1. Lee Hong Kok vs.

David Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM Only the government can question a void certificate a government grant. FACTS: This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property. The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM: The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. 2. 3. Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown. Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine. Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared: It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be

of

title issued

pursuant

to

presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. 4. Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant. EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time immemorial. Application for decree of registration is a condition precedent to acquisition of title. Noncompliance gives rise to mere possessory right. An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain by prescription. FACTS: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien. ISSUEs: Whether or not Oh Cho had title Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration HELD: Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.Under the Public Land Act, Oh Chois not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

5. 6. Director of Forestry v. Villareal [G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part. Facts: Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation? HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application forregistration of title of Villareal. 7. Director of Lands vs. CA FACTS: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory. HELD: YES. Petition was granted. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents. FACTS: On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels, denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.The court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements thereon in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUES: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.

RULING: There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it is so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable. The lands subjects of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED. 9. JOSE ALMEDA V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioners failure to comply therewith had the effect of rendering the judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was found that there was lack of merit in the petitioners reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory. HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which provides: Sec.39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Due to petitioners negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment of the trial court final and executory. 10. Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation FACTS: The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since

the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. 11. LAUSAN AYOG v. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., FACTS: On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No.281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made from that decision. Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accionpubliciana). ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands) is applicable in the case at bar. RULING: NO. There is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.

12. SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons. HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the

lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.