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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 INDEX INDEX....................................................................................................................1 PREDICTIONS GOOD..............................................................................................3 PREDICTIONS GOOD..............................................................................................4 SPECIFIC CALCULATIONS GOOD............................................................................6 FEAR OF DEATH GOOD..........................................................................................7 NUCLEAR REPS GOOD...........................................................................................8 A2: NO VALUE TO LIFE..........................................................................................9 VIOLENCE GOOD.................................................................................................10 NONVIOLENCE BAD.............................................................................................11 SCENARIO PLANNING GOOD................................................................................12 RATIONALITY GOOD.............................................................................................13 NUCLEAR WARMORAL OBLIGATION..................................................................14 SUFFERING REPS GOOD......................................................................................15 SUFFERING REPS GOOD......................................................................................16 EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL FOCUS GOOD.................................................................17 EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL FOCUS GOOD.................................................................18 A2: GERWIRTH / INTERVENING ACTORS..............................................................19 A2: GERWIRTH / INTERVENING ACTORS..............................................................20 UTOPIAN THINKING BAD......................................................................................21 UTOPIAN THINKING BAD......................................................................................23 ***LETS BE TOUCHY-FEELY ABOUT IMPACTS***.................................................24 EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL FOCUS BAD.....................................................................25 EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL FOCUS BAD.....................................................................27 NO EXTINCTION...................................................................................................28 SUFFERING REPS BAD.........................................................................................29 INTERVENING ACTORS / GERWIRTH....................................................................31 INTERVENING ACTORS / GERWIRTH....................................................................32 INTERVENING ACTORS / GERWIRTH....................................................................33 HIGH IMPACT RISK ASSESSMENT BAD.................................................................35 HIGH IMPACT RISK ASSESSMENT BAD.................................................................36 SYSTEMIC HARMS OUTWEIGH.............................................................................37 VIRTUES OUTWEIGH CALCULATION.....................................................................39 INTERPASSIVITY TURN.........................................................................................40

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 PREDICTIONS GOOD Debates about the foresight and prevention of catastrophes avert extinction, enable positive social change and affirm obligations to future generations Fuyuki Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York Univ. and a Faculty Assoc. of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale Univ., 2K4
[Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight," constellations, 11:4, p. 455-456]
This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into risk communities that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the

earth sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing below the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations .6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of
globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war,

if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to move up and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between
ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates

the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind . I will
thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the

development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the futures essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism of solidarity that extends to future generations can supplant the preeminence of short-termism with the help of appeals to the publics moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment
of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction

of an alternative world order (IV).

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 PREDICTIONS GOOD The rejection of predictive claims sacrifices the emancipatory potential of policymaking and the alternative Fred Chernoff, PhDs in Philosophy and Political Science, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate , 2K5

Various IR theorists have also argued against prediction. For example, Donald Puchala contends that IR theory
'does not, because it cannot in the absence of laws ... invite us to deduce, and it does not permit us to predict' (Puchala 1991: 79). Interpretivist and reflecitivist IR theorists like Ashley (1986), Onuf (1989), Walker (1993) and others, following the lead of critical theorists and prediction-sceptic philosophers of social science, argue that IR theory (discussed in Chapter 3) is able to facilitate an interpretive understanding of events and deny that IR theory is capable of prediction or scientific-style explanation. Even though many of these authors hope that IR theory can lead to 'human emancipation', their meta-theory undercuts its ability to do so. This trend in the theoretical literature in IR severs the link between IR theory and any significant

ability to aid policy-makers to bring about emancipation or any other foreign policy goal. If they do not leave room for rationally grounded expectations about the future, that is, scientificstyle prediction, then it will be impossible to formulate policies that can be expected to achieve various aims, including the emancipation of oppressed groups. Without the ability to say that a given action option has a higher probability than any of the other options of achieving the objective, e.g, a greater degree of emancipation of the target group, these theorists cannot recommend courses of action to achieve their desired goals. The loss of this essential capability has been largely overlooked by constructivists and reflectivists in the IR literature. All policy decisions are attempts to influence or bring about some future state of affairs. Policy-making requires some beliefs about the future, whether they are called 'expectations', 'predictions', 'forecasts' or 'prognostications'. The next step in the argument is to show how
such beliefs can be justified.

Rejecting predictions makes all your impacts inevitable Fred Chernoff, PhDs in Philosophy and Political Science, Prof. of Political Science at Colgate , 2K5
In IR the most prominent critical theorists reject prediction. Cox says bluntly, 'It is impossible to predict the future' (1987). Few IR scholars outside the HT remark on this feature of constructivist critical theory. But , for policy-making purposes, the

rejection of prediction is quite debilitating for proponents of HT. Chapter I argued that policy-making requires
prediction, and these scholars deny that possibility. Mearsheimer (1994-5: 43-4) is one of the few 'outside' theorists to note this defect in the inside position. Mearsheirner, however, does not go quite far enough in his critique. Cox, Ashley and other critical theorists are

concerned, as most IR theorists are, with the need to create a better world. Mearsheimer notes that the policies recommended by constructivist critical theorists may bring about changes other than those they desire (creating a more internationally cooperative world without the conflictual influences of realism as the hegemonic discourse). Mearsheimer raises as an example the possibility that ridding the world of realist hegemonic discourse may lead to its replacement with fascist hegemonic discourse, which could create a more oppressive world rather than a less oppressive world. But the problem of unpredictability
seems even deeper, since it is entirely possible that the institution-friendly discourse might replace realism as dominant, and there may be no change whatsoever in real world politics. If scholars reject causal (probabilistic) connections between

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 events, states of affairs, or event-types, then there is no reason to believe that any specific change will lead to a particular effect.

