Manotok v.

Barque, Part II : The December 18, 2008 En Banc Resolution

Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques title. In this entry, we look into the December 18, 2008 en banc resolutionthat reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings. The intervening facts After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. On May 2, 2006, the decision of the 1st Division was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006. On September 7, 2006, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot. On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings. How the court en banc voted The Court en banc decided to accept the cases from the 1st Division on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide. J. Tinga wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by CJ Puno, and JJ. AustriaMartinez, Velasco and Brion. Concurring with their respective separate opinions were J. Carpio, with whom J. Carpio-Morales joined, and J. Corona. J. Ynares-Santiago, the ponente of the 1st Division decision and resolutions, wrote a dissenting opinion. She was joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro. J. Nachura did not take part. Issue: Can the Court en banc validly re-evaluate the decision of the 1stDivision? The Court first grappled with what it called procedural unorthodoxies involved in the reevaluation of the Manotoks petitions even after an entry of judgment had already been made by the 1st Division in favor of the Barques. The Court justified its pro hac vice re-evaluation of the petitions based on the constitutional principle that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. This, according to the Court, is necessitated by the argument that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of

the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion . . . over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks title. It reasoned:
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles. It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks title. It reasoned:
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the

ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.

Issue: Should the Supreme Court, after dismissing the Barques petition for administrative reconstitution, act further on the apparent problems of the Manotoks title? After noting the apparent flaws in the Manotoks claim, which it described as considerable and disturbing enough, the Court decided to remand the case to the CA for reception of evidence on the validity of the Manotoks title. It explained this extraordinary step in the following wise:
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the Friar Lands over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act. xxx xxx xxx

The Alonso [v. Country Club] approach [of declaring that a former friar land still legally belongs to the national government for failure of the private claimant to establish a clear title thereto] especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks claim to title i s flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.

The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio Like the majority, J. Carpio holds that the the re-evaluation of the consolidated petitions is proper even after entry of the 1st Divisions decision. He does not however join the majority in remanding the case to the CA. He merely voted to GRANT of the Manotoks motion for reconsideration,REVERSE the 1st Divisions decision and resolution and RECALL its Entry of Judgment, and DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr. J. Carpio argued that the doctrine of immutability is not applicable in this case since the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory, thus:

There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division [such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon]. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack. The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The Manotoks prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.

J. Carpio noted a surfeit of forgeries and badges of fraud regarding the Barque title. He also distinguished the Manotoks and the Barques situations, thus: [A]t the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks title, the Barques had no duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only duly issued existing Torrens title over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On the question of whether the LRA has jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two claimants over the same property is the lawful owner, J. Carpio held in the negative, thus:
...[R]econstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property. Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest, the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. xxx.

On the question of whether equity can be used to justify the collateral attack on the Manotoks title at the LRA level, he reasoned: no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles. The Separate Opinion of Justice Corona J. Coronas joined the majority in reversing the 1st Division and in remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings. According to him, the First Division . . . enlarged the scope of the authority of the [LRA] in administrative reconstitution proceedings when it recognized the authority of the LRA to rule that petitioners certificate of title was a sham, spurious and not duly issued since under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity and val idity of a certificate of title.

The referral of the case to the CA for the complete determination of contentious factual issues is necessitated because the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the province of [the Supreme Court] as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the [CA] has the competence to perform that task. The dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago J. Ynares-Santiago found no compelling reason to further require the referral of these cases to the RTC or the CA for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the two divisions of the CA and affirmed by the Court's 1st Division in its final and executory decision dated December 12, 2005. She reasoned that the doctrine of immutability of final and executory decisions precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action. Particularly, the lady justice found no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that [the Barques] Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR; thus, she held that [the Barques] title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823 -A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, [is] in order. She would also sustain the LRA finding that the Manotoks reconstituted title is spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary to the LRA findings. She concluded that since the property covered by [the Manotoks] reconstituted title is not the property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such property. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the CA to order the cancellation of the Manotoks t itle and the reconstitution of the Barques title, she held:
The Court of Appeals . . . has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda, filed by the parties, and to apply the law applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732. Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that the findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Since petitioners were not able to show that the LRA findings of fact were unsupported by evidence, the Court of Appeals committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings. Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that: SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners TCT No. RT -22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also affirmed the LRA finding that respondents title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative reconstitution process.

On the issue of whether the LRA has jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the Barques title despite the Manotoks previously reconstituted title, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative. She cited the fact that it appears from the records that the location and technical description of the properties described in the parties respective titles are not the same. Thus, [i]t is . . . misleading and baseless for [the Manotoks] to assert that their previously reconstituted title . . . covers the same

property as that identified and described in [the Barques title] so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over [the Barques] petition for reconstitution. However, even assuming that both parties respective titles cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution, thus:
As [the Manotoks] themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, [the Barques] TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24, 1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988. [The Barques] TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time [the Manotoks] filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: [I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void. It, therefore, follows that [the Manotoks] reconstituted title, even assuming the same to ha ve been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere existence of [the Barques] title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of [the Manotoks] title. xxx.

On whether the LRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the Manotoks title in the administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by the Barques, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative, reasoning that [s]ince the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as well as [the Manotoks] opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the [Manotoks]. On whether the LRA or the CA has jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by the Manotoks, J. YnaresSantiago also held in the affirmative: [S]ince [the Manotoks] themselves laid before the LRA and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.
Posted by Atty. Ed at 2:59 AM