MaternityChildrensHospitalvs.SecretaryofLabor G.R.No.78909June30,1989 Facts: Petitionerisasemigovernmenthospital,managedbytheBoardofDirectorsoftheCagayandeOroWomen'sClubandPuericulture Center,headedbyMrs.AnteraDorado,asholdoverPresident.Thehospitalderivesitsfinancesfromtheclubitselfaswellasfrom payingpatients,averaging130permonth.ItisalsopartlysubsidizedbythePhilippineCharitySweepstakesOfficeandtheCagayan DeOroCitygovernment. Petitionerhasfortyone(41)employees.Asidefromsalaryandlivingallowances,theemployeesaregivenfood,buttheamount spentthereforisdeductedfromtheirrespectivesalaries OnMay23,1986,ten(10)employeesofthepetitioneremployedindifferentcapacities/positionsfiledacomplaintwiththeOfficeof theRegionalDirectorofLaborandEmployment,RegionX,forunderpaymentoftheirsalariesandECOLAS,whichwasdocketedas ROXCaseNo.CW7186. OnJune16,1986,theRegionalDirectordirectedtwoofhisLaborStandardandWelfareOfficerstoinspecttherecordsofthe petitionertoascertainthetruthoftheallegationsinthecomplaints.Basedontheirinspectionreportandrecommendation,the RegionalDirectorissuedanOrderdatedAugust4,1986,directingthepaymentofP723,888.

58,representing underpaymentofwagesandECOLAstoallthepetitioner'semployees. PetitionerappealedfromthisOrdertotheMinisterofLaborandEmployment,Hon.AugustoS.Sanchez,whorenderedaDecisionon September24,1986,modifyingthesaidOrderinthatdeficiencywagesandECOLAsshouldbecomputedonlyfromMay23,1983to May23,1986,OnOctober24,1986,thepetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationwhichwasdeniedbytheSecretaryofLaborin hisOrderdatedMay13,1987,forlackofmerit. Issue: WhetherornottheRegionalDirectorhadjurisdictionoverthecaseandifso,theextentofcoverageofanyawardthatshouldbe forthcoming,arisingfromhisvisitorialandenforcementpowersunderArticle128oftheLaborCode. Held: Thisisalaborstandardscase,andisgovernedbyArt.128boftheLaborCode,asamendedbyE.O.No.111.Underthepresent rules,aRegionalDirectorexercisesbothvisitorialandenforcementpoweroverlaborstandardscases,andistherefore empoweredtoadjudicatemoneyclaims,providedtherestillexistsanemployeremployeerelationship,andthefindingsofthe regionalofficeisnotcontestedbytheemployerconcerned. Laborstandardsrefertotheminimumrequirementsprescribedbyexistinglaws,rules,andregulationsrelatingtowages,hoursof work,costoflivingallowanceandothermonetaryandwelfarebenefits,includingoccupational,safety,andhealthstandards(Section 7,RuleI,RulesontheDispositionofLaborStandardsCasesintheRegionalOffice,datedSeptember16,1987). Decision: ACCORDINGLY,thispetitionshouldbedismissed,asitisherebyDISMISSED,asregardsallpersonsstillemployedintheHospital atthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaint,butGRANTEDasregardsthoseemployeesnolongeremployedatthattime.SOORDERED.

AmandaRancevsNLRC G.R.No.L68147June30,1988 A review of the records shows that a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30, 1981 by and between respondentsPolybagManufacturingCorporationandPolybagWorkersUnionwhichprovidesamongothers: ARTICLEV UNIONSECURITY Anyemployee within thebargainingagreementwhoisamemberofthe unionatthe timeoftheeffectivityofthisagreement orbecomes a member of the UNION thereafter, shall during the term thereoforanyextention,continue to bea member in goodstandingoftheUNIONasaconditionofcontinuedemploymentintheCOMPANY. Anyemployee hired during the effectivity of thisagreementshall, within30 daysafterbecomingregularjointheUNIONand continuetobeamemberingoodstandingthereofasaconditionofcontinuedemploymentintheCOMPANY. OnthebasisofaboardresolutionoftheUNION,theCOMPANYshalldismissfromthe service anymemberofthe UNIONwholoses hismembershipingoodstandingeitherbyresignationtherefromorexpulsiontherefromforanyofthefollowingcauses: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. DisloyaltytotheUNION CommissionofactsinimicaltotheinterestoftheUNION FailureandrefusaltopayUNIONduesandotherassessments Convictionforanyoffenseorcrimeor Organizingand/orjoininganotherlabororganizationclaimingjurisdictionsimilartothatoftheUNION.

Provided, however, thatincaseexpulsionproceedingsare instituted againstany member of theUNION,pendingsuchproceedings, theCOMPANY,onthebasisofaboardresolutionoftheUNION,shall suspendthe member concernedandprovidedfurther,thatthe UNION, jointly and severally with the officers and members of the board voting for the dismissal or suspension, shall hold and rendertheCOMPANY,itsexecutive,owners,andofficersfreefromanyandallclaimsandliabilities.(Rollo,p.64). Petitioners herein were among the members of the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyaltyin that they allegedly joined the NAFLU a largefederation.Becauseoftheexpulsion,petitionersweredismissed byrespondentCorporation. Petitioners sued for reinstatement and backwagesstatingtheirdismissal waswithoutdueprocess.Losing bothinthedecisionsof theLaborArbiterandtheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC),theyelevatedtheircausetotheSupremeCourt. Respondent Polybag Workers Union as already stated expelled 125 members on the ground of disloyalty and acts inimical to the interests of the Union (Resolution No. 84, series of 1982, Rollo,p.16) basedon thefindings and recommendationsofthepanelof investigators. Both the Labor ArbiterandtheNLRCfound theCollectiveBargaining Agreementandthe"Union SecurityClause" valid and considered the termination of the petitioners justified thereunder, for having committed an act of disloyalty to the Polybag WorkersUnion byhaving affiliated with andhavingjoined theNAFLU,another laborunion claiming jurisdictionsimilartotheformer, whilestillmembersofrespondentunion(Rollo,pp.4546). Among the disputed portions of the NLRC decision is itsfindingthatithas beensubstantiallyproventhatthepetitionerscommitted acts of disloyalty to their union as a consequence ofthe filingbyNAFLUforandin theirbehalf of thecomplaintinquestion(Rollo,p. 46). Petitioners insist that their expulsion from the Union and consequentdismissal from employmenthavenobasiswhetherfactualor legal, because they did not in fact affiliate themselves with another Union, the NAFLU. On the contrary, they claim that there is a connivance between respondents Company and Union in their illegal dismissal in order to avoid thepaymentofseparationpayby respondentcompany. Petitioners' contention that they did not authorize NAFLU to file NLRCAB Case No. 6427582 for them is borneout bytherecords

whichshowthat they did not sign the complaint, neither did theysignanydocumentofmembershipapplicationwithNAFLU(Rollo, p. 323). Significantly, none of private respondents was able to present any evidence to the contrary except for one employee who admittedhavingauthorizedNAFLUtofilethecomplaintbutonlyforthepurposeofquestioningthefundsoftheUnion(Rollo,p.216). Placed in proper perspective, the mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in the CollectiveBargainingAgreement.Atmostitwasanactofselfpreservationofworkerswho, driventodesperationfoundshelterinthe NAFLUwhotookthecudgelsforthem. Itwill berecalled that 460 employees were temporarily laid off some were laidoff as early as March 22, 1982 althoughtheactual official announcement and notice of the intended shutdown was madeonlyonMay27, 1982(Rollo,p.151).Thelaidoffemployees did not receive any separation pay because as alleged by respondent company their dismissal was due to serious business reverses suffered by it. The only aid offered by the company which was offered when the disgruntled employeesbegantodiscuss amongthemselves their plight, was a 1/2 sack of rice monthly and P 50.00 weekly. Most of theemployeesdidnotavailthemselves of theaid asthosewhodidwereallegedlymadetosignblankpapers.Toaggravatematters, petitionerscomplainedthattheirpleas for their union officers to fight for their right to reinstatement, fell on deaf ears. Their unionleaders continued workingandwerenot amongthose laidoff, which explains the lack of positive action on the part of the latter to help orevensympathizewiththeplightof themembers. All theycouldofferwasastatement"marunongpakayosamayaringkumpanya"("youknowmorethanthecompany owners")(Rollo,p.80).Underthecircumutances,petitionerscannotbeblamedforseekinghelpwhereveritcouldbefound. In fact even assuming that petitioners did authorize NAFLU to filetheactionforthem,itwouldhavebeenpointlessbecauseNAFLU cannot file an action for members of another union. The proper remedy would be to droptheunionaspartytotheactionandplace thenames of the employees instead (Lakas v. Marcelo Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422 [1982]) as whatappearstohavebeendonein thiscasebeforetheCourt. Petitioners claim that the NLRC erred in ruling that the expulsion proceeding conducted by the Union was in accordance withits bylaws. Respondent Union had notified and summoned herein petitioners to appear and explain whytheyshouldnotbeexpelled fromtheunionforhavingjoinedandaffiliatedwithNAFLU. Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not complied with in that, there wasnoimpartial tribunalorunionbody vested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under the union constitution and bylaws,and, that complainantswere notfurnishednoticeofthechargeagainstthem,nortimelynoticesofthehearingsonthesame(Rollo,p.48). According to the minutes of the special meeting of the Board of Directors of respondent Union held on September14, 1982, the Chairman of the Board of Directors showed the members of the board, copies of the minutes of the investigation proceedingsof each individual member, together with a consolidated list of Union members found guilty as charged and recommended for expulsionasmembersoftherespondentUnion.TheBoardmembersexaminedtheminutesandthelist(Rollo,p.219). Itis to benoted, however, that only two (2) of the expelled petitioners appeared before theinvestigationpanel(Rollo,pp.203,235). Most of the petitioners boycotted the investigation proceedings. They alleged that most of them did not receive the notice of summonsfromrespondentUnionbecausetheywereintheprovinces.Thisfactwas notdisprovedbyprivaterespondentswhowere ableto present only a sample copy of proof of service, Annex "14"(Rollo,p.215).Petitionersfurtherclaimthattheyhadno Ideathat theywerecharged with disloyalty those who camewerenotonly threatenedwithpersecutionbutalsomadetowritetheanswersto questions as dictated to them by the Union and company representatives. These untoward incidents prompted petitioners to request for a general investigation with all the petitioners present but theirrequestwasignoredbythe panelofinvestigators(Rollo, pp.280,307).Again,theseallegationswerenotdeniedbyprivaterespondents. In any event, even if petitioners who were complainants in NLRCAB Case No. 6427582 appeared in thesupposedinvestigation proceedings to answer the charge of disloyalty against them, it could nothavealtered thefact that theproceedingswereviolativeof theelementary rule of justice and fairplay.TheBoardofDirectorsofrespondentunionwould have actedasprosecutor,investigator and judge at the same time. The proceedingwouldhavebeen afarceunder thecircumstances(Lit EmployeesAssociationv.Court

of Industrial Relations, 116 SCRA 459 [1982] citing Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. RafaelHernandez,20SCRA109). Thefiling of the charge of disloyalty against petitioners was instigated by the Chairman of the Board of DirectorsandActingUnion President, Ponciano Fernandez, in the special meeting of the members of the Board of Directors as convened by the Union President on August 16, 1982 (Rollo, p. 213). The Panel of Investigatorscreatedunderthe Board'sResolution No.83,s.1982was composed oftheChairmanoftheBoard,PoncianoFernandez,andtwo (2)membersoftheBoard,SamsonYapandCarmenGarcia (Rollo,p.214).ItisthesameBoardthatexpelledits125membersinitsResolutionNo.84,s.of1982(Rollo,p.219). All told, it isobvious, that in the absence of any full blown investigation of the expelled members ofthe Unionbyanimpartialbody, thereisnobasisforrespondentUnion'saccusations. Itis the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure"(ArticleXIII,Sec.3oftheNewConstitution,Section9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution).Theguaranteeisanactofsocial justice.Whenaperson hasnoproperty, hisjobmaypossiblybe his only possessionormeansoflivelihood.Therefore,heshould beprotectedagainst anyarbitrarydeprivationofhisjob.Article280 of theLabor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shallnotterminatethe services of anemployee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. People's Bank and Trust Company, 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). Dismissal is notjustified for being arbitrary where the workers weredenieddueprocess(Reyesv. Philippine Duplicators,Inc., 109 SCRA 489 [1981] and a clear denial of due process, or constitutional right must be safeguarded againstatalltimes,(De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). This is especially true in the case at bar where there were125 workersmostlyheadsorsolebreadwinnersoftheirrespectivefamilies. Time andagain, this Court has reminded employers that while the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer, the same is notwithout limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating theservicesofhis employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, asin theinstant case. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Dueprocessmustbeobserved indismissinganemployeebecause it affectsnot only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their employees, whichincludetherighttolabor(LibertyCottonMillsWorkersUnionv.LibertyCottonMills,Inc.,90SCRA393[1979],Resolution). In thecase at bar, the scandaloushastewithwhichrespondent corporation dismissed125employeeslendscredencetotheclaim that there wasconnivancebetweenrespondentcorporationandrespondentUnion. Itisevidentthatprivaterespondentswereinbad faithindismissingpetitioners.They,theprivaterespondents,areguiltyofunfairlaborpractice. PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission inNLRCNCR11688182dated April 26,1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1) to reinstate petitionerstotheirformer positions without reduction in rank, seniority and salary (b) to pay petitioners threeyear backwages, without any reduction or qualification, jointly and solidarily with respondent Union and (c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each.Where reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent corporation and respondent union are solidarily orderedtopay, considering their lengthofservicetheircorrespondingseparationpayandotherbenefitstowhichtheyareentitledunderthelaw. SOORDERED.

Bondocvs.PeoplesBankandTrustCompany G.R.No.L43835March31,1981 This certiorari case involves the issue of whether respondent Presidential Executive Assistant committed a grave abuse of discretionamountingtolackofjurisdictioninconfirmingtheabolition of petitioner'sposition asadepartment managerinabankand thepaymenttohimofseparationpayinsteadofreinstatinghimwithbackwages. Domingo F.Bondoc, who used to be an assistant of Jaime C. Velazquez intheAyalaSecutritiesCorporation (p. 116,Rollo),joined thePeople's BankandTrustCompanyonOctober1,1966uponthe recommendationofVelazquez,adirector,toRomanAzanza,the bankpresident(p.35,Rollo). He replaced Ariston Estrada, Jr.(p.37,Rollo).Bondocwaschosenby thebank's boardofdirectorson February 21,1967as thefirst managerofthebank'sdepartmentofeconomicresearchandstatisticswhichwasorganizedinJanuary,1967(Exh.4and5). That department had only four employees: a stenographer and three clerks who were formerly employed in the comtroller'soffice, accountingdepartmentandofficeofthecorporatesecretary(p.117118,Rollo). Every year, from 1968 to 1973, Bondoc was elected to the position of department manager and assistant vicepresident bythe bank'sboardofdirectorsatitsannualorganizationalmeeting(Exh.1Bto1F). On May15, 1973, Bondoc reported in writingtoManuelChuidian,a bank director,certainanomalies committedbytheofficersofthe bank. The Central Bank found that some officers of the bank utilized its found for their own interests.Becauseofthoseanomalies, theMonetary BoardsuspendedBenitoR.Araneta,a director and vicepresident, and reprimandedtheotherofficersinvolved,namely, Severino Coronacion, Nicanor O. Corpus, Guillermo D. Teodoro, Feldres G. San Pedro, Carlos Villaluz, Godofredo Galindez, FernandoMacalanlayandManuelP.Elepao(pp.68Rollo). On September 19, 1973, the boardofdirectorsofthe People'sBank,inthecourseofitsdeliberationonthebank'sprojectedmerger with the Bank of the Philippine islands, resolved to abolish itts department of economic research and statistics which, as already noted,washeadedbyBondoc(p.35,Rollo). Theboard regarded thesaiddepartmentasarededant unitwhose functions couldbe performedbyotherdepartments.TheBankof P.I., like twentythree other commercial banks, has no such department (p.117, Rollo).Bondoc'sfoursubordinates were absorbed bytheaccountingdepartment. Bondoc was advised of the abolition ofhis department in the later part of September, 1973. He asked the personnel manager to compute his separations pay. Bondoc was told that his separation pay was equivalenttoseventyfivepercentofhissalaryforevery yearofservice.ItamountedtoP10,481.33underitscarfinacingplan.(p.118,Rollo). Bondoc allegedly told the personnel manager that he would use his separation pay to liquidate his debt and issue a check for P3,012.08 to coverthebalanceofhisdebt.Herequested thepersonnelmanagertoexpeditethepreparationofthebillofsaleforthe Toyotacarsothathecouldgetthedocumentonthefollowingday.Buthedidnotshowupthatday(p.118,Rollo). It is relevant to state that the merger of the two banks was effected in accompliance with the Central Bank's requirement that commercial banks should increase their capital stock to a minimum of one hundred million pesos through mergers and consolidations or other lawful means. The merger was approved by the Monetary Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission.ThemergeragreementwassignedinJanuary,1974.ItwasconsummatedonJune1,1974. On November 2, 1973, the People's Bank, pursuant tosection11of PresidentialDecreeNo. 21(creating thead hocNationalLabor Relations Commission), applied with the SecretaryofLaborforclearnce to terminate Bondoc's services effectiveon November5 (p. 35,Rollo). He lost no time in filing with the NLRC his opposition to the termination his services. He alleged in his opposition that he was

