Peter Finn

Beyond Abu Ghraib Military Detention, Abuse, Iraq and US Power

The United States (US) military detention system in Iraq makes for an illuminating case study as it is possible to trace its creation, evolution and operation from a baseline of zero, as the US and its coalition partners invaded Iraq in the second half of March 2003, through to a fully-fledged bureaucracy, that, by the summer of 2005 was responsible for the housing of approximately 10,000 detainees. (Moss 2006) The initial responsibility for the running of the core of the system fell to Brigadier General Paul Hill who, as head of the 800 th Military Police (MP), had to coordinate units that were mobilizing in Maryland, Indiana and Georgia; most of whom had some basic training in police duties []. Exactly how well trained and how well they would work together was impossible to say (Karpinski & Strasser 2005: 149). Hill was replaced by US Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski who was appointed to head up the system on the 30 th of June 2003 (Beaumont, Burke & Harris 2004; Karpinski & Strasser 2005: 151-173). Karpinskis role as head of the 800th MP saw her responsible for 3,400 soldiers at 16 facilities (Davenport, Higham & White 2004). Karpinski held this post until the outbreak of the Abu Ghraib scandal in April 2004 when Major General Geoffrey Miller was appointed to replace her (Briere & Koladish 2010; Department of the Army 2005: 1). Miller had been an important figure in the operation of the USs detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and had previously also been involved in the operation of Abu Ghraib (Briere & Koladish 2010; Center for Torture Accountability 2011; Department of the Army 2005: 1; MacAskill 2011). Miller was appointed to head up the newly formed Task Force-134 (TF134) (Briere & Koladish 2010; Department of the Army 2005: 1). TF134 was conceived as a body specifically assigned to oversee all aspects of the conduct of detainee operations in Iraq (Briere & Koladish 2010).

Peter Finn The USs military detention system in Iraq was a multi-faceted and ever-evolving system that contained numerous types of sites that carried out various roles and engaged with the USs wider mission in Iraq in differing ways. Detainees were generally captured by US forces engaged in the conflict and held initially at a Foreword Operating Base (FOB) (Phillips 2010: 56-58). These FOBs were spread throughout the country and included FOB Delta, which was in Eastern Iraq near the Iranian border, and FOB Packhorse, which was located in Tikrit in Northern Iraq (Department of the Army 2003: 1; Department of the Army 2004; Rowland 2009). While at such facilit ies, DTNs were in -processed and allotted the same rations as US military personnel (Department of the Army 1 2003: 3-4). Following this, those detainees not released were transferred to larger facilities such as Abu Ghraib, located to the west of Baghdad, Camp Cropper Theatre Internment Facility, located at Baghdad International Airport, and Camp Bucca, in Southern Iraq near the border with Kuwait (Bill 2010: 421-424; Gourevitch & Morris 2009: 1; Jehl & Schmitt 2004). Detainees could be held for 14 days at FOBs before being transferred to central facilities (Jehl & Schmitt 2004). Some facilities utilised pre-existing infrastructure, with the most famous being the adoption of the notorious Baathist era jail at Abu Ghraib, while others, such as Camp Bucca, were constructed by US forces on their arrival in Iraq (Iraq-Business News 2010; UNHCR 2002). The system was in operation until the handing over of the last prisoner to Iraqi custody in December 2011 (Stewart 2011). This program of US military detention in Iraq came under close scrutiny as a result of pictures taken at Abu Ghraib prison (CBS News 2006; Hersh 2004). These pictures, among other things, depicted naked detainees in a human pyramid and a naked detainee (DTN) being dragged around by a lead tied round his neck (The Guardian 2004). The offending pictures were taken in the fall of 2003 and made public in spring 2004. The furore surrounding these pictures was one of the most high profile scandals of the War on Terror. It was asserted by numerous US officials that the events at Abu Ghraib were committed by a few bad apples that carried out isolated acts of mistreatment against DTNs

Peter Finn (Paul Wolfowitz in CBS News 2009; Phillips 2010: 18; Simone 2009). These acts, it was claimed, were not indicative of a wider trend of mistreatment or abuse of DTNs during the early years of the USs presence in Iraq (CBS News 2009). However, as Seymour Hersh notes:

The roots of the Abu Ghraib scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists, but in the reliance of George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld on secret operations and the use of coercion an eye-for-an-eye retribution in fighting terrorism. (Hersh 2005: 46)

Moreover, as Joshua Phillips states:

To be sure, the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib was notorious and deserved much scrutiny. Yet it represented just one example. Reports by journalists and human rights organizations have shown that US detainee abuse and torture spread beyond that single prison during the war on terror (Phillips 2010: ix)

As stated by both Hersh & Phillips, the abuse at Abu Ghraib was but a small part of a larger story and, as alluded to by Hersh, without understanding the machinations behind these patterns it is not possible to grasp their wider significance. As well as containing numerous types of sites, the US military detention system in Iraq saw the interaction between numerous actors. The actor that anchored the system was the US Army, however, numerous other actors played crucial roles within it; these included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and private corporations. Understanding the behaviour and roles 3

Peter Finn of, as well as the interaction between, these various actors is key to conceptualising how the system functioned. To deal with these issues of conception and understanding this piece will present an analytical framework designed to help one begin to understand the differences between actors, the effects that these differences had on behaviour and the value these differences have for those responsible for the deployment of US power. Drawing on literature related to the development of the private military contractor (PMC) outsourcing industry in the postCold War era, this piece will develop a framework that enables the actions of, and interactions between, the various actors within the system to be understood. Building on research into the outsourcing phenomena that enables one to get a handle on its development, this work will illuminate how a variation on the phenomena, which this piece shall label insourcing, can help one understand the roles played by various actors of the US government within the US military detention system in Iraq. This work will draw distinctions between three types of actors. As the actor in overall control of the lions share of the system, the US Army will be labelle d the main actor. Actors external to the US government will be said to be outsourcing actors and those that form part of the US government but are separate entities to the US Army will be labelled as insourcing actors. Firstly, the main actor framework will be examined. This will be done with an examination of the core capture, transport and detention functions of the system that were provided by the US Army. This process will provide the groundwork for the examination of other actors. Next, this outsourcing/insourcing dichotomy will be illuminated, with particular attention being paid to the similarities between the two phenomena. Throughout the piece, allegations of abuse will be drawn upon to illuminate discussions.

