Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
0 0
1
-...
.._.. -
MARYLAND 1984-99 52 $87,179,371 2 15 1408
-'.'. ,'-'
.. ._.. - .. --_...... ' .. .. , .
_. ..
r
.. -.. .
MASSACHUSET
1985-99
I
54 $5,532,675 9 29 1,535
ITS
. - -_ .. - ..
MICHIGAN 1984-99 132 $20,851,045 15 54 42,444
.. . _.
-
._ .
-
.. _.
"-"-
.. .. -. .. _.
MINNESOTA 198499 85 $7,193,265 8 38 893
MISSISSIPPI 1985-99 87 $11,715,053 15 27 11,507
. _.. _. _., - .. . .... . . " ..
MISSOURI 1984-99 138 $47,275,932 7 27 83,258
.-
*The Environmental Protection Agency maintains records on oil spills of 50 barrels or less (2100 gallons) which would pollute naVigable
\Vaters. Those records reveal that 16,000 such spills occurred from 1989 to 1998.
** The amounts listed should be considered minimums. Not only are spills 2100 gallons or less not reported, 15% of all petroleum pipelines
-lowpressure or so-called "gathering Iinp.s" - are exempt from Federal leak-reporting requirements. According to a 1994 Friends of the
Earth report, "Crude Awakening,: The Oil Mess in America: Wasting Jobs, Energy and the Environment," by Jack Doyle, every year the oil
industry in America wasted or leaked an estimated 280 million barrels or more of oil equivalent energy - or more than three Exxon Valdez
oil spills a day.
603
MONTANA
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
NEW
HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK
198499
198499
1984-99
198499
1984-99
1984-99
60
82
32
7
87
117
145
$4,983,462
$5,536,698
$5,901,618
$286,000
$39,351,725
$10,915,774
$23,214,587
o
2
2
o
4
1
18
7
18
369
o
40
16
85
40,246
29,188
345
2
11,642
50,142
6804
NORTH
CAROLINA
1984-99 56 $2,294,980 3 43 9,634
OHIO 198499 145 $17,980,285 9 72 42,582
OKLAHOMA 1984-99
PENNSYLVANIA 1984-99
PUERTO RICO 1996-99
331
21
201
4
9
$18,810,542
$6,043,600
$39,613,520
$10,030,000
$931,000
13
2
23
66
o
33
3
96
87
4
238,265
1,507
21,006
o
o
SOUTH
CAROLINA
1985-99 25 $5,483,500 o 11 38,111
SOUTH DAKOTA 198599 26 $5,664,950 2 4 12,225
TENNESSEE 198499 71 $19,975,423 3 32 16,532
TEXAS
UTAH
1984-99
198499
1654 $137,928,961
32 $3,842,517
46
1 11
798,387
-24,137
VERMONT
VIRGINIA
1985-99
1984-99
6
57
590,000
$15,763,890
2
2
1
16
1
24,571
WASHINSTON 1985-99
. - -- ---
IWEST VIRGINIA. 198499
47 $10,759,357
52 $2,628,817
5 16
1 24
14,162
8
IWISCONSIN
- .
IWYOMING
198499 75 $8,879,948
1984-99 102 $8,147,555
11
2
46
13
22,864
85,385
According to OPS: North Dakota doesn't show any spills.*
*In Ihe 1994 Friends of the Earth report, "Crude Awakening" (see bottom previous page), North Dakota had Ihe following three pipeline spills
from 1984 to 1994: 15,000 gallons crude oil (Apri11992); 27,000 gallons gasoline (January 1992); and 1.3 million gallons crude oil (July 1989).
Myth: Pipelines are highly regulated.
Facts: Though Congress told the Office of Pipeline Safely (OPS, part of the U.S. Department of Transporation) in 1992 to develop regulations for
pipelines to protect the environment, OPS has yet to issue asingle such requirement. Current oil pipeline regulations developed to enhance pipeline
safety have the following serious deficiencies: they do not require periodic testing to ensure pipeline integrity, the oil pipeline regulations for corrosion
protection are minimal, and there are no leak detection requirements for oil pipelines. Rather than strengthening these regulations, in recent years
OPS has weakened its reporting requirements for oil spills, and has spent alarge portion of its staff resources developing a"Risk Management
Demonstration Projecr program to reduce governmental.requirements without fUll transparency and input from state pipeline regulators and the pUblic.
The pipeline industry contends that it is highly regulated because the rates it can charge are set by the federal government. Nevertheless, oil pipeline
industry profits (net earnings after taxes as apercentage of revenues) were on average 31 %annually since 1980.
604
Highlights of the u.s. General Accounting Office (GAO) Report
on Pipeline Safety and the Office of Pipeline Safety
Issued on June 15, 2000
The recent U.S. General Accounting Office report documents the federal Office of Pipeline Safety's oversight of the pipeline industry. It is not a
pretty picture. According to Congressman John Dingle, ranking member of the House Committee on Commerce, the GAO's report, together
with the Inspector General's Report on Pipeline Safety, " paint apicture of an agency that places disturbing amounts of faith in the
Industry it is supposed to regulate, and is either unable or unWilling to carry out any of its responsibilities under the law. "2 Among
the most disturbing finding:
II The number of fl!ajor pipeline accidents - those resulting in afatality, injury or more than $50,000 in property damage - increased four
percent annually between 1989 and 1998. In all, 226 people were killed, more than 1,030 people were injured, and property damage
reached $700 million in 2241 major accidents.
II During this period. OPS almost eliminated the use of fines as an enforcement tool - decreasing monetary penalties by more than a90
percent. OPS claims that this strategy allows them to work more constructively with pipeline companies, but the office has made no
attempt to determine whether this policy actually improves industry compliance and pipeline safety.
Despite its role as overseer of the pipeline industry, OPS does not collect comprehensive information on the causes of pipeline accidents.
II OPS is not complying with the law. It has failed to implement 22 of 49 requirements mandated by Congress since 1988 to improve the
safety of pipelines. Ten of these 22 requirements were to be completed by deadlines stated in the statutes and are now between about 5
and 11 years past those deadlines.
OPS has the lowest rate of any transportation agency for implementing National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations.
including issues on which NT?B has reported repeatedly.
As pipeline accidents are worsening, the tiny, understaffed Office of Pipeline Safety* is discontinuing use of states to help conduct
inspections of interstate pipelines (*57 field inspectors to police 2.2 million miles of pipeline, or one inspector per 38.000 miles of pipe).
Without any evidence to support its action, OPS is continuing to move ahead with arisk-based approach to pipeline safety regulation,
authorized in the 1996 pipeline legislation. By March 31,.2000, OPS was required to provide an evaluation and make recommenda-
tions as to whether risk management principles should be incorporated into the federal pipeline safety program. OPS has not provided
this report nor complied with statutory requirements or its own guid.ance on developing performance measures for the project. Despite a
Presidential directive that environmental and safety benefits superior to existing regulatory requirements be shown, many participating
companies are not even collecting the data necessary to support an evaluation of the program's safety impacts. Yet, OPS has proposed a
rule on inspection of pipelines in high consequence areas (that would apply to 87 percent of the nation's hazardous liquid pipeline
mileage) which substantially incorporates riSk-management, all without a"... s!lred of credible. quantifiable evidence"3 to show that this
method achieves evell minimal levels of protection. let alone superior levels. ;
I The GAO report (GAO/RCEDQQ-128) covers the extent of major pipeline accidents from 1989 to 1998, the Ollice of Pipeline Safety's (OPS) implementation of risk management
demonstration projects authorized by the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996. OPS inspeclion and enforcement efforts since 1996. OPS' responsiveness to
slatulory requirements and recommendations from lhe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the current status of the investigation into the June 1999 Bellingham,
Washington pipeline explosion.
2 June 14, 2000 letter from Congressman John Dingle to Department of Transportation Secretary, Rodney E. Slater. The GAO report was prepared at the request
of Congressman Dingle.
3Id.
Myth: More regulation is just more regulation; it doesn't assure us that pipelines will actually be made safer.
Fact: During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were numerous accidents in the chemical and energy industries, which resulted in tremendous
loss of life and severe environmental contamination. With the passage of the Clean Air Act and implementation of process safety management
Legislation in the early 90s, these industries have been required to improve their management processes, and subsequently their safety records have
improved significantly. Unfortunately, oil industry lobbyists have succeeded in having liquid fuel transmission pipelines exempted from such
legislation. .
605
National Pipeline Reform Coalition Fact Sheet
Changes Needed to Protect the Public and the
Environment from Pipeline Spills and Leaks-
Regulatory Actions That:
'"'\
..
't
; ~ f
"
f ~
i ~
Mandate periodic testing, including internal inspection/pressure testing, of oil and natural gas pipelines to ensure continued safe service, as
recommended by NTSB
Require leakdetectionwith adeadline to do so, including performancestandards for leak-detection systems, and remote/automatic shut-off valves
when releases are detected
Ensure adequate corrosion protection for oil pipelines (recommended by NTSB in 1989 and 1988, the latter after the Lively, Texas
explosion killed two teenagers)
Require fail-safe operations and hydrostatictesting for those pipeline segments with asignificant history of ruptures
Protect the environment from pipeline hazards, including protection of environmentally sensitive areas (required bylaw, still to be defined
byOPS)
Require reporting of smaller/slower releases (the current threshold is too high), better information on release causes, and reporting of leaks
to groundwater
Cover more types of oil pipelines, including "gathering" pipelines located in oil production fields
Address pipelines that have achange in service with appropriate reporting and upgrade standards
Essential Changes to the Pipeline Safety Act:
Allow states to establish requirements above federal minimums for interstate pipelines, provided these do not conflict with federal stan-
dards, in order to meet local environmental and safety needs (e.g., more closely spaced shut-off valves, enhanced inspections and leak
detection, better reporting, etc.)
Remove the "regulatory reform" cost-benefit provisions since they are designed to slow development of new regulations; other federal
agencies do not have such requirements
Provide additional enforcement authority and resources to state pipeline agencies
Strengthen the citizen suit provisions to facilitate private enforcement actions
Include strict liability provisions for releases
Develop acommunity right-to-know program for pipelines, which includes direct accountability to the pUblic on company actions, to prevent
and mitigate accidents
-Establishregi6hal-advisory councilS to enable pUblic and local government representatives to make substantive recommendations to the
pipeline industry and its regulators
e' Include whistle blower protection provisions for pipeline employees
41 Create an ombudsman position within OPS to track and help address public concerns
Mylh: Pipeline safety regulations are 100 costly and time-consuming.
Fact: Pipeline companies only measure the additional cents per barrel transported cost when calculating how much new regUlations will cost them.
They also resist hydrostatic testing because it forces them to shut down their lines temporarily, and thus lose money. But there are many other "costs"
associated with unsafe pipelines. Since 1984, the Office of Pipeline Safety reports that there have been 408 fatalities, over 4000 injuries, and over one
billion dollars in property damage as aresult of pipeline accidents - and there is no accounting of the environmental damage wrought by toxic fuels
leaking from pipelines into aquifers and soils.
The bottom line is that it is cheaper for companies not to maintain pipelines. This needs to change. Koch Industries in Kansas was recently fined $30
million by the Environmental Protection Agency for over 300 separate spills of crude oil, gasoline, and other oil products between 1990 and 1997. The
company simply waited for the pipelines to fail, rather than testing them. The clean up and repair of the Olympic pipeline explosion in Bellingham has
already cost more than $20 million. Stiffer penalties and sensible, "ounce of prevention" measures are asmall price to pay to avoid tragedies.
606
A Critique of the Pending Federal Pipeline Legislation:
Substance or Show?
by David Bricklin
With few exceptions, the overriding flaw in pipeline "reform" legislation pending before Congress is the continued reliance on the
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Under various proposed bills, OPS could decide:
1) What safety measures will be required;
2) The extent of citizen oversight; and
3) Whether violators will be sUbject to fines and civil penalties.
Nothing in the legislation is directed at reforming OPS. Given OPS's woeful record, enacting laws that give this poorly performing
agency more and more authority is highly unlikely to result in meaningful change.
Integrity Management Program: This could be the centerpiece of apipeline reform bill. It would require pipeline companies to
develop safety programs meeting clearly defined, new and higher standards. But under the proposed legislation, Congress has
not specified those standards. Rather, these bills uniformly allow pipeline companies to develop their own safety programs. The
safety programs so developed are to be reviewed by OPS, utilizing standards set by OPS. Past standard-setting efforts by that
agency inspire little confidence that any new standards will be promulgated in atimely manner or that they will be sUfficiently
stringent or precise.
Increased Fines: The proposed bills generally increase the maximum fine OPS can assess. Historically, however, the problem
has not been astatutory cap on fines. The problem is that OPS usually does not impose fines at all. Raising the ceiling does not
address this serious issue.
Increased Civil Liability: As is the case regarding imposition of fines, many of the bills under consideration authorize the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to seek civil penalties. But these bills all handcuff DOJ. It cannot act unless acase is referred to it
by the Office of Pipeline Safety. There is nothing in these bills or otherwise to substantiate the notion that OPS will suddenly start
referring more cases to DOJ for civil prosecution.....
Oversight: Right to Know: Many of the bills generally provide for increased citizen access to information about pipelines. In
some areas, Congress actually takes the next step and mandates disclosure of particular information (e.g., pipeline routes). But
most of the key information necessary to evaluate acompany's safety program is not specifically identified. Instead, OPS is given
the responsibility to decide how much detail must be prOVided. Historically, OPS has sided with the pipeline industry and
supported non-disclosure of the most ijertinent information, citing proprietary needs and other similar grounds. .
Oversight: Regional Advisory Councils: Some of the proposed bills include aprovision authorizing OPS to establish Regional
Advisory Councils (RACs). Well implemented, RACs can be valuable entities providing much needed oversight of the pipeline
industry. But, once again, the bills leave it entirely up to OPS' discretion whether to create these councils. And, even if created,
the amount of money prOVided to them is also entirely left up to OPS. Without adequate and substantial funding, RACs cannot be
effective.
Other Significant flaws: Nothing in the proposed legislation requires the pipeline industry to replace old pipes. There is also no
requirement that existing pipes be retrofitted to allow for internal inspection of those pipes (with bends and obstructing valves) that
do not currently allow for internal inspection. The recent deadly pipeline explosion in New Mexico involved acorroded 50-year-
old pipe. Internal inspections to detect and correct flaws were not possible. Although routine internal inspections will be reqUired
under the proposed legislation (for those pipes which can be internally inspected, about 50 percent of U.S. pipelines), if defects
are discovered, there is no standard set for what type of anomaly would require further inspection or corrective action. In the
tragic Bellingham, Washington explosion, aknown anomaly found during an internal inspection was never investigated or
repaired. It should be noted that when apipeline is ' ~ e s t e d for corrosion," this may mean only that apipeline's corrosion retardant
systems, which are supposedto prevent corrosion, are being tested. Such atest does not detect existing corrosion.
607
Regional Advisory Councils Provide Meaningful Oversight
What Works: Finding New Ways to Prevent Oil Spills and Pollution
Formed in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska's Re-
gional Citizens' Advisory Councils (RCACs) serve as successful mod-
els for Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) nationwide. They were in-
troduced in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA '90) as formally recog-
nized organizations with mandated funding that flows directly from the
industries who benefit from their advice. Their mission is to prevent oil
spills and pollution from oil transport operations, Alaska's RCACs are
unique as public advisory groups because they are: mandated by fed-
eral law; well funded; independent from political and economic pres-
sure; and assured ahigh level of access to necessary information
sources (I.e., oil pipeline terminal facilities). With enough money to hire
technical experts, conduct research, and monitor the oil industry,
Alaska's RCACs provide high-quality information, solutions and advice
to the oil industry and the public.
During the 1O-year anniversary of the Exxon Valdez tragedy, the RCACs
were praised for their work. Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski
wrote, It, the oversight and creativity of the councils have helped
make Alaska's oil transportation system the best in the world, . , . With
America importing 56 percent of the oil we consume, we need to spread
the word nationwide about how well citizens' advisory councils have
worked to prevent complacency from undermining the safe transport of
oi!." Praise also comes from the oil industry itself. Bob Malone, Presi-
dent of Alyeska Pipeline Services noted, "At Alyeska, we have learned
that we can create an open environment where people feel comfort-
able raising concerns and working together to achieve results, The
proof is in our effort with the citizens' council."
OPA'90 calls on Congress to replicate these successful models. Clearly,
the Alaskan RCACs are working. Despite their success in citizen over-
sight of the oil industry, there are no other RCACs in the U.S. Pipeline
reform advocates are requesting that Congress, during the reauthori-
zation of the Pipeline Safety Act, establish Regional Advisory Councils
to focus on pipeline safety.
photo by Charlie Stanton, Fire Coordinator, Schoharie County, New York
The Thick
Fog of March
Blenheim, NewYork
by Sabrina Johnson
(excelpt from tlie spring/summer 2000 issue of
The Planet magazine)
Looking south to Blenheim, New York.
from New York State Route 30 -
this is what the fire department crew
saw as they drove to the scene of the
pipeline accident.
Early on March 13, 1990, someone noticed a [propane] leak
and called assistant fire chief Robert Hitchcock. He went to the
nearest intersecton, about ahalf-mile fromthe leak, to direct traffic
away from the road. The leak, however, occurred at the top of a .
narrow valley above the intersection. The propane became athick
fog, filling the intersection and surrounding area with propane.
Hitchcock's daughter was leaving for school that morning.
As she approached the intersection the fog was so thick she could
not see. She tried t,o stop. She struck Richard Smith's car in front
of her. Soon after the collison the gas ignited. Hitchcock received
third degree burns all over his body. His daughter had severe
burns on her face and hands. All of the cars stopped in traffic
were on fire, Nine houses and several buildings also caught on
fire. Hitchcock and Smith died as a result of their burns. All nine
houses were destroyed. The fire burning at the leak burned all
through the night, nearly 24 hours, before it finally died out.
Blenheim city supervisor, Bob Mann, said the pipeline rup-
tured because repairs during during this time were done improp-
erly, causing uneven pressure. .
The town of 334 was unprepared to deal with the situation.
"I didn't know what was in the pipeline," Mann said. "If we
hadn't had the accident, I still wouldn't know."
Mann said the response from the pipeline company was swift
and provided $250,000 above its settlements with people who
lost their homes.
"It's easy to look back and see many of the mistakes that were
made by both the town and pipeline company," Mann said. "If
such an incident were to occur again, I know that we are better
608
Burning homes
south of
New York
State Route 30 and
West Kill Road;
the fire
department
was still en
route to the
scene of the
explosion.
photo py Charlie Sianton, Fire Coordinator. Schoharie County. New York
prepared than we were then. However, I also know that we are nowhere near as prepared as we should be."
Mann hopes to see many things changed in the near future. He said pipeline testing should be required and fre-
quent, and pipelines should be equipped with an automatic shut-off valve that activates on pressure loss. He said he
also feels pipeline companies should infOlm the community when they work on a pipeline.
InfOlming a community about pipeline repairs doesn't mean the community will be prepared for an accident.
However, it may grant the opportunity to ask questions and think about possible problems.
According to a report by Pates* titled "Out of sight, out of mind: What every local government should know about
pipeline safety," roughly 1.8 million miles of gas and liquid pipelines carry hazardous materials to urban areas and
through environmentally sensitive regions across the country. The nation's natural gas pipeline is about eight times
longer than its liquid one, extending to almost every street in most cities.
"Every street in most cities" makes this a national problem. Thousands of accidents and hundreds of deaths create
a'strong argument for change. More training, more testing and more disclosure need to come forth from this industry,
as ignorance and accidents apparently go hand in hand. It is only with education that eradication becomes a possibil-
ity.
*James Pates is a Fredricksburg, Virginia city attorney (see related article on page 18).