dismissedwithoutcause(p.114,Rollo). Asalleffortsfortheamicablesettlementofthecasewerefruitless,itwassubmittedforcompulsoryarbitration. During the hearing, Bondoc tried to prove that the abolition of his position was a reprisalforhisaforementionedexposureofsome anomalies in the bank which resulted in the suspension or reprimand by the Monetary Board of certain seniorofficers ofthebank headedbyBenitoR.Araneta,anephewofJ.AntonioAraneta,thechairmanoftheboard(p.48,Rollo). After hearing, the NLRC arbitrator recommended to the Secretary of Labor the denial of the application to terminate Bondoc's employment and ordered the People's Bank to reinstate him with backwages from November 16, 1973 and with allowances and otherbenefitsguaranteedbylawandwithoutlossofstatusandseniorityrights(pp.4243,Rollo). On appeal, theNLRC(CommissionersCastro,BorromeoansSeno)initsdecision of January21,1975 reversedthedecisionofthe arbitrartor, approved the clearance for Bondoc's dismissal and ordered the People's Bank to pay him seventy fivepercent(75%)of his monthly salary for every year of service in lieu ofonehalfmonthsalaryforeveryyear of service fixedintheTerminationPayLaw, RepublicActNo.1052,asamendedbyRepublicActno.1787(p.45,Rollo). TheNLRCadducedasreasontojustifytheabolitionofBondoc'sposition(1)the factthathisposition asmanager beingconfidential in character, the bank had the rperogative to terminate his employment anytimel (2)Bondoc'sdepartmentwasnolongernecessary to theefficient operation of the bank in viewofthemerger(3)the management isnotprecluded from undertakingsareorganization ormaking changes to meet the demands of the present and (4) in case of mergers, departments orposition maybeabolishedor newonescreated,asthenecessityforthemrequires(p.4445,Rollo). Bondoc appealed tot he Secretary of Labor. ThathighofficialintheresolutionofSeptember 29,1975reversedtheNLRC'sdecision on the grounds that the motivation for the termination of Bondoc's services was not taken into account by the NLRC andthatthe People'sBank should not have abolished Bondoc's department without prior clearance. He denied the applicationforclearanceto dismissBondocs(p.50,Rollo). He ordered the People's Bank to reinstate Bondoc to his former position or any substantially equivalent position with backwages equivalent to his salary for six months, it being undrstood thattheBankoftheP.I.hasassumredallthe liabilitiesandobligationsof thePeople'sBank.TheSecretarydeniedtheapplicationforclearancetodismissBondoc.(pp.4850,Rollo). Fromtheresolution,theBankofP.I.,assuccessorofthePeople'sBank,appealedtothepresidentofthePhilippines. Onethe grounds relied upon in that appeal was that Bondoc was convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude(Criminal CaseNo.7185,ManilaCFI,Exh.1). TheBank of P.I. cited Central Bank Circular No.356,whichdisqualifiesa personconvictedofa crimeinvolving moral turpitudefrom becominganofficerofabank(pp.2134,Rollo). In adecision dated May 17, 1976, Presidential Executive Assistant JacoboC.Clavesetaside thedecisionsofthearbitratorandthe SecretaryandconfirmedintototheNLRC'sdecision(p.Rollo). Theoffice of the PresidentheldthatundertheTerminationPayLawanemployment without adefiniteperiodmaybeterminatedwith or without a cause, thatthe abolition of Bondoc's position was a necesary incident of the merger of the two banks and thathis services were no longerindispensabletothem.hence,theclearanceforhisremovalwasauthorizedforhis removalwasauthorized (pp.5254,Rollo). Thereview of the Presidential decision was soughtbyBondoc inthe petitionwhichhefiledin thisCourtonMay27,1976.Thisisthe fifthdecisiontoberenderedinthiscase. We holdthat under the peculiar or particular facts of thiscasethetermination of bondoc'semployment waslawful and justifiedand

that no grave abuse ofdiscretionwaslawfulandjustifiedandthatno grave abuseofdiscretion amountingtolackofjurisdictionwas committedbythePresidentialExecutiveAssistantinaffirmingtheNLRC'sdecisionsustainingtherterminationofhisemployment. Bondoc was not employed for a fixed period. He held his position of department manager at the pleasure of thebank's boardof directors. He occupied a managerial position and his stay in therein depended on his retention of the trust and confidence of the managementandwhethertherewasanyneedforhisservices. Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the aboliton of his position, yet, it is undeniable that the bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his department. Underthe old Termination Pay Law, it was held that in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific periodtheemployer has the right to dismisshisemployeesatanytimewithorwithoutjustcause (DeDiosvs.Bristol Laboratories(Phils.),Inc., L25530, January29,1974,55SCRA349,358JaguarTransportationCo.,Inc.vs.Cornista,L32959,May11,1978,83SCRA77). ItmaybenotedthatunderPolicyInstructionsNo.8oftheSecretaryofLabor"theemployerisnot required to obtainapreviouswritten clearnace to terminate managerial employees in order to enable him to manage effectively". (SEe Associated Citizens Bank vs. Ople,L48896,February24,1981.) ThepetitionerinvokesthepolicyoftheStatetoassuretherightof"workers"tosecurityoftenure(Sec.9,Art.II,Constitution). That guarantee is an actofsocialjustice.Whenapersonhasno property,hisjobmaypossiblybe hisonlypossessionormeansof livelihood.Therefore,heshouldbeprotectedagainstanyarbitraryandunjustdeprivationofhisjob. Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as referring to regular employment and as meaning that "the employershallnotterminatetheservicesofanemployeeexceptforajustcauseorwhenauthorizedby"theCode. Asalreadynotedabove,thefactsofthiscasedonot warrant theconclusionthatBondoc'srighttosecurity of tenure wasoppressively abridged. He knew all along that his tenure as a department manager rested in the discretion of thebank'sboardofdirectorsand thatatanytimehisservicesmightbedispensedwithorhispositionmightbeabolished. On equitable considerations, we hold that Bondoc should be paid as separation pay his salary and allowances, if any, for seven months. WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Presidential Executive Assistant is affirmed withthe modification that theBank of theP.I. shouldpaytothepetitionerseparationpayequivalenttohissalaryandallowances(ifany)forsevenmonths.Nocosts.

AsianTransmissionCorporationvsCA G.R.No.144664 Petitioner, Asian Transmission Corporation, seeks via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1995 RulesofCivilProcedurethe nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision1ofthe Court of Appeals denyingitspetitiontoannul1)the March11, 1993"Explanatory Bulletin"2 of theDepartmentofLabor and Employment(DOLE)entitled"WorkersEntitlementtoHolidayPayonApril9,1993,Arawng Kagitingan and Good Friday", which bulletin the DOLE reproduced on January 23, 1998, 2)theJuly31,1998 Decision3 of thePanel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that the said explanatory bulletin applied as well to April 9, 1998, and 3) theSeptember 18, 19984 ResolutionofthePanelofVoluntaryArbitrationdenyingitsMotionforReconsideration. Thefollowingfacts,asfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,areundisputed: TheDepartment of Labor andEmployment(DOLE),throughUndersecretary CresencianoB.Trajano,issuedanExplanatoryBulletin dated March11,1993whereinitclarified,interalia,thatemployeesareentitledto200% of theirbasicwageonApril9,1993,whether unworked, which[,] apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legalholiday],isalsoAraw ngKagitingan [whichisalsoa legal holiday].Thebulletinreads: "On the correct paymentofholidaycompensation on April 9, 1993 which apart from being Good Friday is alsoAraw ngKagitingan, i.e., two regularholidays falling on the same day, this Departmentisoftheviewthatthecoveredemployeesare entitledtoatleast twohundred percent (200%) of their basic wage even ifsaid holiday isunworked. Thefirst 100%representsthepaymentofholiday payonApril9,1993asGoodFridayandthesecond100%isthepaymentofholidaypayforthesamedateasArawngKagitingan. SaidbulletinwasreproducedonJanuary23,1998,whenApril9,1998wasbothMaundyThursdayandArawngKagitinganxxxx Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of theirbasicpayonApril9,1998.RespondentBisigngAsianTransmissionLaborUnion(BATLU)protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of theCollectiveBargaining Agreement(CBA)existing betweenpetitionerand BATLU,thecontroversywassubmittedforvoluntaryarbitration.xxxxOnJuly31, 1998,theOffice of theVoluntaryArbitratorrendereda decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw ng Kagitignan and MaundyThursday."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) SubjectofinterpretationinthecaseatbarisArticle94oftheLaborCodewhichreads: ART. 94. Rightto holidaypay.(a)Everyworkershallbepaidhisregulardailywageduringregularholidays,except inretail andserviceestablishmentsregularlyemployinglessthanten(10)workers (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalenttotwicehisregularrateand (c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninthofApril,thefirstof May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twentyfifth and thirtieth of December and theday designatedbylawforholdingageneralelection, whichwasamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.203issuedonJune30,1987,suchthattheregularholidaysarenow: 1.NewYearsDayJanuary1 2.MaundyThursdayMovableDate 3.GoodFridayMovableDate 4.ArawngKagitinganApril9(BataanandCorregidorDay) 5.LaborDayMay1 6.IndependenceDayJune12 7.NationalHeroesDayLastSundayofAugust 8.BonifacioDayNovember30

9.ChristmasDayDecember25 10.RizalDayDecember30 In deciding in favor oftheBisigngAsianTransmissionLaborUnion(BATLU),theVoluntary Arbitratorheld that Article94oftheLabor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formulawhich is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it wasAraw ng Kagitinganandatthe same time was Maundy Thursday and that that the law,asamended, enumeratesten regularholidaysforeveryyearshouldnotbe interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certainyears,like1993and1998,isalsoHolyFridayorMaundyThursday." In theassailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that theCollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizestheir intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paidlegal holidays during the effectivity of theCBAandthat"[t]hereisnocondition,qualificationorexception for anyvariancefromtheclearintentthatall holidaysshallbecompensated. TheCourt of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provisioninlawwhich providesfor[a]reduction of holiday payif two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of theLabor Code provisions on holidaypaymustberesolvedinfavoroflabor." Bythepresentpetition,petitionersraisethefollowingissues: I WHETHERORNOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSEOFDISCRETIONINERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETING THE TERMS OFTHECOLLECTIVEBARGAININGAGREEMENTBETWEENTHEPARTIESANDSUBSTITUTINGITS OWNJUDGMENTINPLACEOFTHEAGREEMENTSMADEBYTHEPARTIESTHEMSELVES II WHETHERORNOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDINGTHAT ANYDOUBTSABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED IN THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN WAS LAID TORESTBY THEREISSUANCEOFTHESAIDEXPLANATORYBULLETIN III WHETHERORNOT THERESPONDENTCOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINUPHOLDINGTHE VALIDITY OF THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE SAID BULLEITN WAS NOT AN EXAMPLE OF A JUDICIAL, QUASIJUDICIAL, OR ONE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT [Department of Labor and Employment] DOLE MAYPROMULGATE IV WHETHERORNOTTHESECRETARYOFTHEDEPARTMENTOFLABORANDEMPLOYMENT(DOLE)BYISSUINGEXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11,1993,INTHEGUISEOFPROVIDINGGUIDELINESONART.94OFTHELABORCODE,COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AS IT LEGISLATED AND INTERPRETED LEGAL PROVISIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CREATEOBLIGATIONSWHERENONEAREINTENDEDBYTHELAW V WHETHERORNOT THERESPONDENTCOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINSUSTAININGTHE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENTOF LABOR INREITERATINGITSEXPLANATORYBULLETINDATEDMARCH11,1993ANDIN ORDERINGTHAT THE SAME POLICYOBTAINEDFORAPRIL9,1998DESPITETHERULINGSOFTHESUPREMECOURTTOTHE CONTRARY VI WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ACTS WILL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS BY THE "EXPLANATORYBULLETIN"ASWELLASEQUALPROTECTIONOFLAWS Thepetitionisdevoidofmerit. At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing theCourtofAppeals Decision bypetitionforreview oncertiorariunderRule45 ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,petitionerlodgedthepresentpetitionforcertiorariunderRule65.

[S]incetheCourtofAppealshadjurisdictionoverthepetitionunderRule65,anyallegederrorscommittedbyitintheexerciseofits jurisdictionwouldbeerrorsofjudgmentwhicharereviewablebytimelyappealandnotbyaspecialcivilactionofcertiorari.Ifthe aggrievedpartyfailstodosowithinthereglementaryperiod,andthedecisionaccordinglybecomesfinalandexecutory,hecannot availhimselfofthewritofcertiorari,hispredicamentbeingtheeffectofhisdeliberateinaction. Theappeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals isapetition for reviewunderRule 45andnotaspecialcivilactionunder Rule65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 andRule65, respectively,ofthe1997 RulesofCivilProcedure. Rule45isclearthatthe decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the actionorproceeding involved, may beappealedtothisCourtbyfilingapetition for review, whichwould bebut acontinuationoftheappellateprocessover theoriginal case. Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from noticeofjudgmentordenialofmotion forreconsideration. xxx For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effectsofthejudgmentandtheactsofthe lowercourtor agency. Inthiscase,appealwasnotonlyavailablebutalsoaspeedyandadequateremedy.6 Therecordsof the case show that following petitioners receipt on August 18, 2000 of a copy of theAugust10,2000Resolutionof theCourtofAppealsdenyingitsMotionforReconsideration, it filed thepresentpetitionforcertiorari onSeptember15,2000,atwhich timetheCourtofAppealsdecisionhadbecomefinalandexecutory,the15dayperiodtoappealitunderRule45havingexpired. Technicalityaside,thisCourtfindsnogroundtodisturbtheassaileddecision. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the Stateshallaffordprotectiontolabor.7Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workersonaccountofwork interruptions.Inotherwords, although the worker is forced to take a rest,heearnswhathe shouldearn,thatis,his holiday pay."8Itisalsointendedtoenablethe workertoparticipateinthenationalcelebrationsheldduringthedaysidentifiedaswithgreathistoricalandculturalsignificance. Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9), National Heroes Day (lastSundayofAugust), BonifacioDay(November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared national holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunity to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promote national identity, and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is a day traditionally reserved tocelebratethecontributionsoftheworking classtothe developmentofthenation,whilethereligiousholidays designatedinExecutiveOrderNo.203allowtheworkertocelebratehisfaithwithhisfamily. As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays.9 The provision is mandatory,10 regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis.11Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative,12 holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable underthelaw.Sinceaworkerisentitledtotheenjoyment of tenpaid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on thesame dateshouldnotoperatetoreducetoninethetenholidaypay benefitsaworkerisentitledtoreceive. Itis elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the lawis clear and unequivocal,thelawmust be taken to mean exactly what itsays.13Inthecaseatbar,thereisnothinginthelawwhichprovidesorindicatesthattheentitlement totendaysofholidaypayshallbereducedtoninewhentwoholidaysfallonthesameday. Petitioners assertion that Wellington v. Trajano14 has "overruled" the DOLE March 11, 1993 Explanatory Bulletin does not lie.In Wellington, the issue was whether monthlypaid employees are entitled to an additional days pay if a holiday falls on aSunday. ThisCourt, inanswering the issue in the negative, observed that in fixing the monthly salary of its employees, Wellingtontookinto account "every working day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sunday." In the instant case, the issueiswhetherdailypaidemployeesareentitledtobepaidfortworegularholidayswhichfallonthesameday.15

In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides thatalldoubtsintheimplementationandinterpretationofitsprovisions,includingits implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolvedinfavoroflabor.Forthe workingmanswelfare shouldbetheprimordialand paramountconsideration.16 Moreover, Sec. 11, RuleIV,BookIIIoftheOmnibusRulestoImplementthe LaborCodeprovidesthat"Nothinginthelawor therules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as providedinexistingindividualorcollectiveagreementoremployerpracticeorpolicy."17 From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to payforthe legalholidays as requiredbylaw.Thus,the19971998CBAincorporatesthefollowingprovision: ARTICLEXIV PAIDLEGALHOLIDAYS ThefollowinglegalholidaysshallbepaidbytheCOMPANYasrequiredbylaw: 1.NewYearsDay(January1st) 2.HolyThursday(moveable) 3.GoodFriday(moveable) 4.ArawngKagitingan(April9th) 5.LaborDay(May1st) 6.IndependenceDay(June12th) 7.BonifacioDay[November30] 8.ChristmasDay(December25th) 9.RizalDay(December30th) 10.GeneralElectiondesignatedbylaw,ifdeclaredpublicnonworkingholiday 11.NationalHeroesDay(LastSundayofAugust) Onlyanemployeewhoworksonthedayimmediatelyprecedingorafteraregularholidayshallbeentitledtotheholidaypay. A paidlegal holiday occurring during the scheduled vacation leave will result in holiday payment in additiontonormalvacationpay butwillnotentitletheemployeetoanothervacationleave. Under similar circumstances, the COMPANY will give a days wage for November 1st and December 31st whenever declared a holiday.Whenrequiredtoworkonsaiddays,theemployeewillbepaidaccordingtoArt.VI,Sec.3Bhereof.18 WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDISMISSED.

