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Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No.

180321 March 20, 2012 FACTS: Respondent was the registered owner of a parcel of land. While on board a jeepney, respondents mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the TCT from respondent and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots. Through a falsified deed of sale, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Maura sold one of the lots to one Lorna who sold the same to petitioner for P4,000.00. Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT. ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter HELD: NO. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. Republic vs, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila G.R. No. 192975 FACTS: Republic filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, for cancellation of titles and reversion against respondent RCAM

and several others. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that RCAM appears as the registered owner of 8 parcels of land covered by OCT No. 588 allegedly issued pursuant to a decision by the Land Registration Court in favor of RCAM. RCAM sold the said eight (8) parcels of land to the other named defendants. These parcels of land, however, were certified by the BFD as falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and it was only later that they were declared alienable and disposable. RCAM filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint. It alleged that the action for reversion of title was essentially one for annulment of judgment of the then Court of First Instance acting as a Land Registration Court, hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to act upon.RTC denied RCAM's motion to dismiss for being premature. The CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Republic HELD: Yes. It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. In the present case, the material averments, as well as the character of the relief prayed for by petitioners in the complaint show that their action is one for cancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged the parcels of land subject matter of the action were not the subject of the CFIs judgment in the relevant prior land registration case. Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates of title of RCAM be cancelled which will not necessitate the annulment of said judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on annulment of judgment finds no application in the instant case. The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-E G.R. No. 173021 October 20, 2010 FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the MTC against Jaime Abalos (Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar. Respondents contended that: they are the children and heirs of one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate; at the time of the death of Vicente, he left behind a parcel of land; during the lifetime of Vicente and through his tolerance, Jaime and the Spouses Salazar were allowed to stay and build their respective houses on the subject parcel of land; even after the death of Vicente, herein respondents allowed Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to remain on the disputed lot; however, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the Complaint and asserting in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that: respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription; the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the persons of the defendants; the absolute and exclusive owners and possessors of the disputed lot are the deceased predecessors of defendants; defendants and their predecessors-ininterest had been in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot as owners since time immemorial; defendants are faithfully and religiously paying real property taxes on the disputed lot as evidenced by Real Property Tax Receipts; they have continuously introduced improvements on the said land, such as houses, trees and other kinds of ornamental plants which are in existence up to the time of the filing of their Answer. Petitioners filed their Answer in Intervention with Counterclaim. Like the defendants, herein petitioners claimed that their predecessors-ininterest were the absolute and exclusive owners of the land in question; that petitioners and their predecessors had been in possession of the subject lot since time immemorial up to the present; they have paid real property taxes and introduced improvements thereon. ISSUE:Whether they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the disputed lot in the concept of an owner, or whether their possession is by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest

HELD: In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-ininterest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueo, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription Miguel v. Montaez G.R. No. 191336 January 25, 2012 FACTS: Respondent secured a loan of P143,864.00, payable in 1 year from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot.Due to the respondents failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of P2,000.00 per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner filed before the MeTC a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. The MeTC issued a ruling in favor of petitioner which was affirmed by the RTC. The latter, however, was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner, notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos

HELD: Yes. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy.This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz: A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. The respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.

to cause the eviction and removal of all the respondents on the property. The parties did not repudiate the amicable settlement. The vendees having paid the down payment and second installment of the price of the property, the vendors caused the cancellation of the TCTs. However, Escueta and the other vendors had yet to receive the balance of the purchase price because the respondents were still in the property. Despite the lapse of the extensions granted them, the petitioners still refused to vacate the property. Escueta filed on a verified Motion for Execution against the petitioners with the MTC for the enforcement of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution. The MTC denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether the MTC erred in denying the motion HELD: Yes. Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment. Section 417 of the LGC grants a party a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison d etre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon. The time line in Section 417 should be construed to mean that if the obligation in the settlement to be enforced is due and demandable on the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due and demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due and demandable.

Vidal v. Escueta, 463 Phil. 314 FACTS: Abelardo Escueta died intestate. He was survived by his widow and their six children, including Ma. Teresa O. Escueta. Part of his estate was a parcel of land. The property was leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate over the property. They also executed a special power of attorney authorizing Escueta to sell the said property. Escueta, as a coowner of the property, filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sublessees before the Lupon of Barangay. In the meantime, the heirs of Abelardo Escueta executed a deed of conditional sale over the property including the house thereon, to Mary Liza Santos. Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed an Amicable Settlement, where they agreed that (a) the owners of the property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents with the concomitant obligation of the respondents to vacate the property; (b) if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the property, the barangay chairman was authorized without any court order