Main Actor: US Army

Peter Finn Bureaucratic structures, such as a detention system (regardless of whether they are part of a states foreign policy operations or not) tend to have a single overriding body that is responsible for the overall command and control of the system. The level of consistency of operation across such structures can relate, in part, to the ability and will of the central body to implement consistent procedures amongst its own personnel, along with its ability to dictate similar codes of operation to those who interact with and operate within the structure but do not fall under the direct control of the central authority. In the case of the US military detention system in Iraq, the body in overall control of the system was the US Army. As already mentioned, following the Abu Ghraib scandal TF134 was created to oversee the system; however, this did not mean that those in other parts of the US Army ceased having contact with DTNs or the system itself. The tasks related to detention operations carried out by those working in various roles within the Army, both before and after the creation of TF134, included front line soldiers who took DTNs into custody, those who were involved in transporting convoys containing DTNs between detention sites and those working for brigades dedicated to running larger detention sites such as Abu Ghraib. It is these three core functions (capture, transportation & detention) that form the backbone of the operations carried out within the US military system in Iraq. Without such operations other facets of the system such as interrogation would not take place. This piece will now examine examples of US Army personnel involved in these three core operations and illuminate how the system would not have functioned effectively without them.

Detainee Capture

At 22:45 on the evening of the 3 rd of January 2004 two Iraqi males reached a checkpoint in Samarra, Iraq. They were warned that curfew was about to begin (2300 hours) 5

Peter Finn but were released when they indicated they were close to home and would make it on time. After driving away from the checkpoint they were stopped by US soldiers, asked for identification, let go and then stopped again and detained by the same soldiers. They were put into a Bradley fighting vehicle, their hands zip-tied behind their backs. The US soldiers in the Bradley fighting vehicle drove to a nearby bridge that crossed the Tigris River. The platoon leader ordered three soldiers under his command to push the detainees into the river. One soldier, a specialist, refused to take part and acted as a guard instead. The zip-ties were removed from the two DTNs who were then pushed into the Tigris from the bridge. Following this, the soldiers returned to their vehicle and returned to their Forward Operating Base. One of the former DTNs managed to make his way to the river bank; however, the other former DTN could not swim and drowned.

All information from (Department of the Army 1 2004)

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The events of the 3rd of January 2004 at Samarra Bridge illuminate the central role that frontline US Army personnel played within the US military detention system in Iraq. The initial choice to take the Iraqi men into custody meant that the soldiers then had to decide how to treat the men in their custody and, as turned out not to be the case in this instance, whether to hold them within the system for a prolonged period of time. The decision to push the DTNs of the bridge illuminates the inability, or unwillingness, of the US Army as the central authority within the system to adequately control the actions of those personnel

Peter Finn operating within its chain of command. This lack of control over the chain of command is highlighted by the fact that three members of the platoon were directed to push the DTNs into the river by the platoon leader, thus revealing an inversion of the use of the chain of command to prevent instances of abuse happening. Finally, the events at Samarra Bridge demonstrate that the abusive act of pushing the DTNs of the bridge is secondary to the act of detention itself as, without having been taken into custody in the first place, the DTNs would not have been exposed to the actions of the US soldiers. As already alluded to, by the summer of 2005 the US military detention system in Iraq housed over 10,000 DTNs (Moss 2006). Many of these DTNs were captured by US Army personnel in places such as Samarra and on patrols such as the one that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 (BBC 2003). Without a constant flow of DTNs captured by frontline forces, the system itself would not have evolved at the speed it did. As such, the actions of frontline forces were central to providing the lifeblood of the system and to determining its size and scope.

Detainee Transport

On the 12th of May 2003 a number of US soldiers including Master Sergeant Lisa Girman, Sergeant Scott McKenzie and Specialist Tim Canjar were involved in transferring Iraqi DTNs in a bus from Talil Airbase, Iraq, to Camp Bucca. Girman, McKenzie and Canjar were discharged from the US Army due to allegations of abuse related to the transfer and the fact that they colluded to prevent full details of the events related to the abuse coming to light. The abuse took place during the transfer and during the unloading of the DTNs at Camp Bucca.

Peter Finn The abuse metered out to DTNs by, among others, Girman, McKenzie & Canjar included the kicking of a DTN in the groin, abdomen, and head, the kicking and punching and the dragging around by the armpits of a DTN and the kicking in the leg and face of a DTN. It is alleged that one of the DTNs subject to abuse was targeted because he was accused of multiple rapes. Girman was accused of encouraging a potential subject and/or witness to the case not to take a polygraph examination and of winking at them while telling him that h e did not see anything regarding the maltreatment of the Iraqi prisoners of war. In a document entitled Allegations of Detainee Abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan the potential involvement of other US personnel in the abuse is alluded to. The document, which lists a number of allegations of abuse in both theatres of combat, states that:

On 12 May 03, at Camp Bucca, Iraq, ten USAR enlisted MP soldier physically assaulted seven Iraqi detainees during in-processing at the facility.

As such, although Girman, McKenzie & Canjar were formally punished for the events related to the prisoner transfer to Camp Bucca on the 12 th of May 2003, it is possible that others were also involved in the multiple instances of abuse discussed above. Girman, McKenzie & Canjar, despite accepting being discharged over the abuse, all deny that their conduct constituted abuse and claim they acted in self-defence.

All information from (CNN 2004; Department of the Army 2 2004; Department of the Army 1 2005). ---8

Peter Finn

The events of the 12th of May 2003, coming less than two months after the initial invasion of Iraq, illuminate that, even in the early stages of the Iraq War the US Army had failed, either by fault or design, to adequately train its personnel in the treatment of DTNs. The fact that the assaults were potentially carried out by up to ten members of the US Army against seven DTNs demonstrates the permissive nature of the culture that surrounded this particular DTN transport mission. Moreover, the fact that Girman, McKenzie & Canjar colluded to prevent the full extent of events coming to light would further indicate that they had not been adequately trained in the serious nature of DTN abuse or the obstruction of justice. Finally, as with the events in Samarra, the abuse of the DTNs came about from the lack of strictly observed parameters for DTN transportation. Thus illuminating that the abuse itself was a consequence of the manner in which the core function of transportation was carried out. From the point view of those who ran the US military detention system, however, the ability to circulate DTNs within it, regardless of whether abuse took place or not, offered a key tool that greatly enhanced its flexibility. Such transportation missions could, for instance, be used to move DTNs from smaller FOBs after their capture and initial detention to larger facilities such as Camp Bucca, to move DTNs to Abu Ghraib after its interrogation and intelligence capabilities were ramped up or to move DTNs between sites to deal with practical considerations such as overcrowding and rioting (Joint Training Readiness Center 2003; Karpinski & Strasser 2005: 185-190). As the system grew, the ability of the US Army to deal with a growing DTN population would have been aided significantly by the ability to determine when, where and for how long DTNs were held.

