ARTICLE X

When the law is capable of 2 interpretations, one in favor of centralized power and one in favor of local autonomy, the interpretation in favor of local autonomy takes precedence. The recommendation of the Provincial Governor is a condition sine qua non to the appointing authority of the DBM. To give the DBM Secretary the freedom to appoint whoever he likes would frustrate the meaning and the goal of local autonomy.

SECTION 1. NOTE: In this case the court talked about the local autonomy provisions of the different Constitutions. The court also said that the 1987 Consitution clearly reiterates the earlier doctrines which give more meaning to the provisions in Article X.

SECTION 2. THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS SHALL ENJOY POLITICAL AUTONOMY.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission Facts: A certain Almajose was appointed as Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by the Dept. of Budget and Management Undersecretary upon recommendation of DBM Secretary Abella. Petitioner San Juan, the Provincial Governor of Rizalm contends that he has the sole right and privilege to nominate qualified people to the position pursuant to the Local Government Code. Issue: Is the Department Head of the DBM free to appoint whomever he likes to the position of PBO? Held: As required by Executive Order No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor for the position. In this case, the issue is not just the validity of the appointment of Almajose, but the tug of war between the Provincial Governor and the DBM.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals Facts On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin site of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite in their neighborhood because of its harmful effects on its residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation and found the presence of bacteria in the water of Marilao River. They also found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining the open dumpsite without an environmental compliance certificate from the DENR as required by law. The LLDA issued a cease-and-desist order ordering the City of Caloocan to stop the operation of the dumpsite. The City Government, however, claims that it is within its power as a local government unit pursuant to the Local Government Code to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite. Issue Which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter, the LGU or the LLDA? Does the LLDA, under its charter, have the authority to entertain the complaint?

Held It must be recognized that the LLDA as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under RA 4850 to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development of the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces. The LLDA obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake area from pollution arising from the discharge of wastes. The LLDA has the power to issue the cease-and-desist order. To say otherwise would reduce the LLDA to a toothless paper agency. The LLDA charter sufficiently granted broad powers to the LLDA in the regulation of projects in the Laguna Lake Area, whether by the government or by the private sector. This is not an emasculation of the autonomy of local governments.

PD 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. PAGCOR is not just beneficial to the government but also to society. It is a major source of much-needed revenue for a cash-strapped government and provides funds for social impact projects. With the creation of PAGCOR, and the direct intervention of government, the evil practices and corruption that go with gambling will be minimized, if not, totally eradicated. The City of Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax, must therefore, always yield to a legislative act which is superior, having been passed upon by the State itself, which has the inherent power to tax. Congress has the power of control over local governments. It can grant a city the power to tax, but it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local government sovereign within the state.

Basco v. PAGCOR Facts PAGCOR was first created in 1977 by virtue of PD 1067-A and granted a franchise by PD 1067-B to operate and maintain casinos on land and water within the territorial jursidiction of the Philippines. Subsequently, in 1983, the PAGCOR charter was reenacted by PD 1869 to regulate all games of chance. The petitioners would say that the aforementioned decrees are patently unconstitutional as they claim it to be contrary to public morals, public policy and order, and the newly-restored democracy as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. They also claim that the PAGCOR charter is violative of local autonomy and is a violation of the equal protection clause because it constitutes a waiver of the right of cities to impose taxes and legal fees. Issue Issue Is the PAGCOR charter violative of the autonomy given to local government? Held Held Whether or not LGUs can regulate properties and businesses within their territory in the interest of the general welfare. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City in a leased portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties. The religious elements in the city expressed their objections, as well as other civic organizations.as they described the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permits and cancelling the business permits of those establishments which allowed the operation of casinos in its premises. They also adopted a more stern ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid. Cagayan de Oro City, through its Mayor, now aver that the CA erred in holding that the questioned ordinances were invalid.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1. It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

The Municpal Tax Ordinance imposing the assailed taxes is valid. The power of taxation given to local government is ordained in the Constitution. Under Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

It must not be unfair or oppressive. It must not be partial or discriminatory. It must not prohibit, but may regulate trade. It must be general and consistent with public policy It must not be unreasonable.

