PEOPLE VS.

DELMENDO1 (Guerrero, 1981) Facts: Luis Delmendo and Florentino Delmendo were accused of with the murder of Alfedo Bucat. The version of the prosecution showed that Florentino and Delmendo were drinking and they passed by the house of the deceased who at that time were having supper with his wife and son. Florentino vomited which caused the spouses to complain. The appellants left them alone only to return later to shoot the deceased. It was nighttime when the shooting occurred and the only lighting comes from inside the house but the wife was able to identify the accused and even identify the color of his shirt and pants. However, they did not mention the name of the accused during the initial investigation of the police but filed an information imputing the shooting 16 days after the incident occurred. When the accused were arrested, they were subjected to a paraffin test. The test showed that Luis Delmendo has traces of nitrate on his hands. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting the accused. YES. RATIO: The length of the time that the wife and the son took to reveal the name of the accused weakened their testimony specially that they did not even reveal the identity of the accused during the investigation of the police or to one of their neighbors. Also, it would have been impossible for the wife to identify the accused given that the spot outside their house is dark. She even identified the color of the pants of the accused which was impossible for her to do so because the lower portion of the window would cover the accused from the waist down. The testimony is, therefore, an afterthought and was designed to implicate the accused. The reason why Luis hands are positive of nitrates could be explained. Luis was at the time of the incident, an employee of Filipinos Magnetite Corporation. As an employee of the said corporation, he handled explosive materials and sometimes handled chemicals without gloves on. Citibank, N.A vs. Sabeniano2 (Chico-Nazario, J.; October 16, 2006) FACTS Sabeniano filed a Complaint for Accounting, Sum of Money, and Damages against Citibank and FNCB Finance. She claimed tha thse had substantial deposits and money market placements with Citibank and FNCB, as well as money market placements with the Ayala Investment and Development Corp. (AIDC), the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to Sabenianos Citibank Account. Despite repeated demands, Citibank and FNCB Finance refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements. Citibank and FNCB, on the other hand, admitted that Sabeniano had deposits and money market placemenets with them, including a dollar account with Citibank-Geneva. It further alleged that Sabeniano had several loans from Citibank, evidenced by Promissory Notes, and secured by a Declaration of Pledge dollar account with Citibank-Geneva, and Deeds of Assignment money market placements with FNCB. When Sabeniano failed to pay her
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loans despite repeated demands, Citibank exercised its right to set-off or compensate her outstanding obligations with her deposits and placements. Citibank supposedly informed Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters. RTC- set-off of dollar account with Citibank-Geneva is illegal, null and void; Sabeniano indebted to Citibank, and ordered to pay money judgment. All the parties appealed. CA- affirmed with modification, Citibank failed to establish by competent evidence Sabenianos indebtedness; Citibank ordered to return the money market placements, savings accounts and current accounts, including the AIDC money market placement. Sabeniano filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review but the same was not acted upon by the court. Hence, she failed to file any petition for review (not be allowed to claim more than what was established in the lower court). Citibank filed an MR before the CA. Deleted the order to return the AIDC money market placement. ISSUE/HELD 1. W/N the fact alone that the RTC Decision was rendered by a judge other than the judge who actually heard and tried the case is sufficient justification for the appellate court to disregard or set aside the findings in the RTC Decision? NO. 2. W/N Citibank and FNCB are liable to return the foregoing amounts, with interests and penalties, to Sabeniano? a.) Money Market Placement with Citibank YES. b.) Money Market Placement with FNCB NO. c.) Savings and Current Accounts with Citibank NO. d.) Dollar Account with Citibank-Geneva YES. 3. W/N Citibank is authorized to use the proceeds of the PNs, other deposits and money market placements to pay for Sabeniano's obligations? e.) Money Market Placement with Citibank and FNCB YES. f.) Savings and Current Accounts with Citibank YES. g.) Dollar Account with Citibank-Geneva NO. RATIO General Rule, SC will not consider questions of facts EXCEPT (as in this case) 1. When the findings of fact are conflicting, 2. When the CA went beyond the issues of the case, 3. When the finding are contrary to those of the trial court, and 4. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 1. There is a disputable presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official duties, that he reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the RTC judge who penned the decision is not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence would not render the finding in the said Decision erroneous and liable, when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes are complete and available for consideration by the former.

faye Micha Arias

2. a.) Money Market Placement with Citibank Sabeniano invested the principal and its proceeds several times in the succeeding years for which new PNs were issued by Citibank to replace the ones that matured. The last set of PNs were PN Nos. 23356 and 23357 which upon maturity was paid to Sabeniano who used P500,000 thereof, plus P600,000 from her other funds to open two time deposits with Citibank.

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Citibank admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but qualified that they were no longer outstanding. This admission established prima facie that Citibank is liable to Sabeniano for the amounts stated. However, the qualification that it had been paid to Sabeniano is an affirmative allegation of a new matter, the burden of poof to show that it had been discharged is now upon Citibank. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. After the existence of a debt is fully established, the burden of proving the extinguishment devolves upon the debtor. Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence as distinct from the general burden of proof shifts to the creditor, who is then under duty of producing some evidence of non-payment. Citibank failed to prove that the PNs had already been paid, and used to open one of Sabeniano's time deposits. Pieces of Evidence Adduced: 1.) testimony of Mr. Pujeda, OIC of loans and placements, and 2.) deposition of Mr. Tan, VP of Citibank who directly dealt with Sabeniano with regard to her deposits and loans. 3.) No document upon which the recollection of the said transaction could be based was presented. SC finds it implausible that, even after ten years, they could remember this particular transaction. 4.) Mr. Pujeda attempted to present in evidence a document to support their claim but it was a mere xerox copy ans was blurred and hardly readable. SC: PN Nos. 23356 and 23357 are still outstanding and Citibank is still liable for it. Citibank's Contention: The proceeds of these PNS, together with additional money, were used by Sabeniano to open a time deposit, which was subsequently terminated and the proceeds thereof transferred to a money market placement with FNCB. b.) Money Market Placement with FNCB Two (2) Manager's Checks for the time deposits were issued by Citibank payable to Citifinance with the additional notation A/C Modesta R. Sabeniano, and a typewritten phrase, Ref. Proceeds of TD 17783 / TD 17784. These checks were deposited in FNBC's account with Feati Bank and Trust Co., as evidenced by the rubber stamp mark of the latter found at the back of the MCs. FNCB then issued PNs No. 4952 and 4962 as proof of the placement, payable to Sabeniano's savings account with Citibank. The principals were subsequently rolled over twice, the last set of PNs issued were PNs No. 8167 and 8169. Hence, CA erred in awarding to Sabeniano the principal amounts and interests of PNs No. 5757 and 5758.

c.) Savings and Current Accounts with Citibank Sabeniano presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips and bank statements to prove deposits made to several of her accounts with Citibank (P3.8M). Both TC and CA recognized only P31,079.14 as the amount in her savings account used to offset her alleged outstanding obligations. For Sabeniano's failure to file a timely appeal, this amount is binding upon the SC. d.) Dollar Account with Citibank-Geneva Evidence adduced by Sabeniano: 1.) Sabeniano's own computation of her placements and dollar account US$343,220.98; 2.) Sabeniano's Memorandum claiming a total of US $1,336,638.65 3.) Citibank-Geneva's computation of her placements and dollar accounts US$156,942.70 where US$149,632.99 was transferred to Citibank Manila to offset Sabeniano's outstanding obligation, leaving a balance of US$7,309.71 which was further reduced to US$310.87. RTC and CA gave more credence on Citibank-Geneva's computation. 3. CITIBANK's VERSION: Sabeniano's outstanding obligation amounted to P1.9M. When she failed to pay the first set of PNs, these were renewed several times, for which new PNs were issued. All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is to liquidate existing obligation except for PN No. 34534, which stated for its purpose personal investment. These PNs were secured by Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with FNCB (one for PN No. 8169 and another for PN No. 8167, these were later rolled over to PNs No. 20138 and 20139 respectively). Sabeniano also executed a Declaration of Pledge of all her present and future fiduciary placements held in her personal and/or joint name with Citibank, Switzerland to secure the claims of Citibank. Citibank's copy of the Declaration of Pledge was undated, while that of Sabeniano was a copy certified by a Citibank-Geneva Officer dated 24 Sept 1979.

