Guerrero v. St. Clares Realty Co., Ltd.

1 (1983) Facts: The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy the owners share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in 1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased. Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a Deed of Sale of Land dated 1948 purportedly executed by their aunt Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application of the registration of the land in his favor. Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a St. Clares Realty, a partnership constituted by them. According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero. During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified that the money used for the illness of her mother was obtained from Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20(a), Rule 130 (now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court allowed the witness to continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified from testifying in the case. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to another Branch. This was denied. Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial, and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court as a consequence of their non-appearance. Petitioners filed a Manifestation that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which they were preparing to file. Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by the CA. Issues: a) WON the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of the dead mans rule? (relevant) b) WON the exclusion of petitioners evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the CA? Held/Reason: a) NO. The dead mans rule is clearly inapplicable.
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First, Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who owned the disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property to Manuel. Second, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. b) NO. Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions. The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants evidence and without regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented.

Disposition: SET ASIDE. REMANDED. Goi v CA2 | Fernan, J. (1986) RATIO DECIDENDI The protection provided by the Dead Man Statute can be waived by deposing the plaintiff and cross-examining the plaintiff as to matters occurring during the deceaseds lifetime. It can also be waived by filing a counterclaim and the witness will take the stand in its dual capacity as both plaintiff and defendant. FACTS Pardexes T. Villanueva negotiated with Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACALERA) to purchase 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria. Having insufficient funds, Villanueva offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to Santiago Villegas (to be substituted by Joaquin Villegas). Allegedly, TABACALERA did not agree to this transaction without the guaranty of private respondent Gaspar Vicente. Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. Still due to the lack of funds, Villanueva contracted/promised to sell to Vicente fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce for P13,807. This amount was embodied in a written and signed document with petitioner (and predecessor-in-interest) Genaro Goi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. Vicente adviced TABACALERA to debit P13,807 from his account to pay for the balance of the purchase price. Goi alleges that Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling some property, he then went to Vicente to rescind the contract/promise to sell, but since the amount was already debited, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce would merely be leased to Vicente for 5 years starting with crop year 1950-51. TABACALERA finally executed the Deed of Sale with Villanueva. Fields no. 3, 4 and 13 were delivered were registered in the name of Villanueva and was mortgaged to Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Meanwhile, fields no. 4 and 13 were delivered to Vicente after the 1949-50 milling season.
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CELENI GUINTO

In 1951, Villanueva died, fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce were included in the inventory for the intestate proceedings. In 1954, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages against Goi as administrator of the intestate estate of Villanueva. He based his cause of action on the written contract/promise to sell. Goi filed an answer and counterclaim, claiming that the said contract was already novated and that the agreement as between Vicente and Villanueva was a lease. CFIRuled in favour of Vicente and ordered the reconveyance of the property and damages for the years that Vicente did not enjoy the crops of the land. CAAffirmed the CFI ISSUE/HELD [1] WoN Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in violation of the Dead Man Statute YES [2] Can Vicente claim from the contract of promise to sell? NO RATIO [1] Re: Vicentes Testimony The lower courts were right in ruling for the admissibility of Vicentes testimony. Under ordinary circumstances, it would have been disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, such disqualification as embodied in the Survivorship Disqualification Rule/Dead Man Statute. The object and purpose of the rule is to (1) guard against the temptation to give false testimony and (2) to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to give testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant. This protection extends to the heirs of the deceased, because they are mere representatives of the deceased and they would probably use the defence the deceased would have used had he been living. However, in this case, such protection was effectively WAIVED when counsel for Goi cross-examined Vicente. It must also be observed that Goi presented a counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente took the witness stand, it was in dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery and as defendant in the counterclaim. As defendant, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva. In addition, Goi signed the contract in his representative capacity. He would have known the circumstances that the contract has been entered into. [2] Re: Claim from the Contract Novation was clearly and convincingly proven by Goi and the surrounding circumstances of the case. It was first of all suspicious that Vicente did not demand protection for the lands right away. It was possible that the lease was not encoded due to the close relations of Villanueva and Vicente. DISPOSITIVE CA decision reversed, Villanuevas estate regains hold of the property. Enrique Razon v IAC (Gutierrez, 1992) 3 FACTS
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1962: Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. There were seven incorporators. According to Razon, some of these incorporators withdrew so he distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some frien\ds, among them the late Juan Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares of stock. On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan Chuidian and after him, the private respondent Vicente Chuidan, were elected as directors. The certificate of stock though, after being delivered to the corporate secretary, remained in the possession of Razon who refused to deliver them, until the same was surrendered by Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce. It appeared that the shares of stock were delivered by the late Juan Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock and because of an understanding that Razon was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof. However, as claimed by Razon, he gave Chuidan the option to buy them. RTC: Enrique Razon is the rightful owners of the said shares of stock. CA: Reversed. Juan Chuidian, the deceased father of Vicente Chuidian is the owner of the shares of stock. Razon: (1) The "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, Vicente, did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in him unless the deceased opted to pay the same. (2) His aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock. ISSUE/HELD (1) WON the dead mans statute rule is applicable NO. (2) WON Razon has proven his ownership over the shares of stock NO. (3) WON the appellate court erred in declaring Juan Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock without including all cash and stock dividends and all the preemptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock. YES. RATIO (1) Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) states: Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated. (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."