Detainee Detention

Peter Finn In late November 2003 a riot broke out at Camp Ganci, a section of the wider Abu Ghraib complex. The captain of the 320th US Army Military Police Company, whose company was stationed at Abu Ghraib at the time, noted that a total of four rioters [were] killed that day in order to calm the riot. He further went on to state that [o]ne of my soldiers killed an Iraqi rioter after expending his non-lethal rounds. The captain also noted that [t]here were a number of my soldiers injured that day and that The ROE [rules of engagement] was adjusted after the incident, so that the MP's could go to lethal force a lot sooner. (Matrangelo 2004) On the 3rd of August 2003 at Camp Cropper an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody, no autopsy was conducted, and the body released for burial. The manner of the death was classified as undetermined, with no greater clarity as to the cause of death [] expected as no forensic examination of the body was conducted . (Department of Defense 2004) On the 11th of September 2003 at FOB Packhorse an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. The fatality occurred when an enlisted soldier on guard duty, failed to follow the ROE and shot the detainee. The DTN had been throwing rocks. (Department of Defense 2004) On the 9th of December 2003 at the 2nd Brigade detention facility in Mosul an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. An autopsy was not carried out, but the body did not exhibit signs of abuse or foul play. The death was classified as undetermined, with no greater clarity as to the cause of death expected. (Department of Defense 2004) On the 4th of January 2004 a former Iraqi Army Lieutenant Colonel was taken into custody [] [and] was subsequently placed in an isolation cell and questioned at least two times in ensuing days. The US Armys Criminal Investigation Command was notified of his suspicious death on the 9th of January. An examination of his body on the 11 th of January revealed extensive bruising on his upper body. A subsequent autopsy indicated that the 10

Peter Finn cause of death was blunt force injuries and asphyxia, with the manner of death listed as homicide. (Department of Defense 2004)

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The five DTN deaths described above are broadly reflective of those that took place across the US military detention system. DTN fatalities took place at a number of detention sites and came about for a number of reasons. The causes of some fatalities, such as the shootings described above, are known while the reasons for others are not. This research has currently documented over 70 DTN deaths that took place between the 29th of March 2003 and the 14th of June 2004. As with the abuse that DTNs were subject to at capture and during transportation, a number of the fatalities within the US military detention system illustrate either a lack of awareness of, or a refusal or inability to follow, standard operating procedures. Yet, for those attempting to understand how the US military detention system played into the wider parameters of US power in Iraq, the description of the five fatalities above is exceedingly revealing. Firstly they demonstrate that the US had various types of sites, from small FOBs through to large complexes that were used to house DTNs. Secondly they highlight that these sites were spread across broad swathes of Iraq, from Mosul in the north to Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib in the vicinity of Baghdad. Thirdly, the DTN fatalities described above illuminate some of the practicalities, from dealing with riots to the disposing of bodies, that dogged the system. Just as importantly, they show that these problems manifest themselves across the system at various times and places rather than being selfcontained and isolated issues. Fourthly, the descriptions of the above fatalities reveal some of the methods of control, from isolation cells to the use of lethal force, that were utilised within the system. 11

Peter Finn

The US Military Detention System

When examined as a whole, the core of the US military detention system operated by the US Army illuminates the lack of control and fail-safes to prevent DTN abuse. This is true across all three core functions of capture, transport and detention and between time and place. The use of the chain of command to direct abuse and the evidence of collusion to prevent knowledge of events seeing the light of day in separate incidents help put paid to the myth that events at Abu Ghraib were carried out by bad apples and were not reflective of wider events. However, when viewed in a wider context, the flaws described above do not necessarily take away from the effectiveness of the system itself, if one is thinking in terms of US power. The muddied understandings of, or plain disregard for, the importance of preventing DTN abuse may have played into the hands of the other actors who plugged into the system. As will be discussed in more detail later, the differences in, and sometimes misunderstanding or misrepresentations of the legal frameworks and chains of command that various actors were working to was exploited. The detention system run by the US Army allowed the US to control a substantial population of DTNs in Iraq. This, in turn, provided an outlet for those DTNs captured by frontline forces who could, in theory, be exploited for their intelligence value. Much of this attempted intelligence exploitation was carried out by the other actors within the system, however, without the core competencies of capture, transport and detention carried out by the US Army the other actors, whether they were outsourcers or insourcers, would not have had a system to plug into.

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Peter Finn Outsourcing & Insourcing

Outsourcing of military functions has been an important facet of the post-Cold War world. The tasks carried out by PMCs in Iraq and in the wider WOT are exceedingly varied. At one end of the spectrum they encompass logistical and administrative tasks previously carried out by military personnel such as the running of catering facilities for US troops, while at the other end contractors have engaged in fire-fights (Chatterjee 2004 16; Scahill 2008: Loc 113-214). This variety in roles is reflected in the Quarterly Contractor Census Reports that are published by CENTCOM. The August 2008 version of this report, for instance, reveals that the US DOD had 162,428 contractors working on its behalf in Iraq at this time (CENTCOM 2008). Off this number, 55% were working as 'Base Support', 22% were working within 'Construction', 5% were working within 'Translator/Interpreter' services, 5% were working within Transportation' , 6% were working within 'Security' roles, 2% were working within 'Communication Support' while the final 5% were classified as 'Other'. 29,611 of these contractors were US citizen, 62,650 where classified as 'Third Country Nationals' while 70,167 were Iraqi nationals (CENTCOM 2008). The US DOD classified 7,704 out of the 162,428 as contractors who would perform 'personal security, convoy security and static security mission', of which 7,121 were armed (CENTCOM 2008). By contrast, according to the Congressional Research Service the average monthly Boots on the Ground total for US forces in Iraq in 2008 was 157,800 (Belasco 2009: 9). In other words, in August 2008 the total number of contractors working just for the US DOD exceeded the total number of troops under the DODs command in the country. The full scope and scale of PMC engagement in Iraq was laid bare by analysis carried out in March 2013 by the Financial Times which showed that, as a conservative estimate, PMCs have made at least $138 billion in contracts related to Iraq awarded directly by the US government since the invasion by the US and its partners in March 2003. Some of