Summary of Letters between Citibank and Sabeniano 1.) from Mr. Tan notice that obligation which was due and demandable remained unpaid and shall be referred for legal action 2.) Sabeniano's Reply Letter, with MC Adore's letterhead enclosed a Comtrust check for payment of interests due, and a mention of their pending loan application with DBP. 3.) CN Pugeda, Executive Secretary's Letter, with MC Adore's letterhead requesting for re-computation of the interests and penalty charges of her Upon maturity, four (4) checks were issued to show payment of the principal and loan with maturity dates of all promisory notes at June 30, 1979; requesting the proceeds to Sabeniano's savings account. However, the checks for the two for return of the Comtrust check for replacement of another check; and for principal amounts were returned with a memo that they shall be placed for one the return of the PNs for her signature. more year. When these matured, FNCB issued a check payable to Citibank N.A. 4.) Telegram from Soriano, Legal Counsel requesting for an extension of the A/C Modesta Sabeniano, and accordingly canceled the PNs. due date of the obligations on or before July 31, 1979 upon Sabeniano's arrival from abroad. Sabeniano admitted the issuance and existence of the Check but with the 5.) Sabeniano's letter to Mr. Bobby Mendoza, FNCB Manager, without qualification that the proceeds were turned over to Citibank to liquidate letterhead authorizing FNCB to forward the proceeds of her placements to Sabeniano's outstanding loans. Citibank to be applied to her outstanding obligations with Citibank. 2012 DIGEST GROUP | EVIDENCE LOPEZ Page 2 of 18

6.)

Sabeniano's letter to Mr. Tan, without letterhead - authorizing him to debit her outstanding obligation from her savings and current accounts. 7.) From Citibank notifying Sabeniano of the status of her loan and the foregoing compensation which Citibank effect pursuant to the Deed of Assignment and her previous letters. It also informed her of the remaining past due obligation which the Citibank shall offset with her other collateral if Sabeniano fails to pay within the given period. 8.) Sabeniano's letter to Mr. Tan, with letterheadrequesting for a statement of account covering the principal and interest of the P1.9M loan of MC Adore. 9.) Letter to Citibank, with MC Adore's letterhead authorizing the bearer to settle the overdue accounts of Sabeniano as President and Chairman of MC Adore. 10.) Letter from Citibank's counsel informing Sabeniano of Citibank's offset effected on her account with Citibank-Geneva, and that her obligation to Citibank are now fully paid and liquidated. Unfortunately, the original copies of the Manager's Checks representing the proceeds of the first set of PNs, as well as other related documentary evidence were burned in the fire at Citibank's Building. 1.) SABENIANO's VERSION: Sabeniano denied the first set of PNs (except of PN No. 34534 personal investment). She claimed that she obtained several loans but these amounted to only P1.15M and that she had already paid them. As proof of payment of the P1M, she presented two (2) provisional receipts signed by Mr. Tan and acknowledging receipt from Sabeniano several checks for liquidation of loan. As to the P150,000, she claimed that she borrowed it as her personal investment (PN No. 34534). She admitted receipt of the loan via MC No 228270, which she invested in a money market placement with FNCB. She used the very same placement in FNCB as security for her Citibank loan, so when she failed to pay the loan and Citibank allegedly forfeited her placement with FNCB, it resulted in the payment of her loan. SC FINDINGS in favor of Citibank: Sabeniano presented a handwritten note allegedly of Mr. Tan showing the breakdown of her BPI Check of P500,000 into three different money market placements with Citibank. However, One, it appears that the initial attributed to Mr. Tan were actually of Mr. Bobby Mendoza of FNCB who was not presented during the trial, hence the document was not authenticated by him; Two, the handwritten note provided for different maturity dates for each of the placement when they should mature at the same time after 60 days . Likewise, the maturity date do not correspond to the 60-day placement period stated on the Provisional Receipt. Third, the amount of the placements totaled to P532,000. in excess of the 500,000 acknowledged on the face of the PR. Fourth, the money market placements were with FNCB, SC cannot simply assume that Citibank can issue a check to discharge an obligation of FNCB. Although FNCB and Citibank are affiliated there remained separate and distinct corporations, each having its own financial system, and records. It is also worthy to note that FNCB issued its own checks for its previous PNs to Sabeniano. Fifth, if Sabeniano truly had placements with Citibank or FNCB it would be evidenced by PNs issued by either Citibank or FNCB.

which loans were actually paid. The purpose for the provisional receipts was merely yo acknowledge delivery of the checks to the possession of the bank, but not yet of payment. (check not legal tender, mere delivery does not discharge the obligation until it is encashed). As for the payment of PN No. 34534: 1. Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibit deposit lip of Citibank evidencing the deposit of BPI Check for P150,000 BUT 2. Testimony in RTC (3yrs later) loan covered by PN No. 34534 was secured by her money market placement with FNCB which security was applied to the loan. 2.) SABENIANO's VERSION: She denied receiving two MCs and pointed out that these did not contain her indorsement. She however did not deny receiving all other checks but qualified that she received them not as proceeds of loans, but as payment of the principal amounts and/or interests from her money market placements. Sabeniano presented personal checks drawn from her FBTC account to show that these were invested in separate money market placements with Citibank and FNCB, the returns of which were paid to her via MCs. SC FINDINGS in favor of Citibank: That two of the MCs did not have her indorsement does not negate the deposit thereof to her account. Liability falls upon BPI which received the checks for deposit and stamped its guarantee thereto. Sabeniano therefore would have a cause of action against BPI Cubao. Also, it is an apparent contradiction for respondent to claim having received the proceed of checks deposited in an account, and then deny receiving the proceeds of another check deposited in the very same account. The personal checks of Sabeniano only established her issuance thereof. There was nothing on the face of the checks to show that they were issued and were actually invested in money market placements. 3.) SABENIANO's VERSION: She also claimed that the notation on each check (Re: Proceeds of PN No.___) did not appear on the MCs when she originally received them and that it was written by a different typewriter. She even testified that MCs were not supposed to have notations indicating the purpose for which they were issued. SC FINDINGS in favor of Citibank: As to the other allegations of Sabeniano, these were uncorroborated by any other evidence. It constitutes a mere opinion on the appearance of the notation by a witness who doe not possess the necessary expertise on the matter. Her extensive experience in dealing with banks does not qualify her as a competent witness on banking procedures and practices. 4.) SABENIANO's VERSION: As to the second set of PNs, Sabeniano acknowledged them but asserted that they were merely simulated loans to facilitate her pending loan application with DBP (this fact she wrote by hand in her own copies of the PNs).

While the provisional receipts did state that Mr. Tan for Citibank received Sabeniano's checks as payment for her loans, they failed to specifically identify SC FINDINGS in favor of Citibank: 2012 DIGEST GROUP | EVIDENCE LOPEZ Page 3 of 18

The second set of PNs were mere renewals of the first set of PNs. The first set of PNs were supported by MCs which were crossed with the words Payee's Account Only - only for deposit to payee's bank account. The crossed MCs were indeed deposited in several different bank accounts and cleared by the Clearing Office of the BSP, as evidenced by the stamp marks and notations on the said checks. The possession of Citibank of the said MCs, duly stamped Paid gives rise to the presumption that the said MCs were already paid out to the intended payee. Hence, there is disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. Unfortunately, Sabeniano was unable to present sufficient and credible evidence to dispute these presumptions (simple denials lang). As to PN No. 34534, Sabeniano later admitted that she signed it and received MC No. 22870 as proceeds of the loan, she contradicted herself when she earlier testified that this was among the PNs she executed as simulated loans with Citibank. Sabeniano, likewise failed to provide proof of her alleged loan application with DBP and of any circumstance or correspondence wherein the simulated PNs were indeed used for their supposed purpose. Handwritten notations of Sabeniano on her copies of the PNs were self-serving. 4. Citibank on the other hand was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of Sabeniano's loan obligation. It is supported by the testimony of its officers and available documentation, consistently treating the PNs as regular loans accepted, approved and paid in the ordinary course of business. The exchange of letters between Citibank and Sabeniano consistently recognized that Sabeniano owed Citibank money. While preponderance of evidence should not be wholly dependent on the number of witnesses, there are certain instances when the number of witnesses become the determining factor, as in this case. 5. BEST EVIDENCE RULE - requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced, which for documentary evidence is the original document itself, to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. - this rule is applied only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. Where the issue is only as to its existence or condition, it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence, which my be proved by oral testimony. - in this case, SC did not violated the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners. The terms and contents of these documents were never the point of contention, but their existence and purpose.

were personally executed by Sabeniano. 2. The origianl PNs went through the whole loan booking system of Citibank. 3. FNCB lost the original copies when it moved to its new office. 4. Citibank claimed that the original PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation of the loan either through payment or roll-over, Citibank still looking for them at their storage but not claiming their absence or loss. 5. Other original documents were burned in the fire that broke out in Citibank's office, no showing that fire was intentionally set. 7. The liquidation of Sabeniano's outstanding loans were valid in so far as Citibank used Sabeniano's savings account with Citibank and her money market placement with FNCB; but illegal and void as to the dollar accounts with Citibank Geneva. h.) Savings and Current Accounts with Citibank - Citibank was the creditor of Sabeniano for her outstanding loan. At the same time, Sabeniano was the creditor of Citibank for her deposit account (simple loan or mutuum). Both debts consists of sums of money. The PNs were due and demandable on June 1979, while the SA was demandable anytime. Compensation is by operation of law, and is valid even in the absence of an express authority from Sabeniano. i.) Money Market Placement with FNCB - For the placement, Sabeniano was the creditor and FNCB was the debtor; while as to the outstanding loans, Citibank was the creditor and Sabeniano was the debtor. In this case, the first requisite for compensation that each on of the obligors be bound principally, and be creditors and debtors of the other, was not met. - However, the document that authorized the offset in this case were the Deeds of Assignment. In fact, it was not a legal compensation but actually a partial extinguishment of the obligation through the application of the security given by Sabeniano to the loans. - The Deeds of Assignment were not recognized by the CA because of its erroneous appreciation of the Best Evidence Rule. Note that the contents of the Deeds of Assignment were not in dispute but only its execution. As the Deeds of Assignment were notarized, they are admissible in evidence. - In reality, though the documents were entitled Deeds of Assignment, they were actually more of a pledge by Sabeniano to Citibank of her credit due from FNCB.