Grace Lazaro

The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of Razon to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that Vicente never objected to the testimony so he is deemed to have waived the rule. (2) In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was elected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the (1) corporation's by laws, if any, were followed or (2) in accordance with the provisions of law. The petitioner failed in both instances. The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the shares of stock were given to Juan Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the corporation. (3) The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership. Hence, they also belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian. US v. Antipolo4 (En Banc, 1918) Facts: Appellant was charged with the murder of Fortunato Dinal. The TC convicted him of homicide.
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During the trial the judge refused to permit Susana, the widow of Fortunato, to testify as witness on behalf of the defense concerning alleged certain dying declarations The said witness was called to the stand, and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato, was asked: On what occasion did your husband die? To this question, the fiscal objected on the ground that Susana is not competent to testify, unless it be with consent of her husband. As he is dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that the witness is disqualified from testifying in the case in which her husband is the injured party Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage Objection of the fiscal was sustained by the judge Concerning these facts, some of them would be both material and relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused, as they purported to relate to the dying declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his death, the general purport being that his injuries were due to fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused

Issue/ Held: WON Sec 585 of General Order no. 58 (1900) effectively prohibits the widow from testifying. NO Ratio: The reasons for this rule are: 1. A very serious injury would be done to the harmony and happiness of husband and wife and the confidence which should exist between them. 2. Secure domestic happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all confidential communications between husband and wife; and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the hallowed confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even though the other party be no longer living. This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation , and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. The widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations. There is no possible reason for excluding her. After the husband's death she is no longer his wife, and the rules of evidence, as between husbands and wives, are no longer applicable. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify against her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of the deceased

pauline

Except with the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both shall be parties.

made in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement. The wife may testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other fact known to her. It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant. Disp: Judgment of the court below is set aside; new trial is granted at which the testimony of the witness Susana will be admitted, together with any additional evidence which may be offered on the part of the prosecution or the defense. Krohn v. CA6 (Bellosillo, J.; June 14, 1994) RATIO DECIDENDI The privileged communication between physician-patient cannot be claimed against a person who is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. His testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. FACTS Edgar Krohn filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity against his wife, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn. In evidence, he presented a confidential psychiatric evaluation report on which he, himself testified, and not the physician who prepared the report. The subject of the report, Ma. Paz invoked the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient, and sought to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. Edgar and Ma. Paz were married in 1964 and were blessed with three children. Their marriage became stormy, and in 1971 Ma. Paz underwent a psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile and they finally separated in fact in 1973. On the strength of the confidential psychiatric evaluation report, Edgar was able to nullify their church marriage. The RTC likewise ordered the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Despite the objections of Ma. Paz, the RTC admitted the evidence because when the report was referred to in the complaint, Ma. Paz did not object on the ground of supposed privileged communication but that the said report was irrelevant and unfounded. The RTC likewise ordered the striking off the record of her Statement for the Record that there is no factual or legal basis for Edgar to claim psychological incapacity to annul their marriage, such ground, being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of Ma. Paz.

Ma. Pazs Contention: Sec. 24 par. (c) Rule 130, ROC prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, with more reason should a third person be prohibited from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient. Edgars Contention: (1). The legal prohibition to testify applies only to a physician, and not where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband. (2). The privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto. When Ma. Paz gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to and was considered by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in declaring their church marriage null and void. - When she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer which merely described the evaluation report as either unfounded or irrelevant. Failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver. REASON for Privileged Communication : To inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. It creates a constitutionally-protected zone of privacy which consequently prevents the physician from making public information that will result in the humiliation, embarrassment or disgrace to the patient. The requisites in order that the privileged communication between physician-patient may be successfully invoked,: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity;; and (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient. The person against whom the privileged communication between physician-patient is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the patients husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. His testimony does not fall within the claimed prohibition neither circumvent it because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. For failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and consequently the evidence offered may be admitted. DISPOSITIVE CA Affirmed. REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN 7 | Kapunan, J. (1996) FACTS

ISSUE/HELD W/N the privileged communication between physician-patient can be claimed against a husband testifying on a confidential psychiatric evaluation report? NO, the report is admissible in evidence. RATIO

Micha Arias

Krystel Bautista.

This case is an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Among the defendants named in the case are petitioners and private respondent Roco, who all were then partners of the ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in case against Cojuanco, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the corporations involved in sequestration proceedings PCGG filed a "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded Roco as party-defendant. Respondent PCGG based its exclusion on Rocos undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. The ACCRA lawyers were included in the third amended complaint, stating that they schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of the coconut levy funded corporations. ACCRAs answer: the participation in the acts was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering. Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG (i.e. full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings). Petitioners contend: they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship. PCGG contends: the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor is the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status ISSUE/HELD WoN the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. RATIO It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. In the constitutional sphere, the attorney client privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and

legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged. Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. The instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings. From these conditions, particularly the third, it can be readily deduced that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings. There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. . There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege. In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship. If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN (Honrada; Paredes; Sansaet) REGALADO; 1997
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iani

