[G.R. No. 152895.

June 15, 2004]

OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.

[G.R. No. 153151. June 15, 2004]

GLORIA S. DY, petitioner, vs. The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads: That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for value the check said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason 2. G.R. No. 153151 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed by the MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense in this wise:

That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED

ISSUE(S):
concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65 Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action. Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22.
[11]

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one

that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.
[13]

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128448. February 1, 2001]

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MIRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC., respondents. D EC ISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs [1] of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 picu ls of sugar, with 23,696.40 picu ls marked for export. Private respondent Philippine National Ban k (PNB) financed th e Mirasols sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Cred it Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners attorney -in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latters sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
Exercising his law-making powers unde r Ma rtial La w, then President Ferdinand Ma rcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 579[2] in November, 1974. The decree authori zed pri va te respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase suga r allocated for export to the Uni ted Sta tes and to other forei gn ma rkets . The pri ce and quanti ty was determined by the Suga r Quota Adminis tra tion, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, a nd finall y, by the Office of the President. The decree further authori zed PNB to finance PHILEXs purchases. Finall y, the decree di rected that wha tever profit PHILEX mi ght realize from sales of suga r abroad was to be remi tted to a special fund of the nati onal government, after commissions , overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted

FACTS:

Believ ing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals fro m their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment, petitioners on August 4, 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account ofP1,513,347.78. On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by petitioners to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially fo reclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.

PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Govern ment and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounti ng, specific performance, and damages against PNB wi th the Regional Tri al Court of Bacolod Ci ty, docketed as Ci vil Case No. 14725. After trial on the merits, the trial court deci ded as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX):
(1)Declaring Presidential Decree 579 enacted on November 12, 1974 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. 2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances [7] thereof are unconstitutional.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court in CA -G.R. CV 38607 AFFIRM ED. Costs against petitioners. . It is settled that Regional Tri al Courts have the authority and juris diction to consi der the constitutionality of a statute, presi denti al decree, or executi ve order. [9] The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, internati onal or executi ve agreement, presidenti al decree, order, instructi on, ordinance, or regulati on not onl y in this Court, but in all Regional Tri al Courts.[10] In J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961) we hel d:

1.

Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. [11]
The purpose of the manda tory noti ce in Rule 64, Secti on 3 is to enable the Soli ci tor General to deci de whether or not his intervention in the a ction assailing the validity of a law or trea ty is necessa ry.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Ci vil Case No. 14725. Nor di d the tr i al court ever require hi m to appear in person or by a representati ve or to file any pleadi ng or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals di d not err in hol ding that l ack of the required notice made it i mproper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional vali dity of the questioned presi denti al decrees. Jurisprudence has laid down the foll owing requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the

2.

Court must be ri pe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the vali dity of the act must have standi ng to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. [16] As a rule, the courts will not resol ve the constituti onality of a law, if the controversy can be settled on other grounds.[17] The policy of the courts is to avoi d ruling on constituti onal questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are vali d, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separati on of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executi ve departments and found to be in accord wi th the Constitution before it was fi nally enacted and approved. [18] The present case was instituted primarily for accounti ng and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB s obligati on to render an accounti ng is an issue, which can be determined, wi thout having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB s intransigence in refusing to gi ve an accounting. The governing law shoul d be the l aw on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as petitioners agent. In other wo rds, the requisite that the constitutionality of the l aw in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents. DECISION
PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Referenc e System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

Petitioner contends:

" A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEME NTA TION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLA TE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINE D IN THE CONS TITUTION."
[2]

Respondents counter-argue :

A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW; B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTE CTS AN INDIV IDUA L'S INTE RES T IN PRIVACY.
[3 ]

ISSUE(S):
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the ca se at bar

RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computeriz ed Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a S enator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GS IS funds to implement A.O. No. 308
[4]

. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the res pondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has cont rol over the exec utive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of cont rol, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the m aintenanc e of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
[18] [19] [20]

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President whic h relat es to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Admini strative Code of 1987.
[24]

