RESOLUTION TO INCORPORATE INTO THE BILL OF RIGHTS A PROVISION RECOGNIZING AND DEFENDING RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN HUMAN

EMBRYO Introduced by Honorable Quesada, Romulo, Sarmiento, Villegas, Colayco and Bengzon, Jr. RESOLUTION INCORPORATING IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION A PROVISION THAT UNBORN CHILDREN SHALL BE POSSESSORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE FIRST MOMENT OF CONCEPTION Introduced by Honorable Bacani FR BERNAS: I mention this because in recent years, largely through the influence of socialism and with abundant help from the teachings of the Popes, there have arisen what are called social and economic rights. In the scheme of our work, I consider the social and economic rights principally the concern of the Committee on Social Justice. What distinguishes these new economic and social rights from the traditional liberties in the Bill of Rights is that in the strict sense the former are not rights which operate without implementing legislation, but rather they are more properly claims or demands on the state; they need implementing action by the state. Without the implementing action, they generally cannot be enforced against anybody by judicial action. FR BERNAS: For a brief rundown of the innovations the Committee proposes: On Section I, the phrase "fertilized ovum" on line 10 may I ask everyone to turn his report to the page with the numbered lines might sound jarring to the legal ear. But if we explain the intent, one might be able to coin a more felicitous phrase than "fertilized ovum." The intent of this addition is to preclude the Supreme Court from following the United States doctrine which does not begin to weigh the life of the unborn against that of the mother until the fetus has reached a viable stage of development. In American doctrine, during the first six months of pregnancy, the only requirement for allowing abortion is that it will not be harmful to the mother. It is only after the sixth month that the life of the fetus begins to be weighed against the life of the mother. The innovation does not say that from the first moment the sperm and the egg shake hands, human life is already present, much less does it say that at that moment, a soul is infused; nor does the innovation say that the right to life of the fertilized ovum must prevail over the life of the mother all the time. All that the innovation says is that from the moment of fertilization, the ovum should be treated as life whose worth must be weighed against the life of the woman, not necessarily saying that they are of equal worth. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Suarez be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Suarez is recognized. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. I was jarred the moment I read Commissioner Bernas' Section 1. He used a very descriptive phrase which is grating to lawyers. I am referring to the phrase: "The right to life extends to the fertilized ovum." I really do not know the meaning of "fertilized ovum." Will the Commissioner be kind enough to explain this particular phrase to us since it relates to the word "person" under Section I of the Article on the Bill of Rights? FR. BERNAS: The question really contains two questions: (1) What is the meaning of a fertilized ovum? (2) Is the fertilized ovum whatever it is a person which is a subject of rights? How do we describe a fertilized ovum? I wish we had a physician here; I, myself, am not happy using this phrase. MR. SUAREZ: If the Commissioner is not happy using this phrase, will he join me in seeking the deletion of that phrase "fertilized ovum" at the proper time? FR. BERNAS: I will join efforts to find a more felicitous phrase. As I said, the main idea here is that we want to stop the Philippine Supreme Court from adopting the American doctrine on abortion. This American doctrine on abortion is based on a similar constitutional provision on due process, and, as the doctrine now exists in the case of Roe v. Wade, it, in effect, says that during the first two trimesters or the first six months of conception, abortion can be allowed anytime, provided that the method used will not endanger the mother. Abortion can be allowed, anytime, even if it is not medically needed for the mother. The only condition is that it should not endanger the life of the mother. It is only after the second trimester that the life of the fetus begins to be considered as against the life of the mother. That is the whole purpose of this. MR. SUAREZ: In other words, it is anticipatory in character.

FR. BERNAS: Yes. MR. SUAREZ: But does the term "fertilized ovum" with reference to the first sentence of Section I refer to a person? In other words, is the fertilized ovum already elevated to the category of a person as to enjoy a constitutional right? Is that the meaning? FR. BERNAS: My own thinking would be that it is not a person yet. That is my own thinking, so that perhaps this whole sentence must be modified to express it in such a way that it is not an assertion that this begins to become a person from the very first moment or nine months before birth. As I said, I am in search of a proper way of expressing this. Perhaps you could say "protection of life should extend to the fertilized ovum." MR. SUAREZ: Be that as it may, when we give unto the fertilized ovum the right to life and that life is killed, would the Gentleman consider the perpetrator an offender susceptible to the crime of murder? cda FR. BERNAS: If the Gentleman asks me, even under the Penal Code, that would not be murder but abortion. MR. SUAREZ: Because when one deprives a person of his or her life in a deliberate malicious way, he would be charged with the crime of murder. FR. BERNAS: My understanding of the law on homicide and murder is that if one deprives a person who is already outside the womb of life, that is when there is murder or homicide. But if one deprives somebody of life who is still in the womb, it would be abortion. Perhaps Commissioner Padilla could help me out on this. MR. SUAREZ: That is from the criminal aspect; let me go to the civil aspect. Would the Gentleman give a fertilized ovum the right to succession? FR. BERNAS: No, that is not covered here. MR. SUAREZ: Because the word "person" here refers to life, liberty or property, and so the Gentleman would deny unto this fertilized ovum the right to liberty and the right to property? FR. BERNAS: Yes, it cannot do much as far as physical liberty is concerned because wherever his mother goes . . . MR. SUAREZ: The Gentleman would not be discriminating against the fertilized ovum? FR. BERNAS: I would be; but the law against discrimination recognizes real differences, and I think there is a very real difference between an unborn child and a born child. MR. SUAREZ: I have a number of questions more to address, but may I reserve these at the proper time. FR. BERNAS: Since I do not want to monopolize this, I think Bishop Bacani, member of the Committee, would like to say something about the original proposal. BISHOP BACANI: The formulation reached by the Committee was "fertilized ovum," to precisely define what we meant. And it will be brought forward in another committee report that the right to life begins with conception. That is meant to explain what is understood on the committee report by the word "conception." The Gentleman was asking whether this is a human person. That is not the assertion yet of this section. But what we do assert is this, that this is human life already. If I may be allowed to read the results of the report by Fr. Robert Henley, who is also a Jesuit like Fr. Bernas, it seems they are in all camps. Let me just read this into the record. He says: Specializing as it does in fetal physiology, Georgetown University, probably more than almost any other university, is aware of the biological facts regarding the beginnings of human life. From the moment of conception a new biological entity exists. The entity cannot be considered as physically identical with the mother's body. To consider the matter broadly, there is no essential difference between an ovum fertilized within the body and an ovum fertilized outside the parent's body or rejected in an egg or emerging undeveloped, as in marsupials, in an external pouch. To destroy this entity is to destroy an existing life. Since this life entity is clearly within the development of the human species, there is obviously nothing added on a human being. Its destruction is the destruction of human life. Murder cannot be justified by a legal fiction. cdtai So, I just want to read that into the record. FR. BERNAS: I think Commissioner Padilla wants to say something. MR. PADILLA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Commissioner Padilla is recognized. MR. PADILLA: My humble name was mentioned and I would like to state that under the Civil Code, a fertilized ovum is not yet a person. However, a fertilized ovum may have the right to life. That is the reason why the Revised Penal Code penalizes the crime of abortion. The Penal Code is quite strict because even

