COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Cayetano v.

Monsod 201 SCRA 210 FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetanos objection, based on alleged lack of the required qualification of 10 years of law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years? HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such action and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. Monsod passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank until 1986, became member of Constitutional Commission in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, and lawyer-entrepreneur. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Appointments (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment? HELD: NO. The power of the CA to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

Brillantes v Yorac 192 SCRA 358 FACTS: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac was appointed by President Aquino as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt. ISSUE: Whether the appointment is unconstitutional. HELD: NO. Sec 1 (2) Art IX-C provides that xxx In no case shall any Member [COMELEC] be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Lindo v COMELEC 194 SCRA 25 FACTS:

POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private respondent Octavio Velasco were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Ternate, Cavite, in the January 1988 local elections. After canvass, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate proclaimed petitioner Lindo as elected mayor. On March 22, 1988 Velasco filed an election protest with the RTC of Trece Martires City protesting the results of the election in seventeen (17) of the twenty two (22) precincts in the municipality. After hearing of testimonies, the trial court issued an order excluding the balots from these precincts from the revision. Velaso filed a motion for reconsideration of the order which was denied on December 9, 1988. On appeal by Velasco, the COMELEC en banc, set aside the order of the trial court where it likewise direted the trial court to proceed with the revision of the ballots from the four controverted precincts. A petition for certiorari was later filed by Lindo impugning the order of the COMELEC and was dismissed and affirmed the decision of the COMELEC. On February 6, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision proclaiming Lindo the winner with a plurality of twenty nine (29) votes. On February 12, 1990, counsel for Lindo, Atty. Montajo, was served a copy pf the decision while attending the hearing of another case. Velasco's counsel was also served a copy of the decision by mail which he received on February 16, 1990. Velasco filed a Notice of Appeal to the COMELEC on February 17, 1990. He argued that the winner in an election protest case should be determined not only on the basis of the results obtained from the contested precincts but from the results of both the contested and uncontested precincts. Lindo filed a Notice of Appeal on February 26, 1990, claiming that he knew of the decision only on February 22, 1990. The trial court gave due course to the appeal of Velasco and denied due course to Lindo's appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time. A month after the trial court denied due course to his notice of appeal, Lindo filed a motion with the COMLEC praying that respondent trial court's order denying due course to his notice of appeal be set aside. Velasco's appeal and Lindo's motion were consolidated. On June 6, 1990, after hearing the arguments of the parties, COMELEC (First Division) rendered a decision in favor of Octavio Velasco and declared that he is the duly elected mayor. Lindo moved for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution affirming in toto the decision of the COMELEC (First Division). Lindo filed this petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining order. ISSUE: 1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its own Rule 32, Sec. 3 and Rule 35, Sec. 20 and 22; and 2. Whether petioner was effectively denied due process when his notice of appeal was considered filed out of time and therefore has lost his standing to question a decision which, as to him, had become final and beyond the remedy of apeal notwithstanding that, the petitioner has filed his notice of appeal even before any promulgation was ever made as required by the COMELEC rules. HELD: Rule 35, Sec 20 (Promulgation and Finality of Decision), promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties of their counsel. It petitioner's contention that the act of merely furnishing the parties with a copy of the decision violated the COMELEC rules and did not constitute a valid promulgation,hence the five (5) day period within which the decision should be appealed to the COMELEC did not commence to run is untenable. What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision as required by the COMELEC rules. A mere procedural lapse does not make the proceedings null and void. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it affirmed the order of the trial court denying due course to petitioner's notice of appeal.

Gallardo v Judge Tabamo 218 SCRA 253 FACTS:

POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R. Gallardo were both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the positions of congressmen and governor, respectively, of Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions and were in a bitter electoral battle. On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections, Cong. Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No. 465 before the RTC of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain the respondents from undertaking and/or pursuing certain public works projects and from disbursing, releasing, and/or spending public funds for said projects, allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects were undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). On the same day, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order and required the petitioner to answer the petition within 10 days from receipt. The petitioner received the copy of the restraining order, (being a lawyer) saw that it is not within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence this instant case, questioning the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the jurisdiction of the court over Special Civil Action No. 465. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the Omnibus Election Code? HELD: No. The COMELEC is vested by the Constitution (Art IX-C, Sec 2(2)) with the exclusive [original jurisdiction] charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the enforcement of the Election Code.

Relampagos v Cumba 243 SCRA 690 FACTS: A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction) revives the issue of whether the Commission on Election (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cses where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto or habeas corpus? HELD: Yes it does, but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It has concurrent jurisdiction with that of the Supreme Court.

