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Thomas H. Kean CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton

VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste

Max Cleland

Fred F. Fielding

Jamie S. Gorelick

Slade Gorton

John F. Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer

James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") has been established pursuant to Public Law 107- 306; and

WHEREAS Section 605(a)(l)(A) of Public Law 107-306 provides that the Commission or, "on the authority of the Commission," any member thereof, may, among other powers, administer oaths for the purpose of carrying out the Commission's statutory mandate; NOW THEREFORE IT IS

RESOLVED that each individual member of the Commission shall have the authority, on behalf of the Commission, to administer an oath to any witness being interviewed by the Commission or by members of the Commission's staff, upon the request of the Commission's Chair and Vice Chair or upon the request of the Commission's Executive Director and General Counsel; AND IT IS FURTHER

RESOLVED that any oaths previously administered by individuals members of the Commission, upon the request of the Commission's Chair and Vice Chair or upon the request of the Commission's Executive Director and General Counsel, to witnesses being interviewed by the Commission or by members of the Commission's staff, were administered on the authority of the Commission.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION on November 7, 2003, in Washington, D.C.

Thomas H. Kean Chair^

Lee H. Hamilton Vice Chair

Philip D.'Zelikrfw Executive Director

301 7th Street SW, Suite 5125 Washington, DC 20407 T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

26 Federal Plaza Suite 13-100 New York, NY 10278 T 212.264.1505 F212.264.1595

Thomas H. Kean CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste

Max Cleland

Frederick F.Fielding

Jamie S. Gorelick

Slade Gorton

John F. Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer

James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

DETERMINATION

Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the Intelligence Community, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States hereby determines that:

(a) The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the following areas of inquiry relating to the Intelligence Community:

• The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida;

• The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships with foreign governments, especially Iraq and Iran;

• The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida, whether from organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from other organizations, such as Hizbollah;

• The immediate response of the United States to the attacks;

• Lessons learned and the counterterrorism policies, programs, and procedures instituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks of September 11, 2001;

• The role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence inside the United States; and

• Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism policies and programs.

(b) The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating to the Intelligence Community, some of them extensively, but did not complete its investigation into:

• The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including the higher-level direction of the conspiracy and the activities of the Hamburg cell;

• The activities of the conspirators and their support network inside the United States;

• The global financing network of Al Qa'ida, including the financing of the September 11, 2001 plot;

• Controversies over the policy guidance provided by the Executive Branch for the Intelligence Community's international counterterrorism efforts, includingthe context and details of the debates over covert action and alternative options;

301 7lh Street SW, Room 5125

Washington, DC 20407 T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

Determination

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• The relative priority of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism mission as compared to other Intelligence Community missions;

• National organization and management of the Intelligence Community in performance of its counterterrorism mission;

• Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of the United States;

• Collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism intelligence, including policies, standards, and practices for gathering and pooling of foreign and domestic information against a transnational target;

• Legal authorities for counterterrorism intelligence work inside and outside the United States;

• Liaison with foreign governments in counterterrorism efforts, including the character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan both before and after the attacks;

• Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against the United States, including the sharing of appropriate warning information with the private sector; and

• Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress and Executive Branch for the counterterrorism mission.

(c) The Joint Inquiry concluded its research and investigative work along various tracks at different times during 2002. New information not reviewed by the Joint Inquiry has become available with respect to the facts and circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the immediate response of the United States to the attacks, and the lessons learned from the attacks.

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's investigation progresses or as new information comes to the Commission's attention.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. Kean Chair

.

/Va^^f^-l

Lee H. Hamilton Vice Chair

Philip D. Zehlcow Executive Director

Date:

May 12, 2003

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