IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

S212288
STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP DBA MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE HOME COMMUNITY, Petitioner, v. THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, Respondent. BONNIE SHIPLEY, Real Party in Interest. AFTER SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT OF MANDATE OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO, CASE NO. E058852 THE HONORABLE MANUAL A. RAMIREZ, JUDGE PRESIDING AFTER ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF MANDATE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CASE NO. CIVDS1302013, THE HONORABLE GILBERT G. OCHOA, JUDGE PRESIDING

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Nancy Duffy McCarron CBN 164780
950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 nancyduffysb@yahoo.com 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 Attorney for Real Party Bonnie Shipley

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION TO ANSWER................................................. 4 QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................................... 5 WHY REVIEW SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ......................... 5 THE REA L FAC T S AND R EAL PRO CEDURA L HIST O RY ................ 6 A. Real Facts ......................................................................................................................... 6 B. Real Proceedings Leading up to Denial of Both Summary Judgment Motions ..... 9 C. Shipleys Writ Petition to San Bernardino Appellate Division .................................. 12 D. Petitioner Stubblefields Writ Petition to 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Div. 2 ............. 13 E. Further Appellate Division Proceedings After the Stay Was Issued ............. 13 LEGAL A RGUM E NTS ................................................................... 13 ARGUM ENT I .............................................................................. 13 Appellate Division Correctl y Interpreted Civil 798.75(c) by applying Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation, affirmed by Appellate Courts Summar y Denial of Stubblefields Writ Petition ... 13 A. Appellate Division Applied the Plain Language in Civil 798.75 ......... 13 B. Appellate Division's Correct Interpretation of Civil 798.75(c) Comports with Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation ............ 16 ARGUMENT II .............................................................................................................. 18 WHY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ........... 18 A. Petitioner failed to explain any urgency as required by CRC 8.846(a)(7)(A) .. 18 B. Writ will not issue where petitioner has plain, speedy, adequate remedy at law .. 18 C. Petitioner Admits Malice in Prosecuting a Sham Complaint Against Shipley ..... 20

ARGUMENT III ............................................................................................................. 21 PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES BELOW WERE FATAL TO WRIT PETITION ...... 1 A. Court Below Lacked Jurisdiction to Act on a Defective, Unverified Petition .... 21 B. Petitioners Unappealed Motion for Summary Judgment Not Part of Writ ........ 25

ARGUMENT IV ................................................................................... 27 COURT MUST APPLY LEGISLATIVE INTENT ............................. 27 ARGUMENT V .................................................................................... 28 CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI WAS NOT MET ............................. 28 GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTIORARI ............................. 28

CONCLUSION

................................................................................................................ 29

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ..................................................................................... 30

PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................................................................ 31

APPENDED EXHIBITS ............................................................................................................... 31 A. Palma Order Issued by Fourth District Court of Appeal, Div. 2 6/4/13 B. Declaration of Maury Priest submitted with summary judgment C. Appellate Division fax of Williamsons verification on file in that court D. PE548 * newly manufactured declaration of Tom Parrish page 1 pages 2-7 pages 8-9 page 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES

AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Natl Bank (1986) 179 CA.3d 1061,1065 ....................... 11 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 ...................................................... 29 AFT v. Board of Education (1980) 107 C.A.3d 829, 835-836................................................... 17 Associationn Oil v. Supr. Ct (1955) 43 C2d 815, 82 ................................................................. 29 Benjamin Franklin B & L Corp. v. Schmidt (1933) 132 CA.39 ............................................... 21 Bishop v. Merging Capital (1996) 49 Cal.4th1803, 1809........................................................... 21 Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; Tidewater ............................................................. 29 Burlington v. Sante Fe Ry Co (2004) 121 CA4th. 452, 462 ...................................................... 18 Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank (1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978 ................................................. 11, 16 Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217 .......................................................................... 24 Citibank v. Tabalon (2012) 209 CA 4th. Supp.16, 21 ................................................................ 17 City of LA v. County of LA (1989) 216 CA.3d 916, 923 .......................................................... 17 Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985) 169 CA.3d 1223, 1227 .................................................... 11, 16 County of San Mateo v. W.C.A.B.(1981) 46 Cal. Comp. Cases 496.......................................... 21 County of Santa Clara v. Supr Ct. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545,553 .................................................... 18 Curle v. Supr. Ct (2001) 24 C4th. 1057 ..................................................................................... 21 Denham v Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 ................................................................. 29 Denham ve. Supr. Ct. (1970) 2 C3d. 557, 564 ........................................................................... 18 Estate of Reed (1955) 132 CA2d. 732 ...................................................................................... 30 Eye Dog Found. v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 545 .............. 17 Fortman v. Hemco Inc. (1989) 211 CA 3d. 241, 257-260 ......................................................... 16 Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th.791, 800-801 ................................................................ 18 Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 ................................................................ 16, 21 Gould v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (2011) 192 CA 4th. 1176, 1181 .......................................... 29 Hammer v. Zobelin (1876) 51 C.532 ........................................................................................... 9 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993) 20 CA. 4th 1612, 1617 n 2. [4th. Dist. Div 2] .................... 18 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4th Dist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625 .......................... 11, 16 Howard v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 784, 789 .............................................................. 18

Huber, Hunt, & Nichols v. Moore (1977) 67 CA 3d 278, 313 .................................................. 16 In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887 .................................................................... 18 In re SA (21010) 183 CA 4th. 1128,1148 .................................................................................. 30 Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 ................................................................ 18 Jones v. Superior Court (People) (1994) 26 CA.4th 92, 99-100 ............................................... 25 Keating v. Superior Court (1955) 45 C2d 440, 443 .................................................................. 29 Krueger v. Superior Court (Sec. Pac. Natl. Bank) (1979) 89 CA.3d 934, 936 ........................ 21 Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 CA.3d 285, 293 [review denied December 5, 1985] ........ 14 Leslie G v. Perry & Assoc (1996) 43 CA 4th 472, 487; ............................................................ 22 Kuhn v. Dept Gen Svs (1994) 22 CA4th. 1627, 1632 ............................................................. 18 Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 683 ........................................................... 21 Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 CA3d 643, 647 .......................................................................... 18 Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal. 3d. 604, 614 ............................................................................ 30 Melancon v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 698, 704 ........................................................... 28 Niles v. City of San Rafael (1974) 42 CA3d. 230, 243 .............................................................. 16 Omaha Indemnity v. Superior Court (Greinke) (1989) 209 CA 3d. 1266, 1269 ....................... 29 Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobilehome Park (1991) 1 CA.4th 1521 ................................................... 6 People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 .................................................................................. 17 People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 727 ..................................................... 17 Perkins v. Onyett, 86 Cal. 348 ................................................................................................... 24 Phelan v Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363 ......................................................................... 18 Power v. Fairbanks, 146 Cal. 611, 615; Davey v. So Pac Co., 116 Cal. 325, 330 .................... 18 Rancho Santa Paula Mobilehome Park v. Evans (1994) 26 CA 4th 1139 .................................. 7 Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262................................................................................. 29 Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg (1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465- ............................................. 11 Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg (1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-1466 ..................................... 16 Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1282 .......... 29 Star Motor Imports v. Sp. Ct. (1979) 88 CA.3d 201 .................................................................. 21 Star Motor Imports v. Superior Court (1979) 88 CA3d 201, 203-204 ...................................... 22 Yarrow v.California (1960) 53 C.2d 427, 438 ........................................................................... 18

STATUTES
Article 7 of the MRL.................................................................................................................... 4 Civil Code: 798.......................................................................................................................................... 4 798.11............................................................................................................................. 14, 19 798.23.5................................................................................................................................ 19 798.25.5................................................................................................................................ 19 798.34............................................................................................................................... 7, 19 798.55........................................................................................................................ 4,5,19,28 798.55-57 .......................................................................................................................... 4,14 798.75.............................................................................................. 4,5,8,9,10,13,14,15,20,21 798.77................................................................................................................................. 5, 6 798.88........................................................................................................................... 4,14,20 Code of Civil Procedure 437c(M)(1) ........................................................................................................................... 26 437c(m)(1). .......................................................................................................................... 25 446........................................................................................................................................ 22 904.3..................................................................................................................................... 28 1068...................................................................................................................................... 28 1069...................................................................................................................................... 21 1074...................................................................................................................................... 28 1086...................................................................................................................................... 21 1109...................................................................................................................................... 27 1160................................................................................................................................. 9, 10 1172................................................................................................................................... 9,10 2009...................................................................................................................................... 22 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.809 ................................................................................................. 27 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 56 ...................................................................................................... 21 Treatises 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, 123, p. 3899 ........................... 21

TO: The Honorable Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice Of California, and The Honorable Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court:

IN TR O DU CT I ON TO AN S W ER
In 1978 legislators enacted a comprehensive scheme to protect mobile home owners whose homes were situated on mobile home park sites throughout California; i.e. the Mobilehome Residency Law [MRL] at Civil Code 798 through 798.88. Civil 798.55-798.57 provides unique protections for these residents. A park owner may only terminate a residents tenancy on just cause for only 7 enumerated reasons, following service of a 60-day written notice reciting the statutory just cause reason. Only a purchaser or transferee, who acquires a mobilehome and unlawfully occupies it without executing a park lease, can be summarily evicted under Civil 798.75(c). Article 7 of MRL, governing ownership transfers, provides this limited remedy to protect park owners from unlawful occupants use of a lot space without paying rent. The court erroneously expanded 798.75(c)s limited scope by holding (c) applied universally to any park resident unilaterally labeled as unlawful occupant, despite an uncontroverted affidavit from lobbyist Maury Priest supporting Shipleys summary judgment motion. Priest testified he attended every 1987 legislative session and that legislators intended to grant a limited summary eviction remedy only for purchasers and transferees who unlawfully occupied without executing a lease. [Exhibit B-appended]
The trial courts order abrogated all statutory protections against a parks arbitrary

eviction of mobile home residents without just cause and authorized those evictions on 5-days notice by unilateral labeling a targeted resident as an unlawful occupant. It put millions of poor, elderly and disabled residents at risk of arbitrary evictions. Appellate Division reversed this order contrary to legislative intent and public policy.