Edding v COMELEC 246 SCRA 502 FACTS: During the May 1992 elections, petitioner Edding and private respondent Bernardo were among the candidates for the office of municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive election fraud, Edding filed an election protest with the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment proclaming Edding as the winner of the election. Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved for the immediate execution of the decision. RTC granted both the Notice of Appeal and Motion for
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

Immediate Execution. Edding assumed office while Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injuctions and for the issuance of TRO. The petition were granted hence this petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto or habeas corpus? HELD: Yes the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs but only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It has concurrent jurisdiction with that of the Supreme Court.

Galido v COMELEC 193 SCRA 78 FACTS: In an election contest involving the elected mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, the COMELEC declared Galeon as the duly elected mayor. Fifteen ballots in the name of his rival, Galido, was invalidated for being marked ballots. Galido file the petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a restraining order. Galeon moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that according to the Constitution (Art IX-C, Sec 2(2)) final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal officials are final, executory, and not appeallable. ISSUE: Whether the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal officials are unappealable? HELD: Yes. Decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal officials but it does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of special civil action of certiorari. In the instant case however, it does not show that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in rending the question decision.

People v Inting 187 SCRA 788 FACTS: In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter-complaint against the OIC-Mayor of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for allegedly transfering her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in the office of the Mayor to a very remote barangay and without abandoning prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC as required by law. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumagete (Atty. Lituanas) to conduct preliminary investigation of the case pursuant to a COMELEC Resolution which in turn, is based on Consitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. After the preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondent RTC of Dumagete City a criminal case against the OIC Mayor. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against the accused which was later cancelled on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art III of the Constitution. The court stated that it will give due course to the information filed if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter. Atty.Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. The RTC quashed the information and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

ISSUE: Whether a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal before the RTC may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists? HELD: NO. The Court emphasizes the important features of the constitutional mandate that xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge xxx (Art III, Sec 2, Constitution) First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is for the Provincial Fiscal nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination. Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. It is this report, the affidavits, the transcriptions of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination. Third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminaryinquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore whether he should be subjected to trial; is the function of the prosecutor. Art IX-C, Sec 2, Constitution provides xxx The Commission on Election shall execise the following powers and functions: 1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. xxx 6) File, upon a verified complaint, or in its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. In effect, the 1987 Constitution madates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC (exclusive power) is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. The provincial fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the fiscal files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not have the sole authority under his office to do so. It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or deputies that Sec 2, Art III of the Constitution comes in.

People v Basilia 179 SCRA 87 FACTS: Three complaintswere filed with the provincial fiscal alleging violations of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed the information with the RTC. The judge, motu proprio, dismissed the information on the ground that the COMELEC has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses. Hence this review. ISSUE: Whether fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses? HELD: YES, they may. Although the COMELEC is granted exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses, it is also authorized by the Omnibus Election Code to avail
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. To ensure credible elections, the COMELEC may deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities , whether before or after elections. Pursuant to such authority granted by law, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses.

People v Delgado 189 SCRA 715 FACTS: Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who conducted a preliminary investigation of the alleged election offenses of Delagado and others, the COMELEC filed an information against the latter. The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the warrant of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court ordered reinvestigation. The COMELEC opposed the order on the ground that only the Supreme Court may review the decisions, orders, resolutions of the COMELEC. The trial court denied the COMELEC motion. Hence this certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC action may be reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court? HELD: NO. According to the Constitution, the COMELEC has the following functions: (1) enforcement of laws; (2) decision of election contests; (3) decision of administrative questions; (4) deputizing law enforcement agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable on certiorari by the SC are those orders, decisions, resolutions, etc. rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or on administrative questions are subject to judicial review only by the Supreme Court. In the instant case, no COMELEC adjudicatory power is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the COMELEC has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code before the competent court. But when the COMELEC files the information, the subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the court's approval. The COMELEC cannot conduct reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.

COMELEC v Judge Silva et. al. 286 SCRA 177 FACTS: Pursuant to its power under Article IX-C, Sec 2(6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC charged private respondents Tanciongco and Castillo with violations of Sec. 27 of RA 6646, together with Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the RTC of Bataan. The three were accused of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of canvass during the May 1995 elections. Twelve (12) cases were raffled to three branches of the court presided over the respondent judges, Hon. Silva and Hon.Vianzon. On October 30, 1996, Tanciongco and Castillo filed a joint Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and Dismissal of the the Cases. Chief State Prosecutor Zuno, who had been designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. On March 31, and April7, 1997, respectively, Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases against private respondents. The COMELEC sought appeal of the dismissal of the cases to the CA but the judges denied due course to its appeal. Such denial was grounded on the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the nullification of the orders of the judges, denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC. ISSUE: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

HELD: The COMELEC. The authority to decide whether to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC pursuant to Art IX-C, Sec 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws including acts or omission constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The 1987 Constitution madates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices.

