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Folder Title: [Ai] Gore

Document Date: 04-09-2004
Document Type: Briefing Paper
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To:

Subject: Outline: Interview of Vice President Albert Gore

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 QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issue

The Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "The
federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and
provide substantial funding for capital improvements."

Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should be
treated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,
policies, priorities, procedures etc?

Intelligence and threat analysis

Question: The Gore Commission report referenced the changing threat from terrorism to
the U.S. homeland. How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation both domestically
and internationally from the intelligence you received in the course of the Commission's
work and, in general, as Vice President?

Hij acking/Sabotage

Question: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.
Little was said about hijacking. What was the Commission's view of the hijacking threat
and given the known shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wasn't
this more of a focus?

Technology

Question: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Commission focused on the
importance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice do
you have for this commission about how to set an aviation security R&D agenda, to fund
it and to deploy the technology?

Passenger Profiling

Question: Will you share with us your recollection of the commission's deliberations
about the following key issues:
• Aircraft as weapons;
• The security consequences for passengers selected by the computer prescreening
system that the commission so strongly endorsed; For instance, was it the
commission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify those who may
pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who might pose
a hijacking threat as well?
• The civil liberties aspects of CAPS and CAPS consequences;
• The use of government watch lists to stop suspected terrorists from flying.
Reinventing Government

The Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently on
raising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.

Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the Federal
Aviation Administration? Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that
depended on rulemaking to implement improved security measures, was there concern
that the lessons from the Commission on Reinventing Government might unwittingly
frustrate reforms contemplated in the report of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security? ,,_/ A*~ >
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Genera. Assessments

Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system in place leading
up to and on 9/11/01? Why were the attacks able to succeed? How and why did the
system fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe either the
Clinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented those
disasters?

Gore Commission: General

Question: Commissioner Vict^ia CummockjBled a dissent to many of the ^

Commission's recommendations, argiiirig that in some cases they lacked specificity,
responsibility, substance, accountability^apglicability and timelines and deadlines.
Further, her dissent included what sjae thought^would address those perceived gaps.
Could you comment on that dissejit in terms of its validity and how the commission^de
with her views?

Recommendations

Question: What would you tell the Commission they should recommend to improve
aviation and transportation security in particular and homeland security in general and
what steps can we take to enhance the probability that our recommendations are duly
considered and implemented?

Question: Threats and vulnerabilities to the nation's transportation system are many and
varied. They include not only aviation but maritime, rail, pipelines and other surface
modes. How would you advise that priorities be determined? How should cost be
allocated among stakeholders?
CAPS (computer assisted passenger screening) and CONSEQUENCES

One of the Gore Commission's key recommendations was for the FAA and air carriers to
administer a computerized profiling system to identify passengers who should receive
additional security screening.

The FAA's Baseline Working Group which helped inform the Commission's
recommendation stated that the system should "identify selectees, whose persons and
property (checked baggage and carry-on bags/items) will be subjected to security
scrutiny beyond that required for regular passengers."

However, when the FAA implemented the recommendation the consequence of selection
was restricted to the following: either the selectee's checked bags would be screened for
explosives or they would be loaded onto the plane only after their owner was aboard.
Being a selectee did not mean you underwent any additional screening of your person or
carry-on bags—despite the fact that the FAA knew checkpoints were notoriously porous.
In fact, you could only be a CAPS selectee if you checked bags.

Q: Was it the Commission's intent for profiling to focus solely on stopping

explosives in checked baggage? Did the FAA's rules on CAPS' consequences
adequately reflect the Gore Commission's recommendation?

(Follow-up: The CAPS recommendation included the following provision: "FBI, CIA
and BATF should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijackers and
bombers needed to develop the best possible profiling system." Hijackers sneak things
through on their person/carry-on not their checked bags, so why the focus of CAPS
consequences on checked bags only?

Q: It seems apparent that one of the reasons for focusing CAPS consequences solely
on checked baggage was that by doing so the FAA/air carriers didn't have to
"hassle" people at the checkpoint—which could have raised both civil liberty
complaints and caused "efficiency" problems in getting people through screening
and to their flights. How would you respond to that premise?

Watchlisting

Among the Gore Commission's recommendations was the following: "The FBI and CIA
should develop a system that would allow important intelligence information on known
or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the
integrity of the intelligence or its sources."

Q: Was this intended to be the means of developing a "no fly" list? How expansive
did you intend this effort to be?
Q: As you know there were fewer than 15 people on FAA's no fly list as of 9-11.
This seems like an area in which the Commission's recommendation never went
anywhere. Do you recall hearing why this wasn't being done and did you take any
steps to push it?

Checkpoint Screener Certification

The Gore Commission recommended that screening companies be certified by the federal
government to help enforce better performance. The FAA initiated rule-making to
implement the recommendation in 1997. As of September 11, 2001 the rule still hadn't
been finalized.

Q: Were you aware why it was taking so long to implement such a key rule? Did you
take any steps to eliminate the bureaucratic delay?

Q: The Gore Commission's first recommendation was to treat aviation security as a

National Security issue. Would you agree that taking 5 years to implement a key
aviation security measure was not consistent with that standard?

Lobbying

Q: We understand that the air carriers undertook a very aggressive lobbying

campaign when the Commission was developing its recommendations and in the
implementation phase. What's your recollection of this campaign by the air
carriers?