Actions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is ground for dismissal.

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) (b) (c) The legal right of the plaintiff; The correlative obligation of the defendant and The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013 Actions; moot and academic principle. Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and Employment, the Court emphatically stated that: It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. There was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders dated October 31, 2001 and April 10, 2002 since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the very admission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of. Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere surplusage. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom Philippines; G.R. No. 163037. February 6, 2013 Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case

involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review. It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was as issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed. Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013 Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party. The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x. The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various US State Courts. xxx Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts. Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid

prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al.; G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013 Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings in lower court are barred by estoppel. As to the first issue, there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents Motion to Dismiss petitioners Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents petition for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013 Contempt; distinction between criminal and civil contempt. In People v. Godoy, this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared: A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made. Contempt; contempt akin to libel and principle of privileged communication may be invoked in contempt proceeding. In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled: While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of the appellant. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013 Execution; execution pending appeal; not a bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits. First of all, as held in Legaspi v. Ong, *e+xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013 Execution; execution of RTC judgment does not automatically mean that issues on appeal have become moot and academic; Moot and academic principle. Moreover, even assuming that the writ of execution in the instant case were not void, the execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event that would automatically moot the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana, which is pending before the CA. otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment, once a writ of execution is issued and

satisfied. That situation would be absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment of an executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any supervening event, there is still the possibility of the appellate courts reversal of the appealed decision even if already executed and, consequently, of a restitution or a reparation. In any case, the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana cannot, in any way, be characterized as moot and academic. In Osmena III v. Social Security System of the Philippines, we defined a moot and academic case or issue as follows: A case or issue is considered not and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review. Applying the above definition to the instant case, it is obvious that there remains an unresolved justiciable controversy in the appealed case for accion publiciana. In particular, did respondent-spouses Oria really encroach on the land of the petitioner? If they did, does he have the right to recover possession of the property? Furthermore, without preempting the disposition of the case for accion publiciana pending before the CA, we note that if the respondents built structures on the subject land, and if they were builders in good faith they would be entitled to appropriate rights under the Civil Code. This Court merely points out that there are still issues that the CA needs to resolve in the appealed case before it. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013 Execution; effects of void writ of execution; requirement of good reason in execution pending appeal . In any case, proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. To recall, this Court affirmed the Decision of the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTCs Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision because of the RTCs failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict compliance with the requirement for the statement of good reason, because execution pending appeal is the exception rather than the rule. Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been issued without compliance with the rules, it is without any legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all. Consequently, all actions taken pursuant to the void writ of execution must be deemed to have not been taken and to have had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a violation of the right of due process of the judgment debtors respondent-spouses herein. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013 Hierarchy of courts; exceptions. Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourse should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of certain exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the

advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and direct handling of the case. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013 Judgments; immutability of judgments. The issue on the nullity of Maniegos title had already been foreclosed when this Court denied Maniegos petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012. It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by Poblete. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013 Judgments; pro hac vice; nature. Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a motion for new trial after the judgment of conviction had become final and executory. In People v. Licayan, all the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death by the trial court. More than two years after their conviction became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of their co-accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime. Since the OSG also recommended the opening of the case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of newly discovered evidence. It is worth pointing that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term used by courts to refer to rulings rendered for this one particular occasion. A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013 Judgments; void judgment; nature and effect; may be resisted in any action or proceeding. A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is nonexistent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. xxx Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla; G.R. No. 194168. February 13, 2013 Liberal construction of the rules. In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly

prejudiced thereby. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 Motions; notice and hearing requirements; effect of non-compliance; notice requirement in the issuance of preliminary injunction. A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon. xxx The notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined, the prior notice under this requirement is as important as the hearing, as no hearing can meaningfully take place, with both parties present or represented, unless a prior notice of the hearing is given. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013 Motions; motion to dismiss; defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; exceptions. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot change its defense after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already been admitted by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. To rule otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage since he could no longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed, parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during the pre-trial. Licomcen, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Abainza, etc.; G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013 New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites. Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridels extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridels apprehension. Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term newly-discovered. The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013] Parties; duty of party to inform court of counsels death. The Court strikes down the argument that the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because petitioners counsel, who died while the case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is

no extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the partys duty to inform the court of its counsels demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further, the Court stated: x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm. x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel. x x x x In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercise by a party: xxxx Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the places or law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period therefor. O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013 Partition; stages; requisites. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an addition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013] Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; rationale for the rule; exceptions. The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties. Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); questions of fact generally not reviewable; exceptions; difference between question of fact and question of law. We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI involve questions of fact which are generally not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that *t+he petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issued does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; 7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the findings of the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.; G.R. No. 177116. February 27, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances which are not present in this case. Hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the

signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not dutybound to analyze and weigh the evidence again. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact . We stress the settled rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. A question, to be one of law, must not examine the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; otherwise, the question is one of fact. Whether an express trust exists in this case is a question of fact whose resolution is not proper in a petition under Rule 45. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); change of theory on appeal generally not allowed. Second, we find that the petitioner changed the theory of his case. The petitioner argued before the lower courts that an express trust exists between PALII as the trustee and the HEIRS as the trustor-beneficiary. The petitioner now asserts that the express trust exists between PALII as the trustor and UCPB as the trustee, with the HEIRS as the beneficiaries. At this stage of the case, such change of theory is simply not allowed as it violates basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Our rulings are clear a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change *it+ on appeal, otherwise, the lower courts will effectively be deprived of the opportunity to decide on the merits of the case fairly. Besides, courts of justice are devoid of jurisdiction to resolve a question not in issue. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013 Pleadings; amended complaint; nature. Moreover, respondents filing of their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint may not be considered as a circumvention of the rules of procedure. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated as an entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint. Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents would not have been able to file a petition for certiorari before the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently assailed judgment in their favor. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013 Service of Pleadings; petition should be served on counsel of party; effect of service on party represented by counsel of record; exceptions. Lastly, under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a party, when the party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013 Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); reglementary period. First, we find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents position, the 60 -day period within which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republics receipt of the July 5, 2006 order

denying the latters motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013 Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); requisites. The following requisites must concur for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper, namely: (a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Salvacion Villanueva, et al. v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 178347. February 25, 2013

Special Proceedings
Writ of amparo; nature; special proceeding. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. xxx It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mindboggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 Writ of amparo; procedure. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an immediate evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted with the attendant circumstances detailed. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioners right to lie liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim relies are necessary. The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes

aside form identifying the issues in the case, Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any patter or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper ans appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 Writ of Amparo; writ is an interlocutory order. The Decision dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. x x x This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The Decision is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 Writ of Amparo; the Return is the proper responsive pleading; memorandum is a prohibited pleading. First the insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

xxx The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the writ of Amparo. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013 Writ of Amparo; difference between the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes the availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-912-SC, the rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondent that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or threat to the petitioners life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants the privilege of the writ cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

