AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC G.R. No.

147066, March 26, 2001 Facts: Petitoners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections of new voters. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission under R.A. 8189. On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 requesting for a two-day additional registration of new voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. Subsequently, Comelec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request, it was the consensus. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, which seeks to nullify respondent Comelecs resolution and / or to declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 dated Feb. 8, 2001 as it denies petitioners right to vote. Held: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. The so-called stand-by powers or residual powers of the Comelec, as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commission shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law, cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not otherwise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the operational impossibility of holding the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may not apply. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners request. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs LYNDON V. MACOY Facts: on July 4, 1989, at about 12:30 in the morning, at the Bottom's Up Beerhouse in Sanciangco corner Junquera Streets, Cebu City, Paul Ocampo, the beerhouse manager, was gunned down causing his instantaneous death. Lyndon Macoy who was found in front of Bottom's Up with a gun in his had was arrested by patrolmen Ferdinand Tumakay, Felipe Nonong, Gaudencio Javier, and Pelayo Dingcong. The policemen, who were on patrol duty, were within ten (10) meters from Bottom's Up when they heard a gunshot and a commotion. In response to what they had heard they went to the beerhouse. They saw accused-appellant carrying a gun, a .38 snub-nosed paltik Smith and Wesson revolver, which he surrendered to the police officers. Three live bullets and two empty shells were retrieved from the gun. Paul Ocampo was taken to the Cebu Community Hospital where he was dead on arrival. On July 5, 1989, two cases, one for murder and another for illegal possession of firearms, were filed against Macoy. Upon being arraigned, he pleaded "not guilty," after which the cases were consolidated and tried. On May 31, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment, acquitting Macoy of the charge of violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) but convicting him of murder. Issue: WON accused be acquitted because that the evidence against him is insufficient to sustain a conviction and that on the basis of the finding of the trial court that the gun he surrendered could not have been the one used in the killing of Paul Ocampo Held: It may be that Tueco did not see Macoy take aim and then shoot Ocampo, but this was because the incident, as far as he was concerned, was totally unexpected and because, as the medico-legal officer, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, theorized, the victim was fired upon at close range, possibly at a distance of only 24 inches away. 16 But this witness saw accused-appellant fire a gun and he was only three meters away from accused-appellant so that he could very well conclude that Ocampo had been shot. Hence his testimony that he witnessed the shooting of Ocampo. Manuel Tueco's positive testimony was corroborated by no less than a witness for the defense, Dr. Renato Obra, who testified that Macoy had confessed to him that he had shot Ocampo and that he did so because Ocampo refused to allow him to enter the beerhouse the night before the fatal incident. Accused-appellant himself admitted that before July 4, 1989, he had an altercation with the deceased because he wanted to have drinks but the deceased would not let him in, presumably because accused-appellant was not properly dressed. This divulgence of facts by Macoy constitutes an extrajudicial confession 21 which supplied his motive for committing the crime. It has been held that where the identity of the assailant is in dispute, motive becomes relevant, and when it is supported with sufficient evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sustainable

Second. Accused-appellant claims that Tueco had been "coached" and that his accounts were marked by inconsistencies, selfcontradictions, and incredible assertions. This is allegedly shown by the fact that even though the prosecution had not laid the basis for the identification of the assailant, Tueco was able to say that accused-appellant Lyndon Macoy had shot Paul Ocampo. Another manifestation of the fact that Tueco had been taught what to say, according to accused-appellant, was when Tueco referred to the waiter, who was pushed aside by Macoy, as a "witness." Accused-appellant further claims there were inconsistencies between Tueco's testimony and the testimonies of Piedad and Sanchez. To prove these, accused-appellant cites the fact that Sanchez and Piedad never mentioned a "friend" with whom Tueco claimed accused-appellant exchanged guns he had used in shooting Ocampo and who ran down the stairs with the accused-appellant and the fact that while Sanchez said people scampered after the gunshots, Tueco said the incident did not cause the people to run. These claims are insufficient to discredit Tueco and his testimony. When Tueco stated that accused-appellant Lyndon Macoy shot Paul Ocampo, he was responding to the question, "Who shot him [referring to Paul Ocampo]?" On the other hand, Tueco's reference to the waiter as a "witness" does not indicate prior knowledge by Tueco of Sanchez's testimony. In fact, accusedappellant now claims that the testimonies of Tueco and Sanchez are inconsistent with each other, although these inconsistencies relate to minor details which are expected of an "uncoached" witness, 23 and are in fact explainable. Thus, it has been held that when something is done quickly and unexpectedly, it is not unlikely that the witnesses may perceive the same set of facts in different ways. 24 It may therefore be that the reason Sanchez and Piedad did not mention the person with whom Macoy exchanged guns used in shooting Ocampo is precisely that they did not see him, although Tueco did. The same is true of Tueco's statement that although the people were scared they did not run away. Tueco may have been so startled by the events he saw that he did not equally perceive the events Sanchez did. Third. Accused-appellant contends finally that the trial court's decision has no basis in law or in fact. This is not true. The decision states the facts found by the court. The fact that the case law supporting it is not cited does not make the decision any less valid since it is implicit in the discussion of the evidence that discussion is made in the context of the law. Elucidation of the grounds of the decision would have been helpful in understanding it, but the want of this attribute does not militate against its validity. Some of the conclusions may even be erroneous. For example, we cannot understand why accused-appellant should be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession on the basis of finding that the slug recovered from the body of the victim was not fired from the gun seized from accused-appellant when the fact is that the gun, a .38 cal. paltik Smith & Wesson, was unlicensed. But this is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, and, precisely because the decision is valid this part of the decision cannot be reviewed on appeal without placing accused-appellant in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense. RTC decision is affirmed DAR vs Sutton a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)1 their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,2 this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.3 On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.4 Petitioner ignored their request. On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,5 which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.6

