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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #8 WORKPLAN

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP: IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, CRISIS

MANAGEMENT AND CONTINUITY CONTINGENCIES

Team Members: Dana Hyde

Miles Kara

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Unclassified Readings for

Commissioners and a Briefing Plan

Item 3 Categories of Documents

Item 4 Proposed Interviews

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TEAM #8
Item 1: Key Questions

A. Tracking and Attempted Interdiction of Hijacked Airliners

(1) What accounts for the apparent delay by the FAA in notifying
NORAD of the hijackings? What were the protocols between the
FAA and NORAD concerning hijacked airliners? How were those
procedures followed on the morning of September 11th?

(2) Why did NORAD's planes fail to intercept the hijacked airliners?
In particular, why did NORAD planes fail to intercept Flight #77?

(3) When did the President authorize the military to shoot down
civilian aircraft presumed to be under the control of hijackers?
What specifically did he authorize? How was that order
communicated down the chain of command?

(4) Would NORAD planes (or other military aircraft) have been in a
position to shoot down Flight #93 had it not crashed in a
Pennsylvania field?

B. Emergency Response from the White House on 9/11

(1) On the morning of September 11th, what steps did the national
leadership take to ensure the continuity of government? What
emergency response plans were activated? How did actions
conform to the plans?

(2) What civil defensive measures did military and law enforcement
agencies take on the morning of September 11th to protect the
nation from further attacks?
[Defcon 3; close the borders; port security measures]

(3) How was the decision made to ground all air traffic in the United
States? How was it implemented? What are the lessons learned
from this experience?

(4) What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to
protect the economic security of our nation?

(5) What decisions were made and what steps were taken on
September 11th to provide for the victims of the attacks and their
families? What decisions were made (and how) regarding
financial assistance to New York City?
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C. Key Decisions in the Immediate Aftermath of 9/11

(1) How did the nation's leaders shape the nation's response to the
tragedy? In particular, what key choices were made (or not made)
in the President's three major addresses: (1) the evening of 9/11,
(2) at the National Cathedral on 9/14, and (3) to a joint session of
Congress on 9/20?

(2) What was the agenda for crisis management in the "immediate
response of the United States" [to echo the statute] to the attacks?
In addition to the obvious foreign policy issues, what domestic
policy and homeland security topics were considered, or should
have been considered in the first wave of responses between
September 11 and September 20? What was the role of the
Domestic Consequences Principals Committee?

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TEAM #8
Item 2: Suggested Readings

A. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ON 9/11

(1) FAA&NORAD

a. William B. Scott, Exercise Jump-Starts Response to

Attacks, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 June 2002,
Vol. 156, No. 22, p. 48.

b. William B. Scott, Norad and FAA Sharpen View Inside

Borders, Aviation Week & Space Technology. 10 June
2002, Vol. 156, No. 23, p. 50.

c. William B. Scott, F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight

93, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 September
2002, Vol. 157, No. 11, p. 7.

(2) Decision Making at the White House

a. Tim Russert, Interview with Vice President Richard

Cheney, Meet the Press. 16 September 2001.

b. Nicholas Lemann, The Options: After the Morning of

September 11th, the Presidency Changed, Too, The New
Yorker. 1 October, 2001, p. 70.

c. Evan Thomas, The Day That Changed America,

Newsweek, 31 December 2001 (select pages).

d. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview

with the Washington Post, Defense Link.
www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02052002. 9 January 2002.

e. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to

War; Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in the
First Frantic Hours After Attack, The Washington Post, 27
January 2002, sec. A, p. 1.

f. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster 2002),

pp 1-40.

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(3) Presidential Statements

a. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President After

Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center, 9:30 am EDT,
September 11,2001.

b. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President Upon

Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base, September 11,2001.

c. White House Press Office, Statement by the President in

His Address to the Nation, 8:30 pm EDT, September 11,
2001.

d. White House Press Office, President's Remarks at National

Day of Prayer and Remembrance, September 14, 2001.

e. White House Press Office, Address to a Joint Session of

Congress and the American People, September 20,2001.

