KING: MR. COUGHLIN -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: GO AHEAD, ANSWER THE QUESTION. WE'RE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. MR. KING: --
EXPLAIN WHY HE DIDN'T AVAIL HIMSELF OF RULE 117. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED HIM UP THE YING-
YANG TO GET TREATMENT, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THAT RULE -- MR. COUGHLIN: I DON'T TRUST
PAT KING AT ALL. MR. KING: WOULD YOU MIND IF I ASKED A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: PARDON ME? MR. KING: MAY I ASK A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: IN A MINUTE. HAVE YOUFINISHED YOUR QUESTIONS? MS. PEARL: YES. AND I
THANK YOUFOR THE ANSWERS. MR. COUGHLIN: THANK YOU. I APPRECIATE IT. MR. KING: MR.
COUGHLIN, DID I ON MANY OCCASIONS, INCLUDING WITH DAVID CLARK, ENCOURAGE YOU TO READ
AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RULE 117? MR. COUGHLIN: PAT, I JUST DON'T TRUST YOUAT ALL. MR.
KING: THE QUESTION IS DID WE ENCOURAGE YOUTO? MR. COUGHLIN: IF YOU DID, PAT, IT CAME
AS NOTHING MORE THAN, HEY, MAKE MY JOB EASY. SIGN ON THIS DEAL. OH, IT PAUSES EVERYTHING, IT
PAUSES EVERYTHING. IT WILL ALL COME OUT IN THE WASH WHEN YOUCOME BACK. AND, PAT, I JUST
DON'T TRUST YOU, MAN. I DON'T. MR. KING: THAT'S OKAY. BUT WAS WHAT WAS SAID, THAT IT
WOULD PAUSE EVERYTHING -- MR. COUGHLIN: NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT EITHER, PAT. YOUHAD YOUR
TIME TO PROVE THAT, AND YOUDIDN'T USE YOUR CASE FOR IT, AND NOW YOU'RE NOT GOING TO USE MY
CASE TO PROVE THAT. MR. KING: MR. COUGHLIN, I GET TO CROSS-EXAMINE YOU. DID I ASK YOUTO
GET TREATMENT -- MR. COUGHLIN: CAN I JUST FINISH MYTESTIMONYQUICKLY BEFORE --
THERE'S JUST A COUPLE THINGS. MR. ECHEVERRIA: WE'RE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. I AFFORD-
ED YOU IN EXCESS OF 20 MINUTES. I CAUTIONED YOU WHEN YOU WERE GETTING CLOSE. I TRIED TO
REDIRECT YOUR ISSUE AS TO HOW YOU FELT ABOUT THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE FOR THIS
PANEL TO DETERMINE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PUNISHMENT, IF ANY. WE FOCUSED ON THAT.
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IT'S NOW4:31, ACCORDING TO THE STATE BAR CLOCK. I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE EVERYBODYAN OP-
PORTUNITY TO GIVE US A FINAL ARGUMENT. I'M GOING TO GIVE MR. KING ANOTHER TWO
MINUTES TO FINISH QUESTIONING YOU, AND THEN WE'LL START FINAL ARGUMENT. MR. KENT:
CAN WE TAKE A REAL QUICK BREAK? MR. ECHEVERRIA: PARDON ME? I THINK WE CAN IF WE'RE
WILLING TO GO BEYOND 5:00 O'CLOCKTO WHATEVER BREAK IT IS. I'M PREPARED TO STAY HERE
UNTIL 5:30 OR SO, IS THAT OKAY? MR. VELLIS: YEAH. MR. ECHEVERRIA: DO YOU HAVE ANY
MORE QUESTIONS? MR. VELLIS: DO YOU WANT TO FINISH YOUR CROSS-EXAMINATION, OR ARE
YOU DONE? MR. KING: I'M PROBABLY DONE. MR. ECHEVERRIA: LET'S TAKE A QUICK BREAK.
LET'S COME BACK AT 20 MINUTES TO 5:00, AND WE'LL GO UNTIL 5:15 WITH FINAL ARGUMENT. (RE-
CESS TAKEN.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: BACK ON THE RECORD. THE TIME IS NOW4:40. I'D LIKE TO NOW
PROVIDE BOTH SIDES 15 MINUTES FOR FINAL ARGUMENT.
Further, Couglhin was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine himself. So, the SBN
was afforded two different 15 minutes segments in which to ask questions of Coughlin under oath (in
the SBN's calling Coughlin on direct in its case in chief, and in the SBN being afforded the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Coughlin following Coughlin's direct examination of himself upon calling
himself in his own case in chief.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 301:8) MR. KING: -- explain why he didn't avail himself of
Rule 117. We have encouraged him up the ying-yang to get treatment, taking advantage of that
rule --
What King really means there is he and the OBC continually sought to leverage seeking per-
manent disbarment of Coughlin via a SCR 105 Complaint and FH for alleged RPC violations and a
SCR 111(6) conviction both Clark and King admit are insufficient to support such a request in order
to force Couglin into agreeing to a joint SCR 117 Petition. They enlisted Coe Swobe in the
scheme, too, just like WLS's Elcano did in having Swobe call up Coughlin and his family (including
his father) on several occasions between April 2009 and the present (including a 4/27/09 email from
Elcano simply indicating: Zach, Call Coe.). Bar Counsel continually leveraged the threat of dis-
barment via a SCR 105 Complaint to force Coughlin into a joint SCR 117 Petition to achieve their
avowed and expressly stated goal of shifting the burden of proof onto Coughlin (where any rein-
statement Coughlin would later seek (after three or four years, suggested King...even though, for
Laub/SCR 123 comparision purposes, a Vegas attorney convicted in a sting operation involving his
knowingly engaging in electronic communications of a sexual nature with someone he believe to be a
15 year old girl, and then arranging to and going to meet with her, received only a 6 month suspen-
sion).
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant 855 ; 855. Attorney's fees ; West's Key Number Digest,
Landlord and Tenant 291(14), 310(1)
6. Landlord's Possessory Remedies
b. Summary Possessory Actions
(1) In General
(d) Landlord's Right to Damages
A "prevailing party" is one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judg-
ment entered.[1]
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A party who prevails on a summary-eviction claim is not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees where there is neither contractual nor statutory authority for an award.[2] In a number of
jurisdictions, statutes provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees in evic-
tions or summary-possessory actions.[5] An award of attorney's fees is also appropriate
where there has been a willful breach of contract and where a lessor is forced to take legal ac-
tion against its lessee to recover possession when the lessee improperly holds the lease over
after termination.[6]
Both the landlord and the tenant are "prevailing parties," for the purposes of a statute that
provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, where the trial court finds for
the tenant on the landlord's ejectment claim and for the landlord on the tenant's retaliation
claim.[7] Similarly, a trial court may award fees to both parties where the landlord received a
judgment for possession but the tenant prevailed in part by obtaining a reduction in the
amount of a utility bill due the landlord.[8] However, courts have denied attorney's fees
where the landlord cancels the lease and brings an action under the unlawful-detainer statutes,
notwithstanding that the lease provided for the recovery of fees.[9]
where the parties entered into a settlement agreement with the trial court's assistance.[ 10]
[FN1] Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist.
Hamilton County 2005).
[FN2] Hamilton v. William Calomiris Inv. Corp., Inc., 461 A.2d 466 (D.C. 1983); Satellite
Gateway Communications, Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co., Inc., 110 N.J. 280, 540 A.2d 1267
(1988); H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005); City of Gahanna v. Eastgate Properties, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 65, 521 N.E.2d 814
(1988).
[FN3] Tufco, Inc. v. Pacific Environmental Corp., 113 P.3d 668 (Alaska 2005); North Asso-
ciates v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1st Dist. 1986); Integra Financial,
Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing the rule);
Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd., 184 Ga. App. 822, 363 S.E.2d 31 (1987);
Shipka v. Inserra, 211 Ill. App. 3d 735, 156 Ill. Dec. 128, 570 N.E.2d 604 (1st Dist. 1991);
Borne v. Wilander, 509 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby,
109 Misc. 2d 47, 442 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Term 1981); Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App. 3d 21,
2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d 1139 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2005); Desmarais v. The
Stayers, Inc., 182 Or. App. 338, 51 P.3d 1 (2002); M H 2 Co. v. Hwang, 104 Wash. App.
680, 16 P.3d 1272 (Div. 3 2001).
[FN4] Camelback Plaza Development, L.C. v. Hard Rock Cafe Intern. (Phoenix), Inc., 200
Ariz. 206, 25 P.3d 8 (Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).
[FN5] Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1st Dist. 1990); Integra Fi-
nancial, Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Matusko v.
Gourlay, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 560 N.E.2d 724 (1990); T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M.
354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981); Haberman v. Wassberg, 131 A.D.2d 331, 516 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st
Dep't 1987); Iwenofu v. Consolidated Management, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 3d 33, 550 N.E.2d
505 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1988); Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or.
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App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004); Phillips v.
Hardwick, 29 Wash. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (Div. 1 1981).
[FN6] Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254 (2001).
[FN7] Barlow Trail Mobile Home Park v. Dunham, 189 Or. App. 513, 76 P.3d 1146 (2003).
[FN8] Chang v. Louis & Alexander, Inc., 645 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (the lease entitled the
prevailing party to recovery of any and all reasonable expenses in the event
of any breach or threatened breach.) [FN9] Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d
1102 (Utah 1977). [FN10] Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 So. 2d 916 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 2005) (court had awarded $1,800 in damages).
[FN11] Housing Authority of City of Pasco and Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126
Wash. App. 382, 109 P.3d 422 (Div. 3 2005). [FN12] Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v.
Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003)
, review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004).
[FN13] Oakleaf Mobile Home Park v. Mancilla, 189 Or. App. 458, 75 P.3d 908 (2003)
, review denied, 336 Or. 376, 84 P.3d 1080 (2004). [FN14] Shipley v. Major, 44 A.2d
540 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945) (the lease provides
for the tenant's payment of attorney's fees in the event of the tenant's default).
[FN15] Dawson v. Temanson, 107 P.3d 892 (Alaska 2005).
1681. Attorney's fees; 52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1681 An outcome not substantially fa-
vorable to either side precludes awarding attorney's fees to either side.[7]
Consideration of an attorney's fees award may be deemed inappropriate by the nature of a
summary possessory proceeding that is designed to achieve expedited results, particularly in
the face of complex factual inquiries needed to resolve the fee matter.[8] (NOTE: page 37 of
7 31 12 NRCP60(b)(4) Set Aside Motion by Coughlin)
Basis of litigation on lease is determinative
The relief awarded is not determinative of whether fees are proper, as the question turns on
whether the summary proceedings involve a breach of the lease, under the applicable statute.
N.Y.JERULEE CO. V. SANCHEZ, 43 A.D.3D 328, 841 N.Y.S.2D 242 (1ST DEP'T 2007).
[FN6] N.Y.Fragiacomo v. Pugliese, 11 Misc. 3d 96, 816 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App. Term 2006).
Requires prevailing judgment on merits
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N.Y.ACIERNO V. FALDICH, 4 MISC. 3D 98, 782 N.Y.S.2D 509 (APP. TERM 2004).
[FN7] N.Y. 339-347 E. 12th St. LLC v. Ling, 31 Misc. 3d 48, 921 N.Y.S.2d 781
(App. Term 2011). [FN8] Md.Law Offices of Taiwo Agbaje, P.C. v. JLH Properties,
II, LLC, 169 Md.
App. 355, 901 A.2d 249 (2006). [FN9] N.Y.Stakser v. Rodriquez, 23 Misc. 2d 954,
200 N.Y.S.2d 475 (App. Term
1960).
NO STATUTE FOR FEES IN SUMMARY EVICTION
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005).
[FN3] Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d Dist. 2010).
[FN4] Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d Dist. 2010).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL 3194740
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (fees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. BEACH HAVEN APARTMENTS NO. 1 INC. V. CHESEBOROUGH, 2 MISC. 3D 33, 773
N.Y.S.2D 775 (APP. TERM 2003)
No statute for fees in summary eviction
N.D.H-T Enterprises v. Antelope Creek Bison Ranch, 2005 ND 71, 694 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 2005).
[FN3] Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d Dist. 2010).
[FN4] Cal.Carter v. Cohen, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (2d Dist. 2010).
Conn. Carabetta Management Co. v. Martin, 50 Conn. L. Rptr. 801, 2010 WL 3194740
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (fees to prevailing tenant).
Win on technicality is not prevailing
N.Y. BEACH HAVEN APARTMENTS NO. 1 INC. V. CHESEBOROUGH, 2 MISC. 3D 33, 773
N.Y.S.2D 775 (APP. TERM 2003)
NRCP 15 allowed for Coughlin to file supplemental or amended Motions to Dismis, provid-
ing authority that allows for treating a Motion to Dismiss that may have waived or failed to preserve
certain defense pursuant to NRCP 12(h), assuming such is applicable under SCR 105(4), and SCR
119(3) (not that NNDB publishes any such rules or responds to inquiries for the same by Coughlin).
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COMMISSION ON LAWYER CONDUCT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING REQUEST OF OF-
FICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL (ODC) FOR A CONTINUANCE TO OBTAIN AND PRESENT EVIDENCE
TO REBUT SURPRISE EVIDENCE OF LACK OF HARM TO CLIENTS PRESENTED BY ATTORNEY AT HEAR-
ING TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED ON HIM FOR HIS MISCONDUCT IN CONNEC-
TION WITH EIGHT CRIMINAL CLIENT MATTERS, AS MITIGATING TESTIMONY REGARDING ULTIMATE OUT-
COME OF CLIENTS' CASES TOUCHED ON MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS THAN THE USUAL MITIGATION
TESTIMONY REGARDING AN ATTORNEY'S CHARACTER AND PERSONAL SITUATION, SUCH THAT IT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH REBUTTAL EVIDENCE SHOWING ACTUAL
HARM TO CLIENTS. IN RE STURKEY, 376 S.C. 286, 657 S.E.2D 465 (2008).
The SBN's 8/23/12 Complaint reads:
6. DURING THE TRIAL (IN 22176 BEFORE RMC JUDGE HOWARD) RESPONDENT'S CON-
DUCT WAS SO DISRUPTIVE THAT JUDGE HOWARD FOUND RESPONDENT IN DIRECT CONTEMPT
OF COURT AND SENTENCED HIM TO SERVE THREE (3) DAYS IN SEE EXHIBIT 2...
27. In light of the forgoing Respondent violated RPC 1.1 (Competence); RPC 1.2 (Diligence); RPC
3. 1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions): RPC 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal): RPC 3.4 (Fairness to
Opposing Party and Counsel); RPC 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal); RPC 4. 1
(Truthfulness in Statements to Others): RPC 4.4 (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons); RPC 5A
(sic) (Relations with Opposing Counsel); RPC 8.1 (Disciplinary Matters); RPC 8.2 (Judicial and
Legal Officials); and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct).
Bar Counsel King's Complaint, in alleging an unenumerated number of violations of 12 dif-
ferent RPC's (and, to whatever extent the various subsections of those RPC's is considered to evoke a
different allegation, one may arguably bring that count up 15 different RPC's considering that King's
Complaint at para. 16 therein quotes from the 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes that misstates the sub-
section number of RPC 3.4 to which the language therafter quoted is from (3.4(c) versus 3.4(e); and
further, that quote alleges a violation of RPC 3.2 (though, arguably, King's para 27 in his 8/23/12
Complaint should estop him from asserting such an allegations and the 12/14/12 FOFCOL fails to
identify RPC 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) as an allegation to which it attach its trier of fact role, there-
by supporting the position that such quoting of that 3/12/12 Order by Judge Holmes in King's Com-
plaint is not tantamount to putting Coughlin on notice that such is being plead, but rather, that Cough-
lin is entitled to rely upon those allegations specifically set forth in para. 27 of King's Complaint
(though the lack of any identifcation of which subsections of each RPC cited therein is supportive of
Coughlin's contentions within his Motion's to Dismiss, which arguably may be viewed to be tanta-
mount to a Motion for More Definite Statement); further, whereas both the quotation from Judge
Holmes Order (FHE5) at para 16 of King's Complaint and para 27 therein invoke RPC 1.2 (Dili-
gence), Coughlin was further prejudiced by being forced to prepare for and defend against allega-
tions of violating both RPC 1.2 and 1.3 (RPC 1.2 is Scope of Representation and Allocation of Au-
thority Between Client and Lawyer, and RPC 1.3 is Diligence), and King's own FHE1 contains
the entire text of RPC 1.2 and fails to contain any of RPC 1.3, whereas the FOFCOL continues on
with King and Judge Holmes mismatching RPC 1.2 by failing to identify such correctly, where the
FOFCOL reads: (2) Whether Coughlin violated RPC1.2 (Diligence).
Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written correspondence to Coughlin and the response from Panel
Chair Echeverria upon Coughlin seeking a Pre-Hearing Conference such as that expressed in SCR
111(6) (SCR 111(6). Prehearing conference. At the discretion of the chair, a prehearing con-
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ference may be ordered for the purpose of obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the
issues presented by the pleadings. The conference may be held before the chair or the chairs de-
signee.)
Subject: RE: referral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board From: Tom
Susich (tsusich@nvdetr.org) Sent: Fri 7/27/12 8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'
(zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) Cc: 'PatrickK@nvbar.org'
(PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request
to the Nevada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please com-
municate directly with the State Bar concerning your case. They are
the ones who will process your request and set up any appropriate hear-
ings. If you have questions you can contact Pat King, the Northern
Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. Thomas Susich, Esq.
Further, upon Coughlin following Bar Counsel King's direction on 11/2/12 and placing a call
to Chair Echeverria seeking such a SCR 111(6) Pre-Hearing Conference and to inquire regarding
other issues, Coughlin rebuffed by Echeverria's Office and told not to communicate with them in an
11/2/12 voicemail. So, Bar Counsel King necessarily was able to achieve an impermissible ad-
vantage by taking his kitchen sink pleading approach to the rather slapdash crafting of his 8/23/12
Complaint (the paragraph numbering therein skips from 19 to 25, para 27 mentions a non-existent
RPC (RPC 5A); and that is to say nothing of all the prejudicial, irrelevant, unsupported, material
contained in Bar Counsel's DowSoE, including mentions of the SBN's Custodian of Records where
Coughlin had no disciplinary history whatsoever, mentions of Competency Evaluations (and really,
the entire 11/14/12 FH seemed to suffer from an identity crisis, believing itself to be an SCR 117
Hearing, though such was not noticed, with RPC 1.1 being mistaken as a stand in for an SCR 117
analysis, with all of the Bar's four witnesses offering testimony that clearly confuses the two, with
little help from King in making the distinction given the imprecise questions asked, and where, in
some instances, King's own questions were phrased in a manner that clearly invoked an SCR 117
analysis to the exclusion of any RPC 1.1 inquiry. This kitchen sink pleading style prosecutorial
largesse must not stand, and itself evidences a disregard for RPC 3.1 and 3.8, 8.1. Indeed, RPC 8.1
applies to Bar Counsel's condut as well where it reads:
Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.... a lawyer in
connection with ... a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) Knowingly make a
false statement of material fact; or (b) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to
correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter...
How it is King could possibly be said to have not violated those portions RPC 8.1 himself,
particularly with regard to his asserting that FHE3 was a certified copy when it was not, his offering
the very 8/23/12 Affidavit of Mailing that he knows Clerk of Court Peters communicated to Cough-
lin would never be held out as effecting service under SCR 109 given Peters express indications to
Coughlin on 9/11/12; that Peters would mail out another certified mailing of the Complaint on
9/12/12, that no Notice of Intent to take Default would be sent until such second certified mailing of
the 8/23/12 Complaint was returned to sender unclaimed (and that such a NOITTD as a mandatory
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part of the procedures attendant to any default being entered), that Coughlin would not be required
to pay subpoena fees in light of his indigency (where Peters held herself out as having the authority
to communicate such pronouncements and procedural rules to Coughlin, and Coughlin reasonably
relied thereupon
v
); and where King failed to own up to the fact that the 10/9/12 NOITPDB was not
served on Coughlin, as King, Clerk of Court Peters, and the SBNs own negligence in placing in-
sufficient postage on that filing (and the Certificate of Service by Mail attached thereto certifies
was deposited postage fully pre-paid by certified mail, addressed to...), which was sent via only
one method (despite Coughlin's numerous requests that the SBN copy him on such by fax and or
email, and the legitimate rationale Coughlin proferred in support of such a request), especially where
King continued to hold out the . his failing to disclose to the Panel the express pronouncement of
NNDB Susich's ruling (by way of Chief Bar Counsel Clark in light of Susich's 7/27/12 email and the
various tactics by Bar Counsel/NNDB/Panel to dissuade Coughlin from accessing the procedural
protections afforded him under the law in such matters) under SCR 110, assisting Panel Chair Eche-
verria and other Panel Members in violating the law incident to Echeverria's failing to follow SCR
110(3),(4):
...3. Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena or produce
documents. Whenever any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony
or to produce books, papers, or other documents as required by subpoena, or
requested to provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), refuses to appear
or testify before a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent or proper ques-
tions, or to provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in
contempt of the disciplinary board, and the chair of the disciplinary board shall
report the fact to a district judge of the county in which the hearing is being
held or the investigation conducted. The district court shall promptly issue an
attachment in the form usual in the court, directed to the sheriff of the county,
commanding the sheriff to attach such person and bring such person forthwith
before the court. On the return of the attachment, and the production of the per-
son attached, the district court shall have jurisdiction of the matter; and the per-
son charged may purge himself or herself of the contempt in the same way, and
the same proceedings shall be had, and the same penalties may be imposed,
and the same punishment inflicted as in the case of a witness subpoenaed to
appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil cause before a district court of
the State of Nevada.
4. Contest of subpoena. A contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the chair
of the appropriate disciplinary board.
And how is it the very same arguments and citations that Chair Echeverria relied on in grant-
ing King's two 11/2/12 Motions to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas (such Order is void under NRCP
60(b)(4) for lack of jurisdiction where NNDB Chair Susich has jurisdiction under SCR 111(4) to
hear such contest of a subpoena.
Lehman v. State,727 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1987), aff'd,792
S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Crim.App.1990): A prosecutor is not free to put unfounded allegations in an in-
dictment in the hope that a plenitude of accusations will make the defendant look like a criminal.
Rule 3.09 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct require [sic] him to "refrain from
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prosecuting or threatening to prosecute a charge that [he] knows is not supported by probable
cause." See Nevada RPC 3.8.
The 12/14/12 FOFCOL reads: August 23, 2012).
4. Coughlin's conduct during the trial of the petit larceny case (22716) on November
30, 2011, in which Coughlin appeared in propria persona, was so disruptive that Judge Howard found
Coughlin in direct contempt of court and sentenced him to jail that same day to be relea
sed on December 3, 2011 at 8:00 PM. Judge Howard specifically found Coughlin's conduct to be
disorderly and was either contemptuous or behavior insolent toward the judge in that Coughlin
refused:
"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after being advised by the Court to re-
frain from doing so; demeaning the Court with statements such as "WOW" in response to court rul-
ings; laughing during testimony and further questioning the court and its authority."
