Brendan Ho Contending Theoretical Perspectives in International Politics Student ID: 110094078 Bulter, R 2001, Fatal Choice: Nuclear weapon

and the Illusion of Missile Defense, Westview Press, USA. The problem is the power of nuclear weapon, the need for national survival on the basis of deterrence and mutual assured destruction The choice on using nuclear weapons involves life death. The decision on make, deploy and use nuclear weapon by individual. The effects on nuclear weapon is not only producing massive explosion, releasing radioactivity that are devastating both human and environmental consequences. State to acquire greater number of powerful nuclear weapon, believing other states will attack. Signified the use of deterrence amoug neighbouring states. National security based on the maintenance of a se

The Problem of Nuclear Weapon The seduction power of nuclear weapons national survival on the basis of deterrence and the mutual assured destruction The choice on nuclear weapons also involves life and death The decision to make, deploy, and use nuclear weapon by individual Nuclear weapon do not simply produce on explosion. They release radioactivity, the human and environmental consequences of which are enduring and devastating. State have acquired greater number of move powerful nuclear weapon in the belief that this will assured other state that a nuclear attack would be met by devastating response. Deterrence, the evolution of the theory, of national security based on the maintenance of a specific array and configuration of nuclear weapon. E.g. US and Russia marked their own security One can argue, this threats to all civilisation and the planet is greatly exaggerated; they claim that they have it all under control. Given these facts and the unique and intolerable dangers posed by nuclear weapons, the more rational conclusion would be seek to address the danger through the removal of nuclear weapons rather than to rely on the idea that control over them will never fail or that there will never be an accident, miscalculation, or terrorist use of them. There is the contention that there would be danger in the elimination of nuclear weapons, elementally, because of the notion that what has been invented cannot be disinvented, and it would be foolish to think otherwise. The usual extensions of this distressingly passive theory include the following: we might want to dispose of our nuclear weapons, but others may not or may cheat. That is, they might maintain them secretly. Others will always aspire to obtain nuclear weapons, especially rogues or terrorist. We would be expose ourselves to great danger, or at least blackmail, if we eliminated our nuclear weapon. The problem of nuclear weapon is nuclear weapon. Any serious attempt to address the problems they pose must focus on their very existence. As long as they exist anywhere, they will spread. Prevention of the wide dispersal of nuclear weapons non-proliferation has been a central goal of the nuclear-weapon states and an overwhelming number of others for thirty years However, this non-proliferation objectives is by no means secure.

Brendan Ho Contending Theoretical Perspectives in International Politics Student ID: 110094078 The choice range from political and technical work to strengthen proliferation controls and make them univerisal on one end of the spectrum to military action to remove weapons development facilities on the other, or a combination of these measure. Control over the spread of nuclear weapons can be achieve. The means of control are available. These include restrictions over access to the relevant materials and technologies, inspection and other means of monitoring relvan activities, and the political and legal instrument to clarify ambigours situations and remedy transgressions of non-proliferation norms if so required. In the case of nuclear weapons, however the decision to build a national defensive shield raises serious issues, apart from the obviously enormous ones of the effectiveness of such a shield and it cost in both absolute and relative terms. Nuclear weapons deeply threaten national security and international stability. The US must therefore take action on three fronts: 1. Maintain a quantity and quality of nuclear weapons able to deter their use against the IS, that is, a nuclear deterrent capability directed principally, although not exclusively, at Russia. 2. Ensure that the threat posed by nuclear weapons does not expand through the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-armed terrorism, and for this purpose, strongly support the NPT and associated agreement 3. Reduce the size of the problem through arms control and disarmament agreements. However, it silent on the issue of elimination of nuclear weapons, even though that has been the declared policy of all administrations up to the present one. This new paradigm expresses resignation from the job of strengthening non-proliferation arrangements, and it attempts to assign the blame for this tithe treaties themselves, as if they had a life of their own claiming that they are hopelessly flawed. This resignation ensures that they remain flawed and places the specific protection of US Security vastly above any action by the US to alter the security or threat environment. In fact, this paradigm abandons the US commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear and signals instead a national policy of indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons for protecting the security of the US The US is not alone among the nuclear0weapon state in proclaiming a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons while plainly behaving in the opposite direction.

The Non-proliferation Regime The future existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the aim of preventing proliferation hinges upon the conduct of nuclear-weapon states. But in considerable measure, it also hinges on the degree of confidence invested by the NPT sates in the effectiveness of the mechanisms designed to inhibit clandestine attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. Without this confidence, continued international commitment to non-proliferation is unsustainable. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA systems involves inspection of the relevant activities of all treaty partners Providing a means by which the occurrence, or apparent occurrence of it, it reported publicly. However, is the question of whether a state determined to cheat has reason to think anything adverse will happn to it if its criminal activity is identified.