(4) Timelines

a. Directorate of Public Affairs, North American Aerospace

Defense Command, NORAD's Response Times, September,
2001.

b. CNN, September 11: Chronology of terror,

www.CNN.com. September 12, 2001 (posted 12:27 pm
EDT).

B. BACKGROUND MATERIALS

Continuity of Government (COG), Continuity of Operations (COOP) &

Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) Programs

a. Steven Emerson, America's Doomsday Project, 1 August,

1989, Vol. 107, No. 6, p. 26.

b. Barton Gellman & Susan Schmidt, Shadow Government is

at Work in Secret: After Attacks, Bush Ordered 100
Officials to Bunkers Away from Capital to Ensure Federal
Survival, The Washington Post. 1 March 2002.

c. Department of Treasury, Public Report of the White House

Security Review,
www.fas.org/irp/agencv/ustreas/usss/tlpubrpt.htn (select
pages)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #8
Item 3: Document Requests

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) documents re 9/11

b. SECDEF and DEPSECDEF logs, briefings, memos from
9/11

(2) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. Transcript and tape of the Air Threat Conference Call the

morning of 9/11
b. Crisis Action Team (CAT) documents re response to 9/11
c. National Military Command Center log(s) from 9/11
d. Rules of Engagement (ROE) concerning hijacked aircraft
and domestic air defense.

(3) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

a. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and

Joint Intelligence Task Force - Countering Terrorism
(JITF-CT) logs from 9/11
b. Intelligence Task Force (ITF) documents, if activated

(4) NORAD

a. Rules of Engagement regarding hijacked airliners

b. Real time radar and ASCI files from the Joint Surveillance
System for: (1) the four hijacked airliners, (2) scrambled
military planes responding to the hijacked airliners, and (3)
Air Force One
c. Command/operation logs for 9/11 from Cheyenne and
NEAD
d. After-action reports assessing NORAD's response to 9/11
e. Notes or documents related to the Air Threat Conference
Call
f. NORAD review presented at NRO Conference (Cherie
Gott)
g. Documents describing Vigilant Guardian exercise
h. Record of NORAD actions re Russian strategic aviation
exercise
i. Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/11)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (U.S. SECRET

SERVICE)

(1) Classified Version of 1994 White House Security Review

(2) Command and operation logs regarding communications with

Andrews Air Force Base

(3) Protocols between the Service and FAA regarding air threats and
emergency response

(4) Protocols between the Service and the military regarding the same

(5) Emergency Response Plans (COG, COOP and ECG)

(6) Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/1 1)

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

(1) Command Center logs for 9/ 1 1 (DO J & FBI)

(2) Organization Charts for DOJ & FBI (current and as of 9/1 1)

(3) All documents related to DOJ's participation in the Domestic

Consequences Principals Committee from 9/1 1 to 9/20

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (FAA)

(1) All documents related to policies and procedures concerning

hijacked aircraft (current and as of 9/1 1)

(2) Protocols between the FAA & NOR AD regarding hijacked

airliners (current and as of 9/1 1)

(3) Protocols between the FAA & law enforcement agencies (e.g.,
Secret Service) regarding hijacked airliners (current and as of 9/1 1)

(4) Organizational charts (current and as of 9/1 1)

(5) All documents related to the FAA's tracking of hijacked airliners

on 9/1 1 and communications with NOR AD

(6) Logs from the FAA command center for 9/1 1

(7) After action reviews concerning FAA's tracking of the hijacked

airliners and notification to NORAD
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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

(8) All documents related to DOT's participation in the Domestic

Consequences Principals Committee from 9/11 to 9/20

E. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

(1) Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to close

financial markets on 9/11

(2) Same re decision to reopen all financial markets

F. WHITE HOUSE

(1) Situation Room

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9/11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

(2) White House Military Office

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9//11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

(3) National Security Council

a. National Security Directives regarding Continuity of

Government and/or Continuity of Operations
b. Executive Orders regarding Continuity of Government
and/or Continuity of Operations