Rubble fro111-
one of nine
homes destroyed
after a propane
pipeline exploded
in the rural
town of
Blenheim,
New York.
photo by Charlie Stonton. Fire CU<Jnlimllllr. Schoharie County. New York
609
- Anne Bricklin
photo by Charlie Stanton, Fire Coordinator, Schoharie County. New York
Blenheim, New York residents
look on the aftermath of a
pipeline explosion that
devastated their community
March 13, 1990.
The eelie scene above looks like something straight out of World War II, not small town America in 1990. It is
emblematic of the man-made destmction so prevalent in the last century. We are enteling a new era, however. It is the
dawn of the 21,I century. We are the most prosperous nation on earth, our technology the envy of the world. It is also
a time of great challenge. Our oil and gas delivery system depends upon a 2.2-million-mile network of pipelines
running under our neighborhoods, parks and schools. This aging, poorly maintained, poorly regulated infrastructure
leaks large amounts of hazardous fuel, generating greenhouse gases and contaminating water supplies, wetlands and
habitat on a daily basis. All too often, those releases lead to tragedies like the one in Blenheim, New York. Our
pipeline system symbolizes much of the bad of the past centuly, when the rush to growth and expansion, coupled with
greed, led to waste and pollution. Today we know better. We have the means to fix it. The question remains whether
we have the will. Wliter George W. S. Trow said it very well, in his in-depth article on the 1989 San Bernardino
pipeline explosion: "I learned quite a bit about the scale of things in America while I was reporting this story. We are
set up to build. And we are set up to respond to disaster. Wpat we are willing to do to forestall disaster is: very little." I
More than a decade later, Trow's bleak assessment still lings true. But it does not have to be. At a time of unprec-
edented wealth and knowledge, we can change the status quo and demand that our pipeline systems are safe, well
maintained and regulated. Future generations will thank us.
I George W. S. Trow, "A Reporter at Large - Devastation" The New Yorker, 66, no. 36 (1990): 68
610
What Can You Do?
Share this publication with others to raise awareness about the dangers pipelines pose
Call and write your Congre.ssional Representatives and ask them to support the pipeline safety reforms
described in this book
Write letters to the editor of your local paper about the dangers pipelines pose
Join the National Pipeline Reform Coalition
The National Pipeline Reform Coalition is adiverse, national network of environmental and safety organiza-
tions, local government, and labor unions formed to protect the environment, property, and public safety from
releases from hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines, through research, technical assistance, litigation, and
advocacy. An April 2000 conference had organizational and state/local government representatives from 15
states, including Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, and Washington.
Fuel Safe Washington is acoalition of property owners, labor, business, environmental and public safety inter-
ests. We are avoice advocating for fuel transportation safety. Our mission is to promote aregional fuel policy that
protects our environment, safety, and quality of life by:
Improving the s a ~ e t y of pipeline, tanker, barge, truck, and rail fuel delivery systems
Encouraging fuel conservation
Promoting alternatives to hazardous, nonrenewable, fossil fuels
For additional information please visit the following web sites:
www.fuelsafewashington.org I www.pipelinereform.org
To obtain additional copies of this publication, please send your request along with a donation to National
Pipeline Reform Coalition, c/o Fuel Safe Washington, PO Box 2635, Seattle, WA 98111.
DANGER
HEALTH WARNING
Harmful or fatal if swallowed
Long-term exposure to vapors has caused
cancer in laboratory animals.
Avoid prolonged breathing of vapors.
Keep face away from nozzle and gas tank.
Keep away from eyes and skin.
Never siphon by mouth.
Do not overfill tank.
fAJl,\ll\f TO UU CAUTIOHIotAY C"AVSf.INOU$lK.,NRYOIlUHUl.
611
EXHIBIT 0
http://www.dailyastorian.info/main.asp?SectionID=2&SubSectionID=395&ArticleID=71187
Staff raps LNG firm over pipeline
Planners recommend hearing officer deny land-use application for liquefied natural gas project
BvKATIE WILSON
The DailyAstorian
Clatsop County staff has recommended that Hearings Officer Peter Livingston deny a land-use application to put 41
miles of pipeline through the county for the Oregon LNG liquefied natural gas project.
A pUblic hearing for Oregon Pipeline LLC's consolidated land use application began Thursday in Astoria. The
proposed pipeline is 121 miles long and would connect to a natural gas hub in Molalla. Of this, 41 miles would
cross through Clatsop County at a slant, running in a southeasterly direction from Warrenton, crossing seven
different zoning designations and three special overlay zones.
According to the county, natural gas pipelines are allowed in those zones as outright permitted uses or conditional
uses.
The primary issue Clatsop County staff had with Oregon Pipeline's application was that the company's process was
not clear, especially where the company plans to send the pipeline under Columbia River estuary waters.
Keith Jones, a consultant for the county with Harper Houf Peterson Righellis Inc., a consulting firm based in
Portland, Vancouver, Wash., and Bend, said they did not feel the impacts on the estuary (and elsewhere) had been
completely illustrated.
The company proved they have enough information, he said, but not that they've completed a thorough analysis.
Mike Connors, who works for Oregon Pipeline, said there was some confusion over the county's code
requirements. From what he understood, the county was asking for an impact assessment, but, he said, this is not
required under the county's Comprehensive Plan and the Land, Water, and Development Ordinance. However, the
company prOVided more information anyway.
The company sent the addftionai information on tliepipeline's impacts to Livingston and county staff in aletter-type
document dated June 9. The county did not have time to review this before the hearing. .
Clatsop County Planner Jennifer Bunch said it became apparent during the hearing that the county and the
company were talking about two different things: impact statement (analysis) versus impact assessment.
It appears to be afine diUerence, Bunch said. "We'll talk about this and figure it out," she said.
"That is an issue that has to be resolved," said Ed Wegner, county land use planning director, who said the county
does require an impact statement.
The county also concluded the project did not comply with several goals laid out in the staff report, including the
completion of a geotechnical report and impact assessment, natural hazards concerns (specifically policies to deal
with erosion and shoreline stabilization), and the line the route cuts through some existing properties.
The company had originally said the route would follow existing easements, rights-of-way and property lines,
county staff said in the staff report. A map, however, shows the route cutting straight through and there has been
no documentation that supports the company's original claim, staff said during the hearing.
"It's not as if a lot of thought hasn't been put in about where to route (the pipe)," Connors said. With development
on the scale proposed by Oregon Pipeline, though, he added, "there isn't any development that avoids any impact."
Oregon Pipeline is part of a suite of companies that make up Oregon LNG, which is funded by the New York
holding company, Leucadia National Inc. Oregon LNG has proposed developing an LNG terminal on the Skipanon
1
612
Peninsula in Warrenton.
The terminal project would be located within Warrenton's city limits, but is not part of the pipeline land-use
application.
As has been the tradition with any public hearing involving LNG, the main meeting room at the JUdge Guy
Boyington Building was crammed with people. .
Many of those in opposition to the Oregon LNG project had testified against the NorthernStpr LNG project earlier
this year. -
At this hearing, they were concerned primarily with the proposed route the pipeline would take, how this would
affect property values and public safety issues.
Hans Mulder, assistant fire chief with the Elsie-Vinemaple Rural Firl3 District, was the only person to testify during
time reserved for state agency reports.
The fire district's concerns weren't as much about how the pipe went in, but what would happen after it was in
place, he said.
"A natural gas pipeline poses huge risks," Mulder said. Risks that the district, staffed entirely by volunteers,
is not ready to take on. They lack both the equipment and the training to deal with explosions or fires
resulting from a burst pipe, he said.
The fire district officially covers around 30 square miles. In reality, the coverage is more like 500 square miles since
they answer calls in the forestry land as well.
Access to water is just the beginning of the problems Mulder foresees. If a problem happens down by the river,
firefighters could simply pump the river. But if something happens farther in, perhaps in more isolated areas,
the district will have to bring the water with them.
"If it blows up, it's not just going to be fire," Mulder said. It's going to be a big boom that could take down
trees and houses, he said.
There was not enough time to hear all the testimony so Livingston announced that the hearing will continue June
25, starting at 5 p.m. at the Judge Guy Boyington Building, 857 Commercial St., Astoria.
If all the testimony is heard at that time and the company and county staff also have time to respond, the hearing
will close.
If not all the testimony is heard, a third session would be held July 8 at 1 p.m. at the Judge GUy Boyington BUilding.
Written comments may be submitted to the Community Development OffiCi? at 800 Exchange St., Astoria.
The entire application and accompanying documents are available on the Clatsop County website,
(www.co.c1atsoD.or.US). The application file can also be viewed at the Transportation and Development Services
office, 800 Exchange St., Suite 100 during normal business hours.
(Emphasis Added)
2
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20071004-5081 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM
EXBIBITP
.' ". t; i' 'h '.', ; i ; ld"1\ !'.: t (! ';
J" ..\, t.H.\t {, \:, ; l.k ",! n, \ at f (H: ( :. tlAY, .f)1\!
PREPARED BYTHEE STAFF
OF THE OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
.october 4} 2007
2
614
20071004-5081 PERC PDP (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM
JORDAN COVE LfQUEP(iEO NATURAL GAS TiERiMl1\tAL
ON THE NORTH SPIT COOS BAY, OREGON
The'Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE) issues this Safety Advisory Report on behalf of the State of
Oregon pursuant to section 311(d) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the Act). The report conlZerns the
application to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by Jordan Cove Energy Project LP, (jCEP)
to construct a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminal
l
with an assodated natural gas pipeline
application submitted by Pacific G.as Connector Pipeline L.P. (peGP). The Jordan Cove Terminal wO.uis pe
located in Coos County, Oregon on the North Spit of Coos Bay, near the dties of .Coos.gay and North Bend.
Jordan Cove ftJ.ea Its wlthFERCon September 4,2007.
The Act allowS' the stateto file ali advisory report that identifies and local within
30 dqys of the date tlieapplllXltion 'is' filed. ihe "safetY" information solltltea fn tfteadvisOty report lslargety.
repetitlVe of Information that Jordan Cove Itself provides in Its appllcaUon to HERe in itstermlnsl appliCation
and in Its Waterway Suitabfllty Assessment (WSA) to the Coast Guard. It is infOrmation that Jerdan COve'also
must provide In its emergency response plan to be developed In cOnjunction with the Coast Guard, the st:ite,
and appropriate local jurisdictions prior to any construction.
The State of Oregon has been intimately Involved in reviewlng and commel'ltingonJor.aan Cove!gpre'"flilng
. and application resource reports,and is Invo1ved with the Coast Guara in rev.lewing To tile
extent tMt the State, disagrees Wlththt:; informcition Jordan Cove hps. :or will, pr'l).v,lde:0.1'1 issues
in those venues" the state will purSue corrections or chanQes through the abcNe-review processes. Fer .
example, the WSA s\Jbmltted by' Jordan Cove does not reflect the most reGent clislf;ussions''!;le.tweell JeEP,
ODOE, local response a.gendes and otlTler stateagencles"regarcling the area's emergeneyrespof;lse
capabilities and the proper allocation of augmented The Department will work With the COast
Guard, other state agencies and local jurisdictiOns to correct the information under the WSA process.
The State considered providing FERC with specific scenarios for evaluating acddental or intentional r.eleases
of LNG from a vessel or the facility itself, Again, however, such scenarios playa ro1e bo.th in theWSAand In
the forthcoming emergency response planning. Moreover, based on recent Commission approvals.of.lNG
terminal projects, the state believes theFERC will find that the risk of any potential LNG release $Ceharlo>can
be reduced to an acceptable minimum.
i
On June 15, 2006
1
FBRCat:1proved three new LN.G terminal Sempra!s LNG in P..ortAithur
l
Texas; Cheniere's Creole TraillNGin cameron Parish, and BP America Rreductlon C0rilpany
r
s
Crown Landing LNG in Logan Township In New Jersey. The language in the CommIssion's Creole "frail
decision about the risk of an acc(dental LNG release is mirrored in the other two decisions:
Based on the extensive operational experience of LNG shlp!'Jing, the structural sesignof an
LNG vessel, and the op.erational controls imposed by the Coast Guard and the local pilots} a
cargo containment failure and subsequent LNG spill from a vessel casualty - collision,
grOUnding, or alUslon - Is highly unlikely. For sImilar reasons, an aecldent Involving the
onshore LNG Import tar.minalls unlikely to affect the pUblic. As a result
l
the'fEISdetermlhetiJ
that the risk to the public from acddental causes Is negltglble.
Further, the language In the Commissionfs Creole Trail decision about the riskofa.n Intentional LNG release is
also mIrrored In the other two decisions:
3
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20071004-5081 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 10/04/2007 04:52:07 PM
Unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little gUidance In estimating the
probability of aterroFist attack on an LNG vesseler onsRefe Fora' mew' .LNG
import terminal pr.oposal having a large volume of energy transp:oltetfand,stored"near
pO,pulated the perceivedthreat.ofa terrorist a oHne
population and T&iuires that resources be directed to mitigate p0ss1ble attack paths. If the
Coast Guard issues a Letter of RecommendatIon finding the waterway suitable for LNG
marine traffic, the operational restrictions that would be imposed by the Lake Charles Pilots
on LNG vessel movements through this area, as well as the requirerrtel'lts -that the Coast
Guard would impose, would minilfllle the possibility of a, hazardous eventoccurr.ing along the-
vessel transit area. While the risks associated with the transportation of any hazardous cargo
can never be entirely eliminated, we are confident that they can be reduced t{) minimal levels
and that the public will be well protected from harm.
The Department notes that FERC staff reached a slmllar conclusion regarding the proposed Bradwood
Landing project. On August 17, 2007, FERC staff Issued the Draft Environmental Impact Statement fBEIS)
for Btadwood Landing. The above two paragraphs appear, in neatly ideriticallanguage, in that OEISas well.
DEIS at p.ES-6. .
For the above reasons, in this advisory report the State ptovldes largely broad safety pGlicy statementsao0.ut
the proposed Jordan Cove project along with a limited amount of specific, technical comments. In addition,
the State of Oregon incorporates by reference the safety comments included In previous filings to,the FERC
docket, including PF06-25.
Although the application ttl FERC Is limited in scope to the LNG terminal and pipeline, we GOOsider
the risks from a release of LNG on the inlet to ,be among the most signifIcant sat,ety:, concerns vitrh
. the facility. The safety of the LNG terminal Is strongly connected to the questlqn of,safety on the Inletena In
the Gommul'1ities that the LNG carriers must pass. We expect FERC toadGlress Issues and concerns raised' by
sta'kehoJders in those communities and'to consider the safety ofthose determining whether
to approve, and-if so, how to condItion the LNG terminal and associated pipeline.
Each of the state and local agendes in Oregon, whether or not they <::ontrlbuted to this Cldvrsory rep'ort,
reserve their right to file additional joint or separate comments and/or eyidence on sa'few,and other
State of Oregon General Policy Comments
1. should req.uifean appUeant to committo 100 percent :of the safety and security 'COsts
dire(;ttyassodated with the LNG vessel transits, the fa'eilit'{, and the
Under Section 311(e)(2)) an emergency response plan (ERP}to be developed pr.lor to constructfonmust
include a cost-sharing plan that Includes a"description of any direct cost that tfI'e
applicant agrees to provide to any State and local agencies with r-esponsibiilty'fbrsecurlty and safew at
the LNG terminal and in proximity to vessels that selVe the faCility." The State understands and
appreciates that JeEP has agreed thus far to pick up the costs of most safety and security needs that the
company has identified as necessary. However, the local jurisdictions are not In a position to declitate
their own limited funds to any LNG safety and security measures that may be r.equired. In addition, local
jurisdictions may not agree with an applicant about the level of resources r-equired. An applialnt should
first be required to pay for an adequate assessment of safety and security needs and then pay for all
infrastructure, planning, drilling and other associated costs identified in an ERP agreed to by the state
and local jurisdictions. Conditions proposed In the DEIS for Bradwood landing would require,a Cbs.t-
Sharing Plan to be filed with FERC prior teO initial site preparation. How.eyer, the DEIS Is silent OIl What
percentage of costs, if anYI could be borne by state or local jurisdictions. ShO\1ldF-ERCnot rcequiretne'
applltant to' commit to: 100 percent ofthe costs, FERC should' eX15lalh rts authority f<:ir imposing
on local jUrisdictions and the state.
2. The safetyjsecurity. zones pro.posed for the vess.el in transit and v.essel at dock must
4
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be.sufficiently ealculated and justified. the applicant or Coast Guard m.ust thoroUShly
explain any changestothose zones that might accompany heightened: national S.I3GUfity as
well as any resulting Impacts.
Some area residents have expressed concern that the safety/security zones will be so large thatrtheyWJ/I.
"shut down" traffic on the COos eay Inlet or access to recreational and commerclal fishing, and
harvesting of other seafood products near the proposed terminal site. Others have concern
that the safety/security zones will be too small, sized to avoId the above Concern rather than for
adequate safety protection. Moreover, residents of the small communities on the Eastern shore of the
Inlet have expressed concern that the potential for an emergency affecting their communities is
considered acceptable primarily because of the small size of these commuriitii.:s. Any zones proposed
should provide a rationale for their size.
3. FERC should require an applicant to complete an acceptable ERP prior to any Commission
decision on an application and tn conjunction with the COast Guard's validatron ofthe
Waterway Suitability Assessment.
Under Section 311(e)(1){ FERCwill not require Bradwood to an ERP until after a positive decision
by FERC and just before any final approval to begin construction. However, to the ement that JCEP's WSA
relies on the creation of a satisfactory emergency response, plan to ensure that the CoosBay Il'\let Is
suitab.le for LNG, that ernergency response plan must beavaUable for review prior to any decisions on
both the WSA and the FERC application. Again learning from the 8radwood Lan(jJng experlence, tlte
recommended cQnditions in the DEIS would require the applicant for that prior
to construction, but after FERC's decisIon to approve the project. (Draft Conditions, 62 and 63 at p..S-BO.)
It would be illogIcal for either the Commission or the Coast Guard to decide that LNG Is safefur the
region without knowing first if a suitable emergency response plan can be enacted along the vesse1 route
and at the facillty.
In Resource Report 11 of the application, section 11.3.1, JCEP states that It will develop'manuals,
procedures and plans that address safety and security In accordance with estab.lished regulations. Other
than NVIC 05-05, we have not found 'regulatlons that prOVide detailed gUidance
4. The applicant's ERP must be developed in full cooperation with stateandlocaJ authorities.
Emergency response planning must be an integrated, carefully developed effort that Involv.es ev.ery entity
that Is potentially affected by the LNG import terminal. .
5. rhe applicant's must sufficiently and accurately characterize the emergency response
capabilities along the vessel transit route and near the facility, inc!udingresponsetimes. The
Plan must mitigate for any safety gaps.
Thus far, the state and local jurisdictions have not reached agreement.as to whichjurlsdictlon will have
primary responSibility and authority in the event of an acdsent or intentional breach. Agreement also
has n9t been reached on the resource gaps, and proper allocation of supplemental resources. The USCG
and FERC should not find that the waterway Is suitable until it is known that these issues have been
resolved.
6. The applicant's. ERPmust inclUde aU p.otentiaUYiiff$te:d communities;along the LNG vessel
route and neal' the terminal in a comprehensive, thoroughly pUbli'dze:d. watrting system.
Any community located within one of the three Sandia zones of Imj)act must be considered In emergency
response plans, InCluding access to a reverse 911 system aYldslrens.
1. The applitat'lt's ERP must ac-count for potential populatiot'l lheresse due to' t<>urism.
The Coos Bay area population Increases significantly during high tourism season. Depending on the
location of those visitors, the Influx may bring challenges for LNG emergency response education as well
as LNG ship transit education. The Department is particularly concerned about access and safe'egress
l
because U.S. highway 101 is the only major route in or out of the area, and it 'becomes congested during
peak hours in high tourist season.
