COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

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>MMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

OFFICE OF T H E C O M M A N D A N T FORT LEAVEN WORTH, KANSAS

AIR MAIL Coiruaanding General, Twelfth A i r r o r c e APO 650

c/o Postmaster
New York, N.Y.
Dear Spaatz:

19 March 1943

We are progressively expanding our instruction from Air Corps

Staff officers, trying to improve its quality. To do this we have
need for information from air units which are actively operating and
to have the benefit of their observations and experiences. You will
help us greatly if you can give us answers to the attached list of
questions. If parts of the answers are extremely confidential or
secret, so indicate and we will act accordingly.
I inclose a copy of our latest program for the General Staff
Course to show the character of the instruction now being given and
the amount of special instruction given to the group of Air Corps
students. This group now numbers 132, future classes will be 165.
We intend to increase the amount of Air Force instruction as fast
as our instructors can prepare the material. Every effort is being
made to get our operational information from the field so as to keep
the doctrine up to date and sound and thus insure that your graduates
will improve in quality.
It is our hope that the junior members of active staffs will be
processed through the School whenever they return to this country or
become otherwise available and that their replacements, graduates
from this School, will be observed and checked on their new jobs and
that we be informed so as to further improve the methods and techniques
taught here.
Whatever help you may offer will be greatly appreciated.
All best wishes

) Ml2 InclsQuery \
Program 12GS Course C&GSS
KARL TRUESDELL
Maj Gen, U S Army
Comdt

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

FORT LEAVENWOR7H, KANSAS

19 March 1943
Twelfth Air Force
a. General description of Twelfth Air Force, its constituent
units and their locations.
b. What kind of operations are they carrying out? How do you
coordinate them with the Royal Air Force and the British Navy?
How is your aircraft warning service set up?
d. How is your Air Service Command operated?
. What relations exist between Ninth Ait Force in the Middle East?
f Particularly, what have you discovered about the air support
of ground units: the methods of communication with ground units;
the methods of passing on requests for air support missions; whether
or not air support units are attached to ground units; what special problems
have arisen over the air support of troops of other of the United Nations;
how the observation squadron works out as at present constituted with
light bombardment, fighter and liaison types present in it?
How are bombardment targets in enemy country selected and their
priority established? Y t f h a t practical difficulties arise in following
such a system?
h. Is a central replacement depot maintained for the Twelfth Air
Force, or does each command maintain its own?
d . . Is additional training given at the replacement depots or is
this given after replacements join their units?
j . To what extent are ground units supplied by air?
k. How are troop carrier units assigned and employed?

NOTE:
The practical mission of the General Staff Course is to train
assistant A's and chiefs of Special Staff sections
Command is imparted only indirectly* Methods and techniques are
taught. Sample operation orders tactical and logistical if
furnished would be practical guide* They should be within the scope
of the School (air commands assorted).

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES

Office of t h e Commanding General

Commandant, Command
Ft Leavenworth, Kansas.
Dear Truesdell:
I am enclosing our answers to your queries of March 19,
1943 I sincerely hope they will be of assistance to you in
the Command and General Staff School program. There is a vi
tal need for, and a great lack of, trained staff officers to
man our staffs in all fields at the present time. I am thor
oughly in sympathy with your problem.
All best wishes

Sincerely

Lieutenant
Comm
7. Incls:
Answers to Query
G.O. Nos. 1-18-23, NAAE1
Annexure 5 to G-.0. Ho, 1.
Report on Operations, 9 Apr/43* XII ASC
Operations Bulletin No. 1, Cogy No. 425
Cl

S. JOHNS Colonel, Infa CUSTODIAN

Siops tNgr i i

to ^ In

ssm &mr staffs la nil ^ i H at tho |i^mt ttal* 1

Operations Bulletin No. 1, Q O py u o . 425

HEADQUARTERS NORTHS
Office of the Co:
14 May 1943.__
Answers to Questions Requested in Letter 19 March 1943
Question at* General description of Twelf th Air Force, its constituent
units and "their locations.
was J^DOI^^^^ its stead was organized
1 the ^Northwest ifrican AirForces' ^.^pjp^La^n^jp?'TwtK"'3fXt^''lM and
AmericanILIIT organ! zat ions in the Northwest African iheatre.
Northwest African Air Forces is a subordijaate command of
the^Mej&terranejm^^^
Ndr^hwest I f H c a n Air Forces, RAB1 Malta, RAF Middle East, and the Ninth Air
Force,
Copies of Northwest African Air Forces General Orders Nos. 1,
18, and 23? which cover the formation of its seven subordinate commands,
are attached, A brief description of the responsibilities, operations,
composition, and locations of these seven commands follows:
i # Northwest African Tactical Air Force. This Air Force is
composed of short range fighters, light bombers, and medium bombers. All
the fighters except Spitfires have bomb racks and can be used as fighter-
bombers. During the Tunisian battle this force operated in support of the
ground troops*
j2# Northwest African Strategic Air Force This Air Force is
composed of heavy bombers, medium bombers, and long-range fighters. During
the Tunisian campaign it conducted strategic bombing of enemy-held ports and
airdromes in Tunisia, southern Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily. At times during
the progress of the battle, this force augmented the Tactical Air Force in
direct support to the ground forces. On such occasions, its missions were
prescribed by and closely coordinated with the operations of the Tactical
Air Force.
2+ Northwest African Coastal Air Force. This Air Force is
composed of fighter, night fighter, reconnaissance, torpedo-bomber, and
anti-submarine organizations. It is charged with the air defense of the
entire Allied-held Northwest African coast, with the air protection of
friendly convoys, and with anti-submarine operations in the Western Med
iterranean and off the French Moroccan coast. Its airdromes are located
along the Northwest African coast from Agadir to Tripoli.
J Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Y7ing.
At the present""time this Wing is composed of one AAF Hlotographic Group
plus one RAF Hlotographic Reconnaissance Squadron. It conducts photo
graphic reconnaissance of strategic targets in enemy-held territory in
Southern France, Italy, Sardinia, and|^.^|3|% |t has also assisted '"

-1

compiling maps for the use of ground forces mm meUIbnaining and oper
ational purposes. Its organizations are bas^|fl|^^tea^|e% "--J<- i::
Detachments of this Wing are attached to the
Air Force for direct operational control.
J Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier Command.
This command is composed of all troop carrier units. It trains and plans
with the airborne ground troops. Detachments from the Troop Carrier Com
mand are made to the Northwest African Air Service Command and to the
Mediterranean Air Transport Command for movements of supplies and the
operation of scheduled air routes.
j$. Northwest African Training; Command. Organizations of
this command are located in French Morocco and Northwestern Algeria. It
inadntains replacement pools of personnel and airplanes; it trains newly
arrived combat crews for tactical operations peculiar to this theatre.
All tactical Air Force organizations arriving in this theatre are first
assigned to it for a period of unit training.
2 Northwest African Air Service Command. This command is
composed of AAF and BAF service organizations throughout this theatre. It
is charged with the supply and technical maintenance of these tactical
organizations. Depots are operated in the vicinity of Casablanca, Oran,
Algiers, and Constantine.
Question b What kind of operations are they carrying out? How do you
coordinate~"them with the Royal Air Force and the British Navy?
The type of operations as covered in general by the General
Orders 1, 18, and 23 attached. The combining of the British and American
Air Forces in North Africa under the same headquarters in effect combines
the total air strength in this theatre to act as a single force. The
liaison with the British Navy is effected primarily by the Northwest
African Coastal Air Force which maintains a combined operations room in
conjunction with the Royal Navy. Naval liaison officers are located at
the other headquarters concerned, i.e,, Northwest African Air Forces,
Northwest African Tactical Air Force and Northwest African Strategic Air
Force. As an example of its functioning, the following sequence would
normally follow the movement of a convoy.
1. Navy notifies Northwest African Coastal Air Force dates
and times of the passage past certain given points.
2. Northwest African Coastal Air Force informs NAAF.
3. NAAF instructs NASAF to place heavy attack on airdromes
from which aircraft might attack convoy.
4. NACAF provides anti-submarine patrol and fighter patrol
to cover convoy against hostile submarines and aircraft.