Evidence
Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof; substantial evidence. It is well-entrenched that in an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodrigo v. Mapoy and Don Emmanuel R. Regalario; G.R. No. 197299. February 13, 2013] Civil cases; quantum of proof; preponderance of evidence; evidence of fraud. In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their proponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. The extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. The Court has stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence. Moreover, fraud is not presumed it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadora Ramos v. Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust Co.; G.R. No. 193804. February 27, 2013

JANUARY
Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013 Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not toll fifteenday period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice. In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004, we held that: A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioners counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyers negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA. More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case NO. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous. x x x

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each partys respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraint of technicalities. After a conscientious view, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was not occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioners lawyer in charge of the case, the latter having a valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her fathers sudden demise. There is likewise no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro; G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013 Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be executed if party-pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the guidelines respecting noncompliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows: 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, xxx, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. xxxx 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case. Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013 Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by subsequent submission unless there is substantial compliance or special circumstance. In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly

dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013 Certification against forum shopping and Verification; ratification by the Board of Directors. A closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretarys Certificate submitted by BPI reveals that, at the time the subject complaint was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have the express authority to file and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to BPIs complaint. The SPA, which appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G. Delegencia as BPIs attorneys-in-fact in the case against the petitioners, was executed only on July 8, 2008. Even the Corporate Secretarys Certificate that named the officers authorized by the BPIs Executive Committee to grant and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank was executed only on February 21, 2007. The Executive Committee is part of the banks permanent organization and, in between meetings of BPIs Board of Directors, possesses and exercises all the powers of the board in the management and direction of the banks affairs. BPIs subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramos unauthorized representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners. A corporation can act only through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its board of directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act of ratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficient authority. In PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization (PSTMSDWO) v. PNCC Skyway Corporation, we considered the subsequent execution of a board resolution authorizing the Union President to represent the union in a petition filed against PNCC Skyway Corporation as an act of ratification by the union that cured the defect in the petitions verification and certification against forum shopping. We held that assuming that Mr. Soriano (PSTMSDWOs President) has no authority to file the petition on February 27, 2006, the passing on June 30, 2006 of a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the union is deemed a ratification of his prior execution, on February 27, 2006, of the verification and certificate of nonforum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof. Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013 Certification against forum shopping and Verification; requirements not jurisdictional . In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are not jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against forum shopping us required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of substantial compliance. Sps. Eugene

L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013 Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013 Ejectment; possession de facto; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Juanita Ermitao, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitao v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013 Execution; issuance of writ is trial courts ministerial duty once decision is final; writ of execution must conform to dispositive portion of judgment; order of execution which varies tenor of judgment is void. In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse. It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory. As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty. The writ of execution, however, must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision. Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no further interpretation. It would also be inequitable for the petitioners to pay and for the respondents, who did not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the 12% per annum interest, to receive more than what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution dated December 21, 2009 and the alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void. Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro; G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013 Forcible entry; when proper; when issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and unlawful detainer, is proper:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied] Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements. We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case. Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013 Forum Shopping; definition and nature. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt. Estrellla Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas; G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013 Grave abuse of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari but not in a petition for review on certiorari. It is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA, which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but not in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013 Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Banez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:

The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences, the strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it, the Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an exception to the policy. xxx Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013 Interlocutory and Final orders; distinction. This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows: xxx A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. xxxx Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the court is interlocutory e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable. As above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013 Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to support pendente lite. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support, and conjugal assets. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorneyin-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013

Interlocutory and Final orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not appeal. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013 Judgment; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013 Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in civil cases; voluntary appearance. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the defendants voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latters voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had occasion to state: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013 Litis pendentia; elements. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,

regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013 Motion to dismiss; remedy against denial is not appeal; denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to dismiss, as an interlocutory order, cannot be the subject of an appeal until a final judgment or order is rendered in the main case. An aggrieved party, however, may assail an interlocutory order through a petition for certiorari but only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615. January 30, 2013 Parties; authority of private counsel to represent local officials in suit. The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel, explaining: it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the peoples money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof. In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case, We held that where rigid acceptance to the law on representation of local affairs in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And in Alburra v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. Romeo Gontang, in his official capacity as Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur v. Engr. Cecilia Alayan; G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013 Parties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Under the Rules, parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment case by dropping her as a party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect her conjugal share, but also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by their conflicting actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the collection case, Estrella was foregoing collection of her share in the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does not imply a waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs. While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her amending the complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after these remedies were denied her by the collection court without first questioning or addressing the propriety of these denials. While she may have been frustrated by the collection courts repeated rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition for certiorari or otherwise question the trial courts denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder

of parties are the proper subject of certiorari. Estrella Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); contents; not an absolute rule that will lead to dismissal; liberal construction. The court significantly pointed out in F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc. that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose violation would automatically lead to the petitions dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court may require or allow the filing of the such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, or documents, as it may deem necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate; and *i+f the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. These provisions are in keeping with the overriding standard that procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusively and binding unless any of the following exceptions, obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. However, none of the aforementioned exception applies herein. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. This Court, in numerous instances, has had the occasion to explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasijudicial agencies like the DAR, giving them a certain measure of finality. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, et al. v. Ruben S. Afable, et al., G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. We first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us to delve into factual issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. This rule is read with the equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when, as here, conflict attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one

hand, and of the CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which we deem important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191. January 30, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; applicable to expropriation cases. This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition may only raise questions of law. This rule applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts. Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court may, after hearing, accept the commissioners report and render judgment in accordance therewith. This is what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial courts pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CAs identical findings of fact concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest respect, and are binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their findings. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro Bautista and Valentina Malabanan, G.R. No. 181218. January 28, 2013 Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); review errors of judgment; orders granting execution are interlocutory and should be subject of petition for certiorari under Rule 65; exceptions. The petition filed in this case is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitions filed under this rule bring up for review errors of judgment. It is an ordinary appeal and the petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed. The present petition, however, assails the RTC Order of execution dated December 21, 2009 and alias writ of execution dated May 27, 2010. It is a settled rule that orders granting execution are interlocutory orders; hence the petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This is categorically provided in Rule 41, viz: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be applicable. No appeal may be taken from: xxxx (f) An order of execution; xxxx In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment. Thus, in Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. V. Court of Appeals the Court acknowledged that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. Other exceptions include: (1) There has been a change in the

situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (2) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (3) It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (4) The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (5) It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority. In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved party. Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and vice versa. In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro, G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013 Pleadings; relief. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Tecson, this Court expounded that: Due process considerations justify this requirement, it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice, which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of the complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. xxx The raison detre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendants right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of the Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies the sporting idea of fair play and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-infact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013 Preliminary injunction; abuse of discretion if writ issued despite absence of clear legal right. The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion if the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013