QU E ST I ON PR ES E NT E D F O R R E VI E W
Is the summary eviction remedy in Civil 798.75[c] limited only to purchasers and transferees who occupy a mobile home without first executing a park owners lease? YES. Trial court said NO. Appellate Division said YES. Court of Appeal affirmed.
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WHY REVIEW SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

In 1978 legislators expressed intent to prohibit arbitrary evictions in Civil 798.55: (a) The Legislature finds and declares that, because of the high cost of moving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, the requirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes, and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of this chapter. (b) (1) The management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy, except for a reason specified in this article and upon the giving of written notice to the homeowner, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to sell or remove, at the homeowner's election, the mobilehome from the park within a period of not less than 60 days, which period shall be specified in the notice. Civil Code 798.55 Legislators reaffirmed their abhorrence of arbitrary park evictions in 2012: It is contrary to an expressed legislative goal to encourage owners to use injunctive relief under Civil 798.88 rather than evict a resident for an alleged park rule violation: (Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) (Amended by Stats. 2012, Chap. 99 (AB 2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013) The court held any park rule is enforceable by eviction, regardless of reasonableness, disregarding Civil 798.77 which renders such rule void if it deprives a resident of any right under MRL. The court found a triable issue as to whether a park rule was violated. Even if summary eviction were authorized under 798.75(c) [it clearly is not] the order bypassed two prerequisite issues; i.e. is the park rule constitutional and reasonable? Both issues must be addressed before deciding if a violation justified summary eviction. The order allows summary eviction for violation of any park rule, even if unreasonable, which is contrary to the legislative protections afforded in Civil 798.55 and 798.88. Fortunately, the Appellate Division reversed this devastating order, and the Court of Appeal affirmed reversal by denying a petition below. This Petition should be denied.
5

THE REAL FACTS AND REAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Real Facts Petitioner continues a pattern of misrepresenting facts and law, which resulted in a preemptory writ reversing the denial of Shipleys summary judgment motion. Petitioner [@ page 6] misrepresents the Court and Appellate Division found Shipley occupies the mobile home under an unapproved lease/sublease with McCarron. Petitioner also misrepresented this was an undisputed fact in the writ petition below. Not true. Shipley testified she executed a lease to share the home. [1 PE, Exh.2, p.59] Shipley produced her executed share occupancy agreement at her deposition. Appellate Division found Shipley shares the home as McCarrons co-resident and Stubblefield continued to accept monthly rent from McCarron, all utilities are in her name, and she pays for them. Appellate Division Opinion excerpt recites as follows:

Pet.

Exh.B, p.4

Petitioner misrepresents park Guidelines require McCarron [the 55+ qualifying resident] to at all times regularly occupy the home and that Shipley is an unlawful occupant because McCarron does not regularly occupy the mobilehome (Petition, p. 6) Not true. New Guidelines were not part of McCarrons 2005 lease and she never agreed to be a prisoner within the confines of her home at all times to avoid summary eviction. This unreasonable rule is void as it waives MRL rights under 798.77 as held in Otanez 1 We hold that a tenant need not live in the premises full-time in order to be a resident. Secondly, retroactive anti-subleasing rules are unenforceable against a homeowner who never agreed to such prohibition in her original park lease. Evans 2 Third, Civil Code 798.34 expressly authorizes any owner to share her home with a co-resident as her guest.
1 2

Otanez v. Blue Skies Mobilehome Park (1991) 1 CA.4th 1521 Rancho Santa Paula Mobilehome Park v. Evans (1994) 26 CA 4th 1139
6

Finally, petitioner misrepresents what its position was below; i.e. that Shipleys occupancy was unlawful because McCarron does not occupy the home at all times. The notice to Shipley identified her as a purchaser who failed to execute the rental agreement and the notice recited the purchaser shall not have any rights of tenancy:

1 PE, Exh.1, PE 8 It demanded Shipley surrender possession which she could not do as a non-owner. A hybrid unlawful detainer summons coupled with a forcible detainer claim was bizarre:

1 PE,Exh.1,PE 8

1 PE,Exh.1,PE 8 Petitioner was never Shipleys landlord--a prerequisite for any unlawful detainer action. No breach of contract claim lies where there is no privity of contract with the defendant. Possession of premises attorney fees and damages without privity was equally bizarre.
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The sham complaint described Shipley as purchaser who entered into possession of the premises and kept possession as described in MRL, Article 7 798.75(a)-(d):

1PE,Exh.1,PE 9

Petitioner prayed for an order to take possession of premises knowing McCarron has owned the home since 2005 and without joining her as a defendant in the sham action.

1PE,Exh.1,PE

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Shipleys demur, motion to strike attorney fees and damages were denied, compelling Shipley to answer a sham complaint which mushroomed to 10 volumes, a 15-page docket with 280 entries and 42 hearings-after a year of vitriolic litigation in 3 trial/appellate courts. This case is not about Shipleys being 52 instead of 55+, or whether owner McCarron regularly occupies space #333. This case is about a GOLIATH law firm trying to maintain its top market share in representing wealthy park owners by being The Firm to carve out a slick, speedy remedy for all park owners to filch homes via summary eviction. The Firm converts the homes into cash cow rentals. Stubblefield already filched 200 of 360 homes in the subject Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community because poor, elder and disabled homeowners cannot afford to hire attorneys to save their homes. With $1,000-$1,300/month space rent, rising annually due to no rent control, the prohibition against co-residents forces owners to abandon homes as they cannot make skyrocketing rents alone. The Firm asks this court to expand 798.75(c) to facilitate filching of homes on a paltry 5-days notice.
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B. The Real Proceedings Leading up to Denial of Both Summary Judgment Motions On 12/26/12 Shipley moved for Judgment on the Pleadings as plaintiff did not allege, and could not allege, the statutory elements of a forcible detainer claim. see CCP 1160. Plaintiff could not negate her statutory affirmative defense; i.e. McCarron had been the sole occupant in possession more than a year. Plaintiff had burden of proof at trial. CCP 1172. Both statutes codified forcible detainer elements this court set in 1876 [1 PE:Exh.2:PE40] Hammer v. Zobelin (1876) 51 C.532. It is so ancient counsel had to upload it from archives. This court never overruled Hammer. Although not in published databases it is codified. Judge Alvarez denied Shipleys Motion for Judgment on Pleadings & motion to compel production of secret videos/written reports of McCarron/Shipleys alleged rule violations. Although both were clearly discoverable Alvarez denied Shipleys timely motion to compel. Alvarez ruled against the law for Stubblefield on each motion and never ruled for Shipley. This is because Alvarez is up for reelection in 2014 and fears Stubblefield will bankroll a judicial challenger who may defeat Alvarez based on his negative judicial ethics record. 3 Stubblefield has a 50-yr reputation for blackmailing candidates and posting billboards all over San Bernardino County to defeat public officials who do not comply with his demands. Tax collector resigned upon conviction for $ laundering: http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945

Neil Derry billboard @ Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Park

3

Judge Alvarez was placed on 3 years judicial probation for failing to report a DUI arrest. Because Alvarez fears Stubblefields power he refuses to rule against the wealthy developer.
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Shipley filed Summary Judgment 1/23/13 [1 PE,Exh.2:29-140]. Petitioner moved for summary judgment also. Both motions were denied 1/14/13 [3 PE, Exh.11:560-583]. The court manufactured a triable issue: whether McCarron regularly occupied the home. 2 PE Exh.2:327. This issue had nothing to do with whether plaintiff could prove the elements of forcible detainer at trial [CCP 1160, 1172]---the only claim alleged in the sham complaint and vigorously litigated for a year. Plaintiff never amended to add a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. It was bizarre for a court to transmute one claim to another claim [never alleged] with no pending motion from plaintiff to amend. The court should only have considered whether Shipley proffered evidence to negate any element of forcible detainer (the only claim pleaded) or any evidence to prove any affirmative defense, and whether plaintiff could counter the evidence she had presented. Shipley submitted Maury Priests affidavit (a lawyer/lobbyist for mobilehome owners) who had attended every 1987 legislative session when our legislators added the limited summary eviction remedy [subdivision [c] [d] of 798.75] for purchasers/transferees. Priest testified at length on what happened 26 years ago during the 1987 sessions. 4 Priest testified that legislators intended to authorize summary evictions only against purchasers and transferees who occupied homes without executing leases, and not against an owners coresident already paying rent to the park under an existing lease. 5 Stubblefield failed to file any affidavit in opposition to Maury Priests testimony. The court erred in disregarding Priests affidavit with no contra affidavit on file. A court cannot resolve credibility on summary judgment. 6 Adopting Stubblefields counsels conjecture and speculation on what he thought legislators intended in 1987, instead of Priests testimony on personal knowledge, showed prejudicial judicial bias. Assertions on conjecture or speculation are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 7
4

Exhibit 2 appended to this Opposition; Opposition file below; 1 PE Exh. 2:PE 45 Shipleys Exh.1 filed w/Opposition to Writ Petition bel.,1 PE Exh.2:PE 46,9-10 6 AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Natl Bank (1986) 179 CA.3d 1061,1065 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4th Dist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625
5 7

Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank (1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978; Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985) 169 CA.3d 1223, 1227; Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg (1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-1466 10

Before the court heard the two summary judgment motions it set an OSC on 1/22/13 sua sponte for plaintiff to show cause why it moved for summary judgment before the court had ruled on plaintiffs Motion to Compel deposition responses set for 1/27/13. The court stepped out of its role as judicial officer into a role of Stubblefields advocate, even questioning the wisdom of Stubblefields counsels setting MSJ prematurely? 8

Transcript 1/22/13, p.1:20 Transcript recites like senior partner querying newbie associate to avoid bungling a case.