(4) General

a. POTUS schedule 9111 -9/20

b. VPOTUS schedule 9/11-9/20
c. The President's Daily Diary for September 11th (consists of
the Service's Movement log, the President's schedule as
annotated by the personal aide, and the phone log)
d. Documents of the Domestic Consequences Principals
Committee from 9/11-9/20
e. Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to
close and reopen financial markets
f. Organizational charts (current and as 9/11)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #8
Item 4: Interview Candidates

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. General Myers
b. National Military Command Center (NMCC) Senior Watch
Officer on September 11th - BG Montague Winfield, USA
c. NMCC Air Threat Conference Call Officer
d. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) Senior
Watch Officer
(2) NORAD
a. General Eberhart, US AF, Commander in Chief
b. Major General Larry Arnold, USAF, CG, CONAR
c. Major General Eric Findley, RCAF, Director of Operations
d. Lt Col William Glover, USAF, Air Defense Officer
e. Capt Michael Jellinek, RCN, Command Director,
f. BG Jim Hunter, RCAF, CMOC Vice Commander
g. Col Jerry Hatley, USAF, a Command Director
h. MG Paul Weaver, USAF, Ret.
i. Cheri Gott, Analyst who assessed events of 9/11
(3) North East Air Defense Sector (NEAD)
a. Col Robert Marr Jr, USAF, Commander
b. Col Clark Speicher, USAF, Vice Commander

c. Michael Gould, USAF, Director of Operations

d. Colonel Alan Scott, USAF, 1st Air Force

e. Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, Airborne Control Warning Officer

f. The Duty Senior NCO, Tech Sgt Jeremy Powell

g. Sr Airman Stacia Rountree, USAF

1. The Weapons Section QIC, Maj Philip McCarthy, USAF

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

m. Tech Sgt Jeffrey Lamarche, USAF

(4) 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron

a. Dallas Stone and Mr. Cleveland

b. Representative at NEAD
c. Technician(s) who filtered the JSS radar files
(5) Pilots
a. Otis AFB
- Lt. Col. Tim Duffy
~ Maj. Daniel Nash
b. Langley AFB
— Maj. Dan Caine
— Capt. Brandon Rasmussen
~ Maj. Billy Hutchinson
c. Andrews AFB
— Maj. Lucky Sasseville
— Wingman

B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (SECRET

SERVICE)
(1) Chief, Presidential Protection Detail
(2) Chief, Vice Presidential Protection Detail

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(1) DOJ representative on Domestic Consequences Principals
Committee
(2) Senior staff (DAG's Office?) involved in domestic decisions such
as the victims' fund and airline industry bail out

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

(1) Secretary Mineta and/or his Chief of Staff on September 11

(2) DOT representative on Domestic Consequences Principals

Committee

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E. FAA
(1) Jane Garvey, Administrator
(2) Claudio Manno, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security
(3) Monte Belger, Acting Deputy Director on September 11th
(4) Chief, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations
(5) Air Traffic Controllers on duty responsible for each flight
(6) Supervisory Air Traffic Control officials on duty responsible for
each flight
F. JOINT DOD/FAA AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES CELL (ATSC)
(1) Col Brian Meenan, US AF
(2) Col John Czabaranek, USAF
(3) Lt Col Michael-Anne Cherry, USAF
(4) Maj Kevin Bridges, USAF

G. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

(1) Senior staff and leadership involved in decision to close and

reopen financial markets

(2) Treasury representative on Domestic Consequences Principals

Committee

H. WHITE HOUSE

(1) Principals and/or Senior Staff traveling with POTUS on September

11th (TBD)

(2) Principals and/or Senior Staff in the PEOC on September 11th

(Rice, Hadley, Miller, Libby?)

