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TEAM #8 WORKPLAN

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP: IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, CRISIS

MANAGEMENT AND CONTINUITY CONTINGENCIES

Team Members: Dana Hyde

Miles Kara

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Unclassified Readings for

Commissioners and a Briefing Plan

Item 3 Categories of Documents

Item 4 Proposed Interviews

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TEAM #8
Item 1: Key Questions

A. Tracking and Attempted Interdiction of Hijacked Airliners

(1) What accounts for the apparent delay by the FAA in notifying
NORAD of the hijackings? What were the protocols between the
FAA and NORAD concerning hijacked airliners? How were those
procedures followed on the morning of September 11th?

(2) Why did NORAD's planes fail to intercept the hijacked airliners?
In particular, why did NORAD planes fail to intercept Flight #77?

(3) When did the President authorize the military to shoot down
civilian aircraft presumed to be under the control of hijackers?
What specifically did he authorize? How was that order
communicated down the chain of command?

(4) Would NORAD planes (or other military aircraft) have been in a
position to shoot down Flight #93 had it not crashed in a
Pennsylvania field?

B. Emergency Response from the White House on 9/11

(1) On the morning of September 11th, what steps did the national
leadership take to ensure the continuity of government? What
emergency response plans were activated? How did actions
conform to the plans?

(2) What civil defensive measures did military and law enforcement
agencies take on the morning of September 11th to protect the
nation from further attacks?
[Defcon 3; close the borders; port security measures]

(3) How was the decision made to ground all air traffic in the United
States? How was it implemented? What are the lessons learned
from this experience?

(4) What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to
protect the economic security of our nation?

(5) What decisions were made and what steps were taken on
September 11th to provide for the victims of the attacks and their
families? What decisions were made (and how) regarding
financial assistance to New York City?
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C. Key Decisions in the Immediate Aftermath of 9/11

(1) How did the nation's leaders shape the nation's response to the
tragedy? In particular, what key choices were made (or not made)
in the President's three major addresses: (1) the evening of 9/11,
(2) at the National Cathedral on 9/14, and (3) to a joint session of
Congress on 9/20?

(2) What was the agenda for crisis management in the "immediate
response of the United States" [to echo the statute] to the attacks?
In addition to the obvious foreign policy issues, what domestic
policy and homeland security topics were considered, or should
have been considered in the first wave of responses between
September 11 and September 20? What was the role of the
Domestic Consequences Principals Committee?

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TEAM #8
Item 2: Suggested Readings

A. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ON 9/11

(1) FAA & NORAD

a. William B. Scott, Exercise Jump-Starts Response to

Attacks, Aviation Week & Space Technology. 3 June 2002,
Vol. 156, No. 22, p. 48.

b. William B. Scott, Norad and FAA Sharpen View Inside

Borders, Aviation Week & Space Technology. 10 June
2002, Vol. 156, No. 23, p. 50.

c. William B. Scott, F-16 Pilots Considered Ramming Flight

93, Aviation Week & Space Technology. 9 September
2002, Vol. 157, No. 11, p. 7.

(2) Decision Making at the White House

a. Tim Russert, Interview with Vice President Richard

Cheney, Meet the Press. 16 September 2001.

b. Nicholas J^emann, The Options: After the Morning of

September 11th, the Presidency Changed, Too, The New
Yorker. 1 October, 2001, p. 70.

c. Evan Thomas, The Day That Changed America,

Newsweek, 31 December 2001 (select pages).

d. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview

with the Washington Post, Defense Link.
www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/t02052002. 9 January 2002.

e. Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to

War; Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in the
First Frantic Hours After Attack, The Washington Post. 27
January 2002, sec. A, p. 1.

f. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, (Simon & Schuster 2002),

pp 1-40.

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(3) Presidential Statements

a. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President After

Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center, 9:30 am EDT,
September 11,2001.

b. White House Press Office, Remarks by the President Upon

Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base, September 11,2001.

c. White House Press Office, Statement by the President in

His Address to the Nation, 8:30 pm EDT, September 11,
2001.

d. White House Press Office, President's Remarks at National

Day of Prayer and Remembrance, September 14, 2001.

e. White House Press Office, Address to a Joint Session of

Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001.