j.) Dollar Account with Citibank-Geneva - In this case the offset was made pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge. By processual presumption (assume foreign law is same as Phil. Law), SC determined whether the constitution of the pledge complied with existing laws. 1. Dec. of Pledge is unnotarized, hence Citibank must discharge the burden of 6. Use of Secondary Evidence when the Original is Not Available. proving its due execution and authenticity. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in 2. Citibank was not able to establish the date when the Dec. of Pledge was court, the offerer, upon proof of execution or existence and the cause of its actually executed, as it merely presented an undated photocopy thereof. unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents (1) by a copy, or Meanwhile, Sabeniano was able to present a certified copy from Citibank(2)by a recital of tis contents in some authentic document, or (3) by the testimony Geneva of witnesses in the order stated. 3. Dec. of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. The pledge was in a standard printed - In this case, the execution or existence of the original copies of the documents were form naming the pledgor and the pledgee therein as Citibank. established through: 4. Sabeniano claims that the signature therein was not hers and was a forgery. 1. Testiomonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the Best 2012 DIGEST GROUP | EVIDENCE LOPEZ Page 4 of 18

Evidence Rule, which is especially true when the issue is that of forgery. - As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself. However, Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original Declaration of Pledge, without any showing that it exerted diligent efforts to secure the original copy or any reason why Citibank-Geneva would not return the original document. Moreover, SC is persuaded that Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the original document, and takes into consideration the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to Citibank if produced. DISPOSITIVE SC affirmed CA decision with modification. 1. 2. PNs or Money market placement with Citibank are declared subsisting and outstanding. Citibank ordered to return the principal, plus the stipulated interest to Sabeniano. Remittance of Sabeniano's dollar account from Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with Citibank is illegal, null and void. Citibank to refund Sabeniano, plus stipulated interest for each of the fiduciary placements and current accounts involved. Citibank to pay Sabeniano moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Sabeniano to pay Citibank the balance of her outstanding loans with interest until payment.

documentary evidence which were denied admission were not properly identified by any competent witness and that said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence. ISSUE: WON photocopies constitute electronic evidence within the meaning of the Rules on Electronic Evidence [REE]? Petitioners argument: The photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its assertion that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any printout or output, readable by sight or other means". HELD: NO. Photocopies do not constitute electronic evidence i.e. they cannot be considered electronic documents within the meaning of REE and therefore cannot be considered as the functional equivalent of their original. RATIO: What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. The argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Since offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. These photocopies violate the best evidence rule under R130 and therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Petitioner did not even lay the predicate for the admission of the said photocopies under any of the exceptions to the requirement to produce original writing under R130.3. Home Assurance Corp. v CA4 and Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc (1993) J. Cruz | Rule 45 petition to the SC (denied) Keywords: best evidence of insurance contract is its original copy FACTS: Filipro Phils. (now Nestle Phils), consignee of 2 hydraulic engines shipped from US, refused to accept one of the units when it was found to be damaged. Nestle filed claims against the arrastre operator, the Port Authority, hauler/warehouse owner (Mabuhay) and its insurer Home Insurance. Only Home Insurance paid the claim and was issued a subrogation
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3. 4.

NAPOCOR vs Codilla Jr.3, Bangpai Shipping Co and Wallem Shipping Inc. (2007) J. ChicoNazario | Rule 45 Petition (denied; dec. affirmed) Keywords: photocopies are NOT electronic documents FACTS: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for damages against Bangpai Shipping Co. and its ship agent Wallem Shipping Inc. for alleged damages caused by a vessel (M/V Dibena Win) owned and operated by Bangpai to NAPOCORs power barges while moored at Cebu Intl Port. During trial NAPOCOR offered as documentary evidence Exhibits A to V and their respective sub-markings (22 sets). Of these, Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N,O, P, Q, R, S and sub-markings of H, J, M, N, P, Q, S (16 sets) were not admitted and excluded from the records by respondent Judge Codilla upon motion to strike of private respondents. These excluded documents are photocopies of letters, lists, forms, and the like containing manual signatures, handwritten annotations, RECEIVED stamps, etc. (Please see pp. 421422 of original for itemized enumeration and description). Their original copies were not presented to the trial court despite several opportunities to do so. The court did not accept NAPOCORs justification that the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original document on the basis the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Moreover the requirements of authentication (R5.1, 5.2) and Affidavit to prove admissibility and evidentiary weight (R9.1) of the said rules were not complied with. MR denied. Rule 65 Petition to CA dismissed. Appellate court also noted that the pieces of petitioners
3
eva

eva

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receipt for $6, 070. Mabuhay alone was sued by Home Insurance for recovery of amount it paid to Nestle. TC dismissed complaint noting (1) that insurance contract between the corporation and the consignee was not presented and that the other supporting documents were all only photocopies; no explanation was given for the failure of the plaintiffs to submit the originals; and (2) that crates of the shipment did not comply with the accepted international standards whatever damage was sustained by the engine must have occurred while it was at sea, for which Mabuhay could not be held liable. CA affirmed TC decision adding that Home Insurance had failed to establish a valid subrogation much less establish that it is insurer against all risks of the transport of the goods. ISSUES: (1) WON the subrogation receipt proves the existence of the insurance contract between Nestle and the Home Insurance and the amount paid by the latter to the former? NO. (2) WON the law or presumption of negligence operates against the carrier. NO. RATIO: (1) It is not clear to what rights and against whom is Home Insurance claiming in alleged subrogation of Nestle without proof of an insurance contract. Even assuming that the subrogation receipt may be maybe used to establishment relationship between Home Insurance and Nestle, by itself alone is not sufficient to prove petitioners claim holding the respondent liable for damage of the engine considering that: (a) the shipment of cargo passes several stages and hauling is just one of them therefore (in general) the hauler is only liable to the damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo until delivery to consignee; (b) as a mere subrogee of Nestle, Home Insurance can exercise only such rights against the parties handling the cargo as were granted to Nestle under the insurance contract; it cannot be presumed that the hauling was included in the coverage (insurance contract would have clearly indicated the scope of the coverage but there is no evidence of this) hence the rights transferred to Home Insurance by Nestle still assuming there was a valid subrogation might not include the right to sue Mabuhay. (2) The law or presumption of negligence against the carrier (Art. 1735,CC) is applicable only if the shipper or consignee has, to begin with, a right of action against the carrier. It has not been shown in the case at bar that Home, as the supposed subrogee of Nestle, has acquired such a right against Mabuhay. There is no accepted evidence to show that the hauling portion of the shipment is covered by the insurance policy since the original contract of insurance has not been presented. Such failure is fatal to the petition in light of Rule 130.3 ( Original copies must be produced; exceptions) given that the best evidence of the insurance contract was its original copy, which was presumably in the possession of Home Insurance itself.

Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay In an amended complaint, other defendants were included, and respondent Tan alleged: She is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company Through fraud and machination, other partners took actual and active management of the partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company Partners managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and building's in the cities of Cebu, Lapulapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla, some of which were hidden Upon death of Tee Hoon, without liquidation continued the business of Glory Commercial Company by purportedly organizing a corporation known as the Glory Commercial Company Defendants kept on promising to liquidate said properties but nothing happened Through deceit and misrepresentations, they convinced respondent Tan to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests, in the assets of the partnership of Glory Commercial Company. The quitclaim is in the possession of the adverse party defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu. Petitioners: Respondent Tan is the NOT widow of Tee Hoon because, according to them, his legitimate wife was Ang Siok Tin still living and with whom he had four (4) legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hongkong Her claim or demand has been paid, waived abandoned or otherwise extinguished as evidenced by the 'quitclaim' Annex 'A' Even before the death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the plaintiff was no longer his common law wife and even though she was not entitled to anything left by Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, yet, out of the kindness and generosity on the part of the defendants, particularly Antonio Lain Tanhu, who, was inspiring to be monk and in fact he is now a monk, plaintiff was given a substantial amount evidenced by the 'quitclaim' (Annex 'A') They acquired properties out of their own personal funds TC: granted amendment because Facts merely to amplify material averments constituting the cause of action in the original complaint. It likewise include necessary and indispensable defendants without whom no final determination can be had in the action and in order that complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties. Did not change the main causes of action; still for accounting of real and personal properties as well as for the recovery, with damages Pre-Trial: all of petitioners were declared in default for not appearing Respondent Tan then filed a Motion to drop some defendants Petitioners objected because none of the defendants NOT DROPPED AND DECLARED IN DEFAULT were notified of said motion, in violation of the three-day requirement of Section 4 of Rule 15, Rules of Court TC: granted Motion to drop and ordered for plaintiffs evidence to be received ex-parte Petitioners then filed an MR (denied by the TC) and Motion to Quash (pending) Pending the MQ, petitioners immediately filed a Certiorari to the CA CA: denied the Certiorari since the MQ was not yet resolved by the TC Petitioners counsel then filed a Manifestation stating that the Motion to Quash is in

