Sie sind auf Seite 1von 35

Page |1

People vs. Magallanes G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995 FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abetos cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case. ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers

HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00. If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of taking advantage of his position is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of offenses committed in relation to public office. It is considered merely as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade 27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade 27 or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in rank among the accus ed, only has a rank classified as Grade 18. Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade 27 or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED.

Page |2

Cuyos vs. Garcia G.R. No. L-46934

April 15, 1988

FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00). Under 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial. The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial. Cuyos verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both. Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is, a fine ranging from the amount equal to the va lue of damages to three times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of First Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to property,

the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries, there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries is summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when the imposable penalty is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while the fine is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the information cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crime in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide is six (6) years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

Page |3

Buaya vs. Polo G.R. No. 75079

January 26, 1989 Zaldivia V. Reyes, Jr. GR No. 102342/ July 3, 1992 Facts: Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 1990 for violation of a Municipal Ordinance, allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground that it had already prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion forcing the petitioner to raise it to the Regional Trial Court wherein the respondent sustained the decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly emphasizing the last paragraph of the said rule, stating that it applies in all cases. Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition for review of certiorari before the high court invoking Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on Summary Procedure and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 3326 as the provisions that governs the charge against her being a violation of a municipal ordinance. Issue: Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on Criminal Procedure or covered by the Rule of Summary Procedure. Ruling: The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent judge only governs cases that fall under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and is not applicable to all cases as the said section had begun with for all cases no subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases. Thus, the respondent judges erred in denying the said motion on the ground that the offense is governed by section 1, rule 110 of the rules of criminal procedure.

FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buayas account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit. Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondents principal place of business is in Manila and Buayas failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. Petition is DISMISSED.

Page |4

People vs. Guillen No. L-1477, January 18, 1950 Facts Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, as the information filed against him provided. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was later found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas and company. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime. Ruling: The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was not fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing him from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of multiple attempted murder. CASE: People vs. Uganap G.R. No. 130605 June 19,2001 FACTS: The victim and some of the accused were close relatives. Accused Tirso Arang is the half-brother of the victim, while accused-appellant Felix Uganap is also the victims cousin. Accused Faustino Uganap is the brother-in-law of the victim, being brother of the latters wife, Leilani Asang.

The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of the victim,that at around 8:30 in the evening, he was walking home when he stopped near the house of Salvador Uganap. He peeped through a hole in the wall of the house and saw the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap had a .38 revolver, while Nonoy Panday had a pistolized carbine. The room was illuminated by a lamp. Samuel Arang moved away from the house and hid behind a coconut tree. The accused went to the house of Pedro Arang, which was 30 meters away from where the witness was. Samuel stated that he saw Felix immediately shoot Pedro when the latter opened the door. Samuel fled because they were afraid. Nolly Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was a member of vigilante religious group called Ituman. That he was also recruited when he was 14 years old. Felix Uganap was the groups designated commander as Commander Matador. Luchavez left the group. Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was proposed by Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop. Faustino paid Felix P 3,000.00 for the purpose. The group intended to effect the killing on December 24, but aborted because Pedro left the town to visit his wife. Hence, the plan was set to January 6. Luchavez was unable to go with the group because he had a fever. ISSUES: Whether or not there is conspiracy and; Whether or not the price or reward as an aggravating circumstance will be appreciated. HELD: Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested. The accused appellant was convicted while the other accused were acquitted, by RTC. The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-examination of the entire evidence on record. The Court is likewise not prohibited from instituting a finding of conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of the lower court, when its existence is manifest from the evidence at hand. In the instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of a previous agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness account of how the conspirators effected their plan, was submitted into evidence but disregarded by the trial court. The information alleges that the crime was attended treachery and evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of treachery, but the evident premeditation is present. Court also observes that another

Page |5

aggravating circumstance was proven by evidence. Luchavezs testimony that the taking of Pedro Arangs life carried the price of P3, 000.00 was categorical, credible and unrebutted. However, because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure as revised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating circumstances must be specifically named in the information, the Court will allow for this amendment to retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of price or reward shall not be appreciated. Reclusion Perpetua is applicable and award of damages are the same. CASE: People vs. Nuevo G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001 FACTS: Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 oclock in the evening of December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband for the drinking spree at Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with her 10 month old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm, appellant returned and entered their room. She was awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing. She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail. Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present, witnessed what was being done to her. Appellant threatened her and her niece. Roberta testified that she did not see him because it was very dark that night, she identified him through his voice. His husband corroborated part of his wifes story. He saw Sanico left his fathers place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at around 1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found on the victim, that only old lacerations were present. Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since they were schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor. He denied, he invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances. The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death. ISSUES: Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the offended party based only on her recognition of the sound of

his voice; Whether or not the prosecutions evidence suffices for the conviction of rape and the imposition of the death penalty on him. HELD: In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy talk even from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659, mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty. While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find that these were not averted in the information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances with specifity. This requirement has retroactive effect. The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished only with Reclusion Perpetua.