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Peter Finn the largest earners included Kellog Brown and Root, which made at least $39.5 billion, Agility, which completed contracts equal to at least $7.4 billion, Dyncorp, which took at least $4.1 billion, and Blackwater, which booked at least $1.3 billion of contracts. The Financial Times drew its information directly from Federal Procurement Data. (Fifield 2013: 1/5)

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Two important facets of US foreign policy are the differentiation between and interaction of the various institutional actors within the USs governmental bureaucracy that are responsible for the implementation of foreign policy. Understanding this differentiation and interaction is often key to a full understanding of events. The example of the removal of Geneva Convention rights from suspected members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks help illuminate this point. On February the 7th 2002 President George W. Bush issued a declaration to his senior staff that members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were unlawful combatants who were not entitled to the protections normally afforded Prisoners of War under the Geneva Conventions (Bush 2002). This legal framework quickly filtered down into policy construction. This filtering down is illustrated by a memo, dated 1st of August 2002, by Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, which recommended the adoption of ten techniques ( 1. Attention grasp 2. Walling 3. Facial hold 4. Facial slap (insult slap) 5. Cramped confinement 6. Wall standing 7. Stress positions 8. Sleep deprivation 9. Insects placed in a confinement box 10. The waterboard) to be used during the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah at Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba (Bybee 2002: 2). As well as being held at Guantanamo Bay, Zubaydah was also held at numerous sites in places such as Thailand, Poland and Morocco and rendered between these sites within the CIA rendition system (The Rendition Project 2012). This memo, along with numerous others by members of the Bush 14

Peter Finn administration such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, aided in the application of repressive policies and the removal of the legal rights of DTNs (Rumsfeld 2002). By all buying into the same narrative the head of the executive, those in the upper echelons of the justice department and head of the DOD combined to help construct a situation that allowed the CIA to run a system of extraordinary rendition that feed the Guantanamo bay detention site run by the US Navy, both of which contravene international law in their operation. Understanding the differentiations and interactions between the various bodies involved in this process aids a deeper understanding of these events. Moreover, when one begins to examine the differentiations and interactions between various government agencies responsible for the implementation of US foreign policy, many of the parameters present in outsourcing are reflected in bureaucratic structures that draw on other sections of the US government to provide capabilities and capacities not present in the lead actor. When considered through such a prism, the globe straddling rendition system run by the CIA can be seen as the main actor and the US Navy, which pitched in its Cuban base, as being an actor who made up the shortfall in the capabilities of the intelligence agency. Or, put another way, the US Navy acted as an insourcing institution for the CIA. This piece will now move on to examine the manner in which the phenomena of outsourcing and insourcing reflect one another.

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Outsourcing to PMCs can have, or is at least perceived to have, numerous, often interrelated, benefits for those states that choose to engage in the practice. These benefits include the ability to draw on PMCs as force multipliers and capability multipliers, the ability to deploy additional force with political cover, the ability to exploit the muddied legal structures that govern PMCs, the ability to exploit the opacity of the operations of many 15

Peter Finn PMCs and, perhaps most obvious, the potential economic benefit of outsourcing military and security functions. Interestingly, however, many of the same benefits can arise from insourcing into bureaucratic systems such as the US military detention system run by the US Army in Iraq.

Table 1 Some Outsourcing Benefits for States Force Multiplier Capability Multiplier Political Cover Legal Cover Opacity of Operation Economic Efficiency Outsourcing Y Y Y Y Y Y Insourcing Y Y Y Y Y N

(Avant 2010; Singer 2008; Stranger & Williams 2006)

As highlighted by Table 1, insourcing offers the potential for main actors and policy makers to benefit from many of the characteristics that are often discussed as being benefits to states who engage in outsourcing. As such, it offers the advantage of flexibility for those shaping manifestation of US power, as the myriad of options offered by the many combinations of the numerous actors can be deployed and altered. The insourcing that took place within the US military detention system in Iraq was reflective of this flexibility. This piece will now move on to examine how outsourcing and insourcing actors offer the possibility of many of the same benefits to those implementing US power. It will do so largely by the examination of outsourcing and insourcing within the US military detention system in

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Peter Finn Iraq. However, before doing so, this piece will briefly lay out the perceived economic efficiencies that are derived from the use of PMCs by states.

Economic Efficiency

While those working for PMCs can gain attractive salaries, the perceived economic benefit derived from their use flows from the ability of PMC firms to act in an agile manner in the market place (Spear 2006: 20). Such firms are able to compete in national, regional and global markets for staff and military hardware and, unlike standing militaries, they do not have to pay for the long-term upkeep of a force once a contract is finished (Singer 2008: 101-118). As such, PMCs do not have to worry about paying enduring costs such as medical bills or pensions. Nor do they have to concern themselves with maintaining large stocks of ammunition, logistical supplies or permanent staff as all of these can be procured from the open market to suit each individual contract or mission. It is by passing on such savings, minus their profits, to states that hire them that PMCs are said to be able to benefit the bottom lines of governments looking to operate in the complex, budget sensitive atmosphere, of the post-Cold War era.

Force Multiplier

In the post-Cold War world, many governments cut the military forces at their disposal as the bipolar US-Soviet Union conflict receded from the international stage. As Zamparelli notes:

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Peter Finn During the 12 years between the end of the Cold War and the year 2001, the DOD cut approximately thirty-five percent of its uniformed positions. Going along with this reduction in uniformed personnel, during the same period the DOD has cut slightly more than thirtyseven percent of its civilian workforce. (Zamoarelli in Hennefer 2008: 37).