Lina, Jr. v. Pao Facts Tony Calvento was appointed as an agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install a terminal for the operation of lotto. Moyor Calixto Cataquiz of San Pedro, Laguna denied his application for a mayors permit. The Mayor based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in Laguna. Issue Whether or not the ordinance and the denial of the mayors permit based thereon are valid. Hether or not prior consurtation and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan is required before a lotto system can be operated. Held The ordinance mentioned merely states the objection of the council to the said game. It is a mere policy statement on the part of the local council and is not self-executing. Such policy statement expressing the local governments objection to lotto is valid. However, the freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local government may actually enact ordinances that go against the laws enacted by Congress. The resolution in this case should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance to prohibit the operation of lotto. Lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the National Government through an act of Congress. Municipal governments are only agents of the National Government and local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress.

Under Section 458 of the LGC, local governments are authorized to prevent or prohibit, among others, gambling or other prohibited games of chance. Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are permitted by law, and refers solely to illegal gambling. The ordinances are NOT valid because ordinances should not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Municipal corporations are agents of the national government. Local legislative bodies exercise delegated legislative authority. It is heresy to suggest that LGUs can undo the acts of Congress. The power of PAGCOR has not been modified by the LGC.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. The Municipality of Pililla Facts The Municipality of Pililla wants to tax the PPC pursuant to its taxing power as granted under the LGC. Issue Whether or not the PPC, which already pays a specific tax under the NIRC for its oil products is still liable to pay taxes imposed by the Municipality of Pililla based on a Municipal Ordinance. Held

Dadole v. COA Facts Judges of the RTC and MTC of Mandaue City received regular monthly allowances from the Municipality of Mandaue. However, in 1994, the Department of Budget and Management issued a Local Budge Circular which provided, among others, that grants like those given to Mandaue judges are not to be considered as mandatory. As a result, the Mandaue City Auditor issued a notice of disallowance to the judges, reducing their allowances to P1000 each. Furthermore, the judges were asked to reimburse allowances issued in excess of P1000 from April to September 1994. Issue Whether or not the City of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowance to judges may prevail over that fixed by the Department of Budget and Management under the Local Budget Circular. Whether or not LBC 55 is void or going beyond the supervisory powers of the President Whether or not the yearly appropriation ordinance that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation enacted by Congress. Held LBC 55 is null and void. Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement because it prohibits allowances to exceed P1000.00 when the law where such a circular is based does not prohibit allowances in excess of P1000 if the city can afford it. SECTION 3. THE CONGRESS SHALL ENACT A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WHICH SHALL