if the abortion is not through violence, even if it is with the consent of the mother or the grandparents, it is still penalized. Even if the intention or the purpose is to conceal the dishonor of the mother because she has become pregnant without the identity or much less the marriage of the father, that circumstance is only mitigating. So this matter is fully covered by the Civil Code, not only the crime but also the penalty of punishment of it as a crime against persons, and also includes infanticide, in case the baby is born but is killed within three days. These are all penalized and are covered already by the Civil Code and the Penal Code. There seems to be no need to place it in the Constitution. Many a time Commissioner Bernas has said that is proper in legislation. So, why should we make any exception to fertilized ovum? Even the controversial issue of the death penalty, is the proper domain of legislation. MR. ROMULO: Madam President, just a question to Commissioner Padilla. Suppose a fertilized ovum is done outside the womb, that is, on a test tube and the nurse should accidentally spill it, is she guilty of abortion? MR. PADILLA: The Gentleman used the word "accidentally" that is recognized as an exempting circumstance. MR. ROMULO: I will amend it to purposely. MR. PADILLA: Provided the four requisites are present such as lawful act, with due care, cause injury to another without fault or intention of causing it. Those are some of the exempting circumstances provided in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. If it is intentional, so long as it is an unlawful act, it is punishable, even if the act done be different from that which he intended. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability arises not only when there is dolus or criminal intent but also when there is culpa or negligence, lack of diligence, lack of care, lack of skill, etc. FR. BERNAS: While Commissioner Padilla is on the floor, may I just ask one clarificatory question? Suppose our Supreme Court were to adopt the American Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, would that do away with many of our abortion laws? MR. PADILLA: No, I do not believe so because the Supreme Court cannot legislate and our laws are very clear, that abortion in whatever form is always penalized. FR. BERNAS: Precisely, the decision in Roe v. Wade said that the state cannot prohibit abortion during the first two trimesters if the abortion can be done without damage to the health or life of the mother. MR. PADILLA: But that is not our law. FR. BERNAS: That is why my question is hypothetical. If our Supreme Court were to follow that lead, would that do away with much of our abortion laws? MR. PADILLA: No, I do not believe the Supreme Court can amend our law. So abortion is penalized and our law does not provide "unless it be without danger to the life of the mother," and the Supreme Court cannot adopt such foreign element. FR. BERNAS: Suppose our Supreme Court were to say that existing abortion laws in the Philippines are unconstitutional because they violate the right of privacy of the mother, which was the reasoning in the American Supreme Court. MR. PADILLA: The Supreme Court will have to hold that our laws on abortion are unconstitutional. FR. BERNAS: Correct, this is precisely to prevent the Supreme Court from arriving at a similar conclusion. MR. PADILLA: I believe that is going too far, that the legislature should first amend the Revised Penal Code before the Supreme Court can assume the prerogative of reversing or repealing our law on abortion, because that matter is essentially legislative. FR. BERNAS: But suppose the person is accused of abortion and his defense is that our abortion law is unconstitutional and, therefore, he should not be convicted. MR. PADILLA: If the Supreme Court should make the mistake of legislating and of ignoring our present law on abortion as unconstitutional, that is a possibility that I would not even consider. FR. BERNAS: So, it is the position of the Gentleman that the Supreme Court cannot declare laws unconstitutional. MR. PADILLA: No, precisely, I do not believe that our penal law on abortion is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court may declare a law unconstitutional if it is clearly against the Constitution, or if it is a violation of the Constitution, especially of the fundamental rights of citizens or persons. We all accept that the Supreme Court, which is said to be the weakest department of government, is in a sense the strongest because it has the prerogative of declaring a legislative act or an executive order invalid and illegal if it violates or contravenes the Constitution.

FR. BERNAS: In the same way, for instance, that in Roe v. Wade, the American Supreme Court declared abortion laws unconstitutional because the American Supreme Court considered them violations of the right of privacy. MR. PADILLA: It is all hypothetical. FR. BERNAS: It is not hypothetical, it is in 410 U.S. 113. MR. PADILLA: What I mean by hypothetical is that which is invoking the U.S. decision, and yet our own Supreme Court will follow it on a particular case involving abortion. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Brocka be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Brocka is recognized. MR. BROCKA: Thank you, Madam President. Some of the questions I wanted to ask have already been asked. THE PRESIDENT: Will the Gentleman please talk louder. I have been requested by the people in the gallery; they cannot hear. They think we are just whispering among ourselves. MR. BROCKA: Thank you; I am sorry. Some of the questions I wanted to ask have been asked by Commissioner Suarez but I would still like to ask some of these questions for clarification because I feel very strongly that that particular line on Section I of the Bill of Rights "The right to life extends to the fertilized ovum." should be deleted. I feel that this sort of thing, like "love", is frighteningly catholic and is difficult to argue against. I just want to ask a few questions. Does this mean that abortion under any and all circumstances is a crime or violation of human rights?" FR. BERNAS: No. It does not mean that. MR. BROCKA: Does this apply to a situation where the mother might die if the pregnancy is allowed to continue? How about rape victims? Or any situation for that matter where the physical or psychological well-being of the woman would be endangered by an unwanted pregnancy? LexLib FR. BERNAS: It does not mean that. As I explained, the only object of this is to take away the complete liberty of a woman to get rid of the fetus, even if it in no way endangers her health or her life. MR. BROCKA: So, is it possible then that the provision is worded in such a way to make it very clear that what is banned is illegal abortion? FR. BERNAS: That is why I made an appeal for a more felicitous expression. MR. BROCKA: Thank you. FR. BERNAS: But certainly those matters the Gentleman is afraid of are something not intended at all by this provision. The argument in Roe v. Wade is that the important thing is the privacy of the mother's womb. If she wants to get rid of that fetus anytime within the first six months, it is allowed provided it can be done safely, even if there is no medical reason for it. That is the only thing contemplated in this. MR. BROCKA: Then, I suppose, as the Gentleman said, he is looking for a more felicitous word to describe that. In case the Gentleman cannot find the right phraseology, does this mean that the provision on the fertilized ovum will be placed in the Constitution with the original wording because it has sense of value? FR. BERNAS: If we are unable to find a better substitute and if the provision is approved, then the fertilized ovum will be implanted in the Constitution. (Laughter) MR. BROCKA: I do not think it should be implemented, for the simple reason that medically, there is no clear consensus that the fertilized ovum is considered human life. It may be a living thing and, for that matter, so is a tadpole. But there is no constitution in the world that gives right to life to tadpoles. Thank you. MR. RAMA: One last question, Madam President. Has Father Bernas been an expert on fertilized ovum? If so, where did he get his expertise? (Laughter) FR. BERNAS: I refuse to answer the question on the ground that it may incriminate me. (Laughter) SUSPENSION OF SESSION MR. RAMA: Madam President, I move that we suspend the session until two-thirty in the afternoon. THE PRESIDENT: The session is suspended until two-thirty this afternoon. It was 12:14 p.m. RESUMPTION OF SESSION At 2:51 p.m., the session was resumed. THE PRESIDENT: The session is resumed. MR. MONSOD: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized. MR. MONSOD: May we continue the period of sponsorship and debate. May I call on Commissioner Rigos, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rigos is recognized. May we request the other members of the Committee to please come forward and join Commissioner Bernas. REV. RIGOS: Madam President, my question is related to the first section of the proposed Bill of Rights. cdlex THE PRESIDENT: The Gentleman may proceed. REV. RIGOS: The first sentence is the same sentence we find in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions; I have no difficulty with that. But like a few people who spoke this morning, I am a bit disturbed by the second sentence: "The right to life extends to the fertilized ovum." Cdpr In discussing this proposed sentence, did the Committee consider the sensibilities of some religious groups which do not look at the fertilized ovum as having reached that stage that it can be described as human life? FR. BERNAS: Precisely, we used that word to try to avoid the debate on whether or not this is already human life. REV. RIGOS: I think the Commissioner will remember that in the Protestant community, for instance, there are those who put very much emphasis on the difference between abortion and miscarriage. This sentence tends to interpret abortion from the period of what we call fertilized ovum, and this can raise a lot of questions especially among the members of the religious minority. Does the Gentleman think it possible to abort this sentence at the proper time from this proposed Bill of Rights? FR. BERNAS: As I said before, the clear purpose of this and so long as this is something understood by the Commission is to avoid the over-liberal doctrine, the position taken by the American Supreme Court. As I said, the doctrine in the American Supreme Court is that during the first six months, the mother is absolutely free to abort or not to abort. And if the state were to pass a law prohibiting abortion, let us say in the second trimester, under that doctrine it would be unconstitutional because life is not a consideration but whether or not abortion or termination of the pregnancy is needed medically. Under that doctrine, during the fifth month, termination of the pregnancy, whether or not needed for the health or for the life of a woman, cannot be prohibited by law. The only thing that the law can do is to prescribe that it be done in a manner safe for that woman. That is the only thing about this. REV. RIGOS: Can we not achieve such objective through legislation? FR. BERNAS: As a matter of fact, if the consensus comes out that this body rejects that over-liberal American doctrine, I think we can do away with this expression. cdtai REV. RIGOS: I hope it will be possible for us to go along that way. Thank you, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bacani is recognized. BISHOP BACANI: I would like to express on behalf of others that the one important reason why I believe this cannot simply be left to legislation is this: We would like to have a constitutional damper already on the assault to human life at its early stages. And we realized that it can be possible to more easily change . . . easier to change legislation on abortion. Hence, we would like to be able to prevent those changes in the laws on abortion later. REV. RIGOS: But our religious authorities sharply differ in their opinions as to when human life can definitely be regarded to have commenced. If we constitutionalize the beginning of human life at a stage we call fertilized ovum, then we are putting a note of finality to the whole debate. BISHOP BACANI: I would just like to remind Reverend Rigos that when we talk about this, it is not a question of religious boundaries. In fact, let me just read what is contained in an article given by one of my researchers. It says that many scholarly Protestant and Jewish leaders are prominent in the pro-light movement and they are referring to the anti-abortion movement. I do not want to put this simply on the denominational plain, and it is misleading to put it at that level. REV. RIGOS: Yes. BISHOP BACANI: Because these are people who are not Catholics who are Jewish, Protestants, even atheists but who are against abortion. REV. RIGOS: I think the Gentleman is correct. On the whole, we can describe the Protestant church as against abortion. But there is a big segment in the Protestant church that wishes to make a clear distinction between what we call abortion and miscarriage.