5
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8. Any FERC authorization for an LNG terminal and associated pipeline in 0regon must fully
comply with Oregon state and local laws and regulations; including energy fa:eilitys.itirtg
laws. .
In particular, the state of Oregon requires large energy facilities to provide a:bond: or .letter of'cre:qibifuJ
ensure that the prQposedsite can be restored to a useable, non-haZarS01JS We Gonsider the
bond or letter of credit to be a safety precaution against a potentially abandoned orothefWise vaGated
site. Thus far
l
the applicant does not appear to have addressed this issue In application materials.
State of Oregon Specific comments
Seismic Design
The Department is particularly concerned about the potential for tsunami. Recent statements by DOGAMI
follOWing the 2005 tsunami in Sumatra indicate that maximum tsunami height could be up to 20 feet higher
than previously thought. In discussion with DOGAMI staff stationed at NewpQrt, Oregon, we have been told
that deepening the channel would tend to increase maximum tsunami height, FERCshould require that the
design basis tsunami takes Into account the height increase caused by dredging the channel.
Hazard Identification
Hazards potentially affecting the public are discussed In Resource Report 11 arid Its attachments. As.r-equired
by NFPA 59A, Bradwood landing used the LNGFIRE and DEGADIS ctldes to calculate thermal radiation and
vapor dispersion from the design basis spill. Resource report 11 ihdudes isopleth drawings and input
for these calculatlo'fls at Attachment ilA. We assume but could not verify that intentional spills were
assumed, since they likely bound any aecident scenario.
We note that thermal radiation maps in attachment 11A appear to be centered at the tanks and the d0Ck,
Because the accident or intentIonal spill could just as easlly happen at the carrier during the eight mile
voyage from the mouth ofCCos Bay to the terminal, the thermal radiation maps and vapor dispersion m.aps
should be shown at all poInts along-this voyage. For the JGEP, the nearest affected: popJ;1latibrl. is in'o$t'likely'
not near the terminal but rather the small.communities 6n the eastern sHore of the 'Inlet, and theresidi;lnces
In North B.end in the pony Slough area as the ship approaches theterminal.
safety discussion in Resource Rep0rt 11 appears to rely heavily on the 2004 sandia Report, and
particularly on the Zones of Concern tdentified in that report anddted in NVIC 05-05. H0wever, resQurce
reports 1and 10 of JeEP's application state that the terminal will be designed to accommoGiate ships with
capacity over 200,000 m
3
The zones of <:oncern in the Sandia report were based on' ships smaller than
150,000 m
3
FERC's recommendation for this project should be conditioned on ships no larger than' those
assumed in any heat flux and vapor dispersion calculation,
The assumption of pure methane is probably riot of, aGtuaJ and may not be conservative.
In public meetings, JeEP has disclosed that product could come from a variety of produd.il1'g natiOI1$i lnGludil1g
some where the LNG has a higher concentration of natural gesliq!Jids such as propane. Some ofthese
higher-weight hydrocarbons have higher potential for vapor dispersion than pure meI:hane, We expect FERC
to verify that conservative assumptions were used in NfPA 59A required calculations. The EIS for this project
sho.uld explain how these assumptions were made and why they are the most
Quality AssuraMe
In our SafetY Advisory Report for Bradwood Landing, dated June 2006/ ODOE Induded extensive comments
on the need for a rigorous. Qualit Assurance program that wouid be subject to regulatory 'review pr%r to.
start of construction. We note that the BradwQod DEIS does not include a of such a pf0gram, and
we renew the recommendation and incorporate our comments from tnatJyne 2006 reportinw,thisone. The
State e>q)ects the Commission to describe and Impose acondition requiring: JCEP to adopt'8 ffgorous ana
comprehensive quality program applicable during both construction and operation of'tfue irnl'l0rt
terminal.
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Safety Issues
The state of Oregon has revleweq the Safety Advisory Report 01'1 the proposed LNGterminal at the Port of
Long Beach Issued bythe California Energy Commission (CEC). That report r.elles .Iargely on material taken
from two readily avallable reports: (1) the SaAdia Labs' November 2004: report "Guldal1ce on
and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water' (SsndlaReport) ancl(2)
Richard Clark's "LNG Facilities in Urban Areas."
The safety significant events listed in Sandia and Clark and .quoted In the CEC advisory report could 'apply to
any terminal at any locati0n and need not be repeated ill this report. However
1
we agree with eEe that the 5
kw/m
2
Is described in the Sandia Report 85 "the permissible level for emergency operations lasting several
minutes with appropriate clothing" (Table 6, p.38). This is the lowest heet flux shown In the thermal
radiatIon maps provided in Attachment !lA. Because the people occupying the nearest residences (those on
the eastern shore of Coos Bay and the Pony Slough section of North Bend) do not have the appropriate
clothing or emergency training/ thermal radiation calculations should show the point at which worst case heat
flux will permit safe evacuation, possibly re{Juiring more than "several minutes" and without appropriate
clothing or emergency training. The CEeadViSOry report at p. 15 suggests 1.5 KiN/m
2
, J.CEP sho.uld :calculate
the dlstanceto this heat flux for adesign basis event at JeEP aaq Issue a figure shOWIng the results.
previously, JeEP should Calculate this distance not just at the terminal but along the eIght mile tr,lp from the
mouth of the bay.
Emergency Response CapabiHttes near the Facility location
The State appreciates that peRC has prOVided draft guidance fJ:lr preparing the required ERP for an LNG
Import terminal. However/ the State remains concemed that the gUidance will be viewed byapplkants as an
upper limit on their responsi\>i1ity for ensuring the safety of surroundiFlgcommunities. The State views the
guidance as just that: guidanCl and urges FERC to affirmatively state that the ERP must a<;idi'ss. all
identified emergency situatio.ns, and that all cests attributable to Insuring public saf\Stymustbe bomebythe
appllcant. Furthermore, th.e State remains concerned about the effect of Impasseduth1g negotiations for the
ERP and urges the Commission to adopt a dear, expeditious process for addressing disagreements between
the applicant and state and local governments.
Finally, whatever criteria are used to gener-ate the ERP, FERC should make the .process as transparentto the
public as possible/lnduding the essential.elements of an emergency plan. Although the details of theWSA
and ERP are withheld from public disClosure, information regarding measures to protect the public during a
design basis event should be a part of public outreach and should be available before the issuance of a FERC
construction permit.
7
619
Shell's Sakhalin IT LNG project:
Impacts of LNG production
2002 project design included a LNG jetty of 1,400 m length, and around 160,000 m3 of dredging
2003 project design (imally implemented) involved a LNG jetty that was 800 m in length, requiring
around 1,680,000 m3 of dredging. Final amount of dredging was about 2 million m3.
(2 million cubic meters is equal to 2.6 million cubic yards)
What Avina Bay looked like BEFORE dredging work and dumping of dredged m.aterials.
620
Cont:
What Avina Bay looked like BEFORE dl'edging work and dumping of dredged materials...
621
Aniva Bay - the same area AFTER....
The 2 pictures below were done in Aniva Bay, a year after dumping on the area, which, according
SEIC, should not have any negative impact (sedimentation) fl'om the dumping zone.
Now this area is almost an undenvater desert.
622
Bruce Campbell
1158 26th St. #883
Santa Monica, CA 90403
----- Original Message -----
FrQni:;Bruce:GamObell y,ett:,:,S'>': /j:: .. .> .. ><: :,',
To: Jody McCaffree
Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2010 12:10 PM
SUbject: Comments re: recent comments of PCGP Land Use Coastal Zone Coos County Permit Application
(File # HBCU-1--01)
June 16th, 2010
Coos County Planning Department
250 N. Baxter
Coquille, OR 97423 ,
Re: Comments regarding recently submitted comments on PCGP Land Use Coastal Zone Coos County
Permit Application (File # HBCU-IO-01)
Dear Planning Department:
It is apparent to me from reviewing earlier as well as recently submitted documents, that the
Conditional Use Permit must be denied by Coos County Planning. This is due to the obvious negative
impacts on the environment and on local residents which PCGP construction, use, and maintenance
would bring, but also due to the incompleteness of the application, and the fact that it does not abide by
related legal requirements! The recent Cascadia Wildlands submission summarizes these points very
well.
Cascadia Wildlands also hits the nail on the head in regards to pointing out that what may be
adequate as far as meeting legal requirements on private lands along the proposed PCGP route do not
suffice in regards to activities and impacts on the largest landowner along the PCGP route within Coos
County -- the Bureau of Land Management. As pointed out, the Oregon Forest Management Plan does
not cover BLM lands, plus there have been many shifts in recent times regarding guiding regulations
on BLM land. CW pointed out that BLM's WOPR (Western Oregon Plan Revisions) was adopted in
December 2008, but then was withdrawn by the Department of Interior on July 16th, 2009. It was
withdrawn due to the bad science involved, due to BLM not being able to meet their legal mandates
with that plan, and due to the WOPR being developed hand-in-hand with the bogus Northern Spotted
Owl Recovery Plan from the George W. Bush era which was tossed out since it clearly was not based
on valid scientific analysis. CW was also correct in their contention that thus it is insufficient to cite
some sections in Jordan Cove's LNG FElS (and that document should not have been incorporated by
reference in a wholesale manner) since it was presuming that the WOPR was going to be guiding
management on BLM lands in the region (as well as other inadequacies).
Rather than the Oregon Forest Management Plan guiding activities on BLM land, recall that the
WOPRtried to withdraw about 2.5 million acres of Western Oregon BLM lands from the Northwest
Forest Plan -- but the rejection ofthe WOPR in July 2009 means that the Northwest Forest Plan is now
once again the guiding document in regards to activities which may occur on BLM lands within the
range of the Northern Spotted Owl. Thus, management on BLM land must allow for sufficient wildlife
habitat, must protect water quality, as well as provide for other needed ecosystem services. Very
serious and expensive mitigation measures would be needed to get anywhere close to abiding by legal
I
623
regulations in regards to construction, use, and maintenance of the PCGP through BLM lands in Coos
County (as well as on other BLM lands along the pipeline route).
Also related to the Northwest Forest Plan, CWrightly pointed out that a judge reinstated the NFP
requirement that Survey and Manage for species be conducted on federal forestland within the range of
the Northern Spotted Owl. Thus, these surveys must be conducted (since PCGP construction would
surely bring logging and ground-disturbing activities to BLM land within the Northwest Forest Plan
zone) before considering this application (unless the conclusion is rejection of the application), and
most likely some species would be found in some areas which would likely result in are-routing ofthe
pipeline in some areas. Thus, since we are not talking about the final pipeline route in regards to this
conditional use permit application, the application must be rejected. Please conduct the survey and
manage on the BLM lands to which the requirements apply, figure out a superior route in some areas,
and submit the final proposed pipeline route rather than such an incomplete document!
Judge Pechman (as pointed out on page 2 of C W I ~ comments) allowed for clear exemptions to the
survey and manage requirements, but it is clear that a lineal pipeline resulting in significant logging
and stream-disturbing activities on BLM lands along the proposed PCGP route do not meet any of the
criteria which allow for exemptions. And CW pointed out that Judge Pechman's decision regarding
what areas must undergo Survey and Manage (as well as what areas could be exempted from the
requirements) was still in place as ofa 2009 court decision -- and thus likely still in place or we likely
would have heard about a succeeding case on that matter.
Another fine point by CW was on page 3 oftheir recent comments which discuss how the current
PCGP proposal would illegally degrade endangered species reserves while also violating the Aquatic
Conservation Strategy. Please do not even consider the application for the PCGP (other than the
option of outright rejection) until BLM completes all their surveys and paperwork and can prove they
are following legal requirements under the Northwest Forest Plan.
Under the "Fire" section in CWls comments, it was pointed out that Staff concluded that there would
not be a likelihood of an increase in fire due to the pipeline. I cannot see how that conclusion was
reached, and CW (as well as the Western Environmental Law Center did more thoroughly in their
comments) was correct in pointing out that Staff was discussing fire potential from the pipeline itself,
rather than discussing the contribution ofthe pipeline corridor to the likelihood offaster and more
catastrophic spread of wildfire. Indeed, WELC points out that the pipeline corridor is perfect --
unfortunately perfect for spreading wildfire from ridge to ridge by increasing the probability of
wildfire, the intensity of wildfire; and raising suppression costs to battle wildfires (as well as
endangering the safety of some fire-fighting personnel). There were other fine points regarding ladder
fuels and fine slash and fire danger relating to scattering some debris along pipeline corridor -- points
which I brought up also in earlier comments to the FERC.
Another fine point by CW was that there is no allowance for a corridor of greater than 50 feet under
the Coos County zoning code. I furthermore agree that areas referred to as "Uncleared Storage Areas"
and "Temporary Extra Work Areas" need to be specified and give the time frame for how long the
areas and material would be present on those sites. For instance, how many of the USAs and TEWAs
would violate the 50 foot setback requirements from bodies of water, and such info needs to be
provided before any consideration of any action except rejection of the application for the PCOP?
It strains belief that PCOP is claiming that they are a "public utility project" and thus should have
environmental regulations relaxed so that, for instance, the requirement for maintaining 50 foot buffers
of riparian vegetation does not apply. First, Coos County residents (and possibly no Oregon residents)
2
624
will not be served by the PCGP. Second, the main company which would receive the natural gas is the
private investor-owned utility Pacific Gas and Electric. Thus, I agree once more with CW that the
conditional use permit should not allow for relaxing of environmental regulations due to this
preposterous claim that the PCGP is a "public utility project."
Another good point by CW (as well as by other commenters including NMFS) involves the woeful
lack of information in regards to hydrostatic testing of the PCGP. What water will be used from what
sources for what portions of the pipeline, and where will this water end up? What chemicals and
heavy metals would get into the environment due to hydrostatic testing? Let us get site-specific and
discuss likely locations for hydrostatic testing, and the likely impact on site-specific erosion and thus
sedimentation of nearby watercourses, on various species, and on the spread ofnon-native species
including the Port Orford Cedar root rot disease.
The National Marine Fisheries Service re-submitted some applicable comments during the recent
comment period regarding the proposed conditional use permit. NMFS points out in mid-2009 that
many environmental concerns from their December 2008 submissions have not been addressed. Some
of their key points were: A. the southern distinct population of the eulachon (Thaleichthys pacificus)
was proposed for listing as a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (74 FR
10857) -- since this species occurs in both Coos Bay and the Pacific Ocean, will protections for this
species result in any shift in pipeline route or activities?; B. ifthe option of recovering Natural Gas
Liquids is to proceed, apparently it would be necessary to get a defunct rail line up and running again,
yet such activity and related impacts are not discussed in the documents; C. it appears to NMFS that
the earlier planned fish exclusion screens with fixed water delivery system to hulls of ships have been
essentially abandoned -- just because the Coast Guard pointed out some regulatory problems with the
design does not mean that such screens should not proceed and be implemented; D. will the applicant
ever respond to the repeated call by NMFS to thoroughly assess all toxic chemicals which may be
found in stormwater from Jordan Cove to be discharged into Coos Bay?; E. there continues to be a
lack of a complete mitigation plan for the damage which would occur to eelgrass, sub-tidal lands, and
stream crossings due to the proposed PCGP -- when will such mitigation plans be developed, and
should not this information be thorough and turned in before any consideration of allowing the
conditional use permit to allow construction of the PCGP? F. NMFS has some good points regarding
the fact that a mere 40 trees per acre is insufficient to produce a reasonable amount of large woody
debris to watercourses. Clearly, we do need as precise estimates as possible in regards to the likely
number of snags and downed wood to be removed in the proposed project, which would help elucidate
why the 40 trees an acre amount is definitely inadequate to have decent structure within streams to
facilitate reproduction of native salmonid species.
The Western Environmental Law Center and other commenters have pointed out that the FERC
approval of "certification of public convenience and necessity" is "on hold", and thus it seems clear
that agencies and companies related to the PCGP project do not (at least at this time) possess any land
condemnation authority, and thus it would be illegal to approve the conditional use permit application
since this is one of the elements in which the application is incomplete. WELC pointed out
convincingly that the distinctions involved with the Shrock Farms v. Linn County case have nothing to
do with consideration of this application for construction, use, and maintenance of the PCGP.
A particularly good point raised by the FLOW group is in regards to the proposed Horizontal
Directional Drill to allow the pipeline to cross the Coos River. There is a serious concern with failure
of such a crossing within this conservation management unit, and there can be serious toxic impacts
from such a failure. Not only is the bentonite clay carcinogenic to humans, but its impact on fish and
other species ofthe food chain need to be seriously considered before any' consideration of approval of
3
625
the conditional use permit. This HDD drilling lubricant and sealant can cause serious problems as
pointed out by FLOW's quoting ofthe Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife in regards to
deleterious impacts of bentonite clay in failed HDD drillings. FLOW quotes the Application as saying
that, "construction will use appropriate measures to minimize impacts; all impacts will be mitigated."
This sounds like it was written by an attorney, rather than by biologists who understand the difficulty
of mitigation particularly if there was a toxic release ofbentonite clay due to a failure of HDD drilling
at the Coos River crossing. For instance, while there mayor may not be some sincerity in British
Petroleum and the U.S. government trying to mitigate damage from the oil gush in the Gulf of Mexico,
surely they must realize they should have had contingency plans to prevent such a leak, and they are
likely still pondering howto assist various species in various habitats. Murphy's Law is in effect in
Oregon, so we need mitigation plans and contingency plans up front, rather than relying on some
corporate lawyer's conclusion that of course appropriate measures will be taken and that all impacts
will be mitigated.
FLOW notes that the Oregon Department of State Lands has indicated concern about impacts of
pipeline construction within Coos Bay a ~ l d related turbidity problems and impacts on species. Neither
NMFS nor Oregon state environmental agencies have determined that there are adequate mitigation
measures in the applicant's plans for pipeline construction activities.
lody McCaffree made a fine point about the presumptuousness of claiming that the sizable PCGP is
a "low-intensity utility" and then claimthat all pipeline-related activities would abide by legal
requirements within zoning districts 11-NA and 13A-NA.
WELC has some well-ordered contentions that should be emphasized -- while providing good back-
up evidence for these contentions. These are that 1. the conditional use permit application does not
comply with CCZLDO regarding landowner consent; 2. the proposed activities are not permitted in
Forest (F) zones CCZLDO 4.8.300; 3. the proposed activities are not permitted in Exclusive Farm
Use (EFU) zones; 4. the surrounding uses to the proposed pipeline are too vaguely presented to
qualify under Rural Residential zones related to CCZLDO 4.2.400 and 4.2.900(7); 5. there is
inadequate evidence to garner a public utility exemption for riparian vegetation removal -- or that it is
the "minimum necessary" vegetation removal (relating to CCZLDO 4.4.400 and 4.5.180.
Several other quick points are that there needs to be a lot more information about "existing
aquaculture" which would give a better idea how such operations could be impacted by pipeline
construction/use/maintenance activities, that pipelines are NOT on the list of allowed uses in the Coos
Bay Estuary Management Plan, and that the PCGP proposal does not meet the legal criteria under
ZLDO Section 4.5.285 regarding management objectives for District 7-D.
Due to these important points and others raised in recent submissions to the Planning Department, I
join the call for the rejection of the conditional use permit application related to the Pacific COllilector
Gas Pipeline for the coastal area portion of the route for this pipeline. Thank you for your attention to
these and other submitted concerns.
Sincerely yours,
Bruce Campbell
4
626
Coos County Planning k.:partment
Coos County Courthouse Annex, Coquille, Oregon 97423
Mailing Address: 250 N. Baxter, Coos County Courthouse, Coquille, Oregon 97423
Physical Address: 225 N. Adams, Coquille, Oregon
(541) 396-3121 Ext.210
FAX (541) 756-8630 /TDD (800) 735-2900
planning@co.coos.or.us
Patty Evemden, Planning Director
DATE:
TO:
FROM:
RE:
June 14, 2010
Board of Commissioners
Jill Rolfe, Administrative Planner
i
File # HBCU-l0-0l Pacific Connector Pipeline
There was testimony that was mailed directly to the Hearings Officer so they did not
get included in your original packet; therefore, please replace your cover sheet titled
"Testimony Received between the dates of May 21, 2010 to June 10, 2010" and
include items 24, 25 and 25a as attached to this memo.