See Hearing Exhibit 11 ORDER FOR SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT
COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT, November 30,
2011 (NOTE: that OSPCCIVPC was attachd as Exhibit 2 to the 8/23/12 Complaint, though that
Complaint lacks any of the language this Court relied upon from the Mirch Complaint in 49212, suf-
ficient to find that the 8/23/12 Complaint by King fulfilled the requirements of SCR 105(2)(c) as to
any alleged RPC violation by Coughlin incident to RMC Judge Howard's 11/30/12 OSPCCIVPC,
particularly where such Complaint failed to quote any specific language from that Order, while, as to
other Orders at issue in this matter (such as the 4/13/09 OAT in 01168), the 8/23/12 did, in fact, spe-
cifically quote langauge therefrom therein.
Laub allows for pointing to SBN Bar Counsel Clark's Reply Brief in 49212 at page 7:
"Respondent's first issue is that the State Bar failed to give Respondent clear notice of the conduct
which constituted a violation of SCR 170, the Complaint simply incorporating the Findings and
Order ... the Complaint is "clear and specific" in that it alleges that Respondent violated SCR 170
(Meritorious claims and contentions)"...(page 7, line 20-23): "Further, the Complaint notifies Re-
spondent that the State Bar is adopting and incorporating the factual and legal findings made
... in his Order... in that case".
Further, another salient difference distinguishing this matter even further is that, in
49212, the Respondent was accused of violating one RPC (RPC 3.1), and the Complaint therein spe-
cifically attached the rule alleged violated to the specific factual and legal findings that such Com-
plaint actually and expressly indicated it was adopting and incorporating. Additionally, that
11/30/11 OSPC here is a scant one and half pages of check the box style jurisprudence, that failed
to identify anything more that a handwritten see Court record in the blank lines the form Order
provided in for a response to the following: The Contemnor, when asked if he had anythign to say as
to why sentence should not be pronounce, replied: see Court Record. Actually, Coughlin made an
elegant, respectful, and thoughful plea to Judge Howard at such time, focusing mostly on Coughlin's
desire to obtain at least a minor stay of the imposition of such summary punishment to afford Cough-
lin a legitimate opprotunity to arrange for the avoidance of any prejudice to Coughlin's client's affairs
due to such rather unexpected summary incarceration, particularly where Judge Howard has previ-
ously justified his failure to accord Coughlin court appointed counsel, despite Coughlin's submitting a
sworn Declaration of Indigency and Application for Counsel in a timely fashion which attested that
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Coughlin's income levels were, per se, low enough to qualify for such appointed counsel, pursuant to
this Court's Indigent Defense Order of 2008.
Additionally, it is of note that the 11/30/11 OSPC identifies Coughlin as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 30
th
day of November, 2011, the above named defendant appeared before this
court. NAME: ZACHERY (sic) COUGHLIN, who is a DEFENDANT. As such, Judge Howard
specifically and expressly ruled that his OSPC applied to Coughlin as a defendant rather than in any
professional capacity invoking the RPC, or as an attorney whom had never tried a single criminal
case or even worked on one forced to self represent in a petty larceny prosecution, especially where
even a single continuance was granted to such defendant and where a multitude of ancillary consider-
ation augered strongly to granting such, including the application of an unlawful rent distraint by Hill
as to exculpatory materials (like the receipt for the $83.82 worth of groceries Coughlin purchased
immediately before Wal-Mart's Loss Prevention Associate asked Coughlin if he could ask him some
question (ie, as testified to under oath by that Associate and both RSIC Officers, there was no citi-
zen's arrest conducted upon Coughlin, and, therefore, the RSIC violated NRS 171.1255 in subjecting
Coughlin to a custodial arrest and search incident thereto in connection with an alleged misdemean-
or violation). Such receipt, as later shown in 60838, clearly established that the UPC for the Duract
Cough Melts Coughlin is accused of having ingested lethal levals of (containing Dextromethorphan,
a potent dissociative at such levels) was, in fact, included on that receipt, thereby expressly contra-
dicting the express testimony by both Wal-Mart's AP Associate and the RSIC Officers):
Further, Hill's application of such a unlawful rent distraint makes RMC Judge Howard's re-
fusal to grant a continuance reversible error (and indicative of a patent lack of due process incident
to that proceeding sufficient to invoke Claiborne, and, by analogy, SCR 114 and 37 CFR 11.25(c))
videos and audio withheld by Hill (revealing an express threat to abuse process by Wal-Mart's AP
Staff made to Coughlin on 7/10/11 incident to Coughlin's involvement in the production of a docu-
mentary film detailing the extent to which mega-retailer Wal-Mart has been able to establish a near
monopoly in its market segment, in large part, due to the application of an extremely liberal Return
Policy, which Wal-Mart's personnel and managers convieniently seem to forget or get confused
about in those instances where it would be advantageous for them to do so (ie, large ticket items,
etc.) incident to a then stale eviction order where the lockout was conducted too early in light of the
within 24 hours requirement of NRS 40.253 (which, every County in Nevada other than Washoe,
it seems, it interpreted to mean the Sheriff or Constable must post the 24 hour lock-out Order on the
tenant's door, and return to effectuate the lockout no fewer than 24 hours later., Canon 2.15, or oth-
erwise (indeed, the RMC failed to even report the petty larceny conviction or the 11/30/11 OSPC to
the SBN).
While Nevada is a notice-pleading state and pleadings should be liberally construed to allow
issues that are fairly noticed to the adverse party, a party is entitled to rely upon a demonstrated nar-
rowing of the allegations and issues in dispute where, as here, the Complaint does just that.
Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1483, 907 P.2d 981, 982 (1995); Nevada State Bank v. Jamison
Family Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 801, 801 P.2d 1377, 1383 (1990). T
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/ :TABLE OF TITLES AND CHAPTERS; NEVADA REVISED
STATUTES; TITLE 2CIVIL PRACTICE; CHAPTER 22 - CONTEMPTS
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NRS 22.030 Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate view and pres-
ence of court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate
view and presence of court; disqualification of judge.
1. IF A CONTEMPT IS COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT OR JUDGE
AT CHAMBERS, THE CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED SUMMARILY. IF THE COURT OR JUDGE SUMMARILY
PUNISHES A PERSON FOR A CONTEMPT PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION, THE COURT OR JUDGE SHALL EN-
TER AN ORDER THAT:
(A) RECITES THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE CONTEMPT IN THE IMMEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF
THE COURT OR JUDGE;
(B) FINDS THE PERSON GUILTY OF THE CONTEMPT; AND
(C) PRESCRIBES THE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CONTEMPT...
WHEREAS NRS 22.030 DECLARES THAT WHEN A CONTEMPT IS COMMITTED IN THE IM-
MEDIATE VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT OR JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, IT MAY BE PUNISHED SUMMARI-
LY, FOR WHICH AN ORDER SHALL BE MADE, RECITING THE FACTS AS OCCURRING IN SUCH IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE, ADJUDGING THAT THE PERSON PROCEEDED AGAINST IS THEREBY GUILTY OF A
CONTEMPT AND THAT HE/SHE BE PUNISHED AS THEREIN PRESCRIBED, AND WHEREAS, ON THE 30TH
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011, THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT APPEARED BEFORE THIS COURT. NAME:
ZACHERYCOUGHLIN, WHO IS A DEFENDANT
__ PARTY; WITNESS; SPECTATOR, AND
WHEREAS SUCH INDIVIDUAL COMMITTED THE FOLLOWING ACT(S) IN THE IMMEDIATE
VIEW AND PRESENCE OF THE COURT:
__ (CHECKED) ______ DISORDERLY, CONTEMPTUOUS OR INSOLENT BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE
JUDGE WHILE HE IS HOLDING COURT, OR ENGAGED IN HIS JUDICIAL DUTIES AT CHAMBERS,
___(NOTCHECKED)___ REFUSING TO BE SWORN OR ANSWER AS A WITNESS
___(NOTCHECKED)___ DISOBEYING A LAWFUL WRIT/ORDER/RULE/PROCESS ISSUED BY THE
COURT/JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, AND WHEREAS SUCH CONDUCT:
__(NOT CHECKED) __ Demeaned the Court
__ (NOTCHECKED)__ DEROGATED THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
__ (CHECKED) ______ INTERFERED WITH THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND REQUIRED
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION BY THE COURT TO PRESERVE ORDER AND RESPECT.
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__ (NOTCHECKED)__ AFINE IN THE AMOUNT OF ($500 OR LESS).
__ (CHECKED) ______ IMPRISONMENT FOR (25 DAYS OR LESS), NOALTERNATIVE SENTENC-
ING...
DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASEDON 12/3/11 AT 8 PMDATEDTHIS 30TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011
KENNETHR. HOWARD, JUDGE, RENO MUNICIPAL COURT"
__(NOT CHECKED)___ DISOBEYING A LAWFUL WRIT/ORDER/RULE/PROCESS ISSUED BY THE
COURT/JUDGE AT CHAMBERS, AND WHEREASSUCH CONDUCT:
__(this blank, noticeably and importantly, was NOT CHECKED) _ Demeaned the Court
NOW, IRONICALLY, IT IS THE SBN'S KING WHOM MUST HAVE APPLIED TO HIM THE VERY
AUTHORITY ACCEPTED BY PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA IN GRANTING KING'S 11/2/12 MOTION
TO QUASH THE SUPOENAS UPON RMC JUDGES WHERE JUDGE HOWARD MAY NOT NOW (ES-
PECIALLY DO TO PRINCIPLES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND LACHES) SEEK TO MODIFY HIS
11/30/11 OSPC BY INSERTING A CHECK IN A BLANK WHERE PREVIOUSLY THERE WAS NONE.
THE ORDER MUST STAND AS IT IS, AND, AS SUCH, THAT OPSC PROVIDES COUGHLIN CONCLUSIVE
PROOF (RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL) THAT COUGHLIN DID NOT DEROGATED THE AUTHORI-
TY OF THE COURT OR INTERFERED WITH THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND REQUIRED
IMMEDIATE VINDICATION BY THE COURT TO PRESERVE ORDER AND RESPECT SUFFICIENT FOR RMC
JUDGE HOWARD TO MAKE A FINDING OF FACT OR CONCLUSION OF LAW, MUCH LESS AND ORDER, THAT
COUGHLIN CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN ADJUDGED TO HAVE BEEN ADJUDGED TO HAVE VIOLATED NRS
22.010(2) (ALL OF NRS 22 RELATES TO CIVIL CONTEMPT STATUTES, AND THEREFORE NO ORDER RELAT-
ED THERETO COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SCR 111(5) (DESPITE BAR COUNSEL KING'S CONSTANT
ASSERTIONS AND PLEADING TO THE CONTRARY, WHICH, ITSELF, IS ARGUABLY A VIOLATION OF RPC 3.1,
3.2, 3.3, AND 3.4, 4.1 (THE RMC JUDGES AND RCA), 8.1, 8.2, AND 8.4...AND ALSO, PERHAPS, RPC 4.2
TO THE EXTENT IN RE SCHAEFER WOULD HAVE A PRO SE ATTORNEY HAVE RPC 4.2 APPLIED AGAINST
HIM WHERE SUCH PRO SE ATTORNEY CONTACTS A REPRESENTED PARTY, TURNABOUT BEING FAIRPLAY,
KING'S CONTACTING A SELF REPRESENTING COUGHLIN HERE, THEN, ARGUABLY IS TANTAMOUNT TO
KING VIOLATING RPC 4.2 WHERE KING COMMUNICATED WITH COUGHLIN IN COUGHLIN'S ROLE AS A
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CLIENT TO HIMSELF. OTHERWISE, DDAWATTS-VIAL'S INTERPRETATION OF THINGS, IN HIS 11/13/12
FAXED OBJECTIONS TO COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENA, WHEREIN HE ASSERTS THAT COUGHLIN'S ADMISSION
THAT HIS LAW LICENSE IN NEVADA IS SUSPENDED (THOUGH, IT MAY BE THAT, GIVEN COUGHLIN'S
USPTO LAW LICENSE IS NOT PRESENTLY SUSPENDED, COUGHLIN IS ENTITLED TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS TO
WHOMEVER HE CHOOSES INCIDENT THERETO) NECESSARILY MEANS THAT, UNDER NRCP 45(A)(3), THE
SUBPOENAS COUGHLIN HAD SERVED THAT WERE NOT ISSUED BY THE SBN'S CLERK OF COURT NEED
NOT BE OBEYED OR RESPONDED TO. THIS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT NRCP
45 IS EVEN APPLICABLE IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS, NOR THAT, EVEN WERE IT APPLICABLE, THE FACTS
OF THESE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AUGER FOR AN APPLICATION SUCH AS THE ONE SUGGESTED BY
WCDADDAWATTS-VIAL, PARTICULARLY GIVEN CHAIRMAN SUSICH'S 7/27/12 WRITTEN CORRE-
SPONDENCE TO COUGHLIN, AND THE IMPORT OF SUCH COMMUNICATION WHEN CONSIDERING THE EX-
PRESS DECLARATION MADE BY BAR COUNSEL KING TO COUGHLIN ON 10/15/12 THAT KING HAD CON-
FIRMED WITH CHIEF BAR COUNSEL DAVID CLARK THAT COUGHLIN, AS A RESPONDENT, EVEN WHERE
TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED, MAY, IN FACT, ISSUE HIS OWN SUBPOENAS, AND FURTHER WHERE CONSIDER-
ING THAT THE SBN/NNDB/PANEL/SBNCLERK OF COURT HAD COMMUNICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT
HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY SUBPOENA OR WITNESS FEES, BOTH IN LIGHT OF HIS INIDGENT STATUS,
AND UNDER THE RULES APPLICABLE TO THIS PARTICULAR DISCIPLINARY MATTER UNDER SCR 105(4)
AND SCR 119(3).
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or omis-
sions shall be deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding
court, or engaged in judicial duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a
reference or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the
court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judi-
cial proceeding.
3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers.
4. DISOBEDIENCE OF A SUBPOENA DULY SERVED, OR REFUSING TO BE SWORN OR ANSWER AS A
WITNESS.
5. RESCUING ANY PERSON OR PROPERTY IN THE CUSTODY OF AN OFFICER BY VIRTUE OF AN ORDER
OR PROCESS OF SUCH COURT OR JUDGE AT CHAMBERS.
6. DISOBEDIENCE OF THE ORDER OR DIRECTION OF THE COURT MADE PENDING THE TRIAL OF AN
ACTION, IN SPEAKING TO OR IN THE PRESENCE OF A JUROR CONCERNING AN ACTION IN WHICH THE JU-
ROR HAS BEEN IMPANELED TO DETERMINE, OR IN ANY MANNER APPROACHING OR INTERFERING WITH
SUCH JUROR WITH THE INTENT TO INFLUENCE THE VERDICT.
7. ABUSING THE PROCESS OR PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OR FALSELY PRETENDING
TO ACT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF AN ORDER OR PROCESS OF THE COURT.
And, actually, it is WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, and, arguably the Second Judicial District Court
Judges and Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court, and Custodian of Records whom should be
subject to a finding that they have violated NRS 22.030(4). Further, Reno City Attorney Christensen
and the Reno Muncipal Court Judges, Court Administrator, Custodian of Record, and those City of
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Reno Marshal's whom disobey such subpoena duly served upon them have similarly committed a
violation of NRS 22.030(4) where SCR 110(4) does not entitle any of those individuals or entities to
rely upon the 11/7/12 Order by Chair Echeverria purporting to quash such subpoenas where SCR
110(4) is quite clear that it is NNDB Chairman Susich, only, whom has jurisdiction to make such an
Order and where there is no indication that any of those subpoened communicated an open refusal
under RPC 3.4 sufficient to prevent a finding that a violation of such was committed by all those
subpoened whom are licensed attorneys (which, would included those RMC Judges subpoened).
Similarly, the Reno Justice Court's Custodian of Records and Court Administrator Steven Tuttle and
Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil could be said to have violated NRS 22.030(4) as well. Interestingly,
neither DDA Watts-Vial nor any other attorney from the WCDA's Office communicated any objec-
tion to the subpoen Coughlin had served a non-party over 18 years of age on Stancil, Tuttle, and the
RJC's Custodian of Records by one Nicholas Hassett of Reno, Nevada, a 20 year old at the time.
SCR Rule 114. Reciprocal discipline.
4. IDENTICAL DISCIPLINE TO BE IMPOSED; EXCEPTIONS. AFTER THE
TIME FOR THE ATTORNEY TO RESPOND HAS EXPIRED, THE SUPREME COURT
SHALL IMPOSE THE IDENTICAL DISCIPLINE UNLESS THE ATTORNEY DEMON-
STRATES, OR THE SUPREME COURT FINDS, THAT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD
UPON WHICH THE DISCIPLINE IS PREDICATED IT CLEARLYAPPEARS:
(a) That the procedure in the other jurisdiction was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(b) That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to
the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept the decision of the
other jurisdiction as fairly reached; or
(c) That the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; or
(d) That the misconduct established does not constitute misconduct under any Nevada Rule
of Professional Conduct.
If the court determines that any of the preceding factors exist, it shall enter an appropriate
order.
5. Discipline elsewhere resjudicata. In all other respects, a final adjudication in another
jurisdiction that an attorney has engaged in misconduct conclusively establishes the misconduct
for the purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.
The converse of SCR Rule 114(5) (applied here by analogy) is that the failure of the various
Order's involved here to make a final adjudication...that..attorney (Coughlin, and the 6/26/12 Order
in FHE 2 was entered while Coughlin's law license was temporarily suspended, which, assuredly,
WCDA DDA Watts-Vial would agree, means such Order can in no way be asserted as any sort of
proof, conclusive or otherwise, of any sort of professional misconduct on Coughlin's part, right,
DDA Watts? Also, consider RMC Judge W. Gardner repeatedly referring to Coughlin as an attor-
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ney during the 6/18/12 Trial in 26405, which, again, occurred while Coughlin's law license in Ne-
vada was temporarily suspended). Further, the language in SCR 114(5) referring to another juris-
diction does not necessarily require such final adjudication occur in by the imposition of disci-
plinary sanctions in another jurisdiction outside the State of Nevada. Such use of the term juris-
diction in the phrase another jurisdiction may be taken to mean another court within Nevada, es-
pecially considering the wording of SCR Rule 99.
SCR Rule 99. Jurisdiction.
1. EVERY ATTORNEY ADMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW IN NEVADA, SPECIALLY ADMITTED BY A
COURT OF THIS STATE FOR A PARTICULAR PROCEEDING, PRACTICING LAW HERE, WHETHER SPECIALLY
ADMITTED OR NOT, OR WHOSE ADVERTISING FOR LEGAL SERVICES REGULARLY APPEARS IN NEVADA IS
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DISCIPLI-
NARY BOARDS AND HEARING PANELS CREATED BY THESE RULES.
2. NOTHING CONTAINED IN THESE RULES DENIES ANY COURT THE POWER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
OVER PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED BEFORE IT, SUCH AS THE POWER OF CONTEMPT, NOR DO THESE RULES
PROHIBIT ANY ASSOCIATION FROM CENSURING, SUSPENDING, OR EXPELLING ITS MEMBERS.
SCR RULE 110. SUBPOENA POWER, PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, WITNESSES, AND PRETRIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
1. Issuance of subpoenas by hearing panels and bar counsel. Bar counsel and a member of a
hearing panel who is also a state bar member, in matters under investigation by either, may adminis-
ter oaths and affirmations and issue and compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the pro-
duction of pertinent books, papers, and documents. The attorney may also compel by subpoena the
attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books, papers, and other documents
before a hearing panel. Subpoena and witness fees and mileage shall be the same as in a district
court.
2. Confidentiality stated on subpoena. Subject to the provisions of Rule 121, subpoe-
nas shall clearly indicate on their face that they are issued in connection with a confidential
investigation under these rules and that it is regarded as contempt of the supreme court or
grounds for discipline under these rules for a person subpoenaed to in any way breach the
confidentiality of the investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach of confidentiality for a
person subpoenaed to consult with counsel or to answer questions asked by bar counsel or the
attorney to determine the facts known by the witness.
3. Attachment of person for failure to obey subpoena or produce documents. Whenever
any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony or to produce books, papers, or other documents
as required by subpoena, or requested to provide documents pursuant to Rule 78.5(1)(b), refuses to
appear or testify before a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent or proper questions, or to
provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in contempt of the disciplinary
board, and the chair of the disciplinary board shall report the fact to a district judge of the coun-
ty in which the hearing is being held or the investigation conducted. The district court shall
promptly issue an attachment in the form usual in the court, directed to the sheriff of the county,
commanding the sheriff to attach such person and bring such person forthwith before the
court. On the return of the attachment, and the production of the person attached, the district court
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shall havejurisdictionof thematter; and the person charged may purge himself or herself of the
contempt in the same way, and the same proceedings shall be had, and thesamepenaltiesmaybe
imposed, and the samepunishment inflictedas in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and
give evidence on the trial of a civil cause before a district court of the State of Nevada.
4. Contest of subpoena. A contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the
chair of the appropriate disciplinary board.
5. Restriction on discovery. Discovery by the attorney, other than under Rule
105(2)(c), is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order of the chair for good cause up-
on motion under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6).
6. Prehearingconference. At the discretion of the chair, a prehearing conference may be
ordered for the purpose of obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the issues presented by
the pleadings. The conference may be held before the chair or the chairs designee.
There is nothing in the record to indicate the NNDB Chairman Susich identified any design-
ee for the purpose of carrying out all the matters with which the chair (in all instances in SCR 110
the term chair is used with respect to the chair of the disciplinary board or board and the
term panel is nowhere to be found therein. This makes good sense, as the Chair of the Disciplinary
Board is a continuing position wherein such Chair, presumably, given the prestige and power at-
tendant to such a position, would be someone possessing sufficient, particularized knowledge of the
substantive and procedural issues typically arising in a disciplinary matter context sufficient to make
sure that the various powers accorded to such disciplinary board chair within SCR 110 (and, also,
under , is not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order of the chair for good cause upon motion
under Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6)) to so entrust with such authority. While NNDB Chair Susich's
7/27/12 writing to Coughlin directs Coughlin to coordinate and inquire as to certain matters with the
SBN's OBC and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters, it in now way, authorizes or identifies the SBN,
OBC, or SBN Clerk of Court as a SCR 110(6) designee. Further, the use of the term conference
in SCR 110(6) necessarily requires Coughlin's participation, or, at least, an opportunity to participate
in such a conference be given to Coughlin, and notice thereof. Instead, the NNDB, Panel, and OBC
continually treated Coughlin like the Elephant Man. Coughlin is not an animal. He is a human be-
ing.