Transcript 1/22/13 p.3:1

Transcript 1/22/13 p.4:9 McCarron tells court she has the smoking gun-Priests affidavit on 1987 legislative intent:

Transcript 1/22/13 P 8:21

Transcript 1/22/13 P 9:7

Shipleys Exh.2 filed w/Opposition to Writ Petition below; p.2.12-2.27; @ p.2.13

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Shipley filed a separate statement of four undisputed facts. [1PE, Exh.2, PE 43]. Stubblefields attorney admitted facts were undisputed. [Transcript 1/22/13; p.2:5]. The Appellate Division found The facts are not in dispute. [Petition, Exh. B, p.5]

Pet,Exh.B p.5 Undisputed facts are: 1) owner has a valid lease; 2) Community Rules [2000] were incorporated in her lease; 3) MRL governs; 4) owner was in continuous possession of the premises for 8 years and Stubblefield continues to collect monthly rent from her. Shipley and McCarron filed affidavits reciting that McCarron regularly occupied the home and that Shipley executed a shared occupancy lease with homeowner McCarron. Stubblefield failed to file any affidavits opposing Shipley, McCarron or Priest. Despite petitioners failure to file a statement of disputed facts in opposition, or any contra affidavits to Shipley, Priest or McCarron affidavits, and petitioners attorneys admission that material facts were undisputed, the court denied Shipleys motion. C. Shipleys Writ Petition to San Bernardino Appellate Division Shipley filed a writ petition in the Appellate Division on 2/27/13. On 3/5/13 the Appellate Division issued a stay of all proceedings below. [2 PE, Exh.3, PE 329]. Stubblefield barraged the Appellate Division with over 1000 sheets of paper, none of which were relevant because Shipley had already filed all summary judgment papers. The Appellate Division ignored Stubblefields irrelevant papers and denied him relief. On 3/26/13 the Appellate Division invited the trial court to vacate its 2/14/13 order denying summary judgment and issue a new order granting the motion ( Palma order). On 5/6/13 the Appellate Division issued its Opinion, finding 798,75(c) applied only to purchasers and transferees----not to Shipley. Appellate Division opined 798.75(c)s language recited surrender of the mobilehome site and only a mobilehome owner has the legal authority and power to surrender a mobilehome site or remove a mobilehome from the mobilehome site. [Petition, Exh.B; or 4PE, Exh 17:943-953]
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D.

Petitioner Stubblefields Writ Petition to 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Div. 2

On 6/3/13 petitioner filed a writ petition in 4th District Court of Appeal, Division 2 with 4 volumes of exhibits. [over 1000 sheets]. Petitioner sought a stay of all proceedings. In its Palma notice the Court of Appeal invited Shipley to respond to the petition by 6/24/13 to address procedural/substantive issues that could affect determination "whether or not to exercise its discretion to entertain writ review." The Court of Appeal further ordered that "[u]nless good cause is shown, the court may issue a peremptory writ." [see Exhibit A] Shipley appends Exhibit A because Stubblefield artfully omitted that order in his petition although he was required to append it. CRC 8.486(b)(1)(C). It was omitted so that petitioner could artfully argue that the Court of Appeal gave short shrift to his petition; thus this court should review it; when in fact this was not true. Exhibit A shows the Court of Appeal read the petition immediately, granted a stay the next day and issued the order shown in Exhibit A. The petition was denied only after reading Shipleys opposition. E. Further Appellate Division Proceedings After the Stay Was Issued On 7/22/13 the Appellate Division issued a Remittitur to the trial court and issued a certified Writ of Mandate which was served on both court and petitioner.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS ARGUMENT I

Appellate Division Correctl y Interpreted Civil 798.75(c) by applying Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation, affirmed by Appellate Courts Summar y Denial of Stubblefields Writ Petition A. Appellate Division Applied the Plain Language in Civil 798.75

Statutes must be given a reasonable construction which conforms to the apparent purpose and intent of the lawmakers. Various parts of the statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause in the context of the whole statute." Lehto 9 Civ. 798.75 must be harmonized with 798.55-57 providing unique protections to park residents by prohibiting arbitrary evictions without just cause and due process.
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Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 CA.3d 285, 293 [review denied December 5, 1985] 13

If legislators intended to revoke protections they would have repealed 798.55-57. The MRL is divided into 8 Articles separated by subject area as shown below: Mobilehome Residency Law
Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 Article 3.5 Article 4 Article 4.5 Article 5 Article 5.5 Article 6 Article 7 Article 8 General Rental Agreement Rules and Regulations Fees and Charges Utilities Rent Control Homeowner Communications and Meetings Homeowners Meetings with Management Termination of Tenancy Transfer of Mobilehome or Mobilehome Park Actions, Proceedings, and Penalties

Article 1 General contains MRL definitions. For example, a resident is defined as a homeowner or other person lawfully occupying a mobile home. Civil Code 798.11. Stubblefield could have sought declaratory relief on definition of unlawful occupant. Article 8 Actions, Proceedings, and Penalties contains 798.88 authorizing park owners to apply for injunctions to enforce rules. 798.88 gives park owners a hearing in 15 days after seeking relief. Rather than seek court relief petitioner prosecuted a sham complaint praying to evict a coresident of a paying tenant, without any existing privity of contract. Article 7 governs Transfers of Mobilehomes relating only to transfers of ownership. 798.75(c) authorizes a park owner to summarily evict only a purchaser or transferee who occupies a mobilehome without first executing a park lease. It cannot be expanded to evict a co-resident of a tenant who is paying rent to the park under an existing park lease. Under Lehto the particular clause, subdivision (c) in this case, must be considered in the context of the entire statute. For a year petitioner has misrepresented to the trial court, Appellate Division, Court of Appeal, and this court that 798.75 (c) applies universally to any occupant unilaterally labeled as an unlawful occupant authorizing arbitrary eviction. Petitioner misrepresented the import of subsection (c) by always citing it in total isolation. The trial court erred by reciting subdivision (c) in isolation exactly as petitioner had done. Shipley cited Supreme Court cases directing lower courts to consider that placement of a statute within an Article limits its scope to only the subject area covered in that Article. 10
10

2 PE, Exh. 2, page PE 321

[numbered 12.289 at bottom right of page]

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The court must consider subdivision (c) within the context of the entire statute as follows: Civil Code 798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement (a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located in a park at the time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shall contain a copy of either a fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed by the park's management and the prospective homeowner that the parties have agreed to the terms and conditions of a rental agreement. (b) In the event the purchaser fails to execute the rental agreement, the purchaser shall not have any rights of tenancy. (c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has no rights of tenancy and is not otherwise entitled to occupy the mobilehome pursuant to this chapter, the occupant is considered an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for the surrender of the mobilehome park site, for a period of five days, the occupant refuses to surrender the site to the mobilehome park management. In the event the unlawful occupant fails to comply with the demand, the unlawful occupant shall be subject to the proceedings set forth in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (d) The occupant of the mobilehome shall not be considered an unlawful occupant and shall not be subject to the provisions of subdivision (c) if all of the following conditions are present: (1) The occupant is the registered owner of the mobilehome. (2) The management has determined that the occupant has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park; will comply with the rules and regulations of the park, based on the occupant's prior tenancies; and will comply with this article. (3) The management failed or refused to offer the occupant a rental agreement. It was not necessary for any court below, or this court, to speculate about legislators intent when they amended 798.75 in 1987 to add subdivision (c)s summary eviction remedy limited to use only against new purchasers and transferees of mobilehomes. Maury Priest attended every 1987 legislative session and testified about what he saw and heard during those sessions. [Exhibit B-appended]. Maury Priests declaration was based on personal knowledge and Stubblefield failed to file any affidavit opposing it. As explained above (ANSWER, page7) a court cannot resolve credibility on a summary judgment motion. 11 Assertions on conjecture or speculation are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 12
11

Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4th Dist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625

Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank (1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978; Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985) 15

12

Petitioner will argue Priests affidavit was opinion. Where an expert opines on a matter within his personal knowledge, and no other expert controverts, his opinion is conclusive and may not be disregarded. Huber 13 A court must disregard all contrary arguments. Fortman 14 Whether the court finds Priest a percipient or expert witness Shipley prevails either way. Notwithstanding Maury Priests testimony about what legislators intended in 1987, a court must affirm the decision below on stare decisis.