As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998]

SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARM AMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO ROQUE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA,respondents. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J. :

FACTS:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of xxx national and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Governments Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also revealed that he and members of his family were in danger

of being liquidated, facing as he did the formidable world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold on Philippine social, political and economic systems. After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, t he Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program, providing him a monthly allowance, temporary shelter and personal and security protection during witness duty. On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG), several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling operations On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program, which was denied by petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply dated January 11, 1996 (Annexes H and I). On January 23, 1996, Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program. Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides: On the other hand, petitioners contend that said provisions merely require that the testimony of the state witness seeking admission into the Program can be substantially corroborated or is capable of corroboration. So long as corroboration can be obtained when he testifies in court, he satisfies the requirement that his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points.

ISSUE(S):
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power.

RULING:
There is no quarrel with this point. Until a more opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No Actual Controversy Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty of the cour ts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
[6]

Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have standing; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.
[8 ] [9]

The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests
[10]

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
[14]

In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roques admission into the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUI Z BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOP HER F.C. BOLAS TIG, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL -ARROYO, AS PRESI DENT AND COMMANDER -IN-CHIEF, EX ECUTIV E SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AV ELI NO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENS E, GENERAL GENEROSO S ENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Res pondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRI BUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Res pondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOS EPH G. ESCUDERO, JOS EP H A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMP O, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOS EL J. VILLANUEVA, LI ZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTI N MARC SB. CHIP ECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONI NO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROS ALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS -BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVI ER COLMENARES, MOV EMENT OF CONCERNED CITI ZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTI ES REPRES ENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE S ECRETARY, AV ELI NO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO S ENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF P NP, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

KILUS ANG MAYO UNO, REPRES ENTED BY ITS CHAIRP ERS ON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUS ANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REP RES ENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESI DENT, JOS ELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAP ULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, PRESI DENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHI EF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO S ENGA, AND THE PNP DI RECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMI BAO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. EX ECUTIV E SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO S ENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI BAO, Respondents. G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOS E ANSELMO I. CADI Z, FELI CIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOV Y C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCI A AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (I BP), Petitioners, vs. HON. EX ECUTIV E SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO S ENGA, IN HIS CAP ACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI BAO, IN HIS CAP ACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL -ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER -INCHI EF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR -GENERAL OF THE P HILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (P NP); GENEROS O SENGA, IN HIS CAP ACITY AS CHI EF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP ); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EX ECUTIV E SECRETARY, Respondents. DECISION SANDOV AL-GUTI ERREZ, J. :

FACTS:
These seven (7) consolidat ed petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that res pondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Eds a People Power I , President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 do hereby command the Armed Force s of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppre ss all form s of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated b y me personally or upon my direction ; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. She cited the following facts as bases:

elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF -CPP-NP A and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004; On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, On Marc h 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and aft er all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads: WHEREAS , pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency; WHEREAS , by virt ue of General Order No.5 and No. 6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (P NP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary; In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximat e cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. 4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

While he explained that it is not respondents ta sk to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issue s. On January 17, 2006, Capt ain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their det ention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to " show and proclaim our displeas ure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms. " 5 On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled " Oplan Hack le I " which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippi ne Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the " Magdalos D -Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I." On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the A rroyo administration

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Immediately, the Office of the P resident announced the cancellation of all programs and activities relat ed to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I ; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police

On Marc h 3, 2006, President Arroy o issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

ISSUE(S):
A. PROCEDURAL: 1) Whether the issuanc e of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al. ), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. B. SUBSTANTIVE: 1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge

RULING:
A-1. But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." 23 Courts
may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 24 Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case 28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 29 The Court holds that President A rroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 32third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 34

A-2. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."