Page |6

CASE: Casupanan vs. Laroya G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002 FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases were filed, with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismiss the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied for lack of merit. They f iled a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied the same. ISSUES: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case; Whether or not there is forum-shopping. HELD: The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order

dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of forumshopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively. It is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and relief sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of separate civil action which can proceed independently. Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delito. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately and independently even without reservation. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not the accused.

Page |7

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas FACTS: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows: "That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law." At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board enterd the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant. ISSUES: (1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay. (2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night. (3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as required by the law. RULING: (1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on mere hearsay. RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or

complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause. But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. (2) Yes, the search can be made at night. RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs a search made at night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. However, since the search warrant is declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at night. (3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description. RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabiling him to identify the articles in question, which he did.

Page |8

BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP No. L-64261 December 26, 1984 Escolin, J.: Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. Publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. Issue: Whether there was a valid search warrant? Ruling: The two search warrants were issued wihout probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar, nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. In the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of violating the decree without reference to any determinate provision thereof. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523 Facts: The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province. Held: The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one end of the country to the other.

Page |9

In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands, while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such defendants, may by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case, the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the action according to law. Dela Cruz vs. Moya G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838 Facts: On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in court martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty.

Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before the commission of the crime. The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.

P a g e | 10

People vs. Chupeco G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640 Facts: On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila. Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction

of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or stipulation. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523 Facts: The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province. Held: The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the case

Held: An essential element common to the two acts punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile. On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court

P a g e | 11

one end of the country to the other. In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands, while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such defendants, may by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case, the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the action according to law. Dela Cruz vs. Moya G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838 Facts: On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in court martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their duty.

Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Held: In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before the commission of the crime. The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED. People vs. Chupeco G.R. No. L19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640 Facts: On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila. Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction

P a g e | 12

over the case Held: An essential element common to the two acts punishable by Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile. On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or stipulation. CALEON V AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. FACTS: Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land denominated at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. Agus filed a complaint for ejectment MTC of Manila, against the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25). Petitioner argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in this case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner

and private respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. Therefore, the application of said law to the case at bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners contention is correct? RULING: The Supreme Court Ruled that the petitioners contention is untenable. It is well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit.

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. CA FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants. On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search

P a g e | 13

warrants and ordered the NBI to return the properties that were seized. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner. RULING: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application. Witnesses in the hearing for an application for search warrants must have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony as to the alleged commission of the offense. Also, the sear warrant must contain a specific description of the articles to be seized. General warrants are constitutionally objectionable. People vs. Gano Facts On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the morning Sr. Inspector Ernesto Garcia received a report of a massacre at a residence in San Mateo Rizal. At the crime scene Garcia saw the body of Pociano Salen and was thereafter informed the identity of the suspect. The suspect in the name of Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known aliases was arrested and detained in Butuan City after having tried to escape from the authorities. On their way back to Manila Garcia disclosed that the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and robbery. Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a qualified admission by admitting the killing of the three (3) victims but

denying the charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a complex crime with a single penalty, the accused with the assistance of his counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Issue WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be mitigating? Ruling NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is NOT mitigating. The accused was merely confessing to the crime of homicide but NOT to robbery with homicide, a considerably graver offence. For voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense charged, i.e. robbery with homicide and not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence, if the voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating. People vs. Yaoto Facts Accused-appellant Eduardo Yaoto was charged with two (2) counts of rape and pleaded not guilty to both counts. In her medico genital examination, Dr. Armie Umil certified that Angeline Yaoto, 17 years old, suffered genital and extragenital injuries. It was found that Angeline was not only sexually abused but was also physically assaulted. Accused Yaoto assails the credibility of Angeline and denied having raped her twice. He also assailed Angelines testimony that he had bolo and an ice pick with which he threatened her considering that the prosecution failed to produce said items in evidence. Issue WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the SC? Ruling Yes. The Court ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and

P a g e | 14

their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct and attitude especially under cross-examination. Ordinarily, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witness considering that it is in a better position to observe her candor and behavior on the witness stand.

Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., respondents Facts: The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa though falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried together with the criminal case. The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs. Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issues: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, involving a property in Bulacan. Decision: Case Remanded. There are 3 important requisites which must be present before the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter, the territory where the offense was committed, and over the person of the accused. In this case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of public document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because whe voluntarily submitted to the courts authority. Art. 100 of the RPC provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Art. 104 of the same Code provides that civil liability xxx includes restitution. In this case, the civil liability is

People vs. Bernabe Facts On or about October 29, 1998 in Pasay City Virgilio Bernabe by means of force and intimidation employed upon Maria Esnelia Bernabe, his daughter, a 17 year old minor, unlawfully have carnal knowledge with said victim against her will and consent. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. During trial accused denied having raped his own daughter. He testified that Maria Esnelia charged him with rape because he resented her boyfriend who for sometime slept in their house. He also depicted his daughter as a rebel and neglected her studies. Accused also claimed that his two sisters assisted his daughter in filing the rape case against him because of a land dispute between them. Issue WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the SC? Ruling Yes. The Court ruled that when it comes to the issue of credibility the Supreme Court as any other appellate court, would ordinarily defer to the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only trial courts are in so unique a position as to be able to observe that elusive and insurmountable evidence of the witness deportment on the witness stand while testifying. Gr no. 123340 August 29, 2002

P a g e | 15

deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended party did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted, this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case. GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998 Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs. Hon. Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents. Facts: SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants of arrest against the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime of murder has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon motion of the private respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed homicide. Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court. Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest against them. Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the second. He also set the arraignment of the accused. The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the

trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge Villon. The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense committed was murder. Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment. Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present. The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy. The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the accused for homicide. Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus. Issues: Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having the respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ. Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to set aside the arraignment. Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering his order. Decision: Petition is GRANTED. Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who conducted the investigation, the

P a g e | 16

resolution should be based on the review of the record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed. Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents submitted. The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

P a g e | 17

G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996 RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the same court. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case. The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has been made. Issue: The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:

Held: The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

P a g e | 18

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. BARREDO, J.: Facts: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss. Issues: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? Held: The issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation. a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although he could have been criminally

prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

P a g e | 19

G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001 DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPIECCI), petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents. Facts: On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPIECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the grounds that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping. the trial court issued an order dismissing the Civil Case. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and the trial court granted respondent's, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.

reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation." WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. GO VS. CA FEBRUARY 11, 1992 FELICIANO, J. FACTS: Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-way street in San Juan, Metro Manila. Rolito Gos car and Maguan nearly bumped into each other in an intersection. Because of this, Go shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard of a nearby restaurant saw the incident and took down the plate number of Gos car. Police inv estigators were able to get Gos picture through the credit card that Go used when he dined in restaurant near the crime scene the witness positively identified Go as the gunman. Hence, a manhunt was launched. Several days thereafter, Go went to the police station where the witness identified him as the suspect. The police detained Go. A complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by the police to the Provincial prosecutor. Go was informed of his right to demand preliminary investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver. Meanwhile, Maguan died. Hence, prosecutor filed am information of murder without conducting preliminary investigation. Go posted cash bond and was released after approval of the same by the court. The prosecutor filed for leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation and to prayed for the suspension of court proceedings pending the preliminary investigation. The same was granted and arraignment of Go was suspended. The following day, the court recalled its approval and cancelled the bail of Go. Hence, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the SC, which was remanded to CA. Arraignment took place as scheduled and Go refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered

The Issues Held:

whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action. as a general rule, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages. The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,

P a g e | 20

for him. Then, CA issued its decision dismissing the petition of Go on the grounds that Go was validly arrested without a warrant and Go already waived his right to preliminary investigation. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE 1: Where or not Go was validly arrested without a warrant. HELD: NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, among others, that a peace officer or private person may without warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting person has personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the incident. Hence, at the time of his arrest, the crime has not just been committed. It would have been different if Go committed a continuing crime. In addition, the police officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Go was he gunman. The police arrested Go by relying on the statement of the witness. Finally, the plate number of the car that was taken down by the witness did not point to Gos car but to his wife. ISSUE 2: HELD: Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary investigation. NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory and not constitutional, it is a component of due process of criminal justice. It is a substantive right. To deprive an accused of this right is to deny due process. Generally, said right is invoked before entering a plea; failure to invoke the same amounts to waiver. In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary investigation be conducted upon the filing of the information before the court. The fact that he posted bail did not amount to waiver of said right as he asked for it when he filed for the approval of the cash bond. The court granted his prayer for preliminary investigation before the approval of the bond. Go even filed before the CA for such relief. Hence, Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation. But since the trial had already commenced, the trial should be suspended and preliminary investigation should be conducted. Participation of Go during the trial did not amount to waiver also as he was merely forced to do so to avail his other rights.