Thank you and let us know if you have any questions.
627
Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10, 2010, Page 1
,
-,
-,
,,' - " - " " , '
Date Written
item Testimony # of
# Received From Description/Title pages
typed testimony titled "Land Use Hearing (File # HBCU
1 May 25,2010 Ron Sadler 10-01) Supplemental Testimony" 6
Comments on Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline (PCGP)
Land Use Coastal Zone Coos County Permit
2 June 7, 2010 Cascadia Wildlands Application (File # HBCU-10-01) (typed) 8
John B. Jones, III and Julie Application # HBCU-1 0-01 Pacific Connector Gas
3 June 8, 2010 Jones Pipeline (typed) 2
Philip John Keizer, Jr.,
4 June 9, 2010 M.D. MS (no title) typed letter addressed to Andrew Stamp 2
Bay Area Chamber of
5 June 9, 2010 Commerce HBCU-10-01 (typed letter on letter head) 2
Cover Letter titled Coos County Applications for
Friends of Living Oregon Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Project (with
6 June 9, 2010 Waters (FLOW) attachments as listed) 2
State of Oregon Agency Comments on Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). Dated
6a FLOW December 2008 122
State of Oregon Agency Comments on Final
6b FLOW Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). June 2009 65
Comments of National marine Fisheries Service
6c FLOW (NMFS) on FERC DEIS. December 2008 16
6d FLOW Comments of NMFS on FERC FEIS. June 2009 5
Comments on NMFS on Biological Assessment. June
6e FLOW 2009 10
Documents related to recent massive failure of
Williams pipeline in Appomattox, Virginia in
6f FLOW September 2008. 8
Mr. and Mrs. Timothy Application # HBCU-10-01 Pacific Connector Gas
7 June 9, 2010 Pearce Pipeline (typed) 2
William and Maryann Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Application # HBCU-
8 June 9, 2010 Rohrer 10-01(typed) 1
I 1
File N. HBCU-10-01 (typed)
E-mailed testimony titled PCGP June 10 2010 - 'I Jeff & Christie Meacham I
June 10, 2010 I Paul (Mike) Washburn I 9
10 ,
~ " " C '
Cover Letter titled Coos County Application for Pacific
11 June 10, 2010 FLOW Connector Gas Pipeline Project, HBCU-10-01 1
11a FLOW FLOW Coos Co. Comments June 9, 2010 11
11 b FLOW Excerpt, FERC Authorization PCGP December, 2009 4
,
12 June 10, 2010 Mark Whitlow Cover Letter 3
2002 coos County Decision (HBCU-02-04) approving
12a Mark Whitlow County's application for a 12-inch natural gas pipeline 49
628
Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10, 2010, Page 2
2009 Douglas County decision approving the 7.31 mile
12b Mark Whitlow segment of the PCGP project in Douglas County 98
Summary of the legislative history of OAR 660-006-
0025 regarding utility facilities allowed on forest-zoned
12c Mark Whitlow lands. 6
Portion of a final decision of the Energy Facility Siting
Council (EFSC) approving the COB Energy Facility in
12d Mark Whitlow Klamath County 24
Copy of the relevant portion of the Natural Gas Act
12e Mark Whitlow ("NGA") 2
Letter dated June 1,2010 from Derrick Welling P.E.,
responding to questions raised at the hearing
12f Mark Whitlow regarding geotechnical issues 30
Letter dated June 3, 2010 from Jared Ellsworth P.E.,
Project Engineer for Pacific Connector, responding to
groundwater quality, shallow wells and seeps
12g Mark Whitlow potentially affected by the Pacific Connector Project 4
Letter dated June 4, 2010, from Randy Miller CEP,
responding to environmental concerns in aquatic
12h Mark Whitlow areas 192
Letter dated June 8,2010 from Rodney Gregory
addressing feasibility of acquiring necessary right-of-
12i Mark Whitlow way for the pipeline. 1
Letter dated June 8, 2010 from Rodney Gregory
addressing potential pipeline impacts to forest
practices, pipeline corridor fires hazards, and the
availability of homeowners insurance to proximate
12j Mark Whitlow residential owners. 5
Letter dated June 9, 2010, from Robert H. Ellis Ph.D
providing a determination of project consistency with
12k Mark Whitlow the natural resource capabilities of Haynes Inlet 127
Letter dated June 9, 2010 from Randy Miller CEP
identifying the state and federal environmental permits
required for the aquatic portions of the project and
their relationship with applicable CBEMP standards,
and providing his professional opinion that it is feasible
for Pacific Connector to obtain the necessary state
121 Mark Whitlow and federal permits 10
hand written testimony titled "My comments on
13 June 10, 2010 Don Wisely proposed LNG pipeline" and news articles 2
Comments regarding Pacific Connector Pipeline land
Western Environmental use application HBCU-10-01 (Conditional Use
14 June 10, 2010 Law Center Approval for Pacific Connector natural gas pipeline) 39
Typed testimony titled "To the Attention of Hearings
15 June 10,2010 Elizabeth C. Matteson Officer - Andrew Stamp" 2
1" ~ - ' ' ' " ' ' ' , - , , , ~ _ . - .'. _.- _. ---'.. - " ' - - . ' - " ~ ' - , , " , , ' - ' . ' ' ' ' , ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' < ' - ~ ""'C_'_"""""'''''_'''''' __'' ,-r'-""', "",/-:,:',':',',',',"00"-"-.':, .,,_:1'--' '-'- .. ...' - - , - - , - _ . _ " . , - ~ , . , ~ ... '? ..., .'- - ~ . , . _ .." .. _< ..... _-.,...
June 10, 2010
June 10, 2010
June 10, 2010
Jake Robmson
Messerle & Sons
Typed testimony titled "HBCU-10-01"
Typed testimony titled "HBCU 10-1"
.. -",.,.O',.,-.-,-,." ,,_,.', __,-,,,.. ,. F'
Typed testimony titled" HBCU-10-01 - Pacific
Connector Gas Pipeline Application)
629
Testimony Received between the dates of May 21,2010 to June 10,2010, Page 3
Typed testimony titled "Comments on Pacific
19 June 10, 2010 Derrick Hindery, Ph.D. Connector Gas Pipeline 2
Typed testimony titled "Pacific Connector Conditional
20 June 10, 2010 Harry & Holly Stamper Use Permit Application File # HBCU-10-01" 20
John & Mary Margaret
21 June 10, 2010 Munchrath written testimony titled "To whom it may concern" 1
Confederated Tribes of Conditional User Permit for approval to allow a 49.7-
Coos, Lower Umpqua and mile natural gas (LNG) terminal on the north spit of
22 June 10, 2010 Siuslaw Indians Coos Bav with the Douglas portion of the pipeline 3
Titled" Application #HBCU 10-01- Pacific Connector
23 June 10,2010 Jody McCaffree Gas Pipeline 239
23a Jody McCaffree Exhibit Ai - map 1
23b - part 1 Jody McCaffree Exhibit A2 part 1 - map 1
23b - part 2 Jody McCaffree Exhibit A2 part 2 - map 1
24 June 14, 2010 Seymour Glasssman Dated May 22 addressed to A n d ~ 2
Dated May 25 addressed to Andrew Stamp (titled)
Coos County Planning Commission Hearing Pacific
25 June 14,2010 Dr. Robert Fischer Connector Pipeline 1
attached Civil No. 03-1697-HO Lead Case Sierra
25a Dr. Robert Fischer Club, et al 13
630
RONSADLER
Planning Department
Coos County Courthouse
250 N. Baxter
Coquille, Oregon 97423
May 21, 2010
R
'Er- r: n!f= D
n 't
v
",,= J
MAY 2 5 2010
COOS
/:
POBox 411
North Bend, Oregon 97459
ronsad@uci.net
LAND USE HEARING (FILE# HBCU-IO-Ol
SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY
I have previously submitted written and oral testimony in this case.
During the Applicant's Rebuttal phase at the hearing on May 20, a matter came up that I
feel warrants further discussion.
A participant at the hearing had offered oral testimony regarding his concern that
installing the pipeline across the floor ofthe bay might re-activate pollutants buried in the
bottomsediments.
His concerns have merit.
Research has shown that Coos Bay contains a number of introduced contaminants,
including several chlorinated hydrocarbons. Chlorinated hydrocarbons are extremely
worrisome in that, once introduced into an ecosystem, they are not broken down by
natural processes and persist in their original form almost indefInitely. While they are not
metabolized and inactivated, they can be removed from cycling through the food chain
by, for example, becoming sequestered and buried in bottom sediments. SignifIcant
disturbances of bottom sediments, such as by trenching and burying a newpipeline,
release these contaminants to once again re-enter the food cycle where they essentially
have the effect of increasing the dosage to which living elements are exposed.
For a more comprehensive and documented discussion ofthese points, please see my
previous testimony in the Jordan Cove Marine Docking Berth land use hearing included
herewith as Enclosure #1.
Reacting to these concerns during the Rebuttal phase, the Applicant's stated they would
be sampling the sediments along the pipeline route across the bay. They statedthat an
unspecifIed standardized evaluation process would be used which apparently refers to the
631
protocol used by the Corps of Engineers.
That is all well and good, but one thing is highly probable. The results of the testing will
almost certainly show some level of contaminants occurring at sub-lethal doses.
It is at this point that the logic of attempting to complete the land use approval process in
the absence of a viable Environmental Impact Statement begins to disintegrate.
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, the sediments show a few parts per billion (Ppb)
each ofpolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).
Apparently nothing to worry about, these are small amounts and any released
contaminants would be washed away with the next outgoing tide. Based onthe record
currently before the Board of Commissioners, the decision would no doubt be to go ahead
and approve the pipeline installation as this small amount ofpersistent organic pollutants
recycling through the food chain should not cause any apparent bad effects.
If a viable EIS were available, in the section entitled "Affected Environment" (missing
entirely, by the way, from the Jordan Cove FEIS), we would find that juvenile Chinook
salmon currently swimming in the Coos Bay estuary carry 25 ppb ofPCBs and 300 ppb
of PAHs in their bodies. We would learn that juvenile salmon and their prey
bioaccumulate chlorinated hydrocarbons whenever they become available in the food
chain with detrimental effects on their immune systems which results in increased disease
susceptibility (Enclosure 1). In addition, at some level, genetic effects begin to appear.
In addition, rather than being flushed away on the next tide, we would learn that particles
suspended in the water column in parts of Coos Bay can take as long as 48 days to be
flushed from the estuary (Enclosure 1).
At this point, from a land use approval perspective, it would be apparent that a rubber
stamp approval ofthe project would not be warranted, as the possibility exists the
planned project could move us closer to a threshold which could initiate irreversible
catastrophic impacts on the bay ecosystem. However, the unknown probability ofthis
happening would cause a reluctance to cancel the project out ofhand.
At this point, it would be logical to refer back to the EIS once again and turn to the
sections on "Need for the project" (also missing from the Jordan Cove EIS) as well as the
section which gives a balanced and complete side-by side comparison ofthe proposed
project and all reasonable alternatives (yet again, missing from the Jordan Cove EIS).
The rationale of a logical land use decision could be developed as follows:
- If the need was dire and immediate, and iffew viable alternatives were
available, it would not be arbitrary or capricious to knowingly accept the
environmental risks to the estuary and approve the pipeline in order to better serve
the greater societal needs.
632
- Ifthe need was speculative and future oriented, and ifthere were viable
alternatives in place or readily available, it would not be worthwhile to risk the
real possibility but uncertain probability oftriggering catastrophic impacts to the
estuarine ecosystemand the pipeline would not be approved.
ill my estimation, the interplay of a valid and complete EIS withinthe County land use
approval process is absolutely essential in this case given the importance and possible
long-termimplications ofthe decision to be made.
I understand the legal constraints placed on the Hearing Officer by the existing County
land use approval process. I also understand this to be a somewhat arcane process
probably inadequate to function adequately in today's managerial climate.
I find that the Oregon Progress Board essentially agrees with this premise: "The State's
existing environmental data collection and management systemmust be improved to
effectively measure ecological conditions, trends or risks. Measuring ecological
conditions, trends, and risks is fundamentally different from the problems Oregon's
environmental programs were initially established to address. Resolving them will
require new approaches..... " (Oregon State ofthe Environment Report 2000, Statewide
Summary, page 3).
I ask that you apply your best creative efforts to find a way to postpone the land use
approval decision until such time as it can be more fully and logically considered within
the context of a viable and objective Environmental Impact Statement. I believe the
environmental risks involved fully justify your efforts in this area.
633
Ron Sadler
PO Box 411
NorthBend,OR 97459
Email: ronsad@uci.net
Phone: 541-759-4790
In the matter of: Coos County Land Use Hearing
Jordan Cove Marine Docking Berth
September 17, 2007
Coquille, Oregon
Testimony ofRon Sadler:
It is critical to remember, as was stated in a U.S. Department ofInterior report, that Coos
Bay is truly an ecosystem and one modification or activity could start a chain reaction
which could affect the whole, resulting in severe damage to certain natural resources.
1
The displacement, handling, and disposition ofapproximately 6,000,000 cubic yards of
excavated and dredged material from the bottom and shoreline ofthe bay is certainly an
activity that has great potential to do significant damage to marine life in the estuary,
especially salmonid fish populations. This potential for damage is especially worrisome
given what the sediments involved may contain.
Samples taken at various points in the Coos Bay estuary have shown concentrations of
toxic materials in bottom sediments exceeding levels at which ecological effects are
noted. These toxins include Tributyltin, arsenic, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, zinc,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PARs), ,and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
2
In addition, there are ongoing inputs of materials that may contribute to the accumulation
oftoxins in bottom sediments. In the year 2000, for example, there were inputs totaling
2,470 pounds ofar$enic, chromium, zinc, copper, and mercury released in Coos County.
3
Further, the Coos Bay estuary receives unknown amounts of aliphatic organochlorines,
chlorinated dibenzofurans, chlorinated phenols, and metabolites of each, as a by-product
ofthe release oftreated municipal wastewater. Looking further back in time, 40 years
ago there was a pulp mill located 011 the bay at Empire. Its outfall of wastewatet entered
the bay untreated via a pipe located in the middle ofthe shipping channel. The resulting
outflowresultedin a linear "dead zone" extending towards the mouth ofCoos Bay. The
types and amounts of toxins residing in the deep sediments at this location have not been
investigated to my knowledge.
The various chlorinated organic cornpounds mentioned above are known as POPs -
persistent organic pollutants. At the molecular level, they are extremely stable alld
'# ~
, .la34
virtually indestructible by natural processes. In some instances, polymer chains may be
broken by natural processes, but may recombine to form new compounds (metabolites)
even more toxic than the originals.
Most appropriate to this discussion, then, is the fact that toxic material such as metals,
PCBs, PARs, etc. once released into the environment can remain unchanged for
thousands of years. They are not biodegraded into more benign substances. They
continue to cycle through the ecosystem raising havoc until they become no longer
available to the flora and fauna through the process of sequestration.
In an estuarine ecosystem, the primary mechanismfor sequestering toxins results in them
being locked up by becoming buried in or attached to bottom sediments. There they
remain out of reach of most organisms until some disturbance releases them to r e ~ e n t e r
the food chain once again.
This is not a perfect process, however, as evidenced by conditions as they exist in Coos
Bay today. Juvenile Chinook salmon in the Coos Bay estuary presently carry about 300
ppb ofPARmetabolite concentrations in their bodies. They also carry about 25 ppb of
PCB concentrations. As testimony to the longevity ofthese types oftoxins, they also
carry about 9 ppb ofDDT concentrations, a fu1130 years after its use was banned.
4
It is well established that sediments in estuaries sequester and act as repositories for
contaminants. It has also been shown that juvenile salmon and their prey bioaccumulate
chlorinated and aromatic hydrocarbons, when they become available in the food chain,
with detrimental effects on their immune systems which results in increased disease
susceptibility.
5
Given current baseline loadings of toxins injuvenile salmon, howmuch
room exists for additional inputs oftoxins before critical thresholds are crossed?
The dynamics of tidal flows in estuaries are often viewed in simplistic terms. It is
tempting to think of a cloud of murky water, with its associated toxins, created by
dredging being carried out of sight and out ofmind by the next out-going tide. This is
not realistic, however. Studies have shown that a particle suspended inthe water column
in parts of Coos Bay can take as long as 48 days to be flushed from the estuary.
6
.
Given the serious and potentially catastrophic effects that could negatively impact the
salmonid productivity of the Coos Bay estuary, it appears premature and inappropriate to
approve the construction ofthe marine docking berth at this time.
Several key elements of information essential to an informed and rational decision appear
to be missing at this time. Aviable decision process would require the following:
1. An intensive sampling of all areas proposed for dredging or excavation, to the
full depth ofplanned disturbance, to determine the types and concentrations of
all toxins expected in the spoils.
635
2. Adetailed and explicit disposal and/or storage plan for all dredged and
excavated material, with explicit requirements to prevent water or wind borne
re-deposition in the estuary.
3. Arisk assessment detailing an estimation of the net effects of unavoidable
releases of sequestered toxins on salmonid productivity.
I ask that this information be gathered and analyzed before further action is taken on the
marine docking berth proposal.
FOOTNOTES
1. USDI, "Natural Resources. Ecological Aspects. Uses and Guidelines for the Management of Coos
Bay", L. B. Day, June, 1971, pg. 128.
2. NOAA, "PreliminaryNatural Resource Survey. Coos Bay, December 12, 1997, pg. 11.
3. EPA, "Toxic Release Inventory, Coos County. Oregon", 2000
4. Dr. Mary Arkoosh, National Marine Fisheries Service, Newport, Oregon, 2000.
5. Dr. Mary Arkoosh, "Effect ofPollution on Fish Diseases: Potential Impacts on Salmonid Populations",
Journal ofAquatic Animal Health, Vol. 10, June 1998, pp. 182-190.
6. Arneson, "Seasonal Variation in Tidal Dynamics. Water Quality and Sediments in the Coos Bay
Estuary", OSUMasters Thesis, June, 1976.
1
2
3
4
S
6
636
ascadia Wildlands
PO Box 10455 Eugene, OR 97440 541.434.1463 (tel) 541.434.6494 (fax) info@cascwild.org
June 3,2010
Planning Depatiment
Coos County Comihouse
250 N. Baxter, Coquille, Oregon 97423
,lUi'! C(; ;
\'\ I
RE: Comments Orr Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline (pCGP) Land Use Coastal Zone
Coos County Permit Application (File# HBCU-10-01).
Coos County Planning Conifilission:
Please consider these comments from Cascadia Wildlands in yom' decision on the
conditional use approval to allow a 49.7-mile natmal gas pipeline cOlmecting the Jordan
Cove liquefied natural gas (LNG) temlinal on the north spit of Coos Bay with the
Douglas County pOliion of the pipeline.
We ask the Planning Commission to deny the conditional use application due to its
adverse impacts on the environment and on local citizens, and the fact that the application
is incomplete and does not meet the code criteria.
1. Northwest Forest Plan
TIns pipeline will violate the requirements of the Northwest Forest Plan on BLM lands,
which will have a ilegative impact to federal ForestlY Operations on 27%
1
ofthe forested
miles of the pipeline. The BLMis the largest forest landowner in the Coos County
pipeline route where Forestly Operations must provide for adequate wildlife habitat,
protect water quality and other ecosystemservices.