FACTS: Mansueta Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First MCTC, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Ceferino Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and is at present a Congressman. Generoso Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved herein. in 1976, Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot of Rosario Public Land Subd Survey. This was approved and an OCT was issued in his favor. in 1985, Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the subdivision survey. The TC nullified the patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan, an information for perjury was filed against Paredes in the MCTC. Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. Paredes was represented by Sansaet. Paredes was then haled before the Tanodbayan for PI on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Sec 3(a) of RA 3019. Sansaet was again Paredes' counsel.. On Aug 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution recommending the criminal prosecution of Paredes. Sansaet, as counsel, moved for reconsideration, saying: . . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein . . . A criminal case was subsequently filed with Sandiganbayan, charging Paredes with violation of Sec 3 (a) of RA 3019. However, a motion to quash was later granted and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription. On Jan 23, 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that Honrada, in conspiracy with Paredes and Sansaet, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed to Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy. Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach arraignment since action was suspended pending the review of the case by the DOJ. Respondents filed their counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the submissions he had made. In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear

that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned. For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in the house of Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, Sansaet claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness. in a resolution dated Feb 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against Honrada, Paredes and Sansaet. The proposal for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position: . . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial. The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of the respondents. Thus, three criminal cases were filed in the graft court. These were consolidated for joint trial in the Sandiganbayan. a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites, as provided in Sec 9, Rule 119 ROC, were satisfied insofar as Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by Honrada and Paredes. Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination: From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged. ISSUES: 1. WON the projected testimony of Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege 2. WON, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis HELD: 1. NO. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. a. It may be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the criminal case for falsification, and this may be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel. The fact that Sansaet was called by Paredes and Honrada to witness the preparation of the falsified documents was as eloquent a communication, if not more than, as verbal statements by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or qualification.

In the American jurisdiction, there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is that the documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence. b. It is postulated that a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that it is here dealing with a past crime, and that Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future . In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorneyclient privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorneyclient privilege. c. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It

is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice." It was error for Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law. 2. YES Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy. One of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not appear to be the most guilty" and not that he must be the least guilty as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness. The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the RPC is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all. This is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy. b. The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan. Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in the criminal cases, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution, hence there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet. He has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications. His testimony can also be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses. Moreover, it does not appear that Sansaet has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Disposition Writ of certiorari is granted LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS9 Sept. 25, 1992, J. Davide Jr.
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Facts: Petitioner Nelly Lim and private respondent Juan Sim are lawfully married to each other. Respondent filed with the RTC of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of marnage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present." During trial, respondent presented Dr. Lydia Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, specializing in Psychiatry. Respondents counsel orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Petitioners counsel opposed because the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. TC: still granted the subpoena Petitioner's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash: Respondent: Dr. Acampado will be presented as an expert witness and will not testify on any information acquired in a professional capacity while attending to respondent Petitioner: testimony barred under physician-patient relationship TC: denied the motion and allowed witness to testify but advised counsel for respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony is covered by privileged communication On the witness stand, Dr. Acampado was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviors of a person; she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but never revealed what illness she examined and treated her; nor the result of her examination of Nelly Lim; nor the medicines she prescribed. CA: denied petitioners appeal and ruled that confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It should be based on the circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. *Brief History: The law in point is Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence: "SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.-The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." This section is a reproduction of Section 21(c), Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with two modifications: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character. The 1964 version in is a reproduction of Section 26(f), Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to "would blacken." With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on July 1989, the rule was relaxed by the substitution of the word character with the word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts. Character' is what a man is, and 'reputation'

jill

is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. 'Character' depends on attributes possessed, and 'reputation' on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present. Issue/Ratio: (1) WON Dr. Acampados testimony is under privileged communication? NO. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may be enabled to efficaciously his patient. It rests in public policy. However, the privilege may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician's testimony. In order that it may be invoked, these requisites must concur: 1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; 5. The information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient. The requisites should conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications: 1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentially must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. Meanwhile, the physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him to "safely and efficaciously treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated. One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. As in this case, petitioner failed to discharge this burden: FIRST, witness did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination of the petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information the witness obtained while attending to the patient. He based his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship.

SECOND, there is no showing that the testimony was influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. THIRD, there is authority that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. Here, witness explained that he interviewed not only petitioner Nelly, but also her husband, and father (who also is fellow physician). FOURTH, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken petitioners "character" (or "reputation"). FIFTH, petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel objected to any questions asked during the trial despite the trial court's advise that said counsel may interpose his objection. The failure to seasonable object amounts to waiver. Held: Petition DENIED. Neri v Senate (Leonardo-de Castro J, 2008)10 Plaintiff: Romulo Neri Respondents: Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent Committees") RATIO DECIDENDI the SC considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. FACTS: On September 26, 2007, Rmulo Neri appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Neri disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("PGMA") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The letter invoked Senate v Ermita, and asserts that maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her
10

Ixara Maroto

executive and policy decision making process. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations. It further averred that the context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Lastly, the letter claimed that Malacanang had advised Neri not to answer questions connecting PGMA to the ZTE scandal. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, Neri manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. Meanwhile, Neri filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court assailing the show cause letter dated November 22, 2007. Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory, and declared Neri in contempt of respondent Committees. They issued a resolution ordering Neris arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. On the same date, Neri moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He insisted that he had not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008. Neris petition for certiorari rests on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. ISSUE: First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? -- YES And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order? YES HELD: 1)

were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. BREAKDOWN: While the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad, it still has limitations. The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. SC cited three US cases (Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch,) explaining the nature of executive privilege, and distilled the following elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and nondelegable presidential power." 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. The SC held that based on the three elements, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. A claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution (United States v. Nixon). However, in this case, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the