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 FEAR OF DEATH GOOD Imagining nuclear death is a project of survival their alternative promotes lifedenying repression and denial Millicent Lenz, Assis. Prof Science and Policy @ SUNY, 1990, Nuclear Age Literature for Youth, p. 9-10
A summary of Franks thought in Psychological Determinants of the Nuclear Arms Race notes how all

people have difficulty grasping the magnitude and immediacy of the threat of nuclear arms and this psychological unreality is a basic obstacle to eliminating that threat. Only events that people have
actually experienced can have true emotional impact. Since Americans have escaped the devastation of nuclear weapons on their own soil and nuclear weapons poised for annihilation in distant countries cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched, we find it easy to imagine ourselves immune to the threat. Albert Camus had the same phenomenon in mind when he wrote in his essay Neither Victims nor Executioners of the inability of most people really to imagine other peoples death (he might have added or their own). Commenting on Camus, David P. Barash and Judith Eve Lipton observed that this distancing from deaths reality is yet another aspect of our insulation from lifes

most basic realities. We make love by telephone, we work not on matter but on machines, and we kill and are killed by proxy. We gain in cleanliness, but lose in understanding. If we are to heed Camuss call to refuse to be either the victims of violence like the Jews of the Holocaust, or the perpetrators of it like the Nazi executioners of the death camps, we must revivify the imagination of what violence really entails. It is here, of course, that the literature of nuclear holocaust can play a significant role. Without either firsthand experience or vivid imagining, it is natural, as Frank points out, to deny the existence of death machines and their consequences. In psychiatric usage denial means to exclude from awareness, because letting [the instruments of destruction] enter consciousness would create too strong a level of
anxiety or other painful emotions. In most life-threatening situations, an organisms adaptation increases chances of survival, but ironically, adapting ourselves to nuclear fear is counterproductive. We only seal our

doom more certainly. The repressed fear, moreover, takes a psychic toll. ( ) Death imagery affirms life Michael Allen Fox, Assoc. Prof Phil. @ Queens, 1985, Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Fox and
Groarke, p. 127 There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace.35 Security is not the absence of fear and anxiety, but a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realist that we cannot entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact. The disease for which we must find the cure also requires

that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. 36 In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert J. Lifton points out, confronting massive death helps us bring ourselves more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life.

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 NUCLEAR REPS GOOD

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[Fear and Empowerment Work,, accessed 3-2-2007, JT]

Apocalyptic Y2K expectations can make us afraid, depressed and numb. Intense emotions like this can wipe us out -- to a point where we can't act effectively . But it turns out there is a gift hidden at the core of these emotions, a gift that gives us power.
But first a bit of history.

During the 1980s some peace activists realized that their fellow citizens were paralyzed by fear and powerlessness in the face of the threat of nuclear war. They observed people lost in denial, trying to go about their lives as if the threat didn't exist. Wanting to learn more about this phenomenon, these activists listened carefully to these haunted people -- and searched their own hearts, as well. They discovered that under everyone's denial was a deep caring for their lives, their children's future, and the fate of their world. From that insight, these activists developed a number of emotional and spiritual approaches to
help people in groups break through their denial and despair to contact that deep caring. Once they got in touch with their shared feelings and stories and passion for life, such groups often found a new vitality and determination to do

something about the problem. Buddhist scholar and systems thinker Joanna Macy, pioneer in this work, called it "despair
and empowerment work."

A number of people who were involved with that work a decade or more ago, are now evolving new forms which they are applying to threats such as ecological collapse and the socioeconomic collapse that could be triggered by the Y2K computer problem and our dependence on technology.

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[, Fighting Terror with Estrogen, FrontPage Magazine, ACC. 3-14-08, JT]

advocates of a firm foreign policy and self-defense for survival do not revel in carnage. Since we respect life (especially the lives of the innocent), we would much prefer to avoid violence, if at all possible. But we also understand the ineffectiveness of the "feminine ethos of cooperation, understanding and forbearance" when dealing with bloodthirsty savages death-worshipping megalomaniacs, raving antiSemites and those who torture and murder hostages, and then mutilate their bodies.
Leftist mythology to the contrary notwithstanding, One would love to see Blumner exercising her "feminine ethos" on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, chancellor of the Iranian Reich. First hed insist she don a head-to-toes chador. Then hed have her flogged for a being an insolent woman who dared to speak in his presence. Finally, hed have her executed as a Zionist spy. But Blumner would have the satisfaction of knowing she did not resort to violence no macho gunslinger she.

Those whose mantra is violence-never-solvedanything, are dogma-blinded, historical illiterates who would lead us down the soft path to national suicide. Without warfare and violence, we would have no country. America was born on the battlefield. (George III would never have let us go without a fight.)
And now, let us say a few good words for warfare and violence. The Declaration of Independence was noble words penned on paper. It was the sword that gave them a reality. In this instance, the perpetrators of revolutionary violence included John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington men of learning and ability all. Without warfare and violence the 11 states of the Confederacy would have successfully seceded in 1861, leaving us with two truncated nations. And the slaves would have been pickin cotton for ole massah for at least a few decades more.

Without warfare and violence in 1939-1945, today, half the world would be singing "Deutschland uber Alles," while the other half bowed to the honorable emperor of Japan. And without warfare and violence during the Cold War, the world would have been swallowed up by a monstrous ideology responsible for 100 million deaths in the 20th century.
Blumner is able to prattle about the superiority of soft power and the feminine ethos over testosterone-laden gunslingers because men with guns suffered and died to preserve and protect a republic where human rights are enshrined.


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 NONVIOLENCE BAD NONVIOLENCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VIOLENCE OR IGNORING VIOLENCE Tony Bing, Dir. Of the Peace and Global Studies program at Fordham University, 98
[Albert Camus: The Plague and an Ethic of Nonviolence, Delivered as part of the Charles Lecture Series,, Accessed July2, 2006, JT//JDI] The courage implicit in these words leads me to return to the components of the ethic of nonviolence that I outlined in my first lecture. True pacifism, true nonviolence, is not submission to evil and violence and the structures

of violence but a courageous confrontation of evil by the power of love. It is not an ethic for the weak nor for the naive. Camus statements that he was not a pacifist nor a believer in complete nonviolence most often refer to pacifism or nonviolence as a condition, not an action, i.e., passivity, not pacifism. The point of convergence
between Camus thought and the ethic of nonviolence I am advocating is that both are acts of rebellion, statements of affirmation of an existence better than the one we lead, a yes based upon a no. Both cling to hope and happiness of the sort Rieux sees on Tarrous face as they swim together, "a happiness that forgot nothing, not even murder." (Plague, p.256) To forget nothing, not even murder, means to remember in our happiness the reality of Hitler (in some ways the human manifestation of the Plague) and the negation he embodied. In a 1946 speech at Columbia University, one of the listeners, Nicola Chiaromonte, remembers Camus as saying the following: "Now that Hitler has gone, we know a certain number of things. The first is that the poison which impregnated Hitlerism has not been eliminated; it is present in each of us. Whoever today speaks of human existence in terms of power, efficacy, and historical tasks spreads it...Another thing we have learned is that we cannot accept any optimistic conception of existence, any happy ending whatsoever. But if we believe that optimism is silly, we also know that pessimism about the action of man among

his fellows is cowardly." (Camus: Collection of Essays, pp.14-15)


