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Dan Marcus

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Monday, February 16, 2004 1:42 PM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Lunch with Roger Cressey

Philip,

You'll recall that I checked with you about the propriety of meeting with Roger Cressey
who had been asking me for some time to lunch. You gave me the green light and
asked that I write up any highlights of our discussion. They follow:

• I met with Roger last Friday (February 13) at "Cos!" on 17th and G. He was pressed
for time, as was I, so the lunch lasted less than 30 minutes.

• He said that he and Dick had just gotten back (the day before) from a business trip
(for their "GoodHarbor" consulting firm) to the UAE, where they met with members
of the royal family. (I refrained from asking whether Dick planned to go on any
expeditions with the Emiratis to their falconry/hunting camp in Kandahar.)

• Roger said that Dick felt he had been treated fairly by the commission. He
indicated that Dick was pleased that we had devoted substantial time to talking to
him.

He asked about our extension. I told him what had been in the press, i.e., that the
White House now supported a 2-month extension but Congress had not yet acted
so nothing was definite.

It was pretty clear Roger has been in touch with a number of the people we have
interviewed and, based on what he's learned from them, he thinks he has an idea
of what issues we're interested in. I just listened in passive/receive mode. He
said:
o The CSG was designed to move quickly on operational matters, and those
who say that approach detracted from broader policy considerations
misunderstood the lethality and fast-breaking nature of the al Qaeda threat.
o George Tenet was a weak leader. He "declared war" but nothing really
changed. CIA continued to fund CT efforts out of supplementals. This was a
failure of leadership.
o The military failed to step up and do its share (the same theme he and Dick
stressed in their interviews). Why didn't we seize ground and set up a base
of operations inside Afghanistan pre-9/11 ? he asked. How hard would that

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have been? I asked whether the NSC ever proposed this. He said no, not
specifically. He then asked why the NSC had to propose everything. Why
couldn't CIA and/or SecDef, or the Chairman been making aggressive
proposals? Again, he cited this as a failure of leadership at the principals'
level. He then offered an analogy that I actually kind of like: "There are two
kinds of lawyers. There are those who give you a hundred reasons why you
can't do something that you think is important to do. And, there are those
who understand the importance of what you're trying to do and tell you how
you can make it happen, what you need to do to 'get to yes.'" CIA, the FBI,
and DoD operated exactly like the former group of lawyers, when what was
needed were people who understood the threat and were leaning forward to
figure it out and implement what needed to be done to protect the country.

• Overall, he said that what Dick and he were trying to do was "elevate" the al Qaeda
issue above other foreign policy and national security priorities.

Additional tidbits: Roger said the consulting business was tough. GoodHarbor is
doing fine and has a niche in the cyber-security arena. One of Dick's close friends is
Randy Beers, who is John Kerry's foreign policy/national security adviser. Roger said
that even if Kerry is nominated and manages to win the election, he thinks Dick will
continue his consulting business rather than step back into government. "Dick's worn
out from the struggle."

Mike

2/17/2004