IN GIST: Anent the first ground, the SC considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they

legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events. Under the circumstances of this case, there is no legislative need to answer the questions regarding PGMAs connection in the ZTE scandal. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern However, the right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III of the Constituion11 is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, Article 229 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind. Congress cannot thus equate its right to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information. 2) As to the second ground, the SC found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately Banco Filipino vs Monetary Board et al (1986)12 Facts: RTC Makati granted Banco Filipinos (BF) motion, based on Rule 27.1, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records 13 which are claimed as
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needed by the Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator's report and Receiver's Report. Monetary Board (MB) and Central Bank (CB) seek in the present petition to the SC for the reversal of such order contending that: 1. TC erred in considering the materials records of administrative proceedings which is being challenged by BF; 2. the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act; and 3. the MB deliberations were necessarily held subsequent to the submission of the CB reports. They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any question of fact that may be raised in relation to their contents. Issue: WON the challenged order for the production of documents should be reversed? Held: NO. The documents are not privileged and that these constitute evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court. Ratio: The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, ROC. It has been held that a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books, documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense. The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character could not be received in evidence. In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of action. Likewise, any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice. WRT Items Nos. 3 to 9 , these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, (SES) Reports, a copy of which was already furnished to BF. It cannot adequately study and properly analyze the report without the corresponding annexes they are pertinent, relevant, useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment, objections and exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports. Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr.Estanislao, to MB and to CB Governor (Item 2), these appear relevant as petitioner has asserted that the abovenamed Conservator had in fact wanted to resume normal operations of BF but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever the result may be, BF should be allowed to photocopy the same. As to the tapes and transcripts of MB deliberations on the closure of BF and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), the SC did not follow MB and CBs argument that under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act that the subject matter (of the deliberations), when resolved shall be made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law . 12 eva 13 (1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985; (2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez; (3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF; (4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1985; (5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report; (6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela; (7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report; (8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985; (9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.

subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. The privilege under Rule 130.2114 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable. In the case at bar, the MB and CB have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by BF. On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. People V. Capulong15 | Guttierez, Jr., J. (1988) RATIO DECIDENDI The trial court's findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses. FACTS A special mission of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit composed of Sgt. Lino Jarilla, Sgt. Adjare Jasani and Patrolman Reynaldo Resurreccion proceeded to Laguna to conduct a "buy bust" operation. Their specific assignment was to locate Danilo Capulong, an alleged number one pusher in the sale of marijuana in Santa Cruz, Laguna. The team arrived at Santa Cruz with Larry Estacio, an informant. The informant was given instructions to contact the accused after which the team positioned themselves at strategic places. Estacio then approached Capulong pretending to buy marijuana leaves for himself. o Capulong agreed to sell six (6) plastic bags of dried marijuana for the price of P 50.00 winch was paid by Estacio. o The transaction was witnessed by the team so that immediately after Capulong received the marked money (P 50.00) from Estacio, the former arrested Capulong. Found in the possession of Capulong was the marked money, a fifty peso bill with serial No. JF 247521, while one stick of marijuana was found in the possession of Paynaganan. Capulong was brought to the headquarters at Calamba, Laguna where he was investigated. o Thereafter, he executed an extra-judicial confession admitting his guilt. After a laboratory examination at the PC Laboratory, the bags containing dried leaves were found positive for marijuana.

[2] WoN the witnesses are credible - YES RATIO [1] The extra-judicial confession is inadmissible The extrajudicial confession of Capulong was made without the assistance of counsel. Even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, since it was made without assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

[2] The witnesses are credible. The trial court's findings are accorded the highest degree of respect , it being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses. In the instant case, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt. o He was caught in flagrante delicto by the CANU officers who were then on a mission to conduct a "buy bust" operation for the purpose of apprehending marijuana pushers in Santissima, Santa Cruz, Laguna. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were accepted by the trial court as credible. o Going over the details of said testimonies, we see no reason not to follow the conclusions of the trial court.

ISSUE/HELD [1] WoN the extrajudicial confession of Capulong is admissible in the light of the force, duress and intimidation which allegedly attended the execution thereof - NO
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Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure. 15 PAT HERNANDEZ