This reduction in capabilities left a gap that has been filled in recent conflicts by PMCs who have rushed into the vacuum left by the reduction in state forces and, as Hennefer notes, this gap [] has required the [US] military to outsource not only in the area of logistics, but other key areas including: intelligence analysis, interrogation, detainment and systems maintenance (Hennefer 2008: 37). This rise in the number of PMC personnel has been incredibly stark, leading Geraghty to point out that:

During the first Gulf War in 1991, the ratio of freelancer soldiers to regulars was, at b est, 1:50. During the 2003 invasion it was 1:10. The numbers increased after that. The total rose during 2004 to around 30,000, of whom 14,000 were Iraqi Armed guards. (Geraghty 2009: 188)

In short, PMCs have been drawn on by the US, as well as other states, to fill the hole in their military capabilities left by the post-Cold War troop drain. This reality fed into the operation of the US military detention system in Iraq and in the summer of 2003 the US government turned to a private corporation, CACI, to act as a force multiplier for its interrogation operations within the system. In the summer of 2003 the need for intelligence in Iraq outstripped the US militarys ability to produce it. Put simply it was, according to the US Government Accounting Office

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Peter Finn (GAO), an extraordinary-a wartime environment and an atmosphere of turmoil and urgency (Government Accounting Office 2005). To rectify the problem the US government turned to outside contractors in order to obtain interrogation and other services quickly ( Government Accounting Office 2005). In August of 2003 CACI was asked on behalf of the US military's Combined Joint Task Force 7, which had operational control of troops in Iraq at the time, to provide intelligence support and logistical services in Iraq; the contract for this work was renewed in December 2003 (Harris 2004; London 2008: XV). As such, the outsourcing capabilities of CACI were drawn on to quickly multiply the interrogation capabilities within the US military detention system in Iraq.

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However, CACI was not the only actor that was drawn on to supplement the interrogation capabilities of the US Army. The DIA, along with other bodies such as the CIA, were also utilised, as the following discussion of abuse makes clear.

Around the 11th of May 2004 an intelligence officer of the DIA witnessed what he characterised as the mistreatment of a DTN. This occurred during the initial interrogation of the DTN after capture. During this interrogation four or five non-interrogator personnel arrived in the room and began slapping the detainee while he was attempting to respond to the questioning. (US Government 2004) After about fifteen minutes a senior NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] going by call sign 'XO3' entered the room and asked most of the personnel to leave, to include ALL of the interrogators. The DIA intelligence officer states that they were not aware of what specifically occurred during [their] absence from the interrogation room. It is also noted that another officer, whose name is redacted, was also present at the incident. (US Government 2004)

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Peter Finn

This example highlights how other actors, such as the DIA, plugged into the system operated by the US Army and were drawn on to interrogate suspects. By doing so they, like CACI, acted as a force multiplayer that allowed the system to operate at a higher capacity than if they had not been present.

Capability Multiplier

As well as acting as force multipliers for capabilities that need extending, PMCs also offer militaries the opportunity to contract for services that they have little or no expertise in. In the US military detention system in Iraq the Titan Corporation was drawn on to provide interpreter and translation services. It began providing such services to the US government in 1999. Titans previous work included translation and inte rpretation services at Guantanamo (Hettana 2002; Titan Corporation 2004). The operations carried out in Iraq by Titan were on a much larger scale than those of CACI, with the number of interpreters and translators contracted by the firm being well into the thousands; this was highlighted by the fact that by May 2005 Titan had over 4,000 linguists working in Iraq, although it must be noted that not all of them worked strictly within the US military detention system (AP 2005). Titan was involved in the interrogation of DTNs at various sites, the initial detention of DTNs while working alongside US combat forces at numerous locations throughout Iraq, the translation of documents at various sites and its contractors have been implicated in the abuse of DTNs at a number of locations (Corpwatch 2008: 18-19; Formica Report: Annex 41 2004/2: 3-4; US Army Criminal Investigation Command 2004,5/1: 8-9). Those working for Titan in Iraq were from Iraq, Turkey the US and other states (AP 2005; Calbreath 2004). By drawing on a global pool of contractors Titan was able to act as an outsourcing capability multiplier in the area of language translation and interpretation. This capability 20

Peter Finn multiplication took place both inside and outside of the military detention system and saw Titans contractors engaged in tasks that were crucial to both the detention system itself and the wider mission of the US in Iraq.

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Between March and July 2003 FBI agents were deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to focus on the collection, analysis, and exploitation of documents collected from many former Iraqi Intelligence Service sites in Ira q (US Department of Justice 2009: 38). However, following this period the FBIs activities in Iraq included (1) detainee interviews; (2) the collection of biometric information from detainees; and (3) participation in a limited number of military sensitive site exploitation missions as well as investigations of bombings, murders, and kidnappings involving American citizens in Iraq (US Department of Justice 2009: 38). While most of these functions, such as interviewing DTNs, could be considered as force multiplication functions the collection of biometric data, which took place within the system run by the US Army, could be considered a capability multiplier within the system (US Department of Justice 2009: 43). The possibility of the capability multiplier role of the collection of biometric information can be ascertained by a 2009 review of FBI detainee operations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq which stated, with reference to the biometric data the FBI collected in Afghanistan, that the FBI also collected and disseminated to other agencies detainee biometric information such as fingerprints, DNA samples and standard photographs (US Department of Justice 2009: 26). This is not to suggest that other agencies did not collect such data, in either Iraq or Afghanistan, however, it does seem to imply that the FBI was particularly adept at specialising in its collection. This implication is heightened when one considers the fact that the FBI was specifically brought in to collect such data on Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK) fighters held at Camp Ashraf in Eastern Iraq. Of the approximately 3,800 members of the MEK, an anti21

Peter Finn Iranian paramilitary group designated as a terrorist organization by the State Department in 1997, held at Camp Ashraf FBI personnel biometrically processed some 3,600 MEK detainees between November 2003 and January 2004 (US Department of Justice 2009: 43). If FBI personnel were not particularly adept, or at least perceived as being so, at the collection and analysis of such data, it would seem strange that scarce resources would be wasted by assigning them the collection of biometric data. As such, it seems safe to assert that the insourcing of these skills into the operation of the US military detention system in Iraq acted as a capability multiplier similar to the introduction of translation and interpretation services provided by Titan. Yet, it is vital to bear in mind that the FBI would not have been able to insource such services, had the system itself not been constructed, maintained and operated by the main actor, the US Army.

