MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962 March 27, 2000 FACTS: On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. ISSUE: WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power. HELD: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991). Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the *LGU's corporate powers+ provided under the Code. There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.March 27, 2000Puno, J. Facts Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members arehomeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered ownerof Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.Actions Filed:1. BAVA applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing,trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.2. BAVA appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has noauthority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolitionof its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.3.MMDA filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse. Issues 1.Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory andpolice powers?2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic? Held The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative innature.The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system andadministration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislativepower.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local governmentunits, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. Inthe case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution orderingthe opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondentCourt of Appeals did not err in so ruling.The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately thepowers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of aprivate street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Dispositive IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appealsare affirmed.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs.PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid HELD: No Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255] Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenueearner in the government. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino. On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment

for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution. Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance. Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Basco vs PAGCOR Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy imperium in imperio On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy. Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy. HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide. Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.

Basco v. PAGCOR GRN 91649, 14 May 1991) FACTS: On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government. Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others. ISSUES: Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because: 1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order; 2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy; 3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and 4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization. HELD: 1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. 2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. 3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. 4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

EN BANC SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. G.R. No. 80391 DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Decentralization of power, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. FACTS: On March 12, 1987 petitioner Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. On November 2, 1987, members of Regional Legislative Assembly sans the petitioner Limbona convened in defiance to short recess called for by petitioner as the latter was to attend a congressional committee hearing for Muslim Affairs in Congress. During the convention, having acquired quorum, members thereof move to declare the Speakership of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant, thereby expelling petitioner from office. Petitioner Limbona filed petition for injunction praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter and that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void. In view thereof, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide matters over autonomous region was challenged by respondents. ISSUE: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? February 28, 1989

HELD: An autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category (decentralization of power) [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class (decentralization of government) is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).
32

If the Sangguniang Pampook (of

Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense (decentralization of power), its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only (decentralization of administration) it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power), that is, in which the central government commits an act of selfimmolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Limbona vs. Mangelin GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the

former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONYCALVENTO,respondents G.R. No. 129093 QUISUMBING, J August 30, 2001 FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent bythe Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for theoperation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,for a mayors permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on theground that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaentitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGANNG LAGUNAAs A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratoryrelief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order ----------Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling;(2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincialgovernments police power under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain thatrespondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approvalby the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to theexpress provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part, respondentCalvento argues that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of thestate since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto aslegal. As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were soughtfrom the sangguninang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent stated as a declarationof policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The respondent judge,Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners fromimplementing or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion forreconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE/S:1.Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid2.Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunianare needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given localgovernment unit. RULING: The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states theobjection of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the partof the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid groundto prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policystatement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolutionis valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views whichmaybe contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom toexercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact

Lina v. Pao Facts: Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminalfor the operation of lotto, applied for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province,including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filedan action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporaryrestraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoiningpetitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution. Issue: whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaand the denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid Held: No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the saidgame. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto systemin the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local governmentsobjection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governmentsautonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments.However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governmentsmay actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given thispremise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as ameasure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments aremerely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot besuperior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being thecase, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be permitted is forCongress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress hasallowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify theexercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.

National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes Facts: On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours. Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office.

Issue: WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision. Bito-Onon v. Fernandez: Court ruled that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit? We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect of the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,92 our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based. When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office" reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said "caretakership" was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution. With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter. These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of the Ligas internal organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have.

 Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers. Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. In the Bito-Onon94 case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a postproclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or redone to conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay

Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled: Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments. All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control a power which is denied by the Constitution even to the President. National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130 (Admin Law, DILG-Liga ng mga Barangay, quasi-legislative power) Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga. Petitioner contends that DILGs appointment constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG. Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay. Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.

Abbas vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989

of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. 2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734 Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional. Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional. 1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. 3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. 4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law. 5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions. 6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable

League of Cities v. COMELEC Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. 12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million was enacted. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Sen. Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. 13th Congress: JR 29 was re-adopted as JR 1 and was forwarded to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Sen.Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the LGC. Issues: 1. WON RA 9009 violates the principle of non-retroactivity. NO
Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot

invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. 2. WON RA 9009 violates Sec 10 Art X of the Constitution. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. There is only one LGC. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the LGC and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the laws four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the LGC, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009. True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the LGC. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the LGC. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the LGC. 3. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6Art X of the Constitution. Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the LGC are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

 If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the LGC, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. 4. WON the deliberations of unapproved bills by the 11th Congress may be used as basis for those approved by the 12th . NO Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. The deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. 5. WON the equal protection clause was violated. If Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the LGC, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the LGC as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, [23] not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled: The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held: We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the LGC, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.