US v. Ching Po16 FACTS - Defendant in "The City of Manila vs. Ching Po, et al." was tried and convicted with visiting and being in a house where opium was kept and used upon the person," in violation of Ordinance No. 152 of the said city of Manila - Upon appeal, the defendant testified that a certain amount of opium (18 grams) and an opium pipe found by the police at No. 26 Calle Chica, Manila, where said defendant lived, belonged to him and was in his possession and under his control - Ching Po was acquitted in that case but immediately after, this complaint was filed and the defendant rearrested and charged "with having in his possession and under his control the same opium and pipe" referred to and testified to by him in the former trial - During arraignment, a plea of former jeopardy was presented by the defendant and overruled and due exception taken - After, the prosecution was permitted by the TC, in spite of the objection of defendant, to introduce in evidence his testimony during his trial in the former cause that he was the owner and in possession of said opium and pipe - Defendant was found guilty of possessing opium
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- Defendant appealed and alleged that: > the TC erred in not sustaining the defendant's plea of former jeopardy. > the TC erred in receiving as evidence against the defendant the testimony given by him upon his trial in "The City of Manila vs. Ching Po, et al.," over the objection of the defendant. ISSUES: 1. WoN the TC erred in not sustaining the defendant's plea of former jeopardy? NO 2. WoN the TC erred in receiving as evidence against the defendant the testimony given by him upon his trial in "The City of Manila vs. Ching Po, et al.," over the objection of the defendant? RATIO 1. The crime of which the defendant was acquitted in the former case was a criminal action for the punishment of those who "visited houses where opium was kept and used upon the person" in violation of a City Ordinance whereas, in the present case, the defendant was accused of the crime of "being the owner and having in his possession and under his control 18 grams of opium in violation of the Opium Law." Thus, the crime of which the defendant was accused and acquitted in the former case was a different and distinct offense from that with which he is charged in the present case. A conviction or acquittal upon one complaint is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another complaint, unless the evidence required to support the conviction upon one of such complaints would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test as to former jeopardy is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether the defendant has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. Being, therefore, a distinct and different offense, his plea of former jeopardy cannot prosper. 2. It appears that the attorney for the defendant in both cases advised the defendant, prior to the trial of the former case that he should testify that he was the lessee of the house No. 26 Calle Chica, and that he lived there, and that the opium found belonged to him and was in his possession and custody; that such evidence should free him from the charge against him. Thus, the express admission of the defendant in the former case was given in open court, that he was the owner of the opium with which he is charged of having in his possession in the present case. The fact that this admission was made by the defendant was clearly proved during the trial of the present case by witnesses who heard it. With reference to the admissibility of the admissions and declarations of a defendant charged with a crime, the rule seems to be that the declarations made by a defendant or by a third party, by his authority, if relevant, are admissible against him. The rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A man's acts, conduct, and declarations, whereever made, provided they be voluntary, a readmissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. A voluntary, unsworn statement of a person charged with a crime, may be proved against him as a confession. If his voluntary extrajudicial admissions are admissible against him, there seems to be no good reason why his admissions made in open court, underoath, should not be accepted against him.

Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Hashim and Gorayeb 17 FACTS: 1st COA: Hashim on September 21, 1916, executed a chattel mortgage in favor Ysmael for P13,160.87. The mortgage was set to fall due exactly a year later. Hashim failed to pay so the chattel mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgage property was sold by the sheriff. The proceeds was only P2,100 only, thus leaving a balance of P11,060.87. 2nd COA: Ysmael alleges that Hashim was indebted in the sum of P14,646.47 to the Hashim Commercial & Trading Company, Ltd. The limited partnership assigned the amount due it on saidindebtedness to Ysmael. Now, Ysmael is demanding payment fro Hashim and Gorayeb. The properties of Hashim and Gorayed were subsequently attached. Hashim admits all of the allegations of the complaint and consents to the rendition of the judgment in conformity therewith. Gorayeb (the wife of Hashim) however denied the allegations as to the indebtedness and set up a a special defense that the action is the result of a conspiracy between Hashim and his relations, the stockholders is Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc., to defraud her of the alimony granted her in civil case No. 19115 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The RTC refused to received the testimony of Hashim and a certain person named Hemady in an earlier case (in the case, it wasnt mention what exactly this was except they called it No. 19569). RTC: judgment in favor of plaintiff for the first COA but the 2nd COA was dismissed for failure to show legal assignment. Ysmael and Gorayeb appealed. ISSUE: (for admission against interest) WON there was error in RTC refusing to receive the testimony of Hashim and Hemady from case no. 19569. NO Ratio: In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and Hashim in case no. 19569, Gorayeb did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to the action or their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the laying of a foundation and without the witnesses having testified in the case at bar. But the purpose of the offer of the testimony was evidently to impeach the testimony of the same witnesses in the present case and if so, a foundation should have been laid by calling the attention of the witnesses to the former statements so as to give them opportunity to explain before the statements were offered in evidence. Note: the 2nd COA was properly dismissed because the resolution re: assignment specifically stated that the assignment must be made, and it was not shown that said assignment authorized by the resolution was ever made. Also, a subsequent resolution was adopted which practically revoked the 1st resolution. The only assignment actually effected was that to the Asia Banking Corp. Judgment affirmed with modification (reduction of recoverable sum). People vs. Lorenzo18 (1995, Davide) Facts:
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Accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, At the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain Isabelo Liban and SPO1 Jose Eclipse as its witnesses. The versions of the facts are as follows:

Prosecution In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the Tuguegarao PNP Station was in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. At about a little past 10:00 o'clock that evening, a tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse and reported to him a stabbing incident in Barangay 12. He rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him, 'I killed my husband'. The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store of Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body. Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out of his house. In the presence and within the hearing of said barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, 'I'm surrendering because I killed my husband'. Policeman Eclipse turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer in the PNP Station. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the Police Blotter. Defense: It was not Lorenzo but a certain Robert Santos who killed Agapito. In the afternoon of July 30, 1990, Agapito Lorenzo and his neighbor Robert Santos were in the former's house passing the time over a bottle of beer grande. After going home, Policewoman Lorenzo went to market and then immediately went back home to cook what she bought. While cooking in the kitchen, she heard a heated exchange of words between Robert Santos and her husband in the sala of their house pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade which the latter gave Robert Santos. Policewoman Lorenzo went to the sala to pacify the quarelling men only to meet Robert Santos running out of the house with a bolo and being chased by Agapito Lorenzo who was holding a knife in his hand and whose clothes were splattered with blood. Struggle for the possession of the bolo ensued. While wrestling, Agapito dropped his knife. Policewoman Lorenzo picked it up and tried to stab Robert with it but she was so overwhelmed by nervousness that she collapsed into unconsciousness. Seconds later on, she regained consciousness and found herself beside her dying husband. Policewoman Lorenzo stood and picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise time when Policeman Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident. Policewoman Lorenzo gave the knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse. The Policeman invited her to go with him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station. She obliged. When the two arrived at the police station, Policeman Eclipse, in the presence of Policewoman Lorenzo, reported to the Desk Officer that the latter killed her husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she did not say anything. The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found the accused guilty. It further declared that when the appellant surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession

and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. The trial court rejected the story of the defense and characterized it as "palpably a put-up scenario . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common sense." Circumstances relied upon by TC: confession, withholding of the identity of husbands killer, accused did not file a counter affidavit to explain her innocence, implausible story, version of accused at variance with defense witness

Assignments of error by the accused: Testimonies of Liban and Eclipse are inconsistent on material points She was in detention all throughout and suffering from trauma so she was not able to point to Robert, file an counter-affidavit, etc. Issues: 1. Credibility of witnesses 2. RELEVANT: Whether the witness statement before SPO1 Eclipse is an admission or a confession. Reasoning: 1. It is a well-entrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The appellant has not convinced us that the trial court plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may affect the result of this case. We thus accept its assessment of the evidence as correct and consider it binding, there being no showing that it was reached arbitrarily. a. There is nothing in the records, and more specifically in the cross-examination of Eclipse and the direct examination of the appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that Eclipse had any improper motive to implicate a fellow police officer in the commission of a serious crime or the slightest bias against the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and truthfulness. If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a peace officer. b. Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo Liban's testimony must corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the confession of the appellant since without such corroboration Eclipse's testimony would have no probative value. Note that what must be corroborated under the Rules of Court is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti - the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. Two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act 2. RELEVANT PORTION The Court does not agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. There is a distinction between an admission and a confession.

Defined by the Rules

ADMISSION The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact Usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged Statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt Something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt If the facts acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts

Case

CONFESSION The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein Acknowledgment of guilt

Wharton

An acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged

1. A tricycle driver reported to Eclipse a stabbing incident and the latter immediately proceeded to where it took place; 2. Eclipse met the appellant who had with her a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife; 3. The appellant surrendered to Eclipse the blood-stained bolo and the fan knife; 4. The appellant's husband lay dead nearby; 5. Eclipse accompanied the appellant to the police station and, in her presence, the former reported to the desk officer that she surrendered to him and told him that she had killed her husband; the desk officer then entered this report in the police blotter; 6. Although the appellant heard the report, she did not protest to Eclipse or except to the report; and 7. The appellant never asked the police authorities to investigate Robert Santos for his complicity in the killing of her husband; she implicated Santos only after the lapse of nearly two and one-half years after the incident. Decision affirmed

CMS Logging, Inc. vs. CA19 (Nocon, 1992) Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the CA FACTS: Petitioner CMS is a forest concessionaire engaged in the logging business, while private respondent DRACOR is engaged in the business of exporting and selling logs and lumber. CMS and DRACOR entered into a contract of agency whereby the former appointed the latter as its exclusive export and sales agent for all logs that the former may produce, for a period of five (5) years. By virtue of the aforesaid agreement, CMS was able to sell through DRACOR a total of 77,264,672 board feet of logs in Japan. While on a trip to Tokyo, Japan, CMS's president, Atty. Carlos Moran Sison, and general manager and legal counsel, Atty. Teodoro R. Dominguez, discovered that DRACOR had used Shinko Trading Co., Ltd. as agent, representative or liaison officer in selling CMS's logs in Japan for which Shinko earned a commission of U.S. $1.00 per 1,000 board feet from the buyer of the logs. Under this arrangement, Shinko was able to collect a total of U.S. $77,264.67. CMS claimed that this commission paid to Shinko was in violation of the agreement and that it is entitled to this amount as part of the proceeds of the sale of the logs. CMS contended that since DRACOR had been paid the 5% commission under the agreement, it is no longer entitled to the additional commission paid to Shinko as this tantamount to DRACOR receiving double compensation for the services it rendered.

Underhill

Acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which constitute the crime An acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it

Whigmore

Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband. (Court reiterates the circumstances which the TC found against the accused) Even granting for the sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife but did not admit that she killed her husband, we find in this case several circumstances whose concordant combination and cumulative effect point to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty party. These circumstances which lead to an unbroken chain of events are the following:

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After this discovery, CMS sold and shipped logs directly to several firms in Japan without the aid or intervention of DRACOR. TC: the trial court ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Shinko received the commission of U.S. though the trial court stated that "Shinko was able to collect the total amount of $77,264.67 US Dollars (Exhs. M and M-1)." CA: The Court of Appeals, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint since "the trial court could not have made a categorical finding that Shinko collected commissions from the buyers of Sison's logs in Japan, and could not have held that Sison is entitled to recover from Dracor the amount collected by Shinko as commissions, and that plaintiff was not able to prove its allegations. ISSUES: (1) that the testimony of Atty. Teodoro R. Dominguez, regarding the admission by Shinko's president and director that it collected a commission of U.S. $1.00 per 1,000 board feet of logs from the Japanese buyers, is admissible against DRACOR; (2) that the statement of DRACOR's chief legal counsel in his memorandum dated May 31, 1965, Exhibit "K", is an admission that Shinko was able to collect the commission in question; (3) that the fact that Shinko received the questioned commissions is deemed admitted by DRACOR by its silence under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court when it failed to reply to Atty. Carlos Moran Sison's letter dated February 6, 1962; (5) that DRACOR is not entitled to its 5% commission arising from the direct sales made by CMS to buyers in Japan; RATIO: The evidence adduced establishes the fact that Shinko is DRACOR's agent or liaison in Japan, but there is no evidence which established the fact that Shinko did receive the amount of U.S. $77,264.67 as commission arising from the sale of CMS's logs to various Japanese firms. The fact that Shinko received the commissions in question was not established by the testimony of Atty. Teodoro R. Dominguez to the effect that Shinko's president and director told him that Shinko received a commission of U.S. $1.00 for every 1,000 board feet of logs sold, since the same is hearsay. Similarly, the letter of Mr. K. Shibata of Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. is also hearsay since Mr. Shibata was not presented to testify on his letter. CMS's other evidence have little or no probative value at all. The statements made in the memorandum of Atty. Simplicio R. Ciocon to DRACOR dated May 31, 1965, 15 the letter dated February 2, 1963 of Daniel R. Aguinaldo, 16 president of DRACOR, and the reply-letter dated January 9, 1964 17 by DRACOR's counsel Atty. V. E. Del Rosario to CMS's demand letter dated September 25, 1963 can not be categorized as admissions that Shinko did receive the commissions in question. The alleged admission made by Atty. Ciocon can not be considered as such since the statement was made in the context of questioning CMS's tally of logs delivered to various Japanese firms.

Similarly, the statement of Daniel R. Aguinaldo, and Atty. Del Rosario can not be considered admissions that Shinko received the questioned commissions since neither statements declared categorically that Shinko did in fact receive the commissions and that these arose from the sale of CMS's logs. It is a rule that "a statement is not competent as an admission where it does not, under a reasonable construction, appear to admit or acknowledge the fact which is sought to be proved by it". An admission or declaration to be competent must have been expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language. The finding of fact made by the trial court, i.e., that "Shinko was able to collect the total amount of $77,264.67 US Dollars," can not be given weight since this was based on the summary prepared by CMS itself. Moreover, even if it was shown that Shinko did in fact receive the commissions in question, CMS is not entitled thereto since these were apparently paid by the buyers to Shinko for arranging the sale. This is therefore not part of the gross sales of CMS's logs.

People v. Molleda20 (1978) Facts: The four accused in this case, namelyMolleda, Baluyot, Nicolas, and Duavewere charged with the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation for the killing of Alfredo Bocaling . The evidence of the prosecution was based on the testimony of Ching, an eye and ear witness to the killing and the three extra-judicial confessions of Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas. The victim and Ching were invited by Duave alias Baby China and another woman to join them. As the women were known to the victim and Ching as hostesses, they agreed because the destination was the house of a friend of theirs somewhere in Manila. On their place of destination, the two men joined others drinking. During this time, Duave allegedly contacted the three other accused, all members of the SigueSigue Sputnik Gang, and informed the latter that she had been robbed and raped and that the perpetrators were with her. The three accused were introduced to the victim and Ching and the drinking resumed. When Ching and Bocaling were on their way home, Nicolas and Baluyot accompanied them. Nicolas placed his hand on the shoulder of Bocaling, while Baluyot placed his on the shoulder Ching. Suddenly, both Ching and the victim were boxed by Baluyot and Nicolas on the nape. Ching testified that he shouted to Bocaling, Takbo na tayo, Freddie. As they were running, the victim fell and only Ching was able to make good his escape. When Ching turned his head, he allegedly saw several persons ganging up on the victim, hitting the latter with bottles and pieces of wood. When he returned to the place together with others, Bocaling was gone. On the next day, they learned that the victim had died. Based on the post-mortem findings, the victim died as a result of the mauling. Molleda, Baluyot, and Nicolas made their respective accounts while on the custody of the police, and they later confirmed these in the presence of the inquest officer. The accounts were unanimous in naming the participation of Molleda, Baluyot, Nicolas and Duave. Their accounts stated that they met Duave and Melinda and that Duave told them that she was raped and robbed by men who were currently in the house of a friend. They were also able to give an account of the blows given by them
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that ultimately caused the demise of the victim. In the process, Duave was allegedly inciting the other three to continue mauling until her money was returned. The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness testimony of Ching and the extrajudicial statements to establish the conspiracy to kill Bocaling. It held that the positive and spontaneous testimony of Ching was corroborated by the extra judicial confession of the accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas. The imputations in the extra-judicial confessions against Duave were admitted by the trial court as these were corroborated by Chings testimony. Meanwhile, the trial court did not believe the alibis of the accused and their allegation that their statements were extracted from them through maltreatment, force and intimidation. As to the nature of the crime, the trial court held the four accused guilty of murder qualified by taking advantage of superior strength, with the aggravating circumstance of deceit. Therefore, the four accused were sentenced with the penalty of death.

confessions. There is no such corroboration. The confessions merely stated that Duave incited them to continue the mauling. Barredo is not convinced that such evidence could legally constitute the proof beyond reasonable doubt enjoined by law and jurisprudence.

