The Salvadoran Civil War (1979 1992) was a conflict between the military-led gover nment of El Salvador and

the Farabundo Mart National Liberation Front (FMLN), a c oalition or 'umbrella organization' of five left-wing guerrilla groups. On Octob er 15, 1979 a coup, the first of three before the 1982 elections, led to the kil lings of anti-coup protesters by the government as well as anti-disorder protest ers by the guerillas who also attacked the government.[7] By January 1980 the left-wing political organizations united to form the CRM (Co ordinated Revolutionaries of the Masses) and a few months later the left-wing ar med groups united to form the DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate) which, fol lowing its merging with the Communist party in October 1980, was renamed the FML N[7] The full-fledged civil war lasted for twelve years and was extremely violent. It included the use of death squads, heavy military equipment, the recruitment of child soldiers, the deliberate terrorizing and targeting of civilians, as well a s other violations of human rights. The United States contributed to the conflict by providing large amounts of mili tary aid to the government of El Salvador during the Carter[8] and Reagan admini strations despite significant opposition from the American public.[9] In 1990 the UN began peace negotiations and on January 16, 1992 a final agreemen t, The Chapultepec Peace Agreement,[2] was signed by the combatants in Mexico Ci ty, formally ending the conflict. An unknown number of people "disappeared" during the conflict and the UN reports that more than 75,000 were killed.[10]

Contents [hide] 1 Background 2 Coup d'tat, repression and insurrection: 1979-1981 3 Interim government and continued violence: 1982-1984 4 Duarte presidency: 1984-1989 5 Death squads and peace accords: 1990-1992 6 Aftermath 6.1 Truth Commission 6.2 Military reform 6.3 National Civilian Police 7 Human Rights Commission of El Salvador 8 Post-war international litigation 9 See also 10 References 11 Further reading 11.1 Books 11.2 Journals / Academic studies 11.3 News 11.4 Documentaries 11.5 Lectures 12 External links Background[edit source]

General Carlos Humberto Romero, military president of El Salvador (1977-1979).

His presidency was characterized by increased civil unrest and government repres sion. El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America. As in many nations of La tin America, the history of El Salvador was characterized by marked socioeconomi c inequality.[11] In the late 19th century, coffee became a major cash crop for El Salvador, bringing in approximately 95% of the country's income, which was co nfined within only 2% of the population. Thus the population was sharply divided between a small powerful elite and an impoverished majority.[12] Extreme tensio ns between the classes grew through the 1920s, which were only compounded by a d rop in coffee prices following the stock-market crash of 1929.[13][14] In 1932, Augustin Farabundo Marti formed the Central American Socialist Party and led pea sants and indigenous people against the government. The government brutally supp ressed the uprising in what became known as the 1932 Salvadoran peasant massacre or simply "La Matanza" (the Massacre). In suppressing the uprising, the militar y murdered between 10,000 and 40,000 Indians. Marti was eventually arrested and put to death, and the military subsequently took power over the country.[15] The impact of "La Matanza" lasted for decades, as the event served to engender and reinforce feelings of strong distrust and animosity towards the government, the military and the wealthy land elite among the majority of the population. On July 14, 1969, an armed conflict erupted between El Salvador and Honduras ove r immigration disputes caused by Honduran land reform laws. The conflict (known as the Football War) lasted only four days, but had major long term effects for Salvadoran society. Trade was disrupted between El Salvador and Honduras, causin g tremendous economic damage to both nations. An estimated 300,000 Salvadorans w ere displaced due to battle, many of whom had been forcibly exiled from Honduras or forced to flee their homes. The government subsequently proved unable to sat isfy the economic needs of the refugees. The Football War also served to reinfor ce the political power of the military in El Salvador, stifling efforts at democ ratization in El Salvador and leading to heightened corruption. In the years fol lowing the Football War, the government increased military spending and expanded purchases of more modern and sophisticated weapons from sources such as Israel, Brazil, West Germany, and the United States in an attempt to modernize the Salv adoran Army and security forces. [16] The 1973 oil crisis led to rising food prices and decreased agricultural output due to the lack of obtainability of imported goods and petrol-based fertilizers. To stem the economic and political problems, a series of token land reform meas ures were implemented in the mid-1970s by President Arturo Armando Molina. The l argest measure, implemented in June 1976, called for the redistribution of appro ximately 59,000 hectares of land among 12,000 peasant families. The subsequent f ailure of these reforms due to opposition from the land elite, coupled with risi ng levels of repression against workers unions and left-leaning political partie s, only served to reinforce the already widespread discontent with the governmen t.[17] In elections held on 20 February 1977, General Carlos Humberto Romero, represent ing the National Conciliation Party (PCN), won against the center-left Revolutio nary Party of Democratic Unification (UNO). The elections had been marred by bla tant fraud and voter intimidation by government-sponsored paramilitary forces.[1 8] with massive protest and civil disturbance from the popular movement. The sho rt period between the election on 20 February 1977 and the formal inauguration o f President Romero on 1 July 1977 was characterized by high levels of social uph eaval and state repression. On 28 February 1977, eight days after the elections, a crowd of political demonstrators gathered in an area of downtown San Salvador near 'La Plaza Libertad' to protest the electoral fraud. Security forces arrive d on the scene and opened fire on the demonstrators. A massacre ensued as the se curity forces spread out for several hours and indiscriminately killed demonstra tors and bystanders alike. Estimates of the number of civilians killed range as high as 1,500.[19] President Molina blamed the protests on "foreign Communists,"

and in the immediate aftermath of the massacre a number of top UNO party member s were exiled from the country.[20] Repression continued after the inauguration of President Romero, as the governme nt implemented state-of-siege declarations, the suspension of civil liberties an d systematic use of torture, death squads, forced disappearance and extrajudicia l killing against the opposition. Government forces regularly abducted, tortured and killed civilian opponents of the government. Socorro Jurdico Cristiano (Chri stian Legal Assistance, a legal aid office within the Archbishop's office and El Salvador's leading human rights group at the time) documented the killings of 6 87 civilians by government forces in 1978. In 1979, the number of documented kil lings increased to 1,796.[21] The repression further alienated the population an d prompted many in the Catholic Church to denounce the government. The governmen t responded to the dissent of the Catholic Church by repressing the clergy.[22] Coup d'tat, repression and insurrection: 1979-1981[edit source]

