Care must be exercised in distinguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent

to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime. (G.R. No. 4963, U.S. v. Go Chico)

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

ELENITA C. FAJARDO,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190889

Good faith and absence of criminal intent, however, are not valid defenses since the offense committed is malum prohibitum punished by special law, G.R. No. L-37762 December 19, 1985 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO B. NERI defendant-l

Lack of knowledge cannot constitute a valid defense, for lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum. G.R. No. 138929. October 2, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FLORENTINO DEL MUNDO,

In crimes punished by special laws, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.chanroblesvirtu G.R. No. L-55132 August 30, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal Lagawe Ifugao, Petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao, Lagawe, Ifugao, JULIUS ROBLES, EDUARDO BANDAO, MARCOS OYAGON, DAGYO UYANG, UDULON LATTOD, BUCCAHAN MUNDIGUING, JUNIOR MUNDIGUING, PIWIT TUNDAGUI, GUINOMON CHONGA-AP, FERNANDO TID-ONG, JULIO BALLOGAN, FERNAN GAGGO, CARMEN GAGGO AND BALBINA POCYA

Good faith and absence of criminal intent, however, are not valid defenses since the offense committed is malum prohibitum punished by special law, chanroble G.R. No. L-37762 December 19, 1985 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO B. NERI His good faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibitathe act alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976 SALVADOR LACSON, JR., Complainant, vs. RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of Talisay, Negros Occidental, the crime under consideration is mala prohibita. It is settled that lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum. G.R. No. 121345. June 23, 1999]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SY BING YOK a.k.a. ARTURO MARCELO SY, accused-appellant.

this Court has repeatedly held that motive is pertinent only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit. Where the accused was positively Identified by credible witnesses to be the assailant, as in this case, proof of motive is not essential for conviction. Motive is a state of mind and it is only the accused who can state his real motive in committing the crime. G.R. No. L-51908 November 29, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BAYANI JACINTO y VALLE alias "Boy Juaning"

While it is true that the People failed to prove the motive for the assault against his victims, it has been held time and again that motive is not essential in the conviction of murder cases where there is no doubt as to the Identity of the culprit. (People vs. Herila, 51 SCRA 31). Stated differently motive is pertinent only, when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit. (People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172). As to the second assignment of error regarding the absence of motive to kill, proof of motive is not essential in the face of the positive Identification by the witness (People v. Anquillano, 149 SCRA 442; People v. Ramilo, 147 SCRA 102; People v. Manalo, 135 SCRA 84). Such proof is necessary only when there are no eyewitnesses and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons.chanroblesvG.R. No. 75268 January 29, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ESTEBAN MELGAR Y CORNEL and GERARDO LANGUISAN, It is a settled rule in criminal law that proof of motive is crucial only where the identity of an accused is not sufficiently established. G.R. No. 103801-02 October 19, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRVING FLORES y DICHOSO,

Motive, not being an element of the crime, can become material only when the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt but not, such as in this case, when the accused is positively identified People vs. Salamat, 225 SCRA 499; People vs.

Amondina, 220 SCRA 6; People vs. Molas, 218 SCRA 473.

proof of motive in a criminal case becomes relevant and essential only when the identity of an assailant is in question.

People v. Bautista, 308 SCRA 620, 641 (1999).

Settled is the rule that motive is not essential to conviction when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. 26 People vs.

Solaa, 6 SCRA 60; People vs. Indic, 10 SCRA 130; People vs. Romawak, 12 SCRA 332; People vs. Racquel, 12 SCRA 441; People vs. Reyno, 13 SCRA 647; People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151. Motive is not essential when there are reliable eyewitnesses who fully identified the accused as the perpetrator of the offense. 27 People vs. Evaristo, 13 SCRA 172. And lack of motive for committing the crime does not
chan roble s virtual law l chan rob

precludeconviction for the offense when the crime and the participation of the accused are definitely proved. 28chanrobles virtual
lib

law

People vs. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764.

c hanro bles vi rtu ra

It has been repeatedly observed that alibi is a defense easily fabricated so that great caution must be exercised in accepting it. Not only that, well-entrenched is the rule that for alibi to prosper it is not enough that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. (People vs. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA 56; People vs. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178) In this case, the distance of the place where appellant allegedly was at the time of the incident and the place where the incident happened could be negotiated in just a few minutes by merely walking. Such distance does not preclude the possibility that the appellant committed the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library G.R. No. L-68331 January 29, 1988PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE SANTILLAN, The defense of alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused (People vs. Esmael, 37 SCRA 601 [1971]; People vs. Carandang, 52 SCRA 259 [1973]). More so where it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. Esmael, supra; People vs. Tamani, 55 SCRA 153 [1974]).