In private suits, standing is governed by the "real -parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that " every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest ." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is " the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the sui t. " 38 Succ inctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows bot h "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases dec ided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislat ors may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal

37

standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the " transcendental importance " doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases." This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. . Constitutional Basi s of PP 1017

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 PATRI CIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO S ALAP ANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, res pondent. Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

FACTS:
Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and cont rary to the equal protection and due process guarant ees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seek s to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied) For their part, petitioners igot and S alapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4. Sec. 4. ... Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the Stat e, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the af orementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact. ... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied). Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52) Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordanc e with Section 6, Art. XII -C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commenc e on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.) In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELE C, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)A rt. XIIC of the Constituti on, whic h provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELE C et als . No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

ISSUE(S): RULING:
that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an int erest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied wit h, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings. This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy. It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambans a Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection claus e guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COME LEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqual ification has been filed before the COME LEC. B. Proper part y. The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra ). In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. E ven then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no pers onal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. C. Unavoidability of constitutional question. Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriat e cases and is necessary to a det ermination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented." We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 S CRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969] ), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004]

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY,EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL

HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, respondents. DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, [5] which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436[6] authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. ). However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu.[8] In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints. On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission. Out of the 57 bidders,[13] the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.

ISSUE(S):
the legal standing of petitioners and the alleged prematurity of the Petition.

RULING:
On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -- respond that the issues central to this case are of transcendental importance and of national interest. We agree with petitioners. Our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest;[18] in other words, it is of paramount public interest [19] and transcendental importance.[20] This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society.[21] Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld. Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds,[22] or if public money is being deflected to any improper purpose;[23] or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. [24] In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents. FACTS:
PER CURIAM :

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar E uropa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and tax payers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), ot herwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IP RA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). The Solicitor General is of the view t hat the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of t he IP RA and its Implemen ting Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of

the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; (2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalie nable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples; (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral dom ains and ancestral lands; (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreem ents with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintai n, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all- encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found wit hin said are as, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
[3 ]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IP RA defining the powers and j urisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
[4 ]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over exec utive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
[6]

ISSUE: RULING:
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.[3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.[4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. [5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.[6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.[7] The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. [9] On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT: A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK;

HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.[10]

ISSUE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review RULING: First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cas es wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. [29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy. [31] When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.

G.R. No. L-16263

July 26, 1960

DR. JOS E CUYEGKENG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, a s member of Board of Medical Examiners, respondent. G. B. Guevara, R. P. Guevara and E. S. Tipon for petitioners. J. W. Diok no for petitioners in Intervention. Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Solicitor E. D. Ignacio and A tty. J. A. Garcia for respondent. CONCEP CION, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners are doctors Jos e Cuyegkeng, Pedro N. Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday, Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera-Ramirez. Their alleged cause of action is predicated upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified physicians, approved and submitted, to the President of the Philippines, by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for appointment as members of the Board of Medic al Examiners, and that respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, whom the President appointed to said board was not named in said list. it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioners: ON THE FIRS T OF ACTION:

1. Declaring the petitioners as duly qualified for the position of member of the Board of Medical Examiners and that any one of them is legally entitled to be appointed as members of said Board; 2. Declaring the appointment of the respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz as members of the Board of Medical Examiners illegal and therefore null and void and ousting him therefrom and perpetually prohibiting him (unless appointed in accordanc e with law) from exercising the rights and performing the duties and functions connected therewith. ON THE SE COND CAUSE OF ACTION: 1. That pending the hearing on the merits of this case a writ of preliminary injunction be issued forthwith ex parte ordering the respondent to cease, desist and refrain from assuming the office of member of the Board of Medical Examiners and exercising the rights and performing the duties and functions connected therewith, particularly to give or conduct the next examinations for physicians scheduled on or about December 14, 1959, or to take part in any way in the giving or conducting thereof, and after due hearing to make said injunction permanent; 2. Ordering the respondent to pay the costs of this suit. Petitioners further pray for such further and ot her relief as this Honorable Court "may deem just and proper under the premises." By a resolution dated December 3, 1959, this Court denied the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. It appears that, on October 16, 1959, said Council, acting in conformity with section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, otherwise known as The Medical Act of 1959, approved and submitted to the President a revis ed list of qualified physicians, including petitioners herein, for appointment to the aforementioned Board Petitioner herein, as well as the int ervenors, maint ain that, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, the President cannot appoint to the Board of Medical Examiners any person not named in the list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, and that, accordingly, the aforementioned appointment of respondent is null and void. Respondent alleged in his answer that three(3) of petitioners herein are, pursuant to section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382, not qualified for appointment to the Board for Medical Examiners, they being members of the professional staff of certain privat e medical colleges; that there is no cause of action againsts him none of the petitioners and intervenors claim to be entitled to the office in question; that the aforementioned list, submitted by the executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, is merely recommendatory in nature and, as such, not binding upon the President; that insofar as Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 may be construed as limiting the choice of the President, in a mandatory manner, in the selection of members of the Board of Medical Examiners, to the list aforementioned, said legal provision is unconstitutional and void; and that inclusion in the list above referred to is not one of the qualification prescribed in section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382 for appointment to said Board.