Preliminary injunction; injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum absque injuria. In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the grave and irremediable financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156s enforcement, finding such prejudice inequitable. No doubt, by importing used vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for an injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of Customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013 Preliminary injunction; requirement of actual and existing right. Petitioners argument fails to impress. The CA did not nullify the October 15, 2004 Order merely because of the interchanged pages. Instead, the CA determined that the applicant, Vitaliano, was not able to show that he had an actual and existing right that had to be protected by a preliminary injunction. The most that Vitaliano was able to prove was a future right based on his victory in the suit. Contrasting this future right of Vitaliano with respondents existing right under the GIS, the CA determined that the trial court should not have disturbed the status quo. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013 Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicants clear legal right being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant. Clear legal right, within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013 Preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction: Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists un restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing legal right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013 Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer question the respondents entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Courts determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through the present recourse. Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to the ruling in the former. City of Cebu v. Apolonio M. Dedamo, Jr.; G.R. No. 172852. January 30, 2013 Res judicata; elements. In Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de Hipolito, we enumerated the following as the elements of res judicata: a) The former judgment or order must be final; b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties. In the case at bar, the validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was the primary issue raised by the parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full-blown trial. On September 10, 2004, the issue was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court. Inevitably, res judicata operates to bar PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no end to litigation. Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013

Res judicata; effect of minute resolutions. In Alonso, we declared that a minute resolution may amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent. However, we continued to state that it can not bind nonparties to the action. Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties therein, and calls for res judicatas application. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama is instructive anent the effects of the issuance of a minute resolution, viz: It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. x x x With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. x x x (Underlining ours) It is therefore clear from the above that for purposes of the application of res judicata, minute resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions, hence, binding upon the parties to the action Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013 Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of jurisdiction, acts without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari. In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; an extraordinary remedy; judicial and quasi-judicial functions. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality. As provided in Section 1, Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature. The Central Bank Monetary Board (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. & Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, Represented by its Chairman, Governor Armando M. Tetangco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 192986. January 15, 2013 Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof For a special civil action of certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board or officer, must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013 Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The sole office of the writ of certiorari, according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company: xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave which means either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013

Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64; proper mode of review of COMELEC en banc Resolutions not relating to pre-proclamation controversies. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said Resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and the proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy. Kamarudin K. Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections and Rolan G. Buagas, G.R. No.192289. January 8, 2013 Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013 Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available. Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court. The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justices assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013 Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties. A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed

manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013 Unlawful detainer; nature. Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession. Juanita Ermitao, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitao v. Lailanie M. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013 Unlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as grounds. We find that the RTCs ruling upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the building premises was proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima; and second, the Contract of lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013 Unlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorneys fees. As to the award of monthly compensation, we find that Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since the former continued to occupy the leased premises even after the expiration of the lease contract. Finally we uphold the award of attorneys fees in the amount of P30, 000 and judicial costs in the light of Hertz unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises, thus forcing Optima to file the instant case in order to protect its rights and interest. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013 Special Proceedings Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v. Garcia, Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he set up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the estate of Garcias predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86). The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v OBrien, it explained that the term implied contracts, as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept implied contracts as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen.

This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 Settlement of Estate; specific rules on settlement prevail over general rules. We read with approval the CAs use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 Other Proceedings Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4 of E.O. No. 1008, in order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, two requisites must concur: first, the dispute must somehow be related to a construction contract; and second, the parties must have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings. The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013 Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a construction contract. In William Golangco Construction Corporation v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, we declared that monetary claims under a construction contract are disputes arising from differences in interpretation of the contract because the matter of ascertaining the duties and obligations of the parties under their contract all involve interpretation of the provisions of the contract. Following our reasoning in that case, we find that the issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the performance bond issued by petitioner is a dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of *the CCA+ by reason of difference in the interpretation of the contract documents. The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013 Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful reading of the Performance Bond reveals that the bond is coterminous with the final acceptance of the project. Thus, the fact that it was issued prior to the execution of the Construction Contract Agreement does not affect its validity or effectivity. In fact, in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc., we rejected the argument that the jurisdiction of CIAC is limited to the construction industry, and thus cannot be extended to surety contracts. In that case, we declared that although not the construction contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main construction contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it. The Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013 Election Cases; review extends only to final decisions or resolutions of COMELEC en banc and not to interlocutory orders issued by a division. The petitioners resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail and interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. A party aggrieved by an

interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. xxx Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Governor Sadikul A. Sahali and Vice-Governor Ruby M. Sahali v. Commission on Elections (First Division), Rashidin H. Matba and Jilkasi J. Usman, G.R. No. 201796. January 15, 2013 Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act; prospective application of the law. Sec. 146 of the FRIA, which makes it applicable to all further proceedings in insolvency, suspension of payments and rehabilitation cases xxx except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, still presupposes a prospective application. The wording of the law clearly shows that it is applicable to all further proceedings. In no way could it be made retrospectively applicable to the Stay Order issued by the rehabilitation court back in 2002. Situs Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., G.R. No. 180036. January 16, 2013 HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgage; ruling of HLURB affects only the lot subject of the buyers complaint. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB. In Far East Bank, we held that: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. Hence, the mortgage over the lot is null and void insofar as private respondent is concerned. The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the President is proper only insofar as it refers to the lot of respondent. In short, the mortgage contract is void as against him. Since there is no law stating the specifics of what should be done under the circumstances, that which is in accord with equity should be ordered. The remedy granted by the HLURB in the first and the second paragraphs of the dispositive portion of its Decision insofar as it referred to respondents lot is in accord with equity. The HLURB, however, went overboard in its disposition in paragraphs 3 and 4, which pertained not only to the lot but to the entire parcel of land mortgaged. Such ruling was improper. The subject of this litigation is limited only to the lot that respondent is buying, not to the entire parcel of land. He has no personality or standing to bring suit on the whole property, as he has actionable interest over the subject lot only. (Citations omitted and underlining ours) In Far East Bank, we sustained the HLURB when it declared the mortgage entered into between the subdivision developer and the bank as unenforceable against the lot buyer. However, we were categorical

that the HLURB acted beyond bounds when it nullified the mortgage covering the entire parcel of land, of which the lot subject of the buyers complaint is merely a part. In the case now before us, while it is within Lims right to file a complaint before the HLURB to protect her right as a condominium unit buyer, she has no standing to seek for the complete nullification of the subject mortgage. She has an actionable interest only over Unit 48C of Cluster Dominiko of Vista de Loro, no more and no less. Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013 HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of PD No. 957 limits the HLURBs jurisdiction to three kinds of cases: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. While paragraphs (b) and (c) limit the HLURB cases to those between the buyer and the subdivision or condominium owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman, (a) is broad enough to include third parties to the sales contract. Jurisprudence consistently recognizes the rationale behind the enactment of PD No. 957 to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming developers. For this reason, the Court has broadly construed the jurisdiction of the HLURB to include complaints for annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Indeed, in Manila Banking Corporation v. Spouses Rabina, even if the mortgagee bank was under receivership/liquidation, the Court declared that the HLURB retains jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of the mortgage: The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio Gonzales, Bormacheco, Inc., Nazario Santos, Teresita Chua Tek, Charito Ong Lee, and Ernesto Sibal, G.R. No. 155113. January 9, 2013 Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; and (b) the nature of the question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria are satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over it. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013 Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section 145 of the Corporation Code protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate actors against other corporate actors. The statutory provision assures an aggrieved party that the corporations dissolution will not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies against the corporation, its stockholders, directors and officers. It also states that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its stockholders, directors or officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actors cause of action and remedy against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also preserves the nature of the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.