Further, King likely violated RPC 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4 where he admit-
ted to Coughlin, on 10/15/12 that he fully intended to have such a conference in Coughlin's absence
(and apparently did so) an an effort to achieve his stated goal of skirting the express dictates in this
Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838 and SCR 111(8) and thereby consolidate the requirement stemming
from this Court's Order (which expressly incorporates the dictate found within SCR 111(8)) that re-
fer(red) the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearingbe-
fore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent of the discipline
to be imposed) into
SCR Rule 104. State bar counsel. 1. State bar counsel shall: ... b) Subject to Rule
105(1), dispose of all matters involving alleged misconduct by dismissal of the allegation(s) or by
the filingof awrittencomplaint. Ironically, it is the OBC's King's beloved SCR 111(5) that nows
turns on him here. SCR 111(5). Certified document conclusive. A certified copy of proof of a
conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the crime stated in it in any disciplinary
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proceeding instituted against an attorney based on the conviction. An allegation (under SCR
104(1)(b)) necessarily excludes a conviction given such, under SCR 111(5) provides conclusive
evidence of the commission of the crime, thereby removing from the power granted Bar Counsel
under SCR 104 the right to consolidate the formal hearing required by SCR 111(8) with the SCR
105(2) Commencement of formal proceedings following the or the filing of a written com-
plaint by Bar Counsel under SCR 105(1). Thus, the Bar Counsel had not authority to so consoli-
date the formal hearing required by SCR 111(8) and this Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838. The dis-
tinction between formal disciplinary proceedings...commenced by bar counsel filing a written com-
plaint and that required where an Order stemming from an SCR 111(6) Petition in 60838 fulfilled
this Court's duty, under SCR 111(8) to refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the
institution of a formal hearingbefore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined
shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed is so obvious (proceedings is plural, whereas
hearing is singular; commencement of formal proceedings necessarily implicates the double
jeopardy issues attendnat to King seeking to consolidate the matters involved in the hearing which
SCR 111(8) requires the institution of (ie, commencement and insitution connote entirely dif-
ferent grants of authority and jurisdiciton, in addition to distinct purposes and limitations, particularly
relevant to the particular processes involved) as to make the SBN's OBC's King conduct here, argua-
bly, misconduct violative of RPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.4 and
Coughlin herein points this out in an effort o fulfill his duty undr RPC 3.8.
(SCR 105(2): Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedingsare com-
menced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar...), Note, SCR
105(2) decidedly DOESNOT say that formal disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar
counsel doing that which SCR 104(d) calls for (SCR 104(1)(d) reads:(1) State bar counsel
shall:...(d) File withthesupremecourt petitions with certified copies of proof of conviction demon-
strating that attorneys have been convicted of serious crimes, as defined in Rule 111. Where SCR
105(2) provides that as to the: Commencement of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary pro-
ceedingsare commenced by bar counsel filing a written complaint in the name of the state bar...
and such Complaints are always filed before the appropriate Disciplinary Board in the State Bar of
Nevada (that is to say that the name of the court listed above the caption of such Complaints always
indicates:
STATE BAR OF NEVADA
NORTHERNNEVADADISCIPLINARYBOARD
TO BE SURE, NOTHING IN THE SCR'S INDICATE EXPRESSLY WHAT COURT SUCH FORMAL DISCIPLI-
NARY PROCEEDINGS ARE TO OCCUR IN, AND THE TEXT ABOVE THE CAPTION IN SUCH MATTERS DOES DE-
PART FROM, SAY WDCR 10, WHERE IT FAILS TO INCLUDE INTHE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE CON-
TENTS THEREIN, AND WHERE THE WORD COURT IS NOT PRESENT. HOWEVER, THE SBNHAS HELD
LAURA PETERS OUT AS THE SBN'S CLERK OF COURT, INDICATING, SIMILAR TO THE SET UP IN
CALIFORNIA, THAT THE STATE OF NEVADA HAS A STATE BAR COURT. WHY THE ABOVE IS RELE-
VANT IS THAT SCR 111(4) PROVIDES: 4. BAR COUNSELS RESPONSIBILITY. UPON BEING ADVISED
THAT AN ATTORNEY SUBJECT TO THE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN
CONVICTED OF A CRIME, OTHER THAN A MISDEMEANOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION NOT INVOLVING THE USE
OF ALCOHOL OR A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, BAR COUNSEL SHALL OBTAIN A CERTIFIED COPY OF PROOF
OF THE CONVICTION AND SHALL FILE A PETITION WITH THE SUPREME COURT, ATTACHING THE CERTIFIED
COPY. UPON BEING ADVISED THAT AN ATTORNEY SUBJECT TO THE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE
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SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A MISDEMEANOR INVOLVING THE USE OF ALCOHOL OR A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND THE OFFENSE IS NOT THE ATTORNEYS FIRST SUCH OFFENSE, BAR COUN-
SEL SHALL INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT THE MATTER TO THE APPROPRIATE PANEL OF THE DISCIPLINARY
BOARD PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION. THE PETITION SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE PANELS
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, IF ANY, TO BE IMPOSED UN-
DER THESE OR ANY OTHER RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT PERTAIN TO THE CONDUCT OF ATTOR-
NEYS.
5. Certified document conclusive. A certified copy of proof of a conviction is conclusive evi-
dence of the commission of the crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an
attorney based on the conviction....
7. Suspension on certification. Upon the filing with the supreme court of a petition with
a certified copy of proof of the conviction, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a
serious crime, the court shall enter an order suspending the attorney, regardless of the pendency of an
appeal, pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding, which shall be commenced by
the appropriate disciplinary board uponreferral bythe supreme court. For good cause, the
court may set aside its order suspending the attorney from the practice of law. (NOTE: the
phrase pending final disposition in SCR 111(7) expresses a far different approach than does the
phrases found in SCR 105(2) (commencement of formal proceedings and formal disciplinary
proceedings). (NOTE: the phrase disciplinary proceeding used in SCR 111(7) differs from
the phrase formal disciplinary proceedings (the singular proceeding in SCR 111(7) implies
nond of the extended involvement inherent to where formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced under SCR 105(2) and plural formal disciplinary proceedings, and the presence
of the qualifier formal) found in SCR 105(2)). Further, the approach taken by the SBN's OBC
here, where the Complaint contains three grievance case numbers, none of which represents an iden-
tifier or case number (why no appearance of the SCR 111 Petition's number, 60838?). The OBC of-
fered nothing in its filings to marry any of the three grievance numbers to this Court's 6/7/12 mandate
in 60838 or that required under SCR 111(8).
and SCR 104(1)(d) reads:(1) State bar counsel shall:...(d) File withthesupremecourt peti-
tions with certified copies of proof of conviction demonstrating that attorneys have been convicted of
serious crimes, as defined in Rule 111. Where SCR 105(2) provides that as to the: Commencement
of formal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedingsare commenced by bar counsel filing a
written complaint in the name of the state bar... and the Complaint here bares three case num-
bers (NG12-0204, NG12-0434, NG12-0435), while, noticeably, the SCR 105(3)(a) review by su-
preme court and SCR 105(3)(a) appeal is accorded a different case number (here, 62337)
SCR 111(8): Referral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt of a petition filed under sub-
section 4 of this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, the
supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of sub-
section 7 of this rule, refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a
formal hearingbefore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
of the discipline to be imposed. The panel may, for good cause, postpone the proceeding until all ap-
peals from the conviction have been concluded.
Notice SCR 111(8) DOES NOT READ for the institution of formal disciplinary proceed-
ings after Bar Counsel follows th procedure on receipt of complaint set out in SCR Rule 105(1)(a)
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and a investigations shall be initiated and conducted by bar counsel or bar counsels staff or other
investigative personnel at bar counsels direction prior or pursuantto the opening of a grievance
file... whereupon at the conclusion of an investigation of a grievance file, bar counsel King makes
the decision to recommend in writing the filing of a written complaint where such recommen-
dation shall be promptly reviewed by a screening panel... NOTICE THAT SCR 111(8) SIMPLY
DOES NOT SAY ANYTHING OF THE SORT, DESPITE WHATEVER PERVISION THEREOF
THE OBC'S KING PURPORTS TO BE CONTROLLING HERE.
AMJUR PLEADING 590, In determining which sanctions should be imposed for violations of
Rule 11, the court must consider the purposes to be served by the imposition of sanctions.[FN1] Be-
cause the primary purpose of Rule 11 is to deter future litigation abuse, the court is required to im-
pose the least severe sanction that fulfills the Rule's purpose.[FN2] If a court decides to impose sanc-
tions under Rule 11, it may choose from a wide range of nonmonetary sanctions or, in limited cir-
cumstances, monetary sanctions.[FN3] Any sanction must be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of the violation or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.[FN4] In determining
an appropriate sanction under Rule 11, the court should consider:[FN5] (1) the nature of the viola-
tion committed; (2) the circumstances in which it was committed; (3) the circumstances including
the financial state of the individual to be sanctioned; and (4) those sanctioning measures that would
suffice to deter that individual from similar violations in the future. The sanction may include direc-
tives of a nonmonetary nature.[FN6] Although the Rule itself does not enumerate the types of non-
monetary sanctions that may be imposed, courts have held that they may include issuing a repri-
mand[FN7] or requiring the offending counsel to undertake the representation of a pro se plain-
tiff.[FN8] The public filing of a document finding that attorneys had violated Rule 11 has been
deemed a sufficient sanction.[FN9] [FN9] Gary v. Braddock Cemetery and Consol Energy, 334 Fed.
Appx. 465, 73 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1139 (3d Cir. 2009) A nonmonetary sanction may also include re-
quiring participation in seminars or other educational programs[FN10] or referring the matter to dis-
ciplinary authorities.[FN11] [FN11] Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11.
If, as in Mirch 49212, RPC 3.1 is essentially equated with NRCP 11, then Judge Nash's find-
ings in her 3/14/12 Order in 26800 is violative of the above restrictions in that it is wholly over-
broad and excessive in a manner that cannot be said to be limited to the above goals. It is the equiv-
alent of taking a bazooka to some weeds in one's front lawn.
Further, Judge Flanagan's 6/25/12 Order in 063628 is not a sanction, was made at a time
when Coughlin was already suspended, was not attached to the Complaint, and King himself violates
RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and NRCP 11 where he purports that anything in his 8/23/12 Complaint (wherein
King clearly appears to have attempted to distance his prosecution from Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name
as much as possible, going so far as to pled the 1/12/13 jaywalking arrest, and 11/15/11 traffic cita-
tions outside Hill's office (from which all matters associated with Judge Nash's 2/28/12 and 3/12/12
Orders in 26800 stem and are intimately connected, as is also the case with her mailing to the SBN
her 3/14/12 written grievance against Coughlin, which included the 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in
26405 that King's Complaint pled (at para 12 page 3 therein) thusly: 12. Respondent, representing
himself as co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied
by Judge William Gardner and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demon-
strates that Respondent lacks competence to practice law. (However, such 3/5/12 filing in 26405 by
Coughlin was never attached to anything filed by King nor introduced into evidence at the FH, and
therefore, King's bare, conclusory allegation, can in no way meet the clear and convicing evidence
burden of proof. Further, where King's Complaint indicates :. Respondent, representing himself as
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co-counsel, filed a 36-page motion to dismiss on March 5, 2012. The motion was denied by Judge
William Gardner and was determined to be without merit. The motion, on its face, demonstrates that
Respondent lacks competence to practice law.... (find citation that says such an Order indicating a
motion is without merit is not tantamount to a finding that it was vexatious or sanctionable).
Further, 26405 was a criminal prosecution and, as such NRCP Rule 11 in inapplicable, and Judge
Gardner's failure to adhere to Canon 2.15 or otherwise sanction or report Coughlin to any authorities
is dispositive as to any claim that King may have plead (and, noticeably, King's Complaint stears
away from alleging any such Order by Judge Gardner (which was never attached to any of King's
filings and was not even inlcuded in the 11/7/12 production of some 3,200 pages of documents by
the SBN) is pled as a basis to support an allegation that Coughlin violated RPC 3.1, but rather, King
specifically limits his pleading therto to an allegation that the motion, on its face, demonstrates that
Respondnet lacks competence to practice law. And, even that attempt by King to follow the dic-
tates of SCR 105(2) is muddled, as it is not clear whether King is therein pursuing a competency de-
termination under SCR 117 or attempting to proved a violation of RPC 1.1.
It seems apparent that RJC Pearson's EPO has the added benefit to the SBN of making it
impossible for Coughlin to have the SBN served, sufficient to satisfy any SCR 109 (what service
does SCR 110 require?) or other personal service requirements attendant to any action or filing by
Coughlin, where Coughlin was arrested on 3/8/13 for an alleged violation of that the TPO and EPO
in RJC RCP12-607 for allegedly having a courier deliver a last minute filing to the SBN on 1/3/13
(the deadline or day prior thereto, to file an NRCP 52, 59 and DCR 13(7) Reconsideration Motion),
and again on 1/23/13 (also a deadline as to the filing of Coughlin's Brief in 62337, necessitating, in
accordance with the rules, that Coughlin seeking a stipulation to any such extension prior to filing a
motion seeking such.
(E) Coughlin was afforded ample opportunity to prepare a verified answer or response to the alle-
gations of the Complaint and failed to timely do so. See Findings of Fact 34, 35 and 36. According-
ly, the matter could proceed on a default basis and the allegations of the Complaint deemed admit-
ted. SCR 105(2) Notwithstanding the fact that the matter could have been decided on a default ba-
sis, the Panel permitted the State Bar and Coughlin to present evidence.
62B Am. J ur. 2dProcess 42II. AMENABILITY TOSERVICE OF PROCESSB. PersonsImmunetoServiceof Process3. Other
Particular Persons, Conditions, or SituationsTopicSummaryCorrelationTableReferences 42. Natureof proceedingattended
bynonresidentWest'sKeyNumber Digest West'sKeyNumber Digest, Federal Civil Procedurek415, 416West'sKeyNumber Di-
gest, Processk117to120Theruleof immunityfromtheserviceof civil processof anonresidentwhileattendingcourtinanaction
inwhichheor sheisapartyor awitnessextendstoeveryproceedingof ajudicial nature[FN1] takenin or emanatingfromaduly
constitutedjudicial tribunal, whichdirectlyrelatestothetrial of theissuesinvolved.[FN2] It extendsnot onlytopeoplewhoarein
theimmediatepresenceof thejudgesof thecourtsof record, but tothosealsowhoattendthesubordinatetribunalsandofficers
appointedbythosecourtstoassist theminthedischargeof their duties.[FN3] Hearingsbeforearbitrators, legislativecommittees,
trusteesin bankruptcy, examiners, mastersinchancery, andcommissionerstotakedepositionshaveall beenincludedwithin the
scopeof itsapplication.[FN4][FN4] InreEquitablePlanCompany, 277F.2d319(2dCir. 1960); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder &
McDonald, 44F.2d507, 71A.L.R. 1394(C.C.A. 7thCir. 1930); Velkovv. Superior Courtinandfor LosAngelesCounty, 40Cal.
2d289, 253P.2d25, 35A.L.R.2d1348(1953) (disciplinaryproceedingsbeforestatebar; recognizingrule);
St. J ohnv. Superior Court I nandFor LosAngelesCounty, 178Cal. App. 2d794, 3Cal. Rptr.
535, 84A.L.R.2d415(2dDist. 1960) (licenserevocationhearing); 62BAm. J ur. 2dProcess 42
[1] Whilethegeneral ruleprotectsthenonresident "duringaperiodreasonablynecessarytothe
givingof testimonyinajudicial proceeding" whenheentersthestateprimarilyfor that purpose,
therecognizedexceptiontotherulepermitsserviceif thelater action"arisesoutof or involves
thesamesubject matter astheoneinwhichthenonresident hasmadeavoluntaryappearance."
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(Velkovv. Superior Court (1953), 40Cal. 2d289, 291, 292[253P.2d25, 35A.L.R.2d1348].) I n
theVelkovcase, aNewYork resident appearedbeforealocal administrativecommitteeof The
CaliforniaStateBar, at their request, totestifyinadisciplinaryproceeding, institutedbyMrs.
Velkov, against attorneystowhomMrs. Velkovhadtransferred25per cent of certainproperties
asafeefor services. Mrs. Velkovallegedthetransfer illegal andpredicated[187Cal. App. 2d
211] theinstitutionof disciplinaryproceedingsuponthatbasis. WhenMrs. Velkov"cametoCali-
fornia... totestifyinadisciplinaryproceedingbeforethat body, shewasservedwithsummons."
(P. 290.) Thesummonsemanatedfromanactionbrought bytheattorneysfor declaratoryrelief as
tothetransfer.
HILLHIMSELF VIOLATES RPC3.1, 3.3, AND3.4 INCIDENT TO HIS ALLEGATION, IN HIS PLEADINGS THAT HE ALLOWED COUGHLIN ADDITIONAL
TIME TO REMOVE HIS PERSONTLY DURING LATE DECEMBER 2011, WHICH, APPARENTLY JUDGE FLANAGAN FOUND TO HAVE BEEN AN
AGREEMENT COUGHLIN ENTERED INTO WITH HILL, SOMEHOW, BUT THEN THAT COUGHLIN FAILED
TO LIVE UP TO? THIS IS THOROUGHLYDISPROVEN BYTHE EMAILS BETWEEN HILL AND COUGHLIN
ON AND AROUND 12/24/11, WHERE COUGHLIN REQUESTS ADDITIONAL TIME TO REMOVE HIS RE-
MAINING PROPERTY (AND SETS FORTH A BASIS FOR FINDING THAT HILL'S INTERFERENCE AND OB-
STRUCTIONIST TACTICS CAUSED SUCH A NEED) FOLLOW BY HILL'S 12/24/11 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN
WHY WASN'T COUGHLIN'S 12/14/11 SUBMISSION TO THE RJC INCLUDED IN THE VOL 4 OR OTHER ROA
TRANSMITTED BY THE RJC ON 12/21/11 IN 1708? THEREAFTER, THE 1/4/12 SUPPLEMENTAL FILIGN IN
03628 WAS MERELY 3 PAGES AND FAILED TO INCLUDE THE LION'S SHARE OF COUGHLIN'S CLAIMS AND
CONTENTIONS, INCLUDIGN THOSE MADE IN WHAT HE SUBMITTED FOR FILING ON 12/14/11, 12/26/11 (37
PAGE SUBMISSION BY FAX), A 15 PAGE 12/26/11 SUBMISSION THAT IS FILE STAMPED 12/27/11, AND
OTHER MATERIALS. RJC CLERK CHRISTINE ERICKSON WAS EVASIVE WHEN QUESTIONED BY COUGHLIN
AS TO HER PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THAT FAX FILING WAS NOT PERMITTED T THE RJC WHEN COUGHLIN
BEGAN TO BECOME AWARE THAT, AT LEAST SOME LITIGANTS, WERE PERMITTED TO FILE BY FAX.
HOW IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR THE RJC TO DENY COUGHLIN'S 12/14/11 FILING YET ALLOWHILL TO
FILE A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER IN 1708 ON 12/29/11? THE APPEAL RECEIPT IN THE 1/4/12 SUP-
PLEMENTAL IS DEEPLY FLAWED? TO WHAT DO ENTRIES 9-15 RELATE? ARE THOSE HEARING EXHIBITS
FROM THE 12/20/11 CONTEST PERSONAL PROPERTY LIEN HEARING? WHY IS EVERYTHING THIS SUP-
PLEMENTAL AND THE FOUR VOLUME ROABY RJC CLERK ERICKSON IN BACKWARDS ORDER FROM HOW
ALL OTHER ROA'S ARE PRESENTED? THIS PERSISTES EVEN WHERE IN THE APPEAL RECEIPT THOSE
SEVEN EXHIBITS ARE LISTED IN REVERSE ORDER. IT GIVES THE REVIEWER A HEADACHE TRYING TO RE-
VIEW SUCH A PRESENTATION.
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FROM FLANAGAN'S 4/20/12 ORDER IN CARPENTIER V. AAMES, QLS, ANDRCS INCV08-01709: FINALLY, THIS COURTMAKES THE
FOLLOWINGOBSERVATIONS. THE ARGUMENTS RAISED BYTH PARTIES IN THEIR PLEADINGS GENERALLY CIRCUMSCRIBE THE ADJU-
DICATORYBOUNDARIES OF THIS COURT. SEE ..,BRELIANT V. PREFERRED EQUITIES CORP., 109
NEV. 842, 847, 858 P.2D1258, 1261 (1993 (STATING A DISTRICT COURT GENERALLY MAYNOT
CONSIDER MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS WHEN REVIEWING A MOTION TO DISMISS). AS
SUCH, THIS COURT TAKES NO POSITION ON WHETHER THE FINANCIA INSTITUTIONS IN THIS CASE
FOLLOWED THE LAWWHEN THEY WERE LINING UP THE DOCUMENTS TO FORECLOSE 0 THE PROP-
ERTY. NONETHELESS, THE MANNER AND TIMING IN WHICH THESE INSTITUTIONS-PARTICULARL
AAMES, DEUTSCHE,AND QUALITY-RECORDED THE ASSIGNMENT,FI ED THE SUBSTITUTION OF
TRUSTEE,AN FILED THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT,I S SUSPICIOUS AND TROUBLING TO THIS COURT.
In his 12/28/11 email to the parties, RJC Judge Sferrazza from 1708 again misapplies JCRRT
to landlord tenant matters despite JCRRT 2 indicating such rules do not apply there,
Merliss never had any Landlord's Affidavit filed in 1708 (Baker apparently filed a
Declaration on Merliss's behalf on 10/19/11, but that was after the first hearing of 10/13/11). Any
purported such Affidavit of Unlawful Detainer that Baker attempted to hand Coughlin, in violation of
both courthouse sanctuary doctrine and an attorney's (Coughlin's) immunity against service of pro-
cess when appearing in court (particularly in the very case to which such attempted service is relat-
ed), as well as the duty to withdraw as counsel where, by so doing, Baker necessarily makes himself a
likely witness, makes insufficient any such purporte service. Further, any such Affidavit by Merliss
fails to contain the following required language: That the termination and surrender of the rental unit
was to have taken place on
or before _______________, 20____. That legal Notice has been served upon
the tenant pursuant to the provisions of NRS 40.280, on ________________,
20____. A copy of the Notice is attached hereto and incorporated by this
reference NRS 40.253. As such any hearing or Order based upon and proceeding held therefrom is
void for lack of jurisdiction. NRCP 60(b)(4) and Aikin requires strict adherence to procedural and
statutory rules. Additionally, no such service in compliance of with NRS 40.280 was done as to any
such Notice purported to be served on Coughlin on 9/27/11 in 1708. Further, particularly where no
such: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employ-
ee of RICHARD G. HILL, . CHARTERED, and that on the 27th day of September, 2011, I per-
sonally handed at the hearing in the above-referenced matter, a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing Five Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer for Failure to Vacate Rental Unit - NRS 40.251 ( No -
Cause . Termination) and Notice of Summary eviction - NRS 40.254 to: Zachary Coughlin 121 Riv-
er Rock Street Reno, Nevada 89503 BY/s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq..
Baker and Merliss failed to comply with the requirements of NRS 40.280 (specifically as to a
witness and more) for the alleged service of a 5 day UD Notice on 9/27/11.
FORM#9 AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION OF LANDLORD FOR SUMMARY EVICTION FOR BREACH
CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: 7. AFFIANT REQUESTS THAT THE COURT ENTER AN ORDER FOR
THE SUMMARY EVICTION OF THE
tenant from the premises and the sheriff/constable be ordered to remove the
tenant within twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the court order.
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There is a great deal of confusion as to the law in Nevada vis a vis 24 hour lock-out notices
and how soon after posting one the constable or Sheriff may effectuate the lock-out:
http://www.lpsnv.com/evictionFAQ.pdf: "7. DOES MY TENANT HAVE RIGHTS? Yes they do.