BISHOP BACANI: Yes, there is nothing here against miscarriage. What I mean is that miscarriage is not being ruled out. In fact, miscarriage is an accident. REV. RIGOS: I thank the Commissioner. FR. BERNAS: Madam President, may I take this opportunity to ask the Gentleman his own assessment of the cultural values today. As I said, as far as I am concerned, my only purpose in trying to defend this is to prevent the Supreme Court from taking an over-liberal approach to abortion. Is it the judgment of the Gentleman that that is something that will not happen in the culture of our country? REV. RIGOS: It is my judgment that such an objective can be achieved through legislation. And if we were to do it through legislation, there is little leeway for the Congress to consider the various conflicting views on the subject. At this juncture, the President relinquished the Chair to the Honorable Florenz D. Regalado. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, may I call on Commissioner Aquino? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to react to the position of Commissioner Bacani, if I may be allowed the liberty of treading into the domain of the celibates. I suppose I am entitled, I am unmarried anyway. BISHOP BACANI: The Commissioner is also a celibate up to now. MS. AQUINO: Yes. FR. BERNAS: She has admitted it. MS. AQUINO: Welcome to the club. It should be sufficient to note briefly the way the discussions have been unfolding that there is a wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth. This is the belief of the stoics and a certain predominant section of the Jewish faith, if I am not mistaken. It is my fear, however, that the moment we constitutionalize the term "fertilized ovum" (it may sound gross but that is how it is worded) it might disturb settled jurisprudence in civil law. Law and jurisprudence permits parents of a stillborn child to maintain a suit for wrongful death arising from prenatal injuries. But this right is in vindication of the personal interest of the parents, not the child. Civil law would likewise recognize the right of an unborn child, the inchoate right to future inheritance. But again that is contingent upon live birth, which is the perfection of that inchoate right. In other words, law and jurisprudence are settled that the personality and the right of a person do not ripen until one is born alive. LexLib Madam President, I would now like to react to Commissioner Bacani to say that life is present at conception is to give recognition to the potential rather than the actual. And I believe that in the domain of the Constitution, it is not up for us to preempt the question. The unfertilized egg has life, and if fertilized, takes on human proportions. I am willing to concede to that, but the law and our Constitution should deal with reality not obscurity, the known rather than the unknown. We should deal with facts rather than conjecture. It may be true that when the sperm shakes hand with the egg, it may eventually live, but it may also die. The Constitution should not deal with speculation. The phenomenon called life takes time to develop; in other words, a fetus represents nothing more than a potentiality for life. Conception is a process over time; it is not an event by itself. We do not have to resolve the question of when life begins now, when even those who are trained in their respective fields of medicine, philosophy or theology are unable to arrive at any consensus. I would doubt very much if this Commission mostly considers the predominant influence of celibates like us, at this point in the development of man's knowledge if we are in any position to prejudge this question. MR. OPLE: Why did the Commissioner not take a vow? MS. AQUINO: That does not preclude me from taking a vow later. On the point raised by Father Bernas, I think his fear is as I would say it more apparent than real. The Commissioner's doubt about the possibility of the Supreme Court adopting the jurisprudence in Roe v. Wade is way off mark. Filipino culture would not allow abortion that is unqualified and unconditional. On this point, I would like to propose a felicitous formulation although I do not think this rightfully belongs in the Constitution. Generally, the laws in the United States would provide for stages in pregnancy and conception, like for the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left entirely to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. For the stage subsequent to approximately the age of the first trimester, the state in promoting its interest in the health of the mother may, if it so chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. And for the stage subsequent to viability, the state in promoting its

interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it so chooses, regulate and even proscribe abortion. MR. NOLLEDO: Will the Commissioner please yield to interpellations? MS. AQUINO: Yes, gladly. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you. I would like to mention three terms in relation to the fertilized ovum: life, human and personality. Does the fertilized ovum have life? MS. AQUINO: That belongs to the field of medicine, but I believe that even an unfertilized egg, an egg that belongs to a man, has life itself. (Laughter) It takes human proportion only if it meets the sperm. The Gentleman was referring to the sperm or egg. Without prejudging medical science, I believe that unfertilized egg or sperm has life, but it begins to assume human proportion only if it meets the partner. MR. NOLLEDO: I remember Mr. Tolentino saying in his book that personality can also begin upon conception based on what is known as presumptive personality. Second question: Can the fertilized ovum be considered human? Is it a human being? MS. AQUINO: Yes, in the sense that it begins to assume the proportions of a human person. MR. NOLLEDO: And while it is a fertilized ovum based on the Tolentino opinion, it has a presumptive personality because under the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is considered born for all purposes favorable to it. So it can inherit, it can be a recipient of a donation, it can be a recipient of any benefit. llcd MS. AQUINO: Presumptive personality, yes; but this is conditional, meaning, the perfection of personality is contingent upon being born alive. MR. NOLLEDO: So, the recommendation of the Committee is that the right to life extends to the fertilized ovum. Where is the speculation there? The Commissioner said that the Constitution should not deal on speculations. I do not see any speculation. MS. AQUINO: Speculation lies precisely on this: A fertilized egg or sperm or whatever is a fertilized egg or sperm, meaning, whether or not it will live or die is a matter of conjecture. MR. NOLLEDO: It can die any time in the same manner that we human beings do. It can die at any time. So, while the fertilized ovum remains as such and continues in different stages, does the Commission agree with me, if I say that it has really the right to life? MS. AQUINO: I cannot. This is very instructive because as the Commissioner will note, even this Commission cannot settle the question of whether a fertilized egg has the right to life or not. Those experts in the field of medicine and theology cannot settle this question. It is bad enough for us to preempt this controversial issue by constitutionalizing the ovum; it would be doubly tragic for us to provide for ambiguities which may even disturb settled jurisprudence. MR. NOLLEDO: I do not think there is ambiguity because the fertilized egg, in the normal course of events, will be developed into a human being, a fetus, and as long as the normal course of events is followed. I think the right to life exists and the Constitution should recognize that right to life. We do not presume accidents; we do not presume ambiguities. We presume that as long as it is categorized as a fertilized ovum, it will ripen into human personality. MS. AQUINO: But does the Gentleman agree with me that the status of jurisprudence in civil law is that the right of a person is vested only upon a child when it is born alive? He begins to appropriate interest; he begins to lay claim to enforceable rights only when it is born alive. MR. NOLLEDO: That so-called settled rule is qualified by the express provision of the Civil Code that for all purposes the child is considered born favorable to it, what is called as the presumptive personality. So, with due respect to my lady colleague, I think we should not be bound by settled jurisprudence. We are drafting the fundamental law of the land. In fact, we can even overrule the rulings of the Supreme Court even opinions of recognized luminaries. The Constitution should prevail over settled jurisprudence, even over existing laws. Does the Commissioner agree with me? MS. AQUINO: We submit. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Bacani is recognized. BISHOP BACANI: May I also add this comment? After the eighth week, there is no scientific doubt any more that we are dealing with a human being. So, that is not a matter of speculation. Whether it is a human person is another thing, but there is no doubt that it is a human being. May I just read into the record what an advocate of abortion wrote after his change of mind. This is from Dr. Bernard Nathanson. He said:

In early 1969, I and a group of equally concerned and indignant citizens, who had been outspoken on the subject of legalized abortion, organized a political action unit known as NARL, then standing for National Abortion Rights Action League. We were outspokenly militant on this matter and enlisted the women's movement and the protestant clergy into our ranks. We used every device available to political action groups, such as pamphlet tearing, public demonstrations, exploitation of the media, and lobbying in the appropriate legislative chambers. In the late 1969, we mounted a demonstration outside one of the major university hospitals in New York City that had refused to perform even therapeutic abortions. My wife was on that picket line and my three-year old son carried a placard urging legalized abortion for all. Largely because of this and a few similar groups, the monumental New York State Abortion Statute of 1910 was passed and signed into law by Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Our next goal was to assure ourselves that low cost, safe and humane abortions were available to all. And to that end, we established the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health, which was the first and largest abortion clinic in the western world. Sometime ago, after a tenure of a year and a half, I resigned as Director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. The center had performed 60,000 abortions with no maternal death, an outstanding record of which we are proud. However, I am deeply troubled by my own increased uncertainty that I had, in fact, presided over 60,000 deaths. There is no longer serious doubt in my mind that human life exists within the womb from the very onset of pregnancy, despite the fact that the nature of the intra-uterine line has been the subject of considerable dispute in the past. Electrocardiographic recordings of human brain activity had been noted in embryos at eight weeks. Our capacity to measure signs of life are still becoming more sophisticated and as time goes by, we will doubtless be able to isolate life's signs at earlier stages in fetal development. I can go on but I stop there. cdtai FR. BERNAS: Mr. Presiding Officer, in my own perception, there is no doubt that within this Commission there is a great respect for life. I have no doubt about that; that is the consensus. I also believe in the proposition that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. And the way this provision, as formulated, is sailing, and speaking as someone who is sometimes referred to as a constitutional lawyer, it is my perception that a law which is subject to innumerable interpretations and, therefore, likely to be misunderstood, misinterpreted, is a bad law. The way the provision is worded now confirms my belief that the phrase is not felicitous without making any reference to any celibate felicity here. That is my conviction at the moment. Whether or not we delete this line, my only interest is that there has been an expression of concern for life, but that this particular line 10 may not be the way to express it. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, I believe there is one more speaker who would like to make remarks on this section. May we call on Commissioner Rodrigo? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized. MR. RODRIGO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question basic to the Bill of Rights. As rightly stated by the sponsor, the Bill of Rights lists the rights of individuals vis-a-vis the state; these are rights which cannot be violated by the state. What the Bill of Rights, therefore, tries to prevent is the violation of these rights by the state, and not by other individuals. For example, the provision "no person shall be deprived of life " means nondeprivation of life by the state without due process of law. But if a person kills another person, that is a violation of the penal law, but not of the Bill of Rights. That is not a violation. "No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law" is aimed at the state. The government should not take my property without due process of law. But the government, by means of eminent domain, can take my property but pay me just compensation. My right here is protected by this Article on the Bill of Rights. But, if somebody steals from me, I am not protected by this Bill of Rights which is aimed at preventing the government from taking my property without due process of law. I raise these matters because abortion is not done by the state. It is done by individuals. So, does abortion have any relation to this particular provision in the Bill of Rights? FR. BERNAS: Do we have abortion laws in the country? MR. RODRIGO: Yes. FR. BERNAS: If the state were to say that abortion laws can cover only the period of the third trimester, from the sixth month on, then to that extent it is an assault of the state on the life of those below six months. MR. RODRIGO: But that is not an assault by the state itself. It only opens the door to assaults by individuals. But, what the Bill of Rights tries to prevent are assaults by the state, by the government itself. What we are trying to prevent here is abortion from the moment of conception. The Bill of Rights might not be the right place for such a provision, unless abortion will be compulsorily done by the state.

