Monitoring of Election Administration Composition Final Report

Tbilisi, 2012

Report prepared by: Mikheil Benidze Elene Nizharadze

Lela Taliuri Irma Pavliashvili

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), 2012 Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA), 2012

This project is funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and is implemented jointly by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) with the support of National Democratic Institute (NDI).

I. About the Project To examine composition of precinct election commission (PECs) set up for the 2012 parliamentary elections, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and the Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) carried out a joint project Monitoring of Election Administration Composition in 73 election districts of Georgia from August 1 through October 31, 2012. Goal of the project was to examine the process of recruiting members of the election administration and compliance of election administration officers with the Code of Ethics, as well as to monitor any violation of election laws and imposition of subsequent liability. Furthermore, the project aimed at elaborating recommendations for the election administration for building trust and improving the practice of staffing election commission. The project covered several key strands, including 1. Examining composition of PECs through statistical study of 396 randomly selected precincts throughout Georgia; 2. Monitoring re-appointment of those persons in the 2012 election commissions, who were previously imposed with administrative or disciplinary liability during 2010 municipal elections; 3. Monitoring of compliance with the code of ethics of election officials and imposition of adequate liability for violation of election laws. The project was funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and implemented with the support of National Democratic Institute (NDI). Throughout the course of the project, ISFED and GYLA closely cooperated with the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia. Before launching the active phase of the project, the organizations introduced the project methodology and activities to the CEC. The CEC was also provided with results of different components of the monitoring.

II. History of the Project Monitoring of Election Administration Composition was a follow-up to the similar project carried out in the run up of the 2010 municipal elections. In 2010, GYLA and ISFED identified members of election commissions who had been imposed with a disciplinary or administrative liability during the 2008 elections, as well as members of election commissions who were dismissed from their position and prohibited from working in election administrations. The two organizations applied to the CEC with a recommendation not to staff election commissions with these persons. The recommendation was partially taken into account by the CEC. 1

For detailed information please refer to ISFEDs 2010 report on the Composition of Election Administration

In the framework of the 2010 monitoring, the organizations elaborated and submitted to the Parliament a package of recommendations based on the monitoring results about the following: formation of election administrations, maintaining unified databases of election commissions, imposition of adequate measures of liability in an event of violation of the Code of Ethics or election laws by election commission members. In late 2011, in addition to a number of new regulations introduced in the Election Code, the CEC was imposed with an obligation to maintain a database about election commission members whose alleged violations of law have been confirmed by court, who were dismissed from their position as an election administration officer by the election commission or court for their violation of election laws, who were sentenced to a measure of disciplinary liability for a failure to fulfill their official obligations duly or at all. Moreover, it was determined that a measure of disciplinary liability ordered against commission members must correspond to gravity of violations committed. Additionally, the CEC was imposed with an obligation to adopt the Election Code for election administration officers under a resolution.

III. Monitoring Methodology Statistical study of PECs and their members was conducted by monitors of ISFED and GYLA in 396 precincts selected in a random representative sample throughout 73 electoral districts of Georgia. The monitors visited every selected precinct and collected information through special questionnaires about compliance with applicable requirements of law at election precincts. Further, through interviewing PEC members as well as requesting information about PEC members from the commissions, the monitors studied past election-related experience of PEC members, employment, etc. The monitors conducted visits from August 26 to September 3, 2012. In some exceptional cases additional repeated visits were made to verify/receive additional information. Processing and statistical analysis of the information from questionnaires made it possible to identify general statistical characteristics of composition of PECs throughout Georgia and cases of possible conflict of interests between PEC members at individual PECs. ISFED and GYLA carried out the monitoring of re-appointment of persons imposed with administrative and disciplinary liability during 2010 municipal elections to the 2012 election administration by requesting public information. Initially, GYLA obtained from the CEC the list of 2010 municipal elections administration officers imposed with a sanction. In August 2012 ISFEDs monitors requested similar lists maintained by DECs in 73 electoral districts. The list was compared to the list provided by the CEC as well as to the list of members of PECs for the 2012 parliamentary elections. Notably, identified cases of possible conflict of interests and repeat appointment to election commissions of persons previously imposed with a disciplinary liability does not constitute violation of election laws; however, similar facts may have an adverse impact on activities of the election administration and the level of trust to the process of staffing the election commissions.

IV. Results of Statistical Monitoring Statistical study shows that the PEC first sessions throughout the country were held within the timeframe prescribed by law. Absolute majority of PECs (99,7% 2) elected chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and secretaries during their first sessions 3. 96,9% of the polling stations published voter lists, as prescribed by law; only 3,1% of election precincts did not have voter lists published 4. Procedures for filing complaints over voter lists were published in 79,9% of election precincts, whereas 20,3% of PECs had failed to fulfill the requirement 5. This information could not be obtained from the precincts selected in Gurjaani N12 Electoral District, as GYLAs monitor was not let in 6. In 5075 PEC members elected by DECs and appointed by political parties, prior to the date of visit, women accounted for 64,3%, men 35,7%. Gender analysis of members elected to PEC positions showed that there were equal numbers of chairmen and chairwomen (50%). In deputy PEC chairpersons, women accounted for 60%, men 40%, whereas most of the PEC secretaries were women (80,3%) while men accounted for only 19,3%.