When the notice is served, your tenants rights state that they can contest the notice with the justice
court from the moment that they receive the notice. Their reasons can vary, but they must get their
Tenants Response filed with the court of jurisdiction. It will then be approved or denied by the
judge. If it is approved, then a hearing will be scheduled. Your tenant can also contest the 24 Hour
Lock-out Notice, which is posted by the Constable. This notice is posted 24 hours before the Con-
stable returns to the property to do the lock change."
GAYLE KERN, ESQ., OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO FOLLOWRPC 3.5A, BUT REGARDLESS, SHE
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ANY WRIT OF RESTITUTION OR LOCKOUT ORDER ON 3/15/12
MERELY UPON A DEFAULT BASIS COUGHLIN FILED A DETAILED TENANT'S AFFIDAVIT THAT COULD
SPEAK FOR HIM AT THE HEARING, AND THE INITIAL BURDEN IS ON THE LANDLORD (IE, THE PARTY MOV-
ING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ANVUI), AND KERN FAILED TO EVEN FILE A LANDLORD'S AFFI-
DAVIT.
Regardless, in both 1708 and 374, NRS 40.253 does not allow for the Washoe County
Sheriff to conduct evictions in the manner in which is currently does. Hill's filings claim that the
WCSO's procedures, by being the usual and customary practices of the WCSO, somehow become
black letter law in Nevada, even where a statutory remedy is in place, one that the legislature worked
hard on (despite RJC Judge Pearson, in 1048, ignoring AB226's minor tenant's rights victory where it
required the landlord to, under NRS 40.253(3)(a) identify the court that has jurisdiction over the
matter... and 3(b)(1)'s dctate that such notice advise the tenant: (1) Of the tenants right to contest
the matter by filing,... an affidavit with the court that has jurisdiction over the matter..., in the
face of the unauthorized practice of law on behalf of out of state corporation no less, Northwinds
Apartments Assoc., LLC of Washington state.
NRS 40.253(6) provides...6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in sub-
section 3, regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of
the affidavit permitted by subsection 5 (note, both in 1708 and 374, neither landlord filed such a
Landlord's Affidavit in a timely manner, and Merliss in 1708 never filed one at all. If Baker and
Hill want big boy attorney's fees, they should be required to get those sorts of things right to justify
such exorbinant fees, or even begin to), the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, af-
ter service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of
any affidavit or notice (Baker continually maintained that it was only Coughlin's Affidavit which
was up for inspection, in violation of RPC 3.1) provided for in this section. If the court determines
that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an un-
lawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
So, really, especially in 1708, all the debate about the import and application of
the within 24 hours language is inapplicable anyways, as that phrase is only applicable to a
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situation where the tenant does not file a Tenant's Answer in respose to a 5 day UD Notice be-
ing posted.
NRS 40.253(5):. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(A) THE LANDLORD OR THE LANDLORDS AGENT MAY APPLY BY AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLAINT (NOTE,
THERE IS NOTHING IN CH. 40 THAT ALLOWS FOR A LANDLORD'S AGENT TO DRAFT PLEADINGS
OR APPEAR ON BEHALF OF AN OUT OF STATE CORPORATION, CROSS THE BAR, AND PRACTICE LAW
ON ITS BEHALF, AS WNM'S SUE KIGN DID IN 074408 AND 374, AND AS NCS'S JEFF CHANDLER DID
IN 1048) FOR EVICTION TO THE JUSTICE COURT OF THE TOWNSHIP IN WHICH THE DWELLING,
APARTMENT, MOBILE HOME OR COMMERCIAL PREMISES ARE LOCATED OR TO THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE DWELLING, APARTMENT, MOBILE HOME OR COMMERCIAL
PREMISES ARE LOCATED, WHICHEVER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE MATTER (IN 374, RJCJUDGE
SCHROEDER ISSUED SUCH AN ORDER PRIOR TO KERN EVEN FILING A LANDLORD'S ANSWER). THE
COURT MAY THEREUPON ISSUE AN ORDER DIRECTING THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE OF THE COUN-
TYTO REMOVE THE TENANT WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE ORDER.
But, again, where Coughlin did comply with the 5 day notice, in both 1048, 374, and
1708, NRS 40.253(5) language is inapplicable (The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order.) Rather, it is NRS 40.253(6)'s language that controls: If the court determines that
there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlaw-
ful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant.
There being nothing thereing speaking to some within 24 hours dicate, the de-
fault application in civil law requires that such an an Order be served under NRCP 6(e) where
personal service is not accorded, thus requiring 3 days for mailing. Further, NRAP 8 and some
5 day stay suggested in Anvui, is arguably applicable. There is little indication in Ch. 40 or
elsehwhere to provide some explanation of just how and in what manner such a summary or-
der would be carried out and whether it would allow for the approach taken by the WCSO in
such situations. While NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) does contain the term summary order, the ap-
pearance therein of the within 24 hours language, combined with the non-appearance of such
within 24 hours language in NRS 40.253(6), under traditional principles of statutory con-
struction, actually augers for an interpretation of subsection 6 that would require moretime for
a tenant than is provided for under NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2): That if the court determines that the
tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of
the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order...
It seems rather implausible to suggest that the within 24 hours language is some dic-
tate to the Sheriff or constable requiring such lockouts be effectuated in some narrow window
of time. Rather, particularly given the primacy to individual's and businesses inherent to their
uses as residences of places of business (or, in 1708, as both) it would seem entirely more likely,
and reasonable, to conclude that the legislature intended for the within 24 hours language to
afford tenant's at least 24 hours from the posting (if not the constructive receipt in the mail
under NRCP 6(e) if no personal service was to be had) of such a lock-out Order to remove
those items they find absolutely essential (see Coughlin's difficulties in 1048 where deprived of
his medications, eyeglasses, contacts, some important legal files, etc, not to mention the RPC
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3.5A violation attendant to the default on 7/5/12, especially where the RJC and NCS's Chan-
dler knew Coughlin was in jail incident to a 7/3/12 arrest stemming from Northwind's handy-
man Kreb's falacious accusation of Coughlin disturbing the peace.
the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant
Also, the RJCmay need to explain why it failed to file in fax filings by Coughlin
where it either did file in some by Hill and Baker in 1708 (or consider any failure to file any
10/13/11 Affidavit of Unlawful Detainer by landlord Merliss).
The SBN is likely resting upon some theory that the TPO and EPO granted it by RJCJudge Pearson, which
indicates that Coughlin may . First, the 1/ 114/13 EPO granted the SBN indicates that Patrick
Owen King, Esq., appeared at the Extension Hearing to represent the SBN. As such, King,
knowing he was extremely likely to be a witness in such an action, had a duty to withdraw
from representation, and therefore himself violated a RPC1.16 requir he so withdraw where
his being a witness was a virtual certainty. Further, King's TPO application rests almost en-
tirely on unsworn hearsay, for which King makes no indication with regard to from whom or
how he became aware of such hearsay detailing such purported facts. For instance, the
magic of hearsay may allow a comment like its not fair that Bar Counsel King gets all this ex
parte face time with Panel Chair Echeverria that may have been said to Dena Echeverria on
the telephone to become, according to King, a statement by Coughlin to Echeverria's staff that
he was coming down to the Panel Chair's Office, threatening to get some face time. Cough-
lin's 1996 Honda Accord's electrical problems (an electrical short caused problems with
Coughlin's headlights requiring a primitive workaround requiring Coughlin to braids five
elecrical wires together to turn his vehicle's headlights on...something King alleges, through
unattributed hearsay, was a case of Coughlin malingering around the SBN's Northern Office
after 5 pm flashing his headlights at the one or two women whom were working late (because,
one can be absolutely sure, Asst. Bar Counsel King has never worked late a day in his life, and
certainly not while employed by the SBN, thanks to SCR 106, natch), in an attempt to frighten
and harass them. Then there is the curiosu allegation by King in his TPO application that
Coughlin called the SBN ahead to announce he would be there in fifteen minutes to file some-
thing. King somehow alleges that is threatening behavior even where he subsequently indi-
cates that he had sent Coughlin a letter demanding that Coughlin do just that prior to appear-
ing at the SBN for any reason, including to file documents.
At the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing wherein Gayle Kern, Esq., violate RPC3.5A (probably why RJC
Judge Schroeder asked, upon the topic of taking a default against Coughlin coming up: Is
that fair?), Kern further stated that she was seeking a Writ granting possRestitution must
follow NRS 118A.360, which requires putting up a bond first, which Kern failed to do:
NRS 40.300 Contents of complaint; issuance and service of summons;
temporary writ of restitution; notice, hearing and bond....
3. At any time after the filing of the complaint and issuance of sum-
mons, the court, upon application therefor, may issue a temporary writ of
restitution; provided:...
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(B) THAT THE TEMPORARY WRIT OF RESTITUTION SHALL NOT ISSUE
UNTIL THE COURT HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASCERTAIN THE FACTS
SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE IT TO ESTIMATE THE PROBABLE LOSS TO THE
DEFENDANT AND FIX THE AMOUNT OF A BOND TO INDEMNIFY THE PARTY
OR PARTIES AGAINST WHOM THE TEMPORARY WRIT MAY BE ISSUED.
(c) That the temporary writ of restitution shall not issue until there has been filed with the ap-
proval of the court a good and sufficient bond of indemnification in the amount fixed by the court.
As such, Kern requested the wrong relief from Judge Schroeder, and the
court lacked jurisdiction to then issue a Lockout Order where a Writ of Res-
titution of Possession was requested, particularly where the Lockout Order
fails to conform to the following statute:
NRS 40.420 Form of writ of restitution; execution.
Further, Kern failed to file in a Landlord's Affidavit prior to the 3/15/12 summary eviction pro-
ceeding, which was noticed for 8:30 am, but to which the Kockout Order had a fax header indicated
the Order was faxed to the WCSO Civil Division at 8:24 am. As such, in consideration of the dic-
tates of NRS 40.253(5)-(6), the 3/15/12 Lockout Order is void pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(4) for lack of
jurisdiction given that the summary eviction hearing was held prior to Kern filing a Landlord's Affi-
davit :
NRS 40.253(5). Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlords agent may apply by affidavit of
complaint for eviction to the justice court of the township in which the dwell-
ing, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the dis-
trict court of the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter.
The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order.
The affidavit must state or contain:
(1) The date the tenancy commenced.
(2) The amount of periodic rent reserved.
(3) The amounts of any cleaning, security or rent deposits paid in advance, in excess of the
first months rent, by the tenant.
(4) The date the rental payments became delinquent.
(5) The length of time the tenant has remained in possession without paying rent.
(6) The amount of rent claimed due and delinquent.
(7) A statement that the written notice was served on the tenant in
accordance with NRS 40.280.
(8) A copy of the written notice served on the tenant.
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(9) ACOPY OF THE SIGNED WRITTEN RENTAL AGREEMENT, IF ANY....
...6. UPON THE FILING BY THE TENANT OF THE AFFIDAVIT PERMITTED IN
SUBSECTION 3, REGARDLESS OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVIT,
AND THE FILING BY THE LANDLORD OF THE AFFIDAVIT PERMITTED BY SUBSEC-
TION 5, THE JUSTICE COURT OR THE DISTRICT COURT SHALL HOLD A HEARING,
AFTER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF THE HEARING UPON THE PARTIES, TO DETERMINE
THE TRUTHFULNESS AND SUFFICIENCY OF ANY AFFIDAVIT OR NOTICE PROVIDED
FOR IN THIS SECTION... IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THERE IS A LEGAL DE-
FENSE AS TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THE COURT SHALL REFUSE TO
GRANT EITHER PARTY ANY RELIEF, AND, EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS
SUBSECTION, SHALL REQUIRE THAT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BE CONDUCT-
ED PURSUANT TO NRS 40.290 TO 40.420, INCLUSIVE...
The RJC impermissibly held the 3/15/12 summary eviction proceeding in 375 before Kern
filed a Lanlord's Affidavit in violation of NRS 40.253(6)'s dicates: ... 6. Upon the filing by the
tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless of the information contained in the
affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice
court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the
parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in
this section...
(never mind that the one Kern had filed after the summary eviction proceeding conveniently managed
to change the basis for seeking eviction to one based upon non-payment of rent, rather than the No
Cause Termination Notice posted on the door of Coughlin's former home law office on 2/13/12 in
374, which indicated that Coughlin had 5 days to leave and was entitled to no more Notice give his
was a Tenancy At-Will...this remixing of the basis for seeking and eviction and recharacterization
of the type of Notice served on Coughlin is especially dubious given the authority and argument cited
in Coughlin's 3/8/12 filed Tenant's Answer, which points out that the landlord is prevented from uti-
lizing a summary eviction proceeding to evict a commercial tenant such as Coughlin (whom pled a
commercial tenancy therein) where the non-payment or rent is not alleged, pled, or noticed (as there,
given the No Cause Termination Notice of 2/13/12 in 374). Further, Kern's Landlord's Affidavit is
further suspect where, all of the sudden following Coughlin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer pointing such
out, Kern switches gears and attempts to stear clear of the problems to her cause presented by the ci-
tation to the Glazier decision in consideration of the sworn testimony by WNM's Sue King and
PTTHOA Board Secretary Sheila Lester that the Board approved of the arrangement with Coughlin's
housemates (and arguably, the sublessor there), Christopher Allaback and Laura Foreshee (ne Harri-
son) (against whom, on 1/23/12, Couglin was awarded TPO's in FV12-000187 and 188), though
Allaback and Foreshee were the parties Couglhin called 911 to complain about and seek protection
from incident to the 1/14/12 arrest for misuse of emergency communciations when no actual or per-
ceived emergency exists of Coughlin ordered by the same RPD Sargent Sifre whom ordered Cough-
lin arrested for jaywalking just 48 hours previously at the other former home law office from which
Coughlin was wrongfully evicted in 03628.
ORDER DENYING ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND
COURT'S FAILURE TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NOTICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT
DO SO NOW"AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF 3/15/12 AND ORDER
OF 5/15/12 IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD AND NRCP
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60(B)(4) AND WAIVING THE REQUIREMENT FOR PARK TERRACE TOWNHOMES
ASSOCIATION TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO ZACHARY COUGHLIN'S NOTICE
ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 5, 2012, PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGANT/TENANT, ZACH COUGHLIN
("COUGHLIN") FILED A NOTICE OF CLERK'S OFFICE AND COURT'S FAILURE TO FILE COUGHLIN'S NO-
TICE OF APPEAL, REQUEST THAT IT DO SO NOW, AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROMJUDGMENT IF 3/15/12
AND ORDER OF 5/15/12 IN LIGHT OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD AND NRCP 60(B)(4)
("NOTICE/MOTION"). ALTHOUGH COUGHLIN'S PROOF OF SERVICE INDICATES THAT PARKTER-
RACE TOWNHOMES' MANAGEMENT COMPANY AND ATTORNEY WERE SERVED, THE COURT HAS DIS-
COVERED THAT, IN FACT, NEITHER WAS SERVED.
The Court has reviewed Coughlin's Notice/Motion. The Court has further considered the pa-
pers and pleadings on file herein, together with any attached exhibits, and the applicable law.
BASED UPON ITS REVIEW, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS FOR
COUGHLIN'S NOTICE/MOTION. GOODCAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBYOR-
DEREDTHAT COUGHLIN'S NOTICELMOTION IS DENIED. ITIS FURTHER ORDEREDTHAT PARK
TERRACE TOWNHOMES ASSOCIATION IS RELEASED FROM ANY REQUIREMENT TO RESPOND TO
COUGHLIN'S NOTICELMOTION. DATEDTHIS 14TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2012. /S/ JACK SCHROEDER,
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
THE APPROACH BY RJC JUDGE SCHROEDER AND OPPOSING COUNSEL GAYLE KERN, ESQ., IN 375
IS INTERESTING. COUGLIN RECEIVES JUDGE SHROEDER'S ORDER ONLY FROMKERN, ALONG WITH HER
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER. THAT IS, THE RJC AND OR JUDGE SCHROEDER DO NOT MAIL COUGHLIN
JUDGE SCHROEDER'S ORDER, BUT RATHER, PROVIDE THEM TO ONLY KERN, WHOM THEN SERVES THEM
TO COUGHLIN ONLY WITH A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, THEREBY DEPRIVING COUGLIN OF, POTEN-
TIALLY, A FEW DAYS OR SO TO REVIEW SUCH AN ORDER PRIOR TO THE DEADLINES THAT BEGIN RUNNING
UPON SERVICE OF A NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER BEGINNING TO RUN.
Additionally, Judge Schroeder's Order of 11/14/12, very curiously reads: Although Cough-
lin's Proof of Service indicates that Park Terrace Townhomes' management company and at-
torney were served, the Court has discovered that, in fact, neither was served. One can only
wonder just Judge Schroeder and the Court has discover that, in fact neither opposing counsel
Gayle Kern, Esq., nor her unauthorized practitioner of law/propery manager, Western Nevada
Managment's Sue King wer served if not by having impermissible ex parte communications with
King or Kern and or otherwise engaging in extra-judicial discussion and failing to abide by the estab-
lished precedent in Nevada that a court's adjuciatory boundaries are limited to those matters presented
to it by the litigants, rather than what the Court has discovered through some unnamed methodolo-
gy. Judge Schroeder has a duty to avoid the appearance of bias or impropriety.
The RJC file in 374 also contains a Post-It Note Order by Judge Schroeder of 3/27/12 in re-
sponse to Couglin's 3/23/12 Motion to Set Aside the 3/15/12 Lockout Order that reads Clerks,
Please see if Atty for LL is going to file a response. Send the file back to me in 13 days. JS.
Couglin has never received an inquiry or remind from any RJC Judge as to whether he is going to
respond to some filing by an opposing counsel. Such a Note Order may be interpreted to create an
appearance of impropriety, particularly given the subsequent 11/14/12 Order by Judge Sferrazza
summarily disposing of Couglin's 11/5/12 NRCP 60(b)(4) Motion/Notice and absoliving Kern of
even having to file an Opposition thereto or otherwise address Couglin's allegations of fraud on
Kern's part.
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ADDITIONALLY, COUGHLIN NOTES ANOTHER APPEARANCE OF THE CURIOUS PRACTICE OF THE
RJC AND WCDA'S OFFICE CHARACTERIZING COUGHLIN AS AN ATTORNEY WHEN IT WOULD SEEM TO
SUIT WHAT SOME MIGHT SAY IS THEIR AGENDA, AND NOT AN ATTORNEY/SUSPENDED FROM THE PRAC-
TICE OF LAW, WHEN IT SO SUITS THE SAME TO DO SO (IE, WCDADDAWATTS-VIAL'S 11/13/12 OBJEC-
TION TO COUGHLIN'S 10/30/12 SUBPOENAS ON THE 2JDC
vi
(... BY YOUR OWN ADMISSION AT THE TOP OF
THE SUBPOENA., YOU ARE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. IT FOLLOWS THAT
YOUHAVE NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS, AND THAT THERE IS NO DUTY TO COMPLY WITH THE
SAME. NRCP 45(3)...), WCDADDAKANDARAS'S 11/14/12 MOTION TO QUASH COUGLIN'S SUBPOE-
NAS/DUCES TECUMS IN 063341 FILED IN 063341, THOUGH ALSO ATTACHING ASSOCIATED SUPBOENAS IN
0204 (THE PARTIES REQUEST THAT ALL SUBPOENAS AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM ISSUED BY DE-
FENDANT ZACH COUGHLIN BE QUASHED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ISSUED AND SERVED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH NRS 174.305...WITH RESPECT TO EXHIBITS AAND B, THOSE SUBPOENAS WERE NOT
PROPERLY ISSUED...THE PARTIES REQUEST THAT THE COURT'S ORDER ISSUED NOVEMBER 8, 2012 (EX-
HIBIT D) BE EXTENDED TO THE REFERENCED SUBPOENAS IN EXHIBITS AAND B. SPECIFICALLY, PARA-
GRAPH 2 OF THAT ORDER STATES THAT "ANY SUBPOENA NOT PROPERLY ISSUED BY THE CLERK OR OTH-
ERWISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NRS 174.305 IS HEREBY QUASHED." SUBPOENA IN EXHIBIT AWAS NOT
ISSUED BY THE COURT...), RJC JUDGE SFERRAZZA'S 11/8/12, 11/16/12, AND 11/19/12 ORDERS QUASH-
ING COUGHLIN'S SUBPOENAS AND GRANTING THE RENO CITY ATTORNEY SKAU'S MOTION FOR A TEM-
PORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER PREVENTING COUGHLIN FROM BEING ABLE TO EVEN HAVE ANY NEW SUB-
POENAS ISSUED BY THE RJC.
RJC Judges Clifton and Sferrazza have indicated they view it as Coughlin's fault that he is-
sued and or had issued and or had served so many subpoenas on or around October 30
th
, 2012 in
both 063341 and 0204. They do not view the 15 different arrests of Couglin this year as overkill by
the local judiciary and law enforcement/prosecutors as having some role in attempted utilization fo
such subpoenas, the obstructionist approach by the Washoe County Public Defender's Office in
fighting to stay on as attorney of record in Coughlin's cases in 063341 and 065630 as long as possi-
ble, only to, at the last minuted (usually at the 15 day deadline prior to Trial to file a Pre-Trial Mo-
tion, obtain and Order allowing the withdrawal of WCPD Jim Leslie, Esq., or Biray Dogan, Esq.,
leaving Coughlin to make up for lost time in terms of using subpoenas for his defense), or the as a
mitigating factor Judge Sferrazza's express indication, on the record on 10/22/12 in 063341 that he
absolutely would not grant Coughlin a continuance of the continuation of Trial in 063341 he then set
for 11/19/12 despite Couglin indicating that the State Bar of Nevada was to hold Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12. At that same hearing, shortly after announcing that he had refused
the SBN's request to testify at that 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, Judge Sferrazza failed to
disclose the 4/11/12 written correspondence and voluntary submission of Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing in
065630, the dockets in 065630 and 063341, and the offer to send Couglin's 2/15/12 Pre-Trial Motion
in 063341 to the SBN to Coughlin. Such a failure to disclose his Judicial Secretarie's submission to
the SBN by Judge Sferrazza arguably creates the appearance of impropriety and or an inference sup-
porting of a finding of evident impartiality or bias.
The RJC file in 374 contains another curiousity where, upon Couglin
COUGLIN WAS CHARGED WITH A GROSS MISDEMEANOR NECESSITATING A $300 BAIL EXPENDI-
TURE, AND TO WHICH COUGLIN WAS ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION AT ALL STAGES OF THE PROCEED-
INGS, DESPITE HIS WCPDBIRAY DOGAN FAILING TO APPEAR ON HIS BEHALF (AS HAD BEEN AGREED TO
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UPON COUGLIN AND DOGAN DISCUSSING THE MATTER ON 2/8/12 IN PERSON) AT THE 2/14/12 ARRAIGN-
MENT (WHICH THE RJC HAS NOT CHARACTERIZED IN ITS DOCKET AS CANCELLED, APPARENTLY TO
PROTECT DOGAN FROM A POTENTIAL RPC VIOLATION...THOUGH RJC JUDICIAL SECRETARY LORI
TOWNSEND DID MANAGE TO VOLUNTARILY SEND THE SBN, IN HER 4/11/12 EMAIL TO ASST. BAR
COUNSEL KING, COUGHLIN'S 2/21/12 FILE STAMPED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, ETC. IN THAT MATTER,
RJC RCR2012-065630, ALONG WITH THE DOCKETS IN THAT CASE AND ANOTHER RETALIATORY PROSE-
CUTION OF COUGHLIN IN 063341, IN ADDITION TO OFFERING TO SEND COUGHLIN'S 2/15/12 PRE-TRIAL
MOTION IN 063341 AS WELL IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAUSE COUGHLIN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SBN, IN AN
APPARENT RETALIATORY MOVE IN CONNECTION WITH COUGHLIN'S SUMMARY EVICTION IN 1708, IS-
SUES WITH RJC BAILIFFS, AND THE CRITICISMS OF THE PROCESS ONE MIGHT READ INTO COUGHLIN'S
2/21/12 FILIGN IN 065630, WHICH IS CITED IN BAR COUNSEL'S 8/23/12 COMPLAINT THUSLY:
9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, Notice
of Appearance Entry of Plea of Not Guilty, Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to
Dismiss, etc. in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012
065630, City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Re-
spondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court
and opposing counsel.