LIM TANHU V. RAMOLETE5 August 29, 1975 | Barredo, J. Facts: Complaint filed by respondent Tan Put only against the spouses-petitioners Antonio
5
jill

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effect an abandonment of their MQ in the TC; directly went to the SC on Certiorari Relevant Issue: WON respondent Tan is the legitimate wife of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan? NO. Ratio: TCs finding is that respondent is the legitimate wife , but this is contrary to the weight of the evidence brought before it during the trial and the pre-trial Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Thus, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained The certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court: o Here, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not a competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract. o The authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. o Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. Also, there are 2 documents of great weight belying the pretended marriage: (1) Exhibit LL, the income tax return of the deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating that the name of his wife was Ang Sick Tin; and (2) the quitclaim, Annex A of the answer, wherein plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living with the deceased without benefit of marriage and that she was his "common-law wife" Since the existence of the quitclaim has been duly established without any circumstance to detract from its legal import, the court should have held that plaintiff was bound by her admission therein that she was the common-law wife only of Po Chuan and what is more, that she had already renounced for valuable consideration whatever claim she might have relative to the partnership Glory Commercial Co. Also mentioned in the memorandum of petitioners: (1) the certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and (2) a similar certification of the Apostolic Prefect of the Philippine Independent Church, Parish of Sto. Nio, Cebu City, that their respective official records corresponding to December 1949 to December 1950 do not show any marriage between Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and Tan Put, neither of which certifications have been impugned by respondent. Moreover, a written agreement executed in Chinese, but purportedly translated into English by the Chinese Consul of Cebu, between Tan Put and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan is not impugned by the respondent: CONSULATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA Cebu City, Philippines TRANSLATION This is to certify that 1, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan Put, have lived with Mr. Lim Po Chuan alias TeeHoon since 1949 but it recently occurs that

we are incompatible with each other and are not in the position to keep living together permanently. With the mutual concurrence, we decided to terminate the existing relationship of common law-marriage and promised not to interfere each other's affairs from now on. The Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has been given to me by Mr. Lim Po Chuan for my subsistence. Witnesses: Mr. Lim Beng Guan Mr. Huang Sing Se Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the 54th year of the Republic of China (corresponding to the year 1965). (SGD) TAN KI ENG Verified from the records. JORGE TABAR (Pp. 283-284, Record.) Held: Proceedings of the TC null and void AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO 6 | Sanchez, J. (1966) FACTS Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims bound for Lourdes. Air France issued him a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the airline forced him to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying because there was a "white man", who had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his seat, Carrascoso refused and a commotion ensued. He later on reluctantly gave his seat. CFI: Ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso amount for damages and the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome CA: Affirmed TC but slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket Air France says: The ticket did not represent the intent and agreement of the parties. Carrascoso knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight and that the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but would depend on the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE/HELD [1]WoN Carrascoso had been issued a confirmed 1st class ticket? YES [2] WoN the pursers entry in his notebook is incompetent evidenceNO RATIO [1] The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA and TC regarding this issue CA says: The airline received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not TC says: The OK marks on the tickets mean that they are confirmed. Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Zaldariaga and Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "1st class airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
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Krystel Bautista

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whatever. Defendant's own witness Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. As a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. [2] Air France says the CA erred in accepting as evidence the pursers entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene", as this was only based on Carrascosos testimony. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. The transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence. People v Felipe Tanjutco (JBL Reyes, 1968)7 Petitioner: Felipe Tanjutco Respondents: People of the Philippines FACTS Felipe Tanjutco served as the secretary to Ramon Santos, a businessman, financier and, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company (PBTC). As Santoss secretary, Tanjutco held office in the bank premises, had free access to all offices of the bank and free use of its equipment. Mr. Santos maintained four accounts, all current, with the bank. Tanjutco deposits Santoss money for him in these accounts. Tanjutco deposits it with the bank and obtain a duplicate of the deposit slip duly stamped by the bank. This duplicate deposit slip would later on be shown to Mr. Santos to satisfy the latter that the money entrusted to the accused was already deposited according to his instructions. After Santos checks the correctness of the amount appearing in the duplicate deposit slip, he would return the duplicate to Tanjutco for safekeeping. The bank kept the original of the deposit slips and a separate ledger for each account of every depositor. It contains the deposits and withdrawal of a depositor during the month, arranged according to the dates of the transactions. The deposit slips prepared by Tanjutco for Santos indicated the account number to be credited with the amount of each deposit and the check used in withdrawing from the deposits likewise carried the account number to be debited with the amount of the check. These ledgers were prepared in duplicate, and the bank sent the duplicate to the depositor after the end of each month. In this manner, the depositor could check the duplicate deposit
7
Ixara Maroto

slips in his possession with the entries in the duplicate ledger received by him monthly to determine whether or not correct entries of the deposits and withdrawals were made. Tanjutco used the money entrusted to him for his personal use. He deposited a smaller amount than that he received from his employer. At times, he did not deposit anything at all, although he received money for deposit. To hide his crime, Tanjutco falsified duplicate deposit slips which he showed to Mr. Santos. And when he received the monthly customer's ledger, he likewise falsified a duplicate monthly customer's ledger, entering in the falsified ledger the correct amount he received from Mr. Santos for deposit in place of the amount he actually deposited. It was this falsified ledger which the accused showed to Mr. Santos monthly. The CFI of Manila convicted Tanjutco of qualified theft. He now appeals this decision claiming that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he is the author of the falsified documents. ISSUE/HELD WON there was sufficient evidence to convict Tanjutco of qualified theft? YES RATIO 1) Tanjutco contends that no single witness testified to having personally seen the accused in the act of falsifying the duplicate deposit slips or bank statements. SC: Direct evidence on this point is not imperative, because it was Tanjutco who prepared the original and deposit slips, and that the supposed duplicate deposit slips were duly signed by Tanjutco. These contained forged initials of the bank-teller, or else not covered by any original slip at all. Tanjutco also admitted, not only of having manipulated the records of his employer, but also of having been able, by that means, to abstract an undetermined amount from the funds of the latter. Even assuming these evidences to be circumstantial, they nevertheless constitute legal evidence that may support a conviction, affording as they are basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the fact thereby sought to be proved. 2) According to Tanjutco, the duplicate deposit slips should have been identifies one by one before they may properly be considered against the accused. SC: These slips were not only bundled into a bunch and formally presented as Exhibit Q; they had also been consistently referred to as one of the bases of the prosecution's claim that the misappropriation amount totalled P400,086.19. The absence of any record of the formal presentation of certain exhibits does not render their consideration reversible error, if repeated references thereto in the course of the trial by counsel for the accused and of the court convincingly show that the documents were part of the prosecution's evidence. No error, therefore, was committed by the trial court in giving due credence and weight to the deposit slips. 3) Tanjutco challenges the competence of 40 duplicate deposit slips which do not bear his signature, and urges that the amount covered there P233,744.63 should be deducted from the total amount covered by the duplicate deposit slip, coming from the files of Don Roman Santos. SC: These 40 duplicate deposit slips were admitted by the Court below, not to prove falsification, but only to establish the fact that accused-appellant has received money to be deposited for the account of his employer, and determine the exact amount thus received.