Our efforts to emphasize the differences between the situation in El Salvador to day and the one prevailing in Nicaragua before July 1979 have had an impact on p ublic perceptions. Media coverage of El Salvador has been responsive to official government policies: greater emphasis on U.S. interests in the region, continuo us reference to Cuban involvement, understatement of the "human rights" dimensio n, effective use of the "extremists of the right and the left" formula. Therefor e, the current domestic environment is generally supportive of current policy as articulated for public consumption. --Dissent paper on El Salvador and Central America: Written With the Participati on of Members of the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Dep artment of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Congress[23] With tensions mounting and the country on the verge of an insurrection, the civi l-military Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno (Revolutionary Government Junta) JRG deposed President General Carlos Humberto Romero in a coup on October 15, 1979. The United States viewed the October 15th coup as a fortuitous event, given the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, and embraced the junta with large offers of military and economic aid. The United States allocated $5.7 million in military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1980, replacing Israel as El Salvad or's main source of military supplies. The aid was officially designated to "str engthen the Army's key role in reforms" in order to prevent at all costs "anothe r Nicaragua."[24][25] Inspired by left-wing politics, and wishing to project a m oderately-civilized Salvadoran world image, the JRG enacted some land reform (De cree No. 43, 6-XII-1979) restricting landholdings to a hundred-hectare maximum, nationalised the banking, coffee, and sugar industries, scheduled elections for February 1982, and disbanded the paramilitary private death squad ORDEN on Novem ber 6, 1979.[26] Measures aimed at the redistribution of land and wealth caused powerful factions within the military and the wealthy elite began to resist the policies of the J RG, and subsequently, the JRG failed to implement many of its promised reforms. The continuing violence and the JRG's lack of efficacy in implementing reforms b red widespread discontent with the government. Subsequently, tensions between ci vilians and conservative military sectors escalated. The process of political po larization triggered an unprecedented increase in violence. Left-wing organizati ons such as the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR), the Ligas Populares 28 de F ebrero (LP-28) and the Frente de Accin Popular Unificada (FAPU), among others, he ld public demonstrations, occupied ministries and organized strikes demanding th

e release of political prisoners. Economic measures and land tenure reforms were adopted. Organizations within the popular movement subsequently came together t o form the Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (CR14). All three civilian members of the junta resigned on January 3, 1980, along with 10 of the 11 cabinet ministers. On March 9, 1980, Jos Napolen Duarte became a memb er of the junta when the Christian Democratic Party expelled Dada Hizeri, Rubn Za mora and other leaders from its ranks. An unprecedented increase in death squad activities and government repression subsequently took place. On January 22, 198 0, the Salvadoran National Guard attacked a massive CR14 demonstration, describe d as peaceful, killing up to 50 people and wounding hundreds more.[27] On Februa ry 6, US ambassador Frank Devine informed the State Department that mutilated bo dies were appearing on roadsides as they had done in the worst days of the Romer o regime and that the extreme right was arming itself and preparing for a confro ntation in which it clearly expected to ally itself with the military.[28]

Archbishop Romero played a crucial role in the history of El Salvador between t he 1970s and 1980s. In February 1980, amidst escalating violence and repression, Archbishop scar Rome ro published an open letter to US President Jimmy Carter in which he pleaded wit h him to suspend its ongoing program of military aid to the Salvadoran regime. H e advised Carter that "Political power is in the hands of the armed forces. They know only how to repress the people and defend the interests of the Salvadoran oligarchy." Romero warned that US support would only "sharpen the injustice and repression against the organizations of the people which repeatedly have been st ruggling to gain respect for their fundamental human rights."[29] On 24 March 19 80, the Archbishop was assassinated while giving a mass a month after his reques t, and the day after he called upon Salvadoran soldiers and security force membe rs (National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police) not to follow orders o f their commanders to kill Salvadoran civilians, especially farm workers in conn ection with the newly announced Phase I of government agrarian reform. At his fu neral a week later, government-sponsored snipers in the National Palace and/or p osted on the periphery of the Gerardo Barrios Plaza in front of the National Cat hedral, were responsible for the shooting deaths/trampling massacre of some fort y-two mourners. On 7 May 1980, former Army Major Roberto D'Aubuisson was arrested with a group o f civilians and soldiers at a farm. The raiders found documents connecting him a nd the civilians as organizers and financiers of the death squad who killed Arch bishop Romero, and of plotting a coup d tat against the JRG. Their arrest provoked right-wing terrorist threats and institutional pressures forcing the JRG to rele ase Maj. D Aubuisson. In 1993, a U.N. investigation confirmed that Maj. D'Aubuisso n ordered Archbishop Romero assassinated.[30] In addition to repression and violence in cities, rural violence began to escala te. Exactly one week after the arrest of Roberto D'Aubuisson for the assassinati on of scar Romero, the National Guard and the newly reorganized paramilitary Orga nizacin Nacional Democrtica (ORDEN), with the cooperation of the Military of Hondu ras, carried out a large massacre at the Sumpul on May 14, 1980, in which an est imated 600 civilians were killed, mostly women and children. When the villagers were attempting to escape violence by crossing the river they were prevented fro m reaching the other side by the Honduran armed forces "and then killed by Salva dorian troops who fired on them in cold blood."[31] Assigning responsibility for the repression became the source of intense ideolog ical polarization in the United States. An internal US State Department memo fro