Coughlin subsequently filed a grievance against Dogan which Asst. Bar Counsel King
promptly failed to investigate in any discernible manner and dismissed without assisgning it a griev-
ance number, alleging an inability to prove by the clear and convicing evidence standard any
ethicial or RPC violation by Dogan, despite Dogan's failure to appear at the 2/14/12 gross misde-
meanor arraignment being required by statute.
King similarly issued a dismissal letter to Couglin of a grievance Couglin filed against his
then RMC court appointed defender Keith Loomis, which alleged, amongst other things, a lack of
zealous advocacy, competence, diligence, and a failure by Loomis to adhere to the dictates of RPC
3.1 in refusing to assert a claim of right defense on Coughlin's behalf to the criminal trespass prose-
cution where Hill and Baker admitted verbally and in writing that they were charging Coughlin the
same $900 previously charged for full use and occupancy of his former home law office at 121 Riv-
er Rock during the month of November 2011, where Couglin as arrested at his former home law of-
fice on 11/13/11 for criminal trespass.
King's Complaint also goes on to allege:
10. Respondent was arrested on November 13, 2011 by Reno Police
Department and charged with trespassing, a misdemeanor, for which he was
later convicted.
11. The circumstances leading to the above-mentioned arrest are as fol-
lows: at an hearing Justice of the Peace Peter Sferrazza ordered that Respondent
vacate the home he was renting effective November 1, 2011. After the locks
were changed and the notice was posted on the front door the owner, Dr.
Merliss, discovered that someone had broken into the home and was barricaded
in the basement. The Reno Police tried to coax whoever was in the basement to
open the door. Dr. Merliss was forced to kick open the door where the Reno Po-
lice found Respondent. Respondent had broken into the home and living in the
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basement. Respondent was arrested for criminal trespass and was subsequently
convicted of that charge.
12. RESPONDENT, REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS CO-COUNSEL, FILED A 36-
PAGE MOTION TO DISMISS ON MARCH 5, 2012. THE MOTION WAS DENIED BY
JUDGE WILLIAM GARDNER AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHOUT MERIT. THE
MOTION, ON ITS FACE, DEMONSTRATES THAT RESPONDENT LACKS COMPETENCE
TO PRACTICE LAW.
FURTHER, KING'S REFUSAL TO ALLOWCOUGHLIN TO EVEN SEE OR REVIEW THE MATERIALS
SUBMITTED ALONG WITH JUDGE HOLMES' 3/14/12 GRIEVANCE AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS SUBMIT-
TED BY THE RMC (INCLUDING THE 23 EXHIBIT SUBMISSION OF 4/16/12, THAT DID INCLUDE
COUGHLIN'S 3/5/12 MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS MATTER BEFORE JUDGE W.
GARDNER IN 26405) HAMPERED THE CONFLICT/JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION ANALYSIS ATTENDANT TO
A NUMBER OF CASES, INCLUDING THAT CRIMINAL TRESPASS PROSECUTION.
COUGHLIN BELIEVES HE WAS ON TIME FOR THE 8:30 AMHEARING ON 3/15/12, THOUGH THE JAVS AUDIO RECORDING/VIDEO
COUGLIN PAID THE RJC$35 FOR(IT IS ONLY2 MINUTES 12 SECONDS LONG) HAS A VISUAL TIME STAMPING INDICATING A START TIME
OF THE RECORDING THE RJCPROVIDED TOCOUGLHIN OF 8:33:35 AMON3/15/12 (THE RJCHRLF ITSELF OUT TO THE PUBLIC AT ALL
RELEVANT TIMES AS STARTING SUCH HEARINGS AND STACKED DOCKETS AT 8:30 AM). REGARDLESS, THE LANDLORD'S AFFIDAVIT
THAT KERN FILED AFTERTHAT SUMMARY EVICTION HEARING IS FILE STAMPED AS BEING FILED AT 9:24
AM. THE AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF THAT 3/15/12 SUMMARY EVICTION HEARING REVEALS RJC
JUDGE SCHROEDERS JUDICIAL ASSISTANT PROMPTING HIM TO GO OUT OF THE ORDER HE HAD
PLANNED TO HEAR THE CASES ON HIS STACKED DOCKET IN IN ORDER TO, HOPEFULLY, SPEED
THROUGH A DEFAULT AGAINST COUGHLIN, WHOM THE CLERK NOTES ON THE AUDIO TRANSCRIPT,
HAD YET TO SHOWUP THAT MORNING. SUBSEQUENTLY, COUGHLIN HAS RECEIVED ORDER FROM
JUDGE SCHROEDER ONLYBY THEIR BEING ATTACHED TO NOTICE OF ENTRY MAILED OUT BY
KERN, CURIOUSLY. FURTHER, A RECENT ORDER BYJUDGE SCHROEDER CURIOUSLYABSOLVES
KERN FROM NEEDING TO RESPOND TO COUGHLIN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SUMMARYEVIC-
TION, NOTING THAT JUDGE SCHROEDER HAS LEARNED THAT KERN AND KING ...
The 3/15/12 Lockout Order by RJC Judge Schroeder in 374 not only contains the wrong ad-
dress of the building from which Coughlin was actually evicted later that day, but further was
signed and file stamped in priory to Kern filing a sworn Lanldord's Affidavit as required by law,
containing the assertions and information required by NRS 40.253. That 3/15/12 Lockout Order
reads:
UPON APPLICATION duly and regularly made by Park Terrace
Townhornes, Landlord, and proof therein, supported by a sworn
Affidavit on the date hereinafter mentioned, and good causing appearing
therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS: That the Sheriff of Washoe County, or one of their duly
authorized agent, are hereby directed to remove each and every person
found upon and within those certain premises located at 1442 E 9th ST
Reno NV 89512, Reno Washoe County, Nevada within 24 hours after
receipt of this order .
The 3/15/12 RJC Rev2012-000374 Lockout Order taped to door by WCSO with fax header
from RJC timed 8:24 am though file stamped 9:33 am PTTHOA wcso 0204. The WCSO Civil Di-
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vision has indicated to Coughlin, both through Liz Stuchell, Roxy Silva, and Maureen, that the RJC
faxes Lockout Orders to the WCSO Civil Division, and the WCSO takes the fax, inputs by hand into
a software program the time of receipt of such Order (which is not necessarily the same as the
time of receipt of the fax as indicated by the time stamping and fax number received from shown in
the fax header as printed onto the Lockout Orders by the WCSO Civil Division fax machine),
whereupon no copy of such fax is made or maintained by the WCSO Civil Division, but rather, that
faxed Lockout Order is then given to the Deputies whom will perform the lockout within 24 hours
of receipt of that Lockout Order, and that such lockout procedure includes taping that faxed Lock-
out Order to the tenant's door. Coughlin maintained the exact faxed Lockout Order that WCSO
Deputies Cannizaro and Durben taped to his door on 3/15/12 at approximately 1:45 pm at 1422 E.
9
th
St. #2 (shortly before the 3/15/12 hearing before NVB Judge Bessley in Cadle Co. v. Keller that
Judge Beesley testified to at the 11/14/12 Hearing, at first indicating that Coughlin did not have a
jacket on when appearing at the hearing, but then later admitting on cross examination that
Couglhin, in fact, was wearing a suit jacket during that appearance.
The Lockout Order in 374 is like most every Lockout Order issued by an RJC Judge, even
though the landlord had an attorney representing it. The RJC has indicated to Coughlin (through
Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil and Clerk Bonnie Cooper) that, when an attorney is representing the
landlord, the attorneys will typically prepare their own Orders, and that the attorneys will then ar-
range for such Orders to be delivered or transmitted to the WCSO Civil Division. That assertion
runs counter to the sworn testimony by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., at the criminal trespass
prosecution trial of Couglhin on 6/18/12 in RMC 26405, where Baker swears:
REGARDLESS, NEITHER THE 10/25/11 EVICTION DECISION AND ORDER, NOR THE 10/27/11
FOFCOL AND ORDER OF SUMMARY EVICTION IN 1708 CONTAINS THE LANGUAGE REQUIRED BY NRS
40.253 FOUND ABOVE IN THE LOCKOUT ORDER BY JUDGE SCHROEDER IN 374 ( THAT THE SHERIFF OF
WASHOE COUNTY, OR ONE OF THEIR DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT, ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REMOVE
EACH AND EVERYPERSON FOUND UPON AND WITHIN THOSE CERTAIN PREMISES LOCATED AT (IN-
SERT ADDRESS OF RENTAL HERE), RENO WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RE-
CEIPT OF THIS ORDER.
Further, with respect to the criminal trespass prosecution of Coughlin in 26405 based
upon an arrest on 11/13/11 of Coughlin at his former home law office at 121 River Rock St., 89512,
no language in either the 10/25/11 eviction Decision and Order, nor the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order
of Summary eviction in 1708 could reasonably be said to be tantamount to a warning sufficient to
support a finding that Coughlin's presence at the location alone (without any further warning, request
that he leave, or signage warning against trespassing) would suffice to support a conviction for crimi-
nal trespass. Where RCA Hazlett-Steven's suggestion that State v. McNichols supported such a find-
ing was expressly cited by RMC Judge L. Gardner, a lack of due process is evident, particularly
where Judge Gardner ruled as irrelevant Coughlin's contentions that neither of those Orders in 1708
were appropriately served (never mind the fact that the Orders were stale in one respect, and the
lockout was effectuated too early in other respects, much less that voidness for lack of jurisdiction of
the Orders themselves in light of NRS 40.253(6)'s dicates
It is rather curious that it was on that same 2/27/12 date as the simple traffic citation
trial in RMC 26800 before Judge Nash Holmes resulting in an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin
and a 5 day summary incarceration and confiscating without a warrant an not pursuant to a search
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incident to arrest of Coughlin's HTC G2 smart phone, free standing 32 GB micro SD data card, Sam-
sung flip phone, and Braun electric shaver for 37 days, at which point the items were returned to
Coughlin with all data thereon wiped, damaging Couglin's law practice, making it overly difficult to
compensate for the sudden 5 day summary incarceration and imprudent denial of a stay by Judge
Holmes on 2/27/12, or to know of or attend the 3/12/12 continuation of the trial before her in 26800,
which was improperly held given the competency issues Judge Nash Holmes herself found to be in
question as to Coughlin in both her 2/28/12 Order (which Coughlin did not receive until finding it
attached to a filing in 60975 in mid June 2012, given the RMC mailed it to the 121 River Rock ad-
dress that it knew was no longer good for Coughlin, and where the RMC had been provided Cough-
lin's then current 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 address on multiple occassions, including in a 2/23/12 filed Mo-
tion to Set Aside the candy bar and cough drops conviction in 22176 in the matter before RMC
Judge Howard, which was the subject of a RMC Judge meeting discussing the strategy the RMC
would take with Coughlin prior to the 2/27/12 trial date. So, Judge Holmes' contention, in her
3/14/12 formal written complaint against Coughlin to the RMC that she was having such difficulty
contacting Coughlin given the four or so different addresses the RMC had for him (noting that she
had heard he may be living in his car...which indicates, along with the premature Lockout Order
entered at 8:24 am, per the time stamped fax header in 374, by RJC Judge Schroeder the very next
day, 3/15/12, that RMC Judge Nash Holmes, and RJC Judge Schroeder had extra-judicial discussions
related to Coughlin (perhaps that is where Judge Holmes was between 1:30 pm and 3:00pm when her
Judicial Assistant can be heard on the record remarking as to how strange it was that no one could
figure out where Judge Nash Holmes was exactly, indicating Holmes may have, by that point, ven-
tured over the RJC for a little strategizing as to the approach with Coughlin). What is strange is that
the fax header on the 3/8/12 file stamped TENANT'S ANSWER AND TENANTS AFFIDA-
VIT/DECLARATION TO 30 DAYNOTICE TO QUIT; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND AT-
TORNEY'S FEES indicates that that filing was received by the RJC on 2/27/12...further, a file stamp-
ing of 3/5/12 can be seen on that filing, though it is crossed out and marked as filed in error. Most
likely, the 3/8/12 file stamping, compared to the 2/27/12 fax header date stamping of receipt by the
RJC is owing to the RJC not filing in the Tenant's Answer where the IFP submitted along with was
denied, until Coughlin paid the $33 filing fee, which he ultimately did, likely on 3/8/12.
Couglin's 3/8/12 Tenant's Answer in 374 contains, in part, the following argument and cita-
tion:
...COMES NOW, THE UNDERSIGNED TENANT AND STATES: 1. I AM THE TEN-
ANT OF A RENTAL UNITED LOCATED AT 1422 E. 9TH ST. #2, RENO 89512. 2. MY
RENT IS NOT SUBSIDIZED BY PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY OR OTHER GOVERN-
MENTAL AGENCY. GLAZIER V. JUSTICE COURT OF SMITH VALLEY TP., 111
NEV. 864, 899 P.2D 1105 (NEV. JUL 27, 1995): "SUMMARY EVICTION STATUTE
ALLOWING LANDLORD TO APPLY TO JUSTICE'S COURT FOR EVICTION ORDER BASED ON
DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF RENT DID NOT APPLY TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION
AGAINST TENANT WHO NEVER PAID ANY RENT NOR WAS REQUIRED TO PAY ANY AND,
THUS, SUMMARY EVICTION ORDER WAS OUTSIDE JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE'S COURT.
N.R.S. 40.253..ON MARCH 1, 1993, RICHARD FULSTONE, PRESIDENT OF FULSTONE,
SERVED GLAZIER WITH A THIRTY-DAY NOTICE TO QUIT THE PROPERTY. GLAZIER FAILED
TO VACATE THE PREMISES,AND ON APRIL 2, 1993, FULSTONE SERVED GLAZIER WITH A
FIVE-DAY NOTICE. THIS NOTICE EXPRESSLY THREATENED AN ACTION IN JUSTICE'S
COURT FOR EVICTION, PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253,FN1 THE SUMMARY EVICTION STAT-
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UTE. FN1. NRS 40.253 ALLOWS A LANDLORD TO APPLY TO THE JUSTICE'S COURT FOR
AN EVICTION ORDER BASED ON DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF RENT. IF THE TENANT CAN
SHOW, BY AFFIDAVIT, A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, FUR-
THER PROCEEDINGS MUST BE CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE MORE FORMAL EVICTION
PROCEDURES IN NRS 40.290 TO 40.420. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TENANT FAILS TO
SHOW A LEGAL DEFENSE TO THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THEN THE JUSTICE'S
COURT MAY ISSUE A SUMMARY ORDER FOR REMOVAL OF THE TENANT. THE JUSTICE'S
COURT HELD A HEARING PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF NRS 40.253 AND ORDERED
THAT GLAZIER VACATE THE PROPERTY WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. GLAZIER THEN FILED A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, ALLEGING THAT
THE JUSTICE'S COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER THE SUMMARY EVICTION
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE BY, INTER ALIA, INQUIRING INTO MATTERS BEYOND THE
TRUTHFULNESS AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVITS, AND FAILING TO DISMISS THE
SUMMARY EVICTION PROCEEDING ONCE A LEGAL DEFENSE HAD BEEN RAISED. THE
DISTRICT COURT HELD A HEARING ON THE WRIT PETITION AND DENIED THE PETITION.
ON APPEAL TO THIS COURT, GLAZIER ARGUES THAT, PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253, ONCE
HE RAISED THE LEGAL DEFENSE THAT HE WAS A LIFE TENANT UNDER THE GRANT OF A
LIFE ESTATE, THE JUSTICE'S COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO DISMISS THE SUMMARY PRO-
CEEDING AND TO REQUIRE THAT THE LANDLORD PROSECUTE HIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER
ACTION UNDER THE PLENARY EVICTION PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED FOR IN NRS 40.290
TO 40.420. **1106 ALTHOUGH GLAZIER'S ARGUMENT IS LOGICALLY SOUND, IT IS SIMP-
LY IRRELEVANT. IT IS CLEAR THAT, DESPITE ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND THE
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES BEFORE THIS COURT, NRS 40.253 DOES NOT APPLY TO
THIS CASE. THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE WHEN THE TENANT OF ANY DWELLING [ ]
WITH PERIODIC RENT RESERVED BY THE MONTH OR ANY SHORTER PERIOD, IS IN DE-
FAULT IN PAYMENT OF THE RENT. (EMPHASIS *866 ADDED.) ALL PARTIES TO THIS AC-
TION CONCEDE THAT GLAZIER NEVER PAID ANY RENT, NOR WAS HE REQUIRED TO PAY
ANY. IT MAY BE THAT FULSTONE IS ENTITLED TO HAVE GLAZIER REMOVED FROM THE
PROPERTY, BUT NOT PURSUANT TO NRS 40.253. THERE WAS NO CASE OR CONTROVER-
SY BEFORE THE JUSTICE'S COURT BASED ON NRS 40.253, AND ACCORDINGLY, THE JUS-
TICE'S COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION BY ISSUING THE SUMMARY EVICTION OR-
DER. ACCORDINGLY, WE REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND RE-
MAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO GRANT THE WRIT. FURTHER, WE
ORDER THAT THE EVICTION ORDER ENTERED BY THE JUSTICE'S COURT BE VACATED.
NEV.,1995. GLAZIER V. JUSTICE COURT OF SMITH VALLEY TP. 111 NEV. 864, 899 P.2D
1105, SEE, ALSO, NEV.,1996. LIPPIS V. PETERS 112 NEV. 1008, 921 P.2D 1248..." (PAGE
4)...I HAVE A LEASE WHICH HAS NOT EXPIRED AND THE LANDLORD HAS NOT GIVEN ME
NOTICE THAT THEY/SHE IS TERMINATING MY LEASE. MY LEASE ALLOWS ME TO USE THE
PREMISES FOR A HYBRID PURPOSE OF A HOME LAW OFFICE, IE A COMMERCIAL LEASE, AS
SUCH THE NO CAUSE TYPE OF EVICTION IS NOT AVAILABLE HERE, ESPECIALLY WHERE,
AS HER, MY LEASE HAS NOT TERMINATED BY ITS TERMS AS OF YET. I HAVE NOT RE-
CEIVED A NOTICE FROM THE LANDLORD TELLING ME TO LEAVE THE PREMISES. THEY
CAN TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY TOLD "JOHN DOE" TO DO, BUT...AITKEN REQUIRES THEY
CHANGE ANY "JOHN DOE" NOTICES TO REFLECT MY ACTUAL NAME ONE THEY WERE AP-
PRISED OF IT. THE WERE AS EARLY AS JANUARY 5TH, 2011 ACCORDING TO SUE KING,
YET THEY FAILED TO SERVE APPROPRIATE NOTICE.. IF I HAVE EVER OWED THE LAND-
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LORD ANY RENT, I HAVE PAID IT ALL OR HAVE PAID IT WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY
LAW. ASSOCIATION'S NEGLIGENCE VIS A VIS LAURA AND CHRIS'S NEGLIGENT
ANDINTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED AGAINST ME, WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THOU-
SANDS OF DOLLARS OF DAMAGES. PLEASE COPY ME ON ANY AND ALL CORRESPOND-
ENCE VIA FAX OR EMAIL AS THE LANDLORDS AND OR THEIR ARGENTS HAVE BEEN OR
AREWITHHOLDING MY MAIL OR OTHERWISE INTERFERRING WITH MY ACCES TO IT, AND
THEY HAVE ALSO DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE ESSENTIAL SERVICE OF ELECTRICITY..