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The relevancy of these documents to prove that fact is not affected by the absence of appellant's signature thereon. Most of the amounts covered by these 40 deposit slips are sufficiently backed by the original deposit slips and the bank ledgers. There is no showing that the figures indicated in both the original and duplicate slips are separately treated or that the amount thus covered is included twice in the summing up of the missing amounts. Even if some of the original deposit slips delivered to the bank do not bear appellant's signature, the absence alone of such signature is no indication that the 40 duplicate slips in question were not in fact prepared by him. The prosecution had to prove the amount allegedly embezzled by Tanjutco. This, the prosecution tried to do by establishing the amounts received by the Tanjutco and comparing it with those deposited in the bank; the resulting difference being treated as the amount abstracted from the funds of the complainant. Under this theory, the ledgers and bank statements naturally are not just secondary, but the primary evidence of the deposits made, while the monthly bank statements found in the files of complainant Roman Santos which were supposed to confirm the amounts he had ordered Tanjutco to be deposited, are the best evidence of the amounts actually entrusted to the latter. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in ruling in favor of the admissibility of the above-mentioned exhibits. 4) Tanjutco alleges that there was no "positive, direct evidence" to show that the monthly bank statements found in the file of Santos were the same documents delivered by him to the latter. SC: By urging the deduction from the total sum covered by all the duplicate deposit slips coming from the files of complainant Santos, of the amounts covered by the 40 unsigned deposit slips, claiming that the resulting difference is the "correct total amount covered by duplicate deposit slips for which accused can be held liable,, Tanjutco in fact acknowledged that these duplicate deposit slips were the ones delivered by him to complainant Santos. 5) Tanjutco contests the accuracy of the auditing firm of Costa and Cruz as hearsay. SC: The lower court gave due weight to the report of the auditors because it was found to be clear and duly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence (monthly bank accounts, bank statement, deposit slips the materiality and relevancy of which were already here sustained) presented during the trial, to which conclusion we fully agree. Petition DENIED, RTC decision AFFIRMED.

evidence is inadmissible and would surely have been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. FACTS In the Information filed against respondent Aviles, it was alleged that being sub-agents of Interpacific (ITI) and enjoying its trust and confidence, they collected from clients payments for airway bills in the amount of P204,030, they unlawfully converted to their own personal use. Prosecution introduced Xerox copies of airway bill supposedly received by the accused for w/c they had not rendered proper accounting. Defense objected, invoking best evidence rule. Prosecution said it would submit original airway bills in due time. TC allowed the marking. Prosecution never submitted orig, nor proved their loss to justify substitution w/ secondary evidence. However, when Xerox copies were formally offered in evidence, defense DID NOT object.

TC: acquitted accused. Rejected agency theory (it was creditor-debtor relationship). Certified photocopies were NOT admissible under the rule that there can be no evidence of a writing the content of w/c is the subject of inquiry other than the orig writing itself. Neither had it been shown that originals had been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of w/c is made evidence by law. Petitioner ITI: evidence of airway bills shouldnt have been rejected CA: Affirmed. Petitioner: insists on admissibility of evidence to prove civil liability ISSUE/HELD WON Xerox copies of airway bills should be admitted - YES RATIO Lower Courts confined themselves to the best evidence rule. They disregarded an equally important principle --- objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature. Identification: done in the course of trial and accompanied by marking of evidence as an exhibit. Formal Offer: done only when the party rests its case and not before. Mere fact that a document is identified and marked as an exhibit doesnt mean that it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence. Party may decide to formally offer it, or decide not to do so at all. In the latter case, tc is not authorized to consider it. Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, and not before. In the case at bar, Xerox copies were objected to only when they were being identified, but was not objected to when they were formally offered in evidence. No valid and timely objection was made at that time. It is no argument to say that the earlier objection should be considered a continuing one. Rule 132, Sec. 7 refers to a single objection to a class of evidence w/c when first offered is considered to encompass the rest. Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by court in its judgment. This is true even if by nature the evidence is inadmissible and would surely have been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. While there may really be no criminal liability, the rejected evidence (now admissible) sufficiently established indebtedness of Aviles. We disbelieve that cancelled payment checks had been lost and merelty presented check stubs to prove that debt has been

Interpacific Transit Inc vs Aviles8 | Cruz, J. (1990) RATIO DECIDENDI Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, and not before. Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by court in its judgment. This is true even if by nature the

iani lauron

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paid. He did not produce any receipt. It could easily have secured a certification from the bank that the checks allegedly issued to ITI had been honored. DISPOSITIVE Aviles liable to pay ITI P204,030 COMPANIA MARITIMA v. JOSE LIMSON9 | Patajo, J | G. R. No. L-27134 | February 28, 1986 | Appeal from the Decision of CFI Manila CFI Manila held Compania Maritima liable to Limson in the amount of P441,339.01. This represented the difference between the claim of Compania for unpaid passage and freight charges for shipments of hogs and cattles on its vessels for the period from 1957 to 1961, and the claim of Limson for the 1) purchase price of foodstuffs he sold to Compania, 2) payments on account of freight not accounted for by Compania, and 3) rebate to which Limson was entitled on the aforesaid freight charges. Compania filed a complaint for collection of the sum of P44,701.54 against Limson. Attached to the complaint was the statement of account supporting its claim Limson filed a motion for bill of particulars asking that the bills of lading referred to in the complaint be attached. Compania opposed said motion. CFI granted motion. It ordered that photostat copies of the bills of lading be attached. Compania filed an MR on the ruling on the motion. It was denied but upon Companias motion, the CFI modified its order that duplicate originals of the bills of lading instead of photostat copies be attached. Limson denied liability. He said he paid for the shipments already AND that a number of the bills of lading submitted by Compania as basis of its claim are not properly chargeable him since 1) he was not the shipper nor 2) had he authorized said shipments which were made by parties other than those for whom defendant is liable or who had been duly authorized by defendant to make said shipments. Limson also set a counterclaim for the refund of the rebate to which he was entitled to pursuant to an agreement and for cost of foodstuffs sold or delivered to Compania in the total amount of P411,477.45. Compania moved that the CFI appoint an accountant to examine the accounts involved in the case before the court proceeds. This was granted (Anselmo Del Rosario was the CPA assigned)

3 bills signed by representative of Limson totalling Pl,148.10 91 bills signed by a certain "Perry" with Limson, as shipper and consignee totalling P61,981.00 149 bills signed by said "Perry" for others as shippers and consignee totalling P46,869.60 16 bills signed by others totalling P5,180.70 662 bills unsigned totalling P260,170.23 333 bills missing totalling P102,982.46. However, according to Del Rosario, Limson can be held liable only for the 267 bills signed by him and the 3 bills signed by his representative in the total amount of P68,209.79. Note that Del Rosario examined the bills and classified and regrouped them into: [1] Original bills of lading duly signed by Limson or his agent - P68,209.76 [2] Original bills of lading without the signature of Limson [3] No original bills of lading 310,317.21 166,867.28

CFI: Agreed with Del Rosario BUT added that Limson was liable for the bills of lading without originals involving a total of P166,867.26 AND NOT liable on the bills of lading which had not been signed by him or his authorized representative. It also sustained Limsons claim that Perry was not his authorized representative. Sentence: Compania must pay Limson the sum of P441,339.01, (computation found on page 412. Im not including it here cos hahaba, sayang sa paper. Basically there was offsetting) Both parties appealed to the SC ISSUES: Limson: WON he was liable for P166,867.28 representing the amount for the bills of lading without originals. YES Compania: WON the decision of the CFI was fully supported by the documentary evidence presented in trial. YES BUT NOTE THAT the SC said CFI erred in not including the bills of lading signed by Perry and Limson as shipper/consignee and bills of lading signed by "Perry" where persons other than defendant-appellant as shipper and the bills of lading unsigned by Limson as part of Limsons liability. Compania A. 91 controverted bills of lading signed by "Perry" with Limson as shipper or consignee in the total amount of P61,981.50 witness Cabling testified that the signatures are those of Cipriano Magtibay alias "Perry" who took delivery of the cargoes after signing the delivery receipts. He testified that they were signed in his presence. witness Nolasco Cruz Ilagan, delivery order clerk of Compania testified that as a clerk, he prepared the delivery orders for these cargoes to be delivered to Limson or his authorized representatives. He mentioned that names of some of his reps: For hogs, the authorized representative is Cipriano Magtibay or Perry; and for cattles, carabaos and cows, is Eye, Mario, Mr. Marcelino Tinoco and others whom he couldnt remember the names. o When these representatives take delivery of the shipments, he lets them sign the delivery orders. In case where there is no original bill of lading, delivery order is effected also only when authorized by Mr. Cabling, based on the manifests. The boat gives us the manifest as soon as it arrivesEven though the name of the shipper is not Mr.