The proposed use would "force a significant change in, or significantly increase the cost
of, accepted ... forest practices,,2. The NOlihwest Forest Plan is what determines the
accepted forest practices on BLM land, not Oregon's Forest Management Plan. The
"management activitieS" that would be disrupted relative to federal uses are broader than
management activities on the private lands the pipeline crosses. County approval of the
existing pipeliile right-of-way will force a significant change, and significantly increase
the cost of, accepted forest practices of the Northwest Forest Plan.
1 Staff Report 12 reports that out of S9,47 miles of Forest Land the pipeline crosses in CobS County,
10.75 miles is on land.
2 Criteria Section 4.8.400 A.
peGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 1
637
The BLM management their land along the pipeline right-of-way under Northwest Forest
Plan
3
(NWFP) requires the BLMto survey for rare plant and animal species before
ground disturbing activities can begin. If surveyed species are found, they should be
protected. Known as Survey and Manage (S&M)4, surveys must be done in all forests
over 80 years of age. Since the BLM has not yet completed the surveys according to the
2001 S&M regulations, the BLMand PCGP do not yet know what impacts the pipeline
would have as it crosses public lands.
On December 17,2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
issued an Order in Conservation Northwest et at. v. Rey, et at., No. 08-1067 (W.D.
Wash.) (Coughenour, J.), granting Plaintiffs' motion for pa11ial summary judgment and
fmding a variety ofNEPAviolations in the BLM and USFS 2007 Record of Decision
eliminating the Survey and Manage mitigation measure. Previously, in 2006, the District
Court (Judge Pechman) had invalidated the agencies' 2004 RODs eliminating Survey and
Manage. Following the District Court's 2006 ruling, parties to the litigation had entered
into a stipulation exempting certain categories of activities from the Survey and Manage
standard (hereinafter refened to as "Pechman Exemptions").
Judge Pechman's Order from October 11,2006 directs: "Defendants shall not authorize,
allow, or permit to continue any logging or other ground-disturbing activities on projects
to which the 2004 ROD applied unless such activities are in compliance with the 2001
ROD (as the 2001 ROD was amended or modified as of March 21,2004), except that this
order will not apply to:
(a) Thinning projects in stands younger than 80 years old;
(b) Replacing or removing culverts for temporary roads;
(c) Some types of riparian and stream improvement projects; and
(d) Some hazardous fuel treatments where prescribed fire is applied.
Lineal pipelines are not included in this exception. Following the Court's December 17,
2009 rcling, the Pechman exemptions are still in place. Because the PCGP application
entails regeneration harvest, logging in stands over 80 years old, extensive road building
and trenching, the project does not meet any of the Pechman Exemptions.
Therefore, this project cannot proceed until Surveys are done on BLM lands in
accordance with the 2001 Survey and Manage ROD, and found species protected. The
FERC LNGreferenced Survey and Manage using the nowillegal 2003 Survey protocols,
which did not require surveying for many of the species the 2001-ROD requires. Once
the proper surveys are done for all required species, the final pipeline route could need to
be modified. It is pointless to grant the application now, not knowing what final route
will be taken.
3 The Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) on Management of Habitat for Late-
Successional and Old-Growth Related Species Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl (USDA and
USDI1994). Northwest Forest Plan. Page C-4
4 The 2001 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for Amendments to the Survey
and Manage, Protection Buffer, and other Mitigation Measures Standards and Guidelines in Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 2
638
Another major change in BLM lands that should be considered by Coos County is the
change in the BLM's overall management plan. The application incorporates the FERC
LNG Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) by reference. This FEIS bases
environmental impacts on the Western Oregon Plan Revision (WOPR) land allocations
on BLM lands (including BLM lands inthe CZMA). The WOPR, a new management
plan adopted by BLM in December 2008, was withdrawn on July 16, 2009 by the
Department ofInterior. Therefore the LNG FEIS needs to be supplemented with impacts
to BLMlands managed under the 1995 Northwest Forest Plan before a final decision can
be made to allowthe pipeline to be built. The FERC LNGFEIS is incomplete and cannot
be referenced in this application. When complete information is referenced, it will likely
result in a change in the right-of-way.
Another step required by the BLM is an amendment of the BLM's 1995 Resource
Management Planto allow a pipeline that would otherwise illegally degrade endangered
species reserves and violates the Aquatic Conservation Strategy. The BLMhas not yet
started this process, and when it does so, it could take another year to approve a final
pipeline route and determine mitigations for destroying salmon, spotted owl, and marbled
murrelet habitat. This would result in even more pipeline relocations.
Since the land can only be used as permitted
5
, all of these changes in the right-of-way
location will require the County to go through this permitting process again. Therefore, it
is premature to grant the application based on the existing right-of-way. It makes no
sense to approve an application before those plans and re-routes are finalized.
2. Safety
Before the commissioners grant this application, safety of county residents who live near
the 49.7 miles must be considered.
Rural areas have weaker pipeline safety standards that PCGP has to follow. Federal
pipeline regulations define most people in Southern Oregon as in a "Class 1 location
area" because home density is less than 10 homes within 660 feet, along a mile of the
pipeline. This is also true through most ofthe 50 miles though Coos County. In Class 1
locations, only a minimum of 10% of the welds are required to be inspected or tested,
compared to non-rural areas where up to 100% ofthe welds are inspected by techniques
such as X-ray. Also of concern in rural areas is that thinner pipes are permitted, and
virtually no internal inspections are required on the pipeline once it is in the ground.
6
These and other weaker regulations for Class I areas mean safety is being compromised
by the PCGP just because Coos County is rural.
The PCGP pipeline will be installed and maintained by Williams Pipeline. On September
14,2008, a Williams's natural gas 36" pipeline exploded in an urban neighborhood in
5 Criteria Section 3.3.300
6 CFR Title 49, Part 192, Transportation of natural and other gas by pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety
Standards: <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgiltitextttext-idx?c=ecfr&sid=b024b0040734d9320
fdb3a1 c1 aeaf3e1&rgn=div5&view=text&node=49:3.1.1.1.3&idno=49#49:3.1.1.1.3.2.9.3>
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 3
639
Texas. A huge explosion erupted into a fireball that demolished two homes and blistered
siding on homes 400 yards away7. If it could happen in 2008 in Texas to a Williams
pipeline, it could happen in Oregon.
The 49.7 miles in Coos County has the unique geological features of the rugged Coastal
mountain ranges which has steep and unstable slopes, clay soils, rocky terrain, and
earthquake potential. Safety-wise, constructing this pipeline throtlgh this area is
questionable at best, ifliot foolhardy.
The application failed to consider how many families along the 49.7 miles will be
"boxed-in" by the pipeline, with no access or escape route except over the pipeline.
Accidents happen, vandalismhappens, leaks happen. For rurall'esidents that are trapped
behind afaulty pipeline, accidel1ts could be fatal, especially since the gas is unordorized.
The County should consider other impacts to HIraI families, slIch as their ability to build
new structures near the pipeline, above or below ground, impacts to wells, pasul1'es, and
family forest lands. Because ofweaker pipeli11e regulations in rural areas, the pipeline
l;ight-of-way will violate criteria section 4.8.400 B.
3. Fire
The StaffReport found that the pipeline would not significantly increase fire hazard. The
applicant and the staff only considered the fire hazard from a potential release of gas
fro111 the pipeline. They failed to consider how the pipeline corridor alone could influence
the spread ofwildland fire. Aclearcut cOlTidor containing only dry, flammable brush,
cOlIld spread a wildfire though Coos County forests at a speed greater than without the
ylearcut corridor, and thus disrupt Forestry Operations on all land ownerships within the
Coos County pipeline corridor. .
This application will "significantly increase fire hazard or significantly increase fire
suppression costs".8 The pipeline clearcut right-of-way could. act like a wick and spread
wildland fire fmiher along the right-of-way path from its source; ang thm; to the adjoining
forests, faster than if the right-of-way did not exist. This increased fire risk is a safety
issue to local residents, and a potential increase in fire-suppression cost.
There is an abundance of science that backs tlp this claim. For instance, the WEEP report
for the 2002 Tiller fire, (near the pipeline route in the South Umpqua watershed)
detelmined that "The YOl111g vegetation, including plantations, experienced a
disproportionately high amount of stand.,replacement mortality caused by crown fires as
compared to older, unmanaged forests... Plantations had a tendency to Increase the rate
of fire spread and increase the overall area of stand-replacement fIre effects by spreading
to neighboring stands.,,9 The pel}1etually young vegetation of the pipeline right-of-way,
7 www.newsadvance.com/lna/news/locallarticle/
some appomattox residents return home after explosion/83921
8 Criteria Section 4.8.400 B.
9 Wildfire Effects Evaluation Project. UNF. March 2003 Page 4.
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 4
640
similar to a plantation, will also increase the rate of fire spread, this time following the
young vegetation, bringing fire along the pipeline route and into adjoining forests.
Numerous scientific studies have documented that tree plantations or young vegetation,
because they lack the resistant prowerties of native forests, have a tendency to bum hotter
in forest fires and spread quicker.
1
The vegetation and young trees in the pifeline right-
of-way is dense, packed close together, making them more inclined to bum.
1
The
increased susceptibility offorest openings, such as the pipeline route, to severe fire is also
due to the fact that they have warmer, windier and drier conditions than natural forests. 12
In a study of fire severity in northwest California, researchers found that tree plantations
of any age were "more receptive to combustion" than other forests. The study found:
...tree plantations had twice the burn severity of closed-canopy forests. Fire severity
tended to increase with plantation age... Plantations of any age are more receptive to
combustion than co-occurring forests in our study area. Because plantations are often
established following high-severity fire, a self-reinforcing relationship is possible. An
ecological analog may exist where exotic species invade and become abundant
through positive feedback with fire. Plantations in or study area have grown to cover
about one-third of the roaded area burn in 1987, increasing the likelihood of future
positive feedback effects. In concert with climate change, these landscape dynamics
provide reason to expect the trend of increasing fire size to cOIitinue, especially in
roaded areas. 13
Plantations have similar properties to the pipeline conidor - dry, sunny, dense vegetation.
The study "found high fire severity in plantations" and "found that plantations and
adjacent vegetation burned more severely than natural forests.,,14 While Pacific
Connector might remove the vegetation within the right-of-way occasionally, it will be
there more often then it won't be there.
Another reason the pipeline route can act as a wick, spreading wildland fire quickly, is
that vegetation removal will leave behind tons offme fuels, exasperating the fire danger.
All ofthis violates criteria section 4.8.400 B.
4. Right-of-Way exceeds 50-feet.
Right of ways over 50 feet are not allowed under county zoning code
l5
The code makes
no distinction between temporary and permanent right-of-ways. PCGP will require at
10 For instance: DellaSala, D.A., D.M. Olson, S.E. Barth, S.L. Crane and SA Primm. 1995. Forest health:
moving beyond rhetoric to restore healthy landscapes in the inland northwest. Wildlife Society Bultetin 23(3):
346-356. Ingalsbee,T. 1997. Fires burn hotter in tree farms. Headwaters Forest News 7(2):10-11
11 Frost. E.J. and R. Sweeny. 2000. Fire Regimes, Fire History and Forest Conditions in the Klamath-
Siskiyou Region: An Overview and Synthesis of Knowledge. Available at:
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/forests/attachmentslfireJeport.pdf. . .
12 Countryman, C.M. 1955. Old-growth conversion also converts fire climate. Fire Control Notes 17(4):15-19.
13 Odion, Frost, Strittholt, Jiang, DellaSala, Moritz. Conservation Biology Vol. 18, No.4, Aug. 2004. Patterns
of Fire Severity and Forest Conditions in the Western Klamath Mountains, Ca. Pg. 933-934
14 OCUon, Frost, Strittholt, Jiang, DellaSala and Moritz. Conservation Biology Vol. 18, No.4, Aug. 2004.
Patterns of Fire Severity and Forest Conditions in the Western Klamath Mountains, California. Pg. 935
15 Criteria Section 4.8.300(F)
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments PageS
641
least a 95-foot right-of-way to build the pipeline. Potentially a 300' right-of-way (100' on
either side of the 95-foot right-of-way) is needed in certain areas.
95-feet is needed to give access to heavy equipment digging the pipeline trench, and later,
this width will again be needed when repairing the pipeline. A 95-feet wide clearcut will
be needed through all forested areas, and re-clearcut in the event a repair is needed that
involves digging up the pipe (which is fairly common). The applicant never admitted that
the 50-foot limit would be almost doubled.
In areas that are very steep, or where the pipeline will turn, a 150' -wide clearcut would be
required, interfering with significant forestry operations for decades, or centuries,
depending on the purpose of the forestry operations. In some areas, "Temporary Extra
Work Areas" (TEWAs), sometimes acres wide, would need to be taken from the
landowner and clearcut. In other areas, strips up to 100' wide on either side of the 95'
wide clearcut would need to be taken from the landowner so that slash, rocks, and other
debris from digging the pipeline trench could be permanently stored, called "Uncleared
Storage Areas". While the application implies that Uncleared Storage Areas are
"temporary", in fact, right-of-way debris like tree stumps and boulders will be stored
there permanently, permanently rendering the land unusable for other purposes, like
forestry operations.
These right-of-ways in excess of 50' are needed by PCGP to install, maintain and repair
the pipeline for the life of the pipeline, and could be taken by eminent domain ifthe
landowner does not agree. Years from now, if a part ofthe pipeline needs repairing,
PCGP can again ''take'' a 95' or 150' wide strip ofland and rip up any trees planted or
other so-called mitigations outside of the 50' wide right-of-way. The criteria requires a
50' wide right-of-way limit
16
This application requires far more and thus is not allowed
under the current zoning code provisions.
PCGP admits that the right-of-way outside ofthe 50' width is a significant long-term
"take" of people's lands and forest conditions. Although forested areas located outside of
the permanent maintenance corridor, which were cleared during construction, would be
revegetated and allowed to regenerate to their original state, it would take multiple
decades for these areas to reestablish to pre-construction conditions; therefore, impacts in
these areas are considered 10ng-termP
5. Application is inadequate in other ways
The application failed to give the acres of "Temporary Extra Work Areas" (TEWAs) in
each land-type. The Planning Commission should know howmany extra forested acres
need to be clearcut and how many extra grazing land acres need to be disturbed for
TEWAs. The application states TEWA's will be "reclaimed", but it could be decades
before the soil compaction and other disturbances are restored.
15 Criteria Section 4.8.300(F)
17 LNG EIS 4.4-37
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 6
642
The application discloses that TEWAs will more likely be placed on very steep side
slopes in forested locations. This increases the likelihoodoflandslides from the pipeline
clearcut corridor, as clearcut slopes have twice the probability of management-caused
landslides. IS
Likewise, the number of Uncleared Storage Area (UCSA) acres have not been disclosed
in the application. UCSAs are not cleared of overstory trees, but they are cleared of
understory trees and brush, have soils compaction because of heavy equipment use, and
also can take decades to recover brush and soil cQnditions. UCSAs might never fully
recover because the forest debris stored there will remain there permanently, such as
large stumps and boulders.
For TEWA's, FERC has given an exemption for the 50' set-back for almost all
waterbodies onthe pipeline
19
FERC also gives an exemption inthe EIS so that every
Uncleared Storage Area (UCSA) can violate the 50' setback requirement. The Coos
CountY application fails to disclose howmany of the TEWAs and UCSAs will violate the
50' setback for waterbodies.
Mitigations offered are also inadequate. The application claims that only 30 feet centered
over the pipeline will be maintained as a cleared corridor through forested areas. The
remaining 20 feet of the permanent right-of-way as well as the disturbed temporary
construction easement will be reforested. What the application doesn't say is that anytime
there is a pipeline problem, all the mitigation is ripped up, the replanted trees are cut
down, the sediment barrier are taken up, and the so-called "temporary construction
easement" is used again. As happened recently on the Medford lateral, a small subsidence
or underground landslide, caused many feet of that pipeline to be uncovered. Any of the
49.7 miles of pipeline through Coos County could also be uncovered at any time inthe
future, over and over again. All trees and sediment barriers and other mitigations will be
removed, impacting streams, fmm land and forest land.
The application failed to fully describe the pipeline hydrostatic testing procedures and
impacts. The company will use millions of gallons ofwater to pressure test the pipeline,
and then discharge the water into a sub-watershed different from where it was collected.
This has the potential to spread disease, kill fish, and cause soil and stream-bank erosion.
The application failed to describe a safe, plentiful source of water for hydrostatic testing,
or a safe way to discharge the millions of gallons ofwater to prevent soil erosion and
spreading of disease. This is especially important to consider in this area of Port Orford
Cedar root rot, which spreads in water and mud transferred from an infected watershed to
an uninfected watershed.
PCGP claims this is a "public utility project", and as such enjoys relaxation of
environmental protections, such as the 50-foot riparian vegetation protection.
This is not a public utility project. No gas generated in Coos County will be exported. No
16 Oregon Department of Forestry. 1998
19 FERC LNG DEIS 4.3-38
PCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page?
643
gas imported from overseas is to be delivered to the public in Coos County, thqs Coos
County will receive no economic or service benefit from reducing environmental
protections in the riparian zone. Instead, Coos County residents will just receive
environmental problems, such as lower fish populations that have economically sustained
the county, with no public benefit. In fact, Coos County residents are giving up their
environ.mental protections and their land for the benefit ofRussian 01' other Foreign gas
companies. None of the county residents ate expOlting their own products. The
couditional use permit should not waive the 50-foot riparian vegetation set back
requiremeneo 01' other waivers allowed a "public utility project".
The goal of the American people is to reduce or eliminate our dependence on foreign
imports of fossil fuels. LNG is counter to this goal, bringing gas in from places like
Russia. Therefore, ifthe United States meets our goal to eliminate our dependence for
energy from foreign governments, this pipeline will be useless.
The application claims that the gas supplied by this pipeline is "necessalY for public
se1'vice,,21. We disagree. This does not comply With Criteria defi.nition ofnecessalY for
public service. There is hot a need fo1' LNG in Oregon. In reality, there is far less
domestic demand for LNG than PCGP discloses in their application. For instance, the
application failed take into a.ccount the Ruby pipeline a 42-inch natui'al gas transmission
pipeline beginning at the Opal Hub in Wyoming and terminating at Malin, Oregon, the
same location as the PCGP pipeline. Ruby is designed to serve Northern California also,
with an initial capacity of between 1,300 and 1,500 :MMcf/d
22
, Once the Ruby pipeline is
built, bringing prolific supplies of domestic natural gas to the California market, we have
no need to increase our energy dependence on foreign governments, making this PCGE
pipeline applicati.on unneceSSalY.
In conclusion, Cascadia Wildlands 1'equest paliy standing in the proceedings, for the
reasons stated above. The pipeline's route through Coos County impairs our mission to
protect and restore the watersheds of the Coquille river basins and to reduce global
warming impacts on our climate.
Francis Eatherington
Cascadia Wildlands
P.O. Box 10455
Eugene, OR 97440
frallcis@cascwild.org 541~ 6 4 3 - 1 3 0 9
Please send responses to Our field office at:
886 Raven Lane, Roseburg, OR97471
20 Criteria Section 4.8.750 11
21 Criteria Section 2.1.200. Utilities
22 Nqrthwest Gas Association 2008 Outlook, http://www,nwg13.org/pub-,docs/gasoutiook08.pdf, p. 25.
pCGP Conditional Use Application comments Page 8
644
John BJones, III and Julie Jones
89056 Whiskey Run Lane
Bandon, OR 97411
541.;.347-2528
jules2030@verizon.net
Coos County Planning Dept.