Sanchez v. COMELEC The Court discussed the intent behind Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. The Court said that while Section 3 of Article X mandates the Congress to enact a LGC providing for, among others, an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in the provision can be made to mean a repeal of BP 337, the Local Government Code existing prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. The provision merely provides that the new Code should be more responsive than the one present. Until such time, the present Code shall remain in full force. Considering that the present LGC is still in effect, COMELECs promulgation of Resolution 2272 (which provides for the supervisiory power of the COMELEC in the process and election of recall) is valid and constitutional. Garcia v. COMELEC Facts Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the 1992 elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vicemayors, and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the 12 municipalities met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Garcia on the ground of loss of confidence. They promulgated a resolution which carried 146 names but only 80 carried signatures. Of these 80, only 74 were found as genuine. They filed this resolution with the COMELEC. Garcia contends that the resolution failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down by the LGC regarding recall elections. Garcia also contends that Section 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional because the people have the sole right to decide whether or not to initiate proceedings and it violates the right of elected public officials from the political minority to the equal protection of law. Garcia says that since only those amenable to the recall were notified, the acts of the PRA were tainted by a fatal irregularity. Since only those members inclined to agree with the resolution of recall were notified, the PRA did not sufficiently satisfy the requirement of notice which is fatal to the validity of the petition to recall. Issue Whether or not the Constitution provides for alternative modes of recall.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Held Issue The Court did not discuss the constitutionality of Section 70 of the LGC because it found that the petition can be decided on equally fundamental issues, such as the issue that not all members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified. Whether or not the members of the PRA voted along party lines can only be surmised. The alleged irregularities in the notification cannot be considered as fatal. The contention of Garcia that only the people have the power to initiate recall is wrong. Nothing in the Constitution can sustain this position, because it does not specify any mode for initiating recall elections. Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandates the enactment of a LGC that shall provide for a more responsive and accountable LG structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. Congress was clearly given the power to choose effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The only requirement in the Constitution is that this mechanism should be effective. The petition is DISMISSED. Whether or not Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional, and whether the Court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of such a section. Held The RTC has the authority to decide on the constitutionality of the provision, because it is within the definition of judicial review. However, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a law. The presumption is always for the constitutionality of a law and only when there is a clear showing of an infraction of the Constitution can the Court pronounce or declare a law unconstitutional. Section 187 of the LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality of a tax ordinance, and if warranted, to revoke it. He is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version. He did not say it was unwise or unreasonable. He just said it was illegal. It was only an act of supervision and not of control. Drilon set aside the Code on two grounds: the inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions, and non-compliance with substantive requirements. These grounds did not impugn the reasonableness of the law. SECTION 5.

SECTION 4.

Drilon v. Mayor Lim Facts The City of Manila enacted an ordinance, the Manila Revenue Code, a section of which taxed four oil companies for their use of the Pandacan depot. On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary declared the ordinance null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and to public policy. The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari with the Manila RTC to revoke the Secretarys decision, which was sustained. The decision also declared that Section 187 of the LGC which provides for the procedure for approval and effectivity of tax ordinances and revenue measures as unconstitutional because it gives the Secretary of Justice control over local governments in violation of local autonomy, because the Constitution only gives the President the power of supervision over local government.

MERALCO v. Province of Laguna Facts Certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, granted franchises in favor of MERALCO for the supply of electric light, heat, and power within their areas.

The LGC of 1991 enjoined LGUs to generate their own sources of revenue and levy taxes, fees, and charges, subject to the limitations expressed in the Code, consistent with the policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the 1991 LGC., Laguna enacted a provincial ordinance levying franchise taxes on businesses in the province. A demand letter was sent to MERALCO for the payment of taxes. MERALCO paid the taxes under protest, but subsequently filed a claim for refund, claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and continued to pay to the national government pursuant to PD 551 included franchise taxes imposed by the ordinance. The claim was denied both by the Mayor and the RTC, hence this petition. Issue Whether the provincial ordinance is valid. Held Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax, except to the extent delegated to them by the delegating statute. The LGC explicitly authorizes local governments, notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law, to impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. The LGC has effectively withdrawn tax exemptions or incentives enjoyed by certain entities. In the case at bar, all exemptions granted to MERALCO can no longer be invoked to disclaim liability for the local tax. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The Constitution itself is explicit that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except for the condition that such privilege shall be subject to alteration or repeal by Congress and when the common good so requires. SECTION 6.

Ramos issued AO372, requiring LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized appropriations for non-personal services and to stop all training (except those funded and conducted by the national government), hiring of personnel, and foreign travel (except those funded by grants). The AO also suspended tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs. This AO was announced to adopt cash management measures to match available resources. Aquilino Pimentel questioned the AO, alleging that the President committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering that LGUs undertake this cost-reduction scheme in violation of LGUs fiscal autonomy. Issue Whether or not AO 372 is a valid exercise of the Presidents power of general supervision over LGUs. Held The President exercises power of supervision over executive officials of the National Government and over local government officials. This means that he has the task of overseeing the performance of the local government officials duties. The power of control necessarily connotes the power to nullify, modify, or set aside the acts of a subordinate and substitute ones judgment for that of the subordinate. Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration to local governments, and is not a devolution of power. Local officials remain accountable to the central government. Local government units only exercise delegated powers, because the aim is to make government more responsive at local levels. Notwithstanding their responsibility to the national government, the directive in AO 372 is not valid, because the basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of its shares in the National Internal Revenue, and is mandated by the Constitution. SECTION 7. SOURCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre Facts