FR. BERNAS: I agree with the Gentleman that the Bill of Rights is generally a constitutional provision governing the relation between the state and the individual. MR. RODRIGO: Yes. FR. BERNAS: But as I said, the Bill of Rights also contains certain commands to the state and we put some of those commands in this Constitution, if they are intimately related to some other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. For instance, on page 4, Section 21, lines 22 to 26 are strictly not guarantees, but they are commands to the state flowing directly from the guarantees in the rest of the section. Similarly, I would consider Section 10 a command to the state insofar as this command is intimately related to the first three lines. MR. RODRIGO: However, this sentence is not worded as a command to the state, unlike the other provisions in the Bill of Rights. That is all, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, may we call on Commissioner Quesada? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I was one of the proponents of Resolution No. 175 which sought for a section that would express the right to life of the human embryo, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, to be guaranteed by law. I wonder why it did not appear in this formulation in the Bill of Rights. May I know what was the thinking of the proponents who were present in the committee meeting? FR. BERNAS: One reason was the words "human embryo." We got into a debate as to when an embryo begins to become human. We wanted to avoid that debate but, perhaps, not successfully. Certainly, as I said, if we must keep this provision, I am very open to a reformulation. MS. QUESADA: Yes. But my main consideration here was the clause "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother shall be guaranteed by law." Earlier I think Commissioner Brocka also mentioned something about this right that a mother should enjoy. cdasia FR. BERNAS: So, we would very happily entertain an amendment by substitution on that matter. MS. QUESADA: When the time comes. FR. BERNAS: Yes. MS. QUESADA: Still on the same section on the right to life, I am glad that Commissioner Rodrigo also mentioned something about this. I would like to get the opinion of the Committee on how an individual can invoke this particular right when a full-blown human being, not just an embryo nor a fertilized ovum, is deprived of life; a human being that would be denied the right to life because of the neglect or the absence of an important life-saving drug in a hospital. We have seen many of these individuals who lost their lives, practically "salvaged by institutions pledged to prolonging life because of the neglect of the state in providing services. What provision of the law can these people invoke to protect their right to life? FR. BERNAS: The Commissioner is addressing her question to Commissioner Rodrigo? MS. QUESADA: No, I am asking the Committee because earlier, I did ask the Commissioner where we would put this particular concern of ours, the health care delivery system, in this Constitution. I am a nurse, and many of the people I have worked with are now struggling to improve the health care delivery system because they have been witnesses to lives lost of persons being "salvaged" in hospitals. There are many competent doctors and nurses who are unable, powerless and helpless to prolong the lives of patients in spite of their expertise. We are talking about due process of law and the Gentleman said this due process of law would refer to people who have committed crimes against property, e.g. felony, or whatever. But when they go to a hospital or a clinic, they may not have access to an injection an antibiotic, a blood transfusion or just a simple tablet, resulting in the denial of the right to life. Nobody gets accused of any crime because there is no law that covers this particular situation in our society. Our respect for life is what makes us in the health sector work for justice in health. We have such respect for life, otherwise we would not be in this profession. And that is why I would like this particular body to respond to the need for our people to know that they have the right to protection under the law. We regret that many people outside health institutions enjoy civil and political rights, but once they enter a hospital, they cannot invoke the right to life and the due process of law. Would this particular provision which states: No person shall be deprived of life, without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws . . .

be applicable to the health situation described earlier? FR. BERNAS: My own thinking is that it would be better placed in the Declaration of Principles. If the Commission will recall, for instance, in the 1973 Constitution, Section 7 of Article II says: The State shall establish, maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of education, health . . . But as I said, this is not self-executory; it has to be carried out by legislation. MS. QUESADA: Should this not be enshrined in the Bill of Rights as a fundamental human right? Our personal experience shows that because of inadequacy or lack of social services, like health service, many people have been denied this right to life. FR. BERNAS: As I was saying, my own general classification of what is in the Bill of Rights is that it is a list of those which the state may not do. It is not a list of those which the state must do. So, in the example of the Commissioner, what she is asking for is something which the state must do. MS. QUESADA: Yes. This brings me to a second issue which is the expansion of the Bill of Rights. The limitation of the present conceptualization of the Bill of Rights has contributed to the lack of respect for human life. There is no such strong guarantee in our Constitution that enables us to give due respect not just to a fertilized ovum but to a fully developed being who loses his life, for instance, in a hospital. We health workers feel so helpless and powerless to do something about this because there is no such provision in our law that makes it the state's responsibility to insure that nobody is denied this right to health and, in effect, right to life. Therefore, in addition to what the Committee has covered here, we would like that the Committee explore the possibility of expanding the Bill of Rights to cover all the fundamental rights that have been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ratified by our own government, in 1976. After we have gone through the general provisions and the provisions on social justice and human rights, we would be able to classify the other rights that we feel should be recognized by the state. I think this is particularly timely now that the President of the Philippines, President Aquino, has mandated the teaching of human rights in all schools. Is the Committee open to the suggestion that these rights be classified under economic, social and cultural rights? FR. BERNAS: As I said, the reason we limited ourselves to this is that there are other committees such as the Committee on Human Resources, the Committee on Social Justice and the Committee on General Principles working precisely on those topics. So, we did not want to steal the work from them. We want to give them a little work also. MS. QUESADA: Would there be a possibility of harmonizing this with the other committees concerned? FR. BERNAS: That is certainly something I am not closed to. MS. QUESADA: Finally, I would like to seek clarification on page 3, Section 14, line 10, which states: No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Could this provision be invoked in the following situation: Right now, we are witness to a situation where hundreds of nurses "volunteer" their professional services in hospitals for as long as two years on the guise of training for their application for overseas employment. But we know for a fact that these nurses are actually serving as volunteer workers without any pay to serve as cheap labor pool to maintain the necessary nursing services. So, we are asking what provision of the law could be invoked for this particular situation which some feel is like slavery. They are forced to work because there is no law that would be violated nor any legal provision that will prevent the management to just employ them on voluntary basis. Could this provision be invoked? FR. BERNAS: From what the Commissioner has described, my initial reaction would be "no" because as she said, they are volunteer workers; their working is not involuntary. This provision covers any kind of involuntary service whether it be slavery, peonage, or what-have-you. But as I understand what she described, it seems to be voluntary and, perhaps, it should be covered more by labor legislation or social justice legislation. MS. QUESADA: I thank the Commissioner. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, may we call on Commissioner Ople please? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Ople is recognized. MR. OPLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Presiding Officer. Will the sponsor yield to a few questions?

FR. BERNAS: Very willingly. MR. OPLE: Thank you. The most recent preoccupation of the Committee and of the body has been the protection of human life, whether in nascent form or in a more developed form and I think this is also related to an innovation in Section 22, according to which no death penalty shall be inflicted. I am one of the authors of Proposed Resolution No. 242 which considers the death penalty a cruel and inhuman punishment, and I am glad that this is now being incorporated, presumably, together with all the resolutions in Section 22. I was struck, however, in the debates this morning by the remarks of Commissioner Garcia concerning other more contemporary, more systematic, more irresistible and overpowering threats to human life and safety, and these take the form of extrajudicial execution. In our countryside, there are millions who live in terror for fear of their lives in a situation where the threat can come maybe in the middle of the night, whether from the military or their adversary forces, or other such contending forces in a situation of nascent civil war which we, of course, deplore. The Bill of Rights, of course, provides for the protection of life and liberty and presumably the pursuit of happiness as well, but should it not mirror these conditions to which human life is so exposed in an unsettled political, economic and social situation in many parts of the country? I do not know if Commissioner Garcia will agree that in the Escalante massacre, for example, some people were emboldened to shoot protesting citizens because of a perception that this kind of action was either part of a silent policy or it would be tolerated by their superiors as a necessary form of action in behalf of national security. Will the Committee at some point consider amending the legislation that will give explicit recognition to this situation and provide that in the event members and agents of the military and of their adversary forces are determined to have committed flagrant abuses against the right to life, including extrajudicial executions and the mass deprivation of life, their superiors should be held equally accountable although there may be no written policy for judicial executions and salvages? Experience shows that men in uniform in the field are more likely to commit these crimes against life and against property, if they knew that these are sanctioned and tolerated, if not encouraged, by higher levels of authority. I do not know how an appropriate formulation for a bill of rights of this very rare problem of our times and of Third World countries in general can be introduced, but I suppose if the Committee is disposed to accept such a provision in the period of amendments, I will be happy to collaborate with the Committee on an appropriate formulation. Will the Committee consider that in due course? FR. BERNAS: The Committee would be happy to avail itself of the skillful pen of Commissioner Ople. MR. OPLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. GARCIA: Could I just add a brief comment? In fact, we could also add here the systematic "hamletting" and prolong the zoning that we find in different rural areas in the countryside which definitely should also be addressed in this Bill of Rights. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, may we call on Commissioner Uka. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Regalado): Commissioner Uka is recognized. MR. UKA: Mr. Presiding Officer, now that we are almost through with a lengthy discussion of the egg and the ovum, I would like to make a few comments on the abolition of the death penalty. JOINT WORKING DRAFT ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Resolution No. 4, as amended by the Committee, in relation to Resolution No. 84 and others.) SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. THE RIGHT TO LIFE EXTENDS TO THE FERTILIZED OVUM. (For purposes of this section, life is deemed to begin at the moment of conception.) Explanation: The first sentence embodies the old provision. The second sentence expresses the pro-life option and precludes the Supreme Court from following the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 113 (1973) and Doe V. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) which weighs the life of the unborn against that of the mother only when the fetus has reached the stage of development when it can survive outside the womb with artificial aid. ARTICLE II Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 9. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen

the family as a basic social institution. The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the government. R. TINGSON: Before Commissioner Villegas speaks, may I just attempt to put back some smile on our faces by saying that there are just as much excitement in other sections of our committee report as there are on the military bases issue. So, Section 9 states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the government. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Villegas, a member of the committee, be recognized to speak on this provision. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Villegas is recognized. SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER VILLEGAS MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, I would like to speak in favor, especially of the second sentence in Section 9 which mandates the State to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. Commissioner Azcuna and others have talked about the possible annihilation of the world by a nuclear holocaust. May I remind the body that according to the U.N. Demographic Yearbook, every single year 50 million babies, unborn in the wombs of their mothers, are being killed. In the United States alone, every year 2 million unborn babies, some of them in their 8th month, are killed, prompting some pro-life Americans to refer to the American holocaust as paling in insignificance in relation to the monstrosity of Hitler against the Jews. Madam President, although our good chairman has said that we should bring smiles back to all of us, it is very difficult for me not to be emotional about this holocaust. I will try as much as possible to stick to a very logical analysis of the problem at hand. In the debates conducted on Section 1 of the Bill of Rights, various legal arguments were raised against the inclusion of the right to life of the fertilized ovum. And just to paraphrase Commissioner Villacorta, in legal necromancy, all types of legal refinements are cited to question the right to life of the fertilized ovum. Among other things, the question of personality of the unborn child from the moment of conception was raised. I propose to review this issue in a logical manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biology categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life. The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human. Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. Medical science, in the field of human reproduction and genetics, has so advanced that the question of when human life begins is already settled. It is not a debatable issue as far as medical science is concerned. There are no two ways about this. Human life begins at conception. The controversy arises from the third question. This is where legal necromancy comes in the legal necromancy that has opened the floodgates for 50 million abortions that are being committed on innocent lives year in and year out. Is this fertilized ovum a person? It seems to me that the true answer to this question lies not in physical or legal science, for the simple reason that there is no physical evidence of personality yet. The answer lies in the science of moral ethics which defines a person as an individual substance of a rational nature. May I remind all that in the Constitution when we talk about the Declaration of Principles, we are talking mostly of principles that we borrow from the science of ethics which is speculative science. Precisely, the

basic law is superior to legislation. Ethics is the source of the majority of these principles that we are declaring in the Article on the Declaration of Principles. While it is true that no unicellular human being actually performs rational acts, it does not follow that its nature is not rational since, as we have said, it has all the primordial essential properties of humanity. Which is why there is absolutely no statistical probability that the fertilized ovum of a human mother will ever, ever turn into a frog as someone in this body facetiously remarked. It would be most unfortunate, Madam President, if the law and the fundamental law at that were to be divorced from ethics from ethical principles. And while it is true that the manifestations of essential personality are in real potency in the early stages of pregnancy, there would be no such real potency if essential personality were absent from the very beginning. This, to my mind, explains the difficulty of law to grasp the inalienable right to life of the human being upon conception. Legal science often fails to transcend itself and establish itself upon the reality of life. Granted, however, that the ethical notion of personality is unacceptable to the legal mind; granted that the lawyers refuse to give the fertilized ovum its legal personality, from the foregoing evidence provided by empirical sciences biology, genetics and in the absence of proof that the human organism from the moment of conception is not a person, the law must presume that it is, or take the awesome risk of injustice to unduly terminate an innocent human life, which is far too great to take. Let us remember that we are drafting here a fundamental law which enumerates basic and inalienable rights. And in so doing, we must not be constrained by inferior laws, particularly if they are effective or open to amendment or repeal or beset with internal contradictions. For example, let me mention how ridiculous American jurisprudence is in this regard. In the United States, the unborn child has the right to inheritance and damages while yet unborn; to get a blood transfusion over his mother's objection; to have a guardian appointed and other rights of citizenship. But in the United States, it does not have the most basic right of all, which is the right to life. That is why, as was reported in a medical journal, The California Medicine, which interestingly is a journal known for its pro-abortion stand, there is this following condemnation of American morality which says: Since the old ethics has not yet been fully displaced, it has been necessary to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing which continues to be socially abhorrent. The result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact which everyone really knows that human life begins at conception and this continues whether intra- or extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking a human life would be ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices. It is suggested that the schizophrenic sort of subterfuge is necessary because while a new ethic is being accepted, the old one has not yet been rejected. So schizophrenia is the characteristic of American jurisprudence on this issue. Beyond these legal technicalities that we must regard as secondary, other arguments, arguments of principle and of pragmatism have also been raised. The so-called hard-case arguments which are always the key to open the floodgates to millions of abortions, the alleged conflict of rights between fetus and mother, the economic arguments favoring the option to abort, all have been put forward. Madam President, let me dwell on these hard cases because once and for all, we give answers to the hard-case arguments. There are those who say that the possibility of abortion should be allowed for certain hard cases such as in pregnancies resulting from rape or incest. Should we not be open to abortion in these exceptional cases for reasons of compassion for the women? No. The main reasons why we should say "no" are: (1) a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong; (2) no one should be deprived of human life without due process and we have established scientifically that from the moment of conception, the fertilized ovum already has life; and (3) a fetus, just like any human, must be presumed innocent unless proven guilty. It is quite obvious that the fetus has done no wrong. Its only wrong is to be an unwanted baby. Besides, laws that would legalize exceptions would be prejudicial to the common good. As the proverb says, "hard cases make bad laws." What is the danger in allowing exceptions in hard cases? The danger is that any exception made in legislation and in courts of law creates a precedent, a leak in the dike that can turn the exception for a few into the rule for all. This has happened in England, in the United States and in other so-called advanced countries. Let me just cite some very glaring statistics. After the notorious Roe v. Wayde decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on January 22, 1973, these are the statistics on abortion: Before that date, illegal abortions in the United States numbered 100,000 a year; immediately after, in 1972 when the decision was made, there were 586,000 abortions; then in 1973, that increased by 27 percent or 745,400 abortions; and another 20 percent increase in 1974 or 900,000 abortions. And as I reported today, there are more than