250 N. Baxter
Coquille, OR 97423
Re: Application # HBCU-10-01
Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline
Dear Mr. Andrew Stamp and Coos County Planning Dept:
fUN r' 201[)
June 7,2010
We are writing out of concern with the proposal by Pacific Connector Gas
Pipeline to cross 383 water bodies in Coos County per the Pacific Connector's
Clean Water Permit Application that was submitted to the Army Corps in May of
2009. Now, the Final EIS on page 4.5-84 states The Pacific Connector pipeline
would cross and affect 249 water bodies. There appears to be a significant
difference in the number of water body impacts here. Which is it? And why the
change, since the route has not changed?
We were wondering how the LNG tankers could possibly enter into and out of
Coos Bay with all the special security exclusion zones around LNG tankers and
not have any adverse impacts to the current ships using the harbor for the
shipment of wood chips and logs. This would adversely affect an already viable
business and commerce for the harbor. There already exists a 1,500 foot
exclusion zone on either side of LNG tankers t h ~ t coulq extend two miles in front
of LNGtankers and one mile behind that would also threaten our commercial
chip andlQgging ships that enter here and devastate the local fishermen. There
would too many restrictions on the mouth of the port for access for fishermen,
tourists, sailing vessels and recreation in the bay.
These LNG pipes that would cross forest zoned lands, private family farms, Coos
Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands (whose timber sales go into the County Fund),
estuary, Watershed, natural habitats for marine and wildlife, and oyster bed farms
are too significant of major impacts. There is a large variety of threatened and
endangered species that call home to Coos Bay. This pipeline would degrade the
critical habitats and streams for salmon and numerous other species by the foot
print of the pipes belowthe water and on land causing potential land slides and
sediment run off into the water bodies.
1
645
Re: Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Application
# HBCU-10-01
What about releases of LNG? Just think of the fire hazard. The hazard zone for
this pipeline is approximately 900 feet in circumference from the center of the
pipe. This would take into account 1,800 feet across. These impacts are
immense. Afire could devastate our forests, family farms and spread so quickly
given the dry season and remote locations of some the LNG pipe areas. Look at
the mess we have in the Gulf of Mexico. Accidents happen. Releases of LNG
into our Bay, rivers, creeks, streams, forests and estuaries would devastate the
biological ecosystemthat nurseries 1,OOO's or more of critical fish and animal
habitat. The devastation to Clausen Oyster Farm submerged tide flats could
potentially put the family out of business. The unknowns are too many and LNG's
high ignition potential being so volatile is much too risky for our area.
Why would we want an LNGterminal in our port and a gas pipeline to serve only
those in California? There are no benefits to the residents of Oregon. The long
term impacts are too over powering and far too great for this small county to
absorb. Please deny Jordan Cove Terminal and the pipeline application. We look
fOlWard to hearing from you.
Cc: Andrew H. Stamp, Atty at Law
4248 Galewood Street
Suite 16
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
2
646
Philip John Keizer, Jr., MD, MS
2300 N.14th Street
Coos Bay, OR 97420
Andrew Stamp
Coos County Planning Department
250 Baxter St
Coquille, OR97423
June 8, 2010
Dear Mr. Stamp:
JUN 0 D2010
As you suggested during the May 10th hearing, I have reviewed the information
submitted by the applicant just prior to the hearing and I do not find a comprehensive
Emergency Response Plan (ERP). Paragraph 68 on page 84 of Docket No. CP07-441-000,
et al. states the ERP shall be filed with the Secretary for review and written approval by
the Director ofOEP prior to initial site preparation. I assume this to mean the ERP has
not yet been drafted. The ERP is a vital component and should not be put offuntil the
last moment and then pushed through in haste. A case in point is the Shoreham Nuclear
Power Plant built on Long Island, NY. The plant was nearly completed when it was
determined the ERP was inadequate. This resulted in significant delays to the project and
eventual conversion ofthe plant to fossil fuel instead of nuclear fuel at great expense to
the local rate payers. We can avoid a similar travesty by planning ahead. The ERP should
be finalized before Coos County gives any permission or permits to proceed with the
project.
Also listed are minimum requirements ofthe ERP. While these requirements are good
things to consider, they fall short ofa complete list of minimum requirements. These
appear to be more directed to the ships and the terminal than the pipeline. I do feel that
the pipeline, terminal and vessels are mutually dependent upon each other. Like
I
conjoinedtwins sharing a vital organ, none' would survive without the others. Therefore,
a comprehensive ERP would include all three.
The ERP should outline a clear chain of command in order to avoid confusion between
various local, county, state and federal agencies. Coordination should be made with local
ham radio operators. Clear escape routes need to be established for evacuation ofthe
public. This is ofgreat concern for people living and working near the pipeline which
could easily cut off exit routes in the rural areas. The pipeline should also be directed
around the rural residential areas to avoid this specific problem. Analysis needs to be
made on effects ofweather and different scenarios need to be considered for various
Pasquill categories. Emergency drills should be planned annually. These should include
all groups, not just the pipeline and terminal staff.
647
Multiple system failures need to be considered. For example, what if the pipe breaks at
one of the control valves. What if the remote safety valve control system fails. What if
the monitoring system fails, etc.
During the hearing, you asked me what I thought a worst case scenario would be. I have
now had more time to think about it. There are likely several different scenarios which
could be consideredj and for emergency planning and drills, different scenarios should be
played out. While these are unlikely events, they are still possible and it is prudent to
prepare for the worst so as to be best able to handle any actual emergency situation.
Having thought out and planned for a low probability, high consequence event leaves us
better prepared for a higher probability and lower consequence event. And, ifthe worst
happens, we have a plan.
As for the LNG portion, the original analysis was assuming 12,500 m
3
I believe FERC used
23,000 m
3
. The proposed volume is 148,000 m
3
. A leak from the terminal was assumed to
be limitedto 10 minutes at full preSSUl'e. Any analysis is only as good as the assumptions
made. It only stands to reason that ifthe full volume of LNG was to be lost and the
appropriate weather conditions existed, a far worse disaster would be upon us and the
proposed safety zones would be too narrow.
One possible worst case type scenario would be an earthquake causing multiple pipeline
failures, breach and loss ofthe full volume ofLNG in the terminal and an approaching
LNG vessel. The earthquake could also disrupt communications. Bridges could be out
prohibiting traffic along highway 101 both north and south. Abridge failUl'e or pipeline
secondary fire could close highway 42. Multiple secondary fires would start in both
residential areas as well as in the forests. Fires from the terminal and vessel could disable
the airport, Coast Guard Air Station and the North Bend Fire Department. Residential
fires could trap physicians, nurses, EMTs, and other emergency responders. Fires could
trap students at North Bend High, North Bend Middle and Sunset Middle Schools. This
is just one possible scenario and other equally bad or perhaps worse could be considered.
My purpose today is not to compose a complete ERP and worst case scenarios, but rather
to point out this has not yet been done. Therefore, I urge you to rule against this project
based upon inadequate emergency planning and to require a comprehensive ERP before
reconsideringthe application. The applicant has demonstrated a past practice of
submitting voluminous material just before deadlines. This impedes the public review
process. Therefore, I further suggest public notification ofthe ERP completion and a
public comment hearing after reasonable time for the public to reviewthe document. We
are, after all, the people living with or perishing from this project.
Sincerely,
Philip John Keizer, Jr., MD, MS
648
June 9,2010
Patty Evernden, Planning Director
Coos County Planning Department
Coos County Annex
201 N. Adams
Coquille, OR 97423
RE: HBCU-l0-0l
Ms. Evernden:
PI
JlJN n ~ ) 2U1U
The Bay Area Chamber of Commerce supports the conditional use request by
Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline to allow a 49.7 mile natural gas pipeline connecting
the Jordan Cove LNG terminal on the North Spit of Coos Bay with the Douglas
County portion of the pipeline. The Chamber endorses the pipeline route of the
applicant which considers the social, environmental and economic impacts it will
have, while treating landowners fairly and with respect.
We find the Coos County Planning Department staff report on HBCU-l0-0l was
well written, with a good analysis and proposed conditions which adequately
address the public good. We support the conditions as specified within that .
report and urge the approval of the requested coniditional use permit.
Coos Bay is Oregon's largest costal deep-draft harbor and its economic value to
commerce in Southern Oregon is currently underutilized. With the demise of our
natural resource based economy, over the last 30 years, our county consistently
ranks among the highest in the state for unemployment. This $1 billion
investment in our area will directly benefit the entire sbuthern Oregon region.
The additional $19 million in property taxes will help provide needed services
across the county.
145 Central Avenue Coos Bay, Oregon 97420
(541) 266-0868 Fax: (541) 267-6704
www.oregonsbayarea.org
649
The Bay Area Chamber of Commerce is a non.:.profit; professional business
organization made up of the Coos Bay, North Bend, and Charleston communities.
The Chamber works for a healthy economic climate of good jobs, capitol creation
and efficient government. The Chamber's strength lies in the number and
diversity of its membership. With over 650 members strong representing every
aspect of this area's economy, we use their vast collective experiences and energy
to make a positive difference in our community.
Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this process for this important
permit.
Lucinda DiNovo
President
Bay Area Chamber of Commerce
650
Friends of Living Oregon Waters (FLOW)
P.O. Box 2478 Grants Pass, OR97528
(503) 890-2441
Coos County Planning Department
250 N. Baxter
Coquille, OR 97423
HECE!\IED
JUN () 9 2Ulu
"'> coos COUNTY
H.. f-\I'JNING DEPi\RTMENT
Re: Coos County Applications for Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline Project
(Submitted via email and mail)
Dear Coos County Planning Department and Hearings Officer:
We submit these attachments in support of previous comments on behalf of
Friends of Living Oregon Waters (FLOW), which has members who live, work, and
recreate in the vicinity of the Jordan Cove LNG terminal and Pacific Connector Gas
Pipeline.
Several of these documents were referenced in written comments submitted on
May 20,2010. Additionally, the Hearing's Officer requested that the comments
submitted by the State of Oregon regarding the project be provided in full. We have also
provided comments of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding the
project.
Documents included in this submittal:
1. State of Oregon Agency Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(DElS). December 2008.
2. State of Oregon Agency Comments on Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FElS). June 2009.
3. Comments of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) on FERC DElS.
December 2008.
4. Comments ofNMFS on FERC FElS. June 2009.
5. Comments ofNMFS on Biological Assessment. June 2009.
6. Documents related to recent massive failure of Williams pipeline in Appomattox,
Virginia in September 2008. (Print one original with color photos).
1
651
Additionally, FLOW and other community members and organizations plan to file
additional comments before Thursday, June 10.
Sincerely,
Monica Vaughan,
FLOW
P.O. Box 2478
Grants Pass, OR 97528
2
652
THEODORE R. KULONGOSKI
GOVERNOR
Decep1ber 4; 2008
Ms. D. Secretary
Federal Ellergy Regu.latory Commission
888 First Sf. NE, fun lA
Washington DC 20426
Re: Q01tlmellts oftlle State ofOregoll
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Joi'dan Cove Energy Project, LP Docket No. CP07-444
Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline, LP Docket Nos. CP07-441, CP07-442 aild CP07-443
Secretary Bose:
At my direction, State ofOregon natural resource agencies have been engaged in a
rc'"iew ofthe proposed Jordan Cove Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import terminal and the
aSsociated Pacific COlmector Ijipelille. Oregon's comments on the braft Envirolinlental Impact
Statement for these projects are attached. My primary motivation fol' a detailed stilte review of
this document was to ensure that state standards Md concerns are addressed by the developer and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
As Gove1'1lor ofthe State ofOregoll, I believe that locilting an LNG import terminal in
Oregon 1)1U8t be supported by a comprehensive review oran potentialiinpacts ofthe facility in
tIle State. That is the function ofthe Jordan Covetpacific Connector DEIS. In this regard, I
conclude that the Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS is incomplete and fla\ved in a number of
respects, as more fully explained below and in the attached comments. '
Qregol1 has al). effeCtIve systeni for siting latge facilities that balances the fol'
JWW reSOl.lfCeS effectively with environmental protectional1d adequate safety standards.
That siting process involves all interested Oregon natural resourceagellcies in the review of any
facility. As a result of Oregon's unified siting process, state natural resource agencies have
attained a high level ofexpeltise tn evaluating applications 811d contdbuting not only to the
analysis Ofthe enviromnental hnpacts but also to the design arid adoption of appl'opi'iate
mitigation meilsures. Even though Oregon's energy facility siting process for LNG tennfnals is
currently preempted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as result of this experience and expeliise,
Oregon is uniquely situated to provide comments on this proposed facility.
STATE CAPITOL,SALf:M 97301-4047 (503) 378-3111 FAX (503) 378-4863 ny (503) 378-4859
\YIWW. GOVERNOR, STATE. OR. US
653
Ms. Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
pecetnber 4, 2008
Page Two
The State retains permitting atlthoi"ity dV<:<l' LNG tei"minals in the areas ofwater qUality,
a:ir quality, coastal zone management and in cases wlwre sff.ite approval is needed for .
construction of tenninals or appUlienunt stmctures on state lands. In many instances the DEIS is
the best evidence abolll the applleant's plans for compliance with these federally delegated
progl:ml1s-. In their CoiUlllents, the QregOll agencies iilVolved have identified deficiencies that
present hut'dles to the ultiinate approval of the project by those Mencies.
As the specific commetlts will reflect, many conclusions in the DEIS are founded OIl
assertion.s and unenforceable promises, hot on sound science, analysis a1id
facts. The Commissioil should bot 111ake a decision t6 Iicens<:< tIllS- LNG tenninal 011
t1}einadequate envirolUnental teeOl'd cUlTel1tIy befote the CO
m
lnissio:n.
It is well-established that the final HIS, as the foundatiQn for the licensingdecision by
FERC
t
hiust be cOlliplete. Thus, anyillitigation plan or other clOC1l1Ueilt that Will be l'eIied on by
FERC to detennine that the facility meets liceilsing cliteda must be included in the DEIS atl-d
Irculated for mel3.ilingful review before adoption of the final EIS. Furthennore, such plans and
documents must be referenced in liCense conditions in the final decision. The State ofOregon
has asked twice for an extension ofthe puplic comment period to allow the applicants to submit
eOlliplete i11f01111atioll and the mitigation plans called for in the DElS. FERC has chosen not to
ptovide that n1inimum level of public review. The only remedy will be a suppleniental DElS.
As flU c:xal11ple oIthe bfthe OEis to support aaeisioh, lal'ge PQrtjQilsofthe
mit1@tiOll for habitat, wetlands, archeological impact, landslide protection and emergency
plalllung are still unknown. Indeed, many suppOliing documents for the decision will be
Pi'oduced after the oppOtiullity for C01mnent on the DEIS has closed. This is a fundamental
ptocess flaW. 11'etom11lend delaying the Final Envir01Ulleiltal Impact (FEIS) until the
tettninal desigt.l a11d pipeline 1'oute are finalized, mitigation pteUl$ with i1)ctrics are written, and
l'esponse protocols (Jan pe defined; and afteL' paliies have had all
opportunity to comment of the efficacy of those plans. I fuliher reconunend that when the FEIS
is pi'esElllted, it clearly pi'esent the i'equired inf011llation used to develop and alticulate measurable
pi"oject specific conditions that demonstrate how the facility would meet Oregon's statidards.
FERC l.11ust ptovide adequate assurance that the facility will be constructed, operated,
maintained, and decommissioned aSl'equircd by Oregon's Energy Facility Siting standards.
Liquefied Natul'al Gas ternlitlals also introduce a range ofrelatecl issues assoCiated with
ilatural gas pipelines that cany LNG from tenninals to serviCe ateas, sometimes at gt:eat
dl$fallces. The sodal and envirQllmelltal impacts ofthese pipelines are of as tm;tch concem to the
State the terminals themselves. Accordingly, sJate agencies have also identified and evaluated
the environmental and social impacts of these pipelines through federal and state permitting
processes. Further, because pipeline companies who obtain a FERC license have the power of
654
Ms. Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary
December 4, 2008
Page Three
eminent domain, I have insisted that that power be used carefully and with the utmost respect for
property rights. That includes fair compensation and full mitigation of impacts to propeliy
owners, as well as recognition of need to be responsive to citizens concems and public requests
for information and maps of these pipeline projects. I have communicated these expectations to
pipeline project sponsors and will continue to monitor progress in this mattei',
Jordan Cove and Pacific Connector have provided evidence that the proposed project will
offer substantial economic benefits to the local community, including:
Ellhancedcapacity for Coos Bay (!lew bar pilots, new tugs);
Increased tax revenues for Coos, Douglas, Jackson, alld Klamath Counties;
Terminal constructions jobs (average monthly workforce of430, peak of 929);
Pipeline construction jobs (peak workforce of 1,844 with average 3 to 8 month job)
Operational jobs (39 permanent local hires for the teoninal, 5 for the pipeline)
Those ccon01nic benefits iuust be balatlced ,vith the environmental impacts of the facility
arld pipeIil1e.
I highlight the following major concerns regarding the DEnS, which ate addressed in
nl0re detail in the accompanying comments.
a. The need for the facility has not been establisIled and the alternative analysis is
inadequate. The DEIS does not adequately ailalyze market data and natural gas supply trends to
support the claim by the developers that additional supplies of LNG are needed in the Pacific
Northwest. Nor does the DElS contain a comprehensive alternatives analysis that takes a hard
look at othCl' alte111atives include no action, energy conservation, expansion of existing
infi'astructure, and potential new sources of natural gas. The DEIS fails to adequately address any
change in the need for the project, given that FERC has already conditionally approved an ii11pOrt
te11ninal in Oregon at Bradwood Landing,
b. bEls to demonstrate that the proposed locatiou oCthe tel'Illinal complies
with Federal Aviation Administration requirements. The proposed tenninal and LNG
stotage tanks appear to be located within, or very close to, a horizontal distance of one mile fi'OlU
the ends ofthe Soutlnvest Oregon Regional Airport runways, contrary to 49 CFR 193.2155(b).
Most ofthe altemative locations proposed in the DEIS are well within that distance. There is no
discussion in the DEIS of height requirements in the vicinity of the airport either. I am very
concemed about the safety of the citizens of North Bend and Coos Bay, given the terminals'
close proximity to an airpOli. Through a Connect Oregon II grant, Oregon has made an
investment in the Coos County Airpolt District of $624,000 for the construction of the first air
traffic control tower at the Southwest Oregon Regional Airport. This investment will create
655
Ms. Kil1lberly D. Bose, Secl'etary
December 4, 2008
Page Four
mOre accesS opportunity for econo1i1ic development in the region. The DEIS needs to
address those safety COllc;el11S; any impacts on the airport and must demonstrate that the temlinal
facility can comply with Federal Aviation Administration requirements.
C,. ..... I;a$$; tb nElS depends on assertions thatniitigatioll win be proVided, but
tile oftJle mitigatiou arc unknown. The State ofOregol1 is deeply troubled by the
Commiss-ion's process and the lack of infonnation contained in the DElS for a project of this
inagnitude. In the previous LNG import tenninalmatter in Orego11 (Bradwood Landing)? PERC
defen'ed detailed consideration ofenvlronmei1tal hnpacts and hoW they would be mitigated l,lhtil
\Vella.fter (he DElS cOi1lll1ent period In order to be effective, a 1i1itigatiOl1lu?a.sure ll1\lst
be supported by analytical data. demonst1'ating why it will adequate buffer again$t
the imp(j,cts that l11ay resylt 1'0111 the authorized a9tivHy. FERC's reliance on its Office
of Energy Projects to modify approved operations does not provide ellough l)h')tectioll under this
standard. The public must be able to i'eView; in advance, hOw specific measures will bring
pl'ojects into compliance with ehvironmentill staiidards. Because the details for mitigation are
I)1js$ing, neithet the State nor the Commission can presul11e the mitigation Will be feasible or
effective.
d. The proposed project '''ouid have adverse b11lHtds on ail' and Watel- quality
'wildlife habitat in the Coos, Coquille, Umpqua Rogue Illig Klamath watel'she<J.s, Proliosed
dredging for the tenllinal, fuming basin and pipeline construction will Cause damage to
Watershed function, water quality sensitive species and habitats, and these impacts h,;we not
been adequately evaluated or addressed in DEIS. Supply ships ami vaporizers will contli.bute air
pollutants. Cumulative impacts need to be thoroughly ahalyzed. The 379 Sil'CaUI crossiiigs and
230 miles ot'pipeline with associated 16sS of riparian vegetation will have impacts 611 Watei'
quality_ .