It must he stressed at the outset that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, especially if there is direct testimony of an eyewitness duly corroborated by that of another, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the case of fabricating evidence of alibi and the difficulty of checking or rebutting.

As was stressed in Justice Castro's opinion in People v. Alcantara: 31"The appellant's main defense in exculpation is alibi. It must he stressed at the outset that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, especially if there is direct testimony of an eyewitness duly corroborated by that of another, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the case of fabricating evidence of alibi and the difficulty of checking or rebutting." 32People vs. Estrada 33was cited in support of such a view. Thus: "No jurisprudence in criminal case more settled than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defense and that the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime. Such should be the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. And for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. G.R. No. L-26182 May 31, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TOMAS BAGASALA, JUANITO BAGASALA, ANICETO RONAN, SALVADOR RONAN and ANICETO REX, defendants, JUANITO BAGASALA, D

This Court has already held in numerous decisions that the defense of alibi is the weakest defense that an accused can avail of, and cannot prosper where the accused has been positively and properly identified by the offended party. G.R. No. L-5781-82 August 30, 1957 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. JOSE VILLAROYA, MANUEL DAET, ENRIQUE AREJOLA, JOSE MORALES, ALFREDO IBASCO, JR., ERNESTO TACORDA and LORETO SELPO, defendants; JOSE VILLAROYA, MANUEL DAET and ENRIQUE, An alibi should be proved by probate evidence which reasonably satisfied the Court of the truth of said defense. U. S. vs. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587. Oral proof of alibi must be clearly and satisfactorily established cause it is easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credit (People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 710).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanroble s virtual law lib rary

As pointed out by the Solicitor general, "an alibi to be effective must be proved by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence which reasonably satisfy the court of its truth (People vs. Dizon, 76 Phil., 265, 42 Off. Gaz., 2766), and it has been held that an alibiis weak when it is only supported by witnesses found to be related by ties of relationship or friendship to the appellants as in the instant case (People vs. Japitana et al., 77 Phil., 175 Besides, We have repeatedly ruled in the past that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is the easiest to fabricate and concoct. The view We have adopted is that unless it is so convincingly demonstrated, the defense ought not be given credence (People v. de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. L- 4880, May 18, 1953; People v. Mesias, G.R. No. L-19250, Aug. 30, 1963; People v. Ramos, G.R. Nos. L-1740203, Aug. 31, 1963.) It is all the more true when, as in this case, the prosecution evidence positively established the presence of the accused at the time and place of the commission of the offense (People v. Baniaga, G. R. No. 1,14905, January 28, 1961).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychan
Time and again this Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed. No. 187073 : March 14, 2012]

[9]

[10]

[G.R.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO CASTRO Y PERALTA AND RENERIO DELOS REYES Y BONUS, APPELLANTS. The defense of alibi crumbles even more in the face of positive identification of the assailants which, in this case , has been clearly established by prosecution witnesses (People v. Arroyo, 201 SCRA 616 [1991]).

the other lesser points raised by appellant who question the delay on the part of Elisa Gazmen and Rosalia Dauz in making the accusation against him do not impress us as sufficiently persuasive. The alleged delay in naming the accused as the assailant was not long enough to be significant and even this had been adequately explained. G.R. No. Nos. L-62030-31 October 4, 1985THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NESTOR CABANIT,
Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and undeserving of weight in law. As against the positive, direct and convincing evidence of the prosecution, the accused was only able to present denials and uncorroborated alibi. G.R. No. 199398 : June 13, 2012]
cra law

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GEORGE VELO Y BALBAS

Denials unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 16 People v. Tumaob, Jr.
291 SCRA 133.

Given the positive and unequivocal identification of appellants, we hold that their defense of alibi cannot prevail. Alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by a prosecution witness.17 People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239
(1995).

Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and selfserving evidence undeserving of weight in law.18 People vs. Dinglasan,
crlwvirtu

267 SCRA 26 (1997).

Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.[18 [18 People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550 , February 13, 2002. Defense of alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevailover the positive identification of the accused. For such a defense to succeed, the accused must establish physical impossibility and improper motive of the prosecutionwitnesses which matters the accused failed to prove (People v. Calixto, 193 SCRA 303 [1991]).
The main defense of the accused is denial and alibi. This argument does not merit the Court's consideration. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. The prosecution witnesses in this case positively and consistently testified that they saw the accused perpetrate the crime. For this reason, it was incumbent upon the accused to prove that he was at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Dioneda, G.R. No. 180923, April 30, 2009, 587 SCRA 312, 318.