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PREDICTIVE SCENARIO PLANNING FOSTERS QUESTIONING OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD AROUND US. EVEN UNDER UNCERTAINTY, SCENARIOS ALLOW US TO MAKE BETTER DECISIONS Timothy E. Somes, Prof. and Chair of the US Naval War College, Dept. of Joint Military Operation and Dr. Jerome E. Liotta, Chair of Dept of Economics at the US Naval War College , 2K3
[The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios and the Future, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn, pp. 121-133, JT//JDI]

*Elipses in original

*Sexist language!

The challenge for strategic planners is to help decision makers understand what the future security environment might look like, to affect their perceptions, in essence, to help them "reperceive." Wack, who gained some fame as a strategic planner during the oil crises of the 19705 with his ability to get the
senior executives in Shell Oil to understand what might happen in the energy business, wrote in the Harvard Business Review some years later: Scenarios deal with Two worlds: the world of facts and the world of perceptions . They explore the facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions. This transformation process is not trivial-more often than not it does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt "Aha!" from you ... [decision makers] and leads to strategic insights beyond the mind's previous reach. In short, to think and act effectively in an uncertain world, people need to learn to reperceive-to

question their assumptions and their understanding about the way the world works. By questioning those assumptions and rethinking the correct way to operate under uncertainty, we often see the world more clearly than we otherwise would. Wack summarized his goals as a strategic planner
and developer of scenarios by stating: I have found that getting to that [decision makers'] "Aha!" is the real challenge of scenario analysis. It does not simply leap at you when you've been presented all the possible alternatives .... It happens when your message reaches the microcosms of decision makers, obliges them to question their assumptions about how their ... world works, and leads them to change and reorganize their inner models of reality.4


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[, Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword, accessed March 21, 2007, JDI]
But why did I do it? I confess that I'm an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I'm a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist

objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them. (If science were merely
a negotiation of social conventions about what is agreed to be ``true'', why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short life to it? I don't aspire to be the Emily Post of quantum field theory.3) But my main concern isn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit (we'll survive just fine, thank you). Rather, my

concern is explicitly political: to combat a currently fashionable postmodernist/poststructuralist/social-constructivist discourse -- and more generally a penchant for subjectivism -- which is, I believe, inimical to the values and future of the Left.4 Alan
Ryan said it well: It is, for instance,

pretty suicidal for embattled minorities to embrace Michel Foucault, let alone The minority view was always that power could be undermined by truth ... Once you read Foucault as saying that truth is simply an effect of power, you've had it. ... But American departments of literature, history and sociology contain large numbers of self-described leftists who have confused radical doubts about objectivity with political radicalism, and are in a mess.5
Jacques Derrida. Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm has decried

the rise of ``postmodernist'' intellectual fashions in Western universities, particularly in departments of literature and anthropology, which imply that all ``facts'' claiming objective existence are simply intellectual constructions. In short, that there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. But there is, and for
historians, even for the most militantly antipositivist ones among us, the ability to distinguish between the two is absolutely fundamental.6 (Hobsbawm goes on to show how rigorous historical work can refute the fictions propounded by reactionary nationalists in India, Israel, the Balkans and elsewhere.) And finally Stanislav Andreski: So long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society. Firstly, because clear and

logical thinking leads to a cumulation of knowledge (of which the progress of the natural sciences provides the best example) and the advance of knowledge sooner or later undermines the traditional order. Confused thinking, on the other hand, leads nowhere in particular and can be indulged indefinitely without producing any impact upon the world.7


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 NUCLEAR WARMORAL OBLIGATION Moral Obligation to avoid nuclear war via policy decisions. Yevgeny Chazov, cochair of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1985
(Tragedy and Triumph of Reason, Nobel Lecture, December 11,

In our medical practice when we deal with a critical patient in order to save him, we mobilize all our energies and knowledge, sacrifice part of our hearts and enlist the cooperation of our most experienced colleagues. Today we face a seriously ill humanity, torn apart by distrust and fear of nuclear war. To save it we must arouse the conscience of the world's peoples, cultivate hatred for nuclear weapons, repudiate egoism and chauvinism, and create favorable atmosphere of trust. In the nuclear age we are all interdependent. The Earth is our only common home which we cannot abandon. The new suicidal situation calls for the new thinking. We must convince those who take political decisions. Our professional duty is to protect life on Earth.


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[Can Politics Practice Compassion?, Hypatia, Fall, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 97+, JDI//JT]
When the experience of, for example, being in a detention camp in a remote desert area seems to crush the morale of asylum seekers, attentiveness to their plight in the form of gifts, letters, and practical or legal help affirms their humanity. We see this dignity explained in Seyla Benhabib's concept of the "generalized other," which treats people as having equal rights and duties including the right to seek asylum when one has been persecuted, and the "concrete other," which "requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution" (1987, 164). Ethical politics is about

trying to cultivate decent polities that affirms human dignity. Such politics acknowledges the uniqueness of citizens, and affirms "our humanity in making others part of our lives while recognizing their right to be different" (Coicaud and Warner 2001, 13). It is by no means simple to humanize the experience of the other when that experience is horrific, such as in torture, war-rape, sexual trafficking, or existing in detention camps. The "humanizing" comes in recognizing the intensity of pain, feeling some of the anguish, and realizing human vulnerability to the point of appreciating that in different situations, we too might be tortured, raped, forced into prostitution, or seeking asylum. Yet there are competing interpretations of the nature of pain and its causes, consequences, and moral, religious, and social significance. Debating pain and suffering places it in a political space. A compassionate society that values people must value different people with different interpretations of what is needed to ease suffering. It is hypocritical for states to mouth the rhetoric of compassion and respect of obligations to others, but in practice to ignore suffering. For example, mandatory detention of asylum seekers in
Australia can last for many years.22 Isolation, uncertainty, separation from families, and memories of past traumas in one's country of origin often lead to mental breakdown or prolonged anguish. Yet the Australian government claims to respect the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.