(IBAAEU)vsInchiong G.R.No.L52415 Thisis a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, AmadoG. Inciong, in NLRC caseNo.RBIV156176entitled"InsularBankofAsiaandAmericaEmployees'Union(complainantappellee),vs. InsularBankofAsiaandAmerica"(respondentappellant),thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows: xxx xxx xxx ALL THE FOREGOINGCONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National LaborRelationsCommission dated 20 June 1978 be, as itishereby,setasideanda new judgment.promulgateddismissingtheinstantcaseforlackof merit(p.109rec.). Theantecedentfactsculledfromtherecordsareasfollows: On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV inManila. Conciliation havingfailed,andupon therequestofbothparties,thecasewascertifiedforarbitrationonJuly7,1975(p.18,NLRCrec. On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Sorianorenderedadecisionintheaboveentitledcase,grantingpetitioner'scomplaint forpaymentofholidaypay.Pertinentportionsofthedecisionread: xxx xxx xxx The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as mandatedbytheCode,particularlyArticle208,towit:t.hqw Art.208. Righttoholidaypay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishmentsregularlyemployinglessthan10workers. (b) Theterm"holiday"asusedinthischapter,shallinclude:NewYear'sDay,MaundyThursday,GoodFriday,theninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twentyfifth and the thirtieth of Decemberandthedaydesignatedbylawforholdingageneralelection. xxx xxx xxx This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees was computed in the past with the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes of determining the deductible amount for absences incurred Thus, if the employer uses the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of monthly paid employee, this gives rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not includepaymentsforunworkedregular holidays.The useofthefactor303indicatesthe number of ordinary working days in a year (which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the 52 Sundays andthe 10regular holidays. The useof251asafactor(365calendardaysless 52Saturdays,52 Sundays, and 10regularholidays)givesriselikewise to the same presumption that the unworked Saturdays, Sundays and regular holidays are unpaid. Thisbeing thecase, it is not amisstostatewithcertaintythattheinstantclaimforwagesonregularunworkedholidaysisfoundtobetenableandmeritorious. WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered: (a) xxx xxxx xxx (b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular h(olidays since November 1, 1974 (pp. 9799,rec.,underscoringsupplied). Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it compliedwith theorderofArbiter RicarteT.Sorianoby payingtheirholidaypayuptoandincludingJanuary,1976. On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No.850waspromulgatedamending,amongothers, theprovisionsoftheLaborCode ontherighttoholidaypaytoreadasfollows:

Art.94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages during regular holidays, except in retailandserviceestablishmentsregularlyemployinglessthanten(10)workers (b) Theemployer may require an employee to work on any holiday butsuch employee shallbe paidacompensation equivalenttotwicehisregularrateand (c) As used inthisArticle,"holiday"includesNewYear'sDay, MaundyThursday,GoodFriday,theninthofApril,thefirst of May, thetwelfth of June, the fourth of July, thethirtiethofNovember, thetwentyfifthandthethirtiethofDecember,andthe daydesignatedbylawforholdingageneralelection. Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgatedtherulesandregulationsfortheimplementationofholidayswithpay.Thecontroversialsectionthereofreads: Sec.2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed tobepaidforalldaysinthemonthwhetherworked ornot.Forthispurpose, themonthlyminimumwage shallnot belessthanthestatutoryminimumwagemultipliedby365daysdividedbytwelve"(italicssupplied). On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the abovequoted rule,pertinentportionsofwhichread: xxx xxx xxx Theten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended tobenefitprincipallydailyemployees.Inthecaseofmonthly, onlythosewhosemonthlysalarydidnotyetincludepaymentfortheten(10)paidlegalholidaysareentitledtothebenefit. Underthe rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies ontheentitlementof monthly paid employees, Thenewdeterminingruleisthis:Ifthemonthly paidemployeeisreceivingnot lessthanP240,the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidaysinmonthswheretheyoccur,thenheisstillentitledtotheten(10)paidlegalholidays...."(emphasissupplied). Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing Article 94 oftheLaborCodeandbyPolicy InstructionNo.9,stoppedthepaymentofholidaypaytoanitsemployees. On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writofexecutiontoenforcethe arbiter'sdecisionofAugust25,1975,wherebythe respondentbankwasorderedtopayitsemployeestheirdailywagefortheunworkedregularholidays. On September 10,1975,respondentbankfiled anopposition to themotionforawrit of executionalleging,amongothers,that:(a)its refusal to pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August25,1975,isbasedonandjustifiedbyPolicyInstruction No.9which interpretedthe rules implementingP.D.850and(b)that thesaid award is already repealed by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975,andbysaidPolicyInstructionNo.9ofthe Department of Labor, considering that its monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and theirmonthlypay is uniform from January to December, and that no deductions are made from the monthly salaries of its employees on accountof holidaysinmonthswheretheyoccur(pp.6465,NLRCrec.). On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the respondent bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the judgment is already final and the findings which is foundinthebodyofthe decision aswellas thedispositiveportionthereofisresjudicataoris the law of the case between the parties and (b) that since the decision had been partially implemented by therespondent bank, appealfromthesaiddecisionisnolongeravailable(pp.100103,rec.). On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the abovecited order of Labor Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations Commission, reiterating therein its contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution. Respondent

bank further alleged for the first time that the questioned order isnotsupportedbyevidenceinsofaras it findsthatrespondentbank discontinuedpaymentofholidaypaybeginningJanuary,1976(p.84,NLRCrec.). On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal,thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows: In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss, respondent's appeal to set aside Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano'sorderof18 October1976and,asprayedforbycomplainant,toorderthe issuanceofthe proper writofexecution(p.244,NLRCrec.). Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979 or almost eight. (8) months afteritwas promulgated,whilecopieswereservedontherespondentbankonFebruary13,1979. On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office oftheMinisterofLabor amotionforreconsideration/appealwithurgent prayer to stay execution, alleging therein the following: (a)thatthere isprimafacie evidence of grave abuseofdiscretion,amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in dismissing the respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without passing upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution appealedfromis contrarytothe law and jurisprudence(pp.260274,NLRCrec.). On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and alleged the following grounds: (a)that the officeofthe Minister of Labor has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant appealpursuanttothe provisionsofP.D.1391(b)thatthe labor arbiter's decision being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the petitioner and (c)thatthe decisionofthelaborarbiterdatedAugust25,1975issupportedbythelawandtheevidenceinthecase(p.364,NLRCrec.). On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying thata writ of execution be issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pendingappeal of thecase withthe Officeofthe Minister of Labor. Respondentbankfiledits oppositiontheretoonAugust8,1979. OnAugust13,1979,theNationalLaborRelationsCommissionissuedanorderwhichstates: The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to designate a SocioEconomic Analyst to compute the holidaypayoftheemployeesoftheInsularBankofAsia and America from April 1976tothepresent, inaccordancewiththeDecisionoftheLaborArbiterdatedAugust25,1975"(p.80,rec.). On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order, the dispositiveportionofwhichstates: ALL THE FOREGOINGCONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National LaborRelationsCommission dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, setasideanda new judgmentpromulgated dismissing theinstantcaseforlackof merit(p.436,NLRCrec.). Hence, this petition for certiorari chargingpublicrespondent Amado G.Inciongwithabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcess ofjurisdiction. Theissuein thiscaseis:whetherornotthedecisionofaLaborArbiter awardingpaymentofregular holiday paycanstillbe set aside on appeal by the Deputy Minister of Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially executed, the finality of whichwasaffirmedbytheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionsitting enbanc,on thebasisofan Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the Ministry of Labor long after the said decision hadbecome finalandexecutory.

WEfindforthepetitioner. I WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issuedby the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisionsonholidaypay, theyineffectamendedthembyenlargingthescopeoftheirexclusion(p.11,rec.). Article94oftheLaborCode,asamendedbyP.D.850,provides: Art.94. Righttoholidaypay.(a)Everyworkershallbepaidhisregulardailywageduringregular holidays,exceptin retail andserviceestablishmentsregularlyemployinglessthanten(10)workers.... ThecoverageandscopeofexclusionoftheLaborCode'sholidaypayprovisionsisspelledoutunderArticle82thereofwhichreads: Art.82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall applytoemployeesinallestablishmentsandundertakings,whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him forsupportdomestichelpers,persons inthe personal service of another,andworkers whoarepaidbyresultsasdeterminedbytheSecretaryofLaborinappropriateregulations. ...(emphasissupplied). From theabovecited provisions, it is clear that monthlypaidemployees arenot excluded from thebenefitsofholidaypay.However, theimplementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Laborexcludes monthly paidemployeesfromthesaid benefits by inserting,underRuleIV,BookIlloftheimplementing rules,Section2,which providesthat:"employees who areuniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimumwageshallbepresumedtobepaidforalldaysinthemonthwhetherworkedornot." Publicrespondent maintains that "(T)herulesimplementingP.D.850andPolicyInstructionNo.9 were issuedtoclarify thepolicyin theimplementation of the ten(10)paidlegalholidays.Asinterpreted,'unworked'legalholidaysaredeemed paidinsofarasmonthly paidemployees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the statutory minimum wage, (b) their monthly payis uniform from January to December, and (c) no deduction is made from their monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur. As explained in Policy Instruction No, 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily paid employees. In case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten(10) paidlegal holidaysareentitledtothebenefit'"(pp.340341,rec.).Thiscontentionisuntenable. It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocalthe law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the LaborCode onthe entitlementtothebenefitsofholiday pay areclear and explicit it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy InstructionNo. 9, thethen Secretary of Labor went as far as to categoricallystatethatthebenefitisprincipallyintendedfordailypaid employees,whenthelaw clearlystatesthateveryworkershallbepaidtheirregularholidaypay.Thisis aflagrantviolationofthemandatory directiveofArticle4 of theLabor Code, which states that "All doubts intheimplementationandinterpretationoftheprovisionsofthis Code, includingits implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumedthatthelegislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its languagepermits(Orloskyvs. Haskell,155A.112.) Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Codeauthorizing himtopromulgatethenecessaryimplementingrulesandregulations. Publicrespondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, asexpressedbytheSecretaryofLaborinthe case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v.TheCharteredBank (NLRCCaseNo.RB178975,March24,1976),is to correct

thedisadvantages inherent in the daily compensation systemofemploymentholidaypay isprimarily intendedtobenefitthedaily paid workers whose employment and income are circumscribed by the principle of "no work, no pay." This argument may sound meritorious but, until the provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is amended by another law, monthlypaid employees are definitely included in the benefits of regular holiday pay. As earlier stated, the presumption is always in favor oflaw,negativelyput, theLaborCodeisalwaysstrictlyconstruedagainstmanagement. While it istrue that the contemporaneous construction placed upona statute byexecutiveofficers whosedutyistoenforceitshould be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction issoerroneous, asin theinstant case,thesamemustbe declaredas nulland void. It is the roleoftheJudiciarytorefineand,whennecessary,correctconstitutional(and/orstatutory)interpretation,inthe contextof the interactions of thethreebranchesofthegovernment, almostalways insituations wheresome agencyoftheStatehas engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmentalpower(The SupremeCourt inModern Role,C. B.Swisher1958,p.36). Thus. in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981) where the Secretary of Labor enlarged the scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree grantingincrease in emergencyallowance,thisCourtruledthat: ...theSecretaryofLaborhasexceededhisauthoritywhenhe includedparagraph(k)inSection1oftheRulesimplementing P.D.1123. xxx xxx xxx Clearly,the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authoritygranted to theSecretary of Labor,andthesameistherefore void,asruledbythisCourtinalonglineofcases... Therecognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in theadministration of thestatute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908. Then came in a 1914 decision, United States vs.TupasiMolina (29Phil.119)delineationofthescopeof such competence. Thus: "Of course theregulations adopted under legislativeauthoritybya particulardepartment must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulationsrelatesolelytocarryinginto effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People vs. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions oftheAct,'themandateoftheActmustprevail and must befollowed.Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling inc. vs. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and itsscopeiswithinthestatutoryauthoritygrantedby thelegislature,evenifthecourts arenot inagreementwith thepolicy stated therein or its innate wisdom. ...Ontheotherhand,administrativeinterpretationofthelawis at bestmerely advisory,foritisthecourtsthatfinallydeterminechatthelawmeans." "It cannot be otherwiseas theConstitutionlimitstheauthorityofthePresident,inwhomallexecutivepowerresides,totake carethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted.Nolesseradministrativeexecutive officeoragency thencan, contrarytotheexpress language of the Constitution assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed the statute requires adherence to, not departure from its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with whatthe Veterans Bill of Rights provides"(Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,supra,463, 464, citing Teozon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA 33 SCRA585see also Santosvs.Hon. Estenzo,etal,109 Phil. 419 Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil. 295 Sy Man vs. Jacinto&Fabros,93Phil. 1093 Olsen&Co.,