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order7 partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.8 They filed a notice of appeal9 with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.10 It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. ISSUE: WON DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 is constitutional , which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Held: The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.13 The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. 14 In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.15 Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. Alunan III vs Asuncion Resolution No. 93-0322 issued by petitioner National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), through its Chairman, petitioner Rafael Alunan III and its four Commissioners, Guillermo P. Enriquez, Jr., Edgar Dula Torre, Federico S. Comandante and Alexis Canonizado. The Resolution provides, as follows This Resolution became the subject of a Prohibition and Mandamus suit filed with respondent court by private respondents in their capacity as agents and regular employees of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).4Private respondents complained that the Resolution violates provisions of R.A. No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP) and RA. No. 5750, the law governing CIS agents. According to private respondents, R.A. No. 5750, which granted CIS agents, including civilian operatives, police powers, has not been repealed by R.A. No. 6975, such that the CIS agents absorbed into the PNP, including civilian operatives, still enjoy the police powers granted to them by RA. No. 5750. On November 25, 1993, respondent court issued a Temporary Restraining Order5 against petitioners, followed by a writ of preliminary injunction6 enjoining the implementation of the Resolution. Following hearing on the merits of the case, respondent Court rendered the Judgment subject of the instant Petition, granting the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed by private respondents; thereby permanently enjoining the implementation of the subject Resolution and any plans to phase out the CIS civilian operatives or deprive them of their police functions.1wphi1.nt

ISSUE WON RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESOLUTION NO. 92-032 DOES NOT VIOLATE R.A. NO. 6975 BUT ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTS IT. Does this violate R.A. No. 6975? We find that it does not. Urged by the Constitutional mandate for the establishment and maintenance of one police force,8 R.A. No. 6975 was promulgated creating the Philippine National Police. The new police absorbed the members of the former National Police Commission, Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police, all three of which were accordingly abolished.9 R.A. No. 6975, therefore, had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substituting a new unified one in its place. This, alone, proves that R.A. No. 5750 has already been repealed because a subsequent statute revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the earlier statute. The revising statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom is discarded.10 Further, with the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary, including, necessarily, its Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), R.A. No. 5750, which provides for the qualifications, selection and appointment of civilian investigation agents of the CIS as well as their powers as peace officers, has been rendered inutile. Indeed, considering that CIS members have been absorbed by the new PNP, R.A. No. 5750 has lost its function. Not only has R.A. No. 5750 lost its raison d'etre by reason of the abolition of the CIS which is its sole subject matter. A point by point analysis of the law itself will readily show that it has, indeed, been superseded by R.A. No. 6975, the PNP law. To start off, Section 30 of R.A. No. 6975 lists down the qualifications for appointment to the PNP, thus superseding Section 1 of R.A. No. 5750. Then, too, the position of Deputy Chief as provided for under Section 2 no longer exists inasmuch as the head of the equivalent Criminal Investigation Unit is now, under Section 35(b)(4), a Director with the rank of chief superintendent. Neither is the period within which to comply with qualification requirements provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 5750, still available under the PNP law, which only concedes alternative requirements insofar as educational requirements are concerned for those already in the service upon its effectivity. Finally, the police powers provided for under Section 5, as well as the oath and subpoena powers underSection 6, of R.A. No. 5750 are also provided for under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6975. In fight of the foregoing, it stands clear that respondent court was in error in holding that "(W)ithout an express provision in the PNP Law which states clearly and explicitly that RA 5750 has been modified or repealed, such repeal or modification cannot be assumed." At any rate, it is beyond dispute that the police powers provided for under R.A. No. 5750 are also provided for under the PNP law. The issue lies in the question as to who can exercise such police powers. We must stress that the questioned Resolution does not strip all former CIS agents of police powers. As clarified above, only those who opted not to join the uniformed personnel of the PNP are effectively denied such powers. In effect, therefore, what is being introduced by the questioned Resolution is the concept that CIS civilian operatives may no longer, under the PNP structure, enjoy police powers. As stated in the questioned Resolution, "R.A. No. 6975 envisioned the PNP as a single national police organization, composed entirely of uniformed personnel who are to be appointed to their respective police ranks, governed by one set of standards and covered by its own retirement and disciplinary systems." Accordingly, police powers have been reserved for such uniformed personnel of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 in Civil Case No. Q-93-18393 is SET ASIDE. Let new judgment issue dismissing Civil Case No. Q-9318393 for lack of merit. CIR v. Primetown Property Group GR 161155; August 28, 2007 Facts: Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondents paid in 1997. The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. According to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. Issue: Whether or not the counting of the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claim of refund is governed by the Civil Code. Held: Counting of 2-year period for filing claim for refund is no longer in accordance with Art 13 of the Civil Code but under Sec 31 of EO 227 - The Administrative Code of 1987. As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. In the case at bar, there are 24 calendar months in 2 years. For a Final Corporate ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should start from Apr 15, 1998 and end on Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is 1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 . 24th month - Mar 15, 2000 to Apr 14, 2000. National Marketing v. Tecson, 139 Phil 584 (1969) is no longer controlling. The 2-year period should start to run from filing of the final adjusted return. We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period