(3) Josh Bolten and/or senior staff of Domestic Consequences

Principals Committee

(4) Director, White House Situation Room (Capt. Deborah Loewer,

USN)
(5) Senior Watch Officer on Duty
(6) Watch Officer responsible for the ATC Conference Call
(7) NSC Official responsible for COOP/COG

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE
.QUESTIONS Page 1 of 9

National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Team #8: National Leadership: Immediate Response, Crisis Management, and Continuity
Contingencies

Team Members: Miles Kara

Dana Hyde

Item #1: Key Questions & Issues

Item #2: Suggested Readings

Item #3: Document Requests

Item #4: Interview Candidates

I. KEY QUESTIONS & ISSUES

A. Tracking and Attempted Interdiction of Hijacked Airliners

1. What accounts for the apparent delay by the FAA in notifying NORAD of the
hijackings? What were the protocols between the FAA and NORAD
concerning hijacked airliners? How were those procedures followed on the
morning of September 11th?
(2) Why did NORAD's planes fail to intercept the hijacked airliners? In particular, why
did NORAD planes fail to intercept Flight #77?

3. When did the President authorize the military to shoot down civilian aircraft
presumed to be under the control of hijackers? What specifically did he
authorize? How was that order communicated down the chain of command?

(4) Would NORAD planes (or other military aircraft) have been in a position to shoot
down Flight #93 had it not crashed in a Pennsylvania field?

B. Emergency Response from the White House on 9/11

1- On the morning of September 11th, what steps did the national leadership take to ensure the
continuity of government? What emergency response plans were activated? How did actions
conform to the plans?

(2) What civil defensive measures did military and law enforcement agencies take on the
morning of September 11th to protect the nation from further attacks?
[Defcom 3; close the borders; port security measures]

(3) How was the decision made to ground all air traffic in the United States? How was it
implemented? What are the lessons learned from this experience?

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QUESTIONS Page 2 of 9

(4) What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to protect the
economic security of our nation?

(5) What decisic/ns. were made and what steps were taken on September 11 to provide
for the victims of the attacks and their families? What decisions were made (and
how) regarding financial assistance to New York City?

C. Key Decisions in the Immediate Aftermath of 9/11

1. How did the President use the power of the bully pulpit in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to
shape the nation's response to the tragedy? In particular, what was the decision making process
that went into crafting his three major addresses: (1) the evening of 9/11, (2) at the National
Cathedral on 9/14, and (3) to a joint session of Congress on 9/20?

2- What key domestic policy decisions were made at the White House from September 11th to
September 20 ? Specifically, what was the roje of the Domestic Consequences Principals
Committee in setting and coordinating the national domestic policy agenda for that period?

[federal compensation fund; airline liability]

II. SUGGESTED READINGS

A. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ON 9/11

(1) FAA & NORAD

a. William B. Scott, Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks, Aviation Week &

Space Technology. 3 June 2002, Vol. 156, No. 22, p. 48.

b. William B. Scott, Norad and FAA Sharpen View Inside Borders, Aviation
Week & Space Technology. 10 June 2002, Vol. 156, No. 23, p. 50.

c. William B. Scott, F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight 93, Aviation Week
& Space Technology. 9 September 2002, Vol. 157, No. 11, p. 7.

(2) Decision Making at the White House

a. Tim Russert, Interview with Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the
Press. 16 September 2001.

b- Nicholas Lemann, The Options: After the Morning of September 11th, the
Presidency Changed, ToorThe New Yorker. 1 October, 2001, p. 70.

c. Evan Thomas, The Day That Changed America, Newsweek. 31 December 2001
(select pages).

d. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the
Washington Post, Defense Link.
www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02052002. 9 January 2002.

e. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War; Bush's
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in the First Frantic Hours
After Attack, The Washington Post. 27 January 2002, sec. A, p. 1.

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QUESTIONS Page 3 of 9

f. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster 2002), pp 1-40.

(3) Presidential Statements

a. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President After Two Planes
Crash Into World Trade Center, 9:30 am EDT, September 11, 2001.

b. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President Upon Arrival at Barksdale
Air Force Base, September 11, 2001.

c. White House Press Office, Statement by the President in His Address to the
Nation, 8:30 pm EDT, September 11, 2001.

d. White House Press Office, President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and
Remembrance, September 14, 2001.

e. White House Press Office, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
September 20, 2001.