The projyct will <:llso impact 594 acres ofCategory 1 that will be either removed ot
litodified by constlUctiOl1 impacts. Category 1habitat is "ineplaceable, essential habitat for a
fish 6j' \vildlife species, population, ot a uliique asseinblage of species and is limited 011 either a
physiographic province or site-specific basis, depending on the individual species, population or
uniqlle assemblage." 1his Categoty 1habitat consists of: 561 acres of coniferous old growth and
late successional forest (a 1'01ti011 ofthis acreage with spotted owl and marbled munclet use); 24
acres ofvemal pool wetlands; 6 acres of mature oak woodlands; and 3 actes ohare plant ilabitat.
Undel' Oregon law, ifil11pacts to Category 1habitat calhiot be avoided, the project cannot be
approved...
Yet PERC only proposes the applicants deyelpp a mitigation plan that way include a fund
to compensate for the Project's temporal and permanent riparian vegetation and aquatic hripacts
656
Ms. Kilnberly D. J3ose; Sectetal'Y
December 4, 2008
Page Five
fi'Olll constmction and operation of the project. This and other proposed mitigation Ineasures are
wholly inadequate to offset the damage that will be done.
The DErS does ltot adequately recog1iiie tbe state's Nile itt cn1Cl'gency
prcparcdness; No ellfotceable cOlnmitment has beel1l118de for Emergency Response resollrces
necessary to operate at the proposed facility; nor were safety and secUl'ity impacts to the local
CQinWlunities adequately assessed. Astatement in the DEIS defen'ing this issue to local
respol'lders is iIiadequate.
f. The .QEIS must contain mitigation recommendatiol1s requiring Cove to
u1itigflte C02 emissions and to provide financial assurance to retire the facility. A detailed
, e11ghieeti!lg estimate of site retirement costs should aM assui'allce gained that those
c()sf$ will he covered, before FERC iSS\leS a Final EIS. Without that ass\H'al1cc, the State has no
prof9tf<m against ban1a.uptcy or abandolJnlent of the facility.
In summary, I believe that the state and the Commission must fairly address all the
benefits811d costs associated with LNG. For the Commission to make LNG siting decisi01ls in a
,;acuum without the best available illfol111ation fll1d scientific data does a huge disservice to the
people of Oregon. UltiInately, the decision to sHe terminals j"equites the fiJll el1gagement of the
federal government, the state and the communities where facilities are proposed. Only by
working together tlu'ough the siting, environmental assessment and pennitting processes can we
make sound decisions about the appropriateness of any proposed LNG terminal.
I look forwal'O to YO\lr resbl\ltiort of OtegOli's cOl1cerhs.
Si!lCerely,
(/"TWA/
Govemor
TRK:uW:jb
Eifcldsures
657
Oregon State Agency Comments
Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS
December 4, 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
click on agency name to go directly to comments
1. OREGON DEPT. OF ENERGY 2
2. OREGON DEPT. OF ENERGY - EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING 6
3. OREGON DEPT. OF PARKS AND REC, SHPO 17
4. OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT 17
5. OREGON DEPT. OF FISH & WILDLIFE 21
6. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 42
7. OREGON DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 46
8. OREGON DEPT. OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 75
9. OREGON DEPT. OF LAND CONSERVATION &DEVELOPMENT - CZMA 85
10. OREGON DEPT. OF STATE LANDS 94
11. OREGON DEPT. OF FORESTRY 96
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Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS
Oregon Agency Comments
12-4-08
Oregon State Agency Comments
Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS
1. Oregon Dept. of Energy
NEPA requires agencies considering "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment" to prepare and issue an environmental impact statement. The statement
shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform
decision-makers and the public ofthe reasonable altematives which would avoid 01' minimize
adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. NEPAfurther demands the
agency takes a 'hard look' at the potential environmental consequences ofthe proposed action.
The DEIS as it cUlTently stands, is flawed and legally deficient because it fails to rigorously
explore alternatives, includes an inadequate environmental assessment of the impacts of the
proposedproject and fails to adequately address cumulative impacts. The overall level ofdetail
in the DEIS is woefully inadequate. Much of the DEIS contains only general inf01mation about
environmental and resource effects. There is little or no linkage between the factual information
supporting the FEIS and the conclusions in the document. Because ofthe lack ofadequate
Supp011ing inf01mation in the DEIS, the FERC has required imp01tant environmental information
to be provided before the end ofthe comment period. As outlined inthe November 21,2008
letter from Mike Grainey, Director of Oregon Department of Energy to FERC Secretary
Kimbel1y Bose, much of that inf01mationhas not been before the end ofthe comment
The comment period has now come to. an end and still much of that information has not
been submitted or was finally submitted just today without any time for review. Hence, an
adequate consideration ofall those aspects has thus far evaded necessary public comment.
The DEIS itself is incomplete and flawed as outlined in prior comments. It cannot be cured by
issuance of an FEIS. FERC must issue a revised Supplemental DBIS with an opportunity for
further public comment.
Purpose and Need (section 1.3)
FERC nevel' actually explains what the pUlpose and need ofthe project is. Instead FERC
describes the objectives of the project as:
Provide a new access point fol' overseas LNG supplies through a new LNG import
terminal located on the southern Oregon coast that can accommodate industry-standard
LNG carriers;
2
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Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS
Oregon Agency Comments
12-4-08
Provide a new source ofnatural gas to Pacific Nol1hwest, nOlihern Califomia, and
nOlfuern Nevada markets to diversify the supply sources for these markets to meet future
demands; and
Serve multiple markets through an interstate pipeline with interconnections with newand
existing pipeline infrastructure.
(see DEIS 1.3)
As stated in our July 10, 2008 letter to Governor Kulongoski, we stand by the conclusions in our
May 7 report to the governor on demand; for future natural gas inOregon, an evaluation of
alternatives,. and an assessment ofthe life cycle carbon emissions compared to coal and non.:.LNG
sources.
Oregon will continue to need increased supplies of natural gas for the
foreseeable future, in part because of population growth.
Natural gas sources inNorth America, mainly from western Canada and
the Rockies, are likely to provide natural gas at less cost than natural gas from
any of the LNGterminals cUl1'ently proposed in Oregon,
Natural gas from NOlfu America has less life-cycle carbon dioxide impacts
than LNG.
Oregon Dept. of Energy, Oregon Dept. ofJustice, and Jordan Cove Energy Project are cUll'ently
(Nov. 2008) developing a Memorandum ofAgreement that addresses C02 emissions and
standards for the eventual retirement ofthe facility. Our intent is to have enforceable conditions
in place that emulate the Oregon standards that would be in place but for the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. Standards for these conditions are found in Energy Facility Siting Council rules, OAR
Chapter 345, Division 22.
Note: DLCD andDEQ also commented on the needfor LNG
Alternatives (page 3
M
25)
PERC has already conducted an alternatives analysis on the Jordan Cove Project that detelmined
that "[t]here are no clear environmental advantages of the Jordan Cove LNGProject ovel' the
Bradwood Landing Project; therefore, it is not a preferable alternative." Bradwood Landing
FEIS 3-271. FERC acknowledges that: "The purpose of the Bradwood Landing LNG Project is
to provide up to 1.3 Bscfd ofnatUl'al gas to markets in the Pacific Northwest through newsources
of imported LNG, Therefore, the Bradwood Landing LNGProject could be an alternative to the
proposed JCE & PCGP Project.' Jordan Cove DEIS 3-25.
PERC never actually reaches a conclusion on whether the OregonLNG or Bradwood Landing
proposals would 01' would not be an environmentally preferable systemaltemative to the Jordan
1Northern Star Energy LLC and Bradwood Landing LLC, FERC Docket Nos. CP06
M
366, CP06
M
376, CP06-377, CP06-365 (hereinafter Bradwood Landing)
3
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Jordan CovelPacific Connector DElS
Oregon Agency Comments
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Cove Project. FERC simply describes the projects and never makes a detelmination. Instead,
FERC suggest that it is "unclear ifthe Bradwood Landing LNGProject could meet all ofthe
objectives of the JCE & PCGP Project, because it would not directly connect to the Avista LDC
systemserving southern Oregon." Jordan Cove DEIS 3-25. The stated goal ofa project
necessarily dictates the range of 'reasonable' alternatives, and an agency cannot define its
objectives in unreasonably narrowterms. FERC is impermissibly defining the project in
unreasonably narrowterms by apparently rejecting an altemative ifit cannot meet the preferred
altematives specifications. This is not a proper alternatives analysis. Connecting with the Avista
LDC system is not the purpose and need of the project.
FERC also notes "ifnatural gas were to be provided by the Bradwood LNGimport terminal to
markets innorthernNevada 01' northern California, it would have to be transported longer
distances through the existing G1N systemthan the Pacific Connector pipeline." DElS 3-25.
Yet, FERC has not conducted an analysis ofwhether transport through existing systems is
preferable to the creation ofa new230 mile long new pipeline. .
FERC has in a sense satisfied the "need" for the Jordan Cove Project by its approval ofthe
Bradwood Landing project. FERC has essentially made its altemative selection already. FERC
must explain in the DElS why there is still a need for another LNG import terminal facility, given
FERC's approval of Bradwood. FERC lllust explain why, ifit prefers Jordan Cove, that Project
is now environmentally preferable to Bradwood Landing. FERC cannot simply approve each of
its import tenninal alternatives piece-meal while at the same relying on the same need
justification.
FERC Alternatives (page 3-1).
FERC's alternatives analysis is impelmissibly constrained by its selection criteria. The FERes
evaluation criteria for selecting potentially reasonable and environmentally preferable
altematives include whether they: are technically feasible, reasonable, and practical; offer
significant environmental advantage over the proposed project; and meet the objectives of the
p r o j e c t ~ as described in section 3.1. DEIS 3-1. As described below, FERC has impermissibly
and repeatedly relied upon the project description to reject alternatives, rather than the stated goal
ofthe project. Moreover, FERC relied upon its own selection criteria ("offering significant
environmental advantage over the proposed project") to remove alternatives fi'om Ruther
consideration before even conducting the requisite environmental analysis. Those cursOlY
dismissals, unsuppOlted by agency analysis or fact, do not satisfy PERC's NEPA duty to consider
a reasonable range of alternatives.
The alternatives analysis fails to incorporate accurate information about other projects that may
provide natural gas at lower cost to the region. Realistically, FERCmust conduct a detailed
comparative analysis of LNG import terminal and pipeline projects currently proposed in the
region and the potential for domestic supply and pipeline altematives. Such an analysis is
necessary to determine whether the Jordan Cove project and pipeline represents a superior
4
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Jordan CovelPacific Connector DEIS
Oregon Agency Comments
12-4-08
facility from an economic, environmental and social perspective.
FERC has not satisfied its obligation to consider a true no-action alternative before deciding to
allowthe Project to proceed.. FERCstates "it would be purely speculative to predict the resulting
effects and action that could be taken by other suppliers or users of natural gas in the region as
well as any associated direct and indirect environmental impacts." DElS 3.1.1. As a result,
FERC does not conduct that analysis. A general statement about uncertainty does not satisfy the
procedural requirement that an agency take a hard look at the environmental effects of an action.
While FERC might explain specific projections with reference to uncertainty; it may not rely on
a statement ofunceliainty to avoid even attempting the requisite analysis. See id. Fresh
consideration of a no-action alternative in this case is consistent with the agency's obligation to
take a meaningful look at the environmental consequences of the proposed action at a point early
enoughto conttibute to the decisionrnaking process, and not simply "rationalize 01' justifY
decisions already made." 40 CFR 1502.5;
FERC fails to consider the altemative ofpostponing action until an environmental analysis has
been completed onthe othel' LNG or pipeline projects proposed in Oregon. By postponing action
pending finther study, FERC could then conduct a comparative regional analysis to determine
which alternative best meets the needs ofthe Pacific Northwest with the least environmental
impacts. The failure to examine this viable altelnative renders the entire environmental impact
statement inadequate.
FERC has impermissibly conflated the no-action alternative and the postponed action alternative.
No-action and postponed action will have different impacts and should have been treated as
separate alternatives.
DEIS 3.1.1.3. The analysis ofrenewable energy sources is fundamentally flawed because it does
not make' a comparison ofthe Project to a pOltfolio ofconservation and altemative sources.
Instead, FERC compares the amount ofenergy each alternative energy source could separately
produce to the Project in order to reject them (e.g. "At this rate, thousands ofacres of solar
collectors would be needed." DEIS 3-8; "...it would take 4,337 wind turbines to produce an
equivalent amount of electricity that could be generated using the total capacity ofthe natural gas
fl.-om the JCE & PCGP Project." DEIS 3-8 - 3-9). Those altemative energy sources are not
operating in a vacuum. A reasonable alternative is an energy p01tfolio consisting ofa variety of
different alternative energy sources. FERC's alternative analysis must reflect that reality and
hence must conduct further analysis on a portfolio of alternative energy projects as a reasonable
alternative to the Project.
DEIS 3.1.3.6. The Coos Bay terminal site alternatives are not true altematives because they
could never support an LNG telminal. They are located within a horizontal distance ofone mile
from the ends ofthe Southwest Oregon Regional Airport runways, contrary to 49 CFR
193.2155(b). FERCneeds to select actual alternative terminal locations.
5
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OregonAgency Comments
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Cumulative Impacts IDEIS 4.13)
Acumulative effects analysis must provide a useful analysis ofthe cumulative impacts ofpast,
present, and future projects. It must not only describe related projects but also enumerate the
environmental effects of those projects. It should provide adequate data of the time, place, and
scale and explainindetail howdifferent project plans and harvest methods affect the
environment. It must consider the interaction ofmultiple activities and cannot focus exclusively
on the environmental impacts of an individual project.
Here, the DEIS does not include an adequate discussion ofthe direct effects ofany ofthe
cumulative impacts it identifies. FERC must do more than merely state that past projects
-contributed to environmental harms. Nor does the DElS contain the requisite level of detailed
explanation. The DElS contail).s a table summarizing cumulative effects in broad terms, but it
does not offer quantified or detailed data about those effects. DElS Tables 4.13.1-1 and 4.13.1-2.
Nor does it list 01' discuss past activities- only Current 01' Proposed Activities. General
statements about possible effects and some risk do not constitute a hard look absent a
justificationl'egarding why more definitive information could not be provided. The DElS DOEs
not supply sufficient data ofthe time, type, place, and scale ofpast, present and future activities.
Even ifFERC is unable to indicate with any great degree ofceltaintythe results of the various
projects because the cumulative effects analysis requires an agency to predict future conditions,
uncertainty is an inherent part ofthe process. Therefore, a general statement about unceliainty
does not satisfy the procedural requirement that an agency take a hard look at the environmental
effects of an action. Although FERC might explain specific projections with reference to
unceliainty, it may not rely on a statement of uncertainty to avoid even attempting the requisite
analysis.
The DElS is paliicularly inadequate in looking at past effects. NEPArequires adequate
cataloguing of relevant past projects in the area. The DElS must give a sufficiently detailed
catalogue ofpast, present, and future projects, and provide adequate analysis about howthese
projects, and differences between the projects, are thought to have impacted the environment.
FERC's DElS fails to describe past activities and previous environmental harms caused by these
past activities in sufficient detail to promote an informed assessment of environmental
considerations and policy choices by the public and agency personnel upon review ofthe DEIS.
The DEIS fails to take a hard look at the cumulative effects ofseveral pipeline crossings within
particular watersheds, many of which are 303(d) listed. Ifstreams are not meeting standards
now, it is unclear how impacts on riparian and upland vegetationfrom pipeline placement and
maintenance would affect them. The cumulative impact of all crossings of streams (permanent
or intennittent) whether through Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), alternative 01'
conventional construction techniques, on temperature and sediment impacts within the various
watersheds has not been adequately addressed. The cumulative impact from these tributary
impacts on the already temperature-impaired lower rivel'S is also not analyzed.
6
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Oregon Agency Comments
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2. Oregon Dept. of Energy - Emergency Response Planning
After completing the review ofthe FERCDEIS for JCEP, you will fInd that these comments are
consistent with those made for FERC's DEIS for Bradwood Landing. Like the Bradwood
Landing DEIS, the JCEP DEIS' also recognizes the need to develop an emergency response plan
and a cost-sharing plan to ensure funding to state and local agencies fOl' project-specific safety
and security management costs. Unfoltunately, both DEIS' fail to provide ODOE permit
conditions to ensure that the final JCEP Emergency Response Plan meets state standards for
protecting the health and safety of Oregonians in the event ofan LNGemergency at the terminal
or along the 12-mile transit route involving the vessel.
ODOE's primary concern is that without specific guidelines enforceable by permit conditions for
developing the emergency response plan and a cost-sharing plan, FERC will create a process
flawthat opens the door for LNGdevelopers in Oregon to submit a final Emergency Response
Plan and receive FERCapproval without the necessary equipment, systems, and personnel
resources to implement the plan putting the lives of Oregonians at risk.
Here are some specific concerns and recommendations to FERC's JCEP DEIS:
4.12.5 LNG Carrier Safety
Page 4.12.40 - FERCRecommendation: Throughout the lite ofthe facility, Jordan Cove should
ensure that thefacility andany LNGcarrier h'ansiting to andfrom the facility comply with all
requirements setforth by the Coast Guard Captain ofthe Port Sector Portland, including al1l'isk
mitigation measure in the WSR,
ODOE Concern: While the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) WSRfocused on the navigation safety
and matitime;security risks posed by LNGmat'ine traffic, and the measures needed to responsibly
manage risks ;for the proposed project, the WSRprovides no guidelines to re-evaluate these risks
and the impacts to the community should JCEP decide to expand or make other changes to the
project.
ODOERecommendation: ODOE recommends FERC include as a condition ofthe permit
language in section 4.12.5 that states: Throughout the life of the facility, Jordan Cove should
ensure that the facility and any LNG cat1ier transiting to and from the facility comply with all
requirements set forth by the Coast Guard Captain ofthe P0l1 Sector Portland, including all risk
mitigationmeasure recommended in the WSR. This includes working with COTP and the
Oregon Depm1ment ofEnergy (ODOE) to assess potential impacts to state and local emergency
response capabilities, resources, and activities as a result of the proposed project change 01'
expansion, LNG developers will cover all costs incurred by ODOE and local emergency
response organizations as a result of the proposed expansion or change. Propose expansion and
changes to the project include, but is not limited to:
a. Increases to the current shipment schedule
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b. Increasing the CUlTent carrier vessel size
c. Increases to the CUlTent emergency planning zones
d. Constructing additional LNGstorage tanks on site
e. Expanding CUlTent dockside capabilities
f. Other as appropriate
4.12.6 Emergency Response and Evacuation Planning
Page 4.12.42 - FERCRecommendation: Jordan Cove should develop an Emergency Response
Plan (including evacuation) and coordinate procedures with"the Coast Guard,' state, county, and
local emergencyplanning groups; fire departments; state and local law enforcement,' and
appropriate federal agencies. This plan should include at a minimum:
a. Designatedcontacts with state and local emergency response agencies;
b. Scalable proceduresfor the prompt notification ofappropriate local officials and
emergency response agencies basedon the level andseverity ofpotential
incidents.
c, Proceduresfor notifyingresidents andrecreational users within areas of
potential hazard;
d. Evacuation routes/methodsfor residents andother public use areas that are
within any h'ansient hazard areas along the route ofthe LNG marine h'afjic;
e. Locations ofpermanent sirens andother warning devices; and
f. An "emergency coordinator" on each LNGcarrier to activate sirens andother
warning devices.