HELD: alt hough none of the groups already adverted to have sufficient votes to constitute the requisite
majority, the members of this Court are unanimous in the opinion that respondent herein has a good and valid title to his office. Lastly, this is a a quo warranto proceeding, which, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, may be brought either by the Government or by a private individual. Not every individual may, however, initiate the proceedings. Section 6 of said Rule provides:

When an individual may commenc e such an action . A person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name. Thus, one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another cannot question his title thereto by quo warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to entitled to the officeheld by respondent herein. None of them has been appointed theret o and none of them may, therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of the alleged flaws in respondent's title theret o. They merely assert a right to be appointedto said office. Considering, however, that there are seven (7) petitioners and that only one (1) office is involved in this case, none of them can, or does, give an assuranc e that he will be the one appointed by the President, should said office be declared vacant. In short, the claim of each petitioner is predicated solely upon a more or less recipient of the appointment. It is obvious, therefore, that none of them has a cause of action against res pondent herein (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil., 18, 22; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil., 401; Neuno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12). Upon the other hand, the petition in int ervention is predicated upon the right of the intervenors to submit a list ofrecommendees for appointment to the Board of Medical Examiners. Such right does not entitle the intervenors, under the above provision of Rule 68, to question the title of respondent herein. Hence, the petition for quo warrantohas no leg to stand on. Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 118910 July 17, 1995 KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAP ULONG, JR., JOS E T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOS E ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTI N S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDI E WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents .

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232
SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the P CSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be "consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision." On January 25, 1995, the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (hereafter called ELA ) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental

equivalent to 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales derived by the P CSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35, 000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. The rental is to be comput ed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCS O agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2) Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is allotted to charity. (R.A. No. 1169, 6 (B)) The term of the lease is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3) In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment arising from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the lease, the P CSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 million. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case. Petitioners argue: 1. THE AMENDE D ELA IS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS BASICA LLY OR SUBS TANTIALLY THE SAME AS OR SIMILAR TO THE OLD LEASE CONTRA CT AS REPRESENTE D AND ADMITTED BY RESPONDE NTS PGMC AND PCSO. 2. ASSUMING ARGUE NDO, THA T THE AMENDE D ELA IS MA TERIALLY DIFFE RENT FROM THE OLD LEASE CONTRACT, THE AMENDE D ELA IS NEVE RTHELESS NULL A ND VOID FOR BEING INCONS IS TENT WITH AND VIOLA TIVE OF PCSO'S CHARTE R AND THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF MAY 5, 1995. 3. THE AMENDE D EQUIPME NT LEASE AGREEME N T IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING VIOLA TIVE OF THE LAW ON PUBLIC BIDDING OF CONTRA CTS FOR FURNIS HING SUPPLIES, MA TERIALS A ND EQUIPME NT TO THE GOVE RNME NT, PARTICULA RLY E.O. NO. 301 DA TE D 26 JULY 1987 AND E.O. NO. 298 DA TED 12 AUGUS T 1940 AS AMENDE D, AS WELL AS THE "RULES AND REGULA TIONS FOR THE PREVE NTION OF IRRE GULAR, UNNECESSA RY, E XCESS IVE OR E XTRAVA GANT (IUEE) E XPE NDITURES PROMULGA TED UNDER COMMISS ION ON A UDIT CIRCULA R NO. 85-55-A DA TED SEP TEMBER 8, 1985, CONSIDERING THA T IT WAS AWARDED AND E XE CUTED WITHOUT THE PUBLIC BIDDING REQUIRED UNDE R SAID LAWS AND COA RULES AND REGULA TIONS, IT HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRES IDE NT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND IT IS NOT MOS T ADVANTAGE OUS TO THE GOVE RNME NT. 4. THE ELA IS VIOLA TIVE OF SECTION 2(2), ARTICLE IX-D OF THE 1987 CONS TITUTION IN RELA TION TO COA CIRCULAR NO. 85 -55-A.