(4) Timelines

a. Directorate of Public Affairs, North American Aerospace Defense Command,

NORAD's Response Times, September, 2001.

b. CNN, September 11: Chronology of terror, www.CNN.com. September 12,

2001 (posted 12:27 pm EDT).

B. BACKGROUND MATERIALS

Continuity of Government (COG), Continuity of Operations (COOP) & Enduring

Constitutional Government (ECG) Programs

a. Steven Emerson, America's Doomsday Project, 1 August, 1989, Vol. 107, No.
6, p. 26.

b. Barton Gellman & Susan Schmidt, Shadow Government is at Work in

Secret: After Attacks, Bush Ordered 100 Officials to Bunkers Away
from Capital to Ensure Federal Survival, The Washington Post. 1
March 2002.

c. Department of Treasury, Public Report of the White House Security Review,

www. f as .org/irp/agency/ustreas/usss/t 1 pubrpt.htn (select pages)

IV. DOCUMENT REQUESTS

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) documents re 9/11

b. SECDEF and DEPSECDEF logs, briefings, memos from 9/11

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 STIONS Page 4 of 9

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. Transcript and tape of the Air Threat Conference Call the morning
of 9/11

b. Crisis Action Team (CAT) documents re response to 9/11

c. National Military Command Center log(s) from 9/11

d. Rules of Engagement (ROE) concerning hijacked aircraft and

domestic air defense.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

a. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and Joint Intelligence

Task Force - Countering Terrorism (JTTF-CT) logs from 9/11

b. Intelligence Task Force (ITF) documents, if activated

(4) NORAD

a. Rules of Engagement regarding hijacked airliners

b. Real time radar and ASCI files from the Joint Surveillance System for: (1) the four hijacked
airliners, (2) scrambled military planes responding to the hijacked airliners, and (3) Air Force One

c. Command/operation logs for 9/11 from Cheyenne and NEAD

d. After-action reports assessing NORAD's response to 9/11

e. Notes or documents related to the Air Threat Conference Call

f. NORAD review presented at NRO Conference (Cherie Gott)

g. Documents describing Vigilant Guardian exercise

h. Record of NORAD actions re Russian strategic aviation exercise

i. Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/11)

B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (U.S. SECRET SERVICE)

1. Classified Version of 1994 White House Security Review

2. Movement log of POTUS and VPOTUS detail

3. Command and operation logs regarding communications with Andrews Air Force Base

4. Protocols between the Service and FAA regarding air threats and emergency response

5. Protocols between the Service and the military regarding the same

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 2STIONS Page 5 of 9

6. Emergency Response Plans (COG, COOP and ECG)

7. Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/11)

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. Command Center logs for 9/11 (DOJ & FBI)

2. Organization Charts for DOJ & FBI (current and as of 9/11)

3. All documents related to DOJ's participation in the Domestic Consequences Principals Committee
from 9/11 to 9/20

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (FAA)

1. All documents related to policies and procedures concerning hijacked aircraft (current and as of
9/11)

(2) Protocols between the FAA & NORAD regarding hijacked airliners (current and as of
9/11)

(3) Protocols between the FAA & law enforcement agencies (e.g., Secret Service)
regarding hijacked airliners (current and as of 9/11)

4. Organizational charts (current and as of 9/11)

(5) All documents related to the FAA's tracking of hijacked airliners on 9/11 and
communications with NORAD

(6) Logs from the FAA command center for 9/11

8. After action reviews concerning FAA's tracking of the hijacked airliners and
notification to NORAD

9. All documents related to DOT's participation in the Domestic Consequences Principals

Committee from 9/11 to 9/20

E. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY -

1. Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to close financial markets on 9/11

2. Same re decision to reopen all financial markets

F. WHITE HOUSE

(1) Situation Room

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9/11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

2. White House Military Office

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 iSTIONS Page 6 of 9

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9//11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

3. National Security Council

a. National Security Directives regarding Continuity of Government and/or Continuity of Operations

b. Executive Orders regarding Continuity of Government and/or Continuity of Operations