[4]

People v.

Indeed, the testimony of minor children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than of older persons, so that once established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence." (Marco v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 276, 283, citing People v. Rodico, 249 SCRA 309 and People v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392) In the absence of evidence showing ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit. 30 30 People v. Rendoque, 322 SCRA 622 (2000).
crlwvirtual ibr ry

Alleged delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation when adequately explained, does not necessarily impair the credibility of the said witness (People vs. Rotas, 73 SCRA 583, 593; People vs. Lao Wan Sing, 18 SCRA 1076).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation when adequately explained does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness (People v. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583; People v. Lao Wan Sing, 18 SCRA 1076; People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary As long as the delay or vacillation is adequately explained, said delay does not necessarily undermine the complaining witness credibility. 36 People v. Mitra, supra at 12.

It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the credibility of the complaining witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 12crlw People v. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472; People v. Errojo, 229 SCRA 49; People v. Jimenez, 250 SCRA 349.

Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. The law on prescription of crimes would be meaningless if We were to yield to the proposition that delay in the prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the state and to the offended parties. In fixing the different prescriptive periods on the basis of the gravity of the penalty prescribed therefor, the law takes into account or allows reasonable delays in the prosecution thereof.'

People

v. Rostata G.R. No. 91482, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 657.

Settled is the rule that failure to reveal at once the identity of the perpetrator of a felony does not impair the credibility of a witness more so if the delay has been adequately explained.

40

People v. Manegdeg, 316 SCRA 689, 706 (1999); People v.

Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1 (1999).

It bears stressing that the fact of delay alone does not work against the witnesses. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 116 People v. Simon, G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 330, 352, citing People v. Rostata, G.R. No. 91482, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 657.

In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified in behalf of the former are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on account of self-interest and blood kinship. Situated as they are, their inclination to be truthful is highly suspect. And quite aside from being self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are inconsistent, and manifestly concocted or improbable to be seriously considered.43

What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein.

23

Malto v.

People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 657.

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 647, 666-668.
0

In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein 1 G.R. No. 165924, January 19,
2009.

Moreover, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the testimonies of children of sound mind are likely to be more truthful than those of older persons, so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimonies should be given full credence. People of the Philippines v. Albert Teoso, G.R. No 188975, 5 July 2010, 621 SCRA 614.

[12]

Moreover, it has been held that the testimony of children of sound mind is likelyto be more correct and truthful than that of older persons so that once established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full faith and credence (People v. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 546 [1989]).
chanroble svirtual

Delay of a witness in informing other people of what he knew about a criminal offense would not affect his credibility where the delay was satisfactorily explained. People v. Lao Wan Sing, L16379, Dec. 17, 1966; People V. De Gracia, L-21419, Sept. 29, 1966; People v. Sampang, March 31, 1966, L-15843; People v. Equal, May 27, 1965, L13469, L-14340, L-14209; People v. Telan, June 29, 1962, L-17921; L-17922; People v. Delfin, July 31, 1961, L-15230, etc.; People v Collado, Nov. 23, 1960, L-12002.

It is settled, however, that delay on the part of witnesses in informing the authorities of what they know about the occurrence of a crime will not, by itself, affect their credibility, where such delay is satisfactorily explained. 5People v. Pugal, et al., G.R. No. 90637, 29 October 1992;
People v. Valdez, 159 SCRA 152 (1988); People v. Mandapat, 196 SCRA 157 (1991).

Delay in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. The law on prescription of crimes would be meaningless if we were to yield to the proposition that delay in the prosecution of crimes would be fatal to the state and to the offended parties. 31People v. Rostata, Jr., 218 SCRA 657
[1993]; People v. Cordova, 224 SCRA 320 [1993]; People v. Gorres, 230 SCRA 270 [1994].

In the case of People v. Dominguez, et al.19, the Court explained the settled doctrine that delay on the part of the witnesses in informing the authorities of what they know about the occurrence of a crime will not, by itself, affect their credibility where such delay is satisfactorily explained. Likewise, in People v. Gamboa,20 the Court reiterated that delay on the part of the witnesses to immediately report the identity of the offender to the police investigators does not

affect their credibility, especially so when the witnesses are related to the victim.21 People v. Reoveros, 247 SCRA 628, at 632-33 (1995).
21