"

Question c. Plow is your aircraft warning

Warning System;
! RDF. Coastal chain..
Consisting of G.C.I, stations C.O.L. stations M.R.U.
stations and, in a few instances L.W. sets.
2. Observer Corps.
Consisting of W.O.V's and the French C.R.D.A.T.
3 All the above stations, centres and units are fed into
the various Sector Filter Rooms by land line or in certain circumstances
W/P and in all cases there exists an emergency '7/T link v/hich is fre
quently tested.
4 In this theatre of war e_ach_sector has a Combined Oper
ations and Filter Room so that the information received in the Filter
Room can be passed from the Filter Table to the Operations Table with
the least possible delay. Only clean tracks are plotted on the Operations
Table and all tracks of interest to lateral Sectors are passed to them by
land line.
Question d+ How is your Air Service Command operated?
See annexure No. and G.O. 1.
Question e. Y/hat relations exist between the British Air Force in the
Middle EasT?
The Ninth Air Force, the Malta Command, and the NAAF are
parallel forces under the jurisdiction of the Mediterranean Air Command.
Question t% Particularly, what have you discovered about the air support
of ground units: the methods of communication with ground units; the
methods of passing on requests for air support missions; whether or not
air support units are attached to ground units; what special problems
have arisen over the air support of troops of other of the United Nations;
how the observation squadron works out as at present constituted with
light bombardment, fighter and liaison types present in it?
See copy of General P. L. Williams own report and comments on
Air Ground Support attached. Additional points requested and not covered
by General Williams report are as follows:
(a) Air Support units are not detached to ground units but
stay under the direct control of the Air Support Commander who cooperates
very closely with the commander. (See next to last par. p. 23 Gen Williams
_ .
report)

(b) No special problems

l ^ l J l i i ^ i f e ^ ^

our own troops except communication difficulties when the air headquarters
was not at the same place as the ground headquarters.
(c) In general the composite observation group is not satis
factory. Forces are unnecessarily broken down into groujjs which are too
small to realize their full effectiveness in this theatre, Ho use has
been found for the liaison type aircraft in the observation group.
Question How are bombardment targets in enemy country selected and
their priority established? What practical difficulties arise in follow
ing such a system?
1. Targets for bombing for the Strategic Air Force are select
ed in conformity with a strategic directive given the M A P by the MAC. In
turn the ITAAF gives a general directive to the NASAF. Day to day conferences
are held by A-3 of the 3SASAF with A-3 of the NAAF on the operation to be con
ducted for the next day, Reconnaissance, intelligence reports, weather, and
the necessity for dispersion of the enemy defenses determine the targets from
day to day. The greatest latitude is permitted the NASAF in targets selected,
and methods of attack, in so long as the basic directive as to priorities is
followed. Only in special cases, such as bombing in support of a ship convoy,
does the NAAF designate a particular objective.
2. Targets for the support of the ground forces are designated /
by the ground commander. However, until air supremacy has been established, L
the commander of the Tactical Air Force may refuse any butjfce_mosturp;ent
targets in order to concentrate his effort on the enemy airdromesaneL in
stallations necessary to secure air supremacy.
(Question ji. Is a central replacement depot maintained for the Twelfth Air
Force, or does each command maintain its own?
A central replacement depot is maintained for the Northwest
African Air Forces. New units and replacement aircraft and crews coming
into the theatre are placed under the command of the Northwest African
Training Command*
Question ! Is additional training given at the replacement depots, or
is this given after replacements join their units?
All training is conducted by the Training Command up to the
point of readiness for the group. When the crews join the groups they
are given short indoctrination training by the group.
Question j[. To what extent are ground units supplied by air?
Following is the total tonnage, including mail, carried by
air for the period January 1, 1943 - March 25, 1943- The ratio between
supplies carried for ground forces and others, remains fairly consistent
for periods not covered here.

Total Tons Carried 5423

U.S. Ground
Forces
2561 2862

Percentage of t o t a l carried for U.S. Ground Forces

Includes supplies carried for U.S. Air Forces, British Air & Ground
Forces, and French Air & Ground Forces.
Question k How are troop carrier units assigned and employed?

1. There has been set up in this theater a Troop Carrier

Command to which all troop carrier units now in this theatre have been
assigned, and those arriving in the future will be assigned.
2. Depending upon the requirements in the various sections,
the Troop Carrier Command in turn attaches the required number of aircraft,
whether it be a portion of a squadron, a full squadron, or a group to the
service command or command headquarters in that particular locality for
employment in transporting freight and passengers. At present, the North
west African Troop Carrier Command has approximately 35/J of its aircraft
attached to service areas or commands located in various parts of North
Africa. This method is employed to eliminate the necessity of requesting
transportation from the Troop Carrier Command for movement of personnel
and materiel falling under a particular service area. The communication
facilities are not adequate and dependable enough to allow a more central
ized control without considerably hampering movements. The extent of de
centralization of control in any theatre will depend upon the demands in
various localities and the character of communications as effecting
efficient operations.
3. The Troop Carrier Command and Headquarters is primarily
tactical and is located in close proximity to the Headquarters of the air
borne troops. This is essential to secure the best results in planning
and training.

HEADQUARTERS NORTHWEST AFRICAN 4IH FORCES

AFO 650 , ^ ' " " "

Secret by auth CG
14 Mar 43

GENERAL ORDERS )
Number Id )

'/

1 4 | March, 1943.',u * & *

/
\
1. Prragr.ph 9 of General &r4er No^J-f^Eq. Northwest African Air
Forces, 18 .'e^rvary 1943, is rescinded and the following substituted:
To "the Northwest African Air Service Command arc assigned:
a* Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron XII Air Force
Service Command.

"b# Royal Air Force personnel as appointed to fill R.A.F.

T f t a r Establishment No. U;m/WIA/l0G6.
c. All Service Groups, Depot Groups, arms and Service
units e.ssigned to the Twelfth Air Force Service Commnd*

d. All Maintenance Units, Aircraft Repair Units, Aircraft

* ~ * and M. T. Assembly Units, Embarkation Units, M. T. Base
Depots, and Mobile Parachute Servicing Units, formerly
assigned to the Eastern Air Command, and as detailed in
Annexure 5 (issued herewith) to Geieral Order No. 1.
e. Airdromes and bases as detailed in Annexure 5.

Brigadier Gcnoral DELMAR H. DUNTON, is d< signated as Commanding

Generr.l, Northwest African Air Service Command."
2. Paragraph 11 b of Geaeral Order No. L, is rescinded and the
following substituted: *~
'll.b. Airdromes will be assigned to the Tactical, Strategic
and Coastal Air Forces, and to the. Training and Air Service
Commands. '?ho Corrmianding General, Northwest African Air Service
Command, v/iil furnish Station Complement personnel for the
operation cf TISAAF air br.ses with more than two squadrons, and
within the moans at his disposal. At all b- ses operated by Air
Service Co: jnarid Station Complements, the Air Service Commander
will designate the Station Commander, who will be responsible
to the Coi. manding General, Air Service Comma: d, through the
Service A>-ea Commander, for all matters effecting the base* At
all other bases, the Commanding General or Air Officer Command
ing the ''orce or Command to which the base is tssigned will
de s i gnat 3 the C omraand ing Off i c e r."
By c* nmand of Lieutenant General SPAATZt
E. P. CURTIS, :
OFFICIAL: 4 -_ Colonel, U S M P , >

Air 4ijutant General*

DISr_I'RIBUTICN 10 -- TAG 10 -- CG AAF ' W i n 1 0 ' - - CinC MAC 10 -- CG AF 10 - CG NATOUSA 10 -- CG ETOUSA 6 -- EIGHT AF 6 -- NINTH AF 2 . - L i b r a r i a n **EIq AAI 1/fe.shn DC 3 -- D / A O C , / e a Gen & ypec S t a f f Sec,. RAiLF 2 0 - CG i&ASAP 20 ? - CG NATA? 20 -- CGNNAASC 20 - CG WiTC 20 - CG NACAF 20 - CO KAAFTCC 20 - CO RAHRW mil
I 1 -- 16th 1 - Major McDonald

HEADQUARTERS NORTHS
API
GENERAL ORDERS )
t

19 March 1943.

Number

23 )

Activation of the Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier

Command (Provisional) . , . . . . . . . . . * , . . . . . ,1
Reassignment of Air Force Unit . * . * , . . . . . . , . . . . .II
SECTION I Activation of the NAAF Troop Carrier Command (Prov).
1 The Northwest African Air Forces Troop Carrier Command (Prov),
is hereby activated, with headquarters at Algiers, Algeria*
2, Colonel RAY A. DUNN 0-9561, AC, is announced as Acting Command
ing Officer.
* 3. The 51st Troop Carrier King is hereby relieved from assignment
to XII Air Force Service Command. .
& The Hqf & Hq. S<j 51st Troop Carrier "ingj the 60th, 62nd and
64th Troop Carrier Groups and such other Troop Carrier units as may
arrive in the North African Theatre are assigned to the Northwest African
Air Forces Troop Carrier Command (Provisional)
5* Report will be submitted immediately to this Headquarters,
and Cabled to TAG; CG NATOUSA; and CG AAF, Yuashington, D.C., giving date
of completion of activation.
SECTION II -* Reassignment of Air Force Unit*
The Twelfth Air Force Combat Camera Unit is relieved fromsassjfcgmant
to Northwest African Air Service Command for administration and is assigned
to Northwest African Air Forces for administration. 'I".It;-.'will remain
assigned to A-2. Section, NAAF for operational control.
By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZt
E. P. CURTIS,
Colonel, USAAF,
Chief of Staff.
T. JV BROGAN,
Colonel, A* G D#,,
Asst Adjutant General.
DISTRIBUTION
10 ' TAG T " 10 CG AAF Washn DC 10 CinC MAC 10 CG AF 10 CG NATOUSA 10 CG ETOUSA 6 - CG EIGHTH A F 6 CG NINTH AF 3 D/&OC, ea Gen & Spec Staff Sec, NAAF 1 16 MRtf 1 -YQ Frye
Q
"jjt

OFFICIAL

20 CG 20 CG 20 CG 20 CG 20 CG 20 CO

NASAF NATAF NiuSC IL1TC NATC

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copy i.
i s s S By Authority O.G. XII Ai Initials ^^ Dates ^X^ril 194?