m 1981 stated that the "death squads" were "usually a euphemism for the security or military forces."[32] Over the course of 1980, the Salvadoran Army and three main security forces (National Guard, National Police and Treasury Police) kill ed 11,895 people.[21] Most of the victims were peasants, trade unionists, teache rs, students, journalists, human rights advocates, priests, and anyone working i n the interest of the poor majority. More people were killed due to state repres sion in El Salvador in 1980 than in all other nations of Latin America combined. The Salvadoran government subsequently gained recognition among human rights or ganizations as the hemisphere's most errant violator of human rights.[33] The US Bureau of Affairs later stated "The immediate goal of the Salvadoran army and security forces and of the United States in 1980, was to prevent a takeover b y the leftist-led guerrillas and their allied political organizations. At this p oint in the Salvadoran conflict the latter were much more important than the for mer. The military resources of the rebels were extremely limited and their great est strength, by far, lay not in force of arms but in their "mass organizations" made up of labor unions, student and peasant organizations that could be mobili zed by the thousands in El Salvador's major cities and could shut down the count ry through strikes."[34] Critics of US military aid charged that "it would legit imate what has become dictatorial violence and that political power in El Salvad or lay with old-line military leaders in government positions who practice a pol icy of 'reform with repression.'" A prominent Catholic spokesman insisted that " any military aid you send to El Salvador ends up in the hands of the military an d paramilitary rightest groups who are themselves at the root of the problems of the country."[35] On December 2, 1980, the Salvadoran National Guard raped and murdered four Ameri can nuns and a laywoman. Maryknoll missionary nuns Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, and U rsuline nun Dorothy Kazel, and laywoman Jean Donovan were on a Catholic relief m ission providing food, shelter, transport, medical care, and burial to death squ ad victims. U.S. military aid was briefly cutoff in response to the murders, but would be renewed within six weeks.[36] As government-sanctioned violence increased in both rural and urban settings, pr eviously non-militant mass political groups metamorphosed into guerrilla fronts. The five main insurgent groups subsequently formed unity agreements and merged, while increasing the scale of their attacks. In May 1980, the Salvadoran revolu tionary leadership met in Havana, forming the consolidated politico-military com mand, the DRU Direccin Revolucionaria Unificada (Unified Revolutionary Directorat e). In October, they founded the Farabundo Mart National Liberation Front (compri sing the Frente Farabundo Mart de Liberacin Nacional [FMLN] and the Frente Democrti co Revolucionario [FDR]) honoring insurgent hero Farabundo Mart, whom the Salvado ran National Guard killed in 1932. In late-1980, the FMLN announced plans for an insurrection against the government of El Salvador. The insurrection began on 1 0 January 1981 with the FMLN's first major attack. The attack established FMLN c ontrol of most of Morazn and Chalatenango departments for the war's duration. Att acks were launched on military targets throughout the country, leaving hundreds of people dead. Government sources reported that "at least 500 extremists" had d ied in the final offensive. After the onset of the offensive, United States Operational Planning and Assista nce Teams (OPATs) took over the training of the Salvadoran armed forces, logisti cs procedures, and Command and Control planning. At the Salvadoran High Command, U.S. military advisers prosecuted the war operationally and with intelligence.[ 37][38] In addition, the outgoing Carter administration increased military aid t o the Salvadoran armed forces to $10 million which included $5 million in rifles , ammunition, grenades and helicopters. In justifying these arms shipments, the administration claimed that the regime had taken "positive steps" to investigate the murder of four American nuns but this was disputed by US Ambassador, Robert E. White, who said that he could find no evidence the junta was "conducting a s

erious investigation."[39] During the same month, the JRG strengthened the state of siege, imposed by Presi dent Carlos Humberto Romero in May 1979, by declaring martial law and adopting a new set of curfew regulations.[40] Between January 12 and February 19, 1981, 16 8 persons were killed by the security forces for violating curfew.[41] In its effort to defeat the insurgency, the Salvadoran Armed Forces carried out a "scorched earth" strategy adopting tactics similar to those being employed by the counterinsurgency in neighboring Guatemala. These tactics where primarily de rived and adapted from U.S. strategy during the Vietnam War, and taught by Ameri can military advisors.[42] An integral part of the Salvadoran Army's counterinsu rgency strategy entailed "draining the sea" or "drying up the ocean," that is, e liminating the insurgency by eradicating it's support base in the countryside. T he primary target was the civilian population displacing them in order to remove any possible base of support for the rebels. The concept of "draining the sea" had its basis in a doctrine by Mao Zedong which emphasized that "The guerrilla m ust move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea."[43] Aryeh Neier, the ex ecutive director of Americas Watch wrote in a review of 1984: "This may be an ef fective strategy for winning the war. It is, however, a strategy that involves t he use of terror tactics bombings, strafings, shellings and, occasionally, massa cres of civilians."[44] Beginning in 1983, guerrilla strongholds were found by U .S. reconnaissance planes that relayed intelligence to the Salvadoran military.[ 45][46] The repression in rural areas resulted in the displacement of large portions of the rural populace, and many peasants fled. Of those who fled or were displaced, some 20,000 resided in makeshift refugee centers on the Honduran border in cond itions of poverty, starvation and disease.[47] The army and death squads forced many of them to flee to the United States but most were denied asylum.[48] On Ja nuary 17 18, 1981, a US congressional delegation visited the refugee camps in El S alvador on a fact finding mission and submitted a report to Congress. The delega tion concluded that "the Salvadoran method of 'drying up the ocean' is to elimin ate entire villages from the map, to isolate the guerrillas, and deny them any r ural base off which they can feed."[49] The government's systematic use of terror-tactics and violent repression against the civilian population escalated through 1981. Sources estimate that the army and security forces killed 16,000 civilians in total over the course of that yea r.[50][51] In its report covering 1981, Amnesty International identified "regula r security and military units as responsible for widespread torture, mutilation and killings of noncombatant civilians from all sectors of Salvadoran society." The report also stated that the killing of civilians by state security forces be came increasingly systematic with the implementation of more methodical killing strategies, which allegedly included use of a meat packing plant to dispose of h uman remains.[52] Between August 20 and August 25, 1981, eighty-three decapitati ons were reported. The murders were later revealed to have been carried out by a death squad using a guillotine.[53] In late-1981, the Atlacatl Battalion, organized in 1980 at the US Army School of the Americas in Panama, was deployed in the Morazn Department in the northeaster n part of the country, a major stronghold for the FMLN. On December 11, 1981, th e Atlacatl Battalion occupied the village of El Mozote and massacred at least 73 3 and possibly up to 1,000 unarmed civilians in what became known as the El Mozo te Massacre.[54] The Atlacatl soldiers accused the adults of collaborating with the guerrillas. The field commander said they were under orders to kill everyone , including the children, who he asserted would just grow up to become guerrilla s if they let them live. "We were going to make an example of these people," he said.[55] Despite having been initially denied by the Reagan Administration, det ails became more widely known and the event became recognized as one of the wors