Chart 1: Gender representation at the PECs (*Out of 5075 members)

Out of 395 PECs Monitors visited PECs after the mandatory term prescribed by the Election Code for holding the first PEC session had expired 4 Monitors visited election precincts after the term prescribed by the Election Code for publishing voter lists had expired 5 Percentage values related to publishing of voter lists and rules for filing complaints has been calculated from 390 precincts and does not reflect data from 6 precincts of Gurjaani Election District 6 Gurjaani N12 DEC refused to let an observer in PECs without an observer registration card. The DEC did not allow a monitor to visit PECs based on a power of attorney issued in a due manner
3 2

Party affiliation of PEC secretaries was determined based on information from 382 PECs. The study showed that percentage shares of secretaries from each party were following: a) P.U. 7 European Democrats 35,9% b) P.U. Christian-Democratic Movement 25,7% c) Christian Democratic Peoples Party - 18,6% d) Industry Will Save Georgia - 6,5% e) Conservative Party - 5,5% f) Labor Party - 1,3% 6,5% of PEC secretaries had been selected from members appointed by DECs 8. Chart2: Party affiliation of PEC secretaries throughout Georgia (based on the data from 382 PECs) European Democrats Christian-Democratic Movement Christian Democratic People's Party 25.7% 6.5% 1.3% 5.5% 6.5% 18.6% Industry Will Save Georgia Conservative Party Labor Party Other

35.9%

The study also addressed election-related experience and qualification of PEC members. The research revealed that out of the 1902 members of the election administration elected by the District Election Commission, only 17,4% had a certificate of an election administration officer, whereas the remaining 82,6% did not have the certificate; however, analysis of PECs showed that 47,5% of the polling

Political Union Under para.19 of Article 25 of the Election Code, if no candidate for secretary of the PEC has been nominated by at least 2 party proxies, secretary of the PEC must be elected from the members of commission by an absolute majority. Any two members of the commission are authorized to nominate a candidate.
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stations had at least one member elected by the DEC who had a certificate of an election administration officer.

CERTIFICATION
17.4%

ELECTION EXPERIENCE
16.7%

82.6%

83.3%

Certified

Not certified

Experienced

Inexperienced

Chart 3:Qualification of the PEC members (out of 1902 members)

Chart 4: Election related experience among the PEC members (out of 4159 members)

As to election-related experience, the research showed that 83,3% of 4159 members of target PECs (both DEC-elected and party appointed) about whom information could be obtained had some experience in elections, whereas the remaining 16,7% has no prior experience.

V. Monitoring of re-election of persons imposed with liability during previous elections as members of PECs Within the project, the organizations also studied whether the persons who were imposed with administrative or disciplinary liability during 2010 municipal elections were re-selected by the DECs in the PECs set up for the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. Although such an act does not constitute violation of election law, we believe that re-election of such persons may have a negative impact on building confidence in the election administration. The monitoring revealed 75 persons who had been imposed with disciplinary liability during 2010 municipal elections and were re-appointed as PEC members by DECs for the 2012 parliamentary elections. Majority of these persons (33) were selected as PEC members in Khobi district; 16 were elected in Kutaisi district, nine in Kobuleti district, six in Batumi district, four in Shuakhevi district, three in Chughureti district and one in Krtsanisi, Tskaltubo, Rustavi and Tsalenjikha districts each. In majority of cases these persons were appointed as members of PECs that they served in 2010 elections. GYLA and ISFED provided the information about 75 members of PECs who had previously been imposed with liability to the Central Elections Commission of Georgia. Notably, in addition to members selected by DECs, persons imposed with similar disciplinary or administrative liability were also identified among members appointed by political parties.
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VI. Conflict of Interests among PEC Members The monitoring also addressed possible conflict of interests among PEC members. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of target 396 precincts randomly selected throughout Georgia identified cases of probable conflict of interests in 12,6% of precincts. For the purpose of this research, cases were considered as probable conflict of interests for following reasons: when family ties between PEC members exist or when there is subordination among PEC members permanent workplace - e.g. when a teacher and a school principal, both members of the same PEC, are working at the same school. Herewith, in these types of cases it does not matter whether a teacher is also subordinated to the principal in frames of the commission due to the latters status, i.e. whether the teacher is a member and the principal is the chairperson of the PEC. Subordination at permanent workplace is an important factor notwithstanding their positions at the PEC, which may have an adverse impact on impartial work of the commission. Furthermore, cases where PEC members were a teacher and a mandaturi working for the same school were also qualified as probable conflict of interests. School mandaturis have the right to attend meetings of structural units of the school (pedagogical councils, board of trustees, etc.) with the right to vote, and to raise certain issues that fall under their purview. Thus, a mandaturi has the power to raise the issue of a teachers liability and therefore, the teacher can have a self-perception as a subordinate to mandaturi. This may have an adverse impact on impartiality and independence of the work of the person at PEC. The monitoring revealed four cases involving family ties between members of the same commission at Kvareli N17 and N30 precincts, Telavi N50 precinct and Martvili N28 precinct. Similar to work subordination, family ties between commission members may have an adverse impact on their objective and impartial work. It should be noted, that low number of such facts can be explained by the difficulty to identify the family ties in this kind of study.