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[Can Politics Practice Compassion?, Hypatia, Fall, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 97+, JDI //JT]
I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further the nature of attentiveness. If morality is about our concerned responsiveness, attention is the prerequisite to intense regard. Iris Murdoch borrowed the concept of "attention" from Simone Weil "to express the idea of a just and loving gaze" (1985, 34) on the reality of particular persons. Part of the moral task is, as Murdoch reiterated, to see the world in its realityto see people

struggling in pain and despair. Weil, too, gave "attention" a prominent place, grounded in concrete matters of exploitation,
economic injustice, and oppression.23 Her emphases were pragmatic in struggling against the debilitating nature of lifehow "it humiliates, crushes, politicizes, demoralizes, and generally destroys the human spirit" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 16)and idealistic in striving to put ideals into practice. Too readily, we think about suffering in the height of media accounts of famine, suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, refugee camps, and war's destructive impact, and retreat quickly into our small world of self-pity. As Margaret Little explains, Murdoch's point was that "the seeing itself is a taskthe task of being attentive to one's

surroundings" (1995, 121). We need to "see" reality in order to imagine what it might be like for others, even when this includes horrific images from war violence.24 Yet despite the presence of embedded
journalists, media reporting of such events as the invasion of Iraq has remained entirely typical in that "the experience of the people on the receiving end of this violence remains closed to us" (Manderson 2003, 4). Without political imagination, we will

not have compassionate nations. "Without being tragic spectators, we will not have the insight required if we are to make life somewhat less tragic for those who . . . are hungry, and oppressed, and in pain" (Nussbaum 1996, 88). In order for political leaders to demonstrate compassion, they should display the ability to imagine the lives led by members of the diverse groups that they themselves lead. Otherwise, dispassionate detachment predominates and acts like the 2003 invasion of Iraq lead to talk of freedom without seeing fear, assume liberation without replacing the losses, and abuse power without addressing people's pain . "The difference, for
instance, between someone who discerns the painfulness of torture and someone who sees the evil of it is that the latter person has come to see the painfulness as a reason not to torture" (Little 1995, 126). Attentive ethics in international relations


about priorities and choices.


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The risk of extinction via nuclear war outweighs all - morality demands you evaluate our disad Robert A. Seeley, Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, 1986, The Handbook of Non-Violence, p. 269-70

In moral reasoning prediction of consequences is nearly always impossible. One balances the risks of an action against its benefits; one also considers what known damage the action would do. Thus a surgeon in
deciding whether to perform an operation weighs the known effects (the loss of some nerve function, for example) and risks (death) against the benefits, and weighs also the risks and benefits of not performing surgery. Morally, however, human extinction is unlike

any other risk. No conceivable human good could be worth the extinction of the race, for in order to be a human good it must be experienced by human beings. Thus extinction is one result we dare not-may not-risk. Though not conclusively established, the risk of extinction is real enough to make nuclear war utterly impermissible under any sane moral code.


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[Paradise Lost: Can Mankind (sic) Live Without Its Utopias?, The New York Times, p.B7, JT/JDI]

The utopias philosophers imagined are just as difficult to reach, requiring a mastery of esoteric dialogue (like Plato's) or dialectical theory (like Karl Marx's). Paradise is glimpsed only after strenuous intellectual or physical effort. And whoever has made the journey to alien shores brings back tales of
lands where labor has been transformed into pleasure and knotty earthly problems are unwoven with ease. Our world, too, the story goes, could be like this, if only . . . And there the difficulties begin. The significance of utopias is not that they imagine versions of perfection, but that they imagine cures for imperfection. A utopia is not, like Peter Pan's Neverland, an impossible place; that would turn utopianism into mere fantasy. The promise of utopia is that while seeming to be Neverland and Noplace, it has a chance of becoming This Land and This Place. That is why something seemingly imaginary becomes compellingly urgent. Utopianism defines a political program; utopianism inspires progress. But paradoxically, it also results in the opposite. Visions of utopia have led to extraordinary horrors and nightmarish dystopias. Some have been indelibly imagined in such fictions as "Brave New World" or

"1984." Others, less literary, have flourished in the hothouse of 20th-century expectations: suicide cults and terrorism, Fascism and Communism. What goes absolutely wrong is the attempt to make everything absolutely right. Dystopias are failed attempts at utopias. UTOPIAS ARENT PARADISE, BUT LABORATORIES FOR CRUELTY AND TOTALITARIANISM IN PRACTICE EDWARD ROTHSTEIN, February 5, 2000
[Paradise Lost: Can Mankind (sic) Live Without Its Utopias?, The New York Times, p.B7, JT/JDI]

But considering that these are visions of paradise, it is astonishing how few one would feel comfortable living in. Only those who look for utopia in the distant, irretrievable past find an unambiguous glow. Ovid recalls a Golden Age in which rivers flowed with nectar and honey dripped from green trees, providing
a pastoral ideal that survived for over a millennium. More's 16th-century "Utopia" has a more modern forthrightness about it: no private property, much leisure and few lawyers -- a fantasy that has proved remarkably enduring. But there are hints of satire in some of More's imaginings, and darker intimations that some utopian things one "may rather wish for than hope after." Edward Bellamy, a 19th-century Massachusetts journalist, wrote what has probably been the most popular utopian vision ever created, "Looking Backward: 2000-1887." A reform movement was based on its ideas, but this world, too, seems unpleasant. His hero awakens in the year 2000 from a 113-year sleep, finding a government that is an all-powerful corporation; citizens divide all profits equally while answering to the strict military discipline of an "industrial army." The year 2000 was also imagined by H. G. Wells in his 1901 book "Anticipations;" it is an enlightened era in which "whole masses of human population" are judged inferior and are subject to sterilization, export or poison.