t atrocities of the conflict. Interim government and continued violence: 1982-1984[edit source]

Families looking for "disappeared" relatives in the "Book of Missing," Human Ri ghts Commission Office, San Salvador, 1982. Eli Reed

At a Christian Democratic Party press conference during the Salvadoran war (198 2) In 1982, the FMLN began calling for a peace settlement that would establish a "g overnment of broad participation." The Reagan administration said they wanted to create a Communist dictatorship.[56] Elections were interrupted with right-wing paramilitary attacks and FMLN-suggested boycotts. El Salvador's National Federa tion of Lawyers, which represented all of the country's bar associations, refuse d to participate in drafting the 1982 electoral law. The lawyers said that the e lections couldn't possibly be free and fair during a state of siege that suspend ed all basic rights and freedoms. The News-Gazette, the country's English-langua ge conservative newspaper supported the national bar association's stand.[57] Pursuant with measures put in place by the JRG on October 18, 1979, elections fo r an interim government were held on April 29, 1982. The Legislative Assembly vo ted on three candidates nominated by the armed forces, lvaro Alfredo Magaa Borja, leader of the moderate Democratic Action and thus effectively politically indepe ndent, was elected by 36 votes to 17, ahead of the Nationalist Republican Allian ce (ARENA) and Party of National Conciliation candidates. Roberto D'Aubuisson ac cused Jaime Abdul Gutirrez Avendao of imposing on the Assembly "his personal decis ion to put lvaro Alfredo Magaa Borja in the presidency" in spite of a "categorical no" from the ARENA deputies. Magana was sworn into office on 2 May. Decree No. 6 of the National Assembly suspended phase III of the implementation of the agra rian reform, and was itself later amended. The Apaneca Pact was signed on 3 Augu st 1982, establishing a Government of National Unity, whose objectives were peac e, democratization, human rights, economic recovery, security and a strengthened international position. An attempt was made to form a transitional Government w hich would establish a democratic system. Lack of agreement among the forces tha t made up the Government and the pressures of the armed conflict prevented any s ubstantive changes from being made during Magaa's Presidency.[58] The activities of the insurgency continued during the period of interim governme nt, as did government repression. The FMLN attacked the Ilopango Air Force Base, destroying six of the Air Forces 14 Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters, five of its 18 Dassault Ouragan aircraft and three C-47s.[59] The guerrillas stepped up the ir activities against economic targets. Between February and April, a total of 4 39 acts of sabotage were reported.[60] The number of acts of sabotage involving explosives or arson rose to 782 between January and September.[61] The United St ates Embassy estimated the damage to the economic infrastructure at US$98 millio n.[62] FMLN also carried out large-scale operations in the capital city and temp orarily occupied urban centres in the countrys interior. According to some repor ts, the number of rebels ranged between 4,000 and 5,000; other sources put the n umber at between 6,000 and 9,000.[63] Systemic and widespread human rights violations by the Salvadoran military and s ecurity forces continued at high levels during the period of interim government. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that on May 24, 1982, a

clandestine cemetery containing the corpses of 150 disappeared persons was disco vered near Puerta del Diablo, Panchimalco, approximately twelve kilometers from San Salvador.[64] On June 10, 1982, almost 4,000 Salvadoran troops carried out a "cleanup" operation in the rebel-controlled Chalatenango province. Over 600 civ ilians were reportedly massacred during the Army sweep. The Salvadoran field com mander acknowledged that an unknown number of civilian rebel sympathizers or "ma sas" were killed, while declaring the operation a success.[65] 19 days later, th e Army massacred 27 unarmed civilians during house raids in a San Salvador neigh borhood. The woman were raped and murdered. Everyone was dragged from their home s into the street and then executed. "The operation was a success," said the Sal vadoran Defense Ministry communique. "This action was a result of training and p rofessionalization of our officers and soldiers."[66] During 1982 and 1983, government forces killed approximately 8,000 civilians a y ear.[67] Although the figure is substantially less than the figures reported by human rights groups in 1980 and 1981, targeted executions as well as indiscrimin ate killings nonetheless remained an integral policy of the army and internal se curity forces, part of what Professor William Stanley of the University of New M exico has described as a strategy of mass murder designed to terrorize the civilia n population as well as opponents of the government.[68] General Adolfo Blandn, t he Salvadoran armed forces chief of staff during much of the 1980s, has stated, "Before 1983, we never took prisoners of war." [69] By January 1984, Americas Watch observed that the human rights situation was "as bad as ever" and that "the principal reason that those abuses continue at such a high rate at a point when one would guess the armed forces should have run out of politically suspect persons to murder is that the murders instill terror. Te rror is the means whereby the armed forces maintain their authority."[70] On February 7, 1984, nine labor leaders, including all seven top officials of on e major federation, were arrested by the Salvadoran National Police and sent to a military court. The arrests were part of Duarte's moves to crackdown on labor unions after more than 80 trade unionists were detained in a raid by the Nationa l Police. The police confiscated the union's files and took videotape mugshots o f each union member. During a 15 day interrogation, the nine labor leaders were beaten during late night questioning and were told to confess to being guerrilla s. They were then forced to sign a written confession while blindfolded. They we re never charged with being guerrillas but the official police statement said th ey were accused of planning to "present demands to management for higher wages a nd benefits and promoting strikes, which destabilize the economy." A U.S. offici al said the embassy had "followed the arrests closely and was satisfied that the correct procedures were followed."[71] In February, U.S. military advisers instructed the Salvadoran Air Force to inten sify bombing raids in conflictive and rebel-held zones. The Air Force was aided by new U.S. reconnaissance flights that supply it with improved intelligence. In April, the Roman Catholic Church's human rights office, the Tute-la Legal, said the number of civilians killed during military missions rose from 195 in Februa ry to more than 300 in March. Maria Julia Hernandez, the director of the office, noted a sudden increase in bombing accuracy since the new U.S. reconnaissance f lights began in February. She suggested the Air Force was using intelligence der ived from U.S. reconnaissance to attack civilians suspected of being rebel sympa thizers.[72] Also in April, residents and displaced people from the Cuscatlan and Cabanas pro vinces said the Salvadoran Air Force had increased indiscriminate bombing raids and that the attacks had become much more accurate in recent weeks. "They used t o bomb and it wouldn't land near to the houses, but now they have something to d etect exactly where we are," a displaced person from Guazapa said. "No one is sa fe in their homes, no one is safe anywhere." "Towns such as El Zapote, El Coroza

