Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
in
m
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9/11 Excursion
(AA77and UA93)
Facts:
• 0902 EOT Second World Trade Tower (WTT) hit
o
o
• 0909 EOT Battle Stations for the NORAD F-16s at Langley AFB H
Assumptions (if a scramble order had been given after 2nd WTT hit):
• 0910 EOT - Two F-16s takeoff from Langley AFB for NCR air patrol
• 0925 EOT - F-16s on station over the NCR flying air patrol
• The F-16s would have had 12 minutes of patrol time before AA77 hit
• The F-16s carry radar and IR missiles and a gun
• The air patrol is a box pattern (12 nm per side) centered on the
White House
• Hostile aircraft not squawking so transponder interrogation will not
be done
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00001 Folder: 0001 Document: 25
Series: Dana Hyde Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 1
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 382
Withdrawn: 09-05-2008 by:
Help from the FAA? The FAA lost contact with AA77 when its oo
CO
transponder was turned off at 0851 EDT over West Virginia. The FAA at ro
DCA located AA77 at 0933, but NEADS was not notified until 0936. o
o
NEADS did not have time to do anything about it
Help from NEADS? NEADS never saw AA77, so no cueing was
possible. The best NEADS could do would have been to make a radio
call to "look over there"
The theoretical best that could be achieved by the FAA and NEADS is
the following chain:
• 0933 - DCA FAA calls FAAWashington Center
• 0936 - The FAA Washington Center calls NEADS There was at most 1.5
minutes for the F-16s
• ???? - NEADS calls the F-16s to respond
to respond
• ???? - The F-16s respond before 0937.5
• 0937.5 - AA77 Impact
UNCLASSIFIED
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148
Box: 00001 Folder: 0001 Document: 26
Series: Dana Hyde Files
Copies: 1 Pages: 2
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.
NND: 382
Withdrawn: 09-05-2008 by:
Facts:
01
ro
• 0946 EOT - Radar contact lost with UA93 f-
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U
• 1003 EOT - UA93 Crashes into Shanksville,PA 53
Assumptions:
• UA93 does not crash into Shanksville, PA
• 1003 EOT - UA93 is flown directly to either Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia, New York City, or Washington, DC
• UA93 flies perfectly straight at 400 knots with no turns
• The NORAD fighters will follow the same ROEs as AA77
• NORAD fighters are flying air patrol over NYC and DC
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
o\O
f-
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Detroit
New fork
Philadelphia
''asiiDC
8
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
00
•*
CTl
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• The previous analysis of AA77 made it clear that relying o
o
H
U
on visual pickup of an airliner will most likely not
provide enough time to respond
• Even with every variable optimized, the only reason
there may have been 2 minutes to respond is that AA77
made a 3-minute turn at the very end
• The remainder of the UA93 analysis will assume cueing
9
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Washington, DC
• The above diagram shows that even with perfect cueing, there is no
possible way that either the NYC or NCR air patrols could reach
Pittsburgh in time to stop UA93
• At 400 knots, UA93 would hit Pittsburgh in 13 minutes
• At Mach 1.4 with perfect cueing, it would still take the DC air patrol
15 minutes just to get to Pittsburgh
• No further analysis will be done on Pittsburgh
10
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Protecting Philadelphia
in
109 miles
hiladelphia
Washington, DC
11
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Cueing Requirements
• Washington:
8 minutes
Philadelphia:
14 minutes
13
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Conclusion
oo
•<*
en
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14
UNCLASSIFIED
NCT0073949