Utopias, for all their promise of freedom, turn out to be extraordinarily rigid places, full of rules and demarcations -- attempts to dissolve or constrain desire, greed, envy or other human frailties. In practice, that rigidity has turned into cruelty. The 20th century was unique not in the kinds of utopias imagined (which have been inspired by everything from pastoralism to feminism) but in the relentless attempts to bring them into existence and the technology to make them seem possible. The utopian "science" of Marxism and the 21

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utopian nationalisms of Fascism carried the model to extremes :

grand visions of a new age combined with horrific

exorcisms and totalitarian control.


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[THE ULTIMATE PHILOSOPHY, Book 1, Chapter 4: Fundamentals of Utopia,, Accessed May 27, 2006, JT/JDI]

No individual could exist without some interaction with other humans, and Humanity will only survive if there
is interaction of humans. Therefore, it is fundamental that a society in some form will always be necessary. While no two humans are exactly alike, all humans are equal in the fact that they are all part of the same species, and all humans come from a common beginning through their evolution into existence from the infinity of the third dimension. Subsequently, red or yellow, black or white, tall or small, young or old, shy or bold, all humans are equal in the realm of their creator, the third dimension. Therefore, it is fundamental that all humans are equal in the eyes of society. Every human consists of both a tangible physical existence and an intangible mental existence. The tangible and intangible parts coexist as one being. A human's mental state is capable of positive or good thoughts, and negative or evil thoughts. Additionally, the mental state can cause the physical state to act upon any type of thought. Subsequently, humans can be evil to varying degrees. Since societies consist of humans, societies can be evil to varying degrees. Therefore, it is fundamental that both individuals and societies must contend with the continuing battle of good versus evil.

In summation, it is fundamental that humans live together, as equals, in a positive and good way. While some people would say that if this occurred, it would be Utopia, they would be wrong, because this simply consists of building the foundation on which to build Humanity's house of Utopia. Any house is only as strong as its foundation. If Humanity does not have this strong fundamental base, any attempt at building a Utopia will crumble. Since good and evil are so interwoven with life, the basic working principles for these two elements of Utopia must be applied to both elements as one.


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 EXTINCTION/SURVIVAL FOCUS BAD THE DRIVE FOR SURVIVAL DRIVES WAR & PROLIF. THEIR EMPHASIS ON MERE SURVIVAL IS ONE WITHOUT VALUES OR MEANING Daniel Callahan, founder and Pres. Of the Hastings Center, Honorary Faculty @ Charles University Medical School, 73 **We dont endorse the gender-biased lang. in this evidence!


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OUR CRITICISM ASSUMES ALL YOUR SURVIVAL GOOD ARGUMENTS. THE DRIVE FOR MERE SURVIVAL DESTROYS EVERYTHING WORTH LIVING FOR Daniel Callahan, founder and Pres. Of the Hastings Center, Honorary Faculty @ Charles University Medical School, 73 **We dont endorse the gender-biased lang. in this evidence!


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 NO EXTINCTION

SINGLE IMPACTS WILL NOT CAUSE EXTINCTIONHUMANITY IS RESILIENT TONN 2005 (Bruce, Futures Studies Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, Human
Extinction Scenarios,

The human species faces numerous threats to its existence. These include global climate change, collisions with near-earth objects, nuclear war, and pandemics. While these threats are indeed serious, taken separately they fail to describe exactly how humans could become extinct. For example, nuclear war by itself would most likely fail to kill everyone on the planet, as strikes would probably be concentrated in the northern hemisphere and the Middle East, leaving populations in South America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand some hope of survival. It is highly unlikely that any uncontrollable nanotechnology could ever be produced but even it if were, it is likely that humans could develop effective, if costly, countermeasures, such as producing the technologies in space or destroying sites of runaway nanotechnologies with nuclear weapons. Viruses could indeed kill many people but effective quarantine of a healthy people could be accomplished to save large numbers of people. Humans appear to be resilient to extinction with respect to single events.


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["Delicious Horrors": Mass Culture, The Red Cross, and the Appeal of Modern American Humanitarianism, American Quarterly 55.3, pp. 417-455] *sexist language!!!

the ability to dramatize or sensationalize suffering has become a precondition for mass sympathy or charitable activity in our voluntarist society. The ability to put a face and a body to suffering remains the most powerful way to move readers and viewers. The problems arise when these stories or pictures inspire the "wrong" responses, a vague sentimentalism perhaps or the sort of emotional agitation that precludes serious political reflection. The compassion produced by spectacles of suffering can, and all too often has, become an alibi for other forms of oppression. The wealthy businessmen who ran the Red Cross during the First World War, for
Clearly, example, could feel virtuous without having to trouble over such matters as low wages, unsafe workplaces, or even their own contributions to a war machine that was producing the slaughter in the first place. Indeed, it can be argued that the Red Cross consolidated ideological assent for an often-exploitative industrial social order at a moment of profound corporate vulnerabilityby casting strikers and radical dissenters as unpatriotic, un-American, and inhuman. 95 Even as George Creel and the CPI campaigned to overturn the popular belief that the U.S. was fighting a "capitalist's war," financiers and industrialists were exploiting the prestige of the American Red Cross to undermine the enemies of business. 96 Of course, the Red Cross was supposed to be a source of