Inc.vs.AldaneseandTrinidad,43Phil.259). This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable Workers Union (TUPAS) vs. The National LaborRelationsCommissionandAmericanWire&CableCo.,Inc.,G.R.No.53337,promulgatedonJune29,1984. In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV,BookIIIofthe Rulestoimplement theLaborCode and Policy instructionNo.9issuedby the then Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. IncionghadnobasisatalltodenythemembersofpetitioneruniontheirregularholidaypayasdirectedbytheLaborCode. II Itis not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T.SorianodatedAugust 25,1975,hadalreadybecomefinal,andwas,in fact,partiallyexecutedbytherespondentbank. However,public respondent maintains thatontheauthority of DeLuna vs.Kayanan, 61SCRA49,November13,1974,hecanannul thefinal decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementingrulesoftheLaborCode pursuant to P.D. 850 on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April 23, 1976by the then Secretary of Laborarefactsandcircumstancesthattranspiredsubsequent to thepromulgation of thedecisionofthelaborarbiter,whichrenders theexecutionofthesaiddecisionimpossibleandunjustonthepartofhereinrespondentbank(pp.342343,rec.). Thiscontentionisuntenable. To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public respondent is not a laborcase wherein the express mandate of the Constitution on the protection to laborisapplied.Thus Article4 of theLaborCodeprovidesthat,"Alldoubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules andregulations,shall be resolved in favor of labor and Article 1702 of the Civil Code provides that, " In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contractsshallbeconstruedinfavorofthesafetyanddecentlivingforthelaborer. Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the members of petitioner union of their vestedrightacquiredbyvirtueofafinaljudgmentonthebasisofalaborstatutepromulgatedfollowingtheacquisitionofthe"right". On thequestion of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued prior to its promulgation, thisCourt, throughAssociateJusticeClaroM.Recto,said: xxx xxx xxx We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Saidorder, beingunappealable,becamefinalonthedateofitsissuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be deprived thereof by a constitutional provision enacted or promulgated subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal laws favorable to the accused, have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling ormodifying vestedrights, oraltering contractualobligations"(ChinaIns. & SuretyCo.vs.JudgeofFirstInstanceofManila,63Phil.324,emphasissupplied). In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "... when a court renders a decision or promulgates a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, inthe sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect." Thus, the amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to Implement the LaborCode) cannot be given retroactive effect as to modify final judgments. Not even a law can validly annulfinaldecisions(Inre: Cunanan,etal.,Ibid). Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the publicrespondentare notanalogous to thatofthecaseatbar.ThecaseofDe Luna speaks of final and executory judgment, while iii the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed.just asthecourtis ousted of its jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment itbecomesfinal,thecourt also loses its jurisdictiontoannulor modifyawritofexecutionuponitsserviceorexecutionfor,otherwise,we willhaveasituation wherein afinalandexecutedjudgment

can stillbe annulled or modified by the court upon mere motion of a panty This would certainlyresult inendlesslitigationsthereby renderinginutiletheruleoflaw. Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary because it did so under painoflevy and execution of its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find no merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its voluntariness in complying with the decision of the labor arbiterbynotappealingtothe National LaborRelationsCommissionasprovidedforunder theLabor Code under Article 223. A party who waives his right to appeal isdeemed to have acceptedthejudgment,adverseornot, as correct, especially if such party readily acquiesced in the judgment by starting to execute said judgment even before a writof execution was issued, as in this case. Under these circumstances, to permit apartytoappealfromthe said partiallyexecutedfinal judgmentwouldmakeamockeryofthedoctrineoffinalityofjudgmentslongenshrinedinthisjurisdiction. Section I of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "... execution shall issue as a matter of rightupon theexpirationof theperiod to appeal ... or if no appeal has been duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of labor arbiters whoare exercising quasijudicialfunctionssince"...theruleofexecutionofjudgmentsunderthe rules shouldgovern all kinds of executionof judgment, unless it is otherwise provided in other laws"Saguciovs.Bulos5SCRA803)andArticle 223 of theLaborCode provides that "... decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the Commissionbyanyorbothofthepartieswithinten(10)daysfromreceiptofsuchawards,orders,ordecisions...." Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction toalterthefinaljudgmentandthe judgment becomes final ipso jure (Vega vs. WCC,89SCRA143,citingCruzvs.WCC,2PHILAJUR436,440, January31,1978see also Soliven vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 621 Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, decided jointly, 77 SCRA 297 Vitug vs. Republic, 75 SCRA436Ramosvs.Republic,69SCRA576). In Galvez vs.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31, 1961, where the lower courtmodifiedafinal order,thisCourtruledthus: xxx xxx xxx Thelower court was thus aware ofthefactthatitwastherebyaltering ormodifying its order of January8,1959.Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did, we are constrained to hold however, that the lower court had no authoritiestomakesaidalterationormodification.... xxx xxx xxx Theequitable considerations that led the lower court to take theactioncomplained of cannot offsetthedemandsofpublic policyand public interest which are also responsive to the tenets of equity requiring that an issues passeduponin decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and definitely closed for, otherwise,there would be no end tolitigations,thussetting at naughtthemainroleofcourts of justice,whichistoassistin theenforcementoftheruleoflawandthemaintenanceofpeaceandorder,bysettlingjusticiablecontroversieswithfinality. xxx xxx xxx IntherecentcaseofGabayavs.Mendoza,113SCRA405,406,March30,1982,thisCourtsaid:t.hqw xxx xxx xxx In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil.237),itwascategoricallystatedthattheruleis absolutethataftera judgmentbecomes final bythe expiration of the period provided by the rules within which it so becomes, no further amendment or correction can be made by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. And such final judgment isconclusivenot only astoevery matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as to any other admissible matter whichmusthave been offered for that purpose (L7044, 96 Phil. 526). In the earlier case of Contreras andGincovs.Felix and China Banking Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be adhered to regardless of any possible injustice ina particular case for (W)e have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the overmasteringneedof certaintyandimmutabilityofjudicialpronouncements

xxx

xxx

xxx

III The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the members of the petitionerunion of their rights acquired by virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law Public respondent completely ignored the rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint since he knew for a fact that the judgmentofthelaborarbiterhadlongbecomefinalandwasevenpartiallyexecutedbytherespondentbank. A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution (ChinaIns.&SuretyCo.vs.JudgeofFirstInstanceofManila,63Phil. 324).Afinaljudgmentis"avestedinterest whichit isright and equitable that the government should recognize and protect,andofwhichthe individualcouldno.bedeprivedarbitrarily withoutinjustice"(Rookledgev.Garwood,65N.W.2d785,791). lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy language of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding (Vda. de Cuaycong vs. Vda. de Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis supplied), And "(I)t has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divested the court of jurisdiction and asaconsequenceitsjudgmentisnulland void and confers no rights" (Phil.Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973). Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due process, the actionof public respondent Amado G.Inciong is aclearexampleofdeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflawandconstitutedgraveabuseofdiscretion, amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninissuingtheorderdatedNovember10,1979. WHEREFORE, THEPETITIONISHEREBYGRANTED,THEORDEROFPUBLICRESPONDENTISSETASIDE,ANDTHEDECISION OFLABORARBITERRICARTET.SORIANODATEDAUGUST25,1975,ISHEREBYREINSTATED. COSTSAGAINSTPRIVATERESPONDENTINSULARBANKOFASIAANDAMERICA SOORDERED.1wph1.

ANDRESE.DITAN,petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINEOVERSEASEMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATOR,NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION, ASIAWORLDRECRUITMENT,INC.,AND/ORINTRACOSALESCORPORATION, G.R.No.79560 Facts: AndresE.DitanwasrecruitedbyprivaterespondentIntracoSalesCorporation,throughitslocalagent,AsiaWorld,theotherprivate respondent,toworkinAngolaasaweldingsupervisor.Thecontractwasforninemonths,atamonthlysalaryofUS$1,100.00or US$275.00weekly,andcontainedtherequiredstandardstipulationsfortheprotectionofouroverseasworkers. ArrivingonNovember30,1984,inLuanda,capitalofAngola,thepetitionerwasassignedasanordinarywelderintheINTRACO centralmaintenanceshopfromDecember2to25,1984.OnDecember26,1984,hewasinformed,tohisdistressthatwouldbe transferredtoKafunfo,some350kilometerseastofLuanda.Thiswastheplacewhere,earlierthatyear,therebelshad attackedandkidnappedexpatriateworkers,killingtwoFilipinosintheraid.Naturally,Ditanwasreluctanttogo.However,hewas assuredbytheINTRACOmanagerthatKafunfowassafeandadequatelyprotectedbygovernmenttroopsmoreoverandthiswas morepersuasivehewastoldhewouldbesenthomeifherefusedthenewassignment.Intheend,withmuch misgiving,herelentedandagreed. OnDecember29,1984,hisfearswereconfirmed.TheUnitarebelsattackedthediamondminingsitewhereDitanwasworkingand tookhimandsixteenotherFilipinohostages,alongwithotherforeignworkers.Therebelsandtheircaptiveswalkedthroughjungle terrainfor31daystotheUnitastrongholdneartheNamibianborder. Theytrekkedforalmostathousandkilometers.Theysubsistedonmeagerfare.Someofthemhaddiarrhea.Theirfeetwere blistered.ItwasonlyonMarch16,1985,thatthehostageswerefinallyreleasedaftertheintercessionoftheirgovernmentsandthe InternationalRedCross.Sixdayslater,DitanandtheotherFilipinohostageswerebackinthePhilippines. TherepatriatedworkershadbeenassuredbyINTRACOthattheywouldbegivenpriorityinreemploymentabroad,andeventually elevenofthemweretakenback.Ditanhavingbeenexcluded,hefiledinJune1985acomplaintagainsttheprivaterespondentsfor breachofcontractandvariousotherclaims.Specifically,hesoughttheamountofUS$4,675.00,representinghissalariesforthe unexpired17weeksofhiscontractUS$25,000.00aswarriskbonusUS$2,196.50asthevalueofhislostbelongingsUS$1,100 forunpaidvacationleaveandmoralandexemplarydamagesinthesumofUS$50,000.00,plusattorney'sfees. AlltheseclaimsweredismissedbyPOEAAdministratorTomasD.AchacosoinadecisiondatedJanuary27,1987.2Thiswas affirmedintotobyrespondentNLRCinaresolutiondatedJuly14,1987,3whichisnowbeingchallengedinthispetition. Issue: WhetherornotDitanisentitledtoanyreliefandhiscaseisunderthejurisdictionofNLRC? Held: Yes.Thefactthatstandsoutmostprominentlyintherecordistherisktowhichthepetitionerwassubjectedwhenhewasassigned, afterhisreluctantconsent,totherebelinfestedregionofKafunfo.Thiswasadangerousarea. Thepetitionerhadgonetothatforeignlandinsearchofabetterlifethathecouldsharewithhislovedonesafterhisstintabroad. Thatchoicewouldhaverequiredhimtocomehomeemptyhandedtothedisappointmentofanexpectantfamily. Itisnotexplainedwhythepetitionerwasnotpaidfortheunexpiredportionofhiscontractwhichhad17moreweekstogo.The hostageswereimmediatelyrepatriatedaftertheirrelease,presumablysotheycouldrecoverfromtheirordeal.Thepromiseof INTRACOwasthattheywouldbegivenpriorityinreemploymentshouldtheirservicesbeneeded.Intheparticularcaseofthe

petitioner,thepromisewasnotfulfilled.Itwouldseemthathisworkwasterminated,andnotagainrequired,becauseitwasreally intendedallalongtoassignhimonlytoKafunfo. TheprivaterespondentsstressthatthecontractDitanenteredintocalledforhisemploymentinAngola,withoutindicationofany particularplaceofassignmentinthecountry.Thismeantheagreedtobeassignedtoworkanywhereinthatcountry,including Kafunfo.WhenINTRACOassignedDitantothatplaceintheregularcourseofitsbusiness,itwasmerelyexercisingitsrightsunder theemploymentcontractthatDitanhadfreelyenteredinto.Hence,itisargued,hecannotnowcomplainthattherewasabreachof thatcontractforwhichheisentitledtomonetaryredress. TheprivaterespondentsalsorejecttheclaimforwarriskbonusandpointoutthatPOEAMemorandumCircularNo.4,issued pursuanttothemandatorywarriskcoverageprovisioninSection2,RuleVI,ofthePOEARulesandRegulationsonOverseas Employment,categorizingAngolaasawarrisktookeffectonlyonFebruary6,1985"afterthepetitioner'sdeploymenttoAngolaon November27,1984."Consequently,thestipulationcouldnotbeappliedtothepetitionerasitwasnotsupposedtohavearetroactive effect. TheparamountdutyofthisCourtistorenderjusticethroughlaw.Thelawinthiscaseallowstwooppositeinterpretations,one strictlyinfavoroftheemployersandtheotherliberallyinfavoroftheworker.Thechoiceisobvious.Wefind,consideringthetotalityof thecircumstancesattendingthiscase,thatthepetitionerisentitledtorelief.ThepetitionerwenttoAngolapreparedtoworkashe hadpromisedinaccordancewiththeemploymentcontracthehadenteredintoingoodfaithwiththeprivaterespondents.Overhis objection,hewassenttoadangerousassignmentandashefearedwastakenhostageinarebelattackthatpreventedhimfrom fulfillinghiscontractwhileincaptivity.Uponhisrelease,hewasimmediatelysenthomeandwasnotpaidthesalarycorresponding totheunexpiredportionofhiscontract.Hewasimmediatelyrepatriatedwiththepromisethathewouldbegivenpriorityin reemployment,whichnevercame.Torubsaltonthewound,manyofhiscohostageswerereemployedaspromised.The petitionerwasleftonlywithableakexperienceandnothingtoshowforitexceptdashedhopesandasenseofrejection. Underthepolicyofsocialjustice,thelawbendsoverbackwardtoaccommodatetheinterestsoftheworkingclassonthehumane justificationthatthosewithlessprivilegesinlifeshouldhavemoreprivilegesinlaw. WHEREFORE,thechallengedresolutionoftheNLRCisherebyMODIFIED.TheprivaterespondentsareherebyDIRECTEDjointly andseverallytopaythepetitioner:a)thecurrentequivalentinPhilippinepesosofUS$4,675.00,representinghisunpaidsalariesfor thebalanceofthecontracttermb)nominaldamagesintheamountofP20,000.00andc)10%attorney'sfees.

RubberworldvsNLRC G.R.No.75704

Thisis a petition for certiorari underRule65oftheRulesofCourtseekingtheannulmentofthe decision of therespondentNational Labor Relations Commission dated June 17, 1986 (p. 23, Rollo) in NLRC NCR Case No. 6215884 entitled "Nestor Malabanan and Jonathan Transmil,Complainants,versusRubberworld(Phils.),Inc.andElpidioHidalgo,Respondents,"reversing thedecision oftheLaborArbiterwhichdismissedthecomplaintforillegaldismissalforlackofmerit. Theantecedentfactsareasfollows: Respondent Malabanan was employed by petitioner Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. on September 25,1978 asanordinaryclerk.InMay, 1980, he was promoted to the position of production scheduler with a corresponding salary increase. Hewasagaintransferredto theInventoryControlSectionasstockclerkonSeptember1,1983. On April 6,1984, Elpidio Hidalgo, the Plant I General Manager of petitioner company, received a copy of the Financial Audit Report from the Internal Audit Department of the company showing a significant material variance between the yearendactualinventory and that of the Cards (SC)/EDP Control Records. As a result thereof, Noel Santiago, SectionHeadofthe InventoryControlSection, whererespondent Malabanan was assigned, conducted an investigation of the reported discrepanciesinthestockcardsuponthe request of the Plant General Manager. Santiago then submitted his report to the general managerrecommendingthedismissalof respondentMalabanan. Consequently, Malabanan's case was endorsed to the Human Resources Division of petitioner company, which conducted a reinvestigation on the matter and which affirmed the recommendation of the Inventory Control Section Head for thetermination of employmentofrespondentMalabanan. OnJune6,1984,respondentMalabananwasdismissedbypetitionercompany. On June 16, 1984, respondent Malabanan, along with another complainant named JonathanTransmit,fileda complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against petitioner company alleging that they (respondent Malabanan and complainant Transmil) were members of the monthly salaried employees' union affiliated with TUPAS that petitioner company forced them to disaffiliate from the union and thatduetotheirrefusaltoresignfromthe union,theywereultimately dismissedfromemploymentby petitionercompany. Petitioner company on the other hand, denied complainants' allegations and averred that respondent Malabanan'sdismissalwas duetogrossandhabitualneglectofhisdutyandnotduetohisunionaffiliation. During the hearing of the case, the other complainant, Jonathan Transmil withdrew from the case since he already found another employmentabroad. OnJanuary30,1985,theLaborArbiterrenderedadecision(pp.1722,Rollo),thedispositiveportionofwhichreads: WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thiscaseshouldbe,asitishereby,DISMISSED,forlackofmerit. SOORDERED. Respondent Malabanan appealed from the adverse decision to the respondent Commission. On June 17, 1986, respondent CommissionreversedtheappealeddecisionoftheLaborArbiterandstated,interalia: Confronted with this factual backgrounds, we find ourselves inclined to the view that the appealed decision merits a reversal.

xxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision should be, as it is hereby REVERSED. Consequently, the respondents are directed to reinstate complainant Nestor Malabanan to his former position as production scheduler,with full backwages from the time he was illegally terminated up to actual reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and benefitsappurtenantthereto. SOORDERED.(pp.2327,Rollo) Thepetitionercompanymovedforareconsiderationonthe groundthatthe respondent Commission'sdecisionis notin accordance withfactsandevidenceonrecord.OnJuly23,1986,thesaidmotionforreconsiderationwasdenied. On September 3, 1986, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that the respondent Commission committedgraveabuse of discretionamountingtolackofjurisdictioninreversingtheLaborArbiter'sdecision. The two issues to be resolved in the instant case are: (1) whether or not the dismissal of respondent Malabananis tainted with unfairlaborpracticeand(2)whetherornotajustandvalidcauseexistsforthedismissalofprivaterespondentMalabanan. Petitioner alleges that the National Labor Relations Commission gravely erred in concluding that the demotionofMalabananfrom production scheduler to a stock clerk at the Stock and Inventory Section was intended to discourage Malabanan from union membership. It argued that the Labor Arbiter was correct in finding that the private respondent had not shown ampleproof to the effectthathewasamemberofalabororganizationpriortohistransfertoanotherposition. Webelievethattheforegoingcontentionsareimpressedwithmerit.Art.248oftheLaborCode,PDNo.442,asamended,provides: Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair laborpractices: (a)Tointerferewith,restrainorcoerceemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganization xxx Thequestion ofwhetheranemployeewasdismissedbecauseofhis unionactivitiesis essentially aquestionoffactastowhichthe findings of the administrative agency concerned are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequatetosupportaconclusion.It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred (Philippine Metal Foundries,Inc.v.CourtofIndustrialRelations,et.al.,No.L3494849, May15,1979,90SCRA 135).The findingsoftheLaborArbiter on thenonexistenceofunfairlaborpracticeonthepartofthecompany aremorein accord and supportedbytheevidencesubmitted bythepartiesintheinstantcase,towit: Complainant had stated that he was a member of the monthly salaried employees union affiliated with TUPAS. He, however,offered no prooftosupporthisallegation.Infact, noevidencewaspresented to prove theexistenceofsuchunion. We (note]fromthe records that,astheusualpractice,incaseslikethisone,complainant isusually supportedby theunion of which he is a member. And ordinarily, the union itself is impleaded as a co complainant. Such circumstances, surprisingly, [are] not present in thiscase.Infact,complainantcategorically allegedthathe had solicitedtheservicesofthe PAFLU Labor Union in filing this case. It is, indeed, surprising that complainant had to solicit the help of a laborunion (PAFLU)ofwhich he was notamemberinsteadofsolicitingtheaidofthe laborunion (TUPAS) of whichhe wasallegedlya member.Thesecircumstancesalone[destroy]thecredibilityofcomplainant'sallegations.(p.21,Rollo). Nowhere in the records can We find that the company actually performed positive acts to restrain the union participation of private respondent. For one, it is doubtful whether Malabanan was really engaged in the organization of a laborunion affiliated with the federation TUPAS.Theonlyevidencepresentedbyhimtoprovethis contentionis hisaffidavitandthatofhisfather.Itistherefore,not in accordance with ordinary experience and common practice that the private respondent pursued his battlealone, without theaid and support of his comembersintheunionandhisfederationespeciallyinacaseofseriousnatureas thisoneinvolvingcompany

interventionwithunionactivity. As a rule, it is the prerogative of the company to promote, transfer or even demote its employees to other positions when the interests of the company reasonably demand it. Unless there are instanceswhichdirectlypointtointerferencebythecompanywith theemployees' right to selforganization, the transfer of private respondent should be considered as within the boundsallowedby law. Furthermore, although private respondent was transferred to a lower position, his original rank and salary remained undiminished,whichfactwasnotrefutedorquestionedbyprivaterespondent. InviewoftheforegoingconclusionsoftheLaborArbiter, We arecompelled to agreewith thelatterthatthe petitionercompanydidnot commitanyunfairlaborpracticeintransferringandthereafterdismissingprivaterespondent. Theremainingissuetoberesolvedonthispointiswhetherthedismissal of respondent Malabananwasforajustandlawfulcause. Article282oftheLaborCode,asamended,provides: Article282.Terminationbyemployer.Anemployermayterminateanemploymentforanyofthefollowingjustcauses: xxx b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties xxx. Petitioner contends that private respondent Malabanan was guilty of gross negligence when he caused the posting of incorrect entries in the stock card without counter checking the actual movement status of theitemsatthe warehouse, therebyresultinginto unmanageableinaccuraciesinthedatapostedinthestockcards.TherespondentCommissioncorrectlyruled: Penultimately, even assuming for the sake of argument that herein complainant 'posted entries in the stock card without counter checking the actual movement status of the items at the warehouse, thereby resulting in an inaccuratepostingof data on the stock cards," to ourimpression does not constitute as a just cause for dismissal. Recordsshowthathe was only transferred to the Inventory Control Section onSeptember1,1983 and wasnot sofamiliarandexperiencedasastock clerk,andprior to his transfer, the record shows no derogatory records intermsofhisperformance.Hisfailuretocarry out efficientlyhisdutiesasastockclerkisnotsogrossandhabitual.Inotherwordshe wasnot notoriously negligenttowarrant his severance from the service. Considering thatthereisnothingon record that shows that hewilfullydefiedinstructionsof his superior with regards to his duties and that he gained personal benefit of the discrepancy, his dismissal is unwarranted.(p.26,Rollo). Itdoesnot appear that private respondent Malabanan is an incorrigible offender orthatwhathedidinflictedseriousdamagetothe companyso much so that his continuance in the service would be patently inimical to the employer's interest. Assuming,in gratia argumenti that theprivaterespondenthadindeedcommitted thesaidmistakes inthe postingofaccuratedata,thiswasonlyhisfirst infraction with regard to his duties. It would thus be cruel and unjust to mete out the drastic penalty of dismissal, for it is not proportionatetothegravityofthemisdeed. In fact, the promotion of the private respondent from the position of ordinary clerk to production scheduler establishes the presumption that his performance of his work is acceptable to the company. The petitioner even admitted that it was due toheavy financial and businessreversesthatthecompanyassignedthe private respondent to thepositionofStockClerkandnotbecauseof his unsatisfactory performance asproductionscheduler(p.6,Rollo).Ithasbeenheld that theremustbefairandreasonablecriteria to be used in selecting employees to be dismissed (Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. L56398, July 23,1987,152 SCRA219). Itis worthytonote that the prerogative of management todismissor layoffan employee must bedone without abuseofdiscretion, for what is at stake is not onlypetitioner'sposition,butalsohismeansoflivelihood.This issobecausethepreservationofthe lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the peservation of corporate profits (EuroLinea, Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, L75782,December1,1987,156SCRA79).

The law regards the worker with compassion. Our society is a compassionate one. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the worker should not be visited by the supreme penalty of dismissal. This is not only because of the law's concern for the working man. There isinaddition,hisfamilytoconsider.Afterall, labordeterminationsshould not only be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem (Almira, et al., v. BF Goodrich Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. L34974,July25,1974,58SCRA120). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the decision ofthepublicrespondentishereby MODIFIEDto the effect that petitioner company is ordered to reinstate private respondent Nestor Malabanan to the position of stock clerk or substantially equivalent position, with the same rank and salary he is enjoying at the time of his termination, with three years backwagesandwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandbenefitsappurtenantthereto. Should the reinstatementoftheprivaterespondent asherein orderedberenderedimpossiblebythesuperventionofcircumstances which prevent the same, the petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month's salaryforeveryyearofservicerendered,computedathislastrateofsalary. SOORDERED. Rubberworld(Phils.)vs.NLRC 336SCRA433(July26,2000) JurisdictionoftheSEC Facts:PetitionerRubberworld,acorporationestablishedin1965,isengagedinthemanufactureoffootwear,bagsandgarment. Privaterespondentsareemployeesofthesaidcorporation.OnAugust26,1994,RubberworldfiledwiththeDepartmentofLabor andemploymentanoticeoftemporaryshutdownofoperationstotakeeffectonSeptember26,1994.Beforetheeffectivitydate, however,Rubberworldwasforcedtoprematurelyshutdownitsoperations. OnNovember11,1994,privaterespondentsfiledwiththeNLRCacomplaintagainstpetitionerforillegaldismissaland nonpaymentofseparationpay.OnNovember22,1994,RubberworldfiledwiththeSECapetitionfordeclarationofsuspensionof paymentswithaproposedrehabilitationplan. OnDecember28,1994,SECissuedanordersuspendingallactionsforclaimsagainstRubberworldinaccordancewithP.D. 902A.Despitethisorder,however,theLaborArbiterruledagainstRubberworld,declaringitsshutdownillegalandmakingthe corporationliablefordamagesandpaymentofseparationpay.TheNLRCaffirmedthedecisionoftheLaborArbiter.Hence, RubberworldfiledwiththeSCapetitiontoannultheNLRCresolution. Issue:WhetherornotNLRCactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdiction? Held:P.D.902Aisclearthatallactionsforclaimsagainstcorporations,partnerships,orassociationsundermanagementor receivershippendingbeforeanycourt,tribunal,boardorbodyshallbesuspendedaccordingly.NLRCthusactedwithoutanin excessofitsjurisdictionwhenitproceededtodecidethecasedespitethesuspensionorder.Asaconsequence,anyresolution decisionsororderthatisrenderedwithoutjurisdictionisanullity.

NATIONALSERVICECORPORATION(NASECO)ANDARTUROL.PEREZ,vsNLRC G.R.No.L69870November29,1988 Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the decision * of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. 11494483 dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions for reconsiderationofsaiddecision. Eugenia C. Credo was an employee oftheNationalServiceCorporation(NASECO),a domestic corporation whichprovidessecurity guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist,thenPersonnelClerkuntilshebecameChiefofPropertyandRecords,on10March1980.1 Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming fromhernoncompliancewith Lloren'smemorandum, dated 11October 1983, regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged thatCredo"did not comply with Lloren's instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment and when[Credo] was called byLlorentohisofficetoexplainfurther thesaidinstructions,[Credo] showedresentmentandbehavedina scandalousmannerbyshoutingandutteringremarksofdisrespectinthepresenceofhercoemployees."2 On 7November1983,CredowascalledtomeetArturoL.Perez,thenActingGeneralManagerofNASECO,toexplainhersidebefore Perez and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting,onthesamedate,Credowasplacedon"ForcedLeave"statusfor15days,effective8November1983.3 Before the expirationofsaid15dayleave,oron18November 1983, Credofiledacomplaint, docketedasCaseNo.11494483,with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forcedleave,withoutdueprocess.4 Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983, NASECO's Committeeon Personnel Affairs deliberatedand evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her. 5 As a result of this deliberation, said committee resolved: 1. That,respondent[Credo]committedthefollowingoffensesintheCodeofDiscipline,viz: OFFENSEvs.CompanyInterest&Policies No.3Anydiscourteousacttocustomer,officerandemployeeofclientcompanyorofficeroftheCorporation. OFFENSEvs.PublicMoral No.7 Exhibit marked discourtesy in the course of official duties or use of profane or insulting languagetoanysuperior officer. OFFENSEvs.Authority No.3Failuretocomplywithanylawfulorderoranyinstructionsofasuperiorofficer. 2. That, Management hasalreadygivendueconsiderationtorespondent's [Credo]scandalous actuationsforseveral timesin thepast. Records also show that she was reprimandedforsomeoffenseanddidnotquestionit. Managementat thisjuncture,hasalreadymetitsmaximumtolerancepointsoithasdecidedtoput anendtorespondent's[Credo] beingan undesirableemployee.6 ThecommitteerecommendedCredo'stermination,withforfeitureofbenefits.7 On 1December 1983, Credo was called age totheofficeofPereztobe informedthatshe wasbeingchargedwithcertainoffenses. Notably, these offenses were those which NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already resolved, on 22 November 1983 to havebeencommittedbyCredo. In Perez's office, and in the presence of NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs, Credo was made to explain her side in connection with the charges filed against her however,duetoherfailuretodoso,8shewashandeda Notice of Termination,dated

24 November 1983, and madeeffective1December1983. 9Hence,on6December1983,Credo filed asupplemental complaintfor illegaldismissal in Case No. 11494483, alleging absence of just or authorized causeforherdismissal and lackofopportunityto beheard.10 After both parties had submitted their respective position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of their claims and defenses, on 9 May 1984, the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's complaint, and 2) directing NASECOtopayCredoseparationpayequivalenttoonehalfmonth'spayforeveryyearofservice.11 Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendereda decision: 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing Credo's claim for attorney'sfees,moralandexemplary damages.Asaconsequence,both parties filed theirrespective motions for reconsideration,12 whichtheNLRCdeniedinaresolutionof16January1985.13 Hence, the present recourse by both parties. In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretionthedispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's reinstatement with backwages. 14 Petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that: 1) petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) petitioners failed in the burden of proving that theterminationofCredowasfora validor authorized cause, 3) the alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, couldbeconsideredto havebeencondonedbypetitioners,and4)theterminationofCredowasnotforavalidorauthorizedcause.15 On the other hand, in G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and limited her right to backwagestoonlysix(6)months.16 Asguidelinesforemployersintheexerciseoftheirpowertodismissemployeesforjustcauses,thelawprovidesthat: Section2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnishhimawrittennoticestatingthe particularactsoromissionconstitutingthegroundsforhisdismissal. xxx xxx xxx Section5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal withina reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heardandto defendhimselfwiththeassistanceofhisrepresentative,ifhesodesires. Section6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him statingclearlythereasonstherefor.17 These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legallyeffected.These arethe notice whichapprises theemployeeoftheparticularacts oromissions for which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent noticewhich informsthe employee of theemployer'sdecision todismisshim. Likewise,areadingoftheguidelinesinconsonancewiththeexpressprovisionsoflawonprotectiontolabor18(whichencompasses theright to security of tenure) and thebroaderdictatesofprocedural due process necessarily mandatethatnoticeoftheemployer's decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee concernedampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimself. In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to explainherside"ofthechargesfiledagainsther,thischancewasgivensoperfunctorily, thusrenderingillusory Credo's right to securityoftenure. That Credo wasnotgivenampleopportunityto beheard and to defendherselfisevidentfromthe fact that the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to affordherachancetopreparefor

herdefensewasdispensedinonlyaday.Thisisnoteffectivecompliancewiththelegalrequirementsaforementioned. Thefact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or the decision to dismissher)was dated 24November1983 and made effective 1 December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on terminating her services whenshewasinformed on 1 December 1983 of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought ofaffording herafter 24November 1983wouldmerelybeproformaoranexerciseinfutility. Besides, Credo's mere noncompliance with Lorens memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the company's Statementof BillingsAdjustmentdidnotwarranttheseverepenaltyofdismissaloftheNLRCcorrectlyheldthat: ... on the charge of gross discourtesy, the CPA found in its Report, dated 22 November 1983 that, "In the process of her testimony/explanations she again exhibited a conduct unbecoming in front of NASECO Officers and argued toMr. S. S. Lloren inasarcasticanddiscourteousmanner,notwithstanding, thefact that shewasinside theofficeoftheAcctg.General Manager." Let it be noted, however, that the Report did not even describe how the so called "conduct unbecoming" or "discourteous manner"was donebycomplainant.Anentthe"sarcastic"argument of complainant,thepurportedtranscript19 of the meeting held on 7 November 1983 does not indicate any sarcasm on the part of complainant. At the most, complainant may have sounded insistentoremphaticaboutherwork beingmorecompletethantheworkofMs. deCastro, yet,thecomplainingofficersignedtheworkofMs.deCastroanddidnotsignhers. As to thecharge of insubordination, itmaybeconceded, albeitunclear,thatcomplainant failedtoplacesamecorrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustments as instructed. However, under the circumstances obtaining, where complainant strongly felt that she was being discriminated against by her superior inrelation to otheremployees,we areoftheconsideredview andsohold,thatareprimandwouldhavesufficedfortheinfraction,butcertainlynotterminationfromservices.20 AsthisCourthasruled: ... wherea penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps maybecommitted bylaboroughtnot to bevisitedwitha consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern fortheworking man.There is, inaddition,his familyto consider.Unemploymentbringsuntoldhardshipsandsorrowsonthosedependentonthewageearner.21 Of course, in justifying Credo's termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal Credo's previous and repeated acts of insubordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards hersuperiorofficers,allegedto havebeencommittedfrom1980toJuly1983.22 Ifsuch acts of misconduct were indeed committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been condoned by NASECO. For instance, sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly "reacted in a scandalous manner and raised her voice" in a discussion with NASECO's Acting head of the Personnel Administration 23 no disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her. Nor was she even reprimanded when she allegedly talked 'in a shouting or yelling manner" with the Acting Manager of NASECO's Building Maintenance and Services Department in 1980 24 or when she allegedly "shouted" at NASECO's Corporate Auditor "in front of his subordinates displaying arrogance and unruly behavior" in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted at NASECO's Internal Control Consultant in 1981. 25But then, in sharp contrast to NASECO's penchant for ignoringtheaforesaidactsofmisconduct,whenCredo committedfrequenttardinessinAugustandSeptember1983,shewasreprimanded.26 Even if the allegations of improper conduct (discourtesy to superiors) were satisfactorily proven, NASECO's condonationthereof is gleaned from the fact that on 4 October 1983, Credo was given a salary adjustment for having performed in the job "at least [satisfactorily]" 27 and she was then rated "Very Satisfactory" 28as regards job performance, particularly in terms of quality of work, quantityofwork,dependability,cooperation,resourcefulnessandattendance. Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credo's employment was sought to be legally terminated were insufficiently proved, as to justify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. For "absent thereasonwhichgaveriseto[theemployee's]separationfrom employment, there isnointentiononthepartoftheemployertodismisstheemployeeconcerned." 29And,asaresultofhavingbeen wrongfullydismissed,Credoisentitledtothree(3)yearsofbackwageswithoutdeductionandqualification.30 However,while Credo's dismissal waseffected without procedural fairness, an award of exemplary damagesin herfavor canonly