2,000,000 abortions in the U.S. So clearly, the floodgates have been opened. LexLib Now, how frequently can pregnancy result from rape, this so-called hard case? Are there statistics available on this? Cases of pregnancy resulting from rape are extremely rare. In the United States, rough calculation showed that the chances of conception by rape is 22 for every 3.5 million fertile women or .006 percent probability. In Czechoslovakia, out of 86 thousand successive abortions, 63 were claimed to be caused by rape or .07 percent probability. Why is it difficult to enforce a law that exempts women pregnant from rape or incest from anti-abortion laws? What is meant by this difficulty of proving rape? Rape is a difficult crime to establish mainly because of the reluctance of rape victims to report immediately. It is even more difficult to prove that a pregnancy is the result of rape, especially if the woman is married or known to have an active sex life. Allowing abortion for rape or incest or any other hard case for that matter invites a flood of bogus hard-case abortions. What about mental health? What if the mother is mentally ill? Can her baby not be aborted? The mental illness of a pregnant woman is no valid reason for legal abortion. A mother's mental illness does not necessarily cause the same mental illness in the fetus. The problem, therefore, is not the pregnancy but how the child will be nourished and reared after birth. The solution lies in social services, and we have devoted a lot of time to making sure that this just and humane society that we are trying to establish will be giving social services to all without exception, especially the underprivileged. And the most underprivileged of them all is the unborn child who cannot even scream or run away or do anything to protect himself. It is also worth noting that abortion itself has been found to be a cause of mental disturbance. Instead of being a solution to an unwanted pregnancy, it has even resulted in stress, anxiety and guilt that follows normally after committing a crime. And I really have found one of the arguments being propounded by those who object to this and who say: "Why criminalize a situation that already has brought so much anguish on the woman." That is a very amusing argument. Precisely, the anguish is there because whether she likes it or not natural law has implanted it deep within her. she knows she has committed a crime. And it is not a matter of criminalizing something which is not a crime. Her psychological trauma proceeds from the fact that she knows she has been a criminal. What if it is discovered that the baby is deformed or disabled? Would it not be better to spare it from living as a cripple by aborting it? No. Behind this course of action are a racist philosophy and the pleasure principle. It is logical for the philosophy of pleasure to conclude that persons who cannot enjoy life must not be allowed to live. This will eventually lead to an obsession with racial purity, no different from the Hitlerian mania for the purity of the Aryan race. Death is never a solution to the problems of life. The humane solutions to disabilities of some lie in the social and loving concern and abilities of the more fortunate. What if the woman cannot afford to raise another child decently because of poverty? Would it not be better to allow her to kill the baby instead of letting it live a miserable life and adding to the burden of the rest of the family? To use poverty as a reason for the legalization of abortion would be tantamount to saying that only the rich have a right to life. This is a gross violation of justice. The problem of the poor woman is that she is poor; not that she is pregnant. We would be escaping from the root causes if we resort to abortion as a solution. We must rather solve the real problem and leave the innocent baby alone. Again, the solution lies in social services and equitable distribution of wealth, concerns of private individuals and of the government. And in this regard, let me say that I would also be against any provision in the Constitution we are writing which would give a mandate to the State to determine a so-called "optimum population" of the country, giving the State the power to be God as you have been reading in some materials distributed. The conventional wisdom right now is that the most effective solution to the population problem is economic development and social justice. If we address the root causes of economic under-development and social injustice, the population problem solves itself. This has been shown by hundreds of countries that have developed ahead. What if a doctor has to choose between the life of the child and the life of the mother? Will the doctor be guilty of murder if the life of the child is lost? The doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. I am sure Commissioner Nolledo can give the jurisprudence on this case, the application of the moral principle called the principle of double effect. In a medical operation performed on the mother, the indirect sacrifice of the child's life is not murder because there is no direct intention to kill the child. The direct intention is to operate on the mother and, therefore, there is no dilemma. And let me say that medical science has progressed so much that those situations are very few and far between. If we can produce

babies in test tubes I can assure you that those so-called dilemma situations are very rare, and if they should occur there is a moral principle, the principle of double effect, that can be applied. What would you say are the solutions to these hard cases? The most radical solution to these hard cases would be a caring and loving society that would provide services to support both the woman and the child physically and psychologically. This is the pro-life solution. The abortion solution, on the other hand, not only kills the fetus but also kills any care and love that society could have offered the aggrieved mother. Implicit in all these arguments is the petition for the Constitution, the arguments against Section 9, requiring the State to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. These arguments want the Constitution to be open to the possibility of legalized abortion. The arguments have been put on record for the reference of future legislation and jurisprudence. There is reason to fear that the Constitutional Commission itself shall be used to buttress the inevitable campaign for legalized abortion in the Philippines, unless we explicitly provide the phrase "from the moment of conception." Let us not fall into the trap and just say we will protect the unborn. That is a trap. If life is not protected at the beginning, there is absolutely no reason to protect it at any other period. Let us not kid ourselves about this possibility. We, as a nation in economic crisis and with a large population, are very vulnerable to the temptation to legalize abortion. There are lessons we must learn from other countries. Must we be blind to the experience on abortion of the so-called developed countries? Let us be assured that the International Parenthood Federation is not about to relax until abortion is made legal in the Philippines. May I call to mind, Madam President, Proposed Resolution No. 175 of which I am a proponent together with Commissioners Quesada, Sarmiento, Bengzon, Colayco and Romulo. In this resolution we insisted precisely on a balanced regard for the right to life of the pregnant woman together with that of the child itself. The formulation in Section 9 of the proposed Declaration of Principles is, to my understanding, adequate and proper. It gives due regard to the right to life of the mother in case of ectopic pregnancies pregnancies where the fertilized ovum is implanted in some other places except the uterus and so-called medical dilemmas. At the same time, it restrains a discontented woman from killing her unfortunately unwanted child which, although currently depending upon her, is really a distinct and separate human being. So, this argument of a few women that they should have the right to do whatever they please with their body is completely irrelevant. The fertilized ovum is already a separate body. It is no longer the body of the woman. What is being affirmed in this formulation is the moral right as well as the constitutional right of the unborn child to life. If this should entail the granting of presumptive personality to the unborn beginning at the moment of the conception, then so be it. This is one for the lawyers to work out. This right would include basic primate prenatal care it can only receive if the care and attention due to the mother is also provided. Respect for the rights of the woman with child and respect for the rights of the child in her womb are by nature intimately linked such that any deliberate harm that should come upon one will doubtless effect a corresponding harm to the other. Conflict of rights is fictitious. If the woman has her basic rights and the unborn child's right to life is also recognized, would this not result in a conflict of rights? The conflict is only apparent. It is easily resolved by applying the following principle: When two rights come in conflict, the more basic right and/or the right concerning the graver matter takes precedence over rights involving the less basic or less serious matter. It is clear that the right to life is more basic than the right to privacy or any other posterior rights. Therefore, since removal of the fetus would most certainly result in a violation of its right to life, the woman has no right to evict the temporary resident of her private womb. Moreover, if a mother can kill her own child, what is there to prevent us from killing each other? Madam President and my fellow Commissioners, it is said that the law is hard but, nevertheless, is law? dura lex sed lex. But even more demanding is life, dura vita sed vita. Let us bear in mind that law is for the sake of life. The law must come from life and not vice versa. The views I express here transcend religious differences. As I have declared in another occasion, this is not a Roman Catholic position. Since time immemorial, even before Christianity was brought to our soil, as you very well know, our ancestors referred to the baby in the womb of the mother as tao siya'y nagdadalang-tao. Ang dinadala ay tao; hindi halaman, hindi hayop, hindi palaka tao. Madam President, let me also quote from a non-Christian in our Commission. In a public hearing, the honorable Commissioner Uka said the following: "As a Muslim, I believe in the Ten Commandments, and one of the Ten Commandments is "Thou shalt not kill." From the time of conception, there is already life. Now if you put down that life, there is already killing, a violation of one of the Ten Commandments. The

