TAN v. CA 1 | Sanchez, J.

(1967) FACTS Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued Francisco Tan in the CFI of Manila for acknowledgment and support (Civil Case 26909). Celestina after petitioners had already presented oral and documentary evidence and were about to rest their case moved to dismiss the case upon the ground that the parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed with prejudice and without recourse of appeal. On the same day, Celestina subscribed before the clerk of the CFI of Manila to an affidavit categorically stating that respondent Francisco "is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot divulge". CFI: Dismissed the complaint 1 year and 8 months later, petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced an action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil Case 00855) for acknowledgment and support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. Judge Enriquez rendered judgment declaring that the case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case 26909 of the CFI of Manila. It was also ruled that even on the merits, the petitioners have not made out their case with sufficient evidence. The complaint was thereafter dismissed. On recondisderation, the court declared Carmelita and Rodolfo as the illegitimate children of Francisco and ordered him to support the minors. CA: Reversed the judgment of the court and dismissed the case. ISSUE/HELD WON exhibits H and I, which were presented in Civil Case 26909, were admissible as evidence in the latter case (case 00855)--NO RATIO The witnesses at the former trial were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (case 00855) a number of times. These witnesses did not appear to testify. But are their testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of admissibility set forth in Section 412, Rule 130? These witnesses are not dead. They are not outside of the Philippines. Can they be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to testify? The CA, construing this term, held that "subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. Here, the witnesses in question were available.No other person that prevented them from testifying, is cited. They do not come within the legal purview of those unable to testify. Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy. They could have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt. Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead and submitted their case. We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the law of admissibility of testimony in former trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade them from testifying again. Nothing extant in the record will as much as intimate that respondent was responsible for the non-appearance of these witnesses. The danger of tampering with witnesses is a problem that attends trials in many a time and in number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument works both ways. Because, witnesses at the former trial can be bought
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not to testify at the second trial, in just the same way that they could have been bought to give their original testimony. Solution of this problem lies elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of Section 41, Rule. DISPOSITIVE CA decision affirmed. MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN3 FACTS Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Tarlac. At approximately km 40 of the NLEX in Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. Calaunan suffered minor injuries, while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Hospital in Kalookan by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. A criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in Nov 1989 and has not returned since then. Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. R. Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo left their residence to look for a job. She thought her husband went to his hometown in Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there. TC subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of RTC Bulacan, the court where the criminal case was tried, to bring the transcripts of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in said case, together with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the transcripts and other pertinent documents. Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other transcripts and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said transcript and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence. For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The transcript of the testimony of Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in the criminal case was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead. Respondent further marked, among others, as rebuttal evidence, the transcript of the testimonies of Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case. TC: in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. CA affirmed.
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Krystel Bautista Now rule 130, sec 47

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ISSUE WON the admission in evidence of the TSNs and other documents presented in the criminal case is valid HELD YES Petitioners argue that the transcripts should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the ff must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. PRBLI, not being a party in the criminal case, had no opportunity to cross-examine the 3 witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. REASONING Notwithstanding the fact that PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are still admissible on the ground that PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. It is elementary that an objection shall be made when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. In the case at bar, PRBLI did not object to the transcripts containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the transcripts were admitted by both petitioners. Moreover, PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair. Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have beenadmitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. DISPOSITION petition for review denied. CA decision affirmed.