ASSOCIATION'S NEGLIGENCE VIS A VIS LAURA AND CHRIS'S NEGLIGENT
ANDINTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED AGAINST ME, WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THOU-
SANDS OF DOLLARS OF DAMAGES. PLEASE COPY ME ON ANY AND ALL CORRESPOND-
ENCE VIA FAX OR EMAIL AS THE LANDLORDS AND OR THEIR ARGENTS HAVE BEEN OR
AREWITHHOLDING MY MAIL OR OTHERWISE INTERFERRING WITH MY ACCES TO IT, AND
THEY HAVE ALSO D WRITTEN COMPLAINT TO PTHOA'A EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS, CAUS-
ING PTHOATO RETALIATE AGAINST COUGHLIN WAS PROVIDE ON JANUARY 8, 2012 IN
TWO SEPARATE WRITINGS, WHICH ALLEGED: "PURSUANT TO NRS 118A AND NRS 40, I
AM HEREBY COMPLAINING IN WRITING OF YOURS AND LAURA HARRISON'S VIOLATION
OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMINAL LAWS: AFELONY CONVICTION FOR MALICIOUS DESTRUC-
TION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER NRS 206.310 AND 193.155 MUST BE CIVIL LIA-
BILITYFOR LOSS OR DAMAGE TOPROPERTYNRS 205.980 DETERMINATION
OF VALUE OF LOSS FROM CRIME; NOTICE TO VICTIM; ORDER OF RESTITUTION DEEMED
JUDGMENT TO COLLECT DAMAGES. CHAPTER 206 - MALICIOUS MISCHIEF NRS
206.005 GRAFFITI DEFINED. NRS 206.010 DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF PROPERTY
BY UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY. NRS 206.015 DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF CROPS, GAR-
DENS, TREES OR SHRUBS. NRS 206.040 ENTERING PROPERTY WITH INTENTION TO
DAMAGE OR DESTROY PROPERTY. NRS 206.125 DAMAGE OF PROPERTY USED FOR PUR-
POSE OF RELIGION, FOR BURIAL OR MEMORIALIZING OF DEAD, FOR EDUCATION, AS
TRANSPORTATION FACILITY, AS PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION VEHICLE OR AS COMMUNITY
CENTER; DAMAGE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY CONTAINED THEREIN; PENALTIES; RESTITU-
TION. NRS 206.140 NUISANCE IN BUILDING; TRESPASS UPON GROUNDS; DISTURBING
ASSEMBLY. NRS 206.150 KILLING, MAIMING, DISFIGURING OR POISONING ANIMAL OF
ANOTHER PERSON; KILLING ESTRAY OR LIVESTOCK. NRS 206.160 LEADING OR DRIVING
HORSE AWAY WITHOUT AUTHORITY. NRS 206.200 POSTING OF BILLS, SIGNS OR POST-
ERS UNLAWFUL. NRS 206.220 REMOVAL, ALTERATION OR DESTRUCTION OF MONU-
MENTS OR LANDMARKS DESIGNATING BOUNDARIES. NRS 206.260 FRAUDULENT AND
MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF WRITINGS. NRS 206.270 DEFACING PROCLAMATIONS AND
NOTICES. NRS 206.280 TAMPERING WITH PAPERS. NRS 206.290 OPENING OR PUBLISH-
ING SEALED LETTER OR TELEGRAM. NRS 206.300 FALSE SIGNALS ENDANGERING CARS,
VESSELS OR MOTORS. NRS 206.310 INJURY TO OTHER PROPERTY. NRS 206.320 UN-
LAWFUL REMOVAL OF PETRIFIED WOOD FROM POSTED OR DESIGNATED SITES; DUTIES OF
CERTAIN OFFICERS. NRS 206.330 PLACING GRAFFITI ON OR OTHERWISE DEFACING
PROPERTY: FINES AND PENALTIES; PARENT OR GUARDIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR FINES AND
PENALTIES IF PERSON VIOLATING SECTION IS UNDER AGE OF 18 YEARS; SUSPENSION OF
DRIVERS LICENSE. NRS 206.335 CARRYING GRAFFITI IMPLEMENT AT CERTAIN LOCA-
TIONS WITH INTENT TO VANDALIZE, PLACE GRAFFITI ON OR DEFACE PROPERTY. NRS
206.340 GRAFFITI REWARD FUND CREATED; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT TO BE IM-
POSED FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS; USE OF MONEY IN FUND. NRS 206.345 PERSON OR
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ENTITY TO BE PAID IF RESTITUTION IS ORDERED FOR VIOLATION OF NRS 206.125 OR
206.330. ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ." THE SECOND WRITING: "THIS IS ADDITIONAL WRIT-
TEN NOTICE PURSUANT TO NRS 118AAND NRS 40 COMPLAINING OF AND REQUESTING
REPAIRS AND REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE FOLLOWING: NO CGFI OUTLET NEAR SINK IN
UPSTAIRS BATHROOM. YOUBROKE THE DOOR TO MY ROOM AND THE LOCK AND FAILED
TO PROVIDE A KEY LAURA HARRISON SLASHED TWO OF MY TIRES, NECESSITATING $150
IN REPAIRS. YOUTHREW HOT COFFEE ON ME AND RUINED MY HTC G2 SMARTPHONE, A
$400 PHONE YOUHAVE BREACHED ARE DEAL WITH RESPECT TO MY BEING ALLOWED TO
BE NEW CARPET OVER THE VERY DIRTY CARPET DOWNSTAIRS. YOUHAVE REPEATEDLY
USED FORCE AND THREAT OF FORCE TO PREVENT ME FROM ACCESSING THE WASHING
MACHINE DOWNSTAIRS FOR DOING LAUNDRY AND PREVENTED MY USE OF THE KITCHEN
YOU ADMITTED TO CHANGING THE DEADBOLTS ON THE FRONT AND BACK DOOR'S ON
NEW YEARS DAY AT 12:30 AM, LOCKING ME OUTSIDE ON A NIGHT WITH FREEZING TEM-
PERATURES, NECESSITATING AN EXPENSE OF $60 FOR ALTERNATE LODGING THAT
NIGHT. FURTHER, YOUAND LAURA HARRISON HAVE UNLAWFULLY INTERRUPTED AN
ESSENTIAL SERVICE, MY ELECTRICITY, REPEATEDLY. NRS 118A.390. PLEASE CURE
THESE ISSUES OR I INTEND TO DEDUCT THEM FROM ANY FUTURE RENT. I AM COMPLAIN-
ING OF YOURS AND LAURA HARRISON'S VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW STATUTES MY
DOG HAD CHEWING GUM STUCK IN ITS HAIR IN SEVERAL PLACES, IN A MANNER THAT
SUGGESTS IT WAS PURPOSEFULLY DONE. I WILL REMIND YOUTHAT ABUSE TO ANIMALS
IS INCLUDED IN THE PROTECTION ORDER STATUTES. FURTHER, YOUAND MS.
HARRISON ARE IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW IN PREVENTING MY ACCESS TO THE
MAILBOX INCLUDED IN OUR AGREEMENT, AS IT WAS AGREED THAT I WOULD BE AF-
FORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE MAIL AT THE 1422 E. 9TH ST. #2 ADDRESS AND
USE OF THE MAILBOX. SINCERELY, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ." (PAGES 18-20)......
...The landlord's Complaint fails to state facts which would allow him/her to evict me, further King
and Western Nevada Management and Shiela Lester have admitted they received nothing pursuant to
their arrangement with Allaback and Foreshee, as such the Nevada Supreme Court holding in Glazier
makes inapplicable a summary eviction proceeding. Further, where, as here, my lease allows me to
use the premises for a home law office, and the non-payment of rent has not been alleged, NRS
40.253 makes inapplicable a summary eviction procedure under those circumstances, rather, a plena-
ry procedure is required. Regardless, a proper jury trial demand is hereby made. There is perhaps an-
other person against whom this action should be brought, namely Erin Allaback and Laure Forshee. I
have not been properly named in the notices. Rather, the Notice purportedly posed on January 10th,
2012 only names a "John Doe" despite my numerous writings to Western Nevada wherein my name
was madse clear. The Aitken case makes clear that the procedural and notice requirements of sum-
mary eviction matters must be stricly adhered to, as such this "John Doe" notice is ineffective. I have
other defenses as follows: retaliation, discrimination, lack of allegation of nonpayment of rent, HOA
admitted tenants were not obligated to pay rent, as such, under Glazier, summary eviction procedures
unavailable. IMPORTANT: In some cases, the Court has the power to give you time to find a new
place to live even if you do not have any of the listed defenses. If you wish the Court to determine
whether you are entitled to it, please check below: I have provided written request to landlord for an
extension of 30 days in light of my disability. I am writing to request the 30 days extension based up-
on disability. I am invoking my HIPAA and other privacy rights with respect to divulging anythign
further about my disability. COUNTERCLAIM If you believe that you are entitled to a return of part
of your rent payment or other damages from the landlord, complete the statement below: I here by
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counterclaim in excess of $10,000 in damages. I feel that I am entitled to this amount for the follow-
ing reasons: damages to myself, my clients, and my practice in light of landlord's and landlord's
agents actions. Laura and Chris being the Associations employees and therefore you guys or them
wanted to settle with me on account of a respondeat superior theory of liability making your exposure
significant enough to justify doing so. Association's negligence vis a vis Laura and Chris's negligent
andintentional torts committed against me, which have resulted in thousands of dollars of damages.
Please copy me on any and all correspondence via fax or email as the landlords and or their argents
have been or arewithholding my mail or otherwise interferring with my acces to it, and they have also
done with respect to the essential service of electricity. (pages 26-28)///Being an attorney is hard
enough without dealing with all of Park Terrace's malfeasance." Coughlin also, within that 3/8/12
file stamped filing, sought sanctions: Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11,
June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308, Jeremy D. Spector....WHEREFORE, tenant, Zach Coughlin,
prays that this Court rule that a summary eviction proceeding is unavailable to landlord here and
award in excess of $10,000 damages to Tenant/Counterclaimant. (page 31)...
Also, the 3/8/12 Case Appeal Statement Couglhin filed in the appeal of the first summary
eviction from Coughlin's former home law office, before Judge Flanagan, contains a great deal of
inflammatory information related to RMC, RPD, Reno City Attorney, RJC, WCSO, and others that
ought be considered in evaluating the events, orders, and grievances that ensued on 3/12/12 (Order
by RMC Holmes in 26800), 3/14/12 (greivance by Holmes to the SBN against Coughlin and sub-
mission by Holmes of 4/13/09 Order After Trial of Judge L. Gardner, which WLS (see 60302 and
60317) cited, in Exec. Director Elcano's 5/1/09 and 5/7/09 letters to Coughlin explaining his suspen-
sion and termination as the sole reason for both (that 4/13/09 OAT resulted in Coughlin filign 53833
and 54844, which Elcano, whom testified to being very protective of my employees claime, in his
sworn testimony, to have either not been aware of or to not have reviewed at all...somehow Elcano
decided not to even wait for Judge L. Gardner to rule on Coughlin's 4/27/09 or 4/30/09 Motion for
Reconsideration before deciding to fire Coughlin, though Elcano's testimony on 11/14/12 revealed
the extent to which Elcano has a complete lack of knowledge with respect to the substantive issues
involved in 01168...Elcano just knows he wants to do whatever the Judge wants, despite Elcano ad-
mitting to having mentored and trained Coughlin with such advice as when you walk into that
courtroom, its not the opposing counsel's courtroom, its not the judges courtroom....its YOUR court-
room!.
Regardless, the SBN was provided the 2/23/12 filing by Coughlin in 22176 (it was
included in the 11/8/12 3,200 page document production to Coughlin by the SBN), which contained
argument critical of the handling of the prosecution of Coughlin incident to the 11/30/11 Trial, and
immediate, stay denied, 3 day summary contempt incarceration of Couglin by RMC Judge Howard,
whom had denied Coughlin both court appointed Counsel (despite failing to specifically rule that jail
time was not a possibility and the mandatory authority found in the 2008 Nevada Courts of Limited
Jurisdiction Bench Book known to all judges in Nevada by the Aigersinger U.S. Supreme Court
case). Regardless, the RMC received as undeliverable the 2/28/12 Order in 26800 that it mailed
Coughlin, then proceeded to fail to remail it to any of the other addresses it had for Coughlin, much
less the most current one indicated on Coughlin's 2/23/12 filing in 22176, or even on Coughlin's
3/7/12 or 3/12/12 filings in 26800, much less fax or email it to the number and address held out by
Coughlin on his filings and at www.nvbar.org.
That 2/27/12 traffic citation trial in the RMC resulted in Holmes sending a written grievance
against Coughlin to the SBN, NG12-0434, apparently (the SBN has been very evasive about which
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greivance number belongs to which greivance or grievant, making it difficult to follow RPC 4.2 with
much certainty, to the benefit of the SBN, which has managed to enjoy much synergy with the
WCDA (particularly TPO/EPO Application suggester DDA Mary Kandaras and DDA David Watts-
Vial (relation of 2JDC Administrative Assistant, Laura Watts-Vial, Esq., before whom Coughlin as a
UIFSA case that threatened the hegemony of the WCDA Family Support Division's hegemony in
FV11-03379, G. Jones v. D. Harris) a companion case to the FV05 custody matter for which Cough-
lin did an enormous amount of work but was only paid about $100.00 of the agreed upon $1,500, so
the whole Affidavit of Poverty with the RMC and King, Holmes, and RMC Judge Howard (in his
12/16/11 Order in 22176) taking issue with Coughlin being a licensed attorney while also claiming
poverty, where also claiming his incarceration would prejudice his client's cases is not all that non-
sensical.
One must give King and the RMC Judges some latitude there, though, as, being government
employes and or elected officials, it must be awfully hard for them to imagine someone working
without getting paid. For King, it is probably difficult for him to imagine someone working to get
paid, and similarly, King must have an inordinately difficult time imagining practicing law without
the benefit of SCR 106 immunity. Pretty charmed life that Pat King lives. Gets to bring his Great
Dane to work at the Double R office of the SBN. Leaves prior to 5 pm according to Nevada Lawyer
contributor Paula Campbell (the SBN's filing office occasionally closes in the middle of the day or
prior to 5 pm, which, Couglhin can attest, makes securing a filing date and or file stamped copy ra-
ther problematic at times, as does being subject to TPOs or EPOs, purportedly served by Reno Jus-
tice Court Bailiffs in either the RJC Filing Office or the Department of Alternative Sentencing
(DAS) kiosk/closet with a window located within the RJC Filing Office, adorned with signage point-
ing out the separateness of the DAS kiosk/program from the RJC's Filing Office. Courthouse sanc-
tuary doctrine and the general prohibition against serving attorney's process where they are access-
ing a court or filing office makes void both the TPO and EPO for both Washoe County in 599 and
the SBN in 607, nevermind the fact that the workplace protection order application and Orders are
void for lack of the posting of the $100.00 bond required by statute.
Further, an email Couglin allegedly sent to his WCPD, that inlcuded three different
SBN employees in the list of recipients, the alleged implied threat contained therein being nothign
more than a url being cited to that led to an audio clip only (ie, contrary to King and Leslie's conten-
tions, there was no violent video or scene from movie) that in no way could reasonably be inter-
preted to be a threat of any sort sufficient to meet the requirement for a Workplance Protection Order,
much less an Institutional Workplace Protection Order. Both 599 and 607 are egregious abuses of
process and the pointing of gun at Coughlin's head from 4 feet away by RPD Officer Waddle, in
Couglin's back yard, upon Waddle jumping out from behind a backyard shed at Couglin, without so
much as a single instance of the RPD announcing themselves as law enforcement or otherwise issu-
ing sort of order or request to Couglin of any type, and thereupon arresting Couglin and charging him
with both a felony and a gross misdemeanor (in an obvious attempt by the SBN, WCPD, RJC, and
WCDA, RPD, RMC, and RCA, some might say, to prevent Couglin from being able to timely file his
brief in 62337 and or in retaliation for the 2/7/13 Order by Chief Justice Pickering (if you like it then
you oughta put Pickering on it) striking the extremely negligent and deficient (and soon to be proven
fraudulent) 12/24/12 ROA filed by the SBN (which, curiously, lacks the 10/31/12 filing by Couglin
that Coughlin has a file stamped copy of (heck, the 11/14/12 Hearing Exhibit #14 provides a good
hint to the SBN that such a filing exists, and its contained an Exhibit attached as disc, and the content
of that filing is so incredibly damaging to everything Hill, the SBN, RPD, WCSO, WCDA, RMC,
RCA, and RJC are attempting to accomplish, some might say, that is no wonder the SBN apparently
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lost that filing or otherwise managed to fail to include it in the ROA (or any of the discs attached as
Exhibits containing certified copies of the relevant audio transcripts from the key hearings, and vide-
os from all the arrests mentioned in the 8/23/12 Complaint and of nearly all other incidents at issue in
the 8/23/12 Complaint and associated cases, particularly those wherein some RPC 3.1 violation by
Coughlin is alleged. Nobody expected Couglin to be able to bail out on the bondable $5,000 bail in-
cident to the 2/8/12 arrest by the RPD. It didn't help that the jail continued to deprive Couglin of one
of his psychiatric medications and insisted upon providing Coughlin one medication, Wellbutrin, at
bedtime (Wellbutrin will keep you awake if taken at bedtime) where Coughlin slept through two
alarm clocks upon taking a break from cramming for the 2/12/12 continuation of the Trial in 065630
to take a 30 minute nap at 5:30 am. Judge Clifton (after managing to get an unnoticed, emergency
Ex Parte Hearing recalling Judge Pearson back to the Bench briefly after tagging out with his form
WCDA DDA Criminal Division coworker Clifton on 2/13/12 to alter or withdraw the 2/12/13 Order
for Competency Evaluation that Person had just entered an hour before incident to an unnoticed
emergency Order to Show Cause Hearing held at 8:30 am on 2/12/12 in 063341 stemming from a
2/2/13 custodial arrest of Coughlin by DAS Officer Ramos at 7:02 pm (in violation of NRS 171.136's
prohibition against misdemeanor arrests after 7 pm where no warrant present where Ramos Order
Couglin out of the 5
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wheel trailer he currently rents) based upon an allegation that Coughlin violat-
ed the terms of his probation where it was alleged Couglin failed to check in with DAS on 1/23/13,
despite DAS Officer Celeste Brown writing Couglin, on 1/24/13 to admit that the video at the
courthouse showed and proved that Couglin presented to the security check in no later than 2:56 pm
in an attempt to check in with DAS by their 3 pm closing time, but that Coughlin was prevented from
doing so due to security and the RJC, and Judge Sferrazza's 12/20/12 Administrative Order 12-01,
and security personnel verbal orders that day, and RJC Bailiff Augustin Medina taking just long
enough to appear at the security check in point where Coughlin was ordered to wait for an Bailiff to
escort him the 30 yards to the DAS check in. So, that is three custodial arrests of Coughlin in 10
days, between 2/2/13 and 2/12/13. Judge Clifton ordered Couglin remanded into custody (despite
Couglin being out on an OR release, no on bail) at the conclusion of Coughlin's cross-examination of
ECOMM's Carthen on 2/12/13 at noon for a Contempt Show Cause Hearing to be held the following
day at 9 am based upon Clifton's contention that he had warned Coughlin previously about being
late to Court, despite Coughlin's contention that he had not previously been late, but rather had
been told by RJC Chief Criminal Division Filing Office Clerk Robbin Baker that Clifton had moved
the start time for the Trial in 065630 on 12/11/12 to 1:30 pm from a 9 am start time (which would
make sense considering the Trial Tom Viloria, Esq., respresented a defendant in that morning as
Couglin witnessed, upon Coughlin calling the RJC to inquire about something and being told that the
Trial in 065630 was, in fact, starting at 9 am that morning, at which point Coughlin hurriedly trav-
ersed to the RJC, arriving by 10 am. Despite Robbin Baker, curiously being absent from work that
day, Judge Clifton sua sponte indicated that Coughlin was wrong with regard to his contention that
Baker had informed him of the start time for the 12/11/12 Trial being moved to 1:30 pm. Coughlin
was prevented from subpoening or calling Baker at the 2/15/12 Contempt Show Cause Hearing in
065630 to rebut Judge Clifton's contention that Coughlin had been warned against being late
again. ON 2/15/13 Judge Clifton summarily sentenced Couglhin to 5 days incarceration to begin
immediately where he also denied Coughlin's Motion for even a brief Stay (following his setting
Coughlin's bail at a ridiculous $10,000 on 2/14/13, some might say) with no possibility of paying a
fine in lieu of serving said 5 days. Judge Clifton somehow managed to find Couglhin's sleeping
through two alarm clocks upon attempting to take a 30 minute nap at 5:30 am on 2/14/13 after being
forced to cram for the continuation of trial in 065630 due to the two wrongful arrests of Coughlin (on
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2/2/13 and 2/8/13) as volitional. Coughlin''s suddenly court appointed defender, Bruce Lindsay,
Esq. (how is it Couglin gets court appointed counsel for a civil contempt hearing on 2/14/13 in
065630 where he was denied such at the 3/23/12 Show Cause Hearing in 03628 and on 11/30/12 in
22176 upon Judge Howard announcing he may find Couglin in Contempt, then finding Coughlin in
Contempt, but insisting Coughlin continue on in self representing himself through the remainder of
that criminal prosecution where the possibility 6 months jail time existed and Coughlin was denied
court appointed counsel by RMC Judge Howard?). RJC Chief Bailiff Sexton indicated to Couglin, in
a holding cell that Couglin had five different violations of Judge Sferrazza's Administrative Order
hanging over your head, each one carrying a possible3 25 day jail sentence where such violations,
allegedly, include calling the filing office to confirm the start time of a hearing or other alleged de
minimis infractions.
Of course, the WCDA and the RJC Judges (particularly the second and third most recently
elected Justice of the Peace, former WCDA Criminal Division prosecutors, Clifton and Pearson)
have been particularly keen to inform Coughlin that he is an attorney and therefore expected to
know the rules and follow other Rules of Professional Conduct and duties attendant to being an at-
torney, even where Coughlin is functioning as no more than a self representing criminal defendant in
the various retaliatory prosecutions he has faced for pointing out the inequities attendant to the man-
ner in which landlord tenant law is currently applied in Washoe County and other civil rights viola-
tions by local law enforcement. Of course, that did not stop WCDA DDA Watts-Vial from assert-
ing, in a strategically last minute, faxed, objection to Coughlin's 10/30/12 SCR 110 Subpoenas and
Subpoena Duces Tecums (Watts-Vial alleged that NRCP 45's requirement that such subpoenas ei-
ther be issued by a court or a licensed attorney made those subpoenas issued by Coughlin (per the
express permission to so issue his own subpoenas communicated to Coughlin on 10/15/12 by the
SBN, in line with NNDB's Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written communication to Coughlin that such
SCR 105(4) inquiries and matter be made to the SBN, and not he, the NNDB Chairman, and that the
SBN OBC possessed the power and authority to so communicate such SCR 105(4) matters to
Coughlin) he had served by an appropriate non-party on 2JDC Clerk of Court Hastings and the
2JDC Custodian of Records, that, due to Couglhin's being suspended from the practice of law (as
for Couglin not being an attorney given the temporary suspension of his law license in the State of
Nevada per 60838, that is not the case as far as the USPTO is concerned, and there is authority to
support the contention that a suspended attorney is still an attorney anyways, though, and there is an
entire ALR pointing out the fact that the suspension of one's law license by a State Bar does not nec-
essarily preclude an attorney from appearing before Federal Courts, such as the NVB, or the
USPTO, etc..., and where NVB Judge Beesley's testifying that a mitigating factor in Stephen R. Har-
ris, Esq.'s disciplinary matter exists where Mr. Harris is one of the few Chapter 11 bankruptcy attor-
ney's in town, the District of Nevada's participation (amongst 14 other selected federal courts) in a
Patent Litigation Pilot Program, combined with Coughlin's license to practice patent law before the
USPTO, presents a similar mitigating factor in Coughlin's case, though Panel Chair Echeverria
roundly rejected Coughlin's right to put on such evidence at the 11/14/12 hearing, for some rea-
son...).
Kern's misconduct resulted in profound damage to Coughlin's professional reputation and,
may potentiallly lead to Coughlin being disbarred considering the testimony of NVB Judge Beesley
at the 11/14/12 Formal Disciplinary Hearing regarding Coughlin's appearance before him in the
NVB on 3/15/12 shortly after the WCSO Deputies broke into Coughlin's former home law office at
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, with guns drawn, handcuffing Coughlin, after failing to identify themselves as
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law enforcement and barely knocking before entering the building. The WCSO Deputies allowed
Couglhin a scant few minutes to grab a few personal items (Coughlin chose to use the time to grab
his hard drives and client's files, resulting in his not having a tie to go with the suit jacket, shirt, and
dress slacks and shoes that he wore while appearing before Judge Beesley less than 30 minutes after
the Deputies made Coughlin leave not only his former home law office (refusing to allow him to
grab even his medications or eye glasses/contacts), but where they also threatened to arrest Coughlin
for distrubing the peace or trespassing or obstruction where Coughlin was asking them ques-
tions related to the procedures under which they were carrying out the Lockout Order, with the Dep-
uties then threatening to move the personalty Coughlin had ferried out of the building to the outside
of the building in front of his car back into the building. The Deputies failed to follow through on
that threat, but Coughlin was forced to hurriedly gather up that property under their menacing glares
and threats of abuse of process while a cackling Western Nevada Management's Sue King and Jared
Scalise watched on, soon to move in to the building and, as Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition notes, immedi-
ately begin the process of having all of Coughlin's property recklessly moved into a storage unit that
day and the next.