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HEADQUARTERS XII A.S.C. A.P.O. 766 9 APRIL 19^5 REPORT ON OPERATIONS

I r i

CONDUCTED BY XII AIR SUPPORT COMMAND UNITED STATES ARi-Ef AIR FORCE TUNISIA 7> JANUARY 1945 9

nm

PRE P * AC E This report of the f i r s t American Air Support Command to operate tactically in the theatre of operations is submitted v/hile the Command is s t i l l in actual operation but at the conclusion o:~ a period of direct support of American Troops of I I Corps. A report b;/ the ground forces has or will be md separately, and this report in conjunction with the one of II" Corps should give a complete picture of American operations during the period covered.

HEADQUARTERS X I I AIR SUJ A . P . O . 766

t D a t e : L$ A p r i l SUBJECT: TO THRU : : Report of Operations. Commander i n C h i e f , N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a n

Theater of Operations.
Commanding General, Northwest African Air Force. SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION I XT III IV-- V VI VII VIIIB I X AUTHORITY GENERAL OPERATIONS, 1ST. PHASE OPERATION, 2ND PHASE OPERATIONS, 5RD PHASE OPERATIO3S SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION SERVICE AND SUPPLY, SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS COLLUSIONS AI;D RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION I ~ AUTHORITY 1. In compliance with paragraph 10, A.R. 545-IO5, a report of operations of the XII Air Support Command from 13 January t o 9 April is hereby submitted. SECTION I I ' - GENERAL 1. The XII Air Support Command was o r i g i n a l l y ordered into t a c t i c a l oper a t i o n by l e t t e r , ^ . J a n u a r y , Headquarters Twelfth Air Force which placed t h i s organization in direct"' support of the Satin Task Force and attached t h e r e t o . The CG XII Air Support Command outlined the following objectives to be accomp lished: a. To gain a i r s u p e r i o r i t y in the I I Corps sector in so far,.as possible with the limited number of a i r c r a f t a v a i l a b l e . . ' ]> To support the ground forces d i r e c t l y by: (l). .

Reconnaissance over t h e i r e n t i r e front and flanks.

( 2 ) . By attacking enemy ground raovements and concentrations located by a e r i a l observation. * ( 5 ) . To a t t a c k with the ground u n i t s . rS requested by our Air Support parties

*" ^ t>:'*L f A

(4). was available.

To provide photo reconnaissance whenever equipment

.

. V .,.. . 5). To provide a maximum of protection to our ground

units from enemy'air attacks, .
..v- 2, As operations progressed and the striking force under this Command was .increased.if became possible not only to strike immediately in front of our troops and to offer them protection from enemy aircraft, but to strike at the enemy air installations with bombardment aircraft accompanied by strong fighter sweeps to destroy any planes that might be airborne. At the same time intensive, straffihgr miss ions were being flown far behind enemy lines, striking at enemy concentrations and communication routes. *>. When* our forces began their final, attack, emphasis was placed on thorough reconnaissance and coordinated bombing attacks in front of our ad vancing troops as well as fighter sweeps to intercept enemy aircraft attempt ing to attack our troops. During this phase a careful check was kept for any indication that the enemy might be", 'attempting to withdraw and when the first signs of this withdrawal came, a l l aircraft were directed against the enemyrs
columns. ' ;: '". ' ..

4. From the outset the Headquarters of this CoBsaand was set up in

close proximity to the Headquarters of the ground forces we were supporting,
and the closest liaison between staff officers of corresponding departments
was carried out* - .i
SECTION ,111 - OPERATION P H A S E I 15 January to 14 February 1. The XII Air Support Command was ordered to give full support to II Corps during the preparation and prosecution of the Satin plan* (This plan called for the occupation of the h i l l mass ft-om F O N D O U K to M A K N A S S Y : and eventual occupation of GABES). An attack by the eneray in the OUSSELTIA Valley which forced the French to withdraw made i t imperative for our forces to post pone the plan Of attack and send forces to that point to stabilize the s i t uation. After this engagement our ground forces were active in the E & I D and " S E I Z E D areas. '. 2.
:

XII Air Support Command Objectives: < & , : : To deny the enemy the use of the a i r . _b. To afford reconnaissance for the ground troops. "

To afford close support for the ground forces by bombing and

straffing attacks .against., eneay -ground, t a r g e t s . / .
-'- ' 3 . Order: of. Battle: ; .v a. ,. . '

5^rd Fighter Group (2 Squadrons),

br. ,c ; d . " 4,

47th B o m b Group (L),

92nd Fighter Squadron.
154th Observation Squadron (Fr0121 -:2^ January).
Lafayette Escadrille'. . ;'.;.-.

Aircraft operational for 15 January 1943:

a. 26 P~4O's.

\ .

58 A~2O's.

: :

5. From 13 January to 21 January missions were ordered yerbally by the Commanding General. Operations were largely reconnaissance; straffing and bombing missions were carried out when suitable; targetSuWere found. From 21 January to 15 February we were in direct support of the"SATIN plan with i t s modifications, and the XIX Corps. Operational strength of our units had been built up somewhat and on 26 January the following aircraft were operational: a, 52 P-4O-fs.

In addition,'two Spitfire-squadrons of the 52nd Fighter-Group were attached this organization on 2u_Fg|>r^r;7' and the 51st Fighter Group of three Spitfire squadrons became a part of this organization on 9 February on which date the ^rd. -Fighter Group was withdrawn for reorganization. r 7 6, Missions by type during this period were as follows: _ & Photo . 2 >-<.- Sorties 'u/^. .Sorties /'Sv /v Sorties
Sor ieB

. :. . 516 .880
224
201
172
6
1/801

_b." Reconnaissance . y
. ' '

*_c.

Escort . '.

-81

_d. Strafe -' 3omb ^f. jg,

35 31 Yo 29 1 ''" o 18 ..

Sorties Sortios

Fighter Sweeps .Misaellaneous

(

.' 5 7*1 fa Sorties

-....,

; T01ALS. . ,.r '137 ' . /

*" Escort not counted in mission tote Is due to fact that primary mission, i bomb or reconnaissance wao counted as the mission.

7. Air Victories and losses during this period were as follows :

ja. Victories Destroyed 2^ Probably destroyed 8 7 Damaged
<b.

) ) A l l in a e r i a l combat )

Losses Combat Flak Other 25

7
6

8. barrage i n f l i c t e d to ground units of the enemy during t h i s time and a t a l l times was d i f f i c u l t to estimate due to dust and smoke t h a t invariably accompanied our a t t a c k s . In order to claim a vehicle destroyed i t must have been seen to burn or explode. In other cases where i t was known t h a t vehicles were definitely h i t by a concentration of fire and damge noted but not com plete destruction, the vehicle was claimed as damaged only. On t h i s basis the following claims as to da?mge of ground vehicles is made: a. Trucks Destroyed Damaged b_. Tanks Destroyed Damaged 4 5 ."... 77 175 * ' .

_c Miscellaneous Vehicles Destroyed Damaged

20) This includes h a l f - t r a c k s , motorcycles, 71) staff cars and miscellaneous armored vehicles

All of these claims are r e s u l t s of straffing missions.- No estimation can be made of damage i n f l i c t e d by bombardment a i r c r a f t on ground t a r g e t s . SECTION IV - OPERATIONS HftSE I I 15 February to 16 March

1. On 14 February the enemy started a throe point attack in force with tanks, armored units, a r t i l l e r y and infantry. Theso attacks were aimed t o ward Sidi Bou Zid, from the Faid area and from the Maknassy area toward Gafsa. These operations by'the enemy forced our elements to withdraw to Fcriana in 'order to meet this threat to our airdromes and supply bases in the Thelepte area. Our forces continued to resist these attacks by the enemy and our air forces gave1 continual reconnaissance in the rear of the attacking units and a t the same time.preventing observations and attacks by enemy aircraft. Our fighters and bombers attacked enemy movements and concentrations of vehicles

35SIiiip^^
p

and personnel* The advance of the enemy continued in spite'.'of. the vigorous
resistance of our outnumbered ground forces, and on 17 February we were forced
to evacuate our forward airdromes from the Thelepte area-to prepared airdromes
in the Tebessa area. This evacuation was carried out-with minimum loss of
aircraft and sate rial, while the ground forces held the- enemy along a line
from Feriana to Sbeitla* During this move no interruption of scheduled miss
ions was necessary and our operations continued fron our new bases as from
those evacuated giving all of tho support that could be mustered to our forces.
The enemy advance continued until 22 February when by force of superior
numbers of personnel and equipment they had reached a point 1-vell within the
pass at Kasserine and with their forward elements 12 kilometers south of Thala
where our air crews were kept employed to the limits of physical endurance,
flying continual attack miseions over the battle area* On this day the attack
was stemmed., i y n r i/ r r n u n . f l forces_gave utmost

wore inflicted on the enemy by these operations. On the evening of the 22nd
the enemy started their withdrawal to the Kasserine Pass and on the succeeding
days our aircraft continued to harass their retreating columns toward Gafsa
and Sbeitla. Following the withdrawal of the enemy our air units reoccupied
the Thelepte airdromes. From these fields our aircraft were able to reconn
oiter and attack the enemy from Faid and Gafsa to the coast, giving detailed
information to ground units of all enemy, movements observed and attacked, and
to gain valuable information that was to be used by our forces in their assault
on Gafsa and Maknassy positions.
2, Xir. A.ir Support Command Objectives:
* ' Bi* ^ a fi >or d the ground forces protection against enemy.air during
t h e i r withdrawal from Sidi 3ou Zld, -Kasserine, Sbeitla and Gafsa.
b To provide reconnaissance along the entire II Corps front.