China Banking v CA (2007, Austria-Martinez J)4 Facts: On August 27, 1991, Alfonso Kipte obtained a P1,200,000.00 loan from China Bank, secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina over her properties. The mortgage was annotated on the titles. The loan was also secured by a surety agreement signed by Kipteas principal and by Avelina as surety. Due to Kiptes failure to pay his indebtedness, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled on August 17, 1992. China Bank filed a complaint against Kipte and Avelina. Avelina claims ignorance of both who Kipte was and of the transaction that she was alleged to have entered into. According to Avelina, she was surprised to receive a foreclosure notice from the notary public, stating that her properties would be sold at public auction by virtue of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by China Bank. It was only when she inquired with China Bank that she found out of her alleged real estate mortgage and surety agreement with Kipte. As her defense Avelina claims that the foreclosure is void since she never voluntarily executed the mortgage or surety agreement, never appeared before the notary public, never received any proceeds from the loan, and was never a business associate of Kipte. She said that she was lured into signing a document, which turned out to be the mortgage and surety agreement, by her sons common-law wife, Ludivina, who told her that her signature was necessary as a witness to the execution of a loan in favor of one Cerilia de Leon. Further, Avelina said she was guided by Ludivina into signing the documents, and being blind, she was unable to read them and had no knowledge of its contents. The trial court ruled in favor of China Bank and held Avelina to be liable to Kiptes loan, while the court of appeals gave weight to Avelinas testimony of her blindness and non-knowledge of the documents she was guided into signing, declaring the mortgage and surety agreement to be void ab initio for lack of consent. China Bank appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court, contesting among other things, Avelinas blindness and lack of consent to the agreement. According to China Bank, Avelina should have had submitted a medical certificate attesting to the supposed blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the witness stand, but they did neither. ISSUE: WON Opinion Evidence was necessary to establish Avelinas blindness? NO HELD: The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.Thus, to prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined through common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact. In this case, Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case, categorically testified and attested to her own blindness Also established are the facts that Avelina was already blind when she was manipulated into signing the questioned documents by her daughter-in-law, Ludivina, who did not explain to her
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the contents and true nature of the documents beforehand; that her hand had to be guided by Ludivina during the act of signing; that Avelina did not know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she signed were to secure the loan Kipte contracted from the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she was to sign only as witness; and that Kipte was a total stranger to her, and, by this reason, it is implausible that she agreed to be his surety. In fact, it was only after Avelina received the notices of foreclosure that she learned that there was a mortgage document among the papers she signed. Avelina's blindness was further confirmed by the testimonies of her children, respondents Emmanuel M. Piero and Rebecca Piero-Galang Even the notary before whom she supposedly appeared testified to the fact that she was indeed blind and that she was not made to understand the documents. Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Avelina was in fact blind, that she did not know the contents of the documents she signed, and more importantly, that she did not know the capacity in which she was signing these documents. US v Pineda5 (1918) Malcolm, J FACTS Defendant Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and owner of a drug store in Manila. Feliciano Santos, a customer of the drug store presented to Pineda a prescription calling for a potassium chlorate solution for his two sick horses. Pineda prepared the prescription and gave to Santos packages labeled potassium chlorate. Pineda gave some of the prescription to his sick horses but the horses died shortly afterwards (aaww). Santos brought the remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for examination where Drs. Pea and Darjuan, chemists, found on analysis that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate, a poison. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. A veterinarian performed an autopsy on the horses and found that death was the result of poisoning. ISSUES 1. [Relevant] WON the testimonies of the chemists (as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on analysis to be barium chlorate) are admissible in evidence. 2. WON Pineda is guilty of violation of the Pharmacy Law. HELD 1. YES. Testimonies admissible in order to demonstrate defendants motive and negligence. 2. YES. The law penalizes the druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. RATIO As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible by the principle of res inter alios acta. As one exception, however, it is permissible to ascertain defendants knowledge and intent and fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
5
eva