Content of Del Rosarios report: Limsons claim against Compania For purchases of foodstuffs - P433,237.75 Freight adjustments 8,170.45 Cash payments made by Limson - P235,007.85 P676,416.05 Companias claim against Limson: total P545,394.24 based on 1,521 bills of lading examined 267 were signed by Limson totalling P67,061.66
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paula

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Limson or the consignee is not Mr. Limson, he prepared delivery orders by authorization of Mr. Cabling. The authorized representative to receive for hogs was Mr. Cipriano Magtibay alias "Perry". He signs the delivery orders by the name of "Perry". The delivery orders were signed by Perry in his presence. B.16 controverted bills of lading signed by persons other than "Perry" with freight charges totalling P5,180.70, Ilagan testified that the representatives who signed the delivery receipts and took delivery of the cargoes were Limson's agents. They signed the delivery receipts in his presence. C. 662 unsigned bills of lading with freight charges totalling P260,170.23, delivery receipts were issued upon delivery of the shipments Both Cabling and Ilagan testified that the ordinary procedure at plaintiff's terminal office was to require the surrender of the original bill of lading, but when the bill of lading cannot be surrendered because it had not arrived or received by the consignee or assignee, the delivery of the cargo was authorized just the same, and the delivery receipt was prepared based on the ship's cargo manifests or ship's copy of the bill of lading. This accommodation was specially given to Limson, because he was a regular shipper and ship chandler of Compania, and a compadre of Cabling. D. 149 controverted bills of lading in the name of other persons as shippers or consignees and signed by Perry in the total amount of P46,869.60 it was established that said bills of lading were for cattle and hogs purchased by the Limson from his "viajeros" in Manila which were delivered to and received by him and for which he had to pay the freight charges, where in turn, he deducted from the purchase price the corresponding cost of freigh. Limson admitted to these facts on direct and cross. Cabling also confirmed this. Pagkalinawan, another witness of Compania, corroborated them. He said that in all occasions that he withdrew the cows and carabaos for which he signed the delivery receipts, there were corresponding original bills of lading or copies of the bills of lading which were made even if the original bills could not be produced. Limson signed these bills of lading. Those that Limson was unable to sign, Pagkalinawan was the one who signed them after he calls him up by telephone and he is turned over to Cabling. E. Exhibits "B-276" to "1018" in the total amount of P81,462.92 These were bills of lading not in the name of Limson but which Limson himself signed, thereby proving that he took delivery of shipments in the names of others, shipper or consignee, and which the corresponding charges were debited to his account.

Limson There is merit in CFIs finding that Limson was liable for P166,867.28 representing the amount for the bills of lading without original because the same actually represented freight charges based on the carbon originals of the ship's copy of the bills of lading where Limson appeared as consignee in the amount of P84,529.42 and those based on the ship's cargo manifests, where Limson appeared as consignee in the amount of P81,874.10. The CFI admitted in evidence said copies of the bills of lading which were not considered by the Commissioner because they are not actually the original copy of the bill of lading. The Commissioner accepted only the originals of the bills of lading because he did not consider even duplicate originals duly signed as originals. The ship's copies of the bills of lading and the cargo manifests were substantiated by other supporting documents which were found after the report of the Commissioner from among the records salvaged from the San Nicolas bodega fire or which were found among the records kept on Compania's terminal office. Said documents were presented in lieu of corresponding original of the consignee's copy of bill of lading which could not be submitted to the Commissioner nor presented as Compania's evidence to the Court because they were lost or destroyed during the remodelling of plaintiff's office building or during the fire at Compania's bodega at San Nicolas where they were brought for safekeeping. Apparently, the Commissioner rejected Compania's claims which were not actually supported by the original of the bills of lading notwithstanding the fact that duplicate original of the said documents and other secondary evidence such as the ship cargo manifests, have been presented as evidence. Cabling and Ilagan testified that the practice was that when the originals of the bills of lading could not be surrendered because they have not yet been received by the consignee, the delivery of the cargo was, nevertheless, authorized and a delivery receipt was prepared on the basis of the ship's cargo manifests or the ship's copy of the bills of lading. This shows that the ship's cargo manifests or the ship's copy of the bills of lading can be accepted as evidence of shipments made by Limson since he was allowed to accept delivery of said shipments even without presenting his copy of the bill of lading. Judgment Modified Fiscal of Pampanga v Retes and Gueverra (Villamor, 1931)10 Petitioner: Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga Respondents: Hermogenes Reyes, CFI Judge and Adnres Gueverra FACTS Petitioner Fiscal filed two informations for libel against private respondent Gueverra allegedly for publishing in the weekly paper ING MAGUMASID an article written in Pampango dialect impeaching the honesty, integrity and reputation of Dayrit (information 1) and Nepomuceno (information 2).

F. What Limson was entitled to in the offsetting scheme: freight overcharges - P111,291.18 cash payment made by Limson of P235,007.85, freight adjustment of Pl,138.45 The informations did not include a copy of the libelous article but only a translation of cost of foodstuffs purchased by Compania from Limson of P411,982. which into Spanish. TOTAL: P759,419.83. During the trial, the fiscal attempted to present as evidence exhibits which are copies of the Deducting from said amount, the total of freight charges in favor of Compania, as per the statement of account attached as Annex "A" to the complaint of P698,159.14 10 would give a balance of P61,260.69 in favor of Limson. Grace Lazaro 2012 DIGEST GROUP | EVIDENCE LOPEZ Page 11 of 18

ING MAGUMASID contacting the libelous article, another article in the vernacular published and its translation into Spanish. Guevarras counsel objected to this evidence which was sustained by the trail court on the ground that the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, hence it cannot now be presented as evidence without amending the information. Fiscal asked that information be amended but was denied. Hence, he filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court. ISSUE/HELD (1) WON an information charging a libel published in an unofficial language, without including the copy of the libelous article, but only a translation into Spanish valid YES. (2) WON the exhibits are admissible YES. RATIO (1) General Rule: Complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words AS PUBLISHED and a statement of their susbstance and effect is insufficient. Exception: When defamation has been published in a foreign tongue, it is proper to set out (1) the communication as it was originally made and (2) with an exact translation into English. In some jurisdiction it is enough to allege the foreign publication with an English translation attached. Here, since the article was written in Pampango dialect it is sufficient to insert the Spanish translation. (2) The general rules on admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel and slander. The evidence must be relevant not hearsay. Hence, the rule of procedure requires the best evidence. The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of the article published in it. Hence, the exhibits should be admitted. Writ granted. PEOPLE V HON. TAN 11 | Labrador, J. (1959) FACTS Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others were charged with the crime of falsification of the public documents by making it appear that relief supplies were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to calamity victims when no distributions of such relief had ever been made. The prosecution presented to a witness (a salesman) a booklet of receipts, which was marked Exh. "D", containing value invoices of the Metro Drug Corporation (MDC) Cebu City. This contained the triplicate copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to the Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. The witness explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used

between the three sheets, the original, the duplicate and triplicate so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out by the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals. Also presented was an accountant of the Metro Drug Corporation in Manila declared that sales in the provinces were reported to the Manila office of the MDC, and that the originals of the sales invoices are transmitted to the main office in support of cash journal sheets, but that the original practice of keeping the original white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers, while only the duplicate or pink copies are submitted to the central office in Manila. Hon. Tan held that the triplicates are not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced.

ISSUE/HELD WoN the invoices are to be regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as such, even without accounting for the non-production of the originals. YES RATIO When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others." Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of the admissibility of duplicate originals, as follows: SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper and writing on the exposed surface at the same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other. C (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. I, p. 661). SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 168.) DISPOSITIVE Ruling of the court to the effect that the triplicates formed by the used of carbon papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be reversed. The court below is hereby ordered to proceed in the trial of the case in accordance with this ruling. Maria Mahilum et. al. v CA (Makalintal, 1966)12 Petitioner: Maria Mahilum, Salvador Mahilum, Angel Mahilum, Emelio Ogdiman, Victorio Salazar and Tomas Salazar Respondents: CA and Gorgonia Flora de Sotes RATIO DECIDENDI (for evidence): A duplicate original, i.e., a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as the original, may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other copies. FACTS

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Krystel Bautista

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Ixara Maroto

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Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, with an area of 150,333 square meters. Upon Pedros death in 1934, he was succeeded by his six children, namely, Tomas, Juan, Clemente, Antonia, Juliana and Tomasa. On May 13, 1935, the Mahilum kids executed a "deed of definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia Flora, where they ceded and conveyed the inherited lot to Flora in consideration of P2,000.00. They acknowledged the receipt of payment in the same document. The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D. Destua. Flora had also began paying the taxes on the lot beginning 1936. She filed an action for partition and damages against the Mahilum kids. The Mahilums, however, claimed that they never sold any portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 2195 of the San Carlos Cadastre. According to them, Original Certificate of Title of the lot is free from any encumbrance. They further claimed that if Flora had been in possession of a portion of said lot, it was a mere toleration on their part, but not an acknowledgment of her right if ownership over the property. At the time of the trial, only Tomasa and Juan were still alive. Tomasa testified that neither she nor her brothers and sisters appeared before notary public Nicolas Destua on May 18, 1935, much less thumbmarked and/or signed the deed of sale. Juan, on the other hand, alleged that they had earlier filed an "Annulment of Contract of Definite Sale" in 1955 which stated that Flora has taken advantage of their illiteracy to have them sign a document which supposedly was an acknowledgment of their fathers debt, but was in reality a deed of sale. They also presented the unencumbered certificate of title of the land. Flora on the other hand presented as evidence notarized document, the notary public that notarized the document, who said during trial that The thumbmarks in the deed are the genuine thumbmarks of Tomas, Antonia, Juan, Juliana and Tomasa and this signature is the signature of Clemente Mahilum The CFI and CA ruled in favor of Flora. The Mahilums appeal these decisions to the SC, claiming that the deed of sale is inadmissible because: it lacks the proper documentary stamps, and is a mere carbon copy it was not signed by two disinterested witnesses and that the court should have had placed greater probative value on the certificate of title as conclusive evidence of ownership. ISSUE/HELD WON the deed of sale is admissible? YES WON the deed of sale has greater probative value than the evidence presented by the Mahilums? Yes