c^ To a s s i s t the ground forces on halting the -enemy by bombardment /,

and straffing. ' , ; '' '
d Pass,
To gain detailed information for. the attack by our troops nd Maknassy. Order of Hattler . a. b# c. d 3>3-s>k Fighter Group j?2nd Fighter Group (2. squadrons ) 47th Eomb Group (L) SIst. Fighter Group (2 squadrons)
o n

T.o harass and destroy the enemy" in his withdrawal from Kasse-ri::e

G 154th Observation Squadron

Aircraft operatinal for 16 February

-a* J6 Spitfires.
b. - 27 P-39 l s. . .,

. .'-cL ''The Lafayette', Sscadrille wa-s withdrawn for reorganization 17 February.-- : - ' .. y. .Missions by type: during t h i s period were as follows-:

.9

a. b_.

Photo jRe c'onnai s s ance

: 6
;

SortiesSorties Sorties Sorties Sorties Sorties Sorties

' '

6. 386..

-*aC" 'Sscort ' cU Strafe

60' 25. 17

CM)
129

/' e . E'omb:

79
159
20;:

f. .

Fighter Sweep Miscellaneous . .TOTALS'

15 ' " 4" . 128 .

'1,455 '

* Only 2 of these counted as'.missions because 'they' did' not escort, our.. shipsi Remainder counted under primary objective. 6. Air victories-and losses during t h i s period were as fallows: a.. Victories: 'Destroyed Probably destroyed Damaged ib. Losses-:
Combat 14 . ;

U.) 1.) A l l i n a e r i a l combat. 10) "

*

Flak Other 7

11.
1.
s t r a f f i n g :
' ' j 128

Known damage t o ground forces.by a. Trucks: Destroyed

Damaged

tc.

Tanksi Destroyed . Damaged.' /15 ' ijtk

Miscellaneous Vehicles-* Destroyed Damaged

;

28 55 V- O P E R A T I O N S P H A S E III

'

IT March t o 9 April

1. Prior to the beginning of this-phase of our operations Air Forces- in ITorthwest Africa were reorganized and t h i s organization was placed under the control of Northwe st Af rican_JEJardiicaX->A43?-^ilo-r<je- oemaanded- by- Air Mar shall "Cunningham." Sl^o~iSerrNATAF was organized the Tactical Bomb Force and a l l bombardment aircraft that had been a part of t h i s command were transferred to TBF, and were available to t h i s command on call through NATAF. Prior to t h i s phase also, the Jrd Air Defense Wing was added to t h i s command for the purpoiflae of setting up an air defense system that would not only give warning of enemy planes' in a position t o attack our air i n s t a l l a t i o n s , but would give warning of enemy aircraft in position to attack our ground forces and to direct outt planes-'in their flights assisting them in intercepting the enemy.' The *>rd Air Defense Wing also set up homing devices -which proved invaluable^in many cases. In preparation for this phase of operations in which our ground forces planned t o attack and take Gfafsa, El Guettar and Maknassy, aircraft from our units? in conjunction^ with bombers^ from Northwest African Tactical Air Force and the Strategical Air Force pounded airdromes- in the area of the planned offensive and back as-far as-the ct>ast. At the same time a comprehensive program of reconnaissance for the coming assault was in effact* The planned offensive started on 17 March with a coordinated bomb; ing attack onGafsa. Throughout the day our aircraft hammered at the enemy wherever. he could be found in front of our advancing forces-, and made long range reconnaissance flights t o note any possible reinforcements or .supplies? moving up. Every effort was made to intercept all. enemy aircraft attempting to attack our ground forces-. This program was carried out over the days7 that followed as our. troops^ advanced, accomplishing their, objectives?,. Orr 7 April the enemy began to retreat from the El Guettar and Maknas-sy fronts-and a l l aircraft of this command asr well* as bombers of N A T A F were off to, destroy a l l equipment passible* Our fighterB-yvjpre over the enemy contin ually, straffing and dive bombing as long as daylight permitted. I t is-im possible to estimate the t o t a l number of vehicles: destroyed during these attacks, but a ground observer in a'forward OP reported that, at one time ho. could count 6p burning vehicles-on one stretch of road following two attacks on a convoy at that location. After that day of withdrawal our planes again followed on. succeeding days-to strike at. any movements and made the r.etr.eatu as-costly as^ passible. On 8 April we. were also, given, the job of supporting IX Ctorps- in their advance of Fond auk and Kairoueaa and operated ;ex#eiisiv.ely/

iin that area-with fighter, and reconnaissance sweeps. Due t o the fact, that the enemy was rapidly getting beyond our range, all units-were moved to airdromes- in the vicinity of Sbeitla and. this headquarters to the town of Sbeitla, the move being completed on 7 April. O f particular note during this period is the. success that a:cc^p^^d^^^oj^.,Jl^tQr^ByjQe^s In one engagement 14 Stukas^WeTe^'shot down as"Tn^y attempted t o attack our ground forces. .. . 2. XII Air Support Command Objectives:

EU'f'To defeatitfoe eneniy b y / fighter swee p s and escort for intensive bombardment of .airdrome's I n / t h e TeBagaand La'Tauconnerie areas* b>. front. /' . ' _ ' '".... :.'\ySL* ^ S^-ve direct-support t o ground forces by attacks on enemy
supply columns, vehicle concentrations and any ..enemy armored u n i t s .
:j .'. .. ': i 3f , d.i '...To interce-pt enemy a i r c r a f t attempting .'to attack pur, forces.
Order of B a t t l e : .
;
_ . . . ;
.. .._ To provide visual and photo reconnaissance along the I I Corps

r,.: ,a_. 52nd Fighter Group. -; V. *_&. _d. e_. .' 51st Fighter Group. 81st Fighter Group.

154th Observation Squadron.

55rd" Fighter Group (Back into operation as of 25 March). Jrd Air,Defense Wing.

*. 81 sf.: Fighter. Group vraer withdrawn on 5 April for., reorganization.

4. Aircraft-.peraticmal for.. 17 March
a., lid-spitfires'.. .

li*
A

3
:

F ^ / s ( P h ' o t o ) . y\'*x/ .. .'. . _

, .

''j\:'r7:"' . . ; . ' , . ..' '

1.
- . ' \ ,

.'vs....' . i -

"i A-20. xphot : )-v

5 ' Missions, by t y p e d u r i n g - - t h i s : p e r i o d were a s - f a l l o w s : ^ ' - . ; ' . . P h o t o " ,' ':. .'. " 50 |J ^ o ." S o r t i e s ' " ' $0 /

,-,v._''.

-.'I ;.''*. ..pecormaissan.ee. ^ >.,-. 6^^":: [U / - S o r t i e s

*.

Escort

1.57 ^ 8

S o r t i e s

, d

Strafe

"Tt^'^9

SortiesSortie &
S'ortis/.:L..-..
S o r t i e sr

""758

Qj_ Fighter Sweep; f. **g> Miscellaneous Bomb.er.

TOTALS *
totalsi

lc/Yb5X 1

fyV '/A

271 . . . .
' ' ' " "

TJ: o< t h e s e f lawn a s e s c o r t t o bombers of KATAF and SAP ,are counted i n

** These bombardment missions were escorted by us and were plane.s. of LIAT.AF and SAP operating in-the sector v;e were supporting. They are not included in t h e t o t a l s , shown.. . 6. Air v i c t o r i e s ' a n d losses^ during this-period were as' follows! a. Victoriesi . '

- Destroyed Probably Destroyed

Damaged

27) All in aerial, combat..

74) . c .

Combat:. Flak Other 7

po

1 0

{.

Known; damage t o enemy ground forces-:..