B. Appellate Division's Correct Interpretation of Civil 798.75(c) Comports with Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation
In 1935 this court guided us on statutory interpretation, holding lower courts must give considerable weight to Chapter & Section headings. Gonzales 15 It is an elementary rule of construction that chapter and section headings are entitled to considerable weight in interpreting the various sections and should be given effect according to their import, to the same extent as though they were included in the body of the law. Gonzalez was affirmed in AFT 16 holding that if a section is contained within a Chapter it applies only in the context of that chapter. Gonzales and AFT were followed in City of Los Angeles. 17 In 1991 this court revisited the issue of statutory interpretation, reaffirming Gonzalez and AFT in People v. Hull. 18 In 2001 this court announced in Laff
19

that its long-standing

1935 rule of construction concerning sections within chapters was elementary. "It is an elementary rule of construction that chapter and section headings in the codes are entitled to considerable weight in interpreting the various sections and should be given effect according to their import, to the same extent as though they were included in the body of the lawchapter and section headings properly may be considered in determining legislative intentour opinion states: "That such a remedial section should exist may be conceded but arguments based on such a premise are more properly addressed to the legislature than to the courts."
169 CA.3d 1223, 1227; Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg (1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-1466
13 14

Huber, Hunt, & Nichols v. Moore (1977) 67 CA 3d 278, 313 Fortman v. Hemco Inc. (1989) 211 CA 3d. 241, 257-260. (uncontroverted opinion) Niles v. City of San Rafael (1974) 42 CA3d. 230, 243 (uncontroverted expert opinion) 15 Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 16 AFT v. Board of Education (1980) 107 C.A.3d 829, 835-836 17 City of LA v. County of LA (1989) 216 CA.3d 916, 923 18 People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 19 People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 727
16

In Laff this court held a court may not carve out a new remedy from subsection text because such right to a remedy must be addressed to the legislature not the courts. The trial court had no right to play super legislator by carving a remedy for Stubblefield despite his fears that Stubblefiled will fund a challenger in his 2014 reelection campaign. In re Mark B (2007) 149 CA.4th 61,75 held a court must look to where the section was placed in Chapter & Section Headings giving considerable weight to placement to determine whether it applies specifically or generally. Article 7 of the MRL applies only to transfers and sales of mobile homes. Appellate Division gave considerable weight to 798.75s placement within Article 7, Sales & Transfers, following this courts directive. Under separation of powers neither trial nor appellate courts are authorized to 'review' legislative determinations. The only function of courts is to determine if the exercise of legislative power exceeded constitutional limitations." Eye Dog 20 It is the prerogative of the Legislature, not the courts, to correct any flaws in a statutory scheme.
21

Appellate Divisions order is presumed to be correct. Power 22 The rule applies regardless of whether findings are expressed or implied. Burlington 23 Unless appellant can show there was no evidence to support the order alleged lack of evidence is waived. Fink 24 The court must disregard speculation, conjecture and defer to court Lesley; Kuhn 25 When the sole issue is whether a ruling on a legal issue was erroneous, the court need not address whether any triable issues of fact existed. Henricksen 26 Ghirardo 27 All ambiguities must be resolved in favor of affirming the decision below. Denham 28
20 21 22

23

24 25

26

27 28

Eye Dog Found. v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 545 Citibank v. Tabalon (2012) 209 CA 4th. Supp.16, 21 Power v. Fairbanks, 146 Cal. 611, 615; Davey v. So Pac Co., 116 Cal. 325, 330; Yarrow v.California (1960) 53 C.2d 427, 438; County of Santa Clara v. Supr Ct. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545,553 Burlington v. Sante Fe Ry Co (2004) 121 CA4th. 452, 462; Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 CA3d 643, 647 In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887 Leslie G v. Perry & Assoc (1996) 43 CA 4th 472, 487; Kuhn v. Dept Gen Svs (1994) 22 CA4th. 1627, 1632 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993) 20 CA. 4th 1612, 1617 n 2. [4th. Dist. Div 2] Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th.791, 800-801 Denham ve. Supr. Ct. (1970) 2 C3d. 557, 564
17

The court must give the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance'' Jessup 29 If there is some showing in support of the lower court's action, the quantum of proof cannot be considered or weighed on certiorari. Howard 30 Petitioners failure to file a statement of disputed facts or counter declarations to Shipleys statement of undisputed facts and affidavits [Maury Priest, Bonnie Shipley and McCarron] was fatal to Stubblefields opposition and he must accept the consequences of such failure.

ARGUMENT II
WHY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED A Petitioner failed to explain any urgency as required by CRC 8.846(a)(7)(A ) B. Writ will not issue where petitioner has plain, speedy, adequate remedy at law Although the statute does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ if another adequate remedy exists, it has long been established as a general rule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy was available to petitioner.{cites} Phelan v Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363 Appellate Division recited one available plain, speedy remedy. [Petition, Exh B, p.8-9]:

Pet.Exh B, p.8 In addition to the plain, speedy and adequate remedy Appellate Division recited in its Opinion [Pet., Exh B, p. 8-9] petitioner has the following 10 speedy, adequate remedies:
29 30

Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 Howard v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 784, 789
18

REMEDY 1:

MRL Article 1 General Provisions [ Civil 798.11] defines resident.

Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to clarify the definition of resident under MRL and to decide if a Shipley is an unlawful occupant. REMEDY 2: MRL Article 3 Rules and Regulations [Civil 798.23.5] defines subleasing rules. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to clarify whether the homeowners alleged subleasing to Shipley violated any park rule. REMEDY 3: MRL Article 3 Rules & Regulations [Civ 798.25.5] defines regulations.

Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to clarify whether a rule is void or valid. REMEDY 4: MRL Article 3.5 Fees and Charges [Civil 798.34] defines rules on

guests. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to determine if Shipley is a guest. REMEDY 5: MRL Article 3.5 Fees and Charges [Civil 798.34] defines family members. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to decide if Shipley is family. REMEDY 6: MRL Article 6 Termination of Tenancy [Civil 798.55;798.56] recites

7 authorized justifications to evict including subsection (d) for failure to comply with a reasonable park rule. Stubblefield can try to evict McCarron for alleged rule violation. REMEDY 7: MRL Article 8 Actions, Proceedings & Penalties [Civil 798. 88]

provides for injunctive relief. Stubblefield can move to enjoin any owner for violation of a reasonable rule. Stubblefield can move to enjoin McCarron from violating a rule. Legislators expressed a stated goal to encourage injunction rather than eviction: (Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) Civil 798.88 In addition to 7 statutory remedies Stubblefield has 3 common law remedies of trespass, nuisance, and ejectment. Because he has 10 available remedies, and Civil 798.88 provides a hearing within 15 days there is no justification to grant certiorari to even consider carving out a new remedy abrogating all protections for poor, elderly and disabled citizens from the wrath of greedy park owners trying to filch their homes to convert them to cash cow rentals, rendering those citizens homeless and helpless. There is no justification to grant a stay of proceedings with 10 other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available, including a hearing in 15 days on a petition for injunction.
19

C. Petitioner Admits Malice in Prosecuting a Sham Complaint Against Shipley In the Petition for Review, at page 16, Stubblefield admits having no justification for prosecuting a sham compliant to evict co-resident Shipley. Under a heading entitled, The Appellate Division's Interpretation of Section 798.75(c) Limits The Statute's Application In A Way Not Contemplated By The Statute's Express Language And Which Can Cause Grave Consequences Pet, p.12 Stubblefield argues that limiting Civil 798.75 [c]s summary eviction remedy to only purchasers and transferees would result in grave consequences recited as follows: .. Stubblefield's remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law is to proceed against the homeowner in accordance with Civil Code section 798.56, subdivision (d) for 'failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto." [4 PE, Exh.17:951] Pet,p.16 The problem with this unprecedented "remedy" is it would be the equivalent of no remedy at all . it could not quickly evict underage occupants in a senior park where the "purchaser" parents never take possession or sign a rental agreement, or when violent gang members..wreak havoc on the lawful park residents by playing loud music a caregiver could continue living in a mobilehome park after the death of the mobilehome owner for months without paying rent Pet,p.16 Stubblefields potpourri of imaginary miscreants recited above [violent gang members, parents of adult children who buy a home and move children in instead, and caregivers who remain after the owner dies] is the only purported justification he could concoct to support a lame argument to carve a new remedy out of an isolated subsection, which this court has expressly prohibited since 1935 in Gonzales 31 and its progeny. Under Article III only the legislature can expand the limited scope of Civil 798.75[c]. Shipley is not a violent gang member, adult child of a buyer, or a lingering caregiver. This impliedly admits filing a sham complaint could only have been motivated by malice. Courts may not render advisory opinions. Bishop 32 It is the corresponding duty of reviewing courts to decline to decide issues not properly before them. Id Reversing a valid order to provide a remedy for hypothetical miscreants is an absurd argument.