Political Cover

The development in the post-Cold War era of the PMC industry has provided a policy tool for politicians worried about the political consequences of their favoured foreign policy choices. During the Iraq war as a whole, as Peter Singer notes, the PMC industry offered the potential backstop of additional forces but at no political cost (Singer 2008: 245). Moreover, as Singer moves on to point out there was no outcry when contractors were called up and deployed. [] [I]f the grad ual death toll among American troops threatened to slowly wear down the Presidents approval ratings, contractor casualties were not counted in official death tolls and had no impact on these ratings (Singer 2008: 245). As well as other benefits such as force and capacity multiplication, PMCs in Iraq offered the Bush administration the ability to pursue its preferred policy without having to draw as extensively as it otherwise might have done on politically sensitive state military forces. As already discussed, the US military detention system in Iraq was not immune from the use of PMC forces. CACI had at least 55 contractors within the system as part of its 22

Peter Finn original contract who worked as screeners, interrogators and site leads (London 2008: 97). Moreover, Titan had thousands of contractors working as translators and interpreters, a large number of which were working either directly within detention sites or went out on missions with frontline US Army personnel that could lead to the capture of DTNs (AP 2005). As such, the US military detention system in Iraq was able to benefit from the same political cover afforded to other US operations in Iraq. As a result of outsourcing, both the force and capability of the system was increased without any concurrent rise in political consequences for the Bush administration.

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The potential for political cover can also be afforded by insourcing. By inserting themselves into existing systems provided by other governmental actors, insourcing actors can attempt to operate under the radar and prevent their actions coming to light. Such a tactic was used by the CIA within the US military detention system in Iraq and came to light as a result of the investigations that followed the Abu Ghraib scandal. Despite the fact that it was housing DTNs within the system the CIA did not follow the established procedures for detainee in-processing. This led to confusion regarding DTNs who were unidentified or unaccounted for and detention operations at large were impacted because personnel at the operations level were uncertain how to report them or how to classify them, or how to database them. Such DTNs were known by US Army personnel as Ghost detainees and created a mystique around CIA operations. (Fay & Jones 2004: 44/53) According to the Fay-Jones Report into events at Abu Ghraib [t]he CIAs detention and interrogation practices contributed to a loss of accountability and abuse at Abu Ghraib (Fay & Jones 2004: 9). Moreover, as [n]o memorandum of understanding existed on the 23

Peter Finn subject interrogation operations between the CIA and CJTF-7 [] CIA officers convinced military leaders that they should be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and procedures (Fay & Jones 2004: 9). The actions of the CIA within Iraq illuminate how an insourcing actor with access to a system can circumvent safeguards and procedures. If, for instance, events at Abu Ghraib had not come to light then the CIA would have been able to piggyback on the detention capacity provided by the US Army and would have utilised this capacity to abuse DTNs as part of its intelligence gathering strategy and, most importantly, would have done so without passing on any of the potential negative political consequences to the political leadership of the US. Such an actor could be exceedingly useful to those wanting to make use of a politically explosive policy while keeping the details out of the public eye.

Legal Cover

The opaque nature of the PMC outsourcing industry makes it hard to fully examine, and raises many questions regarding domestic accountability. In part these issues stem from a lack of legal frameworks designed to clearly regulate and police contracted military personnel. As Stephanie Kang notes:

The ambiguous nature of the private security industry has significant implications for foreign policy and the laws that apply to such a lucrative market. Due to the difficulty of identifying and classifying PSCs, the issue of maintaining accountability in such a market becomes even more difficult. (Kang 2013: 37)

These issues are as true for the PMC contractors that worked within the US military detention system in Iraq as elsewhere. After the Abu Ghraib scandal, a number of Titan and CACI employees working at the site were mentioned, either by name or in code, in a number of the investigations that 24

Peter Finn followed (Fay & Jones 2004: 40; Taguba 2004: 17). These revelations led to court cases being brought against the corporations in the US. One of the key points of dispute between the counsel for DTNs held in the system and the representatives of CACI and Titan relates to the chain of command the interrogators were working under; with counsel for the corporations arguing that they were embedded in the US military chain of command and the DTNs representatives claiming that they took orders from the CACI and Titan corporate structures (Robertson 2007: 8/19). The Titan case was brought to a close in 2012 via an out of court settlement when Engility Holdings, Inc, a company that inherited the law suit via a series of mergers and acquisitions, and 72 plaintiffs agreed to resolve and dismiss the action in return for a payment of $5.28 million, this payment was accrued as of September 28, 2012 and paid in October 2012 (Engility Holdings, Inc 2012). As of June 2013 the CACI case is on-going, with a number of motions related to the case currently under consideration by a judge (CCR 2013). The potential cover afforded by these legal ambiguities to those drawing on military outsourcing services is, potentially, huge. With no clear legal structures in place contractors can be hired to act with relative impunity and, hypothetically, deployed to do things that members of the more accountable military cannot. As Singer notes

Private military firms may be part of the military operation, but they and their employees are not part of the military - nor its chain of command or code of justice. (Singer 2008: 251)

It is in this grey area of operation alluded to by Singer that the potential for legal cover exists.

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The numerous US government actors involved in detention and interrogation operations in Iraq worked to differing standard operating procedures. The difference between the procedures utilised by the US military and the FBI was highlighted by an FBI 25

Peter Finn memo from May 2004. This memo noted that the bureau had made its concerns related to the coercive and aggressive techniques utilised by US military personnel in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq clear to Miller, by that point no longer based at Guantanamo but in Iraq as the head of TF134 (FBI 2004). The memo went on to note that in each location where FBI staff had been questioned as part of an internal FBI surve y they had been aware of rumors of abuse which have surfaced as a direct result of pending Military investigations into abusive interrogation techniques (FBI 2004). However, despite these concerns, a reluctance to take part in the investigation of abuses that may have flowed from the use of such coercive and aggressive techniques existed among FBI personnel. A January 2004 email to FBI agent Gary Bald, but copied to a number of other FBI personnel, from FBI agent Edward Lueckenhoff stated that unless instructed otherwise by FBIHQ the FBI in Iraq would not enter into an investigation of the alleged abuse at Abu Ghraib (Lueckenhoff 2004). The reasoning behind Lueckenhoffs assertion was twofold. Firstly, Lueckenhoff believed that the topic was outside our [the FBIs] mission and that pursuing it would see the bureau squander resources (Lueckenhoff 2004). Secondly, however, Lueckenhoff stated that it was in the FBI s interest to maintain good will and relations with those operating the prison and that any involvement by the bureau in such an investigation of the alleged abuse might harm our liaison ( Lueckenhoff 2004). The first part of the reasoning laid out above would seem to illuminate the operation of a chain of command, with Lueckenhoff wanting to wait until directed by his superiors before directing scarce FBI resources toward an investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib. However, the second part of his reasoning is incredibly revealing. It highlights the machinations and manoeuvring related to the investigation of such allegations. While the FBI was in theory an independent actor that, at times, felt able to make clear its concerns over the interrogation techniques being utilised by the US military, its position as an insourced actor made it dependant on the continued largesse of the US Army, the main actor within the system. By stating that he felt that one of the main investigative bodies of the 26

