THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE ECHAVES, JR. G.R. No.

L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 FACTS: On Oct.25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons on the ground of squatting as penalized by PD No.772, section 1, which provides that any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advant age of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five hundred pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. It was alleged that the accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna. Informations of the five accused were raffled to Judge Vicente Echaves, Jr. Judge Echaves motu proprio dismissed the five informations on the following grounds: 1) That it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,an d; 2) That under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. As a result of such order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of stealth and strategy the expression wit h threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the fiscal. The fiscal appealed to the Court under R.A.No.5440 but the appeal was considered devoid of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. RULING: No. The decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The preamble of the decree is quoted below: WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work and Communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class; WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice. It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain. Thus, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the trial courts order of dismissal.

TAADA VS. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) FACTS: The petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders, invoking that the people has the right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution as well as the principle that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable, these must be published in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents, contends that the petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. Thus, Solicitor General moved to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable, publication in the Official Gazette is required. RULING: Yes. The clear object of the provision in Article 2 of the Civil Code that even the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity, the general public should be given adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens by having these published in the Official Gazette. There would be no basis for the application of the latin maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat in the absence of such notice and publication. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word shall imposes an imperative duty which must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. This is the requirement of due process. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." The Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General, claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. ISSUE: Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative. RULING: NO. ART. 2. Provides that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law be effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole. Therefore, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution, administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. The Court pronounced that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.It was held that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

PRIMICIAS vs. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979 FACTS: Juan Augusta B. Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, herein, was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop and told him that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, and more particularly, for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license and issued a temporary operator's permit to him. A criminal complaint was filed against Primicias in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964. As a result of such complaint, the plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. The Court of First Instance rendered the decision, holding that the ordinance was null and void and that it had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. ISSUES: 1)Whether or not the Municipal ordinance No.3, Series of 1964, is null and void. 2) Whether or not a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140. RULING: 1)YES. The Municipality of Urdaneta (appellants) fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law, appellants are in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law." Pursuant to Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992. The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance. An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "it must not contravene . . . the statute," for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136. There is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. The Court also agrees with the court a quo that when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1, Ordinance), it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic" defined. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct. 2)YES. The general rule is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction." allowed in the following instances: 1. for the orderly administration of justice; 2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; 3. to avoid multiplicity of actions; 4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; 18 5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.
17

Exceptions however are

However, the local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception just cited obtains in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction against defendants. Moreover, considering that our law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that of the United States, it would not be amiss for the Court to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a void ordinance, "injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it." The appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-41631 (December 17, 1976) FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974. The respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the following reasons: (a) that the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) that the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) that Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) that the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge issued an order, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code. Respondent Judge rendered its decision, declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, stressing that: (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax. Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court. Respondent Judge denied the motion, hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval? RULING: Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides: Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. * * * Each approved ordinance * * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance. Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs: Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for dissemination. While the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment of the ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.

In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. Therefore, the Local Tax Code controls. As always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. There is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one. A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. The dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code on the point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets. Potestas delegata non delegare potest. The decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted.

CITY OF MANILA vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and CA G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968. FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico,(the respondent herein) who was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the East, was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. His head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. Mr. Teotico was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days and lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catch basin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila and that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catch basin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catch basin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catch basin covers was rampant. The Court of First Instance of Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, the City of Manila appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is governed by Section 4 of R.A. No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila). RULING: No. The Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) provides that: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. Whereas, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. The said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. The decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila.

JUAN SUMULONG vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-48609 October 10, 1941 FACTS: Acting under the authority of section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, the COMELEC adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons named therein. One of those parties, Pagkakaisa Ng Bayan, of which petitioner is the President, claiming the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors, now seeks to nullify that resolution on the ground that section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 is unconstitutional, in so far requires that a political party must have polled at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in the preceding election in order to have the right to propose the appointment of one inspector and his substitute. Petitioner contends that this requirement of section 5 is a subject not expressed in the title of the Act, and that its conclusion in that section contravenes the provision of the Constitution that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections, in giving so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors for the fifty-three legislative districts, has acted within the limits of the discretion given by section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Commission on Elections in the choice of election inspectors where none of the minority parties is entitled to propose the appointment of such inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector. RULING: The constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title express the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. It seems evident, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, Act No. 657 has a necessary and proper connection with the reorganization of the Commission on Elections, which is the subject expressed in the Title of the Act. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by any excessive take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly but firmly in appropriate cases. The order of the Commission on Elections is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.