31 32

Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 Bishop v. Merging Capital (1996) 49 Cal.4th1803, 1809
20

ARGUMENT III PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES BELOW WERE FATAL TO THE WRIT PETITION A. Court Below Lacked Jurisdiction to Act on a Defective, Unverified Petition Only a party may file a petition Curle 33 and must verify it. CCP 1069. If unverified it must be dismissed. 34 It is improper for attorney to appear or verify a petition. Mannheim 35 It secondarily raises the issue of a petitioner's right to relief by prerogative writ upon a defectively verified petition we discharge the writ without reaching the legal issues Krueger v. Superior Court (Sec. Pac. Natl. Bank) (1979) 89 CA.3d 934, 936 Petitioners' petition for prerogative writ is fatally defective in form as well as in substance. A petition for writ of mandate must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., 1086; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56.)A fatally defective verification "is treated as a failure to verify." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, 356, p. 2020.). While prerogative writs are commonly described as granted or denied at the discretion of the court (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, 123, p. 3899), we view the discretion as one that must, to the extent possible, be exercised so that similarly situated litigants be given equal treatment. To permit petitioners to proceed on their petition for prerogative writ which is: 1. defectively verified in a fatal respect would be to afford petitioners preferred treatment denied to other litigants. The petition for peremptory writ is denied. Krueger @ 939-940 In Star Motors36 a writ petition verified by counsel was dismissed as improper. But our subsequent and closer examination of the writ application revealed that as to all of its allegations, the "verification" required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 was made by counsel "under penalty of perjury, ..." "verification" is an affidavit verifying the truth of the matters covered by it. (Code Civ. Proc., 2009; {..cites} "Its object is to assure good faith in the averments or statements of a party" to litigation. {..cites} We have not overlooked the provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 446 This provision, insofar as it purports to permit verification on "information or belief," palpably refers to pleadings that join issues, such as the common complaint and answer of a lawsuit. {cites} Where the verification, or affidavit, is to be "used as evidence" of facts, " Section 446 [Code Civ. Proc.] does not apply." {cites} Star Motor Imports @ 204-205

33 34

Curle v. Supr. Ct (2001) 24 C4th. 1057 Benjamin Franklin B & L Corp. v. Schmidt (1933) 132 CA.39; Star Motor Imports v. Sp. Ct. (1979) 88 CA.3d 201; County of San Mateo v. W.C.A.B.(1981) 46 Cal. Comp. Cases 496 35 Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 683 36 Star Motor Imports v. Superior Court (1979) 88 CA3d 201, 203-204
21

On April 9, 2013 Stubblefield filed an Opposition to Shipleys petition

which was not verified by real party Stubblefield Properties, a CA General Partnership. [appended Exh.C , p.9]. Robert Williamson, real partys attorney verified the Opposition on information and belief. It was fatally defective. Verification is required because relief is based only on genuine factual need. Under Krueger, Star Motors and Mannheim cited above, Appellate Division had no duty to consider a defective Opposition and could have stricken it. Shipley objected to the defect in her Reply. Her writ petition was granted. On June 3, 2013 Attorney Williamson again verified a petition to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Div. 2--- instead of petitioner Stubblefield. Realizing Shipley would object again to this second defective verification, he removed the defective verification (with his signature) from his file copy, and replaced it with a newly manufactured, back -dated verification signed by Tom Parrish as authorized agent for Stubblefield Pro perties--a partnership. Williamson then submitted his fraudulently altered Opposition verification as an Exhibit to Stub blefields petition to the Court of Appeal, testifying under oath that each document included as an Exhibit was a true copy of the do cument as filed in the Appellate Division below . Exhibit C -appended, p 8-9 is a fax from the Appellate Division containin g the only verification on file, which matched the verification served on Shipley. Exhibit D -appended, p.10 is the manufactured Tom Parrish verification which counsel represented as the same verification filed in the Appellate Div ision. Williamson switched the verification page to create a pretext to the Court of Appeal that Parrish verification was the document filed in Appellate Division. Williamson knew Shipley would argue that the Court must affirm the order because a defective return is no return at all so Shipley won by default. This fraud on the court was intentionally perpetrated to gain an advantage in the Court of appeal. Shipley believes the Court issued a summary denial, in part, because the court did not approve of unethical switching maneuvers.
22

Williamson compounded the fraud below by misleading this court. Under CRC 8.848 (b)(1)(C) counsel was required to attach all documents necessary for a complete understanding of the case and the ruling below. Conspicuous by its absence is the Court of Appeal s 6/4/13 Palma notice. Shipley appended it herein as Exhibit A . Only one day after receiving Stubblefiel ds writ petition the Court of Appeal issued a STAY of all the proceedings below, including issuance of a remittitur by Appellate Division. The court invited Shipley to file a response by June 24, 2013 which she did. This order proves the Court of Appeal read his petition and immediately acted upon it by granting STAY relief and issuing a Palma notice reciting, unless good cause is shown, the court may issue a preemptory writ . Once the court reviewed Shipleys response and discovered that counsel had: misrepresented the facts, the law, omitted Maury Priests affidavit , and even altered a verification before submitting the document as the record to gain a strategic advantage, the Court of Appeal denied the petition. Counsels artful omission of the Palma notice should not be ignored. This was yet another unethical maneuver to gain a strategic advantage. Petitioner omitted the Palma notice to create a pretext that the court below issued a summary denial without considering the merits, so he could arg ue this court should grant certiorari to review merits not considered below. This is why counsel failed to explain in the brief why he did not request a rehearing below before filing a petition in this court. CRC 8.504(b)(3). Even if the court ignore d counsels fraud on the court, and accepted the newly manufactured verification of Tom Parrish as genuine, it would not cure the fatal defect because Tom Parrish is not a Stubblefield partner . Only a partner can verify or testify for a partnership . Where plaintiff is a partnership only a partners affidavit is admissible as evidence. Chong Pong
37

37

Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217

23

"An affidavit on behalf of a partnership, therefore, should be sworn to by one of the partners,the affidavit states that the partnership was sworn, and it nowhere appears that the affidavit was sworn to by one of the partnersthe affidavit purports to be made by one incompetent to make it see Perkins v. Onyett, 86 Cal. 348 Chong Pong @ 217 Even if Tom Parrish were a partner [he is not], and were authorized to sign and bind the other partners [he was not] the newly manufactured, back-dated verification is still defective as he verified on information and belief---not under penalty of perjury. This useless fodder has zero evidentiary value on a petition based on factual need. Accordingly, Stubblefield defaulted to Shipleys writ petition in the Appellate Division and filed a defective writ petition in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, relief should have been granted based on Stubblefields default by failing to verify a response. Counsel is trying to pull a rabbit out of a hat by arguing this court should entertain a statutory analysis after an affiant testified about what legislators intended in 1987. Counsels speculation and conjecture about what legislators intended is irrelevant. Counsel violated rules by failing to discuss Priests testimony as admonished in Jones: 38 Without disclosure of the omitted facts, inclusion of any reporter's transcripts or resort to a crystal ball, we had no way of divining the real issuewhether the court properly exercised its discretionWhen transcripts are not available, rule 56 requires that counsel include along with the petition a declaration "fairly summarizing the proceedings ... and the basis of the trial court's decision ...." As an officer of the court and member of the bar, the lawyer is obligated to use only such means as are consistent with truth: he may not seek to mislead a judge by artifice or suppress evidence he has a legal obligation to reveal. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 5-220, 5200(A), (B).) In the final analysis, we cannot accept the notion that a selective recitation of facts satisfies the rules: half the truth in this case is just as misleading as a complete fabrication. With artful omissions and altered documents this court should distrust the arguments. This court must question why the petition for review here was not verified by counsel or petitioner, and why no Stubblefield partner ever verified any pleading filed at any level.
38

Jones v. Superior Court (People) (1994) 26 CA.4th 92, 99-100

24

B. Petitioners unappealed MSJ, Lis Pendens & Injunction Were Not Part of Writ One of the most important procedural issues the court must grasp is that although both Shipley and Stubblefields summary judgment motions were heard the same day they were not cross-motions. They were separately denied on 2/14/13. [3PE, Exh.11, PE572]. Shipley appealed denial within 20 days . CCP 437c(m)(1). Stubblefield failed to appeal. Shipley filed a 300-page appendix including all documents on both sides for her motion. No papers were filed on Stubblefields motion because he elected not to appeal his denial. When Appellate Division issued a Palma order [RP Exh. 6.50] Stubblefield tried to transmute Shipleys unilateral petition to a cross-writ petition to consider his denial. Counsel nestled his own petition in an Opposition to Shipleys petition [2PE 523-PE 551]. Williamson believed he could cure his failure to timely appeal by illegal bootstrapping. It was the 3rd time he nestled request for relief inside Opposition to Shipleys motion, even after the trial court admonished this tactic as shown below. Counsel repeated this unethical tactic in the Fourth District Court of Appeal---again filing over 1000 sheets of paper to obfuscate and confuse the court. Counsel has the audacity to employ this same improper tactic for the fourth time in this court. This court must understand that arguments presented in this writ petition that relate to denial of Stubblefields summary judgment motion in the trial court are not properly at issue here because he never appealed the courts denial of his motion for summary judgment. There is no code or case authorizing any court to transmute one writ proceeding into a cross-writ proceeding. Shipley objected to counsels third attempt at this improper tactic [4 PE 905-PE 925]:
In an order entered March 26, 2013 this court issued a Palma notice to respondent and real party inviting opposition to the writ. The court did not authorize real party to nestle its de facto writ petition inside opposition to petitioners unilateral writ petition. In a footnote on page 2 real party argued that because the court below considered plaintiff & defendants summary judgment motions as cross motions heard on the same day, this court should transmute this unilateral proceeding into a joint cross-writ proceeding, without citing any authority for such an anomaly. Two counter summary judgment motions were filed separately in the court below and were heard on the same court day. Each party filed a statement of undisputed facts and proffered its own arguments as to why the court should grant summary judgment. The court denied both motions and entered two separate minute orders denying plaintiffs motion and defendants motion. 25

Real party elected not to appeal its denial within 20 days by writ.CCP 437c(M)(1) Petitioner filed a timely writ. Real party waived right to appeal by not timely filing. There is no court rule, statute, or reported case authorizing an appellate court to transmute a unilateral writ proceeding into a cross-writ proceeding simply because real party nestles a counter writ petition inside its opposition in petitioners unilateral writ proceeding. This is the third time real party tried through an anomaly to tweak court rules. Real party nestled its first summary judgment motion in an opposition to plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on Pleadings. After plaintiff objected to the anomoly the court below rejected the novel trick, holding real party must file its own motion and pay the fees. As shown in an excerpt from a 1/10/13 transcript the court admonished such conduct.