Torres v COMELEC 270 SCRA 583 FACTS: On May 9, 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite issued a Certificated of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates of the Municipal Offices (Councilors) where petitioner Rosauro Torres was proclaimed as fifth winning candidate for councilor. Two days after or on May 11, 1995 the same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of the number of votes garnered by the petitioner. The votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in the subtotal was erroneously added to Mr. Torres. Mr. Torres should have been number ten (10) in the winning column and that Mr. Peralta should have landed in the 7th position. Petitioner filed his answer alleging that the subject matter of the letter-petition, which was the correction of votes garnered by him, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code. After due course, respondent COMELEC issued the assailed en banc resolution granting the letter-request for the correction of the number of votes garnered by petitioner. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the request of the municipal board of canvassers to correct the votes garnered by petitioner and in ordering the proclamation of private respondent. HELD: NO. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. (a) where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may motu proprio or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. In Castromayor v. Comelec we held that although the above provision applies to pre-proclamation controversies, and even if the proclamation of a winning candidate has already been made, there is nothing to prevent its application to cases like the one at bar in which the validity of the proclamation is precisely in question. In Duremdes cases, where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidates assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. Sarmiento v COMELEC 212 SCRA 307
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

FACTS: The COMELEC, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals (Special Cases), without first referring them to any of its Divisions. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of and decided the appeals of special cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions? HELD: YES. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of the petitioners in the said special cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc .

Reyes v RTC of Oriental Mindoro 244 SCRA 41 FACTS: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 elections. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in the counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Rees votes for Reyes only, considering that the was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname. Without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eight winning candidate. On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court. Municipal Board of Canvassers file its answer in which it admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. On June 23, 1992, trial court rendered its decision annulling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring private respondent as the eight winning candidate for the position of councilor. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and in addition filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the CA. The CA dismissed the petition because of the petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. Hence this instant petition, petitioner contends that the COMELEC's First Division committed grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether this petition for certiorari would prosper? HELD: NO. The filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, Sec 7 of the Constitution because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

National Press Club v COMELEC 207 SCRA 1 FACTS: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisement under RA 6646.
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

ISSUE: Whether RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of expression? HELD: NO. The COMELEC has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with public information campaigns and forums among candidates. Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.

Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v GMA 289 SCRA 337 FACTS: The petitioner questions the validity of Sec 92 of BP 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes property without due process of law. Petitioners contend that (1) it is violative of the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation (2) it denies broadcast media the equal protection of laws and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media communication and information during the election period. ISSUE: Whether Sec 92 of BP 881 is (1) it is violative of the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation (2) it denies broadcast media the equal protection of laws and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media communication and information during the election period. HELD: NO. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencieshave to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequences to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provisions that any such franchise or right granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires it. The free time for the benefit not only of one candidates but even more of the public, particularly, the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. NO.What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads.

Adiong v COMELEC 207 SCRA 712 FACTS: Petitioner Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it provides the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location or publication to authorized posting areas. ISSUE: Whether the resolution is constitutional?
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

HELD: NP. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate of the political party. The regulation of strike at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it place on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. Moreover, the restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. Sanidad v COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 FACTS: On the occasion of the ratification campaign for the Autonomy Act of Cordillera, the COMELEC, issued a resolution prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from using their columns or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite during the period of the campaign. Reliance was made on the Election Code and on Article IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution authorizing the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media communication or information. Sanidad, a columnist, challenged the validity of the resolution as a violation of freedom of expression. ISSUE: Whether the resolution issued by the COMELEC is unconstitutional? HELD: Yes. The resolution is unconstitutional. The authority given by the Constitution is over holders of franchises. The purpose is to assure candidates equal opportunity and equal access to media. Sanidad is not a candidate and in fact in a plebiscite there are no candidates. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and the people's right to be informed must be preserved. Morever, the people's choice of forum for discussion should not be restricted.

Social Weather Stations v COMELEC (May 5, 2001) FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Sec 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publication of elections surveys 15 days and 7 days before election, for national and local candidates. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001. ISSUE:
POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)

Whether Sec 5.4 of RA 9006 is valid? HELD: We hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of speech.

Mitmug v COMELEC 230 SCRA 54 FACTS: The turn-out of votes during the May 11, 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur, was abnormally low. As a result, several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the electorate managed to cast their votes. But a special election was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned and conducted actual voting during election day, low voter turnout would not justify a declaration of failure of election. ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur. HELD: Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. It is indubitable that the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright. There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a special election. The fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC will act on it. The verified petition must still show on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the absence thereof, the petition must be denied outright.

POLITICAL LAW REWIER: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (COMELEC)