On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT INC v. RUFO AND JOSEPHINE AVILES6 June 6, 1990 | Cruz | Petition to review decision of CA FACTS: An information was filed against Rufo and Josephine Aviles for allegedly committing estafa they were sub-agents of Interpacific, enjoying trust and confidence from said entity. As subagents, they were able to collect payments for airway bills amounting to P204,030.66, which were not remitted to Inrterpacific but were instead used for their own benefit. During direct examination, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the Aviles for which they had not rendered proper accounting. The defense objected on the ground of the best evidence rule. The prosecution sad that it would submit the original in due time, so the court allowed the marking of the photocopies. The prosecution never submitted the original airway bills. It also failed to justify the use of secondary evidence. However, when the photocopies were formally offered in evidence, the defense interposed no objection. TC: Rejected agency, hence it acquitted the two. It also held that the photocopies were inadmissible under the best evidence rule. Loss was not proven, since one of the prosecution witnesses testified that the originals were still in the bodega of Interpacific. CA: affirmed TC Issue: WON There was proper objection (in this case, continuing objection) which would render the evidence inadmissible. Held: NO Ratio: There is a difference between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. Identification: done in the course of trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. Formal offer: done when the party rests its case and not before. The party may decide to formally offer it if believes that it will advance its cause. OBJECTION must be made at the time it is formally offered. In this case, the defense must have objected when the marked exhibits were formally offered as evidence. For its failure,
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they became admissible (waiver). CONTINUING OBJECTION: the earlier objection cannot be considered a continuing objection because the provision on continuing objection only refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence. Still the presumption is taht there was an offer and a seasonable objection. In this case, no objection was really made because it not done at the proper time. Decision: remains acquitted for criminal charges but is civilly liable. PEOPLE v IRANG7 | Villa-Real, J. (1937) FACTS This is a case for robbery with homicide. On 9 November 1935, between 7 to 8 in the evening, 7 individuals with white stripes upon their faces, some of them armed with guns, others with bolos, assaulted the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Three lights were burning along the house. Those who went to approach Perfecto immediately ordered him to bring the money and then was attacked with the bolo until he fell to the floor, which eventually led to his untimely death. His wife, Maximinia, was approached by the other assailants and one man struck her with a gun making her lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, the assailants demanded money and jewelry from her. During the turnover of P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200, Maximinia looked at the man she was giving it to and saw that he had pockmarks8 and a scar on his left eyelid. Another assault happened at the house of Juana dela Cruz and she also identified one of them as having pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. The son of the spouses, Toribio Melocotones, saw the assailants arrive, and remained outside as he saw the sizes of the assailants and the order they entered the house. He was the also the one who reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). The investigation was headed by Lieutenant Roman Alejandre. Maximinia informed the PC of the man who struck her with a butt of a gun and took her money and jewelry was lean and had a pockmarked face. After three police line-ups of different groups of arrested individuals, Maximinia recognized Benjamin Irang as her assailant. Juana dela Cruz also recognized Irang. After Irang was taken under custody, he was made to execute an affidavit in Tagalog which he thumbmarked where he attested that Fidel Estrella, et al, invited him to assault the house of the spouses Perfecto and Maximiniana. He then interposed an alibi about being in the rice field. Accordingly, his version of how he was identified during investigation was different. There seemed to have been a certain uncertainty and a coercive insinuation was done by Lieutenant Alejandre to get him recognized by Maximiniana as the assailant. ISSUE/HELD Was Irang properly identified? YES. RATIO During the third police line-up, Maximiniana immediately pointed to Irang. Irang protested but when Maximiniana said that it was he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, Irang became silent. Maximinianas identification was also properly corroborated by Juana dela Cruz as well as Irangs admission under oath in the affidavit. The majority therefore
7 8
ck Pockmark is a scar or pit on the skin that is left by a pustule of smallpox or acne or other eruptive disease

affirmed his conviction because Irangs involvement in the crime was established conclusively beyond reasonable doubt. DISSENT Laurel: Looking at the testimonies presented by the prosecution, Justice Laurel criticizes them: 1) 2) 3) 4) Affidavit/confession could not be given any value because it was obtained from an unknown soldier through force and violence Toribio (the son) he did not know at that time who the assailants were, he just knows them now. The trial court impeached his testimony as unworthy of credence and belief, because the sizes of the assailants is not telling of their identity, therefore there was a lack of explanation. Juana dela Cruz she testified to a wholly distinct crime. Lieut. Alejandre the investigation scarcely gave any importance in proving the identity and guilt of Irang. He just arrested him based on the description given. This isnt very re-assuring considering that he arrested three different groups of people before being able to identify the assailant. Maximiniana it was weird that initially, she recognized the man who assaulted her as having pockmarks. A month later, she said the man who assaulted her had a scar. A scar is easier to identify than pockmarks. This made the justice feel dodgy about the testimony. Therefore, theres reasonable doubt, and so Justice Laurel voted for acquittal.

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