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R v Glennon

Legislation:

s. 568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.):


"The Full Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it thinks ... that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice ..." Cases:

Jago v. District Court (1989) 168C.L.R.:


'a permanent stay should be ordered only in an extreme case'

R. v. Lee (12) and Reg. v. Benz:


Special leave to appeal should be granted to the Crown only in very exceptional circumstances

R. v. Weaver:
"The verdict of acquittal entered by the Supreme Court as a Court of Criminal Appealdiffers greatly in substance from an original verdict of a jurywho have acquitted. The jury's verdict of not guilty has a special constitutional finality and sanctity which are always regarded as an essential feature of British criminal jurisprudence."

Hinch v. Attorney-General (Viet.) (1987),164 C.L.R. 15.


extremely prejudicial and improper and unfair considerations to put before witnesses and potential jurors. "the very real possibility that the publications would adversely interfere with the due administration of justice"

Tuckiar v. The King:


accused's conviction being quashed and a verdict of acquittal then entered on account of the potential prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity

Barton v. The Queen:


"To justify a permanent stay of criminal proceeding, there must be a fundamental defect which goes to the root of the trial 'of such a nature that nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences

Reg. v. Murdoch (1987) 37 A. Crim. R. 118, at p. 126.:


"There must be a sound basis made out on a prima facie footing to anticipate the probability [of] prejudice on the part of an individual juror."

Murphy v. The Queen:


misleading to think that, because a juror has heard something of the circumstances giving rise to the trial, the accused has lost the opportunity of an indifferent jury

Reg. v. Thomson Newspapers Ltd, [1968] 1 W.L.R. I; [1968] 1 All E.R. 268 and Reg. v. Malik, [1968]1 W.L.R. 353; [196811 All E.R. 582.:
Appeals against conviction on the ground of an unfair trial have failed despite a prior finding of contempt arising from pre-trial publication (35). These decisions have been criticized on the ground of inconsistency.

Reg. v. Hubbert: Prior information about a case, and even the holding of a tentative opinion about it, does not
make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict according to the evidence.'

Munday v. The Queen (1989) 167 C.L.R:


"'...it is relevant to note that.the system of jury trial is geared to enable juries to be assisted in every possible way to 'put out of mind statements made outside the court, whether in the media or elsewhere. There is every reason to have confidence in the capacity of juries to do this. Judges do not have a monopoly on the ability to adjudicate fairly and impartially. Other: McGarvie J acknowledged: "[t]here is not an absolute insistence by the law that a jury have no knowledge of a prior conviction of an accused on trial" Toohey J and Mason J: That time span made a vital difference, particularly in relation to something as ephemeral or transient as radio broadcasts Mason C.J. held: the boundary to be crossed when the publication created a substantial risk of serious interference with a fair trial (45). Wilson J. adopted the formulation of a real and definite tendency to prejudice or embarrass pending proceedings (46); a similar formulation was adopted by Deane J. (47) and by Toohey J. (48). Gaudron J. held that, to constitute contempt, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the impugned conduct "poses a real risk to the administration of justice" though the court must decide as a matter of law whether any competing public interest "outweighs the degree of risk established" (49)