The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However, despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the subsequent dissolution of the corporation. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013 Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013 Evidence Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows: Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: xxxx (b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. Juanita Ermitao, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitao vs. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013 Evidence; disputable presumptions; presumption of regularity. The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being the officer having jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more familiar with the property in issue. Besides, this

certification carried the presumption of regularity in its issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed to present any evidence to rebut that presumption. Heirs of Luis A. Luna, et al. v. Ruben S. Afable, et al.; G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Alibi and Denial; alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial. In this case, Romeo positively identified the appellants, whom he both knew since he was a child, thereby rendering the defenses of alibi and denial weak. Certainly, it was not physically impossible for appellant Abundio to be at the hilly portion of Sitio Liki where Pablo was attacked, the same being only a kilometer away from his own house and two (2) kilometers away from the farm where he and his father allegedly were on that fateful day. Appellant Benjamins bare denial, on the other hand, is definitely self-serving. It cannot stand against the positive identification of an unbiased and credible witness. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013. Evidence; credibility of witnesses best evaluated by the trial court. XYZ positively identified the appellant as the person who embraced AAA and spread her legs; who held AAAs breast; and who placed his hand inside the latters underwear sometime in 2002. XYZs testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her daughter XXX who declared that the appellant would embrace AAA and touch her vagina whenever the appellant came home from work. The lower courts found XYZs and XXXs testimonies credible and convincing. In convicting the accused, the Supreme Court emphasized the well-settled doctrine that the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. People of the Philippines v. Patricio Rayon Sr., G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013. Evidence; denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses. In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of the victim, AAA, her positive identification of appellant as her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her part to falsely testify against appellant, the latters defense of denial and alibi must necessarily fail. Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused, as in this case. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot prevail over witnesses positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti, which the appellant in this case failed to do. Here, the houses of the offended party and the appellant are only divided by a fence and the place of the incident is only at the back of the house of the appellant. As such, despite the appellants allegation that he was having a drinking spree and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m of that date, still, given its apparent proximity, there is no impossibility for him to be physically present at the scene of the incident. People of the Philippines v. Rey Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.

Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death. People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013. Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. Here, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the statement of the victim, Florendo, made to his brother, Renato, has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013. Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the statute need not be used. Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000; thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being by and large mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. People of the Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013. Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the statute need not be used. In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the allegations therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Section 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the victims father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation. Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, are sufficiently alleged in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years old on the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAAs father. Amistoso cannot claim that he had been deprived of due process in any way. He adequately understood from the Information that he was being charged with the rape

of his own daughter AAA to which he proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally refuting the fact of AAAs rape regardless of how it was purportedly committed. People of the Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013. Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari distinguished from Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari. The petitioner committed a serious procedural faux pas by filing before the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for review under Rule 45, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. The period to file a petition for review on certiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Here, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs May 5, 2010 Resolution, which denied his second motion for reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he only had until June 4, 2010 to file a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. This he failed to do. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable. Thus, the petitioners failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the reglementary period rendered the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final and executory. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013. Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari no substitute for a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari. It is at once evident that the instant certiorari action is merely being used by the petitioner to make up for his failure to promptly interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution. However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure petitioners failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013. Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause findings of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals (CA) should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for certiorari filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts. The Supreme Court, invoking its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, held that, settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether prosecutors findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816. January 9, 2013. Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause findings of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. While the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the Department of Justice (DOJ), this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising their powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals (CA) may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court. Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate courts exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justices appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge of his functions. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816. January 9, 2013. Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable cause is an essentially executive function. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. The strict validity and merits of a partys accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and pieces of evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended partys complaint. The prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the Secretary of Justice (Secretary) who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors determination. As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or when he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law. Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013. Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable cause is an essentially executive function. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Justice (Secretary) acted with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva with homicide. The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis--vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries and death (as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and which Villanueva proposed by way of defense) is more credible and more likely than the narrations of Edna in her complaintaffidavit, in the affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best be left for the trial court to determine after a full-blown trial on the merits. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013. Searches and Seizures; conduct of house searches; presence of owner of house during search not indispensable where witnesses present. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioners house. There were variations in the witnesses testimonies as to whether petitioner was inside the house during the search. One witness testified that petitioner was coming in and out of the house during the search while the other witnesses claimed that petitioner was waiting just outside the house. Assuming that petitioner was indeed outside the house, it does not taint the regularity of the search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two witnesses are present. The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. As found

by the trial court, accused-appellant and his wife were not prevented from entering their house to observe the search conducted therein. This is bolstered by the testimonies of police officers. Thus, PO3 Villano testified on cross-examination that the wife of the accused was inside, watching. Likewise. P/C Insp. Perfecto de Lima Jr. testified that the accused-appellant and his wife went in and out of their house while the team was conducting a search inside said house; that Valleno and his wife stood outside and sometimes, came in while the search was being conducted; and that before the search the Valleno spouses were requested not to go inside the house, but during the search they kept going in and out of said house. In addition, the search was conducted in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in the persons of Brgy. Kgd. Reynaldo Brito and Chief Tanod Wilfredo Brito. Resultantly, the seized items cannot therefore, be considered as fruits of the poisonous tree. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013. Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of functions; minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. The Supreme Court (SC) noted the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly that of barangay tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place where one of the plastic sachets was found and to the person who brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory, respectively. The SC however brushed aside these inconsistencies as inconsequential. Indeed, one can hardly expect their testimonies to be in perfect agreement. As held in the past, it is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013. Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of functions; minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. For a successful appeal, the inconsistencies brought up should pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to peripheral matters. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The inconsistent testimony of Reynaldo Brito deserves little weight in light of the consonant testimonies of all the police officers who testified in court. It is well-settled that the testimonies of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Absent any clear showing that the arresting officers had ill-motive to falsely testify against the petitioner, their testimonies must be respected and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties must be upheld. Petitioner himself testified that he never had any personal encounter with the police prior to his arrest, thus negating any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013.