ISSUE:

RULING: WHE REFORE, the Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare
the Equipment Lease Agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Offic e and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. invalid is DISMISSE D.

hold that petitioners have no cause against respondents and therefore their petition should be dismissed. The Kilosbay an, Inc. is an organization described in its petition as "composed of civic -spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case," nor that of conclusiveness of judgment poses a barrier to a det ermination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit. Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in decisional law d oes not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were actually involved. Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the cont racting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it (Ibaez v. Hongk ong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 (1912)), or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have been illegally excluded from it. These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. . . . The phras e 'present substantial interest' more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a payment to or rec overy by him But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 JUAN ANTONI O, ANNA ROS ARIO and JOS E ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity a s the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resource s, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROS ARIO, Pre siding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

DAVI DE, JR., J.: FACTS: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers ' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country 's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and ot hers who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Cons equently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Canc el all existing timber licens e agreements in the country; (2) Ceas e and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
5 2 3

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dis miss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. On 18 July 1991, res pondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss RULI NG: . WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRA NTE D, and the challenged Order of res pondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as w ell as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of int ergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healt hful ecology is concerned
10

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the 18 defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to 19 state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or det ermination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctri ne is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenet rable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review

G.R. No. L-21450

April 15, 1968

SERAFI N TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendantappellant. F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio. Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant -appellant Manila Suret y and Fidelity Company, Inc. DIZON, J.: FACTS: On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spous es Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to

recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, aft er the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecut e and (2) A bsence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. RULING: It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spous es was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case which shall fort hwith be set forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi -party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a count er -bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15 -19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais , or estoppel by deed or by rec ord, and of estoppel by laches .

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreas onable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. UPON ALL THE FORE GOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, wit h costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

G.R. No. L-45685

November 16, 1937

THE PEOPL E OF T HE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. LAUREL, J.:

FA CTS:

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, w ho heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as priv ate prosecutor. , the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeter minate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of pris ion may or, to pay the costs and w ith reservation of civ il action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from fiv e years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and tw enty-seven days of prision mayor , but affir med the judgment in all other respects. The instant proceedings have to do w ith the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the f uture. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office whic h recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Artic le XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsectionsubsection (1), Artic le III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effectiv e or otherwis e in their respective or otherw is e in their respective provinces On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution w ith a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of whic h he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation

. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila w hich f ostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridic ule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted w ithout jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdic tion: I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the follow ing reason: (1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it now here states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila. In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherw is e in their respective provinc es, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive

ISSUE: RULING
It is a w ell-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 whic h prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute w ill not be considered on application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel . Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but als o before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court w ithout jurisdiction is void, where the juris diction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality w ill be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a

result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. And, even if we were to concede that the is sue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time w hen a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly rais ed

[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002]

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents. D EC ISION
CARPIO, J.: FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID (Education and Information Department) . On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner a s Director IV of EID in a Temporary capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a Temporary capacity. [2]

On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,[3] and Borra[4] and Tuason[5] as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.[6]However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008.[7] They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. [8] Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,