Heirs of Faustino Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fran, Jr., G.R. No. 201816 April 8, 2013 FACTS: The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian) two parcels of land on installment. Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirswhose names do not appear on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of them refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed away. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, Thus, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC, against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case is entitled Heirs of Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray, Thereafter, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and the petitioners are not real-party-in-interest. The RTC and CA affirmed the motion. ISSUE: Whether the complaint states no cause of action HELD: Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a)The legal right of the plaintiff; (b)The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c)The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresas co -heirs does not fall under any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable party. Nonjoinder means the failure to bring a person who is a necessary party [or in this case an indispensable party] into a lawsuit. An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination

can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint. Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay, et al., G.R. No. 191178 March 13, 2013 FACTS: ASB filed a verified complaint for sum of money and damages with application for replevin against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, respondent Henry H. Furigay; his wife, respondent Gelinda C. Furigay;, The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of ASB. While case was pending, respondent spouses donated their registered properties, to their minor children. Claiming that the donation of these properties was made in fraud of creditors, ASB filed a Complaint for Rescission of Deed of Donation, Title and Damages against the respondent spouses and their children. Instead of filing an answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint, principally arguing that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons as well as over the subject matter in view of the failure of the ASB to serve the summons properly and to pay the necessary legal fees. The RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. The CA found that the action of ASB had not yet prescribed, but was premature. ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in dismissing ASBs complaint on the ground that the action against respondents was premature HELD: No. In order that one may claim to have a cause of action, the following elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants its dismissal. A cursory reading of the allegations of ASBs complaint would show that it failed to allege the ultimate facts constituting its cause of

action and the prerequisites that must be complied before the same may be instituted. ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is, exhausting the properties of CTS, Henry H. Furigay and Genilda C. Furigay or their transmissible rights and actions, simply undertook the third measure and filed an action for annulment of the donation. Mercado v. Espina, et al., G.R. No. 173987, February 25, 2013 FACTS: Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Certificate of Title and Damages. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the heirs of the late spouses Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who were the owners of the subject parcel of land; after the death of Santiago and Sofronia, petitioners inherited the disputed lot, possessing the same as owners; sometime in 1996, herein respondents claimed ownership over the subject parcel of land, alleging that they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado Espina. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case due to the failure of the complainant to state the assessed value of the property, that petitioners' cause of action is barred by prescription, laches and indefeasibility of title, and that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action against respondents who are buyers in good faith. The RTC denied respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the case and enjoining it from proceeding with the case on the ground of indefeasibility of title, prescription and/or laches HELD: NO. Where the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land (such as the one at bar) alleges that some of the defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, it is held that the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint against the purchasers for failure to state a cause of action against them. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corp. v. Parungao,

G.R. No. 197507, January 14, 2013 FACTS: This is a petition for indirect contempt. The Court issued a enjoining the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and/or all persons acting upon their orders or in their place and stead from canceling TCT No. T-105742 in Rivulet's name; issuing a new certificate of title in the name of the Republic; and issuing and distributing CLOAs in favor of anyone during the pendency of the case. Respondent Undersecretary Parugao sought advice from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on the possibility of installing farmer beneficiaries in the subject property despite the TRO, citing that the acts sought to be enjoined had already been performed prior to its issuance and that the DAR was not among those enjoined.The OSG opined that the TRO was directed only against the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and that the installation of farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law directs the DAR to proceed with the distribution of the acquired land to the farmer-beneficiaries upon the issuance of CLOAs in their favor. Accordingly, the farmerbeneficiaries were installed in the subject landholding with the assistance of the members of the PNP. Rivulet claims that the act of respondents in installing farmer-beneficiaries in the subject landholding constitutes an open defiance and disobedience of the TRO for which they should be cited for indirect contempt of court. ISSUE: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt HELD: NO. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. The power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive principle, and only when necessary in the interest of justice

Aldemita v. Heirs of Melquiades Silva, G.R. No. 166403, November 2, 2006 FACTS: A verified complaint for Quieting of Title was filed by the respondents. After three years, the case was submitted for decision. However, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss this case on the ground of plaintiffs lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether the motion should be granted HELD: No. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss should have been filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. As it appears, the motion was filed in the RTC after the case has been submitted for decision. As it now stands, only the following defenses are not waived even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription on the action.16 Failure to state a cause of action is not an exception in said Rule. Thus, under Section 1, Rule 16, petitioner is deemed to have waived this ground and cannot now raise it after the case in the RTC had been submitted for decision or on appeal to the CA. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Catalan G.R. No. 159590 October 18, 2004 440 SCRA 498

1. 2.

Does the complaint state a cause of action? Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?

HELD: 1. Yes. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. In this instance, after carefully examining the amended complaint, we are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on tort under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It is evident that Catalan is suing HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE for unjustified and willful refusal to pay the value of the checks. 2. Yes. It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss. HSBANK already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS: Respondent filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money with damages against petitioner HSBANK, due to HSBANKs alleged wanton refusal to pay her the value of five HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00. Summons was served on HSBANK. It filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the person of HSBAN and the complaint does not state a cause of action against HSBANK. The RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss. ISSUE:

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