Kern's 4/9/12 Opposition itself clearly violates RPC 3.1 where it alleges Coughlin no
more than a squatter with no right to possession of the rental, even where Kern's own client, Park
Terrace Townhomes HOA, through a Secretary of the HOA Board, appearing with WNM's King
(whom was allowed to practice law without a license at a 2/23/12 hearing before Judge Sferrazza
held in response to Coughlin's filing, on 2/10/12 Verified Complaint for Illegal Lockout and or Inter-
ruption of Essential Services (NV Energy, Allaback, Foreshee, Kern, and WNM's King all conspired
to one degree or another to deprive Coughlin of electricity to the building for over 7 days in February
2012 (see attached emails between Coughlin, NV Energy's Ron Jones, WNM's King, and HOA attor-
ney Kern). At the 2/23/12 hearing, Kern's client admitted, under oath, that the individuals whom
placed an advertisement on Craigslist to which Coughlin responded on 12/27/11 for a room for rent
with shared area privileges for $200 per month, were lawfully occupying the building at 1422 E. 9
th
St. #2, perhaps even under some work in exchange for occupancy/lower insurance premiums ar-
rangement with the blessing of the HOA upon WNM's then Assistant Manager Robyn Batalado
bringing such a proposed arrangement before the HOA Board. How Kern can then, on 4/9/09, in her
Opposition, not violate RPC 3.1 where she alleges Coughlin no more than a squatter is not clear,
especially where WNM's King and the HOA Board's Secretary failed to oppose Coughlin's sworn
contention that Allaback and Foreshee rented him the room with shared area privileges on 12/27/11,
under periodic monthly tenancy. As such, the 2/13/12 5 Day Unlawful Detainer No Cause Termina-
tion Notice King had posted to Coughlin's door is deficient where is relies upon a contention that
Coughlin's was an at will tenancy. Further, such a written admission is counter to Kern's 4/9/12 con-
tentions in her Opposition that Coughlin had no legal right to ever possess any part of the structure at
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2.
CONCLUSION
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING THE UNDERSIGNED RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT THIS COURT
GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE TITLE OF THIS DOCUMENT AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THIS COURT
DEEMS JUST.
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AFFIRMATIONPURSUANTTONRS 239B.030
THE UNDERSIGNED DOES HEREBY AFFIRM THAT THE PRECEDING DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF ANY PERSON.
DATED: 4/25/13
/S/ Zach Coughlin________
Zach Coughlin, Defendant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the fol-
lowing party by faxing, emailing, dropping if at their office, and placing a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document in the us mail addressed to:
Chief Daniel Wong, Es.q
Brian Sooudi Esq.
One East First Street, 3rd Floor
Fax number: 775-334-4226
dwong@reno.gov, bsooudi@reno.gov
Reno City Attorney's Office - Criminal Divison
P.O. BOX 1900 RENO , NV 89505
TEL: 775-334-2050 FAX: 775-334-2420
ATTORNEY FOR CITY OF RENO 775 334 3824
RENO MUNICIPAL COURT FILED BY FAX TO :
DATE THIS 4/25/13
/S/ ZACH COUGHLIN
Zach Coughlin, Defendant
RENOCML
CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. RCP2012-000607
State Bar of Nevada
vs.
Zachary Barker Coughlin
Statistical Closures
12/20/2012 Decision without TriallHearing
DATE
Applicant
Adverse Party
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer
State Bar of Nevada
Coughlin, Zachary Barker




C\SE INFORMATION
~ S E ASSIGNMENT
RCP2012-000607
Reno Civil
12120/2012
Pearson, Scott
PARTY INf'ORMATfON
Location: Reno Civil
Judicial Officer: Pearson, Scott
Filed on: 12/20/2012
Case Type: Protection Order - Workplace
Case Status: 12/20/2012 Active
Lead Attorneys
King, Patrick Owen
Retained
EVEi'frS & OItlJERS OF TlU; COlJlU' INDEX
12/20/2012
12/20/2012
12/2012012
12126/2012
01104/2013
01104/2013
01110/2013
03/20/2013
bJ Application for Protection in the Workplace Filed
~ Order Granting Application for Protection Order Filed
9J Temporary Order for Protection Against Stalking Issued
Ql Affidavit of Service Filed
Adverse Party served by Bailiff 12/26/2012
BJ StalkinglHarassment (8: 15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pearson, Scott)
.BJ Extended Order for Protection Against Stalking Work Issued
to expire 1-4-14
l Affidavit of Service Filed
Zachary Barker Coughlin served 1/5/13.
9J Motion Filed
PAGEl OF I
Printed on 05/0112013 at 1:07 PM
CJSCONTE,\1PT 24
17c.J.S.Contempl 24
Corpus Juris Sccundum
[)atabasc L!pdatedMan:h20]J
Page I
Contempt
John Glenn, J.D., Alan J. JBCObs, lD., Karl Oakes, lD.,and JeffJey J. Shampo, J.D.
II. Act'S or Conduct Constituling Contempt
8. Particular Acts or Conduct
2. Disobc:dience of Mandate, Order, or Judgment
TOPic Suntmary COfl"elation Table
24. V.lIdltyof m.nd.ta, order. or Judp .. f; fotlltfr.1 b.r raw
Wuf'. Kfy N.mMr Dlgnf
West's Key Number Digest, Contempt (::::>21
of mandate, order, or. decree ....hich is VQid or issued by a court
.... contcmpt, but disobe(hence of.n nTOoeoU5 order, if made by I
CllUrt ....'thm lIs JunsdK1JOO. constitute'! conlempL

mandate, order, Judgmc:nt, or de\.n:e rs not COIItempt.[FN2)1lOd. penon CIInnot be held
III cOnlempt of coW"! for 10 obey lin Of"der if the rsslliJ1g ooutt had no jurisdklionlo gi ...e
tItc .')rda, the order IS and unenfon:elble.IFN3J An order enlered wit.llo\J.l either
5ub)t matter jun sdktioo or Junsdktion over the parties is ...oid, and cannol pro... Kie Ihc basis
f:,,"' findmg ofcoo!empt.jFN41 Ho ....ever, the fact that In order is in part VQ)d doe$ not justify
of the v.lid parts thereof.IFN5] MOn:over,'D order is not rendered ...oid or unla.... ful
berng e.rronc:ollS or 10 rcvenal on appeaL[FN.61 ....hile the propriety of tbe:
gt'oeta!ly nOI Oft procdings to ""nash for COfItempt,IFN7) particularly 00
for cnrnrlllli coolempt,(FN8j a party being bound to obey '0 order of a
court WIth j.unsdrctmn even if the order is clearly incorrcct,tFN9j the judgment is generally
COocluslve as to the court's authority to render it,/FNIOJ and the question of the jurisdk.
l)On may be ralSed.IFNII. ] There ts authority, bo ....evu, that even l."Our!
o"'er at the lime an order is issued, defendant is bound to obey the
courts order un!llihe order t'S ...acaled through ajudkill procecding. IFNI2)
many jurisdictions. the prev.iling rule ., to contempt ror disobedience of an invalid 01"_
00 IS to ItS the .,. doctrine," which pro...ida thaI. pany may DOt chal_
. courts order by "'lOlatlOg 't.[FN1311n her wmds, indi... iduals cannot challenge lbc:
...alidlty ofa ooun Ord..T in cOGI,empl procecdinp arising from its m!ationtFNI4}-that is,
they may not coi latcnJ ly atla(:k 10 the conlempt pnxttdings III order,judgment, or dc1:ree of
Cl :roU Thomson Reuters. No Claim 1OOrig. US Gov. Works.
CJS CONTEMP'T 24
17 C.J.S. Contempt 24
RIM I. ch'il prOfHdl.p dislh.pl5l11ed'
Sinai Hospital, 111(: . v. Davis, IIA.D.2d 361,188 N.Y.S,2d 2911 (lSI Dcp't
IFN9) re Conlempi 282 Mkh. App. 656. 765 N.W.2d 44 (2009).
IFNIO) parte Annstron!. 110 Tex. Crim. 362. 8 S.W.2d 674 (1928)
IFNIIJ Del. - Mayer.... Mayer. 36 Del. Ch. 457,132 A.2d617 (1957).
Ga. - Bradley v. Simpson, 59 Ga. App. 844, 2 S.E.2d 238 (1939), judgmenl rev'd on
othergroolllls.189Ga. 316.5 S.E.2d S93 (1939).
CelialeralJlIfJlck
C?lia1eral alUH;k of previous order .is allowed in a contempt proceeding only if the
tnal coun lacked subJect matTer jurisdIction or personal jurisdktioo 10 cnler the ordeT.
.... TownorOaslon, 923 N.E.2d988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
IFNllJ ". Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,98<,1 A,ld 256 (2010).
IFNlJ] U.S.- In re Cri minal Contempt Proceedings Against Gerold Cra ....ford, Mi-
chael Warren, 329 FJd 13 I, 55 Fed. R, Sen'. 3d 360 {2d (ir. 2003).
n: Dud,man, 179 VI. 467, 2006 VT 23, 898 A.2d 734 (20(6).
[FNI4) VI. - In re DuckmtlD, 179 VI. 467,2006 vr 23, 8911 A.2d 734 (2006).
Wnh.-:-State v. NOfIh, 103 Wash. App. 29, 9 PJd 1158 (Div. I 2000). as amcrxled on
rcconsu:lenrlion. (0..'1. 30,2000).
IFNI5] Neb. - Sid I>illon Che",roIel-Olmmobile-PoDtiac, 111(:. v. Sullivan, 251 Neb.
722, 559 N.W.2d 740(1997).
Vt.- State v. MOil. 166 VI. 188,692 A.2d 360 (1997).
Silllilarst.tt_nf
co/illeral bar rule precludes coll.leral cballcnge to II court order, based on its in-
"'alidlty, as a defel15C' to a ch.rgc ofmminal COiltempl brought agllinst ooe who has vi-
th61 order.
lJ.S. -- lo re Pmcecdings,.291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.R.1. 2003), aft'd. 373 F.3d 37,
lI4l'cd. It hid. Scrv. 768 (IstCIf. 1(04).
IFNI6J U.S.- U.S. .... Unilcd Mine W"rkcn "r America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677,
91 L. r::d. 884 ( 1947); Reliance Ins. Cn. v, Mtst Const. Co.. 84 F.3d n2. 34 Fed. R.
SeN. _'ld942 (10th Cir. 1996).
r. 2()1 I TII"mwn Reuters. No Claim toOrig. US Go.... WorJrs.
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17 C.J.s.Comcmpl24
Page 2
a court ba... ingjurisdiction of the partie5 and the sIIbject m.ttcrlFNl5J oolln orders
musl be oIx:yed by the parttcs until reversed. modified, or vacated by dirttt.. orderly, and
proper A contempl procccding not open to rcconsjdcralion the legal
or factUll basilO or the orderlUeged 10 have been d;soocyed"FNI7) and lherc: is no privilege w
disobey a COllrt'S order because the alleged 5ubjed belie"cs thai il is Thlls. dis-
obedience ofan in....lid COur1 order may be punished as criminal contempt,IFN 19) The: appro-
priate method to challenge a cOW"! order being 10 petition 10 have the order vlJCaled Of
.mended.IFN20) and this appJies to an order made hy a court within its jurisdictioll iilnd
power, e...en though the order may be clearly erron>e(lU!;.IFN21( Of defendant may sinccrely be-
lic"e that the ordeT is ineffective and will fillllily be vacated,I,,'N22) and even though the act
on ....hich the order is based is ...oid.(FN2J) The rule isjuslifled on the ground tbat il advances
imponant societal iDtercstli in an orderly system of government, respect for the judicial pro-
cess.nd the ru1e ofl ....., and the prcsc:rvation of civil order; IFN24] the rationale for Ihe rule is
to pn::>Iect the authority or lbe cowts when theyaddn:-ss dose: questions and 00 create a strong
ioccntive for parties to follow the orderly processofl,w.IF'N25)
UDder the colillteral bar rule, disobediencc ....iII oot be CllCUSed by the ract lhat the order
was granled.tFN261 or irregularly obtained, (FN27] or by the fact that the basic
Ictiot! becomes rnoot,IFN28J. llhough where the basic action has become moot. the court may
Kfuse to pllnish fQr the technical conternpl.IFN29) A party may be guilty of contempt for dis-
obeying an order which ...as fraudulently obtained.{FNJO)If the ooun reviewing the order
frnds the order to h.ve hid My pretense to v.lidity at the time: it was issued, the revie ....ing
CQw"! should enforce the coIlatera! bar rulc./FN31 J
EXCl'plilHfs.
E1lCepIioDS to the collateral bar rule wbcre adequate efTecti",e remedies do not
eliisl fur orderly re ... iew of the chlllhmged order, or where the order require5 an iJTClrievable
swreodeT or (;oostitutiooal guarantees.IFN32)
A limited 10 the collateral bar rule is DUlde in those elltremely rare (;ases .... here
!he order m.y be tr.ospolrently inv. lid.IFNJJ] The "transparently mvalid onSer" ellccptmn 11.1
the CC)iJlteral bar rule rests on the premise that a cowl issuing a tr.nsparently invalid o rder is
acting $0 flIT in C"ltcess of its lIuthority that il has no right to expect (;ompliance I nd no interest
is protected by requiring compliance.IFN34) A court order sbollid be: cOllSidered trllnsparently
invalid only if the oo\ln reviewing lhe ordu finds the order to h .... e bad no pretense 10 validity
al the time il was issued;/FN351 the exception d0C5 not apply 10 orders th.1 are arguably prop-
er.IFN36)"The tr.nsparently invalid order exception is available only 10 a party who has either
made I good faith effon 10 obtain emergency relief from the appellate court or ....bo shows
compelling circumstances cxC\lsing the decision not to seek some: kind of emergency re-
liefIFN37]
CUMULA TlVE SUPPLEMENT
C...... :
The only remedy from an erronwus order is appeal and disobedience thereto is conlempt.
0 2013 ThomsonReuters. No CI.im to Orig. US Oov. Works.
CJS CONTEMPT 14
17C.J.5.COIllempt24
v. Whinlesey. 126 Idaho 11118 P. 2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995).
",,5
Ncb.-S)d Dillon Chevn)lel-OIdsmobile-PonticH.:, Inc. v. Sullivan, 25 1 Neb. 722. 559
N.W,2d740(1997).
IFNI7) Kontntbccki , 30S B.R. 51O(N.D. Cal. 20(4).
Conn. - Stale v. Winter, 117 Conn. App. 493. 979 A.2d 608 (2(09), certiftcation
denied. 295 Conn. 922, 991 A,ld 569 (2010).
iFNI8J COIIn.- State "'. Winter, 117 Conn. App. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), certifica-
lion denied. 295 Cooo. 922,99 1 A.ld 569 (2010).
IFNI9] U.S.- Walkcr v. City of Birmingham, U.S. 307, 87 S. CI. 1824, 18 LEd.
----- 2d 1210 (1%7); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397.20 Fed. R. Servo 3d 10 (iltheir. 1991).
IFN20J U.S.-U.S. V . Mourad. 289 F.Jd 174 ( lSI CiT. 2002).
!FN21J Supremc Court /Jd. of Professional Ethks & Cl.lIldu<:t V. HllgheS,
557 N.W.2d 890 (lo ....a 1996).
v. Bennett, 228 Mich. App. 305, 577 N.W.2d 915 (1998)
IFN22J v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. CiT. 1951).
U.S.-Black ....elder v. Crooks, 151 F. Supp. 26 (D. D.C. 1957).judllmcnt afl'd in part ,
rev'd inpll rt on othcr grounds, 2521".2d 854 (D.C. CiT. 1958).
lFN2J ) U.S.- U.S. V. United Workers Qf America. 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677.
9 1 L Ed. 884 {l947J.
U.S.-bpon v. U.S. Dept. o f J\lstke, 53 F.3d Ig3 (9th CiT. 1995); liyundai Merchant
Marine Co. Lid. V. U.S .. 159 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
fFN24J Conn.- Stile V. Winter. 117 Conn. App. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), ca1ilica-
tion denied, 295 Conn. 922,991 A.2d 569 (2010).
[FN25] U.S.- In re Special Proceedi ngs, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (O.R.J. 20(3), all'd, 373
F.3d 31, 64 Fed. R, E ... id. Servo 768 (1st Cir. 20(4).
IFN16( CaL- Applkation of F.inn. 15S Cal. App. Id 705. 3 18 P.2d 816 {2d Dil't
1957}
N.J.-Cooper V. Coop<:T, 103 N.J. Eq. 416, 143 A . 559 (Ch. 1928).
IFN27] lo ....a- Ballani V. Grund, 244IowIl623. S6 N.W.2d 166 (1952).
N.J.-Cooper V. Cooper, 10.1 N.J. Eq. 416.143 A. 559 (Ch. 1928).
IFN28] U.S. - U.S. v. United Mine of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677.
(0 1013 Thom!';on Rc:uter5. No Claim to Drill. US G\lV. Works
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17 C.l.S. Cootempl 24
Page 3
Win v. Jay Petroleum, Inc. , 964 N.E.2d evell if there IItC questions
4'!,d\1!c decree
If a ha.sjurisdjction over therO:!':ncomplying contempt
202 (2012).
ity. OregQn Educ. Ass'o V. Oregoll
lEND OF SUPPLEMENT]
. kI 195 2009-Ohio-2275, 919 RE.2d
IFNI) Ohio-Doss v .. Thomas. 183 Owo API" ,
219 (10th Franklin Counly 20(9).
(FN2] D.c. - Sbewareg. V. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d47 (D.C. 2008),
TCll.-ln re Slo.n, 214 S.WJd 217 (Tell. App. Eastland 2001).
V . V. Shenbar, 276 VI. 611,667S.E.2d 555 (20(18) 01" Cb rch 898 N.F..2d
IFN3jlDd.-MIrIon Counly .
437 (Ind. CL App. 200g). lr1Ins er n ,
Obllg.twil of contpll.lICf o. J.riJdkII
OIl
2d D .\ 2010) le ....e to
N.Y.- Aslradll v .. Archer, 71.A
d
%3d 125, 93't N.E.2d
appeal dismissed mpart,dcnJC va,
94 (2010) . . tllIIl a_Hamilton County Hosp. Authority. 249
IFN41 Tenn. _ Konvahnu V. ChII nos
S.W.3d 346 (fenn. 2(08).
122 Tex. 54,52 s .W.2d7J(l932)
tFN5] Tell. - Ex parte Mab!")',. . iIIis 91 Utah 65 P.2d 1136 (1937).
Utah- Uquor Control Commlsston v. Mru ' . H A thority 249
(FN61 Tenn. _ KonVlllink. v. County osp. u
S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2(03). Inc y ()celln Blue Pools, Inc., 28 2d 665,
tFN7J N.Y.-IkI-AqutI Pool Supply. ..
215N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup 1961).
Wyo.-Begley V. Nan, 62 Wyo. 254. 166 P.2d 466 158.
Matlcrs determined on ror contempt. sec H
IFNg ( u.S. --Clielt "'. Hamrnonds, 305 F.2d 5M (5\11 Cir. 1962).
C1 2013 ""[ltotnson ReuteT5. NoClairn toOrig US Go .... Works.
CJS CONTEMPT 24
17C.1.S. Contempt 24
9 1 L. Ed. 884 (1947). see Vatley A\lthorily ... . Moody, 86 F. SlIp(l, 694
IFN291 U.S. - U.S. reI. TcnDe'l
(E.I.>. Tenn. 1949). 1854 WI- 5524 (N.Y. Sup 1854).
PT. 415, , "'
1102 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D. N.Y. 199_).
IFN311 U.S. - U.S. V. T.e
TTY

b
508 F 3d 1003 (11th Ci r. 2007). ccrt. denied. 129 S. CI.
[FN321 U.S.-U.S. V. Strau , .
40,172 L. Ed. 2d 20(2008). . S"'d 44 (D.R.I . 2003), !lITd. 373
(FN331
F .3d 37.64 F .. . er I t7 Conn. APr. 493, 979 A.2d 608 (2009), certiflC3-
A.2d 569 (2010)
, - U.S. "'. Moura4, 289 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2002).
S cial proecedinlEs, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (DK!. 2003). .tTd. 373
768 (IslCi r. 20(4). .
F.3d 37. 64 Fe . . . Proceedings Against Gerald Crawford, MI-
3d 360 (2d Cir. 2003).
westla:. " 2013 ThomsOIi Reuters. No Claim 11.1 Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
ClS CONTEMPT 24
END OF DOCUMENT
to 2013 Thornson RC\lI<!TS. :ow CI!lirn 10 Orig US Gov. Works.
__. ___ ._ __ _ ... ____ ___ __ _ -----
Custom Digest - 7 Headnotes
C [Cited 5 times for this legal issue)
Ex parte Gardner, 39 P. 570
=93CONTEMPT
=93IActs or Conduct Constituting Contempt of Court
=93kl9Disobedience to Mandate, Order, or Judgment
=93k 21k. Validity of mandate, order, or judgment.
Nev.,1895
Page I
It is not a contempt of court to fail to comply with an order which was void for want of juris-
diction.
p [Cited 3 times for this legal issue)
State Indus. Ins. System v. Sleeper, 679 P.2d 1273
Nev.,1984
One may not be held in contempt of a void order.
C [Cited 2 times for this legal issue)
Application of Havas, 371 P.2d 30
Nev. , 1962
Court was without jurisdiction to cite defendant in a replevin action for contempt for failure to
deliver an automobile, where court although having sufficient data for entry of a judgment re-
quiring in the alternative, delivery of the automobile, or its value in case delivery could not be
had, instead entered judgment requiring defendant to deliver the automobile to plaintiff with
no alternative. N.R.S. 17.120.
H [Cited I times for this legal issue)
Del Papa v. Steffen, 915 P.2d 245
Nev.,1996
Violation of Supreme Court orders issued in excess of jurisdiction could not produce valid
judgment of contempt.
C [Cited I times for this legal issue)
Daines v. Markoff, 555 P.2d 490
Nev. , 1976
Trial court was without power to order county comptroller to pay fees for appointed defense
counsel in excess of that allowed by statute and, hence, comptroller could not be held in con-
tempt of order. N.R.S. 7.260, St.J965, c. 279 .
... [Cited 1 times for this legal issue)
State e1 reI. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, Humboldt County, 167 P.2d 648
Nev.,1946
Indefiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment or decree may constitute a good defense in con-
2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

I
I
Page 2 I
tempt proceedings.
p [Cited 0 times for this legal issue)
Whitehead v. Nevada Com'n On Judicial Discipline, 906 P.2d 230
Nev., 1994 . .
"Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction doctrine" relates to authority of courts to
orders while considering other questions (including determination of theIr own JunsdlctlOn)
and to punish as criminal contempt violations of such orders even though may later be JudI-
cially determined that court lacked jurisdiction over proceedmgs m whIch anCIllary orders
were issued.
References
Refusal to obey court order relating to proposed testimony as constituting criminal contempt
under 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 401(3) 63 American Law Reports, Federal 878 (1983)
Contempt based on violation of court order where another court has issued contrary order 36
American Law Reports 4th 978 (1985)
17 Am. JUT. 2d Contempt 130-164
A FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TO THE "COLLATERAL BAR" RULE: PROTECT-
ING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LEGITIMACY OF COURTS 22 Pepperdine
Law Review 405 (1995)
END OF DOCUMENT
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- --- - - - - - - - - - -
---
.. ..
Custom Digest - J Hcadnotes
H
In re Robertson. 19 A,3d 751
(:0=>3 I SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
t(;;:;::>3I 5PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
=>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt. and Conviction
(:;;;;:>315Pk90k. Enforcement in general; police.