"'." a# Trucks-
Destroyed
Damaged'

515,

b y Tanks r ,..,. De stroyed Damaged <

2 1

c. ' Miscellaneous VehiclesDestroyed Damaged

;

'29 "
31

SECTION VI - OPERATIONS SU#1AKY H. -GEMUL: a. The operations section of the XII Air Support Clommand operated in.

accordance with methods-as-outlined" i n F M 51-35. "Aviation i n Support of Ground Forces", dated 9 April 1942. Prearranged message code forms outlined t h e r e i n and standard signal communications were employed. Direct wire t e l e phone 9j teletype and radio were made available at each Command Post location. Generally, all. these channels of signal communication were highly satisfactory Close l i a i s o n with the supported ground force was maintained by lcreat&ng the Air Support Headquarters-immediately adjacent to. the Command -Fast of t h e ground command. Air Support parties-were allacated t o Division and Combat, Command Headquarters'. Their function of transmitting Air Support, request. was p highly-satisfactory. Air Support party officers also provided an i n r valuable function as a i r advisors- t o ground s t a f f s .
2. EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT? a. FIGHTERS:

-'-(!)" Numbers-permitting, the normal fighter, formation was-a squadron of twelve a i r p l a n e s - o p e r a t i n g i n f l i g h t s of four e.ach. (2) Operating S p i t V's and P-4O ! s against t h e enemy: f i g h t e r s s u c c e s s f u l l y , i t was--necessary t o .use large formations. The. speed and climtb of enemy a i r c r a f t enabled him t o ehocse whether t o a t t a c k 'or run. Having gained"air s u p e r i o r i t y , , we forced t h e enemy i n t o f i g h t i n g by conducting"bx>mbr ing missions and f i g h t e r , sweeps a g a i n s t him.

Fighter sweeps-were conducted by 1, 2 or p squadronsy de pending'"upon the enemy-fighter opposition which we ejected to encounter.. Approximately 2,000 feet altitude between ..squadrons were maintained on these, sweeps* Altitudes-varied from 12,000 to 25,000 feet. (4). Eomber Escort missions were carried on most -extensively by our fighters* The standard and most successful method of escort b:eing the close cover by one squadron, a medium cover by another squadron and a free lance high cover by the third squadron. Our fighters^were proud that, ire'forty six bomber escort missions, only tv/o biombersr were destroyed by enemy aircraft. (5). Local protective cover and patrol missions were also, perr Ki> *ormG& by out fighters for the protection of important ground attacks. Us* " \ ually individual squadrons of twelve airplanes-were assigned for this purpose. (6). On rare occasions when the enemy was: moving ands,had note established Anti-Air craft defense, our fighters-were used on straffing mi ssiejas to. exploit the situation. b^ STRAFFING MISSIONS: -.

( l ) . The P-^9 with i t s r ( d e c k ) speed and tremendous firo power, proved the most effective a i r c r a f t for s t r a f f i n g . I t s sturdy construction enabled i t t o complete i t s mission even though often h i t badly by Anti-Aircraft f i r e . Straffing missions-were normally effective against moving columns. P-59's preformed approximately 90$ of our straffing missions-and.accounted for about t h a t percentage of damage.

10

(2) The P-59 t a c t i c s were t a f l y from the airdrome t o t h e

t a r g e t a t minimum a l t i t u d e , attack from an angle and t u r n away without
ever having passed over t h e t a r g e t .
(5). I t was found t h a t t h e damage done by straffing of t a r g e t s
where1 t h e eneiay had had time t o i n s t a l l protective Anti-Aircraft, was not.
commensurate with t h e loss of-our own a i r c r a f t . .
( 4 ) . The P-40 equipped with bombs-' found t h a t they could not strafe over the same t a r g e t area where they dropped t h e i r bombs as t h e bombing'alerted t h e enemy and t h e a i r c r a f t were subject t o heavy and i n tense Anti-Aircraft i"ire. ' .. : c. FIGHTER BOMBERS: '

( 1 ) . The P-40 and H.urri-Boinbers-(often attached for s p e c i f i c operations) were assigned missions of bombing M/T. and gun p o s i t i o n s . They were very successful against M/T, but due t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y of locating gun p o s i t i o n s , t h e i r employment i n this- r o l e was not very productive of
goad resuitsi ' ' :

'

(2). Their methods; of bombing were the conventional di;ve:' type, bombing t a c t i c s modified. They released their bjombs at ab:cut *>,P0 t.o 1,500 feet, depending upon the intensity of enemy defensive fire*
d.. HORIZONTAL BCMBING:. . . ...'

(!) The A-20's and 3-25 Is were used for horizontal, bombing against area t a r g e t s ' a t an altitude usually between 9*000 and 12,000 feet. Heavy escort always; provided, usually at least 100% more fighters thafr" bombers^ The fragmentation cluster bomb, proved very effectivo against a i r craft at r e s t . Aircraft were usually bombed up with the standard load> consisting of two to four. 500 pound demolition b.ombs and eight to twe.lyo fragmGnfation 'cluster bombs. ' < :. -. ( 2 ) . I t was found that only when'the enemy,.',is deiralizcd and caught making- a-' rapid r e t r e a t was itc possitelo tq use the A~20!s at mi altitude. - ' . " ' ' . . (5 Ori t h e onGmyTs retr&st. from t h e Kassorinq Pass, A ^ O ' s v;ere used i n group-s.-b'f 'throo, banbing t h e . congested M/T with delayed a c t i o n b.ombs. Undor. t h i s . condition thoy took no losses- from enomy f l a k . 0^ RE00K1AISSANGE'MISSIONS^ . '; 'v /

( 1 ) . Daily rGconnaissance of areas- and raads wero normally made by tv/o P~59 ! s, escorted by a squadron of (2)j" Spot ro.coniiaissanco was made "by tvjo P-JP's ^i1^ later when available, P-^^'s", flying at miniinum altitude t o gather the necessary inform ation and returning under the protection of t h e i r speed. Spot re dermal ssanco. was found of more value than, area reconnaissance. Tho second ship of the pairs- sent in was for tho purpose of watching behind the f i r s t ship, thus
;

11

permitting the first to give greater attention to its reconnaissance mission.

With the advent of the warning service, these reconnaissance aircraft, were
. advised of the presence of enemy aircraft in, their, area.
5 Each ir Support Party was equipped with an S C R 522 VHF. modified for ground use* This was installed in the S C R 299 capable of opera tion from outside the vehicle. This was of.great. Value in passing in the clear, enemy information* Routine reconnaissance reports can await the r e turn of the pilot to his base. Vital enomy inforifiation was passed directly from the aircraft to the Air Support Party with the Division G-^ Section. > t h i s Air Support V H F channel is capable of much greater value.
/ , . ' , ' ' . . ' . .

. ,/ ( 4 ) . This Command had no aircraft suitable for night reconnaissance, "~~ncTithcr were pilots trained for this typo of work. Knowing that the enemy moved ontiroly by night, the II Corps constAg^L-d^s^red. ni^t.^r^c.onnjaiesanco missions* On some occasions tl is leys from the R.A.F. 2^2 Group were employed in this role, but usually the time factor was such that the information r e ceived from them was of doubtful value. A Reconnaissance Unit assigned to an Air Support C o m m a n d must bo equipped and trained for night employment. . PHOTOGRAPHIC AIRCRAFT: :

( 1 ) . This type of a i r c r a f t was not .available during most of the campaign. However, for a while, A-2O's escorted by f i g h t e r s were used s a t isfactorily. (.2). In order to keep escort missions cf fighters-to the minimum ' that the. fighters may be employed .in an offensive role, the P~?l is considered the most suitable aircraft for reconnaissance and intelligence photography, ' /normally to be flown in pairs. This aircraft presently is not equipped with, cameras'capable of producing suitable photographs for a r t i l l e r y control or terrain study. Phpto^4p^^,-,units;inthe rear have not b:een able t c furnish ,^ t h i s type of photography within, the time limits- required "by the ground forces. \ I t is deemed essential that a suitable number of aircraft, be provided e.ither, in the Reconnaissance Squadron or as- a separate unit, preferably F-5,Ts arid P-^^'s, with an adequate mobile laboratory and'personnel. These missions can be flown at high altitude, approximately ^0,000 feet, in pairs= namely a P-^8 . to watch in the rear, of the photographic F~5 $ L iqUID C O O L E D WGffES:

a. Our losses through Glyco.l leaks were excessive. The J l s t FighterGroup suffered 12 known losses through Glycol. leaks, 8 of which were caused by enemy aircraft and 4 which developed internal GlycoL leaks. b* I t i s urgently recommended that a study be made with the view of determining whether, the radial type motor would, not.be more desirable.
4. MAINTSHANCE; OF AIRCRAFT :

a ^ . Maintenance of aircraft and armament'in'the field was highly sat

isfactory. The American Aircraft showed no outstanding "bugs". They were

12

endurable and dependable and their, sturdy construction has- been justified.
Only a few non-combat motor fai lure &occur re d* .
b The 2 0 M M and 50 calibsr guns were highly dependable and effective.
The 5 7 M M of the P-59 gave trouble which was to a large degree overcome in. tho
field. .
5. AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION A N D RECOGNITION OF G R O U N D TROOPS:

u. Notwithstanding the f a c t t h a t some of our a i r u n i t s had had con sidcrable combat operations before tho beginning of our o p e r a t i o n ^ wo regrets ] t o r e p o r t t h a t on. ono occasion tho ground forces-were straffed by our own a i r - / craft and on one occasion bombed. These were, tho only occuranG.es- i n t h i s ~" * campaign and they occurred i n t h e campaign1 s e a r l y stages* b^ There follows* seme of the measures-taken t o insure safety of our own ground troops from friendly a t t a c k : Photographic reproductions of a l l American vehicles-were furnished t o S-2s of a l l the t a c t i c a l u n i t s . Colored smoke was-used t o mark front l i n e p o s i t i o n s . 1 / H F radio from a i r t o ground was helpful and i s believed t o be_jugceptj.bjle__of jauj^gj^eator. help with d<3v,(Ji.0jM(int helpful singlb factor consi;ste"a or assoitTng a s i t u a t i o n map J i n maintaining g p i n the p i l o t ' s - b r i e f i n g g operations room. A liaison officer each night obtained an overlay from tho ()-i) Corps of ground positions oJid ground plafrst This was taken by him before day light each day to the tactical unit and posted on tho situation map* A close coordination was;maintained between S-2 with the A-2, end. the ground for.eeSE G~2 and G 3 * Every change ..in front. line movement and the bomb; line was- trans mitted to all t a c t i c a l units by telephone and teleprinter., enabling them to maintain an up t o . date situation map and bomb; line. A Radio Par-ty at. each Airport monitored the Air Support frequency,, further to obtain, a more complete, picture. Bombing or straffing to the rear of the bomb line was accomplished only upon specific order. c Panel reading in combat is of questionable value The most certain means^of target identification was by coordinates and prominent t e r r a i n featureo. jd. W e have sustained severe and continued losses by friendly AntiAircraft, and ground f i r o . e_. Tho records of tho Jl^t Fighter Group, 52nd Fighter Group and 55 Fighter Group and 15'4th Observation Squadron disclose that friendly troops hava dostroyodiJO__of^our aircraft since tho beginning of operations and damaged an additional^29 _This doesnot include severe losses- from friendly t'iro suffered by the 81 st Fighter Group or tho losses suffered by the 47th Bomb Group for. which no reports are available. f. While i t i s to be oxpoctcd that green troops-being.Jiarr.assed by enemy aircraft will occasionally firo upon friendly aircraft, w e believe that, stepsrshould b'o taken that will insure the correction of continuous firing by our ground force troops upon friendly aircraft. Our losses have continued from this-source throughout tho campaign. gj^ . Our Corps Commanders have cooperated in t h i s matter and ordered in

15

substance, "Aircraft sh&l! not he fired upon unless positively indentifiod S.S'Hostile or upon tho commission of a h o s t i l e a c t n . This order, must be s t r i c t l y complied with and a i r c r a f t indentification t r a i n i n g continued, SECTION VII - AIMINISTRATION No major problems-in administration were apparent during this- Gjsmpaign. Routine administration was handled by groups-and subordinate u n i t s within, the Command. Problems requiring action by higher authority were passod through the Air Support Command Headquarters i n i t i a l l y t o the Twelfth Air Force arid l a t e r t o the North we st African Air Forces Headquarters* Administration, personnel was r kept t a the minimum, i n the advanced aroa The XII Air Support Command operated i t s Headquarters with an average of 28 officers'and 0 e n l i s t e d mem I t was found p r a c t i c a l to divide squadrons 'into flight; and ground echelon. The f l i g h t echelon at an advanced airdrome* The ground echelon at: a rear f i e l d whore a l l . a i r c r a f t .-.not: idmodiatcly r e quired for operations wore pooled for 2nd and 3rd echo lorn service. (Youks lies Bains). " ; No: difficult;/ was encountered' i n the replacement of .caaib:at..crewsr for. American type a i r c r a f t ; however, there was a shortage of .American. S p i t f i r e p i l o t s and at a letter date, i t became necessary to. e s t a b l i s h a t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g f i e l d i n ' t h e re'ar area for. these type p i l o t s . .- .
t

'

:'< Mail was received at I r r e g u l a r I n t e r v a l s o;/ c.'r tr--r.Eporb.-service, and i t s - r e c e i p t : was of high morale value t o the u n i t - ct t'...c front* A postal unit: for-the Command'was-established at Teaessa.- Post Exchange rations: ( c i g a r e t t e s and candy) wore received regularly by all. troops i n the front areas% . . ' An attempt was\made t o make awards and citations- as earned with, the l e a s t p r a c t i c a l delay; however, a shortage of medals and ribb.ons existed during most of the period. SECTION VIII - SSRYICB AND SUPPLY 14 January 194^ t o 9 April 194^ In preparation for tho planned offensive at the time of the replacementof the. XIT Fighter"CoE2inand by the XII Air Support Command, the supply l e v e l s were requested for ^0 mission stookage at a l l f i e l d s for a l l plane s. Duo t a limited r a i l f a c i l i t i e s and motor transport at XGOI, t h i s request was denied* Since t h i s offensive never developed, the approximate 10 mission level that, was ^maintained was found t o be quite s a t i s f a c t o r y . \i/hcn l a t e r operating from the Gafsa and Sbeitla arcs." i n an offensive, t h i s level proved s a t i s * factory a t the f i e l d s since t h e r e was i n operation a Dump located about f i f t y m i l e s t o the rear in tho Youks-Tpbcssa area.- ; \ - Supply l e v e l s for the original planned offensive were basos on three hour missions and two missions a day for a l l planes. Gasoline" calculations

were based on 120 gallons per hour per plane for both Light Bomber and
Fighter;' Oil was calculated at 5 gallons per mission per plane. Ammunition
and bombs were estimated at 100?o expenditure for a l l pianos per mission,
Thesef igures-were later revised decreasing the length j&f. mis si on and the
expenditure r a t e .
On 14 January 1945, the 62nd Service Group moved into Thelepte # 1 Air Field which strengthened the Service Units in personnel and equipment* The increase in special Air Corps Equipment was the most important improvement, since prior to t h i s time equipment has" been so lacking practically no salvage work had been attempted on those: airplanes-that had crashed away from the f i e l d s . ' The 53rd Fighter Group was replaced by the 3^st Fighter Group* The
shift was completed on J February 1943* The 55rd Fighter, Group moved out of
the Xll Air Support'Command area.
A Service Command Detachment moved into Sbeitla yfl Air Field on 1
February 1943 and was-replaced by the 46th Service Squadron on 6 February
' 1943 This Service'Squadron arrived well equipped and had attached an Ordnance Company, Signal Company and a detachment of a Quartermaster Company. Due'to the changing Tactical Ground condition, no tactical Air. Corps unit, was moved into Sbeitla -#1 at t h i s time. Ar the situation devel oped,; the Service Squadron and the supplies- v*ere ev.c:ated from this field on 14' February 1943. At the same time,, the 47th 3ceb '.rcup v/as-evacuated from Thelepte #1 to Youks Leg Bains Air Base. Supplies at. Thelepte #1 were decreased to. approximately 10 missions for "one Fighter. Group only* At 25OO',, 14 February 1945 complete evacuation of Thelepte j?l. and Thelepte Jp>L Air Fields .was started. All unite were moved back to Teb.essa Air Field*.Le Kouif Air Field,. Kallaat Djerda Air Field and.Youks hem Bains Air Base. For an evacuation-gin which""most of the movement cane at night in the dark, very l i t t l e organisational equipment was left behind. The evacuation' ended at 1200, 15.. February 1943. The units moved consisted of one Service Group, one Fighter Group,, and one Fighter Squadron from Thelepte #1 and one Fighter Group and one Service Squadron from Thelepto #2. This consisted of a t o t a l of 3*496 Officer_ff and Menplus- organizational equipment and supplies-. A t o t a l oi* approximately J?0,000 gallons of gasoline was- destroyed at both Thelepte #1 and 2. Planes- that could not be flown away were destroyed by burning. At, Thelepte -;fl t h i s consisted of four. P-40FTa, three A-20's'and three SpiffirecV?s> Of this t o t a i , .two planes-were of the nonre par able classification. At Thelepte $2,. eight P~39' s were destroyed,. three of'which were nonreparable. Due to continued enemy-advance -into'Kasserine Passj. the organization that had previously been evacurted to' Le liouif Air Field had t > be with drawn to Youlcs Les-Bains and to Ain Seida. F o supplies or equipment were l<st"!in this-move and the supplies that were left kere held ready to be destroyed which proved not. t o be necessary vhori the.enemy advance was finally halted* Pianos-that were nonoperational at: the time of the evacuation wore not destroyed but were merely loft on the field. The plan, although;never required to be put into .effect, was-to leave thes^ planes with the* possibility of reclaiming them later, even though the enemy had moved in to occupy the area. This- procedure is now standard pn a l l

. .