national unity and social harmony. The society's wartime leader Henry P. Davison expressed the hope that class and racial differences would be dissolved in the humanitarian venture. "The rallying cry of comradeship," he claimed "is, indeed, one of the great romances of democracy. Millionaire and miner, red Indian, white man, and negro marched shoulder to shoulder in the army of mercy." 97 But while American Red Cross Magazine took special pains to publicize the commitment of "real Americans" like the South Dakota "Sioux" who became society members"another bit of evidence that we are becoming a unified country"few officials at the Red Cross took substantive steps to challenge racial discrimination in the United States. 98 Significantly, black faces remained invisible in the magazine, and, in keeping with the spirit of the age, African American members were confined to "colored branches." 99 In such a volatile racial context, "compassion" itself could be a dangerous thing. In 1915, even as
American Red Cross Magazine editors were musing about how best to produce sympathy for innocent war victims, D. W. Griffith had found a way to mesmerize audiences across America with his hugely popular movie Birth of a Nation, which sought to create a sympathetic identification between white viewers and the supposedly innocent (and endangered) white women of the South, whom he portrayed as victims of black male violation. 100 The movie played a part in promoting nationwide race riots during the war years (which nearly always involved white assaults on black communities) and a full-scale Ku Klux Klan revival, and one can argue forcefully that Griffith's spectacular representations of suffering thus legitimated another grotesque

spectacle: the public castration, lynching, and burning of black male bodies. 101 His commercially successful propaganda movie,
Hearts of the World, which basically replicated the Birth of a Nation scheme with Allies and Germans taking the good and evil parts (and including, incidentally, reverential shots of "The haloed Crimson Cross"), played a similar role in whipping up the "anti-Hun" sentiment that ended up with vigilante assaults on German Americans across the United States in 1918. 102 In these cases,


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 spectacles of suffering were producing compassion, pleasure, hatred, fear, and violenceall at the same time. 103


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[Alan, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application, , pg 224-230]
5. Let us now consider the right mentioned above: a mother's right not to be tortured to death by her own son. Assume (although these specifica- tiojis arc here quite dispensable) that she is innocent of any crime and has no knowledge of any. What justifiable exception could there be to such a right? I shall construct an example which, though fanciful, has sufficient analogues in past and present thought and action

Suppose a clandestine group of political extremists have obtained an arsenal of nuclear weapons; to prove that they have the weapons and know how to use them, they have kidnapped a leading scientist, shown him the weapons, and then released him to make a public corroborative statement . The terrorists have now announced that they will use the weapons against a designated large distant city unless a certain prominent resident of the city, a young politically active lawyer named Abrams, tortures his mother to death, this torturing to lie earned out publicly in a certain way at a specified place and time in that city.Since the gang members have
t0 make it relevant to the status of rights in the real world.6 already murdered several other prominent residents of the city, their threat is quite credible.Their declared motive is to advance their cause by showing how powerful they are and by unmasking the moralistic pretensions of their political opponents.

Ought Abrams to

torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastrophe? Might he not merely pretend to torture his intlter,
so that die could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang nienihers continued? Entirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily

the main objection to the very raising of such questions is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participatnig in an unspeakably evil project. To inflict such extreme harm on one's mother would be an ultimate act of betrayal; in performing or even contemplating the performance of such an action the son would lose all self-respect and would regard his life as no longer worth living. A mother's right not to be tortured to death by her own son is beyond any compromise. It is absolute. This absoluteness may be analysed in several different interrelated deminsions, all stemming from the supreme principle of
pierce. this deception, morality. The principle requires respect for the rights of all persons to the necessary conditions of human action, and this includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their behavior in the light of such reflection.

The principle hence prohibits using any person merely as a means to the well-being of other persons. For a son to torture his mother to death even to protect the lives of others would be an extreme violation of this principle and hence of these rights, as would any attempt by others to force such an action. For this reason, the concept. appropriate to it is not merely `wrong' but such others as
`despicable', `die honourable', `base', `monstrous'. In the scale of moral modalities, such con- cepts function as the contrary extremes of concepts like the supererogatorv. What is supererogatory is not merely good or right but goes beyond these in various ways; it includes saintly and heroic actions whose moral merit surpasses what is strictly required of agents. In parallel fashion, what is base, dishonourable, or despicable is not entirely bad or wrong but goes be- yond these in moral demerit since it subverts even the minimal worth or dignity both of its agent and of its recipient and hence the basic presupposi- tions of morality itself. Just as the supererogatory is superlatively good, so the

its moral wrongness is so rotten that a morally decent person will not even consider doing it. This is but another way of saying that the rights it would violate must remain
despicable is superlatively evil arid diabolic, and absolute. 6. There is, however, another side to this story.What of the thousands of innocent persons in the distant city Whose lives ale imperilled by the threatened nuclear explosion? Don't they too have rights to life which, because of their numbers, are far superior to the mother's right? May they not contend that while it is all very well for Abrams to preserve his moral purity by not killing his mother, he has no right to purchase this at the ex- pense of their Iives, thereby treating them as mere means to his ends and violating their our' rights? Thus it may lie argued that the morally correct description of the alternative confronting Abrains is not simply that it is one of not violating or violating an innocent person's right to life, but rather not violating one innocent person's right to life and thereby violating the right to life of thousands of other innocent persons through being partly responsible for their deaths, or violating one innocent person's right to life and thereby protecting



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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 INTERVENING ACTORS / GERWIRTH Continued
or fulfilling the right to life of thousands of other innocent persons. We have here a tragic conflict of rights and an illustration of the heavy price exacted by moral absolutism. The aggregative consequen- tialist who holds that that action ought always to be performed which maximizes utility or minimizes disutility would maintain that in such a situation the lives of the thousand must be preferred. An initial answer may be that terrorists who make such demands and Issue such threats cannot be trusted to keep their word not to drop the Bombs if the mother is tortured to death; and even if they now do keep their word, acceding in this ease would only lead to further escalated demands and threats .