Brendan Ho Contending Theoretical Perspectives in International Politics Student ID: 110094078 If the cheating sate is able to calculate that no reliable means exist to enfore its nonproliferation obligations, that detection of its activities will bring no remedy or punishment, then the deterrent effect at least wanes considerably, or even disappears entirely. Effective control over the transfer of nuclear material and technology is possibly the major weapon to be deployed against clandestine nuclear weapon development. The two fundamental necessities for such development are the scientific and technical knowledge involved in the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device and the availability of the special fissionable materials that will form the core of any such device. Strengthening the NPTs effectiveness, especially with respect to rogue states, requires action on two front. 1. Improving the system for verifying state behaviour under the treaty obligations, 2. Strengthening the international controls on trade in relevant technology and materials.

Proliferation Today Their action have been discovered partly through inspections conducted under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and partly as a result of intelligence surveillance by individual states and defector reports. In the case of IRAN, no such referral to the security council has taken place. In the case of NORth Korea, such as referral did occur in 1993, but due to political machinations, chiefly Chinas refusal to allow a sanctions resolution or any other action to pass Security Council, no agreement for a remedy was reached Instead the number of states, led by US, were forces to establish a mechanism outside the US system, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), to carry out the agreement negotiated by the US and North Korea in 1994. KEDO was to provide North Korea two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil for heating and electricity in compensation for the dismantling of its nuclear reactors.

Nuclear Security Iran and North Korea have in common, that they are members of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty They are cheating from within; they are the embodiment of the worst nightmare. It is demonstrate that their cost has been massive, and the dangers they held, and continue to hold, are extreme. Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and working toward their elimination would change the nature of perceived threats to national and international security Alternative non-nuclear weapon-based measures for maintenance of security in a world of declining reliance on nuclear weapons would need to be established. Such measures could be pursued within the structure of conventional political and security relations among states. They should include new structures, both political and military, designed to respond to the unique challenge that continues to be posed by nuclear weapons, but that has never been adequately addressed.

Lee, S, 2003, Terrorism and Asymmetric War: Is North Korea A Threat?, Springer Science & Business Media, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 21-47.
Henriques, S 2012, Working to Improve Nuclear Security Globally, IAEA.org International Atomic Energy Agencies, <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/nsglobally.html

Brendan Ho Contending Theoretical Perspectives in International Politics Student ID: 110094078 CNN Wire Staff, 2012, Obama: North Korea will achieve nothing with provocation, CNN, viewed 28 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/25/world/asia/korea-obamavisit/index.html>.

Wednesday, November 2, 2011 http://thalldgovt132.blogspot.com.au/2011/11/north-korean-nukes-realism-and.html

North Korean Nukes: Realism and Constructivism

In the linked article (http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/31/north-koreas-nuclear-express/?hpt=wo_bn1) the author explains that North Korea now has enough resources to produce nuclear weapons. It explains that the expert who visited North Korea found technology which is used in the process of building nuclear weapons and that the North Koreans were farther along than any outsiders had expects. I would like to take a look at what this might mean from the perspective of two different IR schools of thought: Realism, and Constructivism. Power and state actors The realist perspective focuses on power and state actors. That is to say, realists do not feel that non-state actors play an important role in international relations. Looking at power, it would appear that North Korea is doing a pretty good job of acquiring power here. A state that possesses nuclear weapons is much less likely to be attacked by those that do not possess them. However the possession of nuclear weapons would put them on the radar of larger countries that already have these types of weapons and are looking to control their use and development. So while North Korea may be protecting itself from its current rivals or opponents, by doing so it is stepping up to the plate in a whole new ball park. As these larger states (in terms of power) cannot know the intentions of North Korea, this could lead to a situation demonstrating the Security Dilemma. North Korea may be building up its defenses to remain safe, but to the outside world it may look like an act of aggression. From a strictly realist point of view, this could be a poor move on North Koreas part. However, it is possible that a balance of power, perhaps mutually assured destruction, will develop and prevent conflict from breaking out. The constructivist theory hypothesizes that anarchy is what states make of it. In the case of North Korea it could go either way. The states involved, particularly those more powerful than North Korea, might feel that in an anarchic world they cant control North Korea. In this case they would likely feel compelled to control North Korea with military threat. On the other hand, if the current nuclear weapon owning countries decide that they can work together and reduce anarchy amongst states, they might find a way to regulate the production and use of the weapons. Perhaps they could create a treaty or agreement on how to control these weapons. That being said, if it truly is an anarchic world then there would be no higher power to keep possible rogue states in check and signing a tray would mean nothing unless there was sufficient power to threaten or pound them into submission. North Koreas possible production of nuclear weapons can be a good or bad thing for the country depending on how they handle it. A common theme between the realist and constructivist theory is that North Koreas intention cannot be known. It would appear that they should work with outside powers to prove that they do not have hostile intention with their nuclear program. It seems that from a constructivist point of view North Korea would have more of a chance to be successful in their endeavors and that from a realist opinion they are just jeopardizing their own safety.