l, Tres Cevas, Palo Grande, and Mirandilla no longer exist," another woman conte nded. Chris Hedges, a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor who was at one village in the area, said it resembled a ghost town and that every home app eared to have been bombed and strafed by machine-gun fire. Those who escaped sai d that leaving the free fire zones was just as dangerous. "When we fled," said o ne woman whose children and husband were killed in a bombing attack, "the Army w as not on the road, so we survived. If they see you coming down from the volcano , they will kill you."[73] The Air Force reportedly used incendiary bombs such a s Napalm and white phosphorus to burn villages to the ground and charr large tra cts of land before Army sweeps.[74] In the preceding months, the Salvadoran military had used the Red Cross's humani tarian activities to locate and attack displaced people who gathered at clinics to receive medical assistance and food. The United States Embassy and the Salvad oran government argued that most of the civilians killed were rebel sympathizers (masas). Although, the practice was later terminated by U.S. advisers after pro tests by Americas Watch.[75][76] In 1984, the U.S. Embassy had characterized the civilians residing in FMLN zones as "masas," a term that originated with the guerrillas. According to the Embass y, these masas were "something other than innocent civilian bystanders" because it said they provided "logistical support" for the guerrillas and "mingled" with them. As best the Americas Watch could determine, the "logistical support" cons isted principally in maintaining their traditional subsistence farming, thereby providing themselves and the guerrillas with a source of food. "Mingling" consis ted principally in trying to remain in or near their original communities and no t joining the vast refugee and displaced person populations. Accordingly, Americ as Watch criticized the Embassy's stand. We said that calling these civilians "s omething other than innocent civilian bystanders" implied they were legitimate t argets for attack. Moreover, Salvadoran and U.S. officials continue to attempt t o justify attacks on civilians. Americas Watch, 1985[77] Duarte presidency: 1984-1989[edit source]

Mesa Grande refugee camp in Honduras 1987 In 1984 elections, Christian Democrat Jos Napolen Duarte won the presidency (with 54% of the votes) against Army Major Roberto d Aubuisson, of the Nationalist Repub lican Alliance (ARENA). The elections were held under military rule amidst high levels of repression and violence, however, and candidates to the left of Duarte 's brand of Christian Democrats were excluded from participating.[78] Fearful of a d Aubuisson presidency for public relations purposes, the CIA financed Duarte's campaign with some two million dollars.[79] After President Jos Napoleon Duarte's election in 1984, human rights abuses at th e hands of the army and security forces continued, but declined due to modificat ions made to the security structures. The policies of the Duarte government atte mpted to make the country's three security forces more accountable to the govern ment by placing them under the direct supervision of a Vice Minister of Defense, but all three forces continued to be commanded individually by regular army off icers, which, given the command structure within the government, served to effec tively nullify any of the accountability provisions.[80][81] The Duarte governme nt also failed to decommission personnel within the security structures that had been involved in gross human rights abuses, instead simply dispersing them to p

osts in other regions of the country.[82] While reforms were being made to the security forces, the army continued to mass acre unarmed civilians in the country side. An Americas Watch report noted that the Atlacatl Battalion killed 80 unarmed civilians in Cabanas in July, 1984 and carried out another massacre one month later, killing 50 displaced people in the Chalatenango province.[83] The woman were raped and then everyone was systemati cally executed.[84]