4. General

a. POTUS schedule 9/11-9/20

b. VPOTUS schedule 9/11-9/20

c- The President's Daily Diarv for September 11 (consists of the Service's

Movement log, the "President's schedule as annotated by the personal
aide, and the phone log)

d. Documents of the "Domestic Consequences Principals Committee" (led by

Josh Bolton) from 9/11-9/20

e. Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to close and reopen
financial markets

f. Organizational charts (current and as 9/11)

V. INTERVIEW CANDIDATES

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. General Myers

t>. National Military Command Center (NMCC) Senior Watch Officer on September 11th - BG
Montague Winffeld, USA v

c. NMCC Air Threat Conference Call Officer

d. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) Senior Watch Officer

(2) NORAD

a. General Eberhart, USAF, Commander in Chief

b. Major General Larry Arnold, USAF, CG, CONAR

c. Major General Eric Findley, RCAF, Director of Operations

d. Lt Col William Glover, USAF, Air Defense Officer

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QUESTIONS Page 7 of 9

e. Capt Michael Jellinek, RCN, Command Director,

f. BG Jim Hunter, RCAF, CMOC Vice Commander

g. Col Jerry Hatley, USAF, a Command Director

h. MG Paul Weaver, USAF, Ret.

i. Cheri Gott, Analyst who assessed events of 9/11

3. North East Air Defense Sector (NEAD)

a. Col Robert Marr Jr, USAF, Commander

b. Col Clark Speicher, USAF, Vice Commander

c. Michael Gould, USAF, Director of Operations

d. Colonel Alan Scott, USAF, 1st Air Force

e. Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, Airborne Control Warning Officer

f. The Duty Senior NCO, Tech Sgt Jeremy Powell

g. Sr Airman Stacia Rountree, USAF

1. The Weapons Section QIC, Maj Philip McCarthy, USAF

m. Tech Sgt Jeffrey Lamarche, USAF

(4) 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron

a. Dallas Stone and Mr. Cleveland

b. Representative at NEAD

c. Technician(s) who filtered the JSS radar files

(5) Pilots

a. OtisAFB

-- Lt. Col. Tim Duffy

~ Maj. Daniel Nash

b. Langley AFB

— Maj. Dan Caine

~ Capt. Brandon Rasmussen

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QUESTIONS Page 8 of 9

~ Maj. Billy Hutchinson

c. Andrews AFB

— Maj. Lucky Sasseville

— Wingman

B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (SECRET SERVICE)

1. Chief, Presidential Protection Detail

2. Chief, Vice Presidential Protection Detail

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. DOJ representative on Domestic Consequences Principals Committee

2. Senior staff (DAG's Office?) involved in domestic decisions such as the victims' fund and airline
industry bail out

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

1. Secretary Mineta and/or his Chief of Staff on September 11

(2) DOT representative on Domestic Consequences Principals Committee

E.FAA

1. Jane Garvey, Administrator

2. Claudio Manno, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security

3- Monte Belger, Acting Deputy Director on September 11th

4. Chief, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations

5. Air Traffic Controllers on duty responsible for each flight

6. Supervisory Air Traffic Control officials on duty responsible for each flight

F. JOINT DOD/FAA AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES CELL (ATSC)

(1) Col Brian Meenan, USAF

(2) Col John Czabaranek, USAF

(3) Lt Col Michael-Anne Cherry, USAF

(4) Mai Kevin Bridges, USAF

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QUESTIONS Page 9 of 9

G. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

1. Senior staff and leadership involved in decision to close and reopen financial
markets

(2) Treasury representative on Domestic Consequences Principals Committee

H. WHITE HOUSE

1 • Principals and/or Senior Staff traveling with POTUS on September 11th (TBD)

2. Principals and/or Senior Staff in the PEOC on September 11th (Libby?)

3. Josh Bolton and/or senior staff of Domestic Consequences Principals Committee

(4) Director, White House Situation Room (Capt. Deborah Loewer, USN)

(5) Senior Watch Officer on Duty

(6) Watch Officer responsible for the ATC Conference Call

(7) NSC Official responsible for COOP/COG

DRAFT

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DRAFT

04/25/03

2:39 4/P4

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