Issue (relevant)21: WON the extra-judicial confessions of accused Molleda, Nicolas, and Baluyot were admissible against accused-appelant Duave? Held/Reason: While the general rule is ...that an extra-judicial confession is admissible against the maker; it is incompetent evidence against his co-accused, with respect to whom it is hearsay. This general is not without its exceptions. It is now settled that extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion which are identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other evidence on record are admissible, as circumstantial evidence, against the person implicated to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. In addition, the records show that accused-appellant Duave alias Baby China was present personally when their statements were taken from each of the affiants Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas. In each instance, the affiants pointed to Duave alias Baby China as a participant in the killing of the victim. Her inaction amounted to acquiescence to these statements. The same are, therefore admissible in evidence even as against her. Disposition: Affirmed. However, only 8 Justices voted to affirm the the judgment of conviction with respect to defendants Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas, and only 7 with respect to defendant Duave. It results, therefore, that with respect to the three male defendants, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is to be imposed. As regards defendant Duave, the judgment of conviction should be reversed and she should be acquitted. Dissent (Barredo, J.): The strict rule is that any aggravating circumstance which under the RPC could be a qualifying circumstance of murder may not be so considered even if substantiated by the evidence adduced at the trial unless the same is specifically charged as such in the information, and the killing concerned becomes plain homicide albeit attended by the aggravating circumstance so proven. As a rule, the same are admissible only against each of them respectively. The said exhibits can serve for no other purpose, such as to prove the craft found by the trial court and the guilty participation of Duave in the actual killing of the deceased. They are not spontaneous and identical as the rule on interlocking confession requires. Barredo states at least 8 discrepancies in the supposed interlocking confessions. To hold appellant Duave liable in this case, the tenuous imputation made against her by Ching as having hit the deceased with a belt must appear corroborated by the
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People v Ayson22 | NARVASA, J. (1989) RATIO DECIDENDI The Constitutional Rules on Custodial Investigation and Right Against SelfIncrimination DOES NOT APPLY in administrative proceedings conducted by an employer against an employee. FACTS Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of Philippine Airlines (PAL). He was involved in irregularities in the sale of plane tickets and the PAL management was holding him liable for ~P76,000. Management notified him of the investigation in accordance to the CBA signed by the union. Two documents came out of this investigation: o A handwritten note from Ramos stating that he is willing to settle the irregularities and his willingness to be held liable for the said amount. o A transcript of his answers in response to the questions of the Branch Manager, wherein he revealed that: He did not disclose of the ticket sales He misused the proceeds He was prevented to engage in a settlement because of shame His willingness to settle Ramos was assisted by a Shop Stewardess during the investigation. There was no actual settlement on record, so it is unclear whether a compromise agreement was reached, moreover, consummated. 2 months later, an information was filed against Ramos for estafa Private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence of the handwritten note and the transcript that contained his answers in response to the investigation conducted by PALs management on Ramos. Defendants counselors objected the evidence because the confession was taken without the accused being represented by the lawyer. TCJudge Ayson agreed with the defence and that the admission of the evidence was against the constitutional rights of Ramos to remain silent and have counsel. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, Judge justified his decision by saying that while there can be waivers of the rights to custodial investigation, such waiver must be expressed and with
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third assignment of error out of ten

CELENI GUINTO

assistance of counsel, which was not the case. Also, the fact that Ramos was not detained NOR the investigation being administrative in character does not remove it from the ambit of the constitutional protection. Hence, this action for review on certiorari as brought by PAL. ISSUE/HELD WoN the handwritten note and the transcript are inadmissible in evidence for being against constitutional guarantees against self incrimination and the rights of an accused during custodial investigation .NO, the evidence is admissible RATIO The short of the decision is that these rights do not apply at the point they were objected to during trial. The rights invoked by the defense were only applicable at certain time periods. And such rights, as embodied in the Constitution and the Rules of Court are as follows: 1. BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT/ during Preliminary Investigation/ after accused having been taken into custody (Application of Rights during Custodial Investigation) o Right to remain silent o Right to counsel o Right to be informed of the charges o Right not to be subject to force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will o Exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the abovementioned rights. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (Application of Self-Incrimination Clause) a. To refuse to be a witness; b. Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c. To testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution d. WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that which he is prosecuted

involuntary or coerced statements that in justice cannot be received against the makers thereof. DISPOSITIVE Annulment of Judge Aysons order of inadmissibility. Evidence is admissible.

2.

Ramos was NOT in any sense under custodial investigation when his lawyers invoked the exception. Custodial investigation commences when the accused is in the custody of the police, and ends when an information is filed. The lawyers are objecting to an administrative investigation conducted by PAL, which is not the custodial investigation contemplated by the law. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation therefore does not come into play. Nor can right against self-incrimination be invoked. This refers to the rights of an accused in relation to how taking the witness stand or refusing to answer incriminating questions will affect his standing in a case. Since trial has not commenced, this rule doesnt apply. Judge Ayson makes an interesting precautionary argument about how employers could take advantage of the non-application of these rules in administrative proceedings. However, the Supreme Court reminded the judge that there is already due process laid by the Labor Code (they didnt say it like that, but that was what they were implying) for administrative proceeding involving disciplining employees. Even assuming these fears become realized, the evidence will not be accorded any evidentiary value since they were