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/ K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING VS. TAYPIN 331 SCRA 697 Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Devt Corp., the NBI filed an application for search warrant with the RTC of Cebu City, to search the premises of petitioner located in Talisay Cebu, and to seize the wrought iropn furniture found therein which had allegedly been the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable by Art 189 of the RPC, as the petitioner manufactured wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by the Mendco without securing any license or patent for the same. Seized in the premises were the said pieces of furniture. Petitioners moved to quash the warrant alleging, among others, that (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (b) the crime they are accused of does not exist. The denial of the motion prompted petitioners to come to this court. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners contention is of merit HELD: (a) No. The Court has consistently ruled that that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain in pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, the premises searched located in Talisay Cebu are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. SC AO 113-95 merely specified which courts could try and decide cases involving violations of IPR. The power to issue search warrants in violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in SC Administrative Order. (b) Yes. The issue referred to in Art. 189 of RPC had been rendered moot and academic. Said article has already been repealed by the Intellectual Property Right Code. Further, the acts complained of does not fall under any of the provisions of the IPR Code. There being no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill the constitutional requirements of such, and is therefore defective on its face. Since the warrants are null and void, all the seized properties must be returned to petitioners.

P a g e | 21

P a g e | 22

La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez GR. Nos. L-63796-97 May 21, 1984 Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. Facts: La Chemise Lacoste SA is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines. It is undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the trademarks LACOSTE, CHEMISE LACOSTE, CROCODILE DEVICE and a composite mark consisting of the word LACOSTE and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and other g oods specifically sporting apparels sold in many parts of the world and which have been marketed in the Philippines since 1964. In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the trademark CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company. Two years later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark under the Principal Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an order dated 3 March 1977 allowing the application and holding the registrant to be presumed the owner of the mark until after the registration is declared cancelled. Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to Gobindram Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE. On 21 November 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed its application for registration of the trademark Crocodile Device (Application Serial 43242) and Lacoste (Application Serial 43241). The former was approved for publication while the latter was opposed by Games and Garments in Inter Partes Case 1658. In 1982, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed a Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. SR-2225 docketed as Inter Partes Case 1689. On 21 March 1983, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by Hemandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The NBI conducted an investigation and subsequently filed with the trial court (RTC Manila, Branch XLIX, National Capital Judicial Region) two applications for the issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas. The court issued Search Warrant 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of Article 189 of the

Revised Penal Code. The NBI agents executed the two search warrants and as a result of the search found and seized various goods and articles described in the warrants. Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that the trademark used by him was different from La Chemise Lacostes trademark and that pending the resolution of IPC 1658 before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil action on the same subject matter and between the same parties would be premature. La Chemise Lacoste filed its opposition. The State Prosecutor likewise filed his opposition. The court was, however, convinced that there was no probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated 22 March 1983, the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or officers in custody of the seized items were ordered to return the same to Hemandas The Supreme Court granted the petition in GR 63797-97, reversing and setting the order dated 22 April 1983 of the RTC, and made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 April 1983. The Court, on the other hand, denied due course to the petition in GR 65659 for lack of merit, and thus lifting and setting aside the Temporary Restraining Order dated 5 December 1983. Ruling: Determination of probable cause mandatory for the issuance of a valid search warrant; Probable cause defined As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search warrant, the Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the determination of probable cause by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce (Constitution, Art IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has traditionally meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof (People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667). Determination of probable cause; No general formula or fixed rule The concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by our ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The question of

P a g e | 23

whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA 507). There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of the existence of probable cause since the existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310),. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason, more so it is plain that our countrys ability to abide by international commitments is at stake. Correction of errors must be based on sound and valid grounds Herein, the court complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant when at that point in time; it was fully convinced that there existed probable cause. But after hearing the motion to quash and the oppositions thereto, the court executed a complete turnabout and declared that there was no probable cause to justify its earlier issuance of the warrants. Although the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the rectification must be based on sound and valid grounds. The allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by La Chemise Lacoste should have been assessed more carefully because the object of the quashal was the return of items already seized and easily examined by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and quite obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal prosecution. Application for a search warrant is heard ex parte An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses. Herein, the allegation of Hemandas that the applicant withheld information from the court was clearly no basis to order the return of the seized items. Manalili vs. Court of Appeals October 9, 1997 FACTS: G.R. No. 113447

The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of drug addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area, with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high on drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents of his hands, which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the wallet, police officers found what later on turned out to be crushed marijuana. He was charged with Illegal Possession of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Manalili claimed the charges were trumped up and that the police officer s had blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence seized was inadmissible against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure. On the other hand, the Solicitor General counters that the search and seizure was valid, but regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by petitioner since it was not raised in the lower court. ISSUES: 1) Was the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid? 2) May petitioner raise this defense for the first time on appeal? RULING: The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional. However, there are exceptions to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs search and 5) waiver by the accused. The court added another exception, the stop-and frisk, which is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety of police officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk must be grounded on probable cause that the accused has committed an offense. As such, the court ruled that the search and seizure was valid and admissible as evidence. In addition, Manalili had effectively waived the defense of an invalid search since this issue was not raised during the trial. Such issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

P a g e | 24

Mata vs. Judge Bayona et. Al. GR No. L-50720 March 26, 1985 Ponente: De Castro Facts: An information was filed against Soriano Mata, petitioner, alleging that he offered, took and arranged bets on Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued by the respondent Judge against him for violation under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306. Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, it is with the court. This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of private respondents and that the fact that documents relating to search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Issue: W/N the search warrant issued by respondent Judge were valid. Ruling: The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant or witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.

Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. However, illegality of search warrant does not call for return of things seized which are prohibited. Orquinaza vs. People Facts: On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a sworn statement regarding the allege act of Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap. The case was referred as a case of sexual harassment. Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing that it does not contain allegation to constitute the crime of sexual harassment. The assistant city prosecutor filed with the MTC an information charging the petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived of his right to due process since the information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. The motion was denied. He again filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? Held: Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the assistant city prosecutor concluded that the more proper charge should be acts of lasciviousness. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be futile because the complainant would be presenting the same evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. The lack of preliminary investigation would still not be a ground to quash the information against the accused much less does it affect the courts jurisdiction. The remedy of the accused is to call the

P a g e | 25

attention of the court to the lack of preliminary investigation and demand as a matter of right that one be conducted.

P a g e | 26

No. L-47448 May 17, 1978 The People of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Hon. Emeterio Ocaya, et. al., respondents Facts: The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the court of Hon. Ocaya charging Esterlina Marapao, Letitia Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao of the crime of serious physical injuries. Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial was made on merit and no warrats of arrest were issued. Instead, the respondent judge held that the respondents should be charged of either slight or less serious physical injuries only. This is so, even if the affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the victim, was incapacitated for more than 30 days and a scar was left on her face, deforming it. Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case since the crime or slight or less physical injuries is not within the jurisdiction of the court. The fiscals motion for reconsideration was denied by Hon. Ocaya. Accordingly, the respondent judge evaluated the case without hearing the parties nor the witnesses, nor having received their evidence, as well as ruling against the deformity on the basis of the medical certificate. The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the nullification of Hon. Ocayas orders. Issue: Whether Hon. Oaya acted with grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Decision: The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID. The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the information or criminal complaint, and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judges personal

appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and their witnesses. Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached to the person and subject-matter, the subsequent happening of events, though it may have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not divest the court of jurisdiction already attached. People vs Agbulos Facts: Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos, charging him with Forcible abduction with rape. Agbulos was arraigned on January 23, 1981 where he pleaded guilty. On April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its case. On August 13,1984, a warrant of arrest was issued against Agbulos, but was later on recalled because it was issued to the wrong bonding company, thus the hearing was reset on November 5, 1984,. On the said date, Agbulos failed to appear before the court. The bonding company was given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show the cause why judgement should not be rendered against them. The bonding company fails to surrender the accused and the court issued an order stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgement will issue against the full amount of the bond. Trial was further reset to January 30, 1985 and still the accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of the court on the judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence, thus, Defense counsel just manifested that they were adopting the testimony of prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo, thereafter; the defense rested its case. On July 11 1985, judgement was rendered against the bonding company, and on June 15 1985, accused was found guilty of forcible abduction with rape, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnification. On August 16, counsel for accused appealed. Issue: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the accused may appeal? Held: Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the constitution. The old case of people vs Avancea required the presence of the accused at certain stages of the trial. This only results in the discontinuance of the trial as long as the defendant would not reappear or remain at large. This rule would work for the fugitives advantage. This rule is now modified by the bill of rights which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner cannot simply escape and thwart the continuance of prosecution and conviction against him

P a g e | 27

provided that he has been arraigned, duly notified, and his failure to appear unjustified. By the same rule, the accused forfeits his right to appeal. Rule 124, section 8 of the 1985 rules on criminal procedure provide that the court may, upon motion of the appellee, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