VII. Monitoring of Abidance to the Code of Ethics for Election Administration Officers and Imposition of Liability on Election Commission Members In addition to introducing a number of new regulations in the Election Code in late 2011, it was also determined that the CEC must adopt the Code of Ethics for election administration officer sunder a resolution. 9 Moreover, the new regulations established that a measure of disciplinary liability ordered against commission members must correspond to gravity of violations committed. 10 The final phase of the project entailed monitoring of the process. In particular, it focused on the abidance of the Code of Ethics of election administration adopted in the run up of the October 1, 2012 parliamentary elections and examined whether measures of liability brought against commission members was adequate to gravity of violation committed. On March 9, 2012, the CEC adopted under a resolution the Code of Ethics for election administration officers, determining guidelines of their activities violation of which would result in imposition of
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10

Para.Z3, Article 14 of the Election Code of Georgia Para.4, Article 28 of the Election Code of Georgia

disciplinary liability as prescribed by the Georgian legislation. However, later the CEC itself ignored these guidelines when it commented about opinions expressed by GYLA and ISFED. The CECs criticism lacked substantiation and tact. 11 Further, the Code was violated by the following precinct election commissions: stipulation of para.4c, Article 5 of the Election Code (be sociable and avoid instigation or escalation of personal or any other type of conflict) by chairpersons of PEC N1 of Dusheti DEC N28, PEC N32 of Kaspi DEC N30 and PEC N25 of Gardabani DEC N21, who instigated a conflict with an observer and a media representative and limited their rights guaranteed by the Election Code. Adjudication of complaints filed with DECs and the CECs over the Election Day and post-election procedures showed that election administrations frequently applied inadequate measures of liability against members of subordinate commissions. In particular, The Election Code provides for fines in the amount of GEL500 and GEL 2000 as administrative measures for interference with the activities/curtailing rights of an observer/media representative, re-writing summary protocols. Although these violations were evident, election commissions did not resort to measures of administrative liability but rather, applied disciplinary punishments reproofs and warnings; If a claim filed sought imposition of fine on PEC chairperson and secretary, election administrations favored imposition of fine on PEC secretaries, without bringing disciplinary liability or any liability against chairpersons; For failure to duly perform official obligations of a commission member, the Election Code provides for a disciplinary liability in the form of a reproof, warning, salary deduction (in part or in full) or suspension of power. Despite gravity of violation, higher election commissions usually resorted to the lightest for of disciplinary liability against PEC members reproof and warning. Disciplinary and administrative liability was brought against commission members in total of 78 cases, including: Disciplinary liability: Reproof 35 cases Warning 24 cases Salary deduction 11 cases Fine 8 cases

Administrative liability:

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http://internet.ge/?l=GE&m=1&sm=0&ID=12932

VIII. Findings and Recommendations The monitoring allows to conclude the following: In a number of cases it was difficult to obtain information about commission members, as election precincts either did not have the information or refused to provide it. The issue proved to be particularly problematic when it came to obtaining information about workplace of PEC members and their positions; In 75 cases PEC members had previously been imposed with a disciplinary liability during the 2010 municipal elections; In 12,6% of election commissions, family ties or work subordination was found between PEC members that could have affected their impartial and objective work; Certain dissimilarities were found between records of the Central Election Commission and the DECs about persons imposed with disciplinary or administrative measures; Frequently, measures of liability were not brought against PEC members, based on assertions that violation committed at an election precinct did not influence election results; When a DEC made a decision to impose an administrative or disciplinary liability, it mostly resorted to lighter measures of liability. Based on the monitoring results, the organizations have elaborated the following recommendations: Election commissions should improve transparency of their activities not only at the central but also at the precinct and district levels, and provide access to information about commission members; Election administrations should refrain from re-appointment in the election commissions of those persons who have been previously imposed with disciplinary/administrative liability measures during two consecutive elections; When selecting the commission members, family ties should be an important issue to be considered as a factor. If family relationship can be confirmed, the persons involved should not be selected for the same election commission and should be placed in different commissions; When selecting the commission members, their subordination at work or work relations should be considered. If such relationship at work can be confirmed, the persons who share the work place should not be appointed to the same election commission and should be placed in different commissions; When selecting/appointing their representatives to election commissions, election administration and political parties should give preference to persons with experience in election-related work; In view of the importance of PECs, most of the members of PECs selected by district election commission should be certified; Salary supplements should be provided as an incentive for certified members of election commissions; DECs should provide the Central Election Commission with complete information about members imposed with disciplinary and administrative liability. Measures of liability should be brought against PEC members in proportion to violation committed, without providing any artificial reasons to relieve them from the responsibility.