Velasquez vs Tuquero FACTS: Felix A.

Velasquez, as Executive Vice-President/Managing Director of Techtrade, filed a complaint for estafa against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Assistant Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief, Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter set aside Fiscal Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of an information for estafa against Avila in the RTC. Before arraignment, Avila filed in the DOJ a petition for review which Velasquez opposed. On February 15, 1988, Justice Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III denied the petition for review. A motion for reconsideration of the denial did not prosper. On October 14, 1988, Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4, 1989. He directed the City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation of this case to afford respondent to properly present evidence that he was duly authorized to pay the subject creditors and for complainant to rebut the same with controverting evidence, and thereafter to resolve the case anew on the basis of all the evidence adduced. The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of that resolution but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the Undersecretary of Justice has the authority in ordering the re-investigation of the criminal case. HELD: No, the Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his power in ordering the same. In the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, where the SC ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that. In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ordering the re-investigation of the criminal case against Avila after it had been filed in court. The avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the private respondent to present an authentic copy of the board resolution of the offended party (Techtrade Management International Corporation) which [allegedly] had authorized him to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the corporation" can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court where that piece of evidence may be presented by the accused as part of his defense. PEOPLE VS MONTESA FACTS: An information was filed with the RTC of Bulacan charging private respondents Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz with the crime of falsification of public document. Before arraignment, the private respondents filed with the RTC a petition for reinvestigation on the ground that "after the information was filed, material and relevant evidence was discovered which, if

presented in a reinvestigation, will certainly alter the earlier finding of probable cause." Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order granting the petition for reinvestigation, remanding the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for purposes of reinvestigation. At the reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor, the accused presented what it considered new material and relevant evidence which consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she was the one responsible for the preparation of the questioned public document then recommended for the dismissal of the case because the issue is now moot due to the admission by Feliza Constantino in the aforesaid affidavit submitted. On 22 December 1993, the respondent Judge ordered the arraignment of the private respondents. They pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, the RTC issued an order dismissing the case on the basis of the Rutors resolution. On 5 January 1994, the private prosecutor, who received a copy of the dismissal order filed a motion for its reconsideration. He alleged therein that the Rutor resolution was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who, on the contrary, directed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor to proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; and that the unapproved resolution did not invalidate of modify the information already filed, neither did it serve as basis for the court's order summarily dismissing the case. He further alleged that since the court had arraigned the accused, it should have, pursuant to the Rules, scheduled the case for pre-trial and trial. At the hearing of the motion for reconsideration, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor vehemently opposed it on the ground that the private prosecutor has no personality to intervene in the proceedings and that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for lack of his "(Rutor's) conformity. The respondent Judge forthwith denied the motion. On 12 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor and the private prosecutor jointly filed another motion to reconsider the dismissal order. In his order of 1 February 1994, the respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time as a copy of the order of dismissal was received by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor, and he declared that the motion for reconsideration earlier filed by the private prosecutor "is of no moment as it does not have the imprimatur of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and perforce does not affect the running of the prescriptive period." ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the case. HELD: Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion and therefore the motion to dismiss the case is null and void. In Marcelo vs. CA, this Court ruled that the RTC in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice. In the case at bar, the resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the

reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Findings and conclusion of the Provincial Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should have been the sole and only valid basis for the respondent Judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation. PILAPIL VS SOMERA FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera. A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. ISSUE: whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. HELD: The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private

respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. PEOPLE VS PONELAS FACTS: Salvador Ponelas and Javier Enorio were charged with rape before the Court of First Instance of Manila. Both were found guilty and sentenced each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Both appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, Ponelas moved to withdraw his appeal which was granted. And when counsel for the accused gave notice that he would only raise questions of law, the case was certified to this Court as required by law. Be noted that the victim had died and it was her Aunt Leonor Sarabia who filed the complaint to the Fiscals office. It developed, however, after the prosecution had rested its case, that Leonor was presented as witness by the defense and testified that she made a mistake in her identification claiming that although the deceased bore a marked similarity to her missing niece, she was not the one because her niece turned out to be alive. According to Leonor, the name of her missing niece was Amalia Sarabia whereas the name of the victim was Flora de Cesareo. And in view of this change in the attitude of Leonor Sarabia, counsel for the defense now contends, as he did in the lower court, that the latter lost jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: since the crime of rape can only be prosecuted upon complaint of the offended party, her parents, grandparents, or guardian, does failure to comply with this requirement affect the jurisdiction of the trial court? HELD: No, the RTC did not lost jurisdiction over the case. Leonor Sarabia of her own accord and free will and as guardian of the victim, instituted the original action. Such complaint, the RTC believes, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to take cognizance or try on the case on the merits. While under Article 344 abovementioned the offense of rape can only be prosecuted upon the complaint filed by the offended party, her parents, grandparents or guardian, and that unless this requirement is complied with the prosecution may fail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, we believe however that in this particular case, it cannot be successfully maintained that there is a failure of compliance with this requirement it appearing that Leonor Sarabia has filed the complaint as guardian of the victim after satisfying herself that the one lying in the morgue which she carefully examined and identified was really her niece of which she stood as her guardian in the City of Manila. While Leonor on the witness stand affirmed that she committed a mistake in the identification of the victim, her testimony was not however given credence by the trial court considering her wavering attitude and the apparent discrepancies noted in her testimony.