Peter Finn US government should not pursue an investigation in order to maintain good relations with those running a detention site at the centre of serious abuse allegations, Lueckenhoff demonstrated the kind of thinking that could be utilised by those looking to leverage legal cover for past, present or future operations that deviate from legal norms and procedures.

Opacity of Operation

As already noted, PMCs offer the possibility of legal cover and the chance to reduce the potential political costs to those choosing to use military force. These benefits are, at least in part, related to the opaque nature of some PMC operations. This opacity makes it hard to fully track the development of contractors working for PMCs. This problem of tracking is not confined solely to those outside of governmental circles. Singer has stated that in 2005 he was contacted by the Pentagon to help them determine the number of contractors working in Iraq (Singer 2008: 245). While the anecdote from Singer demonstrates a lack of poor governance within the DOD, it also illuminates the complexity and opaque nature of some of the contracts issued to PMCs with operations in the country. This complexity and opacity could be exploited by policy makers wanting to outsource a policy in order to avoid the political and legal consequences of it. This opacity is reflected in the operations of CACI in Iraq. Despite the fact that in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal the company went on the offensive to defend itself (via an aggressive campaign that culminated in 2008 with the publication of a 780 page book entitled Our Good Name: A Companys Fight to Defend its Honour and Get the Truth Told About Abu Ghraib which was replete with photos, timelines and appendices) the true extent of CACIs operations in Iraq is hard to discern (London 2008: 1 -780). CACI operated at numerous sites other than Abu Ghraib in Iraq. These included sites in Fallujah and at Baghdad International Airport, however, information about such operations must be reconstructed together in a piece meal fashion from disparate sources (Anderson 2003; Fair 27

Peter Finn 2007). These sources include news articles and confessional pieces by former CACI contractor Eric Fair, who has admitted to abusing a DTN in Fallujah (Fair 2007). While vigorously defending itself from any wrongdoing in its book, CACI does not refer to its other operations in Iraq. As such, great opacity remains about CACI operations in Iraq. The fact that CACI has been able to maintain this opacity in the light of great public scrutiny and almost a decade of legal proceedings is tantamount to the attraction that utilising PMCs might offer to policy makers looking to implement controversial policies.

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The myriad of actors involved in the implementation of US foreign policy mean that opportunities exist for exploitation and misinformation. In a survey of FBI agents working at Guantanamo, 20 said they had information regarding non-FBI personnel impersonating FBI agents, with one agent stating that she had personally observed this conduct (US Department of Justice 2009: 200). This agent was deployed to GTMO from December 2003 through September 2004 and claimed to have been present on two occasions when a CIA interrogator represented herself as an FBI agent in a detainee interrogation (US Department of Justice 2009: 200). Such impersonation and misinformation may also have taken place within the US military detention system in Iraq. The US Justice Department stated that [s]ome agents reported in [] survey responses that they had heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves as FBI agents and that [f]ive FBI agents reported that they heard about the impersonation of FBI personnel in Iraq, but none stated that they ever observed such conduct (US Department of Justice 2009: 200).

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Peter Finn . Such impersonation and misinformation offers the possibility of the exploitation of the

differences between actors within a system; be they the main actor, outsourcers or insourcers. The carrying out of actions under incorrect names, aliases or under the false auspicious of another actor could add a similar level of opacity to the operations of those employed by the US government that are often associated with the actions of those contracted by PMCs. Moreover, the adoption of such smoke screens by insourcing actors, if they could be maintained, could add an extra layer of legal cover and deniability to an operation or policy.

Main Actors, Outsourcers, Insources and US Power

The US military detention system in Iraq was a complex, multifaceted and ever evolving structure that drew on the input of numerous actors. It was integral to the manifestation of US influence in the country and, as a consequence, within the Middle East as a whole. Understanding its operation, and the contributions that numerous actors made to it, can help one comprehend how US power manifested itself in the aftermath of 9/11. The model developed in this piece provides a structured understanding of the US military detention system in Iraq. It helps illuminate the importance of the operational and developmental role played by the US Army, and highlights the importance of core competencies. On a number of occasions this piece demonstrated how these core functions were key to facilitating other, sometimes more controversial, facets of the system such as abuse and interrogation. Without an understanding of this facilitation function, much of the context for the numerous instances of abuse discussed in this piece would be missing. The outsourcing/insourcing actor dichotomy is key to the model introduced in this piece. While there are real and important differences between PMCs and the myriad of

29

Peter Finn actors within the foreign policy bureaucracy of the US, there can also be similarities when such US governmental actors operate as insourcers within a pre-existing bureaucracy such as the US military detention system in Iraq. Examining such similarities, regardless of whether they flow from force or capability multiplication, legal or political cover or opacity of operations, can offer important insights to those seeking to understand the workings of a system. The brief examinations of the rendition system run by the US in the post 9/11 era seem to suggest that the model introduced in this piece could be drawn on to gain insights into other manifestations of the USs foreign policy bureaucracy. Manifestations that feature a main anchoring actor and numerous secondary actors whose contribution hinges on the implementation of core functions by the main actor are likely to be of most relevance to this model.