RATIO As regards the contention that the deed lacks the proper documentary stamps, and is a mere carbon copy: The stamps referred to by the Mahilums (and required by Section 238 of the Internal Revenue Code so that a public document may be admitted as evidence) are supposed to be, and as a matter of practice actually are, affixed to the original or first copy of the document and not to any of the duplicates or carbon copies thereof. The deed presented as evidence was a photocopy. There is no evidence whatsoever that such practice was not observed in regard to the deed of sale involved in this case, and consequently the presumptions that official duty has been regularly performed, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that the regular course of business has been followed, must be applied (Sec. 69[q], Rule 123; now Sec. 5, Rule 131). The burden is upon those who seek to destroy this presumption to do so by convincing proof. With respect to the contention that Exhibit D should not have been admitted as evidence because it is only a copy and the non-production of the original has not been explained, it should be pointed out that said exhibit is itself a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as the original. This is what is known as duplicate original, and it may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the other copies. As regards the two witnesses requirement: The requirement of two witnesses to the execution of an instrument, as provided for in Section 127 of Act 496, was complied with in Exhibit D. The notary public himself, Nicolas D. Destua, signed the instrument as such witness, together with his wife, and there is nothing in the law which prohibits a notary public from acting in that capacity. As regards the OCT as conclusive evidence of ownership While Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024 is conclusive evidence of ownership, this is only as regards the deceased Pedro Mahilum, who was succeeded by his children and heirs upon his death in 1934. These are the persons who sold the land in question to herein respondent in 1935. The fact that the deed of sale has not been registered since then does not destroy its efficacy insofar as they and their own privies are concerned. They delivered possession to said respondent, as found by the Court of Appeals; and no superior rights of third persons have intervened. DISPOSITIVE Petition DENIED, CA decision AFFIRMED. Lazatin vs Campos13 | Teehankee, J. (1979) FACTS Dr. Lazatin died intestate. He was survived by his wife Margarita de Asis and adopted twin daughters, Nora and Irma. Few months after, widow Margarita also died, leaving a holographic will w/c provides for a legacy of cash, jewelry and stocks to her granddaughter Arlene, legacy of support to Rodolfo, son of her late sister and legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (son of petitioner Renato Lazatin aka Renato Sta. Clara). Margarita kept a safety deposit box (SDB) at a bank, w/c either she or Nora could open. Nora opened SDB and removed its contents 1) shares of stocks; 2) her and

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iani lauron

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her twins adoption papers; 3) jewelry. Noras sole reason for opening box was to get her certificates and other small items. Private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita. Petitioners son Ramon filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. Ramon prayed to open SDB, Nora said there was no will there. Petitioner intervened in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Ramon filed petition to examine respondents on the contents of SDB. Probate Court: ordered Nora to deliver properties taken from SDB Nora deposited not the items, but two keys to new SDB. Petitioner filed motion to intervene this time as an adopted child, based on an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of deceased Dr Mariano, that petitioner was an adopted child.

DISPOSITIVE Petition dismissed. Ong Ching Po vs. CA14 (Quiason, J.; December 20, 1994) RATIO DECIDENDI Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence (execution, loss, contents) of the document. Who may authenticate or testify to the due execution of a document? 1. Person/s who executed it; 2. Person before whom its execution was acknowledged (notary); 3. Any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures (witness); 4. Person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. FACTS On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to Soledad Parian (Filipino), the wife of Ong Yee. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. According to Soledad, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to Ong Ching Po, her husbands brother, when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it, but Ong Ching Po refused to vacate. Hence, she filed a case for unlawful detainer but it was dismissed by the MeTC, RTC and the CA. Petitioner Ong Ching Po, however, claimed ownership over the same parcel of land alleging that he bought it from Ong Joi Jong on July 23, 1946, and presented a photocopy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. At the time of this sale, Ong Ching Po was not yet a Filipino so Ong Joi Jong acceded to sign another document in favor of Soledad Parian. On December 6, 1983, Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his two (2) sons, and later filed an action for reconveyance and damages against Soledad. Soledad late filed an action for quieting title against the Ongs. The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of Soledad, hence, this petition. ISSUE/HELD Whether the Deed of Sale is a deed of conveyance to Soledad or it was only executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer Ong was an alien (therefore, could not own land) and that Soledad is merely holing the title thereto in trust for Ong? VALID DEED OF SALE TO SOLEDAD RATIO Credence is given to Soledads deed of sale as it was a notarized document, whereas Ongs
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Micha Arias

Petitioner attempted to prove: he had recognized deceased spouses as his parents, been supported by them, formerly known as Renato Lazatin, but changed it to Sta. Clara (deceased refused to consent to his marriage), transferred from house of Margaritas dad to Mercy Hospital (owned by spouses). Photographs were also intended to be presented (eg Margarita w/ Petitioner when he was a boy, document showing his real name is Lazatin). Respondent Court: barred intro of evidence. Dont prove existence of any judicial proceeding where adoption was taken up by court. Evidence tends to prove of a recognized natural child ISSUE/HELD RATIO Adoption is a juridical act. Only an adoption made through court is valid in this jurisdiction. To establish this, requirements should be strictly carried out, otherwise its absolute nullity. Fact of adoption is never presumed, but should be affirmatively proved. Destruction by fire of a public bldg in w/c papers wouldve been filed doesnt give rise to presumption of adoption nor destruction of records is to be presumed. Petitioners evidence doesnt prove judicial adoption. Dont show that at one time a specific court rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses. No juridical records are presented. No witness cited to that proceeding. Petitioners counsel secured a certification (among salvaged records there has not been foundany record regarding the adoption of Renato). This doesnt furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption. No proof that petitioner was really adopted. He couldve secured a copy of newspaper publication. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. Prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof: existence, loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. Sufficiency of the proof lies w/in judicial discretion of the TC. Petitioner failed to establish former existence of adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption paper really existed. This is indispensable.

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was a mere photocopy and not properly authenticated. Ong failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of his deed of sale. The court rejected the testimony of Ongs wife that she was present when the deed of sale was executed for two reasons: 1. Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate, and 2. She was married to Ong only on Sept. 1946 in Baguio City where she resided, or after the execution of the document. Ongs Contention: Deed of Sale to Soledad was only simulated. Response: Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen, and under our Constitution, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Ongs Deed of Sale was established, the same is null and void for being contrary to law. Ongs Contention: Soledad paid no consideration Response: Soledad admitted that she did not pay any consideration as it was her husband who paid for it, financed out of their conjugal funds. Ongs Contention: Soledad never took possession of the property Response: Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if form the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. (Art. 1498 CC) Ongs Contention: Soledad was merely holding the land in trust for Ong and his successors-in-interest Response: An express trust must be in writing and cannot be proved by oral testimony. There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by Ong as trustor and Soledad as trustee. Ongs Deed of Sale does not refer to Soledad, the registered owner of the property, as a party thereto. No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence. (Art. 1443 CC) While an implied trust may be proved orally (Art. 1457 CC), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated. In fact, Ongs wife testified in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam Sing Corp. and was engaged in business, hence is in a financial position to acquire the land and introduce improvements thereto. Ongs Contention: All the tax receipts, tax declarations, rental receipts, deed of sale, and TCT were n Ongs possession Response: Even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment or employment. Also, all these were in the name of Soledad and/or her husband. DISPOSITIVE Petition dismissed. In favor of Soledad. Michael & Co., Inc. v Adriano Enriquez (Morland, 1915)15 Plaintiff an Appellant: E. Michael & Co., Inc. Defendant and Appelle: Adriano Endriquez

FACTS Adriano Enriquez sold a land to E. Michael and E. Michael & Co. with a right to repurchase. The buyers successor, E. Michael, alleged that the time of repurchase having expired, it is now the absolute owner of the property sold. To prove its succession, E. Michael tried to prove the following: (1) Execution and delivery of the instrument transferring the land to its favor (2) The lost of the said instrument The trial court however prevented him from proving those facts and later dismissed the case for failure to prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ISSUE/HELD WON the trail court erred in dismissing the case YES. RATIO Sec 321 of the Code provides that the writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or destroyed, in which case, before its contents may be proved by evidence, it must be shown by the person offering the secondary evidence (1) that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary and (2) that it has been lost or destroyed After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed, read or heard the same. In this case, objections were sustained by trial court since the counsel, in an attempt to identify the document, described or characterized it as an instrument of transfer or cession. The fact of characterization was not sufficient however to cut the counsel off altogether from proving the execution and delivery of the document. The trial court should not be so strict as to the mere form of a question as will result to injustice when the evidence which is intended to be brought out by the question, and which in all probability will be brought out by it is competent and material to the protection of a partys rights. Judgment reversed. New trial ordered. PEOPLE V LAVA 16 | Zaldivar, J. (1969) FACTS The appellants in the five criminal cases were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and arsons. Allegedly, they were members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and as members of the organization, committed acts that were geared towards the overthrowing of the Philippine Government to establish a Communist State. Included in the acts were the killings of soldiers, raiding of towns and stealing from civilians. After joint trial, some were acquitted while some were found guilty. Of the 31 defendants, only 18 appealed the decision of the TC. Upon petition by the Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the AFP, the SC appointed the MIS the custodian of the exhibits and documents that were presented as
16
Krystel Bautista. Dear classmates, sobrang haba ng case na to, kaya yung nilagay ko na lang dito sa digest eh yung may kinalaman sa documentary evidence. Kthnxbye