Borra and Tuason to the same positions. [9] The Office of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 [11] addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petit ioners reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001[12] addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-inCharge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner. On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. [13]Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001 During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these three respondents. Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of judicial
review in constitutional cases; RULING:

Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of petitioners reassignment on Benipayos authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution. On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then petitioners reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain

provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayos assumption of office. Petitioners personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. [22] Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. [23] There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time. Moreover, the legality of petitioners reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA , Petitioner,

G. R. No. 159314 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated: EDWARD F. RANADA and the Honorable OMBUDSMAN AnianoA. Desierto (now June 26, 2006 succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his Deputy OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao, Hon. Antonio E. Valenzuela, Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and DavaoTugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner

Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.[3] The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in theDavao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported Estarijas activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. decision[8] in the administrative case,

Estarija seasonably filed a motion for recons ideration.[10] Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989 , is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the Constitution.

ISSUE: RULING:

[G.R. No. 131124. March 29, 1999]

OSMUNDO G. UMALI, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. R E SOL UT ION
PURISIMA, J.:

FA CTS: On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. He was assigned in Manila, fro m November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994, and in Makati, fro m March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994.
On Augus t 1, 1994, President Ramos recei ved a confidential memorandum a gainst the peti tioner for alleged vi olations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulati ons during his incumbency as Regional Di rector, more pa rti cularl y the following mal feasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance,

On August 2, 1994, upon receipt of the said confidential memo randum, fo rmer President Ramos authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately referred the Co mplaint against the latter to the Presidential Co mmission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Peti tioner was dul y informed of the cha rges a gainst hi m. After evaluati ng the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued i ts Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima fa cie evidence to support si x (6) of the twel ve (12) cha rges agains t peti tioner,

On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCA GC, then President Ramos issued Admin istrative Order No. 152 dis missing petitioner fro m the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. On October 24, 1994, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1994.
On December 1, 1994, peti tioner brought a Peti tion for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injuncti on, docketed as Ci vil Case No. 943079 before the Regional Trial Court of Maka ti ,

On December 23, 1994, the said Regional Trial Court d ismissed the petition. On January 10, 1995, the petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration, this time, theorizing that the Presidential Co mmission on AntiGraft and Corruption is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him. The case was then re-raffled to Hon. Teofilo L. Guad iz, Jr. who, on December 13, 1995, handed down an Amended Decision, granting the petition and practically reversing the orig inal Decision. Not satisfied with the Amended Decision of Judge Guadiz, Jr., the respondents appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. On April 8, 1997, the Ninth Div ision of the Court of Appeals [3] promulgated its decision, reversing the Amended Decision of the trial court of origin, and dismissing Civ il Case No. 94-3079. Petitioners motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied on October 28, 1997. On July 25, 1995, after conducting the investigation, Ombudsman Investigators Merba Waga and Arnulfo Pelagio issued a Resolution finding a probable cause and recommending the institution in the courts of proper

Jurisdiction criminal cases for Falsificat ion of Public Documents (13 counts) and Open Disobedience (2 counts) against the petitioner.
However, acti ng upon peti tioners motion for reco nsiderati on Special Prosecution Officer II Lemuel M. De Guzman set aside the said Resolution of Jul y 25, 1995, and in lieu thereof, dismissed the cha rges agains t peti tioner, in the Order da ted November 5, 1996, whi ch was approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. I ISSUE: WHETHER THE PCAGC IS A VALIDLY

CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND WHETHER PETITIONER CAN RAISE THE ISSUE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY BELATEDLY IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION; AND
RULING: As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCA GC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
WHEREFORE, in li ght of the foregoi ng effecti ve and substanti ve supervening events , and in the exercise of i ts equi ty powers , the Court hereby GRANTS the peti tion. Accordingl y, Adminis tra ti ve Order No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and peti tioner ca n be allowed to reti re with full benefi ts.

November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267 FRANCISCO ZANDUETA , petitioner, vs. SIXTO DE LA COSTA , respondent. Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta for petitioner. Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondent. Villareal, J.:

FACTS:

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year.

On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof.

On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year. On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, RULING: If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American and Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the petition Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner

U.S. Supreme Court

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)
Norton v. She lby County Argued March 24-25, 1886 Decided May 10, 1886 Mr. Justice Field FACTS: This is an action upon 29 bonds, of $1,000 each, alleged to be the bonds of Shelby county, Tennessee, issued on the first of March, 1 869, and payable on the first of January, 1 87 3, with interest from January 1, 1 869, at 6 per cent. per annum, payable annually on the surrender of matured interest coupons attached; and three coupons of $60 each.

e county of Shelby, state of Tennessee, is indebted to the Mississippi River Railroad Company, or bearer, in the sum of one thousand dollars, payable in the city of Memphis on the first day of January, 1 87 3, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from January 1 , 1 869, payable annually in said city BARBOUR LEWIS, 'President of the Board of County Commissioners of Shelby County. 'JOHN LOAGUE, 'Clerk of County Court of Shelby County,' The plaintiff contends (1) that the commissioners, by whose direction the bonds were issued, and whose president signed them, were lawful officers of Shelby county, and authorized, under the acts mentioned in the heading of the bonds, to represent and bind the county by the subscription to the railroad company , and that the bonds issued were therefore its legal obligations; (2) that if the commissioners were not officers de jure of the county, they were officers de facto, and, as such, their action in making the subscription and issuing the bonds is equally binding upo n the county; and (3) that the action of the commissioners, whatever their want of authority, has been ratified by the county . The defendant contends (1 ) that the commissioners were not lawful officers of the county, and that there was no such office in Tennessee as that of county commissioner; (2) that there could not be any such de facto officers, as [11 8 U.S. 425, 436] there was no such office known to the laws, and therefore that the subscription was made, and the bonds were issued, without authority , and are void; and (3) that the action of the commissioners was never ratified, and was incapable of ratification, by the county .

ISSUE: RULING: The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee as to the constitutional existence of the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County is one of this class. That court has repeatedly adjudged, after careful and full consideration, that no such board ever had a lawful existence; that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members were usurpers of the functions and powers of the justices of the peace of the county, and that their action in holding the county court was utterly void. This Court should neither gainsay nor deny the authoritative character of that determination. It follows that in the disposition of the case before us, we must hold that there was no lawful authority in the board to make the subscription to the Mississippi River Railroad Company, and to issue the bonds of which those in suit are a part.

But it is contended that if the act creating the board was void, and the commissioners were not officers de jure, they were nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, eit her de jure or de facto, if there be no office to fill. As the act

attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office never came into existence. an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Where no office legally exists, the pretended officer is merely a usurper, to whose acts no validity can be attached, and such, in our judgment, was the position of the Commissioners of Shelby County, who undertook to act as the county court, which could be constitutionally held only by justices of the peace. Their right to discharge the duties of justices of the peace was never recognized by the justices, but from the outset was resisted by legal proceedings, which terminated in an adjudication that they were usurpers, clothed w ith no authority or official function.

[G.R. No. L-9396. August 16, 1956.] MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL T. FLORES,Defendant-Appellant.

D E CISION BENGZON, J.: FACTS: In Ma y 1954, Ma nila Motor Compa ny filed in the Muni cipal Court of Manila a complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as cha ttel mortga ge ins tallments whi ch fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded pres cripti on: 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal , the Court of Fi rs t Ins tance saw differentl y, sus taining Plaintiff s contenti on tha t the mora tori um laws had interrupted the running of the pres cripti ve period, and that deducting the time duri ng which said laws were i n opera tion three yea rs and ei ght months 1 the ten-yea r term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in Ma y 1954. Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the muni cipal judge for trial on the meri ts .
han c r ob es v l rtu i al aw br a i l ry