ERP combatant Perqun 1990 Through 1984 and 1985, the Salvadoran Armed Forces enacted a series of "civic-ac tion" programs in Chalatenango province. This consisted of the establishment of "citizen defense committees" to guard plantations and businesses against attacks by insurgents and the establishment of a number of free-fire zones. These measu res were implemented under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Per ez, a former director of the Treasury Police and political ally of Major Roberto d'Aubuisson who had previously been exiled to the US Army War College for mutin y.[85] By January 1985 Ochoa's forces had established 12 free-fire zones in Chal atenango in which any inhabitants unidentified by the army were deemed to be ins urgents. Ochoa stated in an interview that areas within the free fire zone were susceptible to indiscriminate bombings by the Salvadoran Air Force. Ochoa referr ed to this strategy as the "Israeli Solution," as it was adapted from Israeli st rategy employed in South Lebanon. Ochoa's forces were implicated in a massacre o f about 40 civilians in an Army sweep through one of the free fire zones in Augu st 1985. Ochoa refused to permit the Red Cross to enter these areas to deliver h umanitarian aid to the victims.[86] Ochoa's forces reportedly uprooted some 1,40 0 civilian rebel supporters with mortar fire between September and November 1984 .[87] By 1985, military repression had succeeded in disarticulating most of the trade unions and mass political organizations. Many of the survivors from within these organizations were forced to flee the country or join the rebels.[88] A nationa l opinion poll conducted in 1986 by the Catholic University showed that 10% of t he population believed that the country was advancing to democracy; 28% said con ditions had improved but that repression continued; 45% thought there was no sig nificant change; and 18% believed freedom and democracy were diminishing.[89] In February 1986, tens of thousands of Salvadorans marched through the streets of San Salvador to protest Duarte's economic Austerity plan. The economic package i ncluded a currency devaluation, increases in gas prices, import taxes, import re strictions and a few price freezes on basic goods. The Austerity measures were d esigned by U.S. economic advisers who warned American aid might be withheld if t he programs were not implemented.[90] During the Central American Peace Accords in 1987, the FMLN demanded that all de ath squads be disbanded and the members be held accountable. In October 1987, th e Salvadoran Assembly approved an amnesty for civil-war related crimes. The Amne sty law required the release of all prisoners suspected of being guerrillas and guerrilla sympathizers. Pursuant with these laws, 400 political prisoners were r eleased. Insurgents were given a period of fifteen days to turn themselves over to the security forces in exchange for amnesty.[91] Despite amnesty being grante d to guerillas and political prisoners, amnesty was also granted to members of t he army, security forces and paramilitary who were involved in human rights abus es.[92] Overall levels of state repression began to escalate again following the 1987 am nesty, reaching levels comparable to the pre-1985 period. As had occurred in the

1970s, the 1988 elections were followed by escalated government violence, as pa rt of a deliberate campaign to terrorize voters and influence election results. An Amnesty International report published in October 1988 titled, El Salvador De ath Squads: A Government Strategy, concluded that "Forces involved include all b ranches of the Salvadorian security apparatus, including the navy, air force and army and the security services, --- including the National Guard, the National Police and the Treasury Police. Personnel from these units have carried out tort ure and extrajudicial execution and have been responsible for "disappearances" both while in uniform and in plain clothes. The death squad style is to operate in secret but to leave mutilated bodies of victims as a means of terrifying the population. Victims are customarily found mutilated, decapitated, dismembered, strangled or showing marks of torture or rape." The report also concluded that c landestine paramilitary units were used so the government wouldn't take the heat for state terrorism.[93] According to Maria Julia Hernandez, director of the Ro man Catholic Church's human rights office, death squad killings always escalated when opposition activity increased and the government couldn't control it.[94] Angered by the results of the 1988 elections and the military's use of terror ta ctics and voter intimidation, the FMLN launched a major offensive with the aim o f unseating the Christiani government on November 11, 1989. This offensive broug ht the epicenter of fighting into the wealthy suburbs of San Salvador for essent ially the first time in the history of the conflict, as the FMLN began a campaig n of selective assassinations against political and military officials, civil of ficials, and upper-class private citizens. The government retaliated with a rene wed campaign of repression, primarily against activists in the democratic sector .[95] The non-governmental Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (CDHES) counted 2, 868 killings by the armed forces between May 1989 and May 1990.[96] In addition, the CDHES stated that government paramilitary organizations illegally detained 1,916 persons and disappeared 250 during the same period.[97] As in the early 19 80s, the University of Central America fell under attack from the army and death squads. On 16 November 1989, five days after the beginning of the FMLN offensiv e, the Atlacatl Battalion entered the campus of the University of Central Americ a in uniform and summarily executed six Jesuit priests Ignacio Ellacuria, Segundo Montes, Ignacio Martin-Baro, Joaqun Lpez y Lpez, Juan Ramn Moreno, and Amando Lpez and their housekeepers (a mother and daughter, Elba Ramos and Celia Marisela Ramos). In the middle of the night, the six priests were dragged from their beds on the campus, machine gunned to death and their corpses mutilated. The mother and dau ghter were found shot to death in the bed they shared.[98] The Atlacatl Battalio n was reportedly under the tutelage of U.S. special forces just 48 hours before the killings.[99] The liberation theology bishops were declared an enemy of the state for speaking out against state terror and working for the "preferential op tion of the poor."[100] By the late 1980s, 75% of the population lived in poverty.[101] The living stand ards of most Salvadorans declined by 30% since 1983. Unemployment or underemploy ment increased to 50%.[102] Most people, moreover, still didn't have access to c lean water or healthcare. The armed forces were feared, inflation rose almost 40 %, capital flight reached an estimated $1 billion, and the economic elite avoide d paying taxes.[103] Despite nearly $3 billion in American economic assistance, per capita income declined by one third.[101] American aid was distributed to ur ban businesses although the impoverished majority received almost none of it.[10 3] The Congressional Research Service said the "ESF [U.S. Economic Support Fund] in Central America is basically a security/military program undertaken to prop up the existing regimes and the elites who support them.."[104] The United State s had been providing most of the country's budget and underwriting almost all go vernment policies.[103][105] The concentration of wealth was even higher than be fore the U.S.-administered land reform program. The agrarian law generated windf all profits for the economic elite and buried the cooperatives in debts that lef t them incapable of competing in the capital markets. The oligarchs often took b ack the land from bankrupt peasants who couldn't obtain the credit necessary to

pay for seeds and fertilizer.[106] Although, "few of the poor would dream of see king legal redress against a landlord because virtually no judge would favor a p oor man."[103] By 1989, 1% of the landowners owned 41% of the tillable land, whi le 60% of the rural population owned 0%.[101] Death squads and peace accords: 1990-1992[edit source]