be justified if her dismissal was effectedinawanton,fraudulent, oppressive ormalevolentmanner.31Ajudiciousexaminationofthe record manifests nosuchconductonthepartofmanagement.However,inviewoftheattendantcircumstances inthecase,i.e.,lack of due process in effecting her dismissal, it is reasonable to award her moral damages. And,forhaving beencompelledtolitigate becauseoftheunlawfulactuationsofNASECO,areasonableawardforattorney'sfeesinherfavorisinorder. In NASECO's comment 32 in G.R. No.70295,itisbelatedlyargued that theNLRChasno jurisdictiontoorderCredo'sreinstatement. NASECOclaimsthat, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National InvestmentandDevelopment Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation),thetermsandconditionsofemploymentofitsemployeesaregovernedbytheCivilServiceLaw,rulesandregulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. JUCO, 33 wherethisCourtheldthat"Thereshouldno longer be any question at thistimethatemployeesofgovernmentowned orcontrolledcorporationsare governedbythecivilservice lawandcivilserviceriflesandregulations." It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactiveeffect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employeessimilarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution ,but prior to theruling inNationalHousingCorporationvs.Juco,thisCourthad recognized the applicability oftheLaborCodeto,andthe authority of theNLRCtoexercise jurisdictionover,disputesinvolvingterms and conditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO).34 Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of governmentowned or controlled corporations, the 1987 Constitution starklyvariesfromthe 1973 Constitution,uponwhichNationalHousingCorporationvs.Juco isbased.Underthe 1973Constitution, itwasprovidedthat: The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including every governmentownedorcontrolledcorporation....35 Ontheotherhand,the1987Constitutionprovidesthat: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharter.36(Emphasissupplied) Thus, thesituationssoughttobeavoidedbythe1973Constitutionandexpressed bytheCourtintheNationalHousing.Corporation caseinthefollowingmanner Theinfirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, ArticleXIIB of theconstitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry ofgovernmenttocreateahost of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A governmentowned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subjecttothecompetitiverestrainsofthe openmarketnortotheterms and conditions ofcivilserviceemployment.Conceivably,allgovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationscould becreated, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutionalamendmentincluding such corporations in the embrace of the civil servicewouldceasetohaveapplication.Certainly, sucha situationcannotbe allowedtoexist.37 appearrelegatedtorelativeinsignificancebythe1987Constitutionalprovisionthatthe CivilServiceembracesgovernmentownedor controlled corporations with original charter and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include governmentowned or controlled corporations whichareorganizedassubsidiariesofgovernmentownedor controlledcorporations

underthegeneralcorporationlaw. Theproceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light onthe Constitutionalintent andmeaningintheuseofthe phrase"withoriginalcharter."Thus THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas) CommissionerRomuloisrecognized. MR.ROMULO. IbegtheindulgenceoftheCommittee.Iwasreadingthewrongprovision. IrefertoSection1,subparagraphIwhichreads: The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporations. My query: Is Philippine Airlines covered by this provision? MR. FOZ. Will the Commissioner please state his previous question? MR.ROMULO. Thephrase on line 4 of Section 1, subparagraph1,underthe CivilServiceCommission, says: "including governmentowned or controlled corporations.' Does that include a corporation, like the Philippine Airlines which is governmentownedorcontrolled? MR.FOZ. I would like to throw a question to the Commissioner. Is the Philippine Airlines controlled by the governmentinthesensethatthemajorityofstocksareownedbythegovernment? MR.ROMULO. It is owned by the GSIS. So, this is what we might call a tertiary corporation. The GSIS is owned by the government.Wouldthisbecoveredbecausetheprovisionsays"includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations." MR.FOZ. The Philippine Airlines was established as a private corporation. Later on, the government, through the GSIS,acquiredthecontrollingstocks.Isthatnotthecorrectsituation? MR.ROMULO. That istrue as Commissioner Ople is about to explain. Therewasapparentlya SupremeCourt decision that destroyed that distinction between a governmentowned corporation created under the Corporation Law and a governmentownedcorporationcreatedbyitsowncharter. MR.FOZ. Yes, we recall the Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco to the effect that all government corporations irrespective of the manner of creation, whether by special charter or by the private Corporation Law, are deemed to be covered by the civil service because of the wideembracing definition made in this section of the existing 1973Constitution.Butwerecalltheresponsetothequestion of CommissionerOple that ourintendmentinthisprovisionis justtogive a general description of the civil service. We are not here to make any declarationas to whetheremployeesof governmentowned or controlled corporations are barred from the operation of laws, such as the Labor Code of the Philippines. MR.ROMULO. Yes. MR.OPLE. MayIberecognized,Mr.PresidingOfficer,sincemynamehasbeenmentionedbybothsides. MR.ROMULO. Iyieldpartofmytime. THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas). CommissionerOpleisrecognized. MR.OPLE. In connection with the coverageoftheCivilServiceLawinSection1(1),may Ivolunteersome information that maybe helpful both to the interpellator and totheCommittee.Followingthe proclamationofmartiallawon September 21,1972, this issue of the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and of theCivil Service Lawalmostimmediately arose. Iam,in particular, referring totheperiodfollowingthecoming intoforce and effectofthe Constitutionof1973,where theArticle on the Civil Service was supposed to take immediate force and effect. In the case of LUZTEVECO,therewas a strikeatthe time. This was agovernmentcontrolledandgovernmentownedcorporation. Ithinkitwas ownedby thePNOC with just the minuscule private shares left. So, the Secretary of Justice at that time, SecretaryAbadSantos, and myselfsat down, and the result ofthatmeetingwasanopinionoftheSecretaryofJustice which9became bindingimmediatelyonthe government that government corporations with original charters, such as the GSIS, were covered by the Civil Service Law and corporations spun off from the GSIS, which we called second generation corporations functioning as private subsidiaries, were covered by the Labor Code. Samples of such second generation corporations were the Philippine Airlines,theManila Hotel and the Hyatt. And thatdemarcationworkedverywell.Infact, all of thesecompaniesIhavementionedasexamples,exceptfor the Manila Hotel, had collective bargaining agreements. In the Philippine Airlines, there were, in fact, three collective bargaining

agreements one, for the ground people or the PALIA one, for the flightattendantsor thePASACandoneforthepilotsoftheALPAC How then could a corporation like that be covered by the Civil Service law? But, as theChairmanoftheCommitteepointedout,the SupremeCourt decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco unrobed the whole thing.Accordingly,thePhilippineAirlines,theManilaHotel and the Hyatt arenowconsideredunderthatdecision coveredbythe CivilServiceLaw. Ialsorecall that intheemergencymeetingof the Cabinet convened for this purpose at the initiative of the Chairman of the Reorganization Commission, ArmandFabella, they agreed to allow the CBA's to lapse before applying the full force and effect of the Supreme Court decision. So, we were inthe awkward situation whenthenewgovernmenttookover.Icanagree withCommissioner Romulowhen hesaidthatthis isaproblem whichI amnot exactly sure we should address in the deliberations on the Civil Service Law or whether weshouldbecontentwith what the Chairman said that Section 1 (1) of the Article on the Civil Service is just a general descriptionofthecoverageoftheCivil Serviceandnomore. Thankyou,Mr.PresidingOfficer. MR.ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, for the moment, I would be satisfied if the Committee puts on records that it isnot their intent by this provision and the phrase "including governmentowned or controlled corporations" to cover such companiesasthePhilippineAirlines. MR.FOZ. Personally, that is my view. As a matter of fact, when this draft was made, my proposal was really to eliminate,todropfromtheprovision,thephrase"includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations." MR.ROMULO. WouldtheCommitteeindicatethatistheintentofthisprovision? MR.MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I do not think the Committee can make such astatementintheface of anabsolute exclusion of governmentowned or controlled corporations. However, this does not preclude the Civil Service Law to prescribe different rules and procedures, including emoluments for employees of proprietary corporations, taking into consideration the nature of their operations. So, it is a general coverage but it does not preclude adistinction oftherules betweenthetwotypesofenterprises. MR.FOZ. In otherwords,itissomethingthatshouldbelefttothelegislaturetodecide. As Isaidbefore,thisis justa generaldescriptionandwearenotmakinganydeclarationwhatsoever. MR.MONSOD. Perhaps if Commissioner Romulo would like a definitive understanding of the coverage and the Gentleman wants to exclude governmentowned or controlled corporations like Philippine Airlines, then the recourseisto offer an amendment as to the coverage, if the Commissioner does not accept the explanation that there could be a distinctionoftherules,includingsalariesandemoluments. MR.ROMULO. Soasnottodelaytheproceedings,Iwillreservemyrighttosubmitsuchanamendment. xxx xxx xxx THEPRESIDINGOFFICE(Mr.Trenas) CommissionerRomuloisrecognized. MR.ROMULO. On page 2, line 5, I suggest the following amendment after "corporations": Add a comma (,) and the phraseEXCEPTTHOSEEXERCISINGPROPRIETARYFUNCTIONS. THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas). WhatdoestheCommitteesay? SUSPENSIONOFSESSION MR.MONSOD. Maywehaveasuspensionofthesession? THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas). Thesessionissuspended. Itwas7:16p.m. RESUMPTIONOFSESSION At7:21p.m.,thesessionwasresumed. THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas). Thesessionisresumed. CommissionerRomuloisrecognized. MR.ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer,Iamamendingmyoriginalproposedamendmenttonowreadas follows: "including governmentowned or controlled corporations WITHORIGINALCHARTERS."Thepurposeofthisamendmentistoindicate that government corporations such as the GSIS and SSS, which have original charters, fall within the ambit of the civil service. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies suchas thePhilippineAirlines,Manila HotelandHyattareexcludedfromthecoverageofthecivilservice. THEPRESIDINGOFFICER(Mr.Trenas). WhatdoestheCommitteesay?

MR.FOZ. Justonequestion,Mr.PresidingOfficer.Bytheterm"originalcharters,"whatexactlydowemean? MR.ROMULO. Wemeanthattheywerecreatedbylaw,byanactofCongress,orbyspeciallaw. MR.FOZ. Andnotunderthegeneralcorporationlaw. MR.ROMULO. Thatiscorrect.Mr.PresidingOfficer. MR.FOZ. Withthatunderstandingandclarification,theCommitteeacceptstheamendment. MR.NATIVIDAD. Mr.Presidingofficer,sothosecreatedbythegeneralcorporationlawareout. MR.ROMULO. Thatiscorrect:38 On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at thetime of decision thereof, the NLRC hasjurisdictiontoaccordrelieftotheparties.Asan admitted subsidiary of theNIDC,inturna subsidiary ofthePNB,theNASECOisagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwithoutoriginalcharter. Dr. Jorge Bocobo, in his Cult of Legalism, cited by Mr. Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Gomez vs. Government Insurance Board (L602, March 31, 1947, 44 O.G. No. 8, pp. 2687, 2694 also published in 78 Phil. 221) onthe effectivity of the principleofsocialjusticeembodiedinthe1935Constitution,said: Certainly, this principle of social justice in our Constitution as generously conceived and so tersely phrased, was not included in the fundamental law as a mere popular gesture. It was meant to (be) avital,articulate,compellingprincipleof public policy. It should be observed in the interpretationnotonlyoffuture legislation,butalsoofalllawsalreadyexistingon November 15, 1935. It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and future. Thus, all the laws whichon the great historic event when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was born, were susceptible oftwo interpretationsstrictor liberal, against or in favorofsocialjustice,nowhavetobeconstruedbroadlyin order to promote and achievesocialjustice. This may seem novel to our friends, the advocates of legalism but it is the only way to give life and significance to the abovequoted principle of the Constitution. Ifitwasnotdesignedtoapply to theseexisting laws,thenitwouldbenecessary to wait for generations until all our codes and all our statutes shall have been completely charred by removing every provision inimical to social justice, before the policy of social justice can become reallyeffective.Thatwouldbe anabsurd conclusion. It is more reasonabletoholdthatthisconstitutional principleappliestoalllegislation inforce onNovember15, 1935,andalllawsthereafterpassed. WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thechallengeddecision of theNLRCis AFFIRMEDwithmodifications. Petitionersin G.R.No. 69870, who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 70295, are ordered to: 1) reinstate Eugenia C. Credotoherformerpositionat thetime of her termination, or if such reinstatement is notpossible,toplace herinasubstantiallyequivalent position,withthree(3) years backwages, from 1December1983,withoutqualificationordeduction,andwithoutloss of seniorityrights andotherprivileges appertainingthereto,and2)payEugeniaC.CredoP5,000.00formoraldamagesandP5,000.00forattorney'sfees. Ifreinstatement inanyeventisnolongerpossiblebecauseofsupervening events,petitioners inG.R. No.69870,whoaretheprivate respondents in G.R. No. 70295 are ordered to pay Eugenia C. Credo, in addition to her backwages and damages as above described, separation payequivalenttoonehalfmonth'ssalaryforeveryyearofservice, to becomputed onhermonthlysalaryatthe timeofherterminationon1December1983. SOORDERED.

SSSEmployeeAsso.vCA175SCRA686(July28,1989) Facts: ThepetitionerswentonstrikeaftertheSSSfailedtoactupontheunionsdemandsconcerningtheimplementationoftheirCBA. SSSfiledbeforethecourtactionfordamageswithprayerforwritofpreliminaryinjunctionagainstpetitionersforstaginganillegal strike.Thecourtissuedatemporaryrestrainingorderpendingtheresolutionoftheapplicationforpreliminaryinjunctionwhile petitionersfiledamotiontodismissallegingthecourtslackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter. Petitionerscontendthatthecourtmadereversibleerrorintakingcognizanceonthesubjectmattersincethejurisdictionliesonthe DOLEortheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionasthecaseinvolvesalabordispute.TheSSScontendsononehandthatthe petitionersarecoveredbytheCivilServicelaws,rulesandregulationthushavenorighttostrike.TheyarenotcoveredbytheNLRC orDOLEthereforethecourtmayenjointhepetitionersfromstriking. Issue: WhetherornotSSSemployershavetherighttostrike WhetherornottheCAerredintakingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter. Held: TheConstitutionalprovisionsenshrinedonHumanRightsandSocialJusticeprovidesguaranteeamongworkerswiththerightto organizeandconductpeacefulconcertedactivitiessuchasstrikes.Ononehand,Section14ofE.ONo.180providesthat: theCivilServicelawandrulesgoverningconcertedactivitiesandstrikesinthegovernmentserviceshallbe observed,subjecttoanylegislationthatmaybeenactedbyCongressreferringtoMemorandumCircularNo.6,s.1987of theCivilServiceCommissionwhichstatesthatpriortotheenactmentbyCongressofapplicablelawsconcerningstrikeby governmentemployeesenjoinsunderpainofadministrativesanctions,allgovernmentofficersandemployeesfrom stagingstrikes,demonstrations,massleaves,walkoutsandotherformsofmassactionwhichwillresultintemporary stoppageordisruptionofpublicservice. Thereforeintheabsenceofanylegislationallowinggovt.employeestostriketheyareprohibitedfromdoingso. InSec.1ofE.O. No.180theemployeesinthecivilservicearedenominatedasgovernmentemployeesandthattheSSSisonesuch governmentcontrolledcorporationwithanoriginalcharter,havingbeencreatedunderR.A.No.1161,itsemployeesarepartofthe civilserviceandarecoveredbythe CivilServiceCommissionsmemorandumprohibitingstrikes. NeithertheDOLEnortheNLRChasjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterbutinsteaditisthePublicSectorLaborManagement CouncilwhichisnotgrantedbylawauthoritytoissuewritofinjunctioninlabordisputeswithinitsjurisdictionthustheresortofSSS beforethegeneralcourtfortheissuanceofawritofinjunctiontoenjointhestrikeisappropriate.