MARCH 2011
CIVIL PROCEDURE Contempt; contempt proceedings distinguished from suspension proceedings. Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v. Godoy, thus:

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the courts officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof. Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Contempt; direct contempt. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice. Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC. Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Contempt; direct contempt; penalty. Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court

under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Contempt; direct contempt; remedy of contemnor. In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides: SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Contempt; indirect contempt; due process requirements. Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for nonobservance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary. In the same vein, the petitioners alleged vilification campaign against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit: Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxx (d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; x x x. Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Contempt; nature of contempt power. The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011. Forum shopping; identity of cause of action. There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodlands right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the

nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues. There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping. The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. The CA ruled that the two cases are different because the events that gave rise to them are different. The CA rationalized that the Annulment Case was brought about by the execution of a falsified document, while the Injunction Case arose from AUBs foreclosure based on a falsified document. The distinction is illusory. The cause of action for both cases is the alleged nullity of the REM due to its falsified or spurious nature. It is this nullity of the REM which Goodland sought to establish in the Annulment Case. It is also this nullity of the REM which Goodland asserted in the Injunction Case as basis for seeking to nullify the foreclosure and enjoin the consolidation of title. Clearly, the trial court cannot decide the Injunction Case without ruling on the validity of the mortgage, which issue is already within the jurisdiction of the trial court in the Annulment Case. The recent development in Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., which involved substantially the same parties and the same issue is another reason for Goodlands loss in the instant case. The issue that Goodland committed deliberate forum shopping when it successively filed the Annulment and Injunction Cases against AUB and its officers was decided with finality therein. This ruling is conclusive on the petitioners and Goodland considering that they are substantially the same parties in that earlier case. Asia United Bank, et al. v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 191388, March 9, 2011. Judgment; immutability and binding effect. Settled is the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. While there are recognized exceptions e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable none of these exceptions apply to the present case. There is no dispute that the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703, which is being questioned by petitioner, had already become final and executory. The petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the said CA Resolution had been denied with finality as this Court found no compelling

reason to grant the said petition. Consequently, an entry of judgment was already issued by this Court on September 1, 2003. It has been established in the assailed CA Resolution that the Certificate of Sale involving TCT No. T-105375 was not registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Owing to the finality of the said Resolution, the Court as well as the parties therein, which includes herein petitioner, are now bound by the said factual finding. The determination of the questions of fact and of law by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703 already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies over the same subject matter.On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC did not err in relying on the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Ramon Valenzuela, G.R. No. 163530, March 9, 2011. Jurisdiction; courts directive for re-raffle is improper where it finds that it has no jurisdiction over action. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a courts jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. The record shows that R-II Builders original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court. With HGCs filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July 2007, said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same is not an intracorporate dispute. In a clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008, the same court significantly took cognizance of its lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise: At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special Commercial Court tasked to try and hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil cases. When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified as an intra-corporate case. However, in the ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defences raised by defendants, even the plaintiff conceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy or even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the parties are all housed in Quezon City. Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare that it does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or civil, this Court would rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics supplied). We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153, HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II

Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court. Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case. Calleja v. Panday, while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercising jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial Courts authority, dealt squarely with the issue: Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and jurisdiction. Calleja ruled on the issue, thus: Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special Commercial Court, in its Joint Order of 2 January 2008 that the case is not an intracorporate controversy, amplified in its Order of 1 February 2008 that it does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action is incompatible with the directive for the re-raffle of the case and to leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. Such a directive is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it had in the same breath declared it did not have. What compounds the jurisdictional error is the fact that at the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005, issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point, there was absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that was supposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of jurisdiction. So faulty was the order of reraffle that it left the impression that its previously issued preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued was not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect. Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, and to show that the proceedings below was error upon error, we find that the CA also gravely erred in not ruling that respondent RTCs (Branch 22, the regular court) jurisdiction over the case was curtailed by R-II Builders failure to pay the correct docket fees. In other words, the jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees. In its order dated 19 May 2008 which admitted R-II Builders Amended and Supplemental Complaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled that the case was a real action and ordered the re-computation and payment of the correct docket fees. In patent circumvention of said order, however, R-II Builders filed its 14 August 2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint which effectively deleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool and, in addition to reducing the claim for attorneys fees and seeking its appointment as a receiver, reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC. Acting on said motion as well as the opposition and motion to dismiss interposed by HGC, respondent RTC ruled as follows in its assailed 3 March 2009 order, to wit: Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011.

Jurisdiction; courts inherent power to amend and control its process and orders. Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court: Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.Every court shall have power: xxxx (g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan: x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.) The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that he had already left the premises. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011. Jurisdiction; effect of failure to pay correct docket fees. For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTCs 19 May 2008 order, it stands to reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court in the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the Court subsequently issued the following guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, viz.: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. True to the foregoing guidelines, respondent RTC admitted R-II Builders Amended and Supplemental Complaint and directed the assessment and payment of the appropriate docket fees in the order dated 19 May 2008. Rather than complying with said directive, however, R-II Builders manifested its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees by withdrawing its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which deleted its cause of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced its claim for attorneys fees, sought its appointment as Receiver and prayed for the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool. In upholding the admission of said Second Amended Complaint in respondent RTCs assailed 3 March 2009 Order, however, the CA clearly lost sight of the fact that a real action was ensconced in R-II Builders original complaint and that the proper docket fees had yet to be paid in the premises. Despite the latters withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of the correct docket fees. In the 15 February 2011 Resolution issued in the case of David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., this Court, sitting En Banc, had occasion to rule that an action for declaration of nullity of share issue, receivership and corporate dissolution is one where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Subsequent to the trial courts rendition of a decision on the merits declared to be immediately executory and the CAs denial of their application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of said decision, the defendants questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid a quo which supposedly failed take into consideration the value of the shares as well as the real properties involved for which the plaintiff additionally caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated. Finding that defendants were already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of non-payment of the correct docket fees, the Court discounted intent to defraud the government on the part of the plaintiff who can, at any rate, be required to pay the deficiency which may be considered a lien on the judgment that may be rendered, without automatic loss of the jurisdiction already acquired, in the first instance, by the trial court. The factual and legal milieus of the case at bench could not, however, be more different. While R-II Builders styled its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as one primarily for the resolution and/or declaration of the DAC, it simultaneously and unmistakably prayed for the conveyance, possession and control of the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that HGC has consistently questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II Builders, estoppel cannot be said to have set in since, the lapse of more than five years from the commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that the case has yet to be tried on the merits. Having admitted that its original complaint partook the nature of a real action and having been directed to pay the correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, R-II Builders is, furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the insufficiency of the docket fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees, moreover, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint after its admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint on the ground that said earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted in view of its non-payment of the docket and other fees it was directed to pay. In so doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked the fact that the very same argument could very well apply to its original complaint for which given its admitted nature as a real action the correct docket fees have also yet to be paid.

The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular. For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case, said decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended Complaint. By itself, the propriety of admitting R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint is also cast in dubious light when viewed through the prism of the general prohibition against amendments intended to confer jurisdiction where none has been acquired yet. Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, HGC correctly fault the CA for upholding respondent RTCs admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof. With the determination of the jurisdictional necessity of the dismissal of the complaint of R-II Builders docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407, first before Br. 24 and later before Br. 22 both of the RTC of Manila, we no longer find any reason to go into a discussion of the remaining issues HGC proffers for resolution. In view, particularly, of its non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent RTC clearly had no authority to grant the receivership sought by R-II Builders. It needs pointing out though that the prayer for receivership clearly indicates that the R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of property consisting of the assets of the JVA from HGC to the formers named Receiver. As already noted, said transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees. Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011. Jurisdiction; jurisdiction over unlawful detainer case determined by allegations of complaint. Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation which comes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. But the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Besides, the records show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a tenant of the land. The MTC records show that aside from the assertion that he is a tenant, he did not present any evidence to prove the same. To consider evidence presented only during appeal is offensive to the idea of fair play. The remaining question is the nature of the action based on the allegations of the complaint. The RTC characterized it as an action for forcible entry, Wilfredo having entered the property and taken over from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this characterization is that the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit. Nowhere in the recitation