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Grace Lazaro

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evidence in the 5 criminal cases before the TC. This step was taken because those documents and exhibits were needed also as evidence in other courts in the prosecution of other members of the HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan). Later, the SC appointed the Staff Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) the custodian of the same documents and exhibits. Those documents and exhibits were kept at the headquarters of the PC at Camp Crame, Quezon City. On Sept 10, 1958 the headquarters of the PC was destroyed by fire, and all the documents and exhibits were burned. Upon a petition for the reconstitution of the said documents and exhibits, the SC appointed Deputy Clerk of Court Ejercito as Commissioner to receive evidence for the reconstitution of those documents and exhibits. The Commissioner, after due hearing, submitted his report recommending that the documents and exhibits that were burned be declared reconstituted by the photostatic copies of the originals of those documents and exhibits. The Commissioner stated in his report that those photostatic copies were duly identified during the hearings on the reconstitution. Over the objection of counsels for the defendants-appellants, the SC approved the report of the Commissioner. ISSUE/HELD WoN the reconstituted exhibits should not be considered in the appeal NO RATIO The reconstitution of the documents was made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3110, which provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court records. Section 59 of said act provides that destroyed documentary evidence shall be reconstituted by means of secondary evidence which may be presented to any Justice of the Supreme Court or any other officer commissioned by the Court. Section 14 of the act provides that the destroyed or lost documentary evidence shall be replaced by secondary evidence. A photostatic copy of an original document is admissible as a secondary evidence of the contents of the originals and they constitute evidence of a satisfactory nature. The record shows that the photostatic copies of the destroyed exhibits, which were presented before the Commissioner during the reconstitution proceedings, were taken before the originals were destroyed by fire. The photostatic copies had been compared with the originals, properly checked and recorded, by the officer who was the custodian of the exhibits. The certified typewritten copies made from the original documents that were hand written in ink are also secondary evidence of the contents of the latter. Sgt. Tingco, assistant to the document officer in charge of the court of exhibits in the rebellion cases, testified that he was the one who furnished the typists the original documents, and after those originals were copied on the typewriter he compared the typewritten copies with the originals, proofread them, stamped them and had them certified as true copies. This witness further testified that before the certified copies were presented in court as evidence said copies were compared with their originals. The exhibits were properly identified. Captain Reyes of the PC, who was entrusted with the custody of the documents, had the list of all the exhibits that were burned, which were inventoried and verified; as well as a list of those exhibits that were presented in these cases, of which photostatic copies had been taken; and when asked where the photostatic copies were, Capt. Reyes said that he had the photostatic copies, and pointed to a bundle of folders containing them. These exhibits were checked and counter-checked with the record of the present cases in the SC. Sgt. Tingco, who brought the exhibits to the different courts where they were presented as evidence, and who personally supervised the taking of the microfilm and the photostatic copies that were presented in the courts in lieu of the originals, when asked to show to the Commissioner the photostats made of the documents which were used the Politburo cases, extracted from a folder a bundle of papers and presented the list of exhibits (Exh. CReconstitution) along with photostatic copies of those listed exhibits, and he testified on

them. The witness was asked to consult the list of exhibits (Exhibit C-Reconstitution) and he pointed to the Commissioner the exhibits to be marked according to the list, which the Commissioner himself marked. The witness testified that the contents of the documents thus marked were the same as those of the originals. The Commissioner considered the documents properly identified and he admitted the documents over the objection of counsel for the appellants, and he recommended to this Court the admission of all of them. The SC approved the report of the Commissioner. DISPOSITIVE Reconstituted exhibits constitute competent evidence to be considered in arriving at a decision in the 5 cases. Compania Maritima v Allied Free Workers Union (Aquino, 1977)17 Petitioner: Compania Maritima Respondents: Allied Free Workers Union , SALVADOR T. LLUCH, MARIANO LL. BADELLES, individually and in their capacities as President and Vice-President, respectively of the Allied Free Workers Union, NICANOR HALEBAS and LAURENTINO LL. BADELLES, individually and officers of Allied Free Workers Union RATIO DECIDENDI (for evidence): The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court). That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like". FACTS On August 11, 1952 the Compaia Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees vessels at Iligan City. The contract was to be effective for one month counted from August 12, 1952. It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper service. The contract could be renewed by agreement of the parties. The union agreed to the stipulation that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the
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Ixara Maroto

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cargoes". The shippers and consignees paid the union for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense. On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract explicitly provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees, as was the alleged practice in Iligan City, and that the shipowner would not be liable for the payment of such services. Thus, the issue of whether the company should pay for the stevedoring service became a sore point of contention between the parties. The union members labored under the impression that they were not being compensated for their stevedoring service as distinguished from arrastre service. Although the arrastre and stevedoring contract was disadvantageous to the union, it did not terminate the contract because its members were in dire need of work. Upon the expiration of the one-month period, the said contract was verbally renewed. The company allowed the union to continue performing arrastre and stevedoring work. On July 23, 1954 the union sent a letter to the company requesting that it be recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit to load and unload the cargo of its vessels at Iligan City. The company ignored that demand. So, the union filed on August 6, 1954 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition praying that it be certified as the sole collective bargaining unit. Despite that certification case, the company on August 24, 1954 served a written notice on the union that, in accordance with payment of the 1952 contract, the same would be terminated on August 31, 1954. Because of that notice, the union on August 26, 1954 filed in the CIR charges of unfair labor practice against the company. On August 31, 1954 the company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. On the following day, September 1, the union members picketed the wharf and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work. The picket lasted for nine days. On September 8, 1954 the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages. This case has gone up and down the Supreme Court several times. The SC has earlier declared that the union was an independent contractor and thus its union members were not employees of the company. The issue now centers on the grant by the trial court of Php450,000 actual damages, moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the company, charged to the union and its officers. These represent unrealized profit because of the 9-day strike and because allegedly the union members worked inefficiently. ISSUE/HELD WON evidence presented by the company (reports by the auditor, testimony by Jose Teves) are inadmissible -- YES RATIO The trial court gave much credence to the auditors report presented by the company in determining the actual damages. The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court). The Supreme Court, however, found it to be inadmissible because this rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that it may be tested on cross-examination. What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like". Other inconsistencies that derogate the credibility of this report are: 1) The trial court did not bother to make a breakdown of the alleged damages, totalling P450,000. The SC tabulated this breakdown, which showed that the alleged damages totaled only to P349,245.37 2) Jayme Siojo, the supposed independent auditor, was not only a friend of Teves but was also his co-employee. Jayme was among the consignees. He was branch manager at Ozamis City and later at Cagayan de Oro City 3) Re: Siojos computation: Accountant Jayme allegedly found from the consignees records at Iligan City that its freight and passenger revenue for the eight- month period from January 1 to August 31, 1953 amounted to P373,333.14 and that for the same period in 1954, that revenue amounted to P470,716.29, or an increase of P97,383.12. Based on this figure, and an alleged boom in business at Illigan City, he imagined that revenue during the first eight months of 1954 could have amounted to at least P600,000. Since the company actually realized P 470,716.29, its loss of freight revenue for that period could be "conservatively" estimated at least P100,000. He used the same reasoning in the other items in his report. According to the SC, It would not be proper to allow Jayme's estimates as recoverable damages. They are not supported by reliable evidence. The pertinent records of the company should have been produced in court. The purser and steward did not testify.

The union contends that the evidence presented by the company to prove entitlement to the The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or inferences. His damages was hearsay and thus inadmissible as evidence. 2012 DIGEST GROUP | EVIDENCE LOPEZ Page 17 of 18

opinion is not evidence. the complaint to show good faith and fair dealing, could have brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading, receipts for the freights, if any, etc.) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries. Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company was not able to collect the stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should have been proforma. in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report. No such exhibits were presented. 4) Siojo testified in place of Salvador Magante, another auditor hired by the company, in presenting the latters report Magante should have been proforma as a witness. Jayme was not competent to take his place since the statement was prepared by Magante, not by Jayme. More appropriate still, the documents and records on which the statement was based should have been proforma as evidence or at least brought to the court for examination by the union's counsel and its accountant. DISPOSITIVE WHEREFORE, that portion of the trial court's judgment declaring the arrastre and stevedoring contract terminated, permanently enjoining the union and its officials from performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the vessels of the Compaia Maritima, and dismissing defendants' counterclaim is affirmed. The lower court's award of damages, is reversed and set aside. No costs.

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