This essay will attempt to analyze the Somali crisis of 2011 and Operation Linda Nchi (Linda Nchi

is Swahili for Protects the Country) the codename for a coordinated military operation that encompasses the Somalia military, the Kenyan military, the Ethiopian military, the French military, and the United States military-who have not confirmed their involvement. It began in mid-October, 2001 when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the conflict zones of southern Somalia in pursuit of Al-shabaab, a terrorist cell that is allegedly responsible for kidnapping several foreign tourists and aid workers in Kenya.1 This analysis will be conducted in relation to the CNN Effect to determine whether CNN Effect was a determinant factor in the course of military intervention in Somalia. Somali, whose capital city is Mogadishu, is a country on the horn of Africa. It occupies a land area of 637,540 square kilometers, a coastline of 3,025km and has sovereignty claim over territorial waters of up to 200 nautical miles.2 It is one of Africas prime examples of monoethnic cultures, however, for over quarter of a century, Somalia has been afflicted by with internal unrest and poor economic and social standards. Since attaining its independence in the 1960s the country has been divided into over sixteen warring clan alliances with no real central authority in place. In 1969, through a military coup, Mohammed Siad Barre became the leader of Somalia and after a long and difficult regime, he, in turn, was overthrown in January of 1991 by a coalition of opposing clans, known as the United Somalia Congress. Soon after the revolution, the coalition divided into two factions resulting in inter-clan warfare and Mogadishu was plunged in chaos as these factions fought for control spiraling into a dire food crisis. It was only in march, 1992 that the fighting stopped after the United Nation brokered ceasefire was set up.
1

Jeffery Gettleman, Kenya Says Western Nations Join Fight in Somalia, as U.S. Denies Role. Oct 23, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/kenya-says-western-nations-have-joined-somaliafight.html?_r=4&src=tp (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 2 Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002. 15

Despite the fact that high U.S official in collaboration with the press took initiatives in bringing light to the deteriorating situation3 in Somalia, the U.S Senate and public remained tight-lipped. 4 In July 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 751 was adopted. A mission to Somalia was approved to monitor the ceasefire and provide military assistance for the UN convoys of relief aid. The U.S offered its troops to lead the mission dubbed Operation Provide Relief. The objective of Operation Provide Relief was to rapidly secure the trade routes in Somalia so that food could get to the people. Regardless of all the efforts, Operation Provide Relief proved inadequate to cease the massive death and displacement of the most Somalis hence Operation Restore Hope was launched to disarm warring parties, ease the delivery of food supplies to the worst-affected famine areas, secure the control of nine key towns, ports and airports and bring calm to the country.5 This began a rollercoaster of events that shifted the intervention from famine relief to a full scale humanitarian war and subsequently withdrawal of U.S troops from Somalia. The media played an important role in the events that happened in Somalia. The shocking TV images starving and dying Somalis that filled the airwaves in the late 1992 ensured domestic legitimacy and as a result, the Bush administration agreed to send Marines to suppress the chaos hence allow for the states to intervene however through the same media, pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu could not garner the Clinton Administration public support to continue the U.S occupation of Somalia.6

Due to inefficient distribution of aid, hundreds of thousands of Somalis perished and as the state collapsed and armed plundering gang groups became a deep problem for Non-Governmental Organizations to deliver aid relief to those most in need. 4 Thomas Sheehy, To Save the Starving, Internationalize the Peacekeeping Force inSomalia. 1992. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/12/bg922nbsp-to-save-the-starving (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 5 Grard Prunier, Writenet (UK). n.d. http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 6 Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. 1997. http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012).4