It may also be argued that it is irrational to perpetrate a sure evil in order to forestall what is so far only a possible or threatened evil. Philippa Foot has sagely commented on cases of this sort that if it
is the is duty to kill his mother in order to save the lives of the many other innocent residents of the city, then "anyone who wants us to do something will think wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do some- thing we think worse".8 Much depends, however, on the nature of the wrong" and the `worse''. If someone threatens to commit suicide or to kill innocent hostages if we do not break our promise to do some relatively unimportant action, breaking the promise would be the obviously right course, by the criterion of degrees of necessity for action. The special diffiulty of tire present ease stems from the fact that the conflicting rights are tiC the same supreme degree of importance. It may be contended, however, that this whole answer, focusing on the Problem outcome of obeying the terrorists' demands, is a consequentialist argument and, as such, is not available to the absolutist who insists that Abrams must not torture his mother to death whatever the consequences. This contention imputes to the absolutist a kind of indifference or even callousness to the sufferings of others that is not warranted by a correct understanding of his position. He can be concerned about consequences so long as he does not regard them as possibly

It is a matter of priorities. So long as the mother's right not to be tortured to death by her son is unqualifiedly respected, the absolutist can seek ways to mitigate the threatened disastrous consequences and possibly to avert them altogether. A parallel ease is found in the theory of legal punishment: the retributivist. while asserting that punishsuperseding or diminishing the right and duty he regards as absolute. ment must be meted out only to the persons who deserve it because of the crimes they have committed, may also uphold punishment for its deterrent effect so long as the latter, consequentialist consideration is subordinated to and lilmited by the conditions of the former,

the absolutist can accommodate at least part of the consequentialist's substantive concerns within the limits of his own principle. Is any other answer available to the absolutist, one that reflects the core of his position? Various lines of argument may be used to show that in refusing to torture his mother to death Abrams is not violating the rights of the multitudes of other residents who may die as a result, because he is not morally responsible for their deaths. Thus the absolutist can maintain that even if these others die they still have an absolute right to life
antecedentalist consideration.1 Thus because. the infringement of their right is not justified by the argument he upholds At least three different distinctions may be adduced for this purpose. In the unqualified form in which they have hitherto been presented, however they are not successful in establishing the envisaged

Abram refrains from torturing his mother to death, he does not directly intend the many ensuing deaths of the other inhabitants either as end or as means. These are only the foreseen but unintended side-effects of his action or, in this case, inaction. Hence, he is not morally responsible
conclusion. One distinction is between direct and oblique intention. When for those deaths. Apart from other difficulties with the doctrine of double effect, this distinction as so far stated does not serve to exculpate Abrams. Consider some parallels. Industrialists who pollute the environment with poisonous chemicals and manufacturers who use carcinogenic food additives do not directly intend the resulting deaths; that are only the unintended but foreseen side-effects of what they do directly intend, namely, to provide profitable demand-fulfilling commodities. The entrepreneurs in question may even maintain that the enormous economic contributions they make to the gross national product outweigh in importance the relatively fl'w deaths that regrettably occur. Still, since they have good reason to believe that deaths wifi occur from causes under their control, the fact that they do not directly intend the deaths does not remove their causal and moral responsibility for them. Isn't this also true of Abrams's relation to the deaths of the city's residents? A second distinction drawn by some absolutist is between killing and letting die. This distinction is often merged with others with which it is not entirely identical, such as the distinctions between commission and omission, between harming and not helping, between strict duties and generosity or supererogation. For the present discussion, however, the subtle differences between these may be overlooked. The contention, then, is that in refraining from killing his mother, Abrams does not kill the many innocent persons who will die as a result; he only lets them die. But one does not have the same strict moral duty to help persons or to prevent their dying as one has not to kill them; one is responsible only for what one does, not for what one merely allows to happen. Hence, Abrams is not moraily responsible for the deaths he fails to prevent by letting the many innocent persons die, so that he does not violate their rights to life.


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[Alan, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application, , pg 229-0]
An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absoluitist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued ai,cl that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations.'2 By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King's opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the

it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rather than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths
rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that

only obliquely but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terrorists that his refusal eventuates in the many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the son's, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute. This point also serves to answer some related questions about the rights of the many in relation to the mother's right. Since the son's refusal to torture his mother to death is justified, it may seem that the many deaths to which that refusal will lead are also justified, so that the rights to life of these many innocent persons are not absolute. But since they are innocent, why aren't their rights to life as absolute as the mother's? If, on the other hand, their deaths are unjustified, as seems obvious, then isn't the son's refusal to torture his mother to death also unjustified, since it leads to those deaths? But from this it would follow that the mother's right not to be tortured to death by her son is not absolute, for if the son's not infringing her right is unjustified, then his infringing it would presumably be justified. The solution to this difficulty is that it is a fallacy to infer, from the two premises (1) the son's refusal to kill his mother is justified and (2) many innocent persons die as a result of that refusal, to the conclusion (3 ) their deaths are justified. For, by the principle of the intervening action, the son's refusal is not causally or morally responsible for the deaths: rather, it is the terrorists who are responsible. Hence. the justification referred to in (1) does not carry through to (2). Since the terrorists' action in ordering the killings is unjustified, the resulting deaths are unjustified. Hence, the rights to life of the many innocent victims remain absolute even if they are killed as a result of the son's justified refusal, and it is not he who violates their rights. He may be said to intend the many deaths obliquely, in that they are a foreseen but unwanted side-effect of his refusal. But he is not responsible for that side-effect because of the

terrorists' intervening action. It would be unjustified to violate the mother's right to life in order to protect the rights to life of the many other residents of the city. For rights cannot be justifiably protected by violating another right which, according to the criterion of degrees of necessity for
action, is at least equally important. Hence, the many other residents do not have a right that the mother's right to life he violated for their sakes. To be sure, the mother also does not have a right that their equally important rights be violated in order to protect hers. But here too it must be emphasized that in protecting his mother's right the son does not violate the rights of the others; for by the principle of the intervening action, it is not he who is causally or morally responsible for their deaths. Hence too he is not treating them as mere means to his or his mother's ends.


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[Nicholas, Risk Analysis BadassRisk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management, Pg 50]

The "worst possible case fixation" is one of the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life situations. Preoccupation about what might happen "if worst comes to worst" is counterproductive whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these worst possible outcomes are wildly improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be viewed as real possibilities at all). The crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss "if worst comes to worst'' but the potential ac- ceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of the risk situation, where we may well be prepared "to take our chances," considering the possible advantages that beckon along this
route. The worst threat is certainly something to be borne in mind and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or gravity of a situation of hazard.