The sources of funds for local govenrments are: 1. local taxes, fees, and charges

2. 3. 4.

its share in the national taxes its share in the proceeds of the utilization of natural resources in their area other sources which they may legitimately make either in their public or proprietary capacity. Held The Court maintained that the term limit provided for in the Constitution means that the local official must have been elected three consecutive times immediately prior to the local election where he wants to run. There are only two qualifications for the application of the disqualification provisions: 1. The official concerned has been elected three consecutive times

Their power to levy taxes, fees, and charges are subject to limitations as Congress may provide. However, for such limitations to be imposed, they must not frustrate the basic policy of local autonomy. Local govenments can either have shares from revenue in their utilization of local natural resources monetarily or directly such as lower rates of electricity, other utilities, and the like.

2.

The official concerned has served three full and consecutive terms.

Section 8.

In the case at bar, Capco has only been elected for the office of Mayor two consecutive times prior to the 1998 election, but has served three consecutive terms. This means that the provision does not apply to him and he can keep his post. Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC Facts The Court gave an example where such a disqualification cannot apply to a Mayor suspended twice for misconduct in his first term as a local official for a total of one year. He has only served two terms successively so he can still run for reelection a fourth time.

The case questions the scope of the constitutional term limits for elected barangay officials. Capco was elected as vice-mayor of Pateros in 1988. He became the mayor by operation of law in 1989 because of the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja, father of the petitioner. Capco ran for election in the 1992 polls and won. He also won his reelection bid in 1995. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for the 1998 elections and Borja seeks his disqualification on the ground that Capco has already served for three consecutive terms. The Second Division of COMELEC ruled in favor of Borja, but the COMELEC en banc reversed. Capco won the 1998 elections, prompting Borja to file a petition for certiorari seeking Capcos disqualification. Issue Whether or not Capcos election violates the Constitutional prohibition regarding term limits for elective local officials.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC Facts Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. During the 1995 elections, he likewise ran for reelection and was proclaimed winner and assumed office but his rival, Juan Alvez filed an election complaint declaringa failure of elections and the COMELEC resolved the election protest and after the re-appreciation of contested ballots, declared Alvez as the winner. Lonzanida vacated his post. During the May 1998 elections. Lonzanida again filed his candidacy. His opponent Ernesto Muli filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida contending that Lonzanida has already served three consecutive terms. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Muli, declaring that notwithstanding that Lonzanida was unseated during in 1995. he was already

proclaimed winner and that is assumption to office, although short, should be counted as one full term. Issue Whether or not Lonzanida is disqualified to run as mayor in the May 1998 elections because he has already served three consecutive terms. Held As held in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court pointed out from the discussions of the Constitutional Commission that it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election. The Court also held in the Borja case that there are two conditions for the application of disqualification must concur. First, that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive term in the same local government post. Second, that an official has fully served three consecutive terms. The petitioner cannot be be considered as having been duly elected to the post in May 1995 and he did not serve the full term from 1995-1998 because of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation of contested ballots and by COMELECs final judgment, Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 elections and his previous declaration as winner was declared null and void. Also, Lonzanida was ordered to vacate his post and therefore did not serve a full term. Lonzanida can run for mayor in the May 1998 elections.