P a g e | 28

People vs Baao Facts: Rowena Frederico is a thirteen year old school drop out, finishing only grade 1 and of limited native intelligence. She claims she was raped five times by accused appellant Baao; three times in December 1982, done in the bathroom of accused-appellants house in Dasmarias Cavite, and twice in February 1983, the fourth done in the backyard while the fifth was done in the living room. On March 4 1983, Rowena decided to tell her mother about the offenses. She said that the first three rapes were done at 8am on dates of December she could not recall, while the fourth was at about 10 pm on Feb 17, and the fifth at noon of Feb 23. She claimed that all rapes were done through force and threat of death and that the first rape caused laceration of her hymen and there was full penetration and pain in all instances. The victim was subjected to physical examinations under Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer of the NBI. According to Dr. Reyes findings, Rowena underwent intercourse for not more than five times, and that the findings were compatible with the testimony of the victim. Lucia Federico, the victims mother, also testified that after she came to know of the rapes, the accused-appellants wife approached her and offered her 2000 Php so she would withraw the charges. The Accused-appellant relied mainly on denial and alibi. He claims that he was just being set up because he once caught the girl sealing soft drinks from his sari sari store and had scolded her. He also claims that at the times stated by Rowena on which dates she was supposedly raped, he was with his daughter at her house near Manila International Airport in Baclaran, to do some carpentry work. His daughter testified and said the same thing. He also argued that the complaint was filed to extort money from him, an amount of 15,000 which was later reduced to 8000. The Trial Judge rejected the charges on the second, third and fifth rapes. This leads the defense to invoke falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, claiming that since the three charges were rejected, the rest should also be rejected. Issue: Whether or not this was merely a tale concocted by Rowena. Whether or not the two charges of rape should also be rejected since the other three were rejected by the court. Held:

Accused-Appellant was held guilty of the crime charged. His contentions were rejected. His alibi of being in Baclaran on December is not enough to relieve him of the charges because he couldn t show that he did not have any opportunity to go back to Dasmarinas during that month. Also, considering the demeanour of the victim, she couldnt have made up such a story on her own. Alibi is an inherently weak defense. On the contention that all charges should be rejected since three were rejected, it could also conversely be argued that since truth was found on the first and fourth rapes, accused should also be held liable for all five rapes and be convicted. The choice really is whether it should be total acquittal or total conviction for all five charges of rape. People vs. Doria Facts: Florencio Doria @ Jun was a seller of illegal drugs. Upon a tip of an informant, PO3 Manlangit together with the informant posed as a buyer of marijuana, PO1 Badua tagged along as support in the whole operation. PO3 Manlangit was able to give the marked bills worth P1600 to Florencio, left and after sometime returned with the 1 brick marijuana at hand. They were able to arrest Florencio inflagrante delicto in selling the marijuana to them, when asked where the marked bills where Florencio replied that it was at the place of Neneth. The group went to the house of the so called Neneth, when there they saw the person whose name was Violeta Gadao carrying water to her house, they questioned her where the marked bills were. At this time also a box with a flap open was seen by the PO3 Manlangit, his suspicion peeked because he saw at the open flap the same wrappings as the 1 brick he got from Florencio at that time. PO3 Manlangit open the box and found 10 bricks of the same marijuana. Simultaneously PO1 Badua was able to get the marked bills out of Violeta and arrested her. The RTC ruled in favour of the police and imposed upon Florencio and Violeta the penalty of Death, the 11 bricks of marijuana were destroyed. The case went to the SC for automatic review. Issue: W/N Florencio is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs W/N Violeta is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs

P a g e | 29

Held: Florencio is guilty, he was caught inflagrante delicto, and the law authorizes such arrest without a warrant in such cases. The law authorizes entrapment, that is the police conducts an operation against the accused without inducing him to commit the said crime. The law authorizes the mix of both subjective and objective test in determining if there is entrapment in a case. The subjective test looks on the daily practice, background and life of the accused in determining if the crime is indeed committed out of his volition and without inducement. The objective test looks into the conduct of the police in trying to plan and execute the entrapment against the accused, if it has no inducement in the whole of its process. Entrapment there is no inducement and the accused did the crime out of his volition. Instigation the crime was committed with inducement by the police and the accused did the crime not of his volition. Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure enumerate the valid Arrests without a warrant: When, in his prescence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the offense. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and When the prisoner to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place he is serving final judgement or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. No, Violeta cant be guilty of selling illegal drugs because the drugs were illegally seized from her house. The marked bills found in her person also didnt prove her participation in the sale of drugs by Florencio The 5 instances where a search and seizure without a warrant is valid when: Search incident to a lawful arrest Search of moving motor vehicle Search in violation of customs laws Seizure of evidence in plain view When the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable

searches and seizure Option b, c, and e can be immediately disposed of as a reason. Since the arrest of Violeta was without a warrant and doesnt fall among the exceptions provided in Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure, the search and seizure cant be the first exception to a valid warrantless search and seizure. As to (a) it was not in hot pursuit, and as to (b) theres no probable cause. The search and seizure cant also be considered in plainview, because PO3 Manlangit himself admitted that the items in the box could have been other items. That marijuana cant be readily identified with just the flap open and the plastic pack sticking out. Florencio was convicted with Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of P500,000 While Violeta was acquitted PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA G. R. No. 123872 Jan. 30, 1998 Regalado, J.: Facts: Ruben Montilla, alias Joy was charged for violating Section 4, Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659 in an information which alleges: That on or about 20th day of June 1994, at Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, xxx the abovenamed accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport and deliver 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves which are considered prohibited drugs. Issue: Whether the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him? Ruling: A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