PeoplevPanis 142SCRA6641986 Facts: FourinformationswerefiledonJanuary9,1981,intheCourtofFirstInstanceofZambalesandOlongapoCityallegingthatSerapio Abug,privaterespondentherein,"withoutfirstsecuringalicensefromtheMinistryofLaborasaholderofauthoritytooperateafee chargingemploymentagency,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandcriminallyoperateaprivatefeechargingemployment agencybychargingfeesandexpenses(from)andpromisingemploymentinSaudiArabia"tofourseparateindividualsnamed therein,inviolationofArticle16inrelationtoArticle39oftheLaborCode. Abugfiledamotiontoquashonthegroundthattheinformationsdidnotchargeanoffensebecausehewasaccusedofillegally recruitingonlyonepersonineachofthefourinformations. UndertheprovisoinArticle13(b),heclaimed,therewouldbeillegalrecruitmentonly"whenevertwoormorepersonsareinany mannerpromisedorofferedanyemploymentforafee." ThepostureofthepetitioneristhattheprivaterespondentisbeingprosecutedunderArticle39inrelationtoArticle16oftheLabor Codehence,Article13(b)isnotapplicable.However,asthefirsttwocitedarticlespenalizeactsofrecruitmentandplacement withoutproperauthority,whichisthechargeembodiedintheinformations,applicationofthedefinitionofrecruitmentand placementinArticle13(b)isunavoidable. Issue:WhetherornotthepetitionerisguiltyofviolatingArticle13(b)ofP.D.442,otherwiseknownastheLaborCode. Held:Article13(b)ofP.D.442,otherwiseknownastheLaborCode,statesthat,"(b)'Recruitmentandplacement'referstoanyactof canvassing,'enlisting,contracting,transporting,hiring,orprocuringworkers,andincludesreferrals,contractservices,promisingor advertisingforemployment,locallyorabroad,whetherforprofitornot:Provided,Thatanypersonorentitywhich,inanymanner, offersorpromisesforafeeemploymenttotwoormorepersonsshallbedeemedengagedinrecruitmentandplacement." Asweseeit,theprovisowasintendedneithertoimposeaconditiononthebasicrulenortoprovideanexceptiontheretobutmerely tocreateapresumption.Thepresumptionisthattheindividualorentityisengagedinrecruitmentandplacementwheneverheorit isdealingwithtwoormorepersonstowhom,inconsiderationofafee,anofferorpromiseofemploymentismadeinthecourseof the"canvassing,enlisting,contracting,transporting,utilizing,hiringorprocuring(of)workers." Atanyrate,theinterpretationhereadoptedshouldgivemoreforcetothecampaignagainstillegalrecruitmentandplacement,which hasvictimizedmanyFilipinoworkersseekingabetterlifeinaforeignland,andinvestinghardearnedsavingsorevenborrowed fundsinpursuitoftheirdream,onlytobeawakenedtotherealityofacynicaldeceptionatthehandsoftheirowncountrymen.

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.LOMAGOCEyOLALIA,DANGOCEandNELLYD.AGUSTIN,accused.NELLYD. AGUSTIN Facts: OnJanuary12,1988,aninformationforillegalrecruitmentcommittedbyasyndicateandinlargescale,punishableunderArticles 38and39oftheLaborCodeasamendedbySection1(b)ofPresidentialDecreeNo.2018,wasfiledagainstspousesDanand LomaGoceandhereinaccusedappellantNellyAgustinintheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,Branch5.OnJanuary21,1987,a warrantofarrestwasissuedagainstthethreeaccusedbutnotoneofthemwasarrested.Hence,onFebruary2,1989,thetrialcourt orderedthecasearchivedbutitissuedastandingwarrantofarrestagainsttheaccused.Thereafter,onlearningofthewhereabouts oftheaccused,ataroundmiddayofFebruary26,1993,NellyAgustinwasapprehendedbytheParaaquepolice. OnNovember19,1993,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentfindinghereinappellantguiltyasaprincipalinthecrimeofillegal recruitmentinlargescale,andsentencinghertoservethepenaltyoflifeimprisonment,aswellastopayafineofP100,000.00.In herappeal,appellantAgustinraisesthefollowingarguments: (1)heractofintroducingcomplainantstotheGocecoupledoesnotfallwithinthe meaningofillegalrecruitmentandplacementunderArticle13(b)inrelationtoArticle34 oftheLaborCode (2)thereisnoproofofconspiracytocommitillegalrecruitmentamongappellantandthe Gocespousesand (3)thereisnoproofthatappellantofferedorpromisedoverseasemploymenttothe complainants. Appellantcounselagreedtostipulatethatshewasneitherlicensednorauthorizedtorecruitapplicantsforoverseasemployment. Appellant,however,deniesthatshewasinanywayguiltyofillegalrecruitment.Itisappellant'sdefensivetheorythatallshedidwas tointroducecomplainantstotheGocespouses.Beinganeighborofsaidcouple,andowingtothefactthatherson'soverseasjob applicationwasprocessedandfacilitatedbythem,thecomplainantsaskedhertointroducethemtosaidspouses.Allegedlyoutof thegoodnessofherheart,shecompliedwiththeirrequest. Issues: WhetherornotappellantAgustinactionsinrelationwiththeGocecoupleconstituteillegalrecruitment. Held: AppellantisaccusedofviolatingArticles38and39oftheLaborCode.Article38oftheLaborCode,asamendedbyPresidential DecreeNo.2018,providesthatanyrecruitmentactivity,includingtheprohibitedpracticesenumeratedinArticle34ofsaidCode, undertakenbynonlicenseesornonholdersofauthorityshallbedeemedillegalandpunishableunderArticle39thereof.Thesame articlefurtherprovidesthatillegalrecruitmentshallbeconsideredanoffenseinvolvingeconomicsabotageifanyofthesequalifying circumstancesexist,namely, (a)whenillegalrecruitmentiscommittedbyasyndicate,i.e.,ifitiscarriedoutbyagroupofthreeormorepersons conspiringand/orconfederatingwithoneanotheror (b)whenillegalrecruitmentiscommittedinlargescale,i.e.,ifitiscommittedagainstthreeormorepersonsindividuallyor asagroup. Recruitmentandplacementreferstoanyactofcanvassing,enlisting,contracting,transporting,utilizing,hiringorprocuringworkers, andincludesreferrals,contractservices,promisingoradvertisingforemployment,locallyorabroad,whetherforprofitornot provided,thatanypersonorentitywhich,inanymanner,offersorpromisesforafeeemploymenttotwoormorepersonsshallbe deemedengagedinrecruitmentandplacement.Ontheotherhand,referralistheactofpassingalongorforwardingofanapplicant foremploymentafteraninitialinterviewofaselectedapplicantforemploymenttoaselectedemployer,placementofficerorbureau.

Thereisillegalrecruitmentwhenonegivestheimpressionofhavingtheabilitytosendaworkerabroad."Itisundisputedthat appellantgavecomplainantsthedistinctimpressionthatshehadthepowerorabilitytosendpeopleabroadforworksuchthatthe latterwereconvincedtogiveherthemoneyshedemandedinordertobesoemployed. Decision: WHEREFORE,theappealedjudgmentofthecourtaquoisherebyAFFIRMEDintoto,withcostsagainstaccusedappellantNellyD. Agustin.

MillaresvsNationalLaborRelationsCommission Facts: DouglasMillareswasemployedbyESSOInternationalthroughitslocalmanningagency,TransGlobal,in1968asamachinist.In 1975,hewaspromotedasChiefEngineerwhichpositionheoccupieduntilheoptedtoretirein1989. In1989,petitionerMillaresfiledaleaveofabsenceandappliedforoptionalretirementplanundertheConsecutiveEnlistment IncentivePlan(CEIP)consideringthathehadalreadyrenderedmorethantwentyyearsofcontinuousservice. EssoInternationaldeniedMillaresrequestforoptionalretirementonthefollowinggrounds,towit:(1)hewasemployedona contractualbasis(2)hiscontractofenlistment(COE)didnotprovideforretirementbeforetheageofsixtyyearsand(3)hedidnot complywiththerequirementforclaimingbenefitsundertheCEIP,i.e.,tosubmitawrittenadvicetothecompanyofhisintentionto terminatehisemploymentwithinthirtydaysfromhislastdisembarkationdate. Subsequently,afterfailingtoreturntoworkaftertheexpirationofhisleaveofabsence,Millareswasdroppedfromtherosterofcrew memberseffectiveSeptember1,1989.Ontheotherhand,petitionerLagdawasemployedbyEssoInternationalaswiper/oilerin 1969.HewaspromotedasChiefEngineerin1980,apositionhecontinuedtooccupyuntilhislastCOEexpiredin1989. In1989,Lagdalikewisefiledaleaveofabsenceandappliedtoavailoftheoptionalearlyretirementplaninviewofhistwentyyears continuousserviceinthecompany.TransglobalsimilarlydeniedLagdasrequestforavailmentoftheoptionalearlyretirement schemeonthesamegroundsuponwhichMillaresrequestwasdenied.Unabletoreturnforcontractualseaserviceafterhisleave ofabsenceexpire,LagdawasalsodroppedfromtherosterofcrewmemberseffectiveSeptember1,1989. MillaresandLagdafiledacomplaintaffidavitforillegaldismissalandnonpaymentofemployeebenefitsagainstprivate respondentsEssoInternationalandTransGlobalbeforethePOEA. ThePOEArenderedadecisiondismissingthecomplaintforlackofmerit.Onappeal,NLRCaffirmedthedecisionofthePOEA dismissingthecomplaint. NLRCratiocinatedthatMillaresandLagda,asseamenandoverseascontractworkersarenotcoveredbythetermregular employmentasdefinedunderArticle280oftheLaborCode.ThePOEA,whichistaskedwithprotectingtherightsoftheFilipino workersforoverseasemploymenttofairandequitablerecruitmentandemploymentpracticesandtoensuretheirwelfare, prescribesastandardemploymentcontractforseamenonboardoceangoingvesselsforafixedperiodbutinnocasetoexceed twelvemonths. Issue: WhetherornotseafarersareconsideredregularemployeesunderArticle280oftheLaborCode. Ruling: ThecourtruledthatSeafarersareconsideredcontractualemployees.Theycannotbeconsideredasregularemployeesunder Article280oftheLaborCode.Theiremploymentisgovernedbythecontractstheysigneverytimetheyarerehiredandtheir employmentisterminatedwhenthecontractexpires.Theiremploymentiscontractuallyfixedforacertainperiodoftime.Theyfall undertheexceptionofArticle280whoseemploymenthasbeenfixedforaspecificprojectorundertakingthecompletionor terminationofwhichhasbeendeterminedatthetimeofengagementoftheemployeeorwheretheworkorservicestobeperformed isseasonalinnatureandtheemploymentisforthedurationoftheseason.

MARSAMANMANNINGAGENCY,INC.vs.NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSIONandWILFREDOT.CAJERAS, Facts: MARSAMANMANNINGAGENCY,INC.(MARSAMAN)anditsforeignprincipalDIAMANTIDESMARITIME,INC.(DIAMANTIDES)assail theDecisionofpublicrespondentNationalLaborRelationsCommissiondated16September1996aswellasitsResolutiondated 12November1996affirmingtheLaborArbiter'sdecisionfindingthemguiltyofillegaldismissalandorderingthemtopay respondentWilfredoT.Cajerassalariescorrespondingtotheunexpiredportionofhisemploymentcontract,plusattorney'sfees. PrivaterespondentWilfredoT.CajeraswashiredbypetitionerMARSAMAN,thelocalmanningagentofpetitionerDIAMANTIDES,as ChiefCookStewardontheMVPrigipos,ownedandoperatedbyDIAMANTIDES,foracontractperiodoften(10)monthswitha monthlysalaryofUS$600.00,evidencedbyacontractbetweenthepartiesdated15June1995.Cajerasstartedworkon8August 1995butlessthantwo(2)monthslater,oron28September1995,hewasrepatriatedtothePhilippinesallegedlybymutual consent. On17November1995privaterespondentCajerasfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalagainstpetitionerswiththeNLRCNational CapitalRegionArbitrationBranchallegingthathewasdismissedillegally,denyingthathisrepatriationwasbymutualconsent,and askingforhisunpaidwages,overtimepay,damages,andattorneysfees.[1]CajerasallegedthathewasassignednotonlyasChief CookStewardbutalsoasassistantcookandmessmaninadditiontoperformingvariousinventoryandrequisitionjobs.Becauseof hisadditionalassignmentshebegantofeelsickjustalittleoveramonthonthejobconstraininghimtorequestformedical attention.HewasrefusedatfirstbyCapt.KouvakasAlekos,masteroftheMVPrigipos,whojustorderedhimtocontinueworking. HoweveradayaftertheshipsarrivalattheportofRotterdam,Holland,on26September1995Capt.Alekosrelentedandhadhim examinedattheMedicalCenterforSeamen.However,theexaminingphysician,Dr.WdenHoed,neitherapprisedprivate respondentaboutthediagnosisnorissuedtherequestedmedicalcertificateallegedlybecausehehimselfwouldforwardthe resultstoprivaterespondentssuperiors.Uponreturningtothevessel,privaterespondentwasunceremoniouslyorderedtoprepare forimmediaterepatriationthefollowingdayashewassaidtobesufferingfromadiseaseofunknownorigin. MARSAMANandDIAMANTIDES,ontheotherhand,deniedtheimputationofillegaldismissal.TheyallegedthatCajerasapproached Capt.Alekoson26September1995andinformedthelatterthathecouldnotsleepatnightbecausehefeltsomethingcrawlingover hisbody. Furthermore,Cajerasreportedlydeclaredthathecouldnolongerperformhisdutiesandrequestedforrepatriation.Thefollowing paragraphinthevessel'sDeckLogwasallegedlyenteredbyCapt.Alekos,towit: PrivaterespondentwasthensenttotheMedicalCenterforSeamenatRotterdamwherehewasexaminedbyDr.Wden HoedwhosediagnosisappearedinaMedicalReportasparanoiaandothermentalproblems.[5]Consequently,uponDr. Hoedsrecommendation,CajeraswasrepatriatedtothePhilippineson28September1995. WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendereddeclaringtherepatriationanddismissalofcomplaintWilfredoT.Cajerasasillegaland orderingrespondentsMarsamanManningAgency,Inc.andDiamantidesMaritime,Inc.tojointlyandseverallypaycomplainantthe sumofUSD5,100.00oritspesoequivalentatthetimeofpaymentplusUSD510.00as10%attorneysfeesitappearingthat complainanthadtoengagetheserviceofcounseltoprotecthisinterestintheprosecutionofthiscase. 1.Theemploymentoftheseamanshallceaseuponexpirationofthecontractperiodindicated intheCrewContractunlesstheMasterandtheSeaman,bymutualconsent,inwriting,agreeto anearlyterminationxxxx(underscoringours). Clearly,undertheforegoing,theemploymentofaFilipinoseamanmaybeterminatedpriortotheexpirationofthestipulatedperiod providedthatthemasterandtheseaman(a)mutuallyconsenttheretoand(b)reducetheirconsentinwriting. TheLaborArbiter,rationalizingthattheaforesaidlawdidnotapplysinceitbecameeffectiveonlyone(1)monthafterrespondent's

overseasemploymentcontractwasenteredintoon15June1995,simplyawardedprivaterespondenthissalariescorrespondingto theunexpiredportionofhisemploymentcontract,i.e.,for8.6months.TheNLRCaffirmedtheawardandtheOfficeoftheSolicitor General(OSG)fullyagreed.ButpetitionersnowinsistthatSec.10,RA8042isapplicablebecausealthoughprivaterespondents contractofemploymentwasenteredintobeforethelawbecameeffectivehisallegedcauseofaction,i.e.,hisrepatriationon28 September1995withoutjust,validorauthorizedcause,occurredwhenthelawwasalreadyineffect.Petitioners'purposeinso arguingistoinvokethelawinjustifyingalessermonetaryawardtoprivaterespondent,i.e.,salariesforthree(3)monthsonly pursuanttothelastportionofSec.10asopposedtothesalariesfor8.6monthsawardedbytheLaborArbiterandaffirmedbythe NLRC. HELD: thequestionedDecisionandResolutiondated16September1996and12November1996,respectively,ofpublicrespondent NationalLaborRelationsCommissionareAFFIRMED.PetitionersMARSAMANMANNINGAGENCY,INC.,andDIAMANTIDES MARITIME,INC.,areordered,jointlyandseverally,topayprivaterespondentWILFREDOT.CAJERAShissalariesfortheunexpired portionofhisemploymentcontractorUSD$5,100.00,reimbursethelatter'splacementfeewithtwelvepercent(12%)interestper annumconformablywithSec.10ofRA8042,aswellasattorney'sfeesoftenpercent(10%)ofthetotalmonetaryaward.Costs againstpetitioners. SOordered