President Alfredo Cristiani, Sept 1989

ERP combatants Perqun 1990 After 10 years of war, more than one million people had been displaced out of a population of 5,389,000. 40% of the homes of newly displaced people were complet ely destroyed and another 25% were in need of major repairs.[107] Death squad ac tivities further escalated in 1990, despite a U.N. Agreement on Human Rights sig ned July 26 by the Cristiani government and the FMLN.[108] In June 1990, U.S. Pr esident George Bush announced an "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" to imp rove the investment climate by creating "a hemisphere-wide free trade zone."[109 ] "For the first time, all five of the countries are led by presidents who were el ected in contests widely considered free and fair," the Washington Post reported from Guatemala City. It is true, the Post continues, that "conservative politic ians in Central America traditionally represented the established order despite their countries' grossly distorted income patterns. But the wave of democracy th at has swept the region in recent years appears to be shifting politicians' prio rities," while observing that, "The new leaders...are committed to free-market e conomics." The Post explains, "Neither in the plan nor in the Declaration of Ant igua' was there any mention of land reform or suggestion of new government socia l welfare programs to help the poor." Rather, they are adopting "a trickle-down approach to aid the poor." "The idea is to help the poor without threatening the basic power structure," a Central American economist observes.[110] Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas said he believed President Cristiani was committed to main taining the system, favoring neoliberal programs that had been increasing povert y.[111] President Bush authorized the release of $42.5 million in military aid to the Sa lvadoran armed forces on January 16, 1991.[112] In late January, the Usulutn offi ces of the Democratic Convergence, a coalition of left-of-center parties, were a ttacked with grenades. On February 21, a candidate for the Democratic National U nity (UDN) party and his pregnant wife were assassinated after ignoring death sq uad threats to leave the country or die. On the last day of the campaign, anothe r UDN candidate was shot in her eye when Arena party gunmen opened fire on campa ign activists putting up posters. Despite fraudulent elections orchestrated by A rena through voter intimidation, sabotage of polling stations by the Arena-domin ated Central Elections Council and the disappearing of tens of thousands of name s from the voting lists, the official U.S. observation team declared them "free and fair."[113] Death squad killings and disappearances remained steady throughout 1991 as well as torture, false imprisonment, and attacks on civilians by the Army and securit y forces. Opposition politicians and members of church and grassroots organizati ons representing peasants, women and repatriated refugees suffered constant deat h threats, arrests, surveillance and break-ins all year. The FMLN killed two wou

nded U.S. military advisers and carried out indiscriminate attacks, kidnappings and assassinations of civilians. The war intensified in mid-1991, as both the ar my and the FMLN attempted to gain the advantage in the United Nations-brokered p eace talks prior to a cease-fire. Indiscriminate attacks and executions by the a rmed forces increased as a result.[114] Eventually, by April 1991, negotiations resumed, resulting in a truce that successfully concluded in January 1992, bring ing about the war's end.[citation needed] On 16 January 1992, the Chapultepec Pe ace Accords were signed in Chapultepec Castle, Mexico City, to bring peace to El Salvador.[115] The Armed Forces were regulated, a civilian police force was est ablished, the FMLN metamorphosed from a guerrilla army to a political party, and an amnesty law was legislated in 1993.[116] Aftermath[edit source] The peace process set up under the Chapultepec Accords was monitored by the Unit ed Nations from 1991 until June 1997 when it closed its special monitoring missi on in El Salvador. During the 2004 elections, White House Special Assistant Otto Reich gave a phone -in press conference at ARENA party headquarters. He reportedly said he was worr ied about the impact an FMLN win could have on the country's "economic, commerci al, and migratory relations with the United States." In February 2004, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega told voters to "consider what kind of a relati onship they want a new administration to have with us." He met with all the cand idates except Schafik Handal, the FMLN candidate. This prompted 28 US Congress m embers to send a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell saying Mr. Noriega "c rossed a boundary" and that his remarks were perceived as "interference in Salva doran electoral affairs." A week later, two US congressmen blasted Reich's comme nts as inflammatory.[117] Truth Commission[edit source] Main article: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador At war's end, the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador registered more than 2 2,000 complaints of political violence in El Salvador, between January 1980 and July 1991, 60 percent about summary killing, 25 percent about kidnapping, and 20 percent about torture. These complaints attributed almost 85 percent of the vio lence to the Salvadoran Army and security forces alone. The Salvadoran Armed For ces were accused in 60 percent of the complaints, the security forces (i.e. the National Guard, Treasury Police and the National Police) in 25 percent, military escorts and civil defense units in 20 percent of complaints, the death squads i n approximately 10 percent, and the FMLN in 5 percent. The Truth Commission coul d collect only a significant sample of the full number of potential complaints, having had only three months to collect it.[118] The report concluded that more than 70,000 people were killed, many in the course of gross violation of their h uman rights. More than 25 per cent of the populace was displaced as refugees bef ore the U.N. peace treaty in 1992.[119][120] The statistics presented in the Truth Commission's report are consistent with bo th previous and retrospective assessments by the international community and hum an rights monitors, which documented that the majority of the violence and repre ssion in El Salvador was attributable to government agencies, primarily the Nati onal Guard and the Salvadoran Army.[121][122][123] A 1984 Amnesty International report stated that that many of the 40,000 people killed in the preceding five y ears had been murdered by government forces, who openly dumped the mutilated cor pses, in an apparent effort to terrorize the population.[124][125] Despite mostly killing peasants, the Government readily killed any opponent they suspected of sympathy with the guerrillas clergy (men and women), church lay wo