Transcr.1/10/13 13:1
Real party used the nestling technique again in trying to lift a stay imposed by this court on March 26, 2013-by labeling what should have called a motion-as an application. Instead of filing preliminary opposition to unilateral writ petition real party applied to the court to lift the stay. The court denied real partys second attempt to nestle a request for relief without complying with mandatory motion procedures. CRC 8.809; CCP 1109 For the third time real party nestled relief requests within its opposition to this writ. Petitioner asks the court to strike real partys improper request to consider irrelevant exhibits related to denial of real partys summary judgment--which is not part of this writ. Petitioner filed all papers related to denial of her motion for summary judgment and writ.Petitioner was not required to file papers related to real partys motion it did not appeal. Real party tries to cure its failure to appeal by asking the court to transmute this unilateral writ petition into a cross-writ petition praying for relief as if it had filed a writ. Cross-writ petitions are not authorized by any court rule, statute, or reported state case. Real party cavalierly prays for relief [leave to file a first amended complaint, order lifting the stay, and an order to set a trial date below]. A writ petition is required to seek relief 26

The court below lacked jurisdiction to transmute Stubblefields writ petition for review of an Appellate Division order into a bootstrapped cross-writ petition. There is no such anomaly under the law and there is no jurisdiction to create such anomaly. Counsel dumped over 1000 sheets of paper at the Appellate Court intake window, just like he dumped 1000 sheets at this courts intake window, all designed to confuse, obfuscate and divert the courts attention from the SOLE ISSUE ON THE WRIT! The other 1000 sheets of paper dumped at the Appellate Division all related to non-issues. Shipley objected to counsels improper tactic below [2 PE PE 502-PE 511]

These same objections Shipley made below are reasserted here. There simply is no jurisdiction to transmute one partys appellate writ proceeding into a cross-writ proceeding whereby an opponents issues are considered as if he had filed a writ. Stubblefield must live with the reality that his counsel never appealed his denial. This mistake cannot be cured by bootstrapping his issues into Shipleys writ case.

ARGUMENT IV COURT MUST APPLY LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Legislators expressed their stated goal to encourage injunction rather than evictions: (Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) Civil Code 798.88

The court has a duty to apply expressed legislative intent, not only in 798.88 but also its general abhorrence to summary eviction of the poor, elderly, and disabled residents from mobilehomes situated inside parks. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that, because of the high cost of moving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, the requirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes, and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of this chapter. (b) (1) The management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy, except for a reason specified in this article and upon the giving of written notice to the homeowner, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to sell or remove, at the homeowner's election, the mobilehome from the park within a period of not less than 60 days, which period shall be specified in the notice. Civil 798.55
27

ARGUMENT V CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI WAS NOT MET

Petitioner s statutory right to review was limited under CCP 904.3 which is one reason why the petition below was denied. CCP 1074. The court could only assure the Division pursued its regular authority,39 and did not exceed its jurisdiction. CCP 1068. The Court of Appeal was not at liberty to alter a decision from the Appellate Division based on a belief that it could render a better decision. It could only reverse if the ruling below exceeds the bounds of all reason. 40 Petitioner did not prove a manifest injustice would occur absent reversal of the order below. Blank 41 In Abelleira 42 this court pronounced the standard of review on certiorari is excess of jurisdiction: In our own recent decision, Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262, we said: "... some confusion exists with reference to what constitutes an excess, and what constitutes an error, in the exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seems well settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct such excess."... Neither court below exceeded jurisdiction. Even if the review standard were error rather than excess of jurisdiction on an appeal from a limited jurisdiction court, there was no error. Moreover, even if there were error it must be prejudicial to warrant reversal. 43 Petitioner failed to provide any evidence of prejudice or lack of remedies. GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTIORARI As the Sequioa court held, "the state has a long-standing involvement with mobile home regulation, the extent of which involvement is, by any standard, considerable."
44

The courts role is to protect an underrepresented class of poor, elderly and disabled citizens from losing their homes without just cause---not to carve out new remedies for park owners to fast track conversion of homes into proprietary cash cow rentals.
39

Melancon v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 698, 704 Denham v Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 41 Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; Tidewater Assn Oil v. Supr. Ct (1955) 43 C2d 815, 820; Keating v. Superior Court (1955) 45 C2d 440, 443 42 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 43 Gould v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (2011) 192 CA 4th. 1176, 1181 44 Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1282
40

28

CONCLUSION Petitioner failed to show entitlement to certiorari or satisfy all Omaha factors 45 to warrant reversal of the very well-reasoned Appellate Division Opinion below; i.e. 1) beneficial interest; 2) no adequate remedy at law; 3) irreparable injury to petitioner with no injury to real party. Petitioner failed to show there is any disagreement among courts on Civil 798.75 because that statute has always been used only against new purchasers or transferees who move into a mobile home without executing a park lease. Maury Priest provided uncontroverted evidence of exactly what legislators intended in 1987 when they revised 798.75; i.e. to limiting the scope to purchasers or transferees. One witness testimony is substantial evidence to support affirmance of the order46 To discount a witnesss testimony there must be physical impossibility, or the testimony is patently false without resorting to inference or deduction,47 or testimony must be contrary to scientific knowledge.
48

There is no evidence Priests testimony is incredible.

Accordingly, there is no need for this court to entertain a statutory analysis to guess at legislative intent in 1987 when we have a witness who heard and observed legislators by attending every session as a lobbyist when 798.75 was revised to add subdivision [c]-[d]. Legislators had every opportunity to revise 798.75, as recently as 2012 when they stated a goal of encouraging park owners to pursue lesser remedies of injunctions under Civil 798.88 rather than evicting the residents: (Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide the Legislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached without negative unintended consequences.) (Amended by Stats. 2012, Chap. 99 (AB 2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013) Shipley prays this honorable court will deny the petition and award her costs and fees. Evil prevails when good men [and women] do nothing. Edmund Burke. [18th century]
45 46 47 48

Omaha Indemnity v. Superior Court (Greinke) (1989) 209 CA 3d. 1266, 1269 Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal. 3d. 604, 614 Estate of Reed (1955) 132 CA2d. 732 In re SA (21010) 183 CA 4th. 1128,1148
29

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT [California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(~)(1)] Answer has 8,377 words counted by MS Word 2007 used to compose it.

APPENDED EXHIBITS
A. Palma Order Issued by Fourth District Cowt of Appeal, Div. 2 6/4/13

B. Declaration of Maury Priest submitted with summaryjudgment

C. Appellate Division fax of Williamson's verification on file in that court
D. PE548 * - newly manufactured declaration of Tom Parrish

Page 1 pages 2-7 pages 8-9 page 10

* Williamson replaced his inadrmssible verification [Exh. Cypage 91 with a

newly manufactured declaration signed by Tom Parrish and artfully substituted it for Williamson's verification on$le in the Appellate Division before submission. Williamson verified under oath that all exhibits he filed with the Petition to the Court of Appeal were "true copies of original documents
onfile with Respondent Appellate Division." [see Pet. to Court of Appeal, p. 51

This was a knowing misrepresentation to the Court of Appeal because Williamson knew he had altered the document, by switching the verification page at the end of the Opposition [his verification] to a newly manufactured verification by Tom Parrish---before copying it and submitting the document to the Court of Appeal as a "true copy" of an "original document on file with Respondent Appellate Division" and verified it was a "true copy" under oath. Williamson's inadmissible verification filed below, was artfully replaced with the newly manufactured Parrish verification before submitting copies to the Court of Appeal (as genuine Exhibits authenticated under oath by Williamson] to gain a strategic advantage by creating a pretext the opposition had been properly verified in the Appellate Division. For this reason alone the court should deny this petition to send a clear message that this court will not tolerate fraud on the court by submitting altered documents to gain a strategic advantage on appeal.

