Paat v. CA GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167) Second Division, Torres Jr.

(p): 4 concurring Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENROs Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck. Its owner, De Guzman, failed to submit the required explanation within the reglementary period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENROs action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman filed for reconsideration but was denied. The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed by De Guzman and company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2), contending that the only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition. Issues: Whether construction admits that the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts Whether the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277 Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of th it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority

constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch e law. The language of the amendatory executive order, when