rkers, political activists, journalists, labor unionists (leaders, rank-and-file ), medical workers, liberal students and teachers, and human-rights monitors.[12 6] The State's terrorism was affected by the security forces, the Army, the Nati onal Guard, and the Treasury Police;[127][128] yet it was the paramilitary death squads who gave the Government plausible deniability of, and accountability for , the political killings. Typically, a death squad dressed in civilian clothes a nd traveled in anonymous vehicles (dark windows, blank license plates). Their te rrorism comprised publishing future-victim death lists, delivering coffins to sa id future victims, and sending the target-person an invitation to his/her own fu neral.[129][130] Cynthia Arnson, a Latin American-affairs writer for Human Right s Watch, says: the objective of death-squad-terror seemed not only to eliminate opponents, but also, through torture and the gruesome disfigurement of bodies, t o terrorize the population.[131] In the mid-1980s, state terror against Salvador ans became open indiscriminate bombing from military airplanes, planted mines, a nd the harassment of national and international medical personnel; all indicate that, although death rates attributable to the death squads have declined in El Salvador since 1983, non-combatant victims of the civil war have increased drama tically.[132] Though the violations of the FMLN accounted for five percent or less of those do cumented by the Truth Commission, the FMLN continuously violated the human right s of many Salvadorans and other individuals identified as right-wing supporters, military targets, pro-government politicians, intellectuals, public officials, and judges. These violations included kidnapping, bombings, rape, and killing.[1 18] Military reform[edit source] In accordance with the peace agreements, the constitution was amended to prohibi t the military from playing an internal security role except under extraordinary circumstances. During the period of fulfilling of the peace agreements, the Min ister of Defense was General Humberto Corado Figueroa. Demobilization of Salvado ran military forces generally proceeded on schedule throughout the process. The Treasury Police and National Guard were abolished, and military intelligence fun ctions were transferred to civilian control. By 1993 nine months ahead of schedu le the military had cut personnel from a wartime high of 63,000 to the level of 32,000 required by the peace accords. By 1999, ESAF strength stood at less than 15,000, including uniformed and non-uniformed personnel, consisting of personnel in the army, navy, and air force. A purge of military officers accused of human rights abuses and corruption was completed in 1993 in compliance with the Ad Ho c Committee's recommendations.[citation needed] National Civilian Police[edit source] The new civilian police force, created to replace the discredited public securit y forces, deployed its first officers in March 1993, and was present throughout the country by the end of 1994. As of 1999, the PNC had over 18,000 officers. Th e PNC faced many challenges in building a completely new police force. With comm on crime rising dramatically since the end of the war, over 500 PNC officers had been killed in the line of duty by late 1998. PNC officers also have arrested a number of their own in connection with various high-profile crimes, and a "puri fication" process to weed out unfit personnel from throughout the force was unde rtaken in late 2000.[133] Human Rights Commission of El Salvador[edit source] In 1986, a major earthquake punctuated the war; and for three years fighting les sened and calls for negotiation grew within the context of the rising social mov ement, The National Debate for Peace; also the Human Rights Commission of El Sal vador-non governmental (CDHES) published a 165-page report documenting the routi

ne use of forty types of torture applied to political prisoners in the Mariona m en's prison, and that U.S. military advisers often supervised and sometimes part icipated in said interrogations.[134][135] On 26 October 1987, Herbert Ernesto Anaya, head of the CDHES, was assassinated. His killing provoked four days' of political protest during which his cadaver wa s displayed before the U.S. embassy and then before the Salvadoran armed forces headquarters. The National Union of Salvadoran Workers said: Those who bear sole responsibility for this crime are Jos Napolen Duarte, the U.S. embassy ... and th e high command of the armed forces. In its report the Commission on the Truth fo r El Salvador, established as part of the El Salvador peace agreement, stated th at it could not establish for sure whether the death squads, the Salvadoran Army or the FMLN was responsible for Anaya's death. Moreover, the FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) also protested M r. Anaya's assassination by suspending negotiations with the Duarte Government o n 29 October 1987. The same day, Reni Roldn resigned from the Commission of Natio nal Reconciliation, saying: The murder of Anaya, the disappearance of university labor leader Salvador Ubau, and other events do not seem to be isolated inciden ts. They are all part of an institutionalized pattern of conduct. Mr. Anaya's as sassination evoked international indignation: the West German Government, the We st German Social Democratic Party, and the French Government asked President Dua rte to clarify the circumstances of the crime. United Nations Secretary General, Javier Prez de Cullar, Americas Watch, Amnesty International, and other organizat ions protested against the assassination of the leader of the Human Rights Commi ssion of El Salvador.[136] Post-war international litigation[edit source] Groups seeking investigation or retribution for actions during the war have soug ht the involvement of other foreign courts. In 2008 the Spanish Association for Human Rights and a California organization called the Center for Justice and Acc ountability jointly filed a lawsuit in Spain against former President Cristiani and former defense minister Larios in the matter of the 1989 slaying of several Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. The lawsuit accused Cristia ni of a cover-up of the killings and Larios of participating in the meeting wher e the order to kill them was given; the groups asked the Spanish court to interv ene on the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.[137] Long after the war, in a U.S. Federal Court, in the case of Ford vs. Garca the fa milies of the murdered Maryknoll nuns sued the two Salvadoran generals believed responsible for the killings, but lost; the jury found Gen. Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, ex-National Guard Leader and Duarte's defense minister, and Gen. Jos G uillermo Garcia defense minister from 1979 to 1984, not responsible for the killin gs; the families appealed and lost, and, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear their final appeal. A second case, against the same generals, succeeded in the same Federal Court; the three plaintiffs in Romagoza vs. Garca won a judg ment exceeding US$54 million compensation for having been tortured by the milita ry during El Salvador's Civil War. The day after losing a court appeal in October, 2009, the two generals were put into deportation proceedings by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a t the urging of U.S. Senators Richard Durbin (Democrat) and Tom Coburn (Republic an), according to the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA). Those deporta tion proceedings as of May, 2010 have been stalled, however; one of the plaintif fs in the case believes the U.S. CIA/DOD protecting its "assets" has stymied the Obama Justice Department, for now. The Spanish judge who issued indictments and arrest warrants for 20 former membe rs of the Salvadoran military, charged with murder, Crimes Against Humanity and

Terrorism requested that US agencies declassify documents related to the killing s of the Jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter but were denied access. In his report, Judge Velasco writes: "The agencies in charge of making the information public have identified 3,000 o ther documents that remain secret and are not available; the reasoning given is that privacy is needed to protect sources and methods. Many of the documents, fr om the CIA and the Defense Department, are not available "