COUIt2,1' OF API'EN, STATE UF CALIFORNIA F0tJRTf-I DISTRICT

--

THE APPELLATE DlWSZON OF THE

SU13ERIORCOURT OF SAX BEW.4RDrrJO COLW"rr.
Respandent;

Thc County of Sm Bcrnardina

THE COtJRT
Goad cause appearing Iherefor,

Rral Party i n Interest is Invited to file a responsc ta the petition for writ uf rnotldatc on fiic hcrcin an crr bcfare June 24.2013, Tlilu response. if' any. may address any procedural or substantive issuc that may affcel this court's dctcrmination whether ur not to cxercjsr its discretion to entertain writ review of this ~natter. Unless goad cause is court may isrue a peremptory writ. silown.

Procccdimlgs in the superior caurt, as well as the appellate division, incltndiilg tile issuance of a rcmittit~u. m e STAYED pending fllrtller order arthis coun.

CE:

SCCilt%a~h~d list

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, CA 93103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb yahoo.com Real Estate roker Lic. #00853086

Attorney for Defendant Bonnie Shipley

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

11 / k b a Mountain Shadows ~ o b i l ; ome Community

1
Plaintiff,

v.

DECLARATION OF MAURICE A PFUEST SUPPORTNG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;filed with Separate Statement of

15

Undisputed Facts Declarations: Nancy Duffy McCarron, Bonnie Shipley; To be considered with D's Request for Defendant. Judicial Notice filed Dec. 26, 2012 (with MJOP) Date: January 28,2013 Time: 8:30 a.m. Honorable Donald Alvarez Dept. S-32

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19 20
21

22 23
24 25
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PRIEST. declare: 1 . MAURICE I attorney over not these statements based on personal knowledge. 1 1 make these statements in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment and opposing I motion for summary judgment. statements relate to the parties' dispute concerning 1 1 plaintiffs I legislative intent in enacting Civil Code in Attorney McCarron provided me with I
I,
A. 1.

am an

18,

a party, and make

2. 1

My

5798.75

1987.

1
1 I

copy of "Plaintiffs Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice" filed for a January 10,2013 hearing. (with attached Exhibits I -N). I have attached the relevant Exhibits L, M, and N addressed below.

3. From 1980 to 2008 I was a registered lobbyist at the State Capitol representing Golden State

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I I before it was passed and enacted by Civil Code Section 798.75. I was personally present during all
Mobilehome Owners League, Inc. (GSMOL) GSMOL opposed the bill which created Civil Code Section 798.75 and requested specific amendments to the bill which were made to the legislation jgislative process as I represented hearings on the bill and 1 have personal~~~~wledge,~of,the, --0DECLARATION OF MAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTING DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I 1

GSMOL and the interests of mobilehome owners in their opposition to the legislation. (see attachec Exhibit M (center of page M) reciting my name [Maury Priest] under "opposed").
4. This declaration is filed to clarifjl the legislative intent of the legislation based upon the events

which occurred during the legislative process.

5. The reasons for my opposition to the enactment as originally presented are explained below my
comments concerning the import of the recitations contained in the attached Exhibita L, M, N. 6. EXHIBIT L: (Assembly Bill No. 556) Introduced by Assembly Member Lewis February 10,1987
Bill 556 recited that it was "An act to amend Section 798.75 of the Civil Code, and to add

Section 17403.4 to the Financial Code, relating to mobilehomes." (see Exhibit L -first line).
Financial Code 3 17403.4 is part of a section governing escrow agents (current statute recited below)
FlNCNCLAL CODE DMtlOn6 E r a O W Monts Chapler 3 Escrow Rogulalionr fi \7403.4. Rsquirsmsnllorsll m

a n escrow inshdon$

Allwrinm escrow i&uc&us sad . P e s a o w tran&tted&cWnicdlyovaIbelntanuumdcdbyebrrycra~,pvhcba ~ prepndbyapasonsd,ieatotbisdivisionorbyapasonexemptbtbisdivioioarmdaSbctioa l 7 0 0 6 . & l 4 r ~ m r c d h ~ k r r I h a 10qxh *pc wbicb sbdl Pcbde the kaue nane and the 1~ of& d e p ~ e n th: t karrc ~ ~Ptbnitymdaartjcbtkpcnmk ~.Thir~clioafbrflnotapplytocrppkmeatalcaaow~ar~toucrownamctionr.

7 . FC tj 17403.4 requires written escrow instructions executed by a buyer or seller to include the license
name of the escrow agent involved in the sale or transfer, so as identify the involved escrow agent. 8. Bill 556 also was intended to prohibit any escrow agent from accepting "any escrow instruction involving the sale or transfer of a mobilehome, if the mobilehome is to remain in the park, unless the instruction includes a copy of a fully executed rental agreement.
9. The intent was to protect park owners from escrow agents who would complete a sale or transfer of

ownership without requiring an executed copy of a rental agreement, which would resuIt in a new occupant of the home (by sale or transfer) moving into the newly acquired home without first executing a rental agreement with the park managers. For example, a violent criminal could move in
10. The authority to use CC $798.75, specifically $798.75 [c] against a homeownerlresident who has r

pre-existing long-term rental agreement with the park owner, and has elected to exercise his or her statutory or contract right to have a co-resident share hisher home as a guest was not intended.
11. The Mobile Home Residency Law ("MRL") is divided into Articles governing specific facets

concerning the rights and duties of park owners, residents and occupants of mobile home parks.

-1-

DECLARATION OF MAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JllDGMENT

Article 7 relates to "Transfer of Mobilehome,or ~ o b i l e h o m e Park" and Civil Code 8798.75 relates specifically to the requirement of escrow agents to attach a copy of a rental agreement:
CIVIL CODE

Division 2 Properly Part 2 Real or lmmovable Property Title 2 Estates in Real Property Chapter 2.5 Mobilehome Resldency Law Article 7 Transfer of Mobilehome or Mobilehome Park 3 798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement

798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement (a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located in a park at the time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shall contain a copy of either a fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed by the park's management and the prospective homeowner that the parties have agreed to the terms and conditions of a rental agreement. (b) In the event the purchaser fails to execute the rental agreement, the purchaser shall not have any rights of tenancy. (c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has no rights of tenancy and is not otherwise entitled to occupy the mobilehome pursuant to this chapter, the occupant is considered an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for the surrender of the mobilehome park site, for a period of five days, the occupant refhses to surrender the site to the mobilehome park management. In the event the unlawful occupant fails to comply with the demand, the unlawFul occupant shall be subject to the proceedings set forth in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (d) The occupant of the mobilehome shall not be considered an unlawful occupant and shall not be subject to the provisions of subdivision (c) if all of the following conditions are present: (1.) The occupant is the registered owner of the mobilehome. (2) The management has determined that the occupant has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park; will comply with the rules and regulations of the park, based on the occupant's prior tenancies; and will comply with this article. (3) The management failed or refused to offer the occupant a rental agreement. Added Stats 1978 ch 1031 1. Amended Stats 1981 ch 667 8; Stats 1983 ch 519 9; Stats 1987 ch 323 I ; Stats 1989 ch 119 1; Stats 1990 ch 645 2, (SB 2340).
12. The clear language of Civil $798.75, and its location within Article 7, relating to "Transfers"

demonstrates that i4798.75 was intended to apply only in the context of transfers of mobilehomes.

13. The clear intent of adding Financial Code 17403.4 compelling identification of any escrow agent
involved in the sale or transfer of a mobilehome in a mobilhome park was to ensure escrow agents would comply with Civil 9798.75 because violations of escrow laws results in criminal liability. (see Exhibit L) bottom of first page reciting ("99 50"), "Since a violation of the escrow agents law
-2DECLARATION OF MAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

is a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program."

14. This bill did not authorize forcible detainer against any occupant or transferee. The sponsor's version containing references to forcible detainer were stricken. see Exh.M "Sponsor is negotiatin~

with Golden State Mobilehome Owners League (GSMOL) to clari3 the summary eviction procedm and will offer amendment to strike references to the forcible detainer which pertains to occupants 'that holdpossession contrary to the previous occupants." J represented GSMOL in o~aositi~n to ij

lsee Exh. M bottom of nave and Exb. M sl~owinp

15. The sponsor's amended version, striking references to forcible detainer was adopted. (Exh. N)

reciting in relevant part, "AB55,as amended, Lewis. Mobilehome sales: a n d

unlawfkl

occupant" and "he or she would be considered an unlawfbl occupant and would be q&&y-ek subject to summary proceedings." There can be no question that forcible
detainer could not be used as a remedy to evict an ''unlawfd occupant" who acquired a mobile

home by way of a sale or transfer without first executing a rental agreement with the park owner. Accordingly, any action for forcible detainer could not be prosecuted under Civil Code $798.75 as recited herein in Paragraph 11 above.

16. 1 declare the above statements to be true under penalty of perjury. Executed in Sacramento, CA.
My electronic or faxed signature shall have the same force and effect as an original signature.