again when he won the recall election on May, 12, 2000 where he served the unexpired term of his then rival Tagarno having lost to latter in the 1998 elections. First Division of COMELEC disqualified Talag but COMELEC en banc reversed and allowed Talag to run, saying that his victory in the recall election does not disqualify him because he lost in the 1998 elections and there was an interruption of his office from 1998-2000. Issue Whether or not Talags win in the recall election of May 2000 and his assumption to office for the remainder of the term disqualifies him to run in the May 2001 elections because of the prohibition in Section 9, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Held Petitioner Adormeo maintains that Respondent Talag is disqualified to run in the May 2001 elections because he has already served three consecutive terms. Adormeo quoted Fr. Joaquin Bernas, who said that if one is elected to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short wiol be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. COMELEC en banc saif that Fr. Bernas comment only applies to members of the House of Representatives, where no recall election is provided. The Consitution aside from providing a prohibition for running for more that three consecutive terms also provides a prohibition to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term-limit rule by a voluntary renunciation of office. The Constitution is explicit in stating that voluntary renunciation does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit, coversely interruption in the service short of the full term amounts to an interruption of of continuity from service. Talags assumption to office by virtue of then candidate Tagarnos involuntary severance is considered as an interruption of continuity from service, which means Talag did not serve the full term.

Adormeo vs. COMELEC Facts Raymundo Adormeo and Ramon Talaga are the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections. Talag was the incumbent mayor. Adormeo filed a petition contending that Talag has already served three consecutive terms and is disqualified to run. According to Adormeo, Talag served as mayor from 1992-1995, again from 1995-1998 and yet

Socrates v. COMELEC Facts Socrates was challenging the validity of Hagedorns candidacy in the recall election for the mayorship of Puerto Princesa. Prior to the recall election, Socrates was elected as Puerto Princesa mayor since Hagedorn had reached his three term limit. Socrates argues that if Hagedorn were to win the election (which he did), it would constitute a violation of Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution, because he would have been elected to four consecutive times. Issue Whether or not Hagedorns bid in the recall election constitutes a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Held The prohibition intended by the provision refers to the next regular election for the same office following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election is no longer covered by the prohibition because (1) a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms, because in a recall election, a prior election must have taken place which is the subject of the recall itself; and (2) the intervening period after the regular election and before the recall election constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Issue Whether or not Romans election violates the prohibition on term limits. Held The Court said that Romans incumbency in the post of governor following the recall elections does not fall within the period covered by the three term limit fixed by law. Romans assumption into office by virtue of the recall election is caused by an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. Although the Constitution attempts to prevent the monopolization of political power, the precept of preserving the freedom of choice of the people in ascertaining who shall hold the reins of government for them is no less than fundamental in looking at its overriding intent.

David v. COMELEC Facts David filed a petition praying that RA 7160 as unconstitutional because an earlier law, RA 6658 fixed the term of barangay officials at 5 years, as opposed to 3 for everyone else. RA 7160, according to David, applies to all local government officials while RA 6658 applies only to barangay officials. Held

Mendoza v. COMELEC Mendoza and Ibarra seek to declare Romans election as governor of Bataan in the 2001 elections as null and void for being contrary to the term limit prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Roman was appointed OIC governor in 1986 and served for two years until 1988. He was elected first in 1988, but lost in 1992. He won the recall elections in 1993, and has been governor since.

The intent of the Constitution was to be able for Congress to decide on how long the terms of barangay officials would be, but it did not mean that the terms could not be three years. The Court also said that the matter had been decided in a way by Paras v. COMELEC when it said that the next regular elections would be in May 1997. There were also appropriations in the 1997 GAA for the elections.