This elaborates the role of media as an accelerant and as an impediment, both of which will be discussed further in the essay as some of the types of the CNN effects. The media is one of the most convenient and fastest ways for different social groups to interconnect including governmental and non - governmental institutions hence it is the most direct mediator between decision makers and the public. It represents a forum for the public to share their opinions on various policies and gives voice to policy makers to garner support for their policies as public opinion directly affect politicians during elections. Thus makes it the perfect tool to invoke public reaction and gather leverage on the foreign policy issues. Cable News Network, CNN was one of the first broadcasters to concentrate on round the clock news reporting. It engaged in a wide range of broadcasting activities across a variety of media. The inspiration behind CNN was to concentrate completely on news and to cover that news in an entirely different way from anyone else. First it would broadcast news, non-stop, 24 hours a day, second, the content would be global in orientation basically broadcasting world news from the world to the world, and lastly it would be live thereby covering news as it happens rather than reporting after the facts.7 The public feedback after watching by CNNs live coverage of the Gulf War and Somalia was overwhelming and it set a unique viewpoint, called CNN effect, which brought to light the crucial impact that real time television has on the process of foreign policy decision making on a global level. The emergence of CNN effect was mainly set into motion by the Post- Cold War context and technological advancements. It was born after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as a new age in foreign policy making had begun. Actors of the international political systems could no longer frame policies within the context of

CNN Changed News - For Better and Worse. 2005. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/05/31/2003257358 (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

Capitalism versus Communism- West versus East8. It can be see that because of this duration of policy uncertainty the media was able to take over some policy matters. The power of media has become a contentious issue discussed not just by academics and journalists, but also by those directly involved in policy-making. Many have acknowledged the impact that the CNN effect carries and concurred with a famous statement of Former UN Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali when he referred to CNN as the sixteenth member of the Security Council. "He said: "The member states never take action on a problem unless the media take up the case. When the media gets involved, public opinion is aroused..." 9 According to Livingstone, there are three conceptually distinct and analytically useful understandings of medias effects on foreign policy process. He goes on to state them as 1) a policy agenda-setting agent, 2) an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals and 3) an accelerant to policy decision making. Livingstone explains how these three types of media effects may occur during the decision making process. In the initial stages like during policy formulating acting as an agenda setting agent, the media could bring to the foreground various key issues and in the later stages like during policy formulation, it could hasten or hinder decision making response time.10 A more concise analysis of the above mentioned types of effects will be discussed in relations to the Somalia crisis in an attempt to determine whether or not the CNN Effect was a determinant
8

Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. 1997. http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012).1 9 Fred H. Cate, CNN Effect is not clear - cut, Reuters Foundations, 18 October 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/31233.html (accessed 13 Jan 2011). 10 Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, Joan Shorenstein Centre for Press and Politics (June 1997): 2

factor in the course of military intervention in Somalia, 2011.The first step at determining the above is to establish if the media had any effect at all. As it is widely asserted, that in the course of crisis an international live broadcast has the ability to evoke public outcry thereby putting pressure on foreign policymaking. Al Shabaab, a term which means the youth in Arabic, is a group that emerged in 2006 as autonomous insurgent force after Ethiopian troops defeated the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).11 Some reports, however, suggest its origins may stretch back to the late 1990s and that it is linked to the infamous Al Qaeda terrorist cell. The group is associated with rampant piracy activities on Indian Ocean and other terrorist activities. 12 Piracy, kidnappings and murders along the coast of Kenya caught the attention of the media and invoked various reactions from the public demanding the government to find solutions. The below chapters will analyze the types of effects in relation to the Somali crisis. As early stated, the CNN effect or media influence could possibly evoke three conceptually distinct consequences on the foreign policymaking and each of them can represent different stage of policy process. Media effect can possess an agenda -setting factor. It can also be an impeding agent in the course of goal achievement or under certain circumstances it could accelerate the decision making policy. The media as an agenda-setting agent means that by bring certain issues or crisis into the foreground and into the attention of the public, the media forces the policy makers to address those issues. News articles and transmissions about the kidnappings and murder at Kenyas