Defendant appealed, a rguing pri ncipally that the mora tori um laws did not ha ve the effect of suspending the period of limi ta tions , because they were uncons ti tutional, as decla red by this court in Rutter vs . Es teban, 49 Off. Ga z. (5) 1807. He ci tes jurisprudence holding tha t when a s ta tute is adjudged uncons ti tutional i t is as inopera ti ve as i f it had never been passed, a nd no ri ghts can be built upon i t. ISSUE: RULING: . Rutter vs . Esteban (93 Phil ., 68) ma y be cons trued to mean tha t a t the ti me of the decision the Mora torium law could no longer be validl y applied because of the prevailing ci rcums tances . At any ra te, al though the general rule is tha t an uncons ti tutional sta tute confers no ri ght, crea tes no offi ce, affords no protecti on and jus tifies no a cts performed under it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)

there a re several i nstances wherein courts , out of equity, ha ve relaxed its opera tion (cf. notes in Cooleys Consti tutional Limi ta tions 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified i ts effects since the actual exis tence of a s ta tute pri or to such decla ra tion is an opera ti ve fa ct, and ma y ha ve consequences whi ch ca nnot justl y be i gnored (Chicot County vs . Bas ter, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approa ch is eroding the general doctri ne (Warri ng vs . Colpoys , 136 Am. La w Rep., 1025, 1030). Judgment affi rmed

Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent. DIOKNO, J.:

FACTS: Believing themselves as fully qualified to practic e law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious
of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying w ith that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allow ed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 w ithout his signature. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY -FIVE. candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fif ty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fif ty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fif ty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fif ty-five bar examinations w ithout a candidate obtaining a grade below fif ty per cent in any subject, shall be allow ed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however , That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number. SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-fiv e per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postw ar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provis ions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are als o others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades w ithout, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately , the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not

ISSUE: whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING: Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insuffic iency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practic e of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precis ely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve offic ially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate pow er to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Laws are unconstitutional on the follow ing grounds: first, because they are not w ithin the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects. Summarizing, w e are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the follow ing reasons, to w it: 1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justif iable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practic e of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms tow ards that end in the admission, suspension, dis barment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assis ts immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justic e. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the prac tice of law according to existing rules. 4. The reason advanced for the pretended classif ication of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts whic h are of general know ledge and does not justif y the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classific ation is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation. 5. Artic le 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of artic le 1, the entire law is void. 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of artic le 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Adm inistration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS: On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriz a, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar : Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty Salazar having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, w e respectfully request that the personal properties seiz ed at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seiz ure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof

ISSUE: The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employ ment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

RULING: Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the w itnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2 it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. The pow er of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. 1. Under Artic le III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997 FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents. PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing w ith ordinary
commodities. Oil companies w ere free to enter and exit the market w ithout any government interference In 1971, the country was driv en to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government, realizing that petroleum and its products ar e vital to national security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welf are, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act. 3 It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, reexporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined petroleum products. The OIC w as vested w ith the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry. 4 By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC. In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Boardto regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public necessity requires." On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants. 10 In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry. It enacted R.A. No.8180, entitled the "Dow nstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refiner ies and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. 11 The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996. On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E .O .No. 372. The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

ISSUE: RULING:
The ruling case law is well stated by author Agpalo, 37 viz .: xxx xxx xxx The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature w ould have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legis lative intent. . . . The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part w ill vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected w ith one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall w ith them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notw ithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck dow n. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.

G.R. No. L-21450

April 15, 1968

SERAFI N TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendantappellant. F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio. Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant -appellant Manila Suret y and Fidelity Company, Inc. DIZON, J.:

G.R. No. L-45685

November 16, 1937

THE PEOPL E OF T HE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. LAUREL, J.: In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherw is e in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and impr oper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive RULING: An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be w ithin constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself ."

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executiv e; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws. We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution w hich, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme w ithin its own sphere. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justic e Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" w hic h enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other w ords, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equalprotection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided. . w here part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this , the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not cons titutionally enact the other. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and w e do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fif ty thousand pesos appropriated for the central offic e, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer w ith a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers. Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.