1 5 .

evacuations' as it-has been, shown on the reoccupation of Thelepte #1' and

Thelepte $"2 that the airplanes destroyed might have been reclaimed had they
not been burned. Since*'the enemy could not have flown them without repair
work .and parts, it is anticipated that they might burin the equipment to des
troy it.but their using the equipment against our forces would be almost
impossible.
The Lafayette Escadrille that was moved into the Air Field at Kalaat
Bjorda was also reevacuated at the same time Le Xouif Air Field was cleared.
Approximately 10,000 gallons of gasoline was destroyed and one P-40F was burnqd
on the. ground. This French Squadron was moved from the area of the XII Air
Support Command at this time* . "
, . , , Since there was no officer of the Air Service Command nearer than Con
stantine, the orders for evacuation of Service Command troops from Sbeitla
and the Thelepte area wore given by the Tactical Commander, XII Air Support
Command. If this were followed, as Standing Operating Procedure on change of
location the confu-sion'that previously existed could be eliminated by having
the Service Command Squadron or Detachment move without any further orders re
quired to any location taken up. by the Tactical Unit who they are servicing.
Since this evacuation, a Service Command Officer has been located in the
XII Air Support Command Headquarters with authority to move any or all Air
Service Command units and.the policy has been adopted to have the Service Unit
stay with the Tactical'Unit it is' servicing for any move that is made unless
unsatisfactory' service is being obtained as expressed by the Tactical Unit
Commanding Officer. This has eliminated the problem of the Servicing Unit
starting to learn from "scratch" each tine a move is made, the problems of
that-particular Tactical Unit and the familiarization of the type of airplane
to be maintained,
. The.Supply Level Calculations were revised after one month's operation
.in this theater using figures as follows:
Missions Length 1 hour Gasoline Consumption . , v . . ' ' . ' . ' . Oil Consumption
: , . - '

2 missions per day for all planes

P-40F per mission 100 gallons A-20 por mission 180 gallons Spitfire per mission 35 gallons P~59 Pr mission 100. gallons Hurri-Bombcr per mission 100 gallons P-AO per mission .A-20 per mission Spitfire per mission P-59 per mission J gallon
5 gallons
gallon
|r gallon

''

. , ' .

'

Ammunition Expenditure kO% por mission

Bombs Expenditure 100;$ for Light Bombers per mission.
The shift of the Jlst Fighter Group from Tobossa Air Field to Kalaat
Djerda.Air Field came'at the completion of tho enemy thrust into ICasserino

1-6

Pass. This movement took placo on 24 February 1945 The Tactical Unit
operated with a detachment of the 62nd Service Group, . . _ .
The 62nd Service Group starting at this time withdrew from XII Air. Support
Command Area and the 4lst Service Group moved into Youks Les Bains Air Base
for the establishment of Service Center #10,
Reoccupation of the advance fields was started on 5 I&rch 1945 by the
movement into Thelepte #2 Air Field of th& 81st Fighter Group and the 46th
Service Squadron,
The 47th Bomb Group moved out of the XII Air Support Command Area on 6
March 19^5 Supplies were maintained for two days operations of this type
of airplane at Youks Les Bains Air Base,
The movement back to Thelepte #1 by the 51st Fighter Group and the 154th
Observation Squadron -was completed on 12 March 1945 after a considerable delay
required for the clearing of enemy land mines from the area. The movement of
the 8lst and 52nd Groups back to Thelepte #2 was also completed on 12 I I a r c h
Supplies were maintained at a three day level at these advance fields for
two missions' a day for all planes. Reserve supplies were held in the Dump at
the 'Tebessa-Youka Area. As the Gafsa Offensive, started and the advance prog
ressed; up. through the Sbeitla section, this supply level was maintained at
these fields. . Youks Les Sains Air Base was maintained at a four day level and
the Dump at Tebessa~Youks was started for a build up to.hold the remainder of
the supplies required for a ten day level .in the area which was" computed as a
total for the supplies at the D,ump, Air Base and'Advance Fields,
The:55rd Fighter Group joined XII Air Support Command once more on 20
March 19^5* This-unit moved intofSbeitla 1 with the 26th Service Squadron,
Supplies were maintained at merely a two- day level due to its advance location*
As soon as the Gafsa area had been occupied by the Ground.Forces, the
Gafsa Air Field was-stocked with emergency supplies. One Squadron of Spitfire
airplanes was moved into this field for daylight hours of operation, only. They
returned to Thelepte #1 with the rest of the Group at night, A small detachmen
of Service Command personnel handled the stockage of supplies and the Cfcound
Crews of the Flight Echelon of the Tactical Squadron r c r . 1 2 . i n e d for the daily
servicing of the airplanes. Supply levels were held at merely one day1 s level.
On advancement on all fronts, the Thelepte and Sbeitla Areas were com?* . .
pletely cleared by all units of the XII Air Support Command on 12 April 1945*
Advance positions were taken up around Le Sers,
Through the entire period from 14 January I945 to 9 April 1945 critical
items were motor vehicles; the Tactical Units operating 75^ short "until the
middle of February and approximately 50% short through to the end of this
period; Field Ranges; Tentago and Paulins: and Airplane spare parts,. This
later item improved_to some extent with the arrival of the 4lst Service Group*
At the eni of this 9 April 1945 period there was still considerable improvement

":-

17

required for the efficient operation necessary for the best.Tactical Oper
ation* Ordnanfce cleaning and preserving materials, armament spare parts,
and tools have been lacking through this entire period. Only by improvising
with the minimum of supplies and equipment have the servicing personnel been
able to operate.
SEOTIOIT I X ~ SIQidL 00MLMI0ATI0K5

li. During the early part of January, 1943, the XII Air Support Command
was given the mission of supporting the II Corps. Tentative plans were immed
iately drawn up for the signal requirements covering HF and VHP radio chan
nels, including call signs and frequencies, wire linearequireaents, direct
circuits, and switching trunks, teleprinter circuits, supply dumps and main
tenance districts.
2. After the plan was' thoroughly coordinated with AFHQ, II Corps, 12th
Air Force and 12th Air Service Command, the S.O.I, for the XII Air Support
Command was published and distribution effected prior to movement into the
theater of operations. The time element involved in perfecting and coordin
ation of the plan and for the completion of the S.O.I, was- approximately one
week. It is now a definately established fact that t-.is coordination is of
prime importance.
5 ^ perform its fission the XII Air Support Corjinand had assigned to
it the following signal and communication units on the dates as listed:
3rd Air Support Cormiiunications Squadron 10 January 1943 927th Signal Battalion, ASC . . 10^ January__l94 . 451st Signal Construction Battalion f cTMarch ~ 3rd Air Defense -fing (Hq) ) $> j>larch Dets. 56lst A.vf.S. Bn. ; 9 March 752nd A.I-/. Co. \ 9 March 753rd A.. 06. \ 9 Harch 734th A.;Co. ' ' . 9 March

The last six units were ordered into the theirfeF for the establish
ment" of the Air Earning Service-.
4. The signal plan and procedure followed is listed below, numbered
according to priority of installations
^ ;-fIRE LINES: ' ,

(l) Direct talking circuits from A-3 to each airfield termin

ating at the group operations desk. If airfields are located more than 20
miles from Headquarters XII Air Support Command two, but not more than two
fields should be connected on one talking circuit.
(2) A direct talking circuit from Headquarters XII Air
: Support Command switchboard to next higher headquarters switchboard.

18

. (5) A direct talking circuit between Av^ and Q-5 ^ Corps.

'(4). A direct talking circuit from A-5 ^o the control officer
Aircraft Earning Service,
(5) A direct talking circuit from Operations Control A.W.S,
to the control officer of the Air Support Commands on the right and left
flanks, (242 Gr~oup and VJeetern Desert Air Force) (British),
(6) A direct talking circuit from Control A.V/.S. to each air
field terminating in the operations officer1s office. A party line to two
or more fields has been found adequate,
(7) A direct talking circuit from Control A.VJ.S. to anti
aircraft headquarters located at each field when the airfields are located
within -12 miles of the A,l',r.S. Control. YJhen the fields are located at a
greater distance, the circuit in (6) above, supplemented by radio is suffic
ient.
(8) Group wire operational circuits are required from group
headquarters to each squadron and to the base command headquarters switch
board, '
h. ADMINISTRATIVE Y'IRE LINES:, " '.

(1) A direct ring down trunk from base headquarters switch-

hoard to the nearest switchboard connecting to the general overall wire net
of the area, : . ,
(2) Local' drops to ordnance, engineer, gasoline and radio
repair sections.
_c. TELEPRINTER WIRE REQUIREMENTS: "

(1) From the immediate vicinity of A-5 to the immediate

vicinity of the group operations at each field. Loop circuits aiinplexed on
direct talking circuits mentioned in par. 4 _ a (l).
(2) From the vicinity of A-5 to next higher headquarters
simplexed'on direct talking circuit mentioned in par. 4 o . (2).
' (5) Administrative teleprinter from service center to the
nearest teleprinter switchboard operating into the general overall teleprinter
wire net.
(4) A teleprinter from Headquarters XII Air Support Command
to ,nearest teleprinter switchboard operating in the general overall tele
printer wire net,
d . . RADIO NETS:
(1) AIR SUPPORT NET remoted from the immediate vicinity of
A-5 to all Air Support Parties attached to Divisions and Combat teams.