P a g e | 30

People vs. Nitafan Facts: On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. Petitioners filed motions for the consolidation of the three informations with the 21 other remaining cases pending before the RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that the indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the transaction complained. RTC granted the consolidation and the 3 infornations were re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any motion from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates Marcos right against ex post facto law and the two other informations on the ground that private respondents right against double jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the 1st criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law and also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases on the ground of violation of private respondents right against double jeopardy. Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to quash an information? Held: In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash and as such she has deemed to have waived and abandon her right to avail any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoked to challenge the complaint or information. If the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case but also takes the side of the accused. It is clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those ground stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged

which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgement on the cause. The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. PRUDENTE V DAYRIT PADILLA; December 14, 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the CA, an application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). Dimagmaliw alleged, among others that: That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that Nemesio Prudente who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Anonas St., Sta., Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives, handgrenades and ammuntion which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio Prudente is keeping and concealing at the premises of the PUP. In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of ISAD, executed a "Deposition of Witness"2 dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. - On 1 Nov 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. They found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers. - On 6 Nov 1987, petitioner Prudente moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the

P a g e | 31

issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. Respondent Judge issued denied the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this present recourse. ISSUES 1. WON the Search Warrant is invalid as it does not show a probable cause since it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence 2. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP 3. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense HELD 1. YES

information from other sources or persons. [b] What the records show is the deposition of witness, Angeles, as the only support to Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of Dimagmaliw and the declaration of Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case: "The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." 2. NO Ratio A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.

Reasoning - In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search

Ratio The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant must be shown to
be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

Reasoning

[a] In his application for search warrant, Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." In his supporting deposition, Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through

warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP. 3. NO Ratio The application for search warrant which was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." means that it was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

Reasoning

[a] While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score.

P a g e | 32

[b] The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Search Warrant No. 87-14 ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Sapiera vs Court of Appeals Facts:

acquitted and the fact from which the civil liability exists did not exist. Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against her. Held: Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless this shows that the fact from which the civil liability is based is proven to not have existed because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt. (b) Where the court expressly declares that the liability is not criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act. The decision of the case would show that the acquittal was based on failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law says that she would be considered an indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66 thereof would be held liable for breach of warranty and is held liable to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the instrument. Stonehill vs. Diokno L-19550 June 19, 1967

Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When they were presented for payment, the checks were dishonoured because the drawer s account was already closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were filed against Sapiera while two counts of BP 22 was filed against Arturo de Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On December 27 1999, the RTC Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for the 2 BP 22 cases and was ordered to pay Sua 167,150 Php as civil indemnity and was sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day. Respondent Sua appealed regarding the civil aspect of Sapieras case but the courtdenied it saying that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals praying that the appeal be given due course, this was granted. On January 1996, CA rendered a decision ordering Sapiera to pay 335000 php to Sua. Sapiera filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA the issued a resolution noting that the admission of both parties that Sua already collected 125000 for the 2 check paid by De Guzman on the BP 22 cases. It appears that the payment should be deducted on her liability as they involved the same two checks which Sapiera was involved in. the CA deducted the liability to 210,000 Php. Hence this petition by Sapiera claiming that the CA erred in rendering such decision because she was

FACTS: Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against the corporate offices and private residences of the accused. The warrants directed police officers to seize and take possession of various items of personal property such as books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, etc. The warrants were based on alleged violations of Central Bank Laws, Tariff Laws, and the like. Petitioners assailed the validity of the warrants as such warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized. In addition, petitioners assert that other items not included in the warrants, such as cash, were also seized. They filed petitions with the court, seeking the quashal of the warrants and the return of their seized property. On the other hand, public respondents claimed the warrants were valid, and any defects were cured by consent of the petitioners. They also claim that such evidence, regardless of the validity of the warrants, were admissible as evidence in court.