30

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Peter Finn Engility Holdings, Inc. (2012) Quarterly Filing for the Period Ending September 28, 2012 . Available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1544229/000119312512467606/d406499d10q.htm (Accessed: 10th June 2013). Fair, E. (2007) An Iraq Interrogators Nightmare. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020801680.html (Accessed: 1st April 2013). Fay, G.; Jones, R. (2004) Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib. FBI (2004) Detainee Interviews (Aggressive Interrogation Issues). Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJFBI002657.pdf (Accessed: 10th June 2013). Fifield, A. (2013) 'US Bill to Rebuild Iraq Hits $138bn as Private Contractors Reap Profits', Financial Times, pp. 1-5. Formica Report: Annex 41 (2004/1) Formica Report: Annex 41: Agents Investigation Report. Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD056721.pdf (Accessed: 10th June 2013). Geraghty, T. (2009) Guns for Hire: The Inside Story of Freelance Soldiering. London: Portrait. Gourevitch, P. and Morris, E. (2009) Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story. London: Penguin Press. Government Accounting Office (2005) Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-201/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05201.htm Hennefer, T. (2008) Professional Military Corporations as Force Multipliers . Minapolis, MS. Capella University. Harris, S. (2004) Technology Contract Used to Purchase Interrogation Work. Available at: http://www.govexec.com/defense/2004/05/technology-contract-used-to-purchaseinterrogation-work/16742/ (Accessed: 12th April 2013). Hersh, S. (2004) Torture at Abu Ghraib. Availab+le at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact (Accessed: 21st February 2013). Hersh, S. (2005) Chain of Command. London: Penguin. Hettana, S. (2002) San Diego Firms Finds Translators for Guantanamo Interrogations Sometimes in the Phone Book. Available at: http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20020628-0649-attacks-detainees.html (Accessed: 12th April 2013).

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Peter Finn Iraq Business News (2010) $245 Deal for Iraq's Camp Bucca. Available at: http://www.iraqbusinessnews.com/2010/12/20/245m-deal-for-iraqs-camp-bucca/ (Accessed: 22nd February 2013). Jehl, D. and Schmitt, E. (2004) The Struggle for Iraq: The Military; In Abuse, a Portrayal of Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed GI's. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/09/world/struggle-for-iraq-military-abuse-portrayal-illprepared-overwhelmed-gi-s.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (Accessed: 23rd February 2013). Joint Training Readiness Center (2003) Observations from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom . Available at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD045821.pdf (Accessed: 9th June 2013). Kang, S. (2013) Private Security Companies: A Lack of Accountability . Avalable at: http://www.urop.uci.edu/journal/journal09/04_kang.pdf (Accessed: June 10th 2013). London, J. (2008) Our Good Name: A Company's Fight to Defend its Honor and Get the Truth Told About Abu Ghraib. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing. Lueckenhoff, E. (2004) Email: Allegations regarding Abu Ghurayb Prison . Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJFBI003109.pdf (Accessed: 10th June 2013). Karpinski, J. and Strasser, S. (2005) One Woman's Army: The Commanding General of Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story. New York, N.Y.: Hyperion. MacAskill, E. (2011) Guantanamo Files: US Agencies Fought Internal War Over Handling of Detainees. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/25/guantanamo-filesinternal-battle-interrogators (Accessed: 18th February 2013). Mastrangelo, M (2004). Taguba Report Annex 69: Testimony of Captain Micheal A. Mastrangelo. Commander, 310 Military Police Company . Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DODDOA002774.pdf (Accessed: 9th June 2013). Moss, M (2006) The Struggle for Iraq; Iraq's Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War. Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE4DD1331F934A25751C1A9609C8B6 3&pagewanted=all (Accessed: 8th June 2013). Phillips, J. (2010) None of us were like this Before: American Soldiers and Torture. London: Verso. Robertson, J. (2007) Memorandum Order in Ibrahim & Saleh v Titan. Available at: http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/SUMMARYJUDGMENTDECISION.pdf (Accessed: 3rd April 2013). Rowland, A. (2009) FOB Delta not just Enduring: It's Growing. Available at: http://www.stripes.com/news/fob-delta-not-just-enduring-it-s-growing-1.87915 (Accessed: 22nd January 2013). Runsfeld, D. (2002) Action Memo: Counter-Resistance Techniques. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc5.pdf (Accessed: 8th June 2013). 34

Peter Finn Simone, S. (2009) Abu Ghraib Head Finds Vindication in Newly Released Memos. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-22/us/us.torture.karpinski_1_abu-ghraib-memos-janiskarpinski?_s=PM:US (Accessed: 14th February 2013). Singer, P. (2008) Corporate Warrior: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press: London. Spear, J. (2006) Market Forces: The Political Economy of Private Military Companies . Available at: http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/531/531.pdf (Accessed: 8th June 2013). Stewart, P. (2011) U.S. Hands Last Detainee over to Iraq. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/16/us-usa-iraq-detainee-idUSTRE7BF1O020111216 (Accessed: 20th February 2013). Stanger, A.; Williams, M. (2006) Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Volume 2: Issue 1. Pp.4-19. Taguba, A. (2004) Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade. Available at: http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (Accessed: 10th June 2013). The Guardian (2011) Torture Scandal: The Images that Shamed America. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,1211872,00.html (Accessed: 7th June 2013). The Rendition Project (2013) Abu Zubaydah Profile. Available at: http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/global-rendition/the-detainees/abu-zubaydah.html (Accessed: June 9th 2013). Titan Corporation (2004) Titan is Awarded New INSCOM Linguist Support Contract. Available at: http://www.sddt.com/finance/article.cfm?SourceCode=20040920tqb&_t=Titan+is+awarded+ new+INSCOM+linguist+support+contract#.UWqGUbXvthx (Accessed: 5th April 2013). UNHCR (2002) Iraq: History of Abu-Ghraib Prison, Whether it Still Exists. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,IRQ,,3df4be4c24,0.html (Accessed: 20th February 2013). US Army Criminal Investigation Command (2004,5/1) US Army Criminal Investigation Command Investigation: ACLU-RDI 1819. Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOD044031.pdf (Accessed 10th June 2013). US Department of Justice (2009). A Review of the FBIs Involvement in and Observation of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bar, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/doj_oig_report_as_reprocessed_for_200 91030.pdf (Accessed: 10th June 2013). US Government (2004) Memorandum for Record: Report of Violations of the Geneva Conventions and the International Laws of Land Warfare (U). Available at: http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DODDIA000172.pdf (Accessed: 23rd February 2013).

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