19

(Stations in command net monitor this net),

(2) COMMAND NET remoted from the vicinity of each airfield.
LIAISON NET #1 remoted from the immediate vicinity of A-
to next higher tactical headquarters.
LIAISON NET #2 remoted from the immediate v i c i n i t y of A-J to the Air Support lands covering the r i g h t and l e f t f l a n k s . (5) .ADMINISTRATIVE NET from the v i c i n i t y of Headquarters XII a i r Support Command to Headquarters of tho Air Service Command and t o the next higher administrative headquarters. . AIRCRAFT W A R N I N G NETS: '

( l ) Prom operations control to each of the outlying Ground Control Intercept (Chain over Low) (GCl/Col) s t a t i o n s and to a l l Light 'Earn ing (IiV/) s t a t i o n s . (2) From a l l Ground Observation Posts to Control Posts to Operations Control A.W.S. SCR-195. '(3) Liaison Control net SCR-299 from the immediate v i c i n i t y of the Defense Wing Headquarters to Headquarters of the Air Support Commands on both flanks* f. ?,H.F. RADIO NETS:
: ;

'

(1) HOMER and R.D.F. HET SCR-574. Homing station at ach

field. (When two or more fields are located v/ithin a 10 mile radius one
homer is deemed adequate).
(2) GROUND-AIR CONTROL NET. (SCR-572 and 575) Located in
the vicinity of tho defense wing operations.
( AIR-GROUND NET.. Air Support Party to a i r c r a f t in f l i g h t . Normally on Channel "D" SGR-522 s e t . (4) (5) g# AIR T O AIR.NETS. Normal SCR-522. :

AIRIBOIiE C01-ITR0L NET.- Normal modified SCR-522*

3-IAINTENAITCE OF V^RE LINES:

(l) The II Corps in the initial phases of the combat covered

a front of approximately l^O miles. Corps and XII Air Support Oornmand bases
extended from this front to the rear approximately 100 miles. The mainten
ance of all wire linos in the area immediately assumed a problem of con
siderable proportions. The entire area was subdivided into sections and
allocated to the 5Jrd Signal Battalion, II Corps, and the 927th Signal Bat
talion, ASC, XII Air Support Command. The installation, operation and
' ' ' 2 0

maintenance of st-ritchboards, switching centrals, test stations and trouble

shooting bivouac areas l^ere likewise allocated between the two battalions.
This procedure produced excellent wire communications and reduced to a min
imum the lost hour circuit failuro. Without this close coordination and
mutual assistance on the part of a.11 Signal personnel in II Corps and XII
Air, Support Command, signal communications could not have functioned nearly
so efficiently. . , >
. . , ji. MESSAGE CENTER:.'.

(1) Message Centers have functioned normally except at Head

quarters, XII Air Support Command. A special Message Center for the "non
stop" delivery of messages of a tactical nature from A-3 to telephones, tele
printers, courier station and remote radio control truck set up adjacent
tpv-A35. This procedure had reduced to an absolute minimum the time interval
from the time the message ie written until the time receipted for by the
addressee.
(2) It was initially assumed that cryptographic duties would
be very heavy. Two cryptographic officers were initially set up along with
five-enlisted men, cryptographic clerks. Immediately upon engagement with
the enemy it was found that this personne'1 was too limited. One additional
officer and four enlisted'"men, cryptographic clerks were added to handle
the traffic and make distribution of secret documents. , .
ri. .SIGNAL SUPPLIES? " ' . . ; *

; . . (l), Through mutual agreement wilSh Signal Officer, II. Corps,

signal supplies fton Corps dumps v/cre made available to tlie XII Air Support
Command. In addition, the Signal Supply Section.of the Third Service Com
mand. Area has rendered excellent and speedy signal supply service, freq
uently delivering critical items lost in1combat or for replacement purposes
within 12 hours after requests were telephoned in. .
(2). Mobile repair sections of the .3rd Air.Support Communications
Squadron and from the 12th Air Force Service Command have been constantly
employed in the repair of#HF and VHF sets, including airplane sets,

J[. MOBILITY:

'

(1) Just prior to entrance into the theater of operations, the requirements for the greatest mobility-was anticipated. Consequently, SOH-522 airplane Tadio-sets were modified for ground use and installed in the SCPv-299 for the use of each Air Support Party. (2) A BD-89-A telephone switchboard was permanently installed in one 2- ton 6 X 6 cargo truck. _ -; ' . (5) ..Remote control keys, michrophones and receivers vrcrc in stalled in a 2-J- ton "6 X 6 truck. These installations have materially aided in.accomplishing,continuous communications during the entire, operations be twoon rear and advanced-headquarters during:'six complete moves. .
1

21

:.k;; MISCELLANEOUS:

(l) The Commanding Generals of both the XII Air Support

Command and II Corps aro fully cognizant of the vital importance of signal
communications during combat with highly mobile enemy forces. Each has
directed in each instance only the general locality into which their head
quarters were to move. The exact location of the C,P has been largely
determined bjr the two Signal Officers concerned. This procedure has con
served many miles of wire and has permitted the establishment of signal
communications with the minimum loss of time and confusion incident to the
displacement of two C.P,1s of this magnitude. It is urgently recommended
that this procedure b-e continued,
SECTION X - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOiC-lSIlDATIOITS.
The following are the personal views of Brigadier General VflLLIAlIS,
who commanded the XII Air Support Command from 21 January, through the re
ported II Corps operations. The Corps was first commanded by Major General
FKEDENDAHL and later by Lieutenant General PATTON.

" " ' '

\-<'J

I am thoroughly convinced that the organization of an Air Support r'^'f--

Command based oh the principles of FM 51-55* ^s sound, '.-.'orkable, and. I ^ - - "
strongly recommend that all such commands be organized in this manner with
certain modifications ad indicated herein.
The composition of ihe.units composing an Air Support Coinmand will
vary according to the mission that.it is required, to perform. The follow
ing units are believed to. be essential to such a command operating in a
purely ground action as was,the case during this- period:
1, A streamlined'mobile headquarters reduced in personnel to the
minimum.
2. One or more Communications Squadrons with Air Corps Party Officers
trained to advise""Ground Commanders; (One Communication Squadron v/as ex
panded to operate sixteen Air Support Parties during the recent operations,)
3# A Signal Construction Battalion consisting of two heavy companies
and one operational company,
4, An Aviation Engineer Battalion,
An Air Earning Service and Fighter Control Organization,
The above units should be assigned to the Air Support Command and
/ their C.P.'s be with or in the immediate proximity to the
/ Command Posts,'
In addition, one or norc Service Groups should be attached to the
Air Support Command and their personnel remain a part of and move with the
Tactical units they serve.
22

tt

All the above units should 'be mobile and have sufficient intregal
transportation to facilitate their own movements. Tactical Commands should
have mobile operations equipment and principal staff officers and commanders
should have mobile living quarters. . . .
Fighter, fighter bomber5 dive bomber and horizontal bomber aircraft
should be assigned and operated under the central .control of the Air Support
Command. The proportion of types is dependent'upon the situation, which is
influenced primarily by the enemy air strength, the location of his airdromes
and the particular problems of the ground forces supported;, In addition, a
.Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron with a Photo Section is essential,,
In order to give the.maximum amount of support to the ground troops,
the Air Commander must be free to employ his force in the manner in which
he" is trained and knows will give maximum support* Ho arbitary rules or doc
trines for Air Support can and should be established* Fundamentally, Air
?apportr can only be effective when air superiority is gained in the area in
which the ground forces are operating,, Hence, the first requirement is to
gain air superiority in the area. This may or may net be done in conjunction
with other air forces operating in the theatre* Local air superiority over
friendly troops is the second definite requirement for effective support.
This is gained by bombing of enemy airdromes, fighter sweep3 and intercept
ions, all for the purpose of neutralizing the enemy' s c . i i ' effort.
With general and local'air superiority established, ground troops can
operate effectively. The maximum localised support can than be given by the
air* The Air Support Commander is in a -osition to iuset all requests on the
part of the Ground Commander within the capabilities of his force.
From the operations reports above, it will be seen that in the first,
phases, the enemy destroyed more of our aircraft than we destroyed of his'. /
fith the assignment of an. increased number of aircraft, air superiority was
'efinitely established. During this period, our ground forces were able to
' ' L o v e up their units from Casablanca and Algiers, without harrassment by the
enemy air. Movements were made by day with vehicles bumper to- bumper. This
because of the protective air screen established by our fighters. This was
our first support mission and, o f course, must have been appreciated by the
Ground Commanders* .
'fith ground forces in position, air superiority had to be and was main
tained. Continuous support:-was given through responding to requests from
Ground Commanders through Air Sjjupport Party channels and also by setting up
targets'as developed by aerial reconnaissance. In this connection, it is
well to note that aboutn & Q j f e , p f . ' "tkg support missions flown were developed by
the Air. This was in accordance with the desires of both General FREDS1JDAHL
.and General PATTON, who both stated in substance, "Don't wait for us to orde'rx.
"air missions, you know what the situation is-, just keep pounding them." J,
I and my principal staff officers lived and operated with tho Corps
Commanders during most of the period. This is absolutely essential, A high
degree of cooperation and. coordination ensued. "This dos not mean that all
ground requests were ajutQjaajt^j^lly^ajgproved by the air. In^liolitiroversTal"'"
c a s e s , " ' " ' a ' conference was held and the propeT"a"ction taken.

The above system d e f i n i t e l y works* The Air Commander must have the i n i t i a t i v e i n the a i r , the Ground Commander on the ground. There i s no nessessity or reason for an assignment or attachment of one force to the other, I am convinced t h a t our a i r support was effective, With the exper ience gained, there i s no doubt i n my mind t h a t outstanding acco^pj islsments along Air Support l i n e s within the American Forces can be expectecU"

PAUL L. WILLIAMS, Brigadier General, USA, Commanding*

24