of the amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that they were in prior possession of the land and were ousted from such possession by Wilfredos unlawful occupation of the property. Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the following: (1) initially, the defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice to defendant, terminating the latters right of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiffs last demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for defendants ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendants possession. Here, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, tenant Romualdos widow, to stay on the land for the meantime and leave when asked to do so. But, without the knowledge or consent of the Dionisios, she sold her right of tenancy to Wilfredo. When the Dionisios visited the land in April 2002 and found Wilfredo there, they demanded that he leave the land. They did so in writing on April 22, 2002 but he refused to leave. The Dionisios filed their eviction suit within the year. Spouses Vicente Dionisio and Anita Dionisio v. Wilfredo Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011. Jurisdiction; real actions. In upholding the foregoing order as well as its affirmance in respondent RTCs 29 September 2009 order, the CA ruled that the case being one primarily instituted for the resolution/nullification of the DAC involved an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. While it is true, however, that R-II Builders continuing stake in the Asset Pool is with respect only to its residual value after payment of all the regular SMPPCs holders and the Asset Pool creditors, the CA failed to take into account the fact that R-II Builders original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both interposed causes of action for conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entire Asset Pool. Indeed, in connection with its second cause of action for appointment as trustee in its original complaint, R-II Builders distinctly sought the conveyance of the entire Asset Pool which it consistently estimated to be valued at P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005. In its opposition to HGCs motion to dismiss, R-II Builders even admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property or an interest therein. With R-II Builders incorporation of a cause of action for conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool in its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, on the other hand, no less than respondent RTC, in its 19 May 2008 order, directed the assessment and payment of docket fees corresponding to a real action. Admittedly, this Court has repeatedly laid down the test in ascertaining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by determining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered capable of pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought. To our mind, the application of foregoing test does not, however, preclude the further classification of actions into personal actions and real action, for which appropriate docket fees are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages, real actions are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. While personal actions should be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, the venue for real actions is the court of the place where the real property is located.

Although an action for resolution and/or the nullification of a contract, like an action for specific performance, fall squarely into the category of actions where the subject matter is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation, we find that the causes of action for resolution and/or nullification of the DAC was erroneously isolated by the CA from the other causes of action alleged in R-II Builders original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint which prayed for the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the Asset Pool. In Gochan v. Gochan, this Court held that an action for specific performance would still be considered a real action where it seeks the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance of real property. More to the point is the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III where, despite the annulment of contracts sought in the complaint, this Court upheld the directive to pay additional docket fees corresponding to a real action in the following wise, to wit: x x x [I]n Siapno v. Manalo, the Court disregarded the title/denomination of therein plaintiff Manalos amended petition as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages; and adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for which should have been computed based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if there was none, the estimated value thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that: In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTAs sale of the property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages, it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said: A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948) An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its continuing stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid. In support of its original complaints second cause of action for appointment as trustee and conveyance of the properties in the Asset Pool, R-II Builders distinctly alleged as follows: 5.12. As the Court-appointed Trustee, R-II Builders shall have and exercise the same powers, rights and duties as if [it] had been originally appointed, having the principal duty of redeeming and buying back the Regular SMPPCs and thereafter liquidating the Asset Pool, which are also the end goals of the Agreement.

5.12.1. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to invest, transfer, convey or assign any of the assets of the Asset Pool, whether funds, receivables, real or personal property, in exchange for shares of stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties of any kind, class or nature, provided that any such investment, transfer, conveyance or assignment shall not impair the value of the Asset Pool. 5.12.2. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to sell, change, assign or otherwise dispose of any stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties or other assets constituting the Asset Pool. 5.12. 3. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to enter into lease agreements as lessor or any other related contract for the benefit of the Asset Pool; and 5.12.4. It is understood that the aforecited powers and rights of R-II Builders as the court-appointed Trustee, are non-exclusive; and is deemed to include all the rights and powers necessary and incidental to achieve the goals and objectives of the Agreement. From the foregoing allegations in its original complaint, it cannot be gainsaid that R-II Builders was unquestionably seeking possession and control of the properties in the Asset Pool which predominantly consisted of real properties. Having admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property or (an) interest therein, R-II Builders emphasized the real nature of its action by seeking the grant of the following main reliefs in the Amended and Supplemental Complaint it subsequently filed, to wit: 5. After trial on the merits, render judgment: (i) Declaring the annulment of the Deed of Assignment and conveyance executed by PDB in favor of HGC; or in the alternative, declaring the nullity of the said instrument; (ii) Appointing R-II Builders as the Trustee of the Asset Pool Properties, with powers and responsibilities including but not limited to those stated in 5.12.1, 5.12.2, 5.12.3 and 5.12.4 herein and those spelled out in the Re-Stated Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement; (iii) Ordering HGC to render an accounting of all properties of the Asset Pool transferred thereto under the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance and thereafter convey title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool to R-II Builders as the Trustee thereof which assets consist of, but is not limited to the following: (a) 105 parcels of land comprising the Smokey Mountain Site, and, the Reclamation Area, consisting of the 539,471.47 square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon, with their corresponding certificates of title; (b) shares of stock of Harbour Center Port Terminal, Inc. which are presently registered in the books of the said company in the name of PDB for the account of the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool; and (c) other documents as listed in Annex E of the Contract of Guaranty. (iv) Ordering NHA to pay the Asset Pool the amount of Php1,803,729,757.88 including the direct and indirect cost thereon as may be found by this Honorable Court to be due thereon;

(v) Making the injunction permanent; (vi) Ordering HGC and the NHA to pay Attorneys fees in the amount of P2,000,000 and the costs of suit. Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011. Mandamus; allegations in petition. Finally, the Alagars assert that PNB availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action of certiorari before the CA rather than one of mandamus to compel the RTC to give due course to its notice of appeal after the latter held that its pro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the period of appeal which had then already elapsed But a reading of PNBs allegations in its petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116 shows that its action was not only for certiorari and prohibition but also for mandamus. The bank alleged that by its whimsical, capricious and arbitrary actions the RTC deprived the PNB of its appeal, leaving it with no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The PNB petition also specifically prayed the CA to direct the trial court to give due course to its appeal. Following the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the pleading and the character of the relief sought, it is unmistakable that CA-G.R. SP 71116 was also a petition for mandamus. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 171870, March 16, 2011. Mandamus; proper remedy to compel issuance of writ of possession. We rule that mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the issuance of a writ of possession. The purpose of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The issuance of a writ of possession is outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides: SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of [this] Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. During the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession upon depositing the approved bond. When the redemption period expires without the mortgagor exercising his right of redemption, the mortgagor is deemed to have lost all interest over the foreclosed property, and the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the property. The purchasers right is aptly described thus: Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchasers

name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its discretion. Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment x x x With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of possession and the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue such writ of possession. Thus, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of *this+ ministerial duty. Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011. Mediation; sanction for non-appearance. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings, was issued pursuant to par. (5), Section 5, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution mandating this Court to promulgate rules providing for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. Also, Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires the courts to consider the possibility of an amicable settlement or of submission to alternative modes of resolution for the early settlement of disputes so as to put an end to litigations. The provisions of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA pertinent to the case at bench are as follows: 9. Personal appearance/Proper authorizations Individual parties are encouraged to personally appear for mediation. In the event they cannot attend, their representatives must be fully authorized to appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise by a Special Power of Attorney. A corporation shall, by board resolution, fully authorize its representative to appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise agreement. 12. Sanctions Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such other sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings. [Underscoring supplied] To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however, of a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been duly authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. To ensure the attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The respective lawyers of the parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to cooperate with the mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes so as to effectively reduce docket congestion.

Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007, the Court finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the absence of petitioners representative during mediation proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case. The Court notes that Manalang was not entirely at fault for the cancellation and resettings of the conferences. Let it be underscored that respondents representative and counsel, Atty. Miguel, came late during the January 19 and February 9, 2008 conferences which resulted in their cancellation and the final resetting of the mediation proceedings to March 1, 2008. Considering the circumstances, it would be most unfair to penalize petitioner for the neglect of her lawyer. Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly construed the absence of Manalang on March 1, 2008 as a deliberate refusal to comply with its Order or to be dilatory, it cannot be said that the court was powerless and virtually without recourse. Indeed, there are other available remedies to the court a quo under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, apart from immediately ordering the dismissal of the case. If Manalangs absence upset the intention of the court a quo to promptly dispose the case, a mere censure or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioners representative and her counsel so as to be informed of the courts intolerance of tardiness and laxity in the observation of its order. By failing to do so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously deprived petitioner of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly paid for. Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for nonappearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has written inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets, while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court. Linda M. Chan Kent v. Dionesio C. Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011. Motions; motion for reconsideration not pro forma. The Alagars fail to show any reversible error in the CAs decision. That courts finding that PNBs motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and, therefore, tolled the running of PNBs period to appeal, is supported by the evidence on record. The motion for reconsideration specified the RTCs findings and conclusions in its decision that PNB thought to be contrary to law. The latter even raised new arguments, not previously considered by the trial court, which even the latter recognized in its assailed March 25, 2002 order. From all indications, the motion for reconsideration complied with requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to have simply concluded that the motion was pro forma and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. The RTC should have given due course to PNBs appeal. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 171870, March 16, 2011. Petition for Review; motion for extension; Court of Appeals discretion to grant or not to grant motion for extension should be exercised wisely and prudently. Although it is within the CAs discretion to grant or not to grant a motion for extension, such discretion should be exercised wisely and prudently. The rules regulating the filing of motions for extension of time to file certain pleadings are intended to promote the speedy disposition of cases in the interest of justice, not throw out such pleadings on pure technicality.

Here, on March 15, 2006 petitioner heirs filed their motion for extension of 30 days (counted from March 21 when the original period was to run out) within which to file their petition. If the CA would want to deny that extension or shorten it to only 15 days up to April 5, 2006, it had technically at least 20 days (from March 15 to April 4) within which to so warn petitioners that they might have a chance to finish up and file their petition. Yet, it did not. While the parties have no right to expect the CA to grant their motion for extension, they have a right to expect reasonableness from it. Technically the CA waited 44 days up to April 28, 2006 before acting on the motion that petitioners filed on March 15, 2006. The CA knew, when it reduced to only 15 days the extension asked of it, that such reduced extension had already come to pass 23 days earlier on April 5, 2006. Surely, the CA did not expect petitioners to still be able to cope with the reduced extension. Since the rules allow the CA to grant an extra 15-day extension for the most compelling reason, the CA ought to have given petitioners reasonable notice that it did not regard its ground sufficiently compelling. The CA gave petitioner heirs absolutely no chance to file a timely petition. What is more, when the CA acted on the motion for extension on April 28, 2006 the petition was already at hand, having been filed earlier on April 20. The CA cannot pretend that it had been waiting with bated breath to have a look at the petition and that, consequently, it could only grant a shorter extension for its filing. Indeed, the CA did not dismiss the petition outright when it did not get the same by April 5, its desired deadline. The CA got the petition on April 20, 2006 but waited eight days more or until April 28, 2006 before looking at it. So what was the point in its denying the longer extension when it was not ready to act promptly on the petition? Heirs of Marilou K. Santiago, et al. v. Alfonso Aguila, G.R. No. 174034, March 9, 2011. Pleading; effect of amendment of complaint on cause of action. An amended complaint that changes the plaintiffs cause of action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint. Here, the original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land from Cruz on September 30, 1989; that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave the land upon demand; that in April 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now occupied it under a claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan; that the Dionisios did not know of and gave no consent to this sale which had not been annotated on their title; that the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo to leave the property by April 31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand in writing on April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get possession so they could till the land and demolish Wilfredos house on it; that Wilfredo did not give the Dionisios just share in the harvest; and that the Dionisios were compelled to get the services of counsel for P100,000.00. The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only new ones are that the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdos widow to stay out of their kindness, tolerance, and generosity; that they went to the land in April 2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the previous registered owner and that he sold the land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying anothers land by the latters tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an implied promise to leave upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.

To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from that stated in the original complaint. Here, both the original and the amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new answer. Spouses Vicente Dionisio and Anita Dionisio v. Wilfredo Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011. Procedural rules; exceptions meriting relaxation of rules. Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. We find that Danilos situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011. Procedural rules; policy for cases to be decided on merits rather than on technicalities. It bears emphasis that the subject matter of the complaint is a valuable parcel of land measuring 328 square meters and that petitioner had allegedly spent a lot of money not only for the payment of the docket and other filing fees but also for the extra-territorial service of the summons to the respondents who are now permanent residents of the U.S.A. Certainly, petitioner stands to lose heavily on account of technicality. Even if the dismissal is without prejudice, the refiling of the case would still be injurious to petitioner because she would have to pay again all the litigation expenses which she previously paid for. The Court should afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from constraints of technicalities. Technicalities should take a backseat against substantive rights and should give way to the realities of the situation. Besides, the petitioner has manifested her interest to pursue the case through the present petition. At any rate, it has not been shown that a remand of the case for trial would cause undue prejudice to respondents. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it just and proper that petitioner be allowed to present her cause of action during trial on the merits to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. Verily, the better and more prudent course of action in a judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide the case on the merits instead of disposing the case by technicalities. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a partylitigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty or property on technicalities. The ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Trial courts are reminded to exert efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits and to adjudge them accordingly to the satisfaction of the parties, lest in hastening the proceedings, they further delay the resolution of the cases. Linda M. Chan Kent v. Dionesio C. Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011. Procedural rules; purpose. Procedural rules are intended to facilitate the administration of justice, not frustrate it. It is always better that a case is decided on the merits rather than disposed of because of procedural infirmities. Considering that the case involves tenancy relations and possession of agricultural landholding and that PARAD and DARAB have made conflicting findings, a review of the case by the CA was clearly in order. Heirs of Marilou K. Santiago, et al. v. Alfonso Aguila, G.R. No. 174034, March 9, 2011.

