A. Concept of Marriage Art. 2 Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution Section 12.

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Art. 15 Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. B. Nature of marriage in Phil. Law Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (FC) Rule 131, Rules on Evidence (1989) Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; (f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter; (g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter; (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid; (i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced; (j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; (k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly; (l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract; (s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration; (t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated; (u) That a writing is truly dated; (v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail; (w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years; (4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact; (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life; (z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship; (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal. (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature; (ff) That the law has been obeyed; (gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published; (hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases; (ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest; (jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules: 1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived; 2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived; 3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived; 4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; 5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.

(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. (NCC) Article 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. (PD 1083 Muslim Code) Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts: Eloisa Goitia De La Camara, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste (immoral) and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home. Perido vs. Perido 63 SCRA 97 Facts: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde. Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.

Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros. Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations. First Issue: Pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. Ruling: The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900. With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate. Second Issue: Whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong. Ruling: We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother. In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.

Third Issue: That 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Ruling: With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal, the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat. Silverio v. Republic GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007 Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fianc. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from Rommel to Mely. Issue: Should the court allow the change of name? Held: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioners cause. The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner will have serious and wide -ranging legal and public policy consequences, i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code People vs. Dela Cruz GR 187683 February 11, 2010 Facts: Version of the Prosecution Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-its just three to four arms length away from the latters house. While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna Liza Caparasdela Cruz[ (Anna), in front of their house. Joel knew the wifes name as Joan. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside the house. Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died. On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1 Condrado Umali and Eligio Jose, responding to the call of duty, went to the hospital for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned over to the police officers by the hospital's security guard on duty.

The Certificate of Death,[11] prepared by Police Senior Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray (Dr. Viray), showed that Victorianos wife died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound, trunk. Version of the Defense Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he came home very drunk from a friend's house. Before he could enter their house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him saying, Hindi ka naman pala namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa. He asked her to go inside their house but she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her inside their house. Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go out of the house. However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up, Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the jalousie. He brought her outside immediately and asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tongits nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his wife to the hospital. At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for questioning. It was only in the following morning that Victoriano learned of his wifes passing. Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident; that Anna was not immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that he did not intentionally hurt her. Issue: W/N Joel's testimony be admissible in court? Ruling: Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which refers to the slapping incident that occurred outside their house. It does not at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime. Thus, Victoriano submits that Joels testimony is merely circumstantial. ut circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in People v. Castillo: Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required. In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth, the location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it can be said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the hospital as Victoriano did does not manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part. De Santis vs. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni December 1, 2010 Facts: Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate.

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia) who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. Espinosa vs. Omana AC 9081 Oct. 12, 2011 Facts: C. 1) Agreements prior to marriage Stipulations in marriage

acknowledgement by him of the contract constitute malpractice w/c justifies disbarment from the practice of law. Espinosa vs. Omana AC 9081 Oct. 12, 2011 2) Breach of promise to marry

Art. 221. (NCC)The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; (3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage; (4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime. Panganiban vs. Borromeo 58 Phil 367 Panganiban v Borromeo Facts: Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribe a contract before notary public Elias Borromeo. Respondent cooperated the in execution of the document although he may not fully understand the content of the document. The substance of the document permits the husband and the wife to live in a adulterous relationship without any opposition. Issue and Holding WON the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral practice Court yes, the contract contained provisions which is contrary to law, morals and public order and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. - In his instance, if the spouse should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, it is far from the purpose of the Legislature to bar to legalize adultery and concubinage .WON the lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct. Court- Yes, the court has the right to discipline an attorney who has been guilty of misconduct - A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary and public of a disgraceful or immoral act character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment. In re Santiago 70 Phil 66 Facts: Ernest Baniquit, who was living then separely from his wife soledad Corales for 9 years, sought the legal advise of respondent Atty. Santiago, a notary public in Negros Accidental. Santiago assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and told the latter to bring his wife that afternoon to process the document which authorized each other to marry again and waive whatever right of action one might have authorized each other to marry again and waive whatever of right of action one might have against the party so marrying. Relying on the validity of the document, Baniquit on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage, with Trinidad Aurelio. Issue: W/N the contract prepared by notary public annuls a marriage of Baniquit to his (first) wife. Ruling: The contract executed between husband and wife upon the advice prepared and acknowledged by a lawyer and notary public is contrary to law and morals, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent as well as the preparation and