The Court also declared that RA 7160 repealed RA 6658. SECTION 9.

and that the plebiscite conducted is null and void because it did not include the residents of Negros Occidental. Issue

Supangan, Jr. v. Santos Facts The petitioners assailed the power of the Secretary of Local Government to appoint sectoral representatives, because no appointment may be made without an enabling law. Issue Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government can validly and legally designate members or sectoral representatives to local legislative bodies. Held The provisions of BP 337, with respect to the appointment of sectoral representatives, are still operative. Section 9, Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates that legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law. Under BP 337, the power to appoint sectoral representatives is conferred upon the President but the Secretary of Local Government, through the authority of the President, may inform the sectoral representatives of their appointments. In cases where the Sanggunian has not yet determined that a particular sector are of sufficient number to warrant representation, there is no basis for designations or appointments from such sectors. The representatives must also meet the requirements required by BP 337. SECTION 10. CREATION OF POLITICAL UNITS Tan v. COMELEC Facts A plebiscite was conducted in the province of Negros for the purpose of creating the province of Negros del Norte. The petitioners contend that BP 885 providing for the creation of Negros del Norte is unconstitutional

Whether or not the BP was unconstitutional and therefore null and void. Held There are certain requisities for the creation of a new political unit. 1. 2. 3. 4. Territory of at least 3,500 sq. km. Population of at least 500,000 Annual income of P10,000,000 for three years The creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province.

The Court found that not all the requisites for creating a new political unit were present because the income of the mother province would be substantially affected and the approval of a majority of votes of all the affected political units must first be obtained. The Court said that two political units would be affected because the boundaries of Negros Occidental would be altered. The Court declared the exercise null and void but did not direct for the holding of a new plebiscite because of the infirmity of establishing a Negros del Norte. Padilla, Jr. v. COMELEC Facts A plebiscite was to be held creating the municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa in Camarines Norte. During the plebiscite, more people voted against the creation of the new municipality. The Board of Canvassers declared the disapproval. The governor filed a petition to set aside the plebiscite for being held in areas that would not be affected because they would not comprise the new municipality. Issue Whether or not the plebiscite should be conducted only in the new municipality or the whole province Held

Following the Tan v. COMELEC ruling, the plebiscite was valid because the entire province was affected by the creation of the new municipality. Section 11. Special Administrative Areas BAVA v. MMDA Facts BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street. BAVA received from MMDA a notice to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 1996 pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law which requires the authority to rationalize the use of roads for the safe and convenient movement of persons. The adjacent perimeter wall separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue was to be demolished. RTC denied BAVAs petition, but on appeal, the decision was reversed. Issue Whether the MMDA could open Neptune Street using its police powers. Held Neptune Street is a private road owned by BAVA. One of the MMDAs duties and responsibilities is traffic management. Police power is defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution. Such power is plenary. Local government exercises police power through delegated police power through the LGCs. The MMDA is a special development and administrative region and the administration of the metro-wide basic services affecting the region was placed under a development authority known as the MMDA. Metro-wide services are those services that have metro-wide impact and transcend metro-wide boundaries, and entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for such services to be provided by individual LGUs. There are seven basic metro-wide services: 1. development planning 2. transport and traffic management

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

solid waste disposal and management flood control and sewerage management urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, shelter services health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control public safety

MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of these seven services. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: 1. formulation 2. coordination 3. regulation 4. implementation 5. preparation 6. management 7. monitoring 8. setting of policies 9. setting of a system of administration There is no syllable in the act creating the MMDA that grants it police power or legislative power. The functions are administrative in nature. It is different from the MMC, which was the kind of government unit defined in Section 11 of the Constitution. SECTION 12. KINDS OF CITIES. Highly Urbanized: can be determined by, among others, population or income pursuant to the LGC Component City: part of the province and subject to general provisions of the province. Cities not highly urbanized but whose charters prohibit them from voting in provincial elections Abella v. COMELEC Facts Adelina Larrazabal wants to run for governor of Leyte. She is a registered voter of Ormoc City and claims that this should not be considered as an impediment to her candidacy. According to the charter of Ormoc City, its qualified voters cannot vote for provincial elective offices. Larrazabal contends that the provision does not prohibit her running and only her voting for the office of governor. Issue