(4) Timelines

a. Directorate of Public Affairs, North American Aerospace

Defense Command, NORAD's Response Times, September,
2001.

b. CNN, September 11: Chronology of terror,

www.CNN.com. September 12, 2001 (posted 12:27 pm
EDT).

B. BACKGROUND MATERIALS

Continuity of Government (COG), Continuity of Operations (COOP) &

Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) Programs

a. Steven Emerson, America's Doomsday Project, 1 August,

1989, Vol. 107, No. 6, p. 26.

b. Barton Gellman & Susan Schmidt, Shadow Government is

at Work in Secret: After Attacks, Bush Ordered 100
Officials to Bunkers Away from Capital to Ensure Federal
Survival, The Washington Post. 1 March 2002.

c. Department of Treasury, Public Report of the White House

Security Review,
www.fas.org/irp/agency/ustreas/usss/t 1 pubrpt.htn (select
pages)
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TEAM #8
Item 3: Document Requests

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) documents re 9/11

b. SECDEF and DEPSECDEF logs, briefings, memos from
9/11

(2) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. Transcript and tape of the Air Threat Conference Call the

morning of 9/11
b. Crisis Action Team (CAT) documents re response to 9/11
c. National Military Command Center log(s) from 9/11
d. Rules of Engagement (ROE) concerning hijacked aircraft
and domestic air defense.

(3) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

a. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and

Joint Intelligence Task Force - Countering Terrorism
(JITF-CT) logs from 9/11
b. Intelligence Task Force (ITF) documents, if activated

(4) NORAD

a. Rules of Engagement regarding hijacked airliners

b. Real time radar and ASCI files from the Joint Surveillance
System for: (1) the four hijacked airliners, (2) scrambled
military planes responding to the hijacked airliners, and (3)
Air Force One
c. Command/operation logs for 9/11 from Cheyenne and
NEAD
d. After-action reports assessing NORAD's response to 9/11
e. Notes or documents related to the Air Threat Conference
Call
f. NORAD review presented at NRO Conference (Cherie
Gott)
g. Documents describing Vigilant Guardian exercise
h. Record of NORAD actions re Russian strategic aviation
exercise
i. Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/11)

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B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (U.S. SECRET

SERVICE)

(1) Classified Version of 1994 White House Security Review

(2) Command and operation logs regarding communications with

Andrews Air Force Base

(3) Protocols between the Service and FAA regarding air threats and
emergency response

(4) Protocols between the Service and the military regarding the same

(5) Emergency Response Plans (COG, COOP and EGG)

(6) Organizational Charts (current and as of 9/11)

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

(1) Command Center logs for 9/11 (DOT & FBI)

(2) Organization Charts for DOJ & FBI (current and as of 9/11)

(3) All documents related to DOJ's participation in the Domestic

Consequences Principals Committee from 9/11 to 9/20

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (FAA)

(1) All documents related to policies and procedures concerning

hijacked aircraft (current and as of 9/11)

(2) Protocols between the FAA & NORAD regarding hijacked

airliners (current and as of 9/11)

(3) Protocols between the FAA & law enforcement agencies (e.g.,
Secret Service) regarding hijacked airliners (current and as of 9/11)

(4) Organizational charts (current and as of 9/11)

(5) All documents related to the FAA's tracking of hijacked airliners

on 9/11 and communications with NORAD

(6) Logs from the FAA command center for 9/11

(7) After action reviews concerning FAA's tracking of the hijacked

airliners and notification to NORAD
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(8) All documents related to DOT's participation in the Domestic

Consequences Principals Committee from 9/11 to 9/20

E. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

(1) Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to close

financial markets on 9/11

(2) Same re decision to reopen all financial markets

F. WHITE HOUSE

(1) Situation Room

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9/11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

(2) White House Military Office

a. Command, operation and communication logs for 9//11

b. Emergency response plans (current and as of 9/11)

(3) National Security Council

a. National Security Directives regarding Continuity of

Government and/or Continuity of Operations
b. Executive Orders regarding Continuity of Government
and/or Continuity of Operations

(4) General

a. POTUS schedule 9111 -9/20

b. VPOTUS schedule 9/11-9/20
c. The President's Daily Diary for September 11th (consists of
the Service's Movement log, the President's schedule as
annotated by the personal aide, and the phone log)
d. Documents of the Domestic Consequences Principals
Committee from 9/11-9/20
e. Notes, memos and other documents related to decision to
close and reopen financial markets
f. Organizational charts (current and as 9/11)

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TEAM #8
Item 4: Interview Candidates
9/11 W o r k i n g - l e v e l Employee

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(1) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JC3)

a. General Myers
b. National Military Command Center (NMCC) Senior Watch
Officer on September 11th - BG Montague Winfield, USA
c. NMCC Air Threat Conference Call Officer
d. National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) Senior
Watch Officer
(2) NORAD \. General Eberhart, USAF\r in Chief

b. Major General Larry Arnbld, USAF, CG, CONAR

c. Major General Eric Findley, RCAF, Director of Operations
d. Lt Col William Glover, US^JF, Air Defense Officer
e. | [Command Director,
f. BG Jim Hunter, RCAF, CMOC Vice Commander
g. Col Jerry Hatley, USAF, a Command Director
h. MG Paul Weaver, USAF, Ret.
i. Cheri Gott, Analyst who assessed events of 9/11
(3) North East Air Defense Sector (NEAD)
a. Col Robert Marr Jr, USAF, Commander
b. Col Clark Speicher, USAF, Vice Commander

c. Michael Gould, USAF, Director of Operations

d. Colonel Alan Scott, USAF, I51 Air Force

e. Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins, Airborne Control Warning Officer

f. The Duty Senior NCO, Tech Sgt Jeremy Powell

g. Sr Airman Stacia Rountree, USAF

1. The Weapons Section QIC, Maj Philip McCarthy, USAF
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m. I IUSAF
(4) 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron

a.
b. Representative at NEAD
c. Technician(s) who filtered the JSS radar files
(5) Pilots
a. Otis AFB
- Lt. Col. Tim Duffy
-Maj. Daniel Nash
b. Langley AFB
~ Maj. Dan Caine
— Capt. Brandon Rasmussen
-- Maj. Billy Hutchinson
c. Andrews AFB
— Maj. Lucky Sasseville
-- Wingman

B. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (SECRET

SERVICE)
(1) Chief, Presidential Protection Detail
(2) Chief, Vice Presidential Protection Detail

C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(1) DOJ representative on Domestic Consequences Principals
Committee
(2) Senior staff (DAG's Office?) involved in domestic decisions such
as the victims' fund and airline industry bail out

D. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

(1) Secretary Mineta and/or his Chief of Staff on September 11

(2) DOT representative on Domestic Consequences Principals

Committee

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E. FAA
(1) Jane Garvey, Administrator
(2) Claudio Manno, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security
(3) Monte Belger, Acting Deputy Director on September 11th
(4) Chief, Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations
(5) Air Traffic Controllers on duty responsible for each flight
(6) Supervisory Air Traffic Control officials on duty responsible for
each flight
F. JOINT DOD/FAA AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES CELL (ATSC)
(1) Col Brian Meenan, USAF
(2) Col John Czabaranek, USAF
(3) Lt Col Michael-Anne Cherry, USAF
(4) Maj Kevin Bridges, USAF

G. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

(1) Senior staff and leadership involved in decision to close and

reopen financial markets

(2) Treasury representative on Domestic Consequences Principals

Committee

H. WHITE HOUSE

(1) Principals and/or Senior Staff traveling with POTUS on September

ll lh (TBD)

(2) Principals and/or Senior Staff in the PEOC on September 1 l lh

(Rice, Hadley, Miller, Libby?)

(3) Josh Bolten and/or senior staff of Domestic Consequences

Principals Committee

(4) Director, White House Situation Room.|

USN)
(5) Senior Watch Officer on Duty
(6) Watch Officer responsible for the ATC Conference Call
(7) NSC Official responsible for COOP/COG

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