Thomas H.

Kean RESOLUTION
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton WHEREAS the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
VICE CHAIR
States (the "Commission") has been established pursuant to Public Law 107-
Richard Ben-Veniste 306; and
Max Cleland
WHEREAS Section 605(a)(l)(A) of Public Law 107-306 provides that the
Fred F. Fielding Commission or, "on the authority of the Commission," any member thereof,
may, among other powers, administer oaths for the purpose of carrying out
Jamie S. Gorelick the Commission's statutory mandate; NOW THEREFORE IT IS
Slade Gorton
RESOLVED that each individual member of the Commission shall have the
John F. Lehman authority, on behalf of the Commission, to administer an oath to any witness
being interviewed by the Commission or by members of the Commission's
Timothy J. Roemer
staff, upon the request of the Commission's Chair and Vice Chair or upon the
James R. Thompson request of the Commission's Executive Director and General Counsel; AND
IT IS FURTHER
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR RESOLVED that any oaths previously administered by individuals members
of the Commission, upon the request of the Commission's Chair and Vice
Chair or upon the request of the Commission's Executive Director and
General Counsel, to witnesses being interviewed by the Commission or by
members of the Commission's staff, were administered on the authority of
the Commission.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION on November 7, 2003, in Washington,

D.C.

Thomas H. Kean
Chair^

Lee H. Hamilton
Vice Chair

Philip D.'Zelikrfw
Executive Director

301 7th Street SW, Suite 5125 26 Federal Plaza

Washington, DC 20407 Suite 13-100
T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545 New York, NY 10278
www.9-1 lcommission.gov T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595
Thomas H. Kean DETERMINATION
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions,
VICE CHAIR and recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the
Richard Ben-Veniste Intelligence Community, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States hereby determines that:
Max Cleland

Frederick F. Fielding
(a) The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the following areas of inquiry
relating to the Intelligence Community:
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
• The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida;
• The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships with foreign
governments, especially Iraq and Iran;
• The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al
Qa'ida, whether from organizations directly affiliated with Al
Qa'ida or from other organizations, such as Hizbollah;
• The immediate response of the United States to the attacks;
• Lessons learned and the counterterrorism policies, programs,
and procedures instituted by the Intelligence Community after
the attacks of September 11, 2001;
• The role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the
collection, analysis, and use of intelligence inside the United
States; and
• Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism policies and programs.

(b) The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating
to the Intelligence Community, some of them extensively, but did not
complete its investigation into:

• The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including

the higher-level direction of the conspiracy and the activities
of the Hamburg cell;
• The activities of the conspirators and their support network
inside the United States;
• The global financing network of Al Qa'ida, including the
financing of the September 11, 2001 plot;
• Controversies over the policy guidance provided by the
Executive Branch for the Intelligence Community's
international counterterrorism efforts, including the context
and details of the debates over covert action and alternative
options;
301 7 lh Street SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407
T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545
www.9-1 lcommission.gov
 Determination
Page 2
• The relative priority of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism
mission as compared to other Intelligence Community missions;
• National organization and management of the Intelligence Community in
performance of its counterterrorism mission;
• Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community
counterterrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of the United
States;
• Collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism
intelligence, including policies, standards, and practices for gathering and
pooling of foreign and domestic information against a transnational target;
• Legal authorities for counterterrorism intelligence work inside and outside
the United States;
• Liaison with foreign governments in counterterrorism efforts, including the
character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan both
before and after the attacks;
• Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against the United States,
including the sharing of appropriate warning information with the private
sector; and
• Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress and
Executive Branch for the counterterrorism mission.

(c) The Joint Inquiry concluded its research and investigative work along various tracks
at different times during 2002. New information not reviewed by the Joint Inquiry
has become available with respect to the facts and circumstances of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the immediate response of the United States to the
attacks, and the lessons learned from the attacks.

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's investigation
progresses or as new information comes to the Commission's attention.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. Kean
Chair

. /Va^^f^-l .

Lee H. Hamilton
Vice Chair

Philip D. Zehlcow
Executive Director

Date: May 12, 2003