11

ICU is the broad-based religious movement that ousted the warlords that controlled Mogadishu and expanded its influence into other parts of southern Somalia. 12 Xan Rice, Q&A: Somalia's Al-Shabaab Rebel Group. Aug 16, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/16/q-a-somalia-al-shabaab (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

coastal region evoked public outcry demanding the government to address the insecurity crisis brought about by Somali gunmen. The real-time, around the hour news broadcasts on the incursions that occurred weeks to Kenyas occupation of Somalia garnered great public support and legitimized the intervention , Local channels carried out opinion polls that showed high approval ratings for the campaign, with some of the ratings as high as 98 percent.13 This is evident of the role of media as an agenda-setting agent. One of the effects of real-time media is shortening of decision-making response time i.e. the Media as an Accelerant. Here decisions are made in haste as instantaneous reports by the media demands that the policy makers respond in the same speedy manner even without detailed reports or analysis of the said event therefore pushes policy makers to always have a policy position. The accelerant effect of the media does not seem have been in play in this case as the Kenyan intervention plan seems to have been discussed and decided in 2010 and even finalized with input from western partners, including the US and France. The executive seems to have seized the opportunity brought about by the kidnappings of foreign nationals by Somali groups on Kenyan territory as an excuse to launch an operation that had been ready and waiting.14 The media only acted to accelerate the implementation of an already laid-out policy plan. It is a well known fact that during warring times, the media can be seen to be a potential security or intelligence risk; however it can also be used to send signals.15 This is clearly elaborated in Kenyas use of the local media as a tool for posturing and propaganda. The local media has been

13

Aaron Maasho, Operation Somalia: The U.S., Ethiopia and now Kenya. Oct 28, 2011. http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews/2011/10/28/operation-somalia-the-u-s-ethiopia-and-now-kenya/ (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 14 Jean-Philippe Rmy, Kenya Develops Plan for Satellite Region of Jubaland on Somali Border. Nov 8, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/somali-fears-in-kenya-conflicts (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 15 Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. 1997. http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012).2

flooding all mediums, visual, print, audio and internet with news on the intervention by the Kenyan Defence Forces, KDF in Somali. With the exception of very few that indicate casualties taken by Kenyans, there seems to be a lot of reports on how the enemy is on the run, Al Shabaab is being trampled and seem to be fleeing and the large of casualties that it has taken. The local media can be seen to be used as a tool for soft power to create an image that Kenya is very confident about its position in this military intervention and also to manufacture consent which Robinson describes as the media being influenced by the agendas of either the Executive or Political Elites.16 The Al Shaabab who have been very open in their loath for western practices all in the name of their brand of puritanical Islam have even embraced Twitter, one of the icons of a modern networked society. They have been posting tweets on the Kenyan Army pages bragging about their prowess and taunting the KDF. The group have been very vocal, using media a propaganda tool to garner support within the group as well as to create an image that they are in control. 17 According to Livingston, there are at least two types of media-related policy impediments. The first is rooted in emotional coverage and operates through the agency of public opinion. The second one is largely linked with the humanitarian operations themselves and their strategic security.18

16

Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" Review International Studies, 1999: 303. 17 . Somalias Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon. Dec 14, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-aweapon.html?_r=1&ref=kenya (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 18 Livingston, Steven. Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. 1997. http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012).4.

The media as an emotional inhibitor which can manifests itself either as the body bags effect or the bullying effect both being roadblocks to the policy decision to intervene or continue with an intervention. The body bags effect whereby images or news of causalities fallen can pull the government away from intervention. Reports on the media reveal that Kenya has suffered a considerable number of causalities both army and civilian and despite Kenyas occupation of Somali, some of these attacks and kidnappings are still being carried out on the Kenyan side of the border.19 The body bags effect predicts that the more causality suffered the less likely the public will support a policy of intervention. The bullying effect is whereby the use of excessive force may drain public support of the intervention. The bully effect is also already being reported by the media in Kenyas treatment of the local Somali population and refugees in Kenya. Its allegedly that suspected Al-Shabaab sympathizers have been attacking police, military, and civilian in Kenya and its is claimed that in retaliation the members of the Kenyan security forces have been responsible for rape, beatings, looting, and arbitrary arrests of Somali civilians.20 If these claims are true, then it could begin shatter Kenyas already fragile collaboration with the Somali and drain public support. The media as a threat to operational security can be taken to mean that the media, because of technological advancement, could hinder some types of operations simply by exposing them. One example in the Somali crisis could be the Al Shaabab having information on the capability and financial constraints affecting the KDF. The international media has been very critical of