ANTONIOM.SERRANOVS.GALLANTMARITIMESERVICES,INC.ANDMARLOWNAVIGATIONCO.,INC. GRNo.167614March24,2009

FACTS: PetitionerAntonioSerranowashiredbyrespondentsGallantMaritimeServices,Inc.andMarlowNavigationCo.,Inc.,undera POEAapprovedcontractofemploymentfor12months,asChiefOfficer,withthebasicmonthlysalaryofUS$1,400,plus$700/month overtimepay,and7dayspaidvacationleavepermonth. OnMarch19,1998,thedateofhisdeparture,Serranowasconstrainedtoacceptadowngradedemploymentcontractforthe positionofSecondOfficerwithamonthlysalaryofUS$1,000upontheassuranceandrepresentationofrespondentsthathewould beChiefOfficerbytheendofApril1998. RespondentsdidnotdeliverontheirpromisetomakeSerranoChiefOfficer.Hence,SerranorefusedtostayonassecondOfficer andwasrepatriatedtothePhilippinesonMay26,1998,servingonlytwo(2)monthsandseven(7)daysofhiscontract,leavingan unexpiredportionofnine(9)monthsandtwentythree(23)days. SerranofiledwiththeLaborArbiter(LA)aComplaintagainstrespondentsforconstructivedismissalandforpaymentofhismoney claimsinthetotalamountofUS$26,442.73(basedonthecomputationof$2590/monthfromJune1998toFebruary199,$413.90for March1998,and$1640forMarch1999)aswellasmoralandexemplarydamages. TheLAdeclaredthepetitionersdismissalillegalandawardedhimUS$8,770,representinghissalarayforthree(3)monthsofthe unexpiredportionoftheaforesaidcontractofemployment,plus$45forsalarydifferentialandforattorneysfeesequivalentto10%of thetotalamounthowever,nocompensationfordamagesasprayedwasawarded. Onappeal,theNLRCmodifiedtheLAdecisionandawardedSerrano$4669.50,representingthree(3)monthssalaryat $1400/month,plus445salarydifferentialand10%forattorneysfees.ThisdecisionwasbasedontheprovisionofRA8042,which wasmadeintolawonJuly15,1995. SerranofiledaMotionforPartialReconsideration,butthistimehequestionedtheconstitutionalityofthelastclauseinthe5th paragraphofSection10ofRA8042,whichreads: Sec.10.MoneyClaims.xxxIncaseofterminationofoverseasemploymentwithoutjust,validorauthorizedcauseasdefinedby laworcontract,theworkersshallbeentitledtothefullreimbursementofhisplacementfeewithinterestoftwelvepercent(12%)per annum,plushissalariesfortheunexpiredportionofhisemploymentcontractorforthree(3)monthsforeveryyearoftheunexpired term,whicheverisless. TheNLRCdeniedtheMotionhence,SerranofiledaPetitionforCertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals(CA),reiteratingthe constitutionalchallengeagainstthesubjectclause.TheCAaffirmedtheNLRCrulingonthereductionoftheapplicablesalaryrate, butskirtedtheconstitutionalissueraisedbyhereinpetitionerSerrano. ISSUES: 1.WhetherornotthesubjectclauseviolatesSection10,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutiononnonimpairmentofcontracts 2.WhetherornotthesubjectclauseviolateSection1,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution,andSection18,ArticleIIandSection3,ArticleXIII onlaborasaprotectedsector. HELD: Onthefirstissue. Theanswerisinthenegative.Petitionersclaimthatthesubjectclauseundulyinterfereswiththestipulationsinhiscontractonthe

termofhisemploymentandthefixedsalarypackagehewillreceiveisnottenable. Section10,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionprovides:Nolawimpairingtheobligationofcontractsshallbepassed. Theprohibitionisalignedwiththegeneralprinciplethatlawsnewlyenactedhaveonlyaprospectiveoperation,andcannotaffect actsorcontractsalreadyperfectedhowever,astolawsalreadyinexistence,theirprovisionsarereadintocontractsanddeemeda partthereof.Thus,thenonimpairmentclauseunderSection10,ArticleIIislimitedinapplicationtolawsabouttobeenactedthat wouldinanywayderogatefromexistingactsorcontractsbyenlarging,abridgingorinanymannerchangingtheintentionofthe partiesthereto. AsaptlyobservedbytheOSG,theenactmentofR.A.No.8042in1995precededtheexecutionoftheemploymentcontractbetween petitionerandrespondentsin1998.Hence,itcannotbearguedthatR.A.No.8042,particularlythesubjectclause,impairedthe employmentcontractoftheparties.Rather,whenthepartiesexecutedtheir1998employmentcontract,theyweredeemedtohave incorporatedintoitalltheprovisionsofR.A.No.8042. ButeveniftheCourtweretodisregardthetimeline,thesubjectclausemaynotbedeclaredunconstitutionalonthegroundthatit impingesontheimpairmentclause,forthelawwasenactedintheexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheStatetoregulateabusiness, professionorcalling,particularlytherecruitmentanddeploymentofOFWs,withthenobleendinviewofensuringrespectforthe dignityandwellbeingofOFWswherevertheymaybeemployed.PolicepowerlegislationsadoptedbytheStatetopromotethe health,morals,peace,education,goodorder,safety,andgeneralwelfareofthepeoplearegenerallyapplicablenotonlytofuture contractsbuteventothosealreadyinexistence,forallprivatecontractsmustyieldtothesuperiorandlegitimatemeasurestakenby theStatetopromotepublicwelfare. Onthesecondissue. Theanswerisintheaffirmative. Section1,ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionguarantees:Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw norshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaw. Section18,ArticleIIandSection3,ArticleXIIIaccordallmembersofthelaborsector,withoutdistinctionastoplaceofdeployment, fullprotectionoftheirrightsandwelfare. ToFilipinoworkers,therightsguaranteedundertheforegoingconstitutionalprovisionstranslatetoeconomicsecurityandparity:all monetarybenefitsshouldbeequallyenjoyedbyworkersofsimilarcategory,whileallmonetaryobligationsshouldbebornebythem inequaldegreenoneshouldbedeniedtheprotectionofthelawswhichisenjoyedby,orsparedtheburdenimposedon,othersin likecircumstances. SuchrightsarenotabsolutebutsubjecttotheinherentpowerofCongresstoincorporate,whenitseesfit,asystemofclassification intoitslegislationhowever,tobevalid,theclassificationmustcomplywiththeserequirements:1)itisbasedonsubstantial distinctions2)itisgermanetothepurposesofthelaw3)itisnotlimitedtoexistingconditionsonlyand4)itappliesequallytoall membersoftheclass. TherearethreelevelsofscrutinyatwhichtheCourtreviewstheconstitutionalityofaclassificationembodiedinalaw:a)the deferentialorrationalbasisscrutinyinwhichthechallengedclassificationneedsonlybeshowntoberationallyrelatedtoservinga legitimatestateinterestb)themiddletierorintermediatescrutinyinwhichthegovernmentmustshowthatthechallenged classificationservesanimportantstateinterestandthattheclassificationisatleastsubstantiallyrelatedtoservingthatinterestand c)strictjudicialscrutinyinwhichalegislativeclassificationwhichimpermissiblyinterfereswiththeexerciseofafundamentalrightor operatestothepeculiardisadvantageofasuspectclassispresumedunconstitutional,andtheburdenisuponthegovernmentto provethattheclassificationisnecessarytoachieveacompellingstateinterestandthatitistheleastrestrictivemeanstoprotect suchinterest. Uponcursoryreading,thesubjectclauseappearsfaciallyneutral,foritappliestoallOFWs.However,acloserexaminationreveals

thatthesubjectclausehasadiscriminatoryintentagainst,andaninvidiousimpacton,OFWsattwolevels: First,OFWswithemploymentcontractsoflessthanoneyearvisvisOFWswithemploymentcontractsofoneyearormore Second,amongOFWswithemploymentcontractsofmorethanoneyearand Third,OFWsvisvislocalworkerswithfixedperiodemployment Insum,priortoR.A.No.8042,OFWsandlocalworkerswithfixedtermemploymentwhowereillegallydischargedweretreatedalike intermsofthecomputationoftheirmoneyclaims:theywereuniformlyentitledtotheirsalariesfortheentireunexpiredportionsof theircontracts.ButwiththeenactmentofR.A.No.8042,specificallytheadoptionofthesubjectclause,illegallydismissedOFWs withanunexpiredportionofoneyearormoreintheiremploymentcontracthavesincebeendifferentlytreatedinthattheirmoney claimsaresubjecttoa3monthcap,whereasnosuchlimitationisimposedonlocalworkerswithfixedtermemployment. TheCourtconcludesthatthesubjectclausecontainsasuspectclassificationinthat,inthecomputationofthemonetarybenefitsof fixedtermemployeeswhoareillegallydischarged,itimposesa3monthcapontheclaimofOFWswithanunexpiredportionofone yearormoreintheircontracts,butnoneontheclaimsofotherOFWsorlocalworkerswithfixedtermemployment.Thesubject clausesinglesoutoneclassificationofOFWsandburdensitwithapeculiardisadvantage. TherebeingasuspectclassificationinvolvingavulnerablesectorprotectedbytheConstitution,theCourtnowsubjectsthe classificationtoastrictjudicialscrutiny,anddetermineswhetheritservesacompellingstateinterestthroughtheleastrestrictive means. WhatconstitutescompellingstateinterestismeasuredbythescaleofrightsandpowersarrayedintheConstitutionandcalibrated byhistory.Itisakintotheparamountinterestofthestateforwhichsomeindividuallibertiesmustgiveway,suchasthepublic interestinsafeguardinghealthormaintainingmedicalstandards,orinmaintainingaccesstoinformationonmattersofpublic concern. Inthepresentcase,theCourtdugdeepintotherecordsbutfoundnocompellingstateinterestthatthesubjectclausemaypossibly serve. Infine,theGovernmenthasfailedtodischargeitsburdenofprovingtheexistenceofacompellingstateinterestthatwouldjustifythe perpetuationofthediscriminationagainstOFWsunderthesubjectclause. Assumingthat,asadvancedbytheOSG,thepurposeofthesubjectclauseistoprotecttheemploymentofOFWsbymitigatingthe solidaryliabilityofplacementagencies,suchcallousandcavalierrationalewillhavetoberejected.Therecanneverbeajustification foranyformofgovernmentactionthatalleviatestheburdenofonesector,butimposesthesameburdenonanothersector, especiallywhenthefavoredsectoriscomposedofprivatebusinessessuchasplacementagencies,whilethedisadvantaged sectoriscomposedofOFWswhoseprotectionnolessthantheConstitutioncommands.Theideathatprivatebusinessinterestcan beelevatedtothelevelofacompellingstateinterestisodious. Moreover,evenifthepurposeofthesubjectclauseistolessenthesolidaryliabilityofplacementagenciesvisavistheirforeign principals,therearemechanismsalreadyinplacethatcanbeemployedtoachievethatpurposewithoutinfringingonthe constitutionalrightsofOFWs. ThePOEARulesandRegulationsGoverningtheRecruitmentandEmploymentofLandBasedOverseasWorkers,datedFebruary 4,2002,imposesadministrativedisciplinarymeasuresonerringforeignemployerswhodefaultontheircontractualobligationsto migrantworkersand/ortheirPhilippineagents.Thesedisciplinarymeasuresrangefromtemporarydisqualificationtopreventive suspension.ThePOEARulesandRegulationsGoverningtheRecruitmentandEmploymentofSeafarers,datedMay23,2003, containssimilaradministrativedisciplinarymeasuresagainsterringforeignemployers. Resorttotheseadministrativemeasuresisundoubtedlythelessrestrictivemeansofaidinglocalplacementagenciesinenforcing thesolidaryliabilityoftheirforeignprincipals.Thesubjectclauseorforthreemonthsforeveryyearoftheunexpiredterm,whichever islessinthe5thparagraphofSection10ofRepublicActNo.8042isDECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Calalangvs.Williams G.R.No.478002December1940 Facts: AresolutionbytheNationalTrafficeCommissionthatanimaldrawnvehiclesbeprohibitedfrompassingalongRosarioStreet extendingfromPlazaCalderondelaBarcatoDasmariasStreet,from7:30a.m.to12:30p.m.andfrom1:30p.m.to5:30p.m.and alongRizalAvenueextendingfromtherailroadcrossingatAntipoloStreettoEchagueStreet,from7a.m.to11p.m.,foraperiodof oneyearfromthedateoftheopeningoftheColganteBridgetotrafficwasapprovedandadoptedbytheSecretaryofPublicWorks andCommunicationsuponindorsementbytheDirectorofPublicWorkspursuanttoCommonwealthAct548withmodificationsthat RosarioStreetandRizalAvenuebeclosedtotrafficofanimaldrawnvehicles,betweenthepointsandduringthehoursasindicated. TheMayorofManilaandtheActingChiefofPoliceofManilahaveenforcedandcausedtobeenforcedtherulesandregulationsthus adopted.MaximoCalalang,inhiscapacityasaprivatecitizenandasataxpayerofManila,broughtbeforetheSupremeCourtthe petitionforawritofprohibitionagainstA.D.Williams,asChairmanoftheNationalTrafficCommissionVicenteFragante,as DirectorofPublicWorksSergioBayan,asActingSecretaryofPublicWorksandCommunicationsEulogioRodriguez,asMayorof theCityofManilaandJuanDominguez,asActingChiefofPoliceofManila. Issue: WhethertherulesandregulationspromulgatedbytheDirectorofPublicWorksinfringeupontheconstitutionalpreceptregardingthe promotionofsocialjusticetoinsurethewellbeingandeconomicsecurityofallthepeople. Held: Thepromotionofsocialjusticeistobeachievednotthroughamistakensympathytowardsanygivengroup. Socialjusticeis"neithercommunism,nordespotism,noratomism,noranarchy,"butthehumanizationoflawsandtheequalization ofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothatjusticeinitsrationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbe approximated.Socialjusticemeansthepromotionofthewelfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentofmeasures calculatedtoinsureeconomicstabilityofallthecompetentelementsofsociety,throughthemaintenanceofapropereconomicand socialequilibriumintheinterrelationsofthemembersofthecommunity,constitutionally,throughtheadoptionofmeasureslegally justifiable,orextraconstitutionally,throughtheexerciseofpowersunderlyingtheexistenceofallgovernmentsonthetimehonored principleofsaluspopuliestsupremalex. Socialjustice,therefore,mustbefoundedontherecognitionofthenecessityofinterdependenceamongdiversanddiverseunitsof asocietyandoftheprotectionthatshouldbeequallyandevenlyextendedtoallgroupsasacombinedforceinoursocialand economiclife,consistentwiththefundamentalandparamountobjectiveofthestateofpromotingthehealth,comfort,andquietofall persons,andofbringingabout"thegreatestgoodtothegreatestnumber." Decision: INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,theWritofProhibitionPrayedforisherebydenied,withcostsagainstthepetitioner.Soordered.