D.C..2011
Page I
Criminal contempt action, initiated in the Superior Court. an Article I court under the ConstI-
tution of the United States, by the Office of the Altomey General on behalf of alleged victim
based on defendant's alleged violation of a civil protection order (CPO), had to be brought in
the name and pursuant to the sovereign power of the United States. U.S.C. A. Canst. Art. I,
I; D.C. Official Code. 2001 Ed. 16-1 OOS(t) (2008).
END OF DOCUMENT
fd 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Custom Digest. 2 Headnotes
v Bentley, 678 So.2d 1265
=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
(;;::::I315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or .
E)Yiolations, Contempt, and Conviction
lOOk. Nature or degree of violation; contempt.
Fla.,1996. .. .. , m t rna not be used to enfort:e with
Statute provirlmg that Imllrect cont.e p. I violates constitutional separatIOn of
injunctions for protection agamst 7412901(2).
powers. West's F.S.A. Consl. Art. 2, 3. ests . . . .
ex Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223
Mo.,1982 . 1 rohibition against imprisonment debt
Adult Abuse Ad .did .not VIOlate of which respondent of
where Act made VIOlation of ex parte 0
1
hut set forth no punishment for VIOlation of an-
violation of fuB or attorney fees. Y.A.M.S. 455.045,
ciliary orders dealing V.A.M.S.ConsLArt. I. II.
455.050. subtl,. 1-7.45. , .. .
END OF DOCUMENT
. 0 Orig US (jov. WorKs.
2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim t .
I
Custom Digest 2 Headnotes
,.
Statev. Ryan, 239 P.3d 1016
(:O=>31SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or Protection
C;;:>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
::=315Pk9l Violations and Offenses
Anti-harassment orders in general.
Or.App.,2010
Page I
Prosecutions under statute criminalizing conduct in violation of a stalking protective order
(SPO), like prosecutions for crime of stalking, require a defendant's expressive "contacts" to
be evaluated in light of the constitutional protections for free speech. West's Or.Const. Art. I,
8; West's Or.Rev. Stat. Ann. 163.732, 163.750.
p-
Garcia v. State, 212 S.W.3d 877
Tex.App,Austio,2006
Statute which makes it an offense to violate protective order, prohibiting persons from com-
municating directly with a protected individual in a "threatening or harassing manner" or
from communicating a "threat through any person to a proteded indi vidual," was not vague
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even though term "harassing" was not
defined; statute contained a scienter requirement, and term "harass" was not impermissibly
vague when given a narrowing definition that saved the statute from constitutional infirmity.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. I, 14; V.T.C.A .. Penal Code 25.07.
END OF DOCUMENT
2013 Thomson Reuters, No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Custom Digest 6 Hcadnotes
,.
State v. Ryan, 239 PJd 1016
(:0=>3 I SPPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or .
:=315PIl( E)Yiolations, Contempt, and ConVIctIOn
E?315PkI01k. Defenses.
Or.App.,2010 . .' lkin roteeth'e order (SPO) to survive a free speech
For a prosecution for vlOlatmg a sta g p ... ohibited contact" must contain an un-
challenge under the .an personal violence: and is object-
equivocal threat that msulls a fear ,Imml W t' 0 Canst Art I 8' West's Or.Rev. Stat.
ively likely to be followed by unlaw u acts. es sr. ., ,
Ann. 163.7S0.
Davit v. Stogsdill, 371 Fed.Appx. 683
C.A,7.IU.,2010 .' rd f rotection even if the order of protection was
Prosecution of arrestee for vlolatmg er 0 p rt of typographical error, did not vi-
\
later determined to be Y C?U laws or Illinois common law. l8 U.S.C.A.
olate arrestee's constitutional fights, rae eteenng
1962; S.H.A. 720 lLCS 511 2-30.
\ v. Boyle, 771 N.W.2d 604
N 0 2009 . rotected speech when he the mother
did not engage 10 ct restraining order that prohibited defenda1t
of his child in violation of a dlsor er y. u than' communicating with the child. U.S.c. .
from contacting the mother for purposes ot er
Const.Amend. 1.
v Romine, 757 N.W.2d 884
Minn.APp.,2008 ..' . . I from the issuance of an order for

tion for violating it; OFP was '
stood as law of the case. M.S.A. .'
State v. Bohager, 168 P.3d 700 . ' d t order of protection is
Mont.,2007 . vailable civil remedies With reg
ar
.0 . I raceeding for de-
district court, during challenges to the
sued agalOst him f the order of protection, from conSI
fendant's alleged ViOlatiOn 0
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------

.l _________ ---'-------
- .------- - --------- ---- - -
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underlying order of protection based upon alleged constitutional due process violations.
U.S.c.A. Const_Amend. 14: MCA 45-5-626.
f>
State v. Norris-Romine. 894 P.2d 1221
Or_App" 1995
Protective order issuance statutes are in pari materia with protective order crimes statutes
and term "legitimate purpose" in issuance statutes is incorporated into crimes statutes and sub
ject to constitutional challcnges by defendants chargcd with protective order crimes. ORS
163.735,163.738, 163_747,163.750.
END OF DOCUMENT
2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Custom Digest - I Hcadnotcs
H
In re Robertson. 19 A.3d 751
OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
C=>315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C;::;;;>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
=3l5Pk I 02Proceedings in General
C=315PkI04k. PIC<jding, notice, and process.
D.C. ,2011
Page I
Criminal (,;ontcmpt action. initiated in the Superior Court. an Article I court undcr the Consti-
tution of the United States, by the Offi(';c of the Attorney General on behalf of allcged victim
based on defendant's alleged violation of a civil protection order (CPO), had to be brought in
the name and pursuant to the sovereign power of the United States. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I,
I; D_C. Official Code, 2001 Ed_ 16-1005(1) (2008).
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Custom Digest - I Headnotes
f>
Grecn v. Grecn, 642 A.2d 1275
=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or Protection
E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
C=315Pkl02Proceedings in General
C=>315PkI03k. In general.
D_C.,1994
Page I
fn intra family contempt proceeding involving civil protection order entered in domestic viol.
ence case, husband did not have "fundamental" constitutional right to public prosecutor, and
trial court could pennit wife's counsel to participate.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Custom Digest - 1 Headnotcs
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State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223
=3 I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
C=;:>315PIISecurity or Order for Peace or Protection
E)Violations. Contempt, and Conviction
IOSk. Sentence and punishment.
Mo_,1982
PClge I
Adult Abuse Act did not violate constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt
where Act made violation of ex parte order of protection of which respondent has notice or of
violation of full order of protection criminal but set forth no punishment for violation of an
cillary orders dealing with child support, maintenance, or attorney fees. V.A.M.S. 455.045,
455.050, subds. IT7, 455.075, 455.085; V.A.M.S.Const.Art. I, II.
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CJS INJUNCTION! 404 Page 2
\/\\:'-'::.tla/. I 43A C.J.S. Injunctions 404
CJS INJUNCTION 404
43A C.J.S. [njunctions 404
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated March 20 I 3
Injunctions
Page I I
By John Hourdeau, J.D., Nicole D. Fox, J.D . John R. Kennel , J.D., ofthe National Legal Re-
sean;h Group, Charles J. Nagy, J.D., Thomas Muskus. J.D .. Eric C. Surette, J.D.
VII. Violation and Punishment
B. Writ or Mandate Violated
Topic Summary References Correlation Table
404. ValIdity and regularIty
West's Key Number Digest
West's Kcy Number Digest, Injunction 1720. 1729. 1732
The fact that an injunction or restraining order is merely elToneous, or was improvidently
granted, or was granted or obtained itTegularly, docs not of itself excuse a violation of such in-
junction or order. but disobedience of a void injunction or restraining order is not a punishable
contempt of
Generally, a party may be held in contcmpt for violating an invalid injunction unless the
injunction is transparently invalid or has only a frivolous prctense to validity.[FNI]In a pro-
ceeding for violation of an injunction, the judgment or for injunction, if rendered by a
court having jurisdiction, is not subject to collateral at least for irregularit-
ies.[FN3] So, where the court has jurisdiction, the fact that the injunction or restraining order
is mercly en'oneous, or is improvidently granted or irregularl y obtained, is no excuse for viol-
ating il, [FN4] even if the claimed error constitutional issues,[FN5] or the injunction
is based on an invalid statute or regulation.[FN6] This rule applies with equal force to a pro-
secution for contempt instituted for the purpose of punishing a person for disobeying an order
of the court on the ground that its authority or dignity is in question, and onc which is insti-
tuted to cnforce the authority of the in the administration of justice between litig-
ants.[FN7]
Similarly, where the has jurisdiction, disobedience is not excused by the fact that the
bill or complaint on which the injunction or restraining order is issued is insufficicnt,[FN8]
that the injunction is broader than that authorized by the order for injunction,[FN9] or that the
injunction is broader than the statute authorizing the injunction.[FNIO] If an injunction or a
restraining order is issued for the purpose of maintaining status quo while the court determ-
ines its own jurisdiction or authority to grant relief, the violation of thc injunction or the re-
straining order may be punished as contempt. even if the court later dctcnnines that it has no
jurisdiction to grant the ultimate relief rcquested.[FN I I]
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Unless an injunction is void. its propriety must be tested by appeal and not by disobcdi-
ence.[FN 12] but where the injunction or restraining order is void and Dot merely voidable, dis-
obedience thereofis not a contempt of court and not punisbable as such.[FNI3] The fact that
r:7n
tempt.[FNI5]
In general, it is only when the court which grants or makes the or restraining or-
der does not have jurisdiction that such injunction or order may be dIsregarded and cannot be
made the basis of a contempt proceeding.[FN 16] So, where no bond has been given as re-
quired by statute, the court is without jurisdiction to for contempt.[FN 17J However, an
injunction is void and, therefore, insufficient as. the baSIS of punishment for co?tempt if it has
no support of any applicable law,[FNI8] or where the court IS withoutjurrsdicllOn to grant the
particular restraining order.[FNI9] When an injunction exceeds the jurisdiction of the issuing
court, a person affected by the injunction has the choice of complying with the order and
bringing a judicial challenge, or disobeying it and subsequently attacking its validity when the
person is charged with contempt.[FN20]
Record.
It has been held that one may not be held guilty of contempt on the basis of an order which
is not of record and which rests solely on a mere oral announcement of the eourt,[FN21} but
the order is not void merely because the minute entry by the clerk of court does not conform
to the oral decision by the trial judge.[FN22] However, it has been held that there may be a
contempt of court in disobeying the lenns of an injunction order which is neither entered nor
filed.[FN23]
[FNI ] Ohio-Natl. Equity Title Agency, Jnc. v. Rivera, 147 Ohio App. 3d 246. 2001 -
Ohio- 7095. 770 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dis!. Hamilton County 2001).
[FN2] U.S.-G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., Inc. , 639 F.2d 29 (1st
Cir.1980).
Mass.-Com. v. Wallace, 431 Mass. 705, 730 N.E.2d 275 (2000).
WiS.-State v. Bou7.ek, 168 Wis. 2d 642, 484 N.W.2d 362 (C1. App. 1992).
Disobedience of invalid or erroneous court order. generally. see C.J.S., Contempt 16.
[FN3] N.D. - State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360, 49 N.W.2d 777 (1951) (abrogated by,
Wallerv. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,90 S. Ct. 1184.25 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1970)).
Typographical error
An erroneous trial date recited in a temporary injunction order requiring enforcement
of an employment agreement's covenant not to compete was a typographical error cor-
rected by nunc pro tunc entry and did not prevent enforcement of the temporary in-
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CJS INJUNCTION 404 Page 3
43A c.J.S. Injunctions 404
junction enforcing the covenant.
Tex.-Bertoui v. C.E. Shepherd Co., Inc., 752 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. Houston 14th
Dis!. 1988),
[FN4]lIL- People v. Nance. 189111. 2d 142,244 Ill. Dec. 1,724 N.E.2d 889 (2000).
lowa-Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 2003).
W.Va. - Kessel v. Leavitt. 204 W. Va. 95, 51 I S.E.2d 720 (1998).
Lack or venue
Ga.-Rockwood Intern. Systems Supply, Inc. v. Rader Companies, Inc., 255 Ga. App.
881. 567 S.E.2d 104 (2002).
[FN5] U.S.-Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. , 619 F.2d 459, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 960 (5th Cir.
1980),j udgment aff'd, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 68 L. Ed. 2d 693 , 31 Fed. R. Servo
2d 509 (I981).
[FN6] Wis.- State ex reI. Atty. Gen. v. Fasekas. 223 Wis. 356, 269 N.W. 700 (1936).
[FN7] IlL-A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16,232 IlL 402,
83 N.E. 932 (1908).
Criminal or civil nature of contempt proceeding as affecting punishment, sec 435.
[FN8] N.Y.-Greco v. Winney, 176 A.D.2d 407,574 N.Y.S.2d 403 (31 Dep't 1991).
[FN9] U.S.-Sickels v. Borden, 22 F. Cas. 71. No. 12833 (C.C.SD. N.Y. 1857).
[FNIO] Miss.-Hanna v. State ex reI. Rice, 169 Miss. 314, 153 So. 371 (1934).
[FNIl] U.S.-Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966).
W.Va.-Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doc, 159 W. Va. 200, 220 S.E.2d 672
(1975).
(FNI2] U.S.- Walker v. City of Bilmingham, 381< U.S. 307, 87 S. C!. 1824, 181. Ed.
2d 1210 (1967); Nonnan Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1976).
Mo. - Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
[FNI3] Hl.-Tri-Statc Coach Lines, Inc. v.lIlinois Commerce Com'n, 202 Ill. App. 3d
206,147111. Deo.529.559 N.E.2d 869 (1st Dist. 1990).
Miss.-Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1988).
[FN 14] Ala.-Ex parte Connor, 240 Ala. 327, 198 So. 850 ( 1940).
1
CJS INJUNCTION 404
43A C.J.S. Injunctions 404
Page 4 I
[FNI5] Mo.-Fulton v. Fulton, 528 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
[FNI6] U.S.-Ex parte Geo'ge, 371 U.S. 72. 83 S. Ct. 178,9 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1962);
Petition of Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 S. Ct. 1114,8 L. Ed. 2d 198,89 Ohio L. Abs. 214
(1962).
Fla.-Falls v. N.E.P. [ntern., tnc" 678 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996).
N.Y.- Scholz v. State. 86 N.Y.2d 225, 630 N.Y.S.2d 978, 654 N.E.2d 1226, 103 Ed.
Law Rep. 361 ( 1995).
[FNI7] CaL-Condor Enterprises, Ltd. v. Valley View State Bank, 25 Cal. App. 4th
734,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (2d Dist. 1994).
[FNI8] Colo.-People ex rel. Indus. Com'n of Colorado v. Aladdin Theatre Corp., 96
Colo. 527,44 P.2d 1022 (1935).
Mass.--City of Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp . 369 Mass. 748,343 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
Okla.-Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Willingham, 1972 OK 149.509 P.2d 901 (Okla. 1972).
[FNI9] U.S.-Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972).
[FN20] CaL-People v. Gonzalez, 12 Cal. 4th 804,50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366
(1996).
[FN21 ] Cal.-Maier v. Luce, 61 Cal. App. 552. 215 P. 399 (2d Dist. 1923).
Tex.-Ex parte Conway, 419 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1967).
[FN22] CaL- Wutchumna Water Co. v. Superior Court in and for Tulare County, 215
Cal. 734, 12 P.2d 1033 (1932).
[FN23] U.S.-Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America. 476 F.2d
860. 17 Fed. R. Servo 2d 395 (3d Cir. 1973).
Wash. - State v. Erickson, 66 Wash. 639,120 P. 104 (1912), affd. 234 U.S. 103,34 S.
Ct. 717, 58 L. Ed. 1237 ( 1914).
Westlaw. 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
CJS lNJUNCTION 404
END OF DOCUMENT
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C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.J.S. Contempt 3 J
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated March 2013
Contempt
Page I
John Glenn, J.D., Alan J. Jacobs, J.D., Karl Oakes. J.D . and Jeffrey J. Sham po, J.D.
IT. Acts or Conduct Constituting Contempt
B. f'artil:ular Acts or Conduct
2. Disobedience of Mandate, Order. or Judgment
Topic Summary References Correlation Table
3). Stay or review of proceedings
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Contempt (;;:;:::;>22
Refusal to obey it court order where steps taken to review the order amount to supersedeas
is not contempt, and any attempt to carry out the order during the proceedings for review is
contemptuous.
While violations of an order arc punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is
set aside on appeal or though the basic action hHs become moot,[FN I J exercising the right to
have an order on which contempt proceedings arc based revised is not contempt of
cOUlt,[FN2] and where steps taken to review an order, judgment, or deuee by appeal, writ of
enor, certiorari. or olher authorized proceeding amount to supersedeas, it is not contempt 10
refuse to act under the order of the trial court.{ FN3] On the other hand, any attempt to carry
out the order during the pendency of the proceedings for review will be adjudged con
tempt,[FN4] although a palty so acting with no knowledge of the appeal and supersedeas is
not in contempt.[FN5] Where a stay of proceedings on defendant's motion is granted until the
hearing and determination of the motion, plaintiff is not punishable for contempt in proceed
ing after denial of the motion, because he or she did not wait until a formal order on the de-
cision had been actually entered.[FN6] Where a commitment by a coul1 has been suspended in
other proceedings, one who acts in obedience to a writ in such proceedings is not ch::lrgeable
with contempt. [FN7]
If the action to review does not operate as a supersedeas, execution of the order of the
court of fil1!t instance is not suspended during the pendency of the proccedings,[FN8) and the
order must be obeyed even though it is actually sct aside on appeal.[FN9] If the order is dis
obeyed the trial court may punish for contempt notwithstanding the subsequent re
vcrsal.[FN I 0] One disobeying an order of court, pending appeal therefrom, may question such
order only insofar as he or she can show it to be absolutely void, and cannot be heard to say
that it is erroneous, however flagrant it may appear to be.[FNIl] Where an order of the trial
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C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.l.S. Conlempt 31
Page 3
[FN9] U.S,-U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 25!o: , 67 S. Ct. 677,
91 L, Ed. !o:g4 (1947): Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. eir. 1951).
[FNIO] U.S,-Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 19(2).
Ga.-Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cravey, 209 Ga. 274, 71 S.E.2d 659 (1952) .
[FN II] Tex.-Lytle v. Galveston. H. & S.A. Ry, Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 112,90 S, W.
316 (1905).
[FNI2] N.Y.-In re Jennings' Estate, 138 N.Y,S.2d621 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
Wesllaw. t"'i 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Gov!. Works.
C)S CONTEMPT 31
END OF DOCUMENT
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C)S CONTEMPT 31
17 C.J .S, Contempt 31

Page 2 I
court is affirmed and the order of affirmance is made the order of the trial court, failurc to pay
costs imposed by the appellate court does not constitute contempt of the trial cOUlt.[FN 12]
[FNt]ldaho--In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275,127 P.3d 178 (2005).
re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich. App. 96,667 N.W.2d 68 (2003).
[FN2) Ala.-Piccolo v. Piccolo, 251 Ala. 483. 38 So. 2d 12 (1948).
Abatement of proceedings on reversal of decree on which contempt is based, see
110.
[FN3] U,S.-Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 19 Fed. R. Servo 3d 332
(7thCir.1991).
Ala.-Piccolo v, Piccolo, 251 Ala, 483, 38 So. 2d 12 (1948).
[FN4J Ariz.-City of Phoenix v. Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 34 P.2d 385 (1934).
IlI.-Gumberts v, East Oak St. Hotel Co., 404 Ill. 386, 88 N,E.2d 883 (1949).
Violation of supersedeas or stay as contempt of appellate or lower court, see c.J.S.,
Appeal and Error 553.
[FN5] U.S.-Wilson v. Slale, 169 U.S. 586,18 S. Ct. 435, 42 L. Ed. 865 (1898).
Person not served with writ
Ariz.--City of Phoenix v, Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 34 P.2d 385 (1934),
[FN6] N.Y.-Dady v. O'Rourke, 71 A.D. 557, 75 N.Y.S. 821 (2d Dep't 1902).
Wis.-State ex reI. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, ! I Wis. 2d 560,105
N.W.2d 876 (1960).
[FN7]
Sheriff acting under writ of habeas corpus
Wis.-State ex reI. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105
N.W.2d 876 (1960).
[FN8] N.Y.-Lefkowitz v. Grosswald, 33 Misc, 2d 905, 225 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup 19(2),
order affd, 16 A.D.2d 889, 229 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1st Dep't 1962).
Wash.-State v. Ralph Williams' N011h West Chrysler Plymouth. Inc., 87 Wash. 2d
327,553 P.2d 442 (1976).
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Custom Digest - I Hcadnotes
C
Henley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Emmet County, 533 N.W.2d 199
=3I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or Protection
C;:;:;>315PlI( E)Vioiations, Contempt, and Conviction
C=315Pk90k. Enforcement in general; police.
iowa,1995
Page I
Summarily jailing domestic violence victim for violating no-contact provision of protective
order directed against her male companion did not violate due process, so as to deprive court
of jurisdiction to hold her in contempt; police officers took vktim into custody under sum-
mary contempt procedures iluthorizcd by Domestic Abuse Act, authorizing immediate cus-
todial arrest of person believed to have violated domestic violence protective order. U.S,C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; LC.A. 236.11. 236.14, 665.7.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Custom Digest - 1 Headnotes
C
State v. Stewart. 706 A.2d 171
=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
::::;; 15PIISccurity or Order for Peace or Protection
C;..J315PIJ( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
e=>315Pk91 Violations and Offenses
Anti-harassment orders in general.
N.H..1998
Page I
After New Hampshire court had issued protective order prohibiting defendant's harassment of
his sister, defendant's threatening and profane remarks directed toward his sister at courthouse
in Maine were intentional violation of New Hampshire court order, for which New Hampshire
courts had Jurisdiction to punish as criminal contempt.
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Custom Digest - 1 Headnotes
H
In re RH., 904 N.Y.S.2d 653
=315PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
::=>315PIISeeurity or Order for Peace or Protection
=315PIl( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
c=>315Pk91 Violations and Offenses
==>315Pk94k. Notice or knowledge of order.
N.Y.Fam.,20JO
Page I
Father could not be held in contempt of temporary order of protection on behalf of employees
of a foster care agency where, at the time the aUeged violation occurred, agency had not
served a copy of the order upon the father, and court lacked jurisdiction to grant the tempor-
ary order of protection in the first place.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Custom Digest - 2 Headootes
i>
State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256
=3I 5PPROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS
or Order for Peace or Protection
;::;::>315PII( E)Violations, Contempt, and Conviction
Violations and Offenses
"No contact" orders.
NJ . 20lO
Page I
Even if defendant could have attacked the jurisdictional underpinning of municipal court
judge's no-contact order, defendant was obligated to abide by the terms of the order until it
was vacated and, thus, jury could have relied on the order to elevate both of defendanf's stalk-
ing convictions to the third degree. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-IO(b. c).
i>
State v. Snapp, 82 P.3d 252
Wash.App.Div.2,2004
State was not required to prove validity of no-contact order in prosecution for violating order
prohibiting contact with defendant's wife, where defendant did not assert substantive chal-
lenge to validity of order, defendant did not take e:\ception to jury instruction on specific is-
sue, and defendant did not challcnge jurisdiction of court that issued no-contact order. West's
RCWA 10,99.020, 10.99.040,26.50.110.
END OF DOCUMENT
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