19

Zimmerman, Katherine. Timeline: Operation Linda Nchi. Dec 12, 2011. http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/timeline-operation-linda-nchi-october-24-2011 (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 20 Ramadhan Rajab, Kenya Security Abusing Civilians Report Says. Jan 13, 2012. http://www.thestar.co.ke/national/national/57957-kenya-security-abusing-civilians-report-says (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

Kenyas decision to intervene in Somalia. Many analysts do not have confidence in the capability of the KDF to be able to handle a militia group in Somalia, a task that better armies have failed to achieve namely U.S, U.N and Ethiopia during various times of the Somali history. Opinion polls already indicate that, the Kenya public and the politicians have started questioning whether the Kenyan involvement in Somalia is likely to last longer than was initially intended. Kenya was not prepared for a long-drawn-out war and with its resources already stretching; it is allegedly that it is already reaching out to the United States and other Western allies for help. 21 This could be seen as an exploitable weakness by the enemy. In conclusion of this paper, two observations can be made. Firstly, the media can have an impact on foreign policy. But, secondly, there are a multitude of other things involved in the foreign policy making process, which affects the possible influence of the media. In the case of the Somali Crisis, the CNN Effect is evident as far as its accelerant factor is concerned. The crisis and decision to intervene seems to have been already initiated and by policymakers. Therefore as indicated earlier the executive seems to have seized the opportunity brought incursions by Somali groups on Kenyan to launch an operation that had been ready and waiting.22 The media only acted to accelerate the implementation of an already laid-out policy plan.

21

Fred Oluoch, Somalia: Why Kenya Is Not Making Any Strides in the War Against Al Shabaab Two Months Into Incursion. Dec 12, 2011. http://allafrica.com/stories/201112110145.html (accessed Jan 13, 2012). 22 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/somali-fears-in-kenya-conflicts (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

Bibliography
Cate, Fred H. "CNN effect" is Not Clear-Cut. 2002. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176/31233.html (accessed Jan 13, 2012). CNN Changed News - For Better and Worse. 2005. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/05/31/2003257358 (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Fitzgerald, Nina J. Somalia: Issues, History, and Bibliography. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2002. Gettleman, Jeffery. Kenya Says Western Nations Join Fight in Somalia, as U.S. Denies Role. Oct 23, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/africa/kenya-says-western-nations-have-joinedsomalia-fight.html?_r=4&src=tp (accessed Jan 13, 2012). . Somalias Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon. Dec 14, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-aweapon.html?_r=1&ref=kenya (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Livingston, Steven. Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. 1997. http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Maasho, Aaron. Operation Somalia: The U.S., Ethiopia and now Kenya. Oct 28, 2011. http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews/2011/10/28/operation-somalia-the-u-s-ethiopia-and-nowkenya/ (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Oluoch, Fred. Somalia: Why Kenya Is Not Making Any Strides in the War Against Al Shabaab Two Months Into Incursion. Dec 12, 2011. http://allafrica.com/stories/201112110145.html (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Prunier, Grard . Writenet (UK). n.d. http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Rajab, Ramadhan. Kenya Security Abusing Civilians Report Says. Jan 13, 2012. http://www.thestar.co.ke/national/national/57957-kenya-security-abusing-civilians-report-says (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Rmy, Jean-Philippe. Kenya Develops Plan for Satellite Region of Jubaland on Somali Border. Nov 8, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/somali-fears-in-kenya-conflicts (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

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Rice, Xan. Q&A: Somalia's Al-Shabaab Rebel Group. Aug 16, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/16/q-a-somalia-al-shabaab (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Robinson, Piers. "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" Review International Studies, 1999: 303. Sheehy, Thomas. To Save the Starving, Internationalize the Peacekeeping Force inSomalia. 1992. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/12/bg922nbsp-to-save-the-starving (accessed Jan 13, 2012). Zimmerman, Katherine. Timeline: Operation Linda Nchi. Dec 12, 2011. http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/timeline-operation-linda-nchi-october-24-2011 (accessed Jan 13, 2012).

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