The emergency response plan should befiled with the Secretaryfor review andwritten approval
by the Director ofOEPprior to initial sitepreparation. Jordan Cove shouldnotifY the FERC
staffofall planning meetings in advance andshouldreport progress on the development ofits
Emergency Response Plan at 3-month intervals.
onOE Concern: ODOE commends FERC f01' requiring the JCEP to complete and receive
approval by the Director of EOP on their emergency response planprior to initial site
preparation. FERC should require this of all developers proposing to build LNG impoli
terminals in Oregon.
UnfOl1Unate1y, FERC's minimum guidelines for developing an LNG emergency response plan is
vague and omits many clitical elements of emergency response planning found the Federal
Response Framework and Oregon state standards and guidelines for emergency preparedness,
response, and recovery for nuclear, biological, chemical, and all-hazard emergencies.
onOERecommendation: Section 4.12.6 on Emergency Response and Evacuation Planning
should read: As a condition o f t h ~ permit, Jordan Cove should develop an Emergency Response
Plan (including evacuation) and coordinate procedures withthe Coast Guard; state, county, and
local emergency planning groups; fire departments; state and local lawenforcement; and
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appropriate federal agencies. This plan should include at a minimum:
a. Designated contacts with state and local emergency response agencies;
b. Scalable procedures for the prompt notification ofappropriate local officials and
emergency response agencies based on the level and severity ofpotential
incidents.
c. Procedures for notifYing residents and recreational users withinareas ofpotential
hazard;
d. Evacuation routes/methods for residents and .other public use areas that are within
any transient hazard areas along the route of the LNGmaline traffic;
e. Locations ofpermanent sirens and other warning devices; and
f. An "emergency on each LNG canier to activate sirens and other
warning devices.
g. Thirty days following the issuance of a FERC pelmit, LNG developers will
provide a comprehensive fire and response plan for the impolt terminal fm' aDOE
and local emergency response organizations review and approval. The planmust
meet state and National Fire ProtectionAssociation (NFPA) standards for a four-
minute response to a 1st Alarm Fire at an industrial facility as shown in Table
7.2.1 below. The proposed plan will include a resource list which details the
location and number offacilities, personnel, equipment, and apparatus provided,
and other peltinent information as appropriate.
Table 7.2.1 - - Required Resources for a "Medium-Hazard Occupancies" Response. This
includes apartments, offices, mercantile and industrial occupancies not normally requiring
extensive rescue or fhe-fighting forces.
At least 3 pumpers
I ladder truck (or combination apparatus with equivalent capabilities)
Other specialized apparatus as may be needed or available
No fewer than 16 fire fighters, 1chiefofficer, 1safety officer, and a Rapid
Intervention Team (4 - 5 fire fighters on standby at event scene).
Note: Refer to Volume 1 - NFPAHandbook, 19
u1
Edition, Chapter 2, Section7, Organizing for
Fire and Rescue Services.
Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, all personnel, training, facilities, equipment, systems
and supplies provided to ensure effective fire and rescue response to the import tenninal must be
inplace prior to consbuction and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNG
developer.
a. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive marine
fuefighting plan for ODOE and local emergency response organizations review
and approval. This proposed plan will be consistent with U.S. Coast Guard and
state standards and requirements for responding to shipboard fires and other LNG
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carrier events along the transit route. The proposed plan will also include a
resource list which details the location and number of personnel, equipment, and
apparatus provided, and other pertinent information as appropriate. Upon state
and local approval of the plan, all personnel, equipment, and resources provided
to marine firefighting must be dedicated to LNG response, in place pdor to
operation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNG developer.
b. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive shore-side
security planfor ODOE and local emergency response organizations review and
approval. The proposed plan will assess and identify additional local law
enforcement personnel and resources needed, ifany, as a result of the project.
This includes, but is not limited to LNG developer expectation oflocallaw
enforcement to conduct shore-side patrols, provide traffic control during
evacuations, and respond to reported suspicious activity from 911 calls or those
captured on security cameras as the LNG carrier is in the channel and at the
import terminal. Upon state and local approval of the plan, all personnel,
equipment, and resources provided to enhance security on shore must be
dedicated to LNGresponse, inplace prim' to operation and maintained throughout
the life ofthe project by the LNGdeveloper.
c. Pdor to construction, LNG developers w i l ~ provide a comprehensive water-side
security plan for ODOE and local emergency response organizations review and
approval. The proposed plan will assess and identify additional local law
enforcement personnel and resources needed, ifany, as a result ofthe project.
This includes, but is not limited to LNG developer expectation oflocallaw
enforcement to conduct water-side patrols and enforce LNGvessel security and
exclusion zones along the channel and at the impOlt terminal. Upon state and
local approval ofthe plan, all pel'sonnel, equipment, and resources provided to
enhance security on the water must be dedicated to LNGresponse, in place prior
to operation and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNG
developer.
d. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive public
waming systemplan for the region for ODOE and local emergency response
organizations reviewand approval. The proposedplan will include the following
alert and notifications systems, but is not limited to:
Reverse 911 (24-Port) Systemfor the host county - The systemwill include the
following capabilities: high volume calling; compatible with majOl' mapping
systems; E911 data ready; multiple devices (recorded voice messages, text
messages to wireless receivers, and digital pages); geo-dimensional calling; full
networking capabilities; off-site back-up notification; remote launching capability;
and other capabilities as appropriate.
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Sirens - Outdoor siren systemthroughout the entire transit route covering all three
zones ofconcern up to the imPOlt terminal. The systemwill include the following
capabilities: multiple high intensity warning signals; live and digital voice
messaging with flat frequency response from 200 - 2000 Hz for clear voice
reproduction; 360-degree coverage with no sound variation in the horizontal plane
(106 to 125 dBc at 100ft/30m); continued emergency operation regardless of
primary power outages, and other capabilities as appropriate. LNG developers will
include a map ofthe proposed number and locations of sirens showing the coverage
area ofeach proposed siren for state and local reviewand approval.
Reader Boards - Reader boards located along the highways in the host county to
provide event information, direct traffic, and facilitate evacuations. LNG
developers will include a map of the proposed number and locations ofreader'
boards for state and county approval. Reader board specifications must be
consistent with the Oregon Department of Transportation reader boards located
throughout the state.
Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, all equipment and systems provided to enhance the
host county's public warning systemmust be in place, tested, and operational prior to import
terminal operation and maintained throughout the life of the project by the LNG developer.
a. Prior to constluction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan for a
remote gas detection systemfor the region for ODOE and local emergency
response organizations review and approval. The proposed plan will include a list
with a breakdown of all proposed fixed and portable gas detectors and designated
locations for the equipment. The plan will include infOlmation about the
following systems, but is not limited to:
Fixed Gas DetectOl's - Fixed gas detectors will be provided in all high risk and
high population areas alohg the entire transit route in the host county. Fixed gas
detector capabilities will include remote wireless operations and the ability to
provide readouts in multiple locations.
Portable Gas Detectors - LNG developers will provide three layers ofpoliable gas
detectors. 1) All emergency responder vehicles inthe region will be provided a
methane gas detector. 2) Methane gas and oxygen meters will be assigned to all
fire tiucks, and 3) Multi-meters will be provided to hazardous materials responders.
Upon state and local approval of the plan, all fixed and pOltable gas detectors and systems
provided must be in place, tested, and operational prior to imPOlt tellninal operation and
maintained throughout the life ofthe project.
a. Prior to consttuction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan for an
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interoperable communications systemfor the region for ODOE and local
emergency response organizations reviewand appl'Oval. The proposed plan will
be compatible with state and local communications capabilities and include the
following systems, but is not limited to:
Repeaters and Cell Towel's - Specify the number ofrepeaters and cell towers
needed to ensure uninterrupted cell and radio coverage along the entire transit route
to the covering all three zones of concern. LNG developers will
pl'Ovide a map of the proposed repeater and cell tower locations showing the
.coverage ai..ea of eachproposed repeater and cell tower locationfor state and local
review and approval. .
Incident Command - Specify the number and locations ofintrinsically safe
handheld radios to be provided to lawenforcement, and other responders to an
LNGmishap. Include information on FCC licensing requirements and proposed
frequencies, antenna system, base station console, and other pertinent infOlmation.
Emergency Operations Centers - Multiple federal, state, and local emergency
operations centers (EOCs) may be activated in response to an LNG mishap. EOCs
support the incident command. LNG developers will specifY the primary and
redundant backup communications systems to be used to ensure uninterrupted
communications between the import telminal and the federal, state, and local
EOCs. This includes, but is not limited to a dedicated phone system, video
teleconference system, satellite phones, Internet, e-mail, and other technology as
appropriate.
Upon state and local approval of the plan, all equipment and systems provided to enhance the
region's interoperable communications systemmust be in place, and operational prior to
import terminal operation and maintained throughout the life ofthe project by the LNG
developer.
a. Prior to construction, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan fOl'
upgrading and equipping the host county primary EOC fo1' state and local emergency
response organization review and approval. The proposed plan will ensure adequate
work space for affected federal, state, and local emergency responders rep0l1ing to the
EOCjointly responding to LNGemergencies at the import tenninal or along the
transit route.
ODOE also requires the host county EOCto be located outside ofthe three zones of concern. If
the host countis EOC is within the three zones of concern, LNG developers will work with the
host countyto complete one of the following tasks:
a; Relocate the EOe to a facility outside ofthe three zones of concern. The relocated
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EOC will be equipped to accommodate affected federal, state, and local emergency
responders reporting to the EOC jointly responding to LNG emergencies at the import
terminal or along the transit route.
b. Pre-designate an altemate EOC and ensure this location has sufficient work space to
accommodate affected federal, state, and local emergencyresponders reporting to the
EOCjointlyresponding to LNG emergencies at import telminal 01' along the transit
route. This includes equipping the pre-designated alternate EOC with the same
capabilities as the primary EOC to ensure a seamless transition to the alternate EOC if
a LNG mishap prevents the use ofthe primmy county EOC. Pre-designating and
equipping an alternate EOC ensures the host county can maintain direction and
control oflocal protective actions and decisions, providing a sustained response
throughout the duration ofan LNG event.
Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, equipment and systems must be in place,
tested, and operational prior to import terminal operation and maintained throughout the life of
the project by the LNG developer.
a. Prior to construction, LNGdevelopers will provide a comprehensive plan for pre-
designating and equipping a Joint Information Center (TIC) for ODOE and local
emergency response organizations review and approval. The proposed plan will
identify a location for the TIC outside ofthe three zones ofconcern. The proposed
plan will ensure adequate space and equipment for conducting news conferences. The
proposedplan will also ensure adequate work space for public information officers
from federal, estate, and local emergency response organizations reporting to the TIC
to coordinate the release of emergency infOlmation and instructions.
The of the JIC is to ensure the coordination ofevent information among the federal,
state, and local agencies responding to the event. The goal is to provide a consistent message to
news media and the public. The TIC will be the location for news conferences;' coordinating
news releases from responding federal, state, and local jurisdictions as well as the LNG
developer; addressing public and media inquiries; and other public information activities as
appropriate. Failure to provide a central cleming house to manage the receipt and dissemination
ofemergency information may result in misinformation, inconsistent information, and
unconfirmed infOlmation getting out to the public and news media creating public panic,
confusion, and mistlUSt.
Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, equipment and systems must be in place,
tested, and operational prior to import terminal operation and maintained throughout the life of
the project by the LNG developer.
a. Thirty days following the issuance of a FERC pelmit, LNG developers will provide a
comprehensive training plan for ODOE and emergency response organizations
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review and approval. The proposed training plan allows state and local organizations
the ability to detelmine whether the project's training programis adequate for
preparing tbis region's emergency responders and decision-makers for an LNG
emergency at the import terminal and along the transit route. The proposed training
plan will include, but is not limited to:
Construction of an LNGFire Training Center inthe host county - It is more cost
effective to build an LNGtraining facility locally and bring in instructors from
Texas A& M or other accredited training institutions than to send fire fighters to
training in Texas or elsewhere in the country, LNG developers will work with state
and local emergency respondel's to determine location and facility design and
layout.
Type oftraining to include, but is not limited to: 1) Incident Command System; 2)
facility security; 3) oil & hazmat spill response; 4) LNG for fire fighters, emergency
responders, and law 5) marine fire fighting; 6) general LNG training;
7) advanced LNG ftre fighting; 8) hospital training; 9) tabletops, drill, and
exercises and other training as appropriate.
Schedule oftraining detailing the type of training, required training hours, and
number of anticipated trainees from LNGdevelopers, state, and local agencies,
Upon state and local approval of the plan, the facility, insttuctors, equipment and systems must
be in place, tested, and operational prior to construction and maintained throughout the life of the
project by the LNG developer.
a. Thirty days following the issuance ofa FERC permit, LNG developers will provide
funding to the host county for hiring a full-time County LNGPlanner & Fire
Response Coordinatol'. The position description for the County LNGPlanner & Fire
Response Coordinator will include 1) drafting the county LNG emergency response
plan; 2) working withfirst responders to prepare for LNG vessel arrivals and
depattures; 3) working with first responders, the state, and LNG developers to
conduct plan review, coordinate training, exercises, public and 4)
pelforming other LNG emergency preparedness activities as appropriate, The County
LNGPlanner & Fire Response Coordinator must be hired and trained prior to
construction. Funding for this position will be maintained throughout the life of the
project bythe LNG developer.
b. Prior to constructioJ.l, LNG developers will provide a comprehensive plan to address
bumvictims as a result ofan LNG emergency at the import telminal or along the
transit route for ODOE and local emergency response organization review and
approval. The plan will be consistent with the capabilities outlined in the Burn Mass
Casualty Plan for the Oregon Burn Center at Legacy Emanuel Hospital. Specifically,
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LNGdevelopers will provide area hospital(s) with the personnel and resources
necessmy to implement the Burn Mass Casualty Plan's 72 Hour BumPlan - Care of
BumPatients in a Non-Bum Hospital. This includes, but is not limited to:
Identifying resources and procedures necessary for treating burn victims if
immediate transfer to a regional bumcenter is not feasible. This includes ongoing
resuscitation and care.
Identify medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and equipment needed to support a
triage station capable ofn'eating 5 victims with severe bums. This includes pre-
packed medical resources.
Communications capabilities including 800 rnhz trunked radio and web-based
clientlsel'Ver applications to coordinate communications between the event scene
and the Columbia Memorial Hospital and serve as the patient information tracking
mechanisminevents involving multiple burn victims.
Staffing requirements for care of burn patients in a non-burn hospital.
Upon state and local approval ofthe plan, the facility, personnel, equipment and
systems must be in place, tested, and operational prior to impOlt terminal operation
and maintained throughout the life of the project bythe LNG developer.
c. LNG developers will provide timely notifications (within 15 minutes of event onset)
to ODOE in the event of an incident at the impOlt telminal and along the transit route
with potential impacts to the health and safety of site workers, the public or the
environment. This includes security threats and any other event that may generate
media attention.
LNG developers will maintain ongoing communications with and provide event information to
decision-makers at the ODOE EOCthroughout the duration of an emergency. This includes, but
is not limited to information about the emergency classification, facility conditions, LNGrelease,
mitigationmeasures taken, vessel information, meteorological data, protective action
recommendations, maps, and other pettinent emergency infOlmation as appropriate.
d. LNG developers will work with ODOE and local emergency response organizations
to maintain program readiness. This includes ensuring that the state and local
decision makers and responders are prepared to respond to an LNG crisis at the
impOlt terminal and along the transpol1 route. This includes:
PlanUpdate - Coordinate the reviewand update ofemergency response
plans at all levels annually or as needed. Revisions will include improvements
identified through training, drills, and exercises.
Drills and Exercises - Schedule and coordinate drills and exercises as
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needed.
~ Annual Tabletop DIm - To talk through the LNG developer response as well as
federal, state, and local responses to an LNGemergency at the import terminal and
along the transit route.
~ Annual Full Scale Exercise - To evaluate the actual response capabilities of LNG
developers and federal, state, and local emergency response organizations as
discussed inthe Tabletop Drills. For full-scale exercises, LNG developers will
work with ODOE to establish an Exercise Planning Team. This Teamwill include
representatives from the LNG developer, U.S. Coast Guard, ODOE, county
government, and local emergency response agencies as appropriate. The Exercise
Planning Teamwill develop the exercise objectives and limitations, the extent-of-
play, and the scenario. All information pertaining to drill and e x e r c i ~ e scenarios
are t ~ be kept under the custody ofthe trusted agent for each organization and not
to be released to participants. The Teamalso organizes control and critique ofthe
exerCIse.
~ Qualterly Communications Exercises - Testing LNG developers' initial
notification methods with offsite federal, state, and local emergency response
agencies. This includes primary and backup communications methods.
Communications exercises can run in conjunction with qumterly impolt terminal
drills.
g. LNG developers will work with ODOE and county governments to ensure LNG
public outreach is conducted inhost communities and throughout the state as
needed. This includes but is not limited to:
Public meetings or workshops
Presentations to community and business groups, elected officials,
schools, and other audiences as appropliate
News Media
Provide pre-plinted materials about JCEP and LNGto libraries, schools,
businesses, government offices, and other locations as appropriate. This
includes but is not limited to brochures, fact sheets, and calendars.
Other public outreach activities as appropliate
Safety Hazards (DEIS 4.12) - DOE appreciates the modeling the applicant has recently
performed on tsunami risks to the telminal facility. However, the model currently provided is
inadequate, because it "does not demonstrate the impact to an LNGtankel' in the slip. The
applicant should explain what would likely happen to an LNGtanker in the slip or explain why
an LNGtanker could never be in the slip when a tsunami hits. The applicant should also explain
how it expects to respond upon receiving notice of a potential tsunami.
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The DEI8 fails to discuss the risk ofanchor strikes to the pipeline as it crosses watelways,
palticularly Coos Bay. If the applicant proposes to somehow prevent boats from anchoring
above the right ofway, the method for doing so, and the impacts to recreational and commercial
waterway users and the environment, need to be discussed in detail.
3. Oregon Dept. of Parks and Rec, SHPO
. From Susan White, 8&0: liThe cultural resource survey and evaluation is still on-going, so our
comments only pertain to what has been submitted to us thus far. I do not anticipate another
draft ofthe cultural resource evaluation report prior to December 2nd, so unless I submit
something else in the meantime, this would be the SHPO comments regarding the archaeology of
the project.
1I
The comments (which were sent directly to Paul Flledman in July 11,2008 letter from SHPO)
are in the form of
a cover letter and table responding to resource report #4 - Cultural Resources
(Attachment #1) and
"trinomial tableII showing various historic and prehistOllc sites and theil' potential
eligibility for National Registry ofHistOlic Places listing (Attachment #2).
4. Oregon Water Resources Department
The Oregon Water Resources Depmtment (OWRD) is concemed that despite several contacts
with project representatives, there seems to be a very limited understanding or acknowledgement
of Oregon Water Law. This is apparent in the numerous comments regarding water use. We are
willing, and encourage, meetings with the applicant to discuss these issues and explore options
leading to their resolution.
Section 2.1.4.3 Service Water Systems. Pg 2-32 Water for Terminal operations will be supplied
by Coos Bay NOlth Bend Water Board (CBNBWB). No issues
Section2.1.3.5 Ballast and Cooling Water Pg. 2-11 20 - 50 million gallons of water per ship
with through a proposed screen system and floating filtered water system. On-shore diversions of
waterjor Ballast and Cooling use will require apermit, storage ojwater on landfor Ballast and
Cooling use will require apermit.
Section 2.1.4.3 Service Water Systems. Pg. 2-32 Hydro-test tank water, Fire pond water fl'Om
CBNBWB system. Unless obtainedfrom a Municipal supplier, water used in the processing of
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