-3DECLARATION OF MAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTRJG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & OPPOSING PLAM'I'IFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JIJDGMkWT

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All1 556

1 SECTION 1 . Section 798.75 of the Civil Coclc is 2 n~ner~clecl to I-end: 3 798.75. ( a ) All escrow, sale. or transfer a g r e e ~ n e r ~ t 4 irl\~olving a cnol,ilel\orne located in a pal.\<at the: tirne of =i the. sale. \wherc t h c mobilchome is t:o r e ~ n n i n in the park, 6 s l i ~ l contail1 l a provisioh signed 13)) t h e purchaser stating 7 thnt, by such sigr~ature h e or she has agreed to the. terms 8 of a rental agreernelit. A'copy of a fully executed r.ent81 9 agreement signed by both the purchaser ant1 park 1.0 nianagemerit will s;~ti.sfyhe requirements of this scction. (I)) 111 t h e e\lc..nt t l \ e purci~aserfails to execute tl~c.' 11 12 rental agree~l:erlt,the purcliaser sliall not: have ally rights 1.3 of ten;~ncy. 14 (c) 11.11l1e cv~...nt that a n occupnnt ol: ; I rnobileholne has 15 no rights o l teliarlcy ;rr~di.r rzot other~.r~ise entjtled 10 16 occrrl~ytl1c rt~ohilehori~s pll~:rt~rqrrt to this cltapl-el', the 17 occ~11:)a~it is cor~sidererla n urllau/f\ll acci~pantif, sfter 3 18 dernanrl is made for [:he s~.lrrerlderof the inol~ilehorne 1 9 parlt sile. l'ov 3 period of five d:ays. t h e occupar>k ref~iscs 20 io s1.1rr.etlrlcr tlie site l o the rnobilel~olr.le pndc 21 1nanapctnenL. 111tlie event the ~t~llnwf~,iI o c c u p ; ~ r fkils ~ t to 22 cor.nl>ly wit11 tile dernand, I.lle ~ ~ n l n \ v l u ncctlpailt l /fr 23 d e m d gtttky eC e h-eikle d e & t i 1 m n *~ t $ shnll be s~.tl~iecl 34 to the proceediligs set fort11 in Chnltter 4 (co1~nrnenci11~ 25 cvikli Section 1159) of Title. 3 of Part 3 of the CIode of Civil 26 Procedure. 27 (tl) 'T'he occupant of the I-nol~ilc!iolneshn11 not 1 . ~ 28 conside.recl ;III IIIII:~\YIU~ O C C C I RIICI ~ ~ sl~all ~ ~ not be sul~.iect 29 to the provisions of'sul~c.li~~ision ( c ) il' d l of the following 30 conditioris a - e present: 31 (J.) T h e occtlpnnl. i s tile regiskered owner of the 32 ~nol,ilelio~ne. -(* rZlke * F H S R ~ ~ ~ k~ & 4ejtlked j 3 T - i ~f)f)pfewd 4 33 34 &e eeettr e tt pwepeehe h e t t s e ~ r kftip ttel; 35 +-8 44% s e e q w A p s w d #e &k m&eh

1 regrilnh'on.~ of tlre par+, based an the occrrpant:r priar 2 l.ena~7cie.s; n11d i.tfill cornplJ~ wit11 tl~isar(.icIe. 3 (3) 'The rnsnagement failed or refused to ofrcr the 4 P ~ ~ ~ H ~ ~ 5 ~ ~ f t C ~ e G occtjp;~rll n renhl agreerl~er~t.

u . -.
W
e

36

(2) l'ltc rn:rnage~l~elll /,;IS dcte~mincd that the

37 occttj~:.iiit 112s the fi~~anci:rl ability to pny the rent arid 38 charges o f the poi.1; l.r.,ill c o j ~ ~ p1rit11 l j ~ tlre 1.tjles a l ~ d

.=<<v

LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERV~CE

SB CO COURTS

APPEALS

Appeals Division 401 North Arrowhea~l Am nue Sen Ben~:~rdlna, C4 92415-Om3

Fax
To:

Nancy Du?,' McCarron

.

From:

.-

Carolyn Solberg

--.."---

Fax: ---.Phone: -

805-965-3432

/Pages: - 2 Including Cover

-----.-. -l ~ l e a s Recycle e

-.---..---

Dabis:

6/21/2013

--------

Re: -

[ ] ~ o rReview

CI=:

.__1-11--

Durgent

n~laase Comment

a~leaga Reply

Thank You,

Carolyn Solberg Appeals Divisiai7 909-521-3671

SB GO COURTS
' L / ;

APPEALS

1 have road tho f~~.~aiii~-,-8~p~3;ti<m 1~ \ V ii t d P v h r r d W ~ ~ ~i lf l ia> lU ~R ~I ~ Y W71

contents.

1 am a aartb to this action. ?-hernirtterc wnt,+.A in the fi)rrgning ~ I A P I I ~ P ~ Tt n r m

my
Oltln &'30\T'104g@, Oxcepe

a G ta

t11030 fnOttCrb

whlah art; atal od s r i it~tinlnation

and L,cl;.:f, i d a d as to t . I a ~ a =I I . ~ L L G ~ IU ~ ~ l i uL ~ ~ W. I u I ILO b~ W V .

1 am

an 3;tllcer0 a partxr
Ps-r-.b:--,

c!k-kb1-(7-1-

an authorized agent fc~r the ~lartners'hir, of

6bi&id
L ~ W I ~ L P ~ L ~

y w n b j

uzad

b&laa

IAubll~~t&W L lV

Il#<Ahb bill3

verification for and on its behalf, and X make this verification fc r xhal. rt:nsan,
Iam infi)rmed and believe and on that ground allege that the rnxtters stated in the

foregoing dmument ate true.

The matters stated in the foregoing document %retrue of m y

own knomlcdge,

esrept n s tn thaw metters which are ~t.atzd on iriformatioli and I d i o f , and ac to

those m:itte:*s, I bciicve then1 to be truc.

I nrn onc: of the at1:orneys for Stubblefield Properties, a party to this action. Such
party is (3bsc:nt from the county of aforesaid where such attornc:r have their officcs,

and I make this verification for and on behalf ofthat party for that reaslxl.. I am
informed ar d believe and or, that ground allege that the matters stated in the

roregoing dscummt are tnJe, Executed on Ajlril 9, 20 13, at Highland, Cnlifon~ia

1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true ai~d correct.

ATTORNEY F OR STURBLEFIE1.D PROPX3R'I'IES

TOTAL P.002

4 -4+

I
VERIFICATION_

[
I

T have read the foregoing Opposition to Writ of Mandate, Section 1 1 1and 1u1o.r~ it
contents,
1 an a party to this action. The matters stated in thc foregoing document are true

to 111yown knowledge, except as to those m~tters which are stated on infonnation

and belief, cmdas to those matters I believe them t o be true,

1a n

an officer

a partner

an authorized agent for the partnership of

Slubblefield Properties, aparty to this action, and arn autl~orizedto ~nalce this verification for rtnd on its behalf*and I make this verification for that reason.

I
I

I am infom~ed and beiieve and on thkt ground allege that the matters stated in the
faregoing document are hue.
The matters stated in the foregoing docuinent are true of m y ow11knowledge,
except as to those-rngtterswhich are stated on information and belief, and as to
'

those matters, I believe them to be true.

Iainoneofthea~orneysfor

, a party to this action,

Such party is absent e u r n the county of aforesaid where such. attorney have their

offices, nnd I malce t11is verification for and or1 behalf of that party for that reason,
1 am infor~ned and '~elieveand on that ground allege that the matters stated in the Executed an April 2 , 2 0 1 3 , at Highland, California
1declare under penalty of perjury under the laws ofrhe State of California that the

foregoitig is true and con~.;ct,

TI-E

P A R ~ R S H OF ~P

STUBBLEFIELD PROFERTIES

PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO Case No. S2 1288

Stubblefield Properties v. Appellate Division of San Bernardino Superior Court Civ E058852 Bonnie Shipley v. San Bernardino County Superior Court CIVDS 13020 13 (Ap. Division) Stubblefield Properties v. Bonnie Shiplev UDDS 1204130 (limited jurisdiction court) I am counsel for Real Party. My address is 950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103 805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492 nancyduffysb~,vahoo.com On the date recited below I served the following document in the manner indicated below: ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE SUMPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
[ ] (By Personal Delivery) to the parties below as follows:

[ ] (By Fax) machine used complied with Rule 2003(3) and no error was reported by the machine. Per CRC,2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to maintain a record of same. faxed to: 714-546-7457 Law Firm of Hart, King & Coldren

[XI (By Mail) 1013a, 82015.5 CCP. I deposited copies in a pre-paid stamped envelope addressed to:
(original+l3 copies - blue cover) CA Supreme Court: Supreme Court of California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94 102 4 15-865-7000 Respondent Court: Fourth District Court of Appeals, Hon. Manuel Ramirez 3389 Twelfth Street Riverside, CA 92501 (95 1)782-2500 fax (95 1)248-0235

Appellate Division: Appellate Division, Hon. Gilbert G. Ochoa (served to clerk) 401 N. Arrowhead Ave. San Bernardino, CA 924 15-0063 (909)521-3574 fax (909)521-3563 Trial Court [S-321: Superior Court, Dept. S-32 Hon. Donald Alvarez (served to clerk) 303 W. Third St. San Bernardino, CA 924 15 (909)708-8690 Petitioner's Attorney: Hart King & Coldren c/o Robert Williamson 4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900 (714-432-8700) fax 714-546-7457 Santa Ana, CA 92707
I am familiar with mail collection in Santa Barbara. I deposited envelopes in the mail at Santa Barbara CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[x ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the above is true.
Executed in Santa Barbara CA on August 1,2013