(NCC) Art. 19-21 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (NCC) Art. 2176 & 1403 2(c) Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry. (FC) Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also state: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals 103 Phil 629 FACTS: An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry. HELD: (Beach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong) It appearing that because of the defendant-appellants seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the Court of First Instance found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. Wassmer vs Velez G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony, Francisco left, leaving a telegram he will come back but never did. Beatriz filed for damages, and judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21. The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who willfu lly causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner. TANJANCO vs. COUIRT OF APPEALS L-18630 December 17, 1966 FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santos he expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953-Dec. 1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment. He refused to marry her nor give support. Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable wrong. HELD: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness

and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed. BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 97336 February 19, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilous parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong. 2. Whether or not Art. 2176 of the Civil Code applies to this case. 3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Art. 2176 defines quasi-delict: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code). It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of the latters ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud. Abanag vs. Mabute AM P-11-2922 April 4, 2011 Facts: D. Requisites for a valid marriage

Tolentino 222 269

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (NCC) Art. 53 Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character (Sec. 1a, art. 3613). (RPC) Art. 350-351 Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. Article 351. Premature marriages. - Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation. De Miijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 Facts:

Mariategui vs. CA GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967. ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license. HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

2) a) b)

Essential requisites Legal capacity Gender

(FC) Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. c) Age

(FC) Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians

1)

Kinds of requisites & effects of non-compliance Republic Act No. 6809 Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed. Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

(FC) Art. 2-5, 35 & 45 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a) Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice. Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. (FC) Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. (NCC) Article 54. Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards, and any female of the age of fourteen years or upwards, not under any of the impediments mentioned in articles 80 to 84, may contract marriage. (NCC) Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents. (RPC) Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes. d) Absence of impediment Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and

Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. Choa vs. Choa GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002 FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case. Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country. ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. NOLLORA, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 191425. September 7, 2011 PEREZ, J.: Statement of Facts: On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: "That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."

Accused Nollora pleaded not guilty and the following facts disclosed: The first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and JesusaPinatNollora was solemnized on April 6, 1999 at SapangPalay, San Jose del Monte; that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City; that in the CounterAffidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino; that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001; the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit; that Geraldino was not a muslim but a Catholic. It was proved that AtilanoNollora was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992 even before the first marriage. In his petition to the Supreme Court, he contended that he is entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief. Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous and therefore null and void ab initio. Answer: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code. Reasoning: Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.The court denied Nollora s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. In applying the Family Code of the Philippines, it is therefore decided that the second marriage of Nollora with Geraldino, being bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, is void from the beginning pursuant to Article 35 paragraph 4 of the Family Code. Holding: The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prisioncorreccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law. 3) Parental Consent

a) Mistake as to identity (FC) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other. (NCC) Article 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties. b) Effect of insanity (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. c) Effect of Fraud (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. (FC) Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (NCC) Article 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. (1269) Article 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n) Article 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n) Article 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n) Article 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n) Article 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error. (n) Article 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties. Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. Anaya vs. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97 FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground. ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. HELD:

(FC) Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife 4) Consent freely given by both spouses

The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage. d) Effect of force, intimidation and undue influence (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. (NCC) Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed. There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. (1267a) Article 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, although it may have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract. (1268) Article 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress. Villanueva vs. CA 505 SCRA 564 FACTS: In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlandos allegations and she said that Orlando freely c ohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlandos affection and care towards her. ISSUE: (a) Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family Code; and ANSWER: No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case.Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be dismissed. REASONING: The SC ruled that Orlandos allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlandos allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening

him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia. HOLDING: Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis. e) Effects of physical incapacity/impotence (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. Jimenez vs. Canizares L-12790, August 31, 1960 FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband. HELD: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court. Alcazar vs. Alcazar GR 174451 Oct. 13, 2009 f) Effectof affliction w/ STD (FC) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage.