Advantages and Disadvantages of Dialectical Reasoning 1.0 Pre-Modern Dialectics 1.

1 Logic can be differentiated into formal or discrete logic and informal or rh etorical logic. The former can include studies in purely formal content, proposi tional and predicate logic, set theory and so forth. The latter is a study in ar gumentation and fallacies. (See "Logic in Philosophy", April 18, 2007 http://lig htbringers.net/node/33) 1.2 The story of dialectics begins as a type of informal logic used by the Helle nes, especially by Plato's Socratic dialogues, but also Heraclitus argument of t he transitory nature of all things and, as a result, the union of contradictions : "We both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not.""We both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not." 1.3 Unlike rhetoric it does not appeal to ethical standards, or emotional states ; it's claims are based on empirical evidence and reasoned argumentation only. T he Socratic method begins with a hypothesis, which is shown to have contradictio ns (negative hypothesis elimination), or by denying the assumptions of the both the proposition and the contrary claim, thus leading to a third alternative, or even an circular abandonment. A famous example of the latter is the discussion i n Euryptho. 1.4 Logical debate has also been a historical feature of the dharmic religious t raditions (e.g., Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, etc). Examples include the Jainist Sy dv da which conditiond a proposition through partiality, the Hindu Purusha-Prakrit i (active consciousness - restive phenomena) in the Hindu Samkhya school. 1.5 A visual and philosophical expression of the dialectic is expressed in the t ao-chi-tu (taijitu), Chinese symbol for the concept of ynyng, and the core symbol of Taoism. The two propositions contains part of its opposite (complementary oppos ites), they are in a dynamic relationship, they are part of a whole (Wuji) which transcends the two propositions, reaching a state of quiescence. 2.0 Modern Dialectics: The Hegelian Revolution 2.1 Dialectics was taught througout the medieval period as part of the Trivium, the foundation of the liberal arts education in universities, along with grammar and rhetoric. An excellent description of the Trivium is "Grammar is the art of inventing symbols and combining them to express thought; logic is the art of th inking; and rhetoric, the art of communicating thought from one mind to another" (The Trivium, 1937). There was not however enormous development in the field, a lthough it was widely used. 2.2 Fichte developed modern principles of dialectics through an attempt to overc ome the notion of the noumenon (Das Ding an sich) in Kant describe an evolving s elf-consciousness of the phenomenal towards an absolute ego (God). Fichte also a rgued thath self-consciousness was a social phenomenon (c.f., his anti-Semetic G erman nationalism). 2.3 Following Fitch, Hegel expanded on this trajectory of dialectical reasoning. Dialectics is expressed in historical and social evolution of consciousness tow ards freedom and the Absolute Idal (cf., Fichte). This evolution is expressed th rough the logical of an Abstract encountering its Negative resulting in the Conc rete. The thetic description of thesis, antithesis, and resulting synthesis was popularised by Heinrich Moritz Chalybus. Note that it the Hegelian version implici tly requires a negation (even in part) of the abstract. An example the process i s given in the Science of Logic; Being (Sein) is in contradiction with Nothing ( Nicht), and are united as Becoming. An example of the social consciousness is ev ident in the famous Master-Slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit. 2.4 The principles of the Fitchean-Hegelian dialectic can be thus expressed as f ollows: 2.4.1 Everything exists in an environment of contradicting forces, both from wit hout and from within. 2.4.2 Everything in a state of dynamic change; including oscillation, interactio n, and interdetermination. 2.4.3 Gradual quantitative changes leads to radical qualitative change.

2.4.4 Changes are progressive through the negation of the negation (i.e., in the process of sublation Concrete 'resolves' the Abstract and Negative), rather tha n equivalent and circular or oscillating changes. 3.0 Marxist Historical and Dialectical Materialism 3.1 Marx brought together Hegel's dialectics and Feurbach's materialism (what co ntemporary philosophy called "physicalism") to come up with "historical material ism". The "direct opposite" of Hegel to Marx (as explained in Capital) was to ex plain ideas as a reflection of the real world on the human mind. From this physi calist theory of consciousness, Marx explained a dialectic dynamic of history wh ereby societies move through different modes of production (a combination of the relations and means of production), where economic classes are in conflict (i.e ., the relations of production). The change from one mode of production to anoth er is qualitative and revolutionary. The historical modes of production identifi ed by Marx included primitive communism, ancient society, feudalism, and capital ism. Hypothesised future societies included socialism and communism. 3.2 Dialectical materialism (as distinct from historical materialism) was first coined by Joseph Dietzgen, and adopted shortly afterwards by Engels as the "mate rialist dialectic". It was introduced as "dialectical materialism" by Plenkhanov and then differentiated by Stalin, whereby dialectical materialism referred to a world-view, and historical materialism as an explanation of social development . 3.3 From Hegel's example of phase-state transitions, Engels also applied the dia lectical method to the natural sciences, especially evolution, but also with fra gmentary notes in chemistry. Lenin attempted to extend this further to include p hysics (in opposition to fellow leading party member, Bogdanov's "Empiriomonism" ). The world-view application of dialectical materialism contributed significant ly to the "evolutionary" arguments of the inheritance of acquired characteristic s versus the "bourgeois" and mechanistic science of genetics ("Lysenko is the mi llstone round the neck of the dialectical biologist" as J.M. Smith put it). 4.0 Criticism and Support of Dialectical Reasoning 4.1 One of the strongest critics of dialectics was Popper, who does not so much criticise the development of knowledge through a dialectical process, criticised the loose and vague way that dialectical theory deal with contradictions, and t he theory of identity representing a unity of opposites. Popper's alternate theo ry of knowledge advanced through falsification (and positivist verification), wa s that hypotheses tested against rational consistency and empirical facts; contr adictions ought to be resolved, not accepted. 4.2 Popper was also very critical of the deterministic and essentialist historic ism, which he traced through Plato to Hegel and Marx, which placed historical de stiny outside of human control, and made impossible predictions concerning the f uture. As the predictions of historical destiny failed to match the contextual r eality, Popper noted negative effects in attempting to expediate a remodelling t he reality of human behaviour to fit the theory. Popper's alternative was "piece meal social engineering", with small-scale and reversible social experiments wer e carried out. 4.3 The Frankfurt School of Social Research and the related body of critical the ory worked on developing dialectics, in particular, that dialectics had to be ap plied to itself, as a self-correcting method. Thus they rejected historicism, ph ysicalist metaphysical presumptions, and orthodox Marxism. Further, they interpr eted praxis and theory as interdependent on each other. The "first generation" o f the Frankfurt School were particularly interested in a Freud/Marx synthesis (e .g., Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse), whereby the "culture industry" produced a mas s, subservient, and unthinking subjects dominated by "surplus repression", count ered only by those engaged in negative critique. The "second generation" (Haberm as) are critical of historical materialism for being inattentive to communicativ e action. 4.4 Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason sought to overcome the contradiction

of freedom and necessity (recalling both Kant and Hegel in the title), argued t hat conscious human activity did have a interconnected and transformative approa ch that was totalising without a totaliser, and could reach a trascendent point in a post-scarcity communist society. It also rejects historicism, dialectics as a world-view, and the possibility of class-based expressions creativity and spo ntaneity. 4.5 The biologists Levins and Lewotin apply dialectics as a heuristic approach, especially in regard to the oscillation between total environments and particula r heterogenuous species which are part of, and alter, that ecology. Again there is criticism of using dialectics in a non-heuristic manner in the physical world : "Dialectical materialism is not, and never has been, a programmatic method for solving particular physical problems. Rather, a dialectical analysis provides a n overview and a set of warning signs against particular forms of dogmatism and narrowness of thought." This is perhaps partially contridicted by Eldredge and G ould, whose theory of punctuated equilibra, argues that species remain in a rela tively static state until a rapid period of branching speciation (cladogenesis), a claim still subject to debate. 4.6 The deconstructionalist strategy of textual analysis has some resemblance to dialectical reasoning, by which conventionally assumed binary opposites are exp lored for tensions and weaknesses between the opposites that suggest a commonali ty, illustrating how the these oppositions are unstable, reversible, and mutuall y dependent on one another. 4.7 Most recently some logicians have attempted to formalise dialectics, albeit within argumentation and decision theory. Utilising rules for critical discussio n, an argument progresses through definition through discussion stages, with cri tical and heurestic functions. Pragma-dialectics has been used in law, mediation and negotion processes, parlimentary and political debates, and health communic ation. 5.0 Evaluating Questions 5.1 Can formal logic be extended to account for temporal and contextual conditio ns? What about partial conditions (e.g., superposition in quantum mechanics)? 5.1 Are the principles of dialectics (2.4, above) universally true for natural s cience, social inquiry, and personal aesthetics? 5.2 How does one determine what is a qualitative change? Are qualitative changes always rapid? How does one determine whether contradictions have been trascende d and sublated, or an incorporated and unresolved compromise? 5.3 What predictive capacity does dialectics really have? If it doesn't have any , is it still useful as a heuristic or post-hoc explanatory tool? Elaborations 1.3 Euthyphro defines as piety is what is pleasing to the gods (6e-7a), but Socr ates notes that the gods differ on what is pleasing, which would mean actions wo uld be both pious and impious (note the interest not in individual gods, but "th e" gods, i.e., their essence). Euthyphro generalises this tp emphasise something which is loved by all gods to represent piety, which Socrates responds with: "I s the good loved by the gods because it is good? Or is it good because it is lov ed by the gods?" (10a). Socrates notes that the approval of all gods is an attri bute of piety; it is not part of its defining characteristics. Euthyphro suggest s that piety is concerned with caring for the gods (13b), which suggests that th ey are subject to such care and improvement. Euthyphro then proposes that piety is an art of sacrifice and appeals; which reduces the gods to agents of commerce . There is no resolution. At this point Euthyphro leaves, and Socrates goes to a ttend the courts on a charge of impiety. 2.4 Note the difference with these core propositions of dialectical logic and th e three classical laws of thought (often mistakingly called "formal logic") usua lly attributed to Aristotle i.e., Law of identity (A=A and not !A)., The Law of

Non-contradiction ("A := B" and "A := !B" are mutually exclusive)., The Law of E xcluded Middle (either A := B or A := !B is true). 3.1 "In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into defi nite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of product ion appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the econom ic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and politi cal superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of consciousness... At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production.... From forms of develo pment of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then beg ins an era of social revolution." (Contribution to a Critique of Political Econo my) 4.1 Recall Avicenna, "Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be b eaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned." (Avicenna, Persia n Philosopher and Physician, 980-1037 CE). Popper from C&R: "The whole developme nt of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in philosophica l system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be made a basi s for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much more mo dest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the stud y of the critical methods of science". 4.1 Consider Stalin's idea of contradiction: "The highest development of state p ower with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'cont radictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930 Further Reading Adorno, Theodore, "Negative Dialectics", Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966 Fichte, Johann, "Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre", (two volumes), FP 1796, 1797 Derrida, Jacques, "Of Grammatology", Les ditions de Minuit, 1967 Eemeren, Frans H. van, Ed. "Advances in pragma-dialectics", Vale Press, 2002 Engels, Frederich., "Anti-Dhring", FP 1878 Engels, Frederich., "Dialectics of Nature", FP 1883 Gould, Stephen J., "The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History", W.W . Norton, 1980 Habermas, Jrgen., "Communication and the Evolution of Society", Beacon Press, 1979 Hegel, Georg W. F., "The Phenomenology of Spirit", FP 1807 Hegel, Georg W. F., "Science of Logic" (three volumes), FP 1811, 1812, 1816 Horkheimer, Max., and Adorno, Theodore., "Dialectic of Enlightenment", FP 1947 Joseph, Miriam, "The Trivium in College Composition and Reading", FP 1937 Levins, Richard., Lewontin, Richard., "The Dialectical Biologist", Harvard Unive rsity Press, 1985 Marcuse, Herber., "Eros and Civilization : A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud", Beacon Press, 1955 Marx, Karl., "A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", FP 1859 Lenin, Vladimar., "Materialism and Empirio-criticism", Zveno Publishers, FP 1909 Plato, "Euthyphro", FPc399 BCE Popper, Karl., "The Open Society and It's Enemies" (Vol II), Routledge, 1945 Popper, Karl., "The Poverty of Historicism", Routledge, 1957 Popper, Karl., "Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge" , Routledge, 1963

Sartre, Jean-Paul., "Critique of Dialectical Reason", Editions Gallimard, 1960 Stalin, Joseph., "Historical and Dialectical Materialism", FP 1938