Writ of execution; effect of compliance with writ on petition in higher court. The Alagars contend that the issue of whether the RTC validly issued a writ of execution in the case had become moot since PNB willingly obeyed the writ, returned the General Luna title to the Alagars, and paid them the damages that the RTC awarded in its decision. Going further, the Alagars argue that the full implementation of the writ foreclosed any question concerning the validity of the decision itself. But the execution of a judgment pending an action in a higher court essentially challenging its finality cannot be deemed an abandonment of that action. The rules grant parties the right to question by special civil actions those orders and rulings that inferior courts issue with grave abuse of discretion. That the PNB complied with the writ of execution after its several attempts to stop it cannot be deemed a voluntary abandonment of its action before the CA. PNB had no choice but to obey the RTC orders, given that the CA did not then deem it appropriate to issue a restraining order. And PNB did not relent in pursuing its action before the CA. Besides, the Alagars did not raise this issue of estoppel before the CA. Consequently, they cannot raise the same for the first time before the Court. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 171870, March 16, 2011. Writ of execution; instances where writ may be appealed. It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Courts attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment involved was already final and executory. However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals until he actually vacates when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of Simeons house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely. The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilos allegation were true and accordingly modified the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. Banaga v. Majaducon, however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) the writ of execution varies the judgment; there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority; In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011. OTHER PROCEEDINGS Expropriation; commissioners to report on just compensation; nature of commissioners duties and functions. Cecilios last source of authority to collect payment from the proceeds of the expropriation is the SPA executed on 18 October 1996 by the Hernandezes in favor of Cecilio as their true and lawful attorney with respect to the expropriation of the Hernandez property. At the outset, it must be underscored that the SPA did not specify the compensation of Cecilio as attorney-in-fact of the Hernandezes. The SPA, however, must be appreciated in the light of the fact that Cecilio was appointed and acted as appraisal commissioner in the expropriation case under the provisions of Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to the court. (Emphasis ours). The commissioner to be appointed is specifically required to be disinterested. As defined, such person must be free from bias, prejudice or partiality. The record of performance by Cecilio of his duties as commissioner shows: (1) Order dated 13 September 1996 appointing Cecilio and three others as court commissioners; (2) Agreement on the course of action of the commissioners appointed 13 September 1996 whereby respondent Cecilio signed as a court commissioner; (3) Appraisal Commission Report dated 10 January 1997 signed by respondent and his fellow court commissioners; (4) Dissenting Opinion on the Lone Minority Report dated 14 February 1997 signed by respondent and two other court commissioners; and (5) Decision dated 7 February 1997 which sets the fees of the court commissioners. When Cecilio accepted the position as commissioner and proceeded to perform the duties of such commissioner until the completion of his mandate as such, he created a barrier that prevented his performance of his duties under the SPA. Due to the nature of his duties and functions as commissioner, Cecilio became an officer of the court. As stated in Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the commissioners duty is to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property to be taken. The undertaking of a commissioner is further stated under the rules, to wit: SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the

business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. Cecilio acted for the expropriation court. He cannot be allowed to consider such action as an act for or in behalf of the defendant in the same case. Cecilio could not have been a hearing officer and a defendant at the same time. Indeed, Cecilio foisted fraud on both the Court and the Hernandezes when, after his appointment as commissioner, he accepted the appointment by the Hernandezes to represent and sue for them. Cornelia M. Hernandez, substituted by Lourdes H. Castillo v. Cecilio F. Hernandez, G.R. No. 158576, March 9, 2011. Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage; special power of attorney. Moreover, the availability of extra-judicial foreclosure to a mortgagee depends upon the agreement of the contracting parties. Section 1 of Act No. 3135 provides: Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, paragraph (c) of the parties REM granted Veterans Bank the special power as attorney-infact of the petitioners to perform all acts necessary for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135. Thus, there is no obstacle preventing Veterans Bank from availing itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure. Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011. Writ of possession; non-prescription of purchasers right. Petitioners assail the CAs ruling that the issuance of a writ of possession does not prescribe. They maintain that Articles 1139, 1149, and 1150 of the Civil Code regarding prescriptive periods cover all kinds of action, which necessarily include the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners posit that, for purposes of the latter, it is the five-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1149 of the Civil Code which applies because Act No. 3135 itself did not provide for its prescriptive period. Thus, Veterans Bank had only five years from September 12, 1983, the date when the Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor, to move for the issuance of a writ of possession. Respondent argues that jurisprudence has consistently held that a registered owner of the land, such as the buyer in an auction sale, is entitled to a writ of possession at any time after the consolidation of ownership. We cannot accept petitioners contention. We have held before that the purchasers right to request for the issuance of the writ of possession of the land never prescribes. The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof. In Calacala v. Republic of the Philippines, the Republic was the highest bidder in the public auction but failed for a long period of time to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation and to seek a writ of possession. Calacala insisted that, by such inaction, the Republics right over the land had prescribed, been abandoned or waived. The Courts language in rejecting Calacalas theory is illuminating: *T+he Republics failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners

predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x xxxx Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligors right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. x x x Moreover, the provisions cited by petitioners refer to prescription of actions. An action is defined as an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. On the other hand *a+ petition for the issuance of the writ, under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is not an ordinary action filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or prevention or redress of a wrong. It is in the nature of an ex parte motion [in] which the court hears only one side. It is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party, and without notice to or consent by any party adversely affected. Accordingly, upon the filing of a proper motion by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale, and the approval of the corresponding bond, the writ of possession issues as a matter of course and the trial court has no discretion on this matter. Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011. EVIDENCE Documentary evidence; interpretation of documents according to circumstances. Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court on interpretation of an instrument provides: SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret. (underscoring supplied) A consideration of the circumstances under which Aragons letter-certifications were issued is thus in order. Amarnanis letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a conditional certification from Aragon was granted two days later when Aragon issued the letter-certification addressed to respondent. Within that period, it could not have been possible for petitioner to even process the application, given that Amarnani had not even complied with the requirements as he, himself, indicated in his letter-request to Aragon to please tell *him+ the requirements for the credit line so *he+ c*ould+ apply. The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000 or 39 days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if indeed a bank guaranty was, to its impression, granted.

By respondents finance manager Leonora Armi Salvadors testimony, upon receipt of the two letter certifications, she concluded that they were bank guarantees considering their similarity with other bank guarantees in favor of respondent by other distributors; and she made inquiries with petitioner only after Keraj defaulted in the payment of its obligation to respondent. In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing a bank guaranty in favor of Amarnani. Respondents reliance on Aragons use of a check writer, a machine used to input a numerical or written value impression in the payment amount field of a check that is very difficult to alter, on the left side of each letter- certification, was misplaced, what prevails being the wordings of the letter-certifications. Bank of Commerce v. Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 191561, March 7, 2011. Res gestae; nature and admissibility. Further, the Court considers a res gestae Amalias recital of what she heard Alice utter when she came and rescued her. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Here, Fallones act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out tama na, tama na! When Fallones opened the door upon Amalias incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o. The admissibility of Alices spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness. People of the Philippines v. Romy Fallones y Labana, G.R. No. 190341, March 16, 2011.