[Nicholas, Risk Analysis BadassRisk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management, Pg 34-36]
On this issue there is a systemic di sagreement between pro- babilists working in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists who work on issues relating to human affairs. The former take the line that small numbers are small numbers and must be taken into account as such. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospects and can be written off. (Dc niinimis non curat 1ev, as the old precept has it: there is no need to bother with trifles.) When something is about as probable as it is that a thousand fair dice when tossed a thousand times will all come up sixes, then, so it is held, we can pretty well forget about it as worthy of concern. As a matter of

Where human dealings in real-life situations are concerned, sufficiently remote possibilities can - for all sensible purpose- be viewed as being of probability zero, and possibilities with which they are associated set aside. In "the real world'' people are prepared to treat certain pro- babilities as effectively zero, taking certain sufficiently
practical policy we operate with probabilities on the principle that when xCa, then x 0. improbable eventualities as no longer representing real possibilities. `~ In such cases our handling of the probabilities at issue is essentially a mat- ter of fiat, of deciding as a matter of policy that a certain level of sufficiently low probability can be taken as a cut-off point below which

In real-life deliberations, in the law (especially in the context of negligence) and indeed throughout the setting of our practical affairs, it is necessary to distinguish between real and unreal (or ``merely theoretical'') possibilities. Once the probability of an eventuation gets to be small enough, the event at issue may be seen as no longer a real possibility (theoretically possible though it may be). Such an event is something we can simply write off as being "outside the range of appropriate concern, " something we can dismiss for "all practical purposes.'' As one writer on insurance puts it: People refuse to worry about losses whose probability is below some threshold. Probabilities below the threshold are treated as though they were zero.
we are no longer dealing with ``real possibilities'' and with "genuine risks.''


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VIRTUES OUTWEIGH CALCULATION Dale Jamieson, New York University, 5/14/07.

[Cambridge Journals: When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists, type=6&fid=1015132&jid=&volumeId=&issueId=02&aid=1015128&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0953820807002452]

This should lead us to give up on calculation, and giving up on calculation should lead us to give up on contingency. Instead of looking to moral mathematics for practical solutions to large-scale collective action problems, we should focus instead on non-calculative generators of behavior: character traits, dispositions, emotions and what I shall call virtues. When faced with global environmental change, our general policy should be to try to reduce our contribution regardless of the behavior of others, and we are more likely to succeed in doing this by developing and inculcating the right virtues than by improving our calculative abilities.


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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 INTERPASSIVITY TURN Focus on the details of policy implementation fosters interpassivity which divorces the self from politicsWe end up fixated on the process of production and lose all ability to enjoy the consequences, only fear them Gijs Van Oenen is senior lecturer in the department of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam , 2K6
[A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life, Theory & Event, Vol 9, # 2, JT]
The observations by Pfaller and Zizek form the starting point for a discussion of some general features of the phenomenon of interpassivity (1). First ,

interpassivity seems to indicate a lack of interest in the aims and goals of our actions. Second, it is intimately related to the prominent role of 'media', especially their power to focus (and narrow) our attention to certain 'superficialities' involved in the process of either arts or politics. Third, it stands in
the tradition of critique of ideology, as it originated in marxism and was continuated in the Frankfurter Schule. Building on these insights, I propose that interpassivity is a suitable diagnostic tool to explain and evaluate certain important socio-cultural developments that affect multiple spheres of social life. My thesis is that these

spheres show a development towards 'interpassivization', and that this has negative consequences for the sense of well-being and the self-understanding of the people involved in the activities that constitute these domains.
Although my main analysis focuses on the sphere of politics, I will start off the second paragraph by discussing interpassive developments in the sphere of labor. This is useful, first, because labor constitutes one of the most important domains of social life, and the discovery of interpassive phenomena in this sphere thus testifies to their importance in general. Second, this discussion enables me to outline and develop some more general points concerning interpassivity in contemporary life.

interpassivity enables us to speak in a new, more insightful way about modes of alienation in contemporary life, especially in the domains of labor and politics. Such alienation implies an increased attachment to a process of production accompanied by a loss of interest in the product of this process. This explains how interpassivity can imply an increase in activity, while also in some important sense entailing a loss.
One of the most important of these themes is alienation. I find that
In the third paragraph, I turn to the domain of politics. The developments here turn out to be similar in many ways to those in the domain of labor. Only the manifestations and consequences of interpassivity in politics are more invasive. By comparing labor and politics, I hope to show how, in both domains, differences in status and position in comparable ways determine how people are affected by interpassivity, or even suffer from it (4). Those in higher positions of management and policy-making are usually well off, while those who are being managed or ruled are most likely to experience the adverse effects of interpassivity. Moreover, both groups seem attracted to interpassive politics, although for different reasons that both typically misunderstand. 1 Interpassivity: the concept and its uses Let us first take a closer look at the concept of interpassivity. What does it refer to? What sort of phenomena does it try to explain, and in what way?

Why act if we do not care much about the consequences? Yet this seems to be the problem of modern consumption society. The more passionately and intimately we are attached to the institutions that can provide us with goods to use or consume, the less we seem actually able to enjoy our action or consumption.2 Our acquisitions seem to constitute not merely the beginning, but the end of our action and enjoyment. This kind of
First, interpassivity implies a lack of interest in the aims and goals of our actions. At first sight, this appears strange.

interpassivity is illustrated by Pfaller and Zizek through examples like buying books or recording videotapes, without ever getting around to read or watch them.3

The VCR, as it were, watches TV on our behalf.

This interpassivity prevents a confrontation with the symbolic order, where any benefit is always mediated Gijs Van Oenen is senior lecturer in the department of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam , 2K6
[A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political Life, Theory & Event, Vol 9, # 2, JT]

Interpassivity thus also concerns 'mechanisms that hold entire societies together', tying interpassivity to notions like 'ritual' and 'ideology'.7 Zizek also connects interpassivity to the impossibility of direct enjoyment; enjoyment is always mediated, in his account of course 40

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Stone-Taylor Lab 2009 through the Big Other, the symbolic order. It is essentially involved in the process of subjectivation, 'What psychoanalysis is looking for in an active subject is precisely the fundamental fantasy which sustains his disavowed passivity'.8