Whether or not a registered voter in a city whose charter prohibits voting for elective provincial officers can run for such office. Held That the phrase entitled and qualified to vote refers to two prohibitions, running and voting for a position in a province. Since Ormocs charter prohibits such, Larrazabal is disqualified from running in the elections. The Court found Larrazabals strained interpretation fallacious. Section 13. Section 14. Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit Facts After President Aquino was installed in power, she advocated a policy of national reconciliation. She conducted negotiations with Fr. Balweg of the CPP-NPA for the cessation of hostilities. After the negotiations, Balweg and his group helped draft EO 220 which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, or the CAR. To accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to serve as a transitory provision in preparation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. The petitioners contend that the passing of EO 220 preempted the Congress in its mandated task to enact an organic act for the creation of an autonomous Cordillera region. Held EO 220 does not create an autonomous region. CAR is merely a transitory procedure in anticipation of an enactment of an organic act and the creation of such a region. CAR was created for administrative coordination. At this time, the legislation for the creation of an autonomous region has already been passed. CAR is not a territorial or political subdivision but an administrative, coordinate planning, and implementing body. CAR is a sophisticated version of a regional development council. Section Section Section Section 15. 16. 17. 18. Abbas v. COMELEC

Facts The case is about a plebiscite in 13 provinces and 9 cities for the creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Abbas maintains that such a region is unconstitutional and it violates the Tripoli Agreement. The Tripoli Agreement is an agreement between the government and the MNLF for the establishment of the an autonomous region in Mindanao during the Marcos regime. Held The Constitution takes precedence over a local agreement, such as the Tripoli Agreement. The Constitution already provides for an autonomous region which means that there is no more need for the Tripoli agreement. The RA is Constitutional. Only provinces who vote favorably for inclusion in the autonomous region shall be part of it. The Constitution provides for the standards by which Congress uses to determine who shall be included in the autonomous region and such discretion cannot be looked into by the Court. The President has the power to merge administrative regions which are territorial although it is not found explicitly in the Constitution. Such power is traditionally vested on the Executive to facilitate supervision over local governments. Cordillera Regional Assembly v. COMELEC Facts Pursuant to a Republic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region, a plebiscite was held in the area, and only the province of Ifugao voted favorably for the creation of the CAR. Issue Whether a lone province can legally and validly constitute such an autonomous region Held The Constitution and the Republic Act contemplate more than one province to constitute an autonomous region. A lone province cannot

constitute CAR because it is impossible to follow certain provisions for the establishment of CAR by just enjoining one province. Leonor v. Cordillera Bodong Administration Facts Due to the failure of the plebiscite creating the CAR, the COMELEC issued a resolution pertaining to orders creating the CAR null and void. As a consequence, the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the indigenous and special courts and the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army as a regional police force do not legally exist. Tribal courts are not part of the Philippine judicial system. Settlements, compromises, awards, and decisions rendered by a pangkat or a tribal court, if not seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment, but it can only be enforced only through a local city or municipal court which the head of the tribal court transmits the compromise settlement. Section 19. Section 20. Pandi v. CA Issue Who has the capacity to appoint the OIC of the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur? a. provincial governor b. regional governor ARMM c. ARMM Health Secretary Held Lanao del Sur provincial governor Mahid Mutilan designated Dr. Saba as OIC of the provincial health office in Lanao on 9/15/93. During this time, the office of provincial health officer was still a national position, paid by national funds. The appointment was void. Sani was appointed PHO by Sec. Bengzon on 1/1/1988. Sani cannot claim tenure as PHO of Lanao, because he was appointed to the region and not the province Macacua, ARMM Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the office in Cotobato City. On 9/9/93. The functions of the DOH had not been

transferred yet so the appointment was void. However, reappointment on 11/6/93, after the issuance of EO 133 delegating DOH functions, made the appointment valid. Macacua designated Pandi OIC of the Lanao PHO on 9/9/93 and reappointed him on 11/6/93. Only the reappointment was valid but it was enough to establish Pandi as the Lanao PHO.