P a g e | 33

ISSUES: 1) Are the 42 search warrants valid? 2) Are the documents and other effects admissible as evidence against respondents? RULING: The seized items were taken from two kinds of locations: the offices of the petitioners and their residences. With regards to the seized items from the offices, petitioners have no cause of action since only the corporation, as a separate juridical personality, may question the validity of the warrants. As the petitioners filed the objection in their personal capacities, the court cannot act on the petition. As to the effects seized from the homes of petitioners, it is clear that the warrants were General Warrants, issued on the basis of no specific offense and with no particular definition of the items to be seized. General Warrants are prohibited by the Consititution since there are clearly issued to conduct fishing expeditions, and not on the basis of actual probable cause. The Constitution provides that items to be seized must be particularly described and probable cause can only be found in connection with one specific offense. Since these items were seized on the basis of an invalid warrant, they are to be deemed fruits of a poisonous tree. As such, they may not be used as evidence against the petitioners. VENUS VS DESIERTO OCTOBER 21, 1998 J. DAVIDE FACTS: Eriberto Venus (Venus) was the mayor of New Washington, Aklan. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality issued a Resolution authorizing Venus to negotiate with the Board of Liquidators in the purchase of a lot in the municipality. Hence, Venus went to Manila and submitted with the Board of Liquidators the resolution and a letterproposal for the purchase of the lot. The proposal was rejected by the board and set bidding on Sept. 19, 1988. Venus informed the SB of the denial. Then, Venus sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor as to the requirements of bidding in order that the municipality may validly participate. The Provincial Auditor opined that it would be impossible to participate as it would need a resolution from the SB. And that the funds

would be pre-audited before its release, which would take at least 2 weeks. This means that the funds will not be available on the day of bidding. Using his personal funds, Venus went to Manila and asked for the postponement of the bidding but it was denied. Hence, Venus bid and got the property, being the highest bidder, using his own money. The lot was used as garage for the municipalitys fire truck free of charge. Nearly four years after the sale, SB members Mars Regalado and Harry Abayon filed a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor charging Venus with violation of paragraph H, Sec. 3 RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act). It was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman of Cebu and was dismissed. Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the dismissal and the case was re-raffled to Deputy Ombudsman Tanco who recommended the filing of information against Venus. Upon review, Special Prosecutor Ines found reasonable ground for filing of information against Venus. Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution recommending the filing of information against Venus. The information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Upon his surrender to the Sandiganbayan, it was found out that Venus was not given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the resolution recommending the filing of information. Sandiganbayan then granted him time to file a motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration was filed before the Office of Special Prosecutor. Said prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. Desierto disapproved the recommendation. Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan set Venus arraignment. Hence, this petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not arraignment may be restrained with injunction or writ of prohibition. HELD: YES. Generally, criminal prosecutions may no be restrained through injunction or prohibition as the determination of probable cause for the filing of information is within the discretion of ombudsman or prosecutor. However, in the case of Brocka vs. Enrile, the Supreme Court provided exceptions to the above-mentioned rule. Among those enumerated is when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. In the case at bar, the Deputy Ombudsman found no ground to believe that Venus violated RA 3019 but the Ombudsman and the other

P a g e | 34

Deputy Ombudsman disagreed. In the motion for reconsideration, the special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. In human relations, good faith is always presumed. He who charges bad faith has the burden of proving the same. In not finding facts constituting bad faith, it was an error for the ombudsman to pass on the duty of finding bad faith to Sandiganbayan. There was no bad faith in the actuations of Venus. The resolution issued by the SB was for him to negotiate with the Board of Liquidators for the sale of the lot. Venus did as he was mandated and returned with the denial of their offer. The municipality did not intend to participate in the bidding as shown by the absence of a resolution to that effect and the absence of the funds for the occasion. Venus faithfully performed his duty and this duty ended when he asked for postponement even if it was denied. Further, RA 3019 requires that bad faith must be EVIDENT. In finding no bad faith, logically there could be no evident bad faith. Hence, there was no prima facie case against Venus. In finding the manifest innocence of Venus, the Supreme Court ordered Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case. Villaflor vs. Vivar Facts: An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues: Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation? Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation be considered a ground to quash the informations?

Held: The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigation was for slight physical injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information was however amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the change in the information was only a formal amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still involves the same facts. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right. Washington Distillers, Inc. Vs Ca Facts: On the basis of a search warrant issued by the Judge of the RTC of Manila, 314, 289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles were seized by the NBI from the premises of petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga for alleged violation of RA 623, otherwise known as An act to regulate the use of duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, and other similar containers, as amended by RA 5700. Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground that the RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant to be executed in Pampanga, which was granted. A motion for reconsideration was issued my private respondents but was denied.

P a g e | 35

Thereafter, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and CA set aside the decision of RTC ruling that a search warrant may be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Manila Issue: Whether or not the search warrant issued against petitioners is valid. Held: No. The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a result of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution and the bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners in the absence of any civil action for their recovery. What is noticeable about this case is the that possession of the bottles was transferred to private respondents through the expediency of a search warrant, so that instead of merely being an ancillary writ issued either as an incident of criminal proceedings, the proceeding for search warrant have become, for all intents and purposes, the main proceedings by which private respondents have been able to obtain possession of what it claims to be its property. There was neither complaint by which the petitioners could have been informed of the charge against them nor answer by which they could have heard in the defense, before property claimed by them was taken from them and given to private respondents.