overwhelming majority of Filipinos agree with Commissioner Uka that we should support Section 9. We have received up to now more than 50,000 signatures from all over the Philippines, from individuals belonging to all walks of life. I do not think there is any other issue in which we have been bombarded with more numerous signatures. Let us, therefore, listen to all of them and mandate that the State should equally protect the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception. Thank you, Madam President. MR. TINGSON: Madam President, Commissioner Nolledo would rather speak his brief piece after our recess. SUSPENSION OF SESSION THE PRESIDENT: The session is suspended for a few minutes. It was 5:04 p.m. RESUMPTION OF SESSION At 5:45 p.m., the session was resumed. THE PRESIDENT: The session is resumed. MR. RAMA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: I ask that Commissioner Nolledo be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. I would like to speak very briefly in support of the second sentence in Section 9 of the report of our committee. Madam President, the first Commissioner to speak in support of this provision was Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, when the Committee on the Bill of Rights, headed by Commissioner Jose B. Laurel, made its report before the Constitutional Commission. Apropos of this provision, Madam President, I would like to say that the unborn from the time of conception has life. It is human and it possesses presumptive personality. Pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it as long as it be born normally later. Thus, under our laws, Madam President, a conceived child can accept a donation; it can inherit. Under the Doctrine of Presumptive Personality, Madam President, it is my firm belief that protecting the unborn from the time of conception is giving meaning and substance to the constitutional declaration that the State recognizes the dignity of the human personality, and to the constitutional injunction that in educating the youth, our curriculum should include love of humanity. This Commission values human life when it also decided to abolish the death penalty. If an erring adult should be protected against destruction by abolition of the death penalty, how much more a helpless and highly innocent human being in the womb of the mother? Killing the fetus, while categorized as abortion in our Revised Penal Code, is plain murder because of its inability to defend itself. Let the unborn, Madam President, the unborn which is a cherished, precious and loving gift from God, enjoy constitutional protection in a Christian country like ours. Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized for a reservation on the Article on Human Resources. MR. RAMA: Madam President, the Vice-President would like to speak on Section 9. MR. PADILLA: Madam President, after the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Villegas on Section 9, I wanted to state that I fully concur with his views in support of Section 9 on the right of the unborn from conception. I found his exposition to be logical, not necessarily creative, much less critical, but logical. Madam President, I would like to state that the Revised Penal Code does not only penalize infanticide but it has various provisions penalizing abortion; Article 256, intentional abortion; Article 257, unintentional abortion; Article 258, abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents; and Article 259, abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. However, I believe the intention of the proponents of Section 9 is not only to affirm this punitive provision in the Penal Code but to make clear that it is a fundamental right that deserves to be mentioned in the Constitution. Thank you, Madam President.

REV. RIGOS: In Section 9, the committee speaks of the family as a basic social institution. It also speaks of protecting the life of the mother and the life of the unborn child. This is also included in the Article on Family Rights. Is the intention of the committee to delete that portion in the Article on Family Rights in case this is approved here, or would the committee tolerate the mention of this portion in the Declaration of Principles and in the Article on Family Rights? start MR. NOLLEDO: Commissioner Villegas would like to answer. MR. VILLEGAS: May I answer that, Madam President. I think this will also apply to other topics. It is the intention of the committee that in the Declaration of Principles, we make general mention of specific rights, whether these be about the family, labor or cooperativism without prejudice to their being fleshed out, so to speak, in the other articles where we can talk about them in greater detail. I think we should not hesitate to have these in a general statement in the Declaration of Principles, although we may find some duplication in the various other articles but with more details. And I think this is also applicable to family rights. REV. RIGOS: Apparently, that is the same intention in the case of the role of the youth, Section 10; the role of women, Section 11; labor, Section 12; education, Section 13; agrarian reform, Section 14; cultural minorities, Section 15; science and technology, Section 19; and autonomy, Section 22. The committee intentionally forgot equally important subjects, such as accountability of public officials, the legislative, the executive, the judiciary. These are not found in the Declaration of Principles. MR. TINGSON: Madam President, we realize that. In a sense, there is a repetition. However, the Declaration of Principles would be a brief, pungent, affirmative, ringing statement that would, as expressed by Commissioner Villegas a while ago, be fleshed out in detail in succeeding articles. Commissioner Rigos may be right in saying that equally important subjects or articles are not included in the Declaration of Principles, and probably he may desire to call our attention to this during the Period of amendments. REV. RIGOS: In other words, the committee had some bases in deciding to include agrarian reform, cultural minorities, science and technology, but not the legislative, the judiciary, the accountability of public officials. MR. TINGSON: One of the bases was the priority of importance, according to the perception of the committee when we were deliberating on this. But we might have overlooked a few that probably merit consideration. REV. RIGOS: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads: The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. When is the moment of conception? MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President. MR. TINGSON: The bachelor member of our committee seems to have expertise on this matter. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Villegas is recognized. MR. VILLEGAS: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. Just to repeat: first, there is obviously life because it starts to nourish itself, it starts to grow as any living being, and it is human because at the moment of fertilization, the chromosomes that combined in the fertilized ovum are the chromosomes that are uniquely found in human beings and are not found in any other living being. REV. RIGOS: I suppose Commissioner Bacani agrees with the Gentleman on that. I just want to be sure that Commissioner Aquino also agrees with him. MR. NOLLEDO: The Gentleman is married; he should know the answer. (Laughter) REV. RIGOS: Thank you, Madam President. MS. AQUINO: The committee is strongly divided on the matter of human life regarding the phrase "from the moment of conception." There are questions like: Is a mere biological existence, as a potential for human life, qualifiable as a human person? This is a question that has rankled and divided the committee on the interpretation of this section. I, personally, would take exception to the position of Commissioner Villegas on the matter, except that I am bound by the committee decision on this. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bacani is recognized. BISHOP BACANI: May I interject a comment at this particular point. I think there need not be, even at this particular point, a conflict between the positions of Commissioner Aquino and Commissioner Villegas.

The position of Commissioner Villegas is that there is human life there; he is not asserting that there is human personality in the philosophical sense. I think at this stage of the game, there is no conflict here. One can vindicate human life biologically and genetically without the need to specify human personality in the philosophical sense. Thank you. MR. TINGSON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Tingson is recognized. MR. TINGSON: We would like Commissioner Rigos to know that the phrase "from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum." However, we figured in the committee that the phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." MR. SUAREZ: Section 9, Madam President, has something to do with family life and, of course, the controversial provision regarding the right of the unborn from the moment of conception. May I address some legal points regarding this matter, but I do not think it would be fair to the Honorable Villegas. MR. TINGSON: Madam President, he is here, and if it is not too inconvenient for him, we will give him the floor being a member of the committee. MR. SUAREZ: No, Madam President, we can conduct our dialogue at the back. I have no objection. MR. TINGSON: It would be better if the Commissioner looks at him while he speaks. It would be more convincing. MR. SUAREZ: Madam President, there is a disturbing word here that needs clarification, and it is "equally" which appears on line 1, page 3. The State is required to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. This is a collision of rights but according to the phrasing, these rights must be of equal weight. If it involves the life of the mother and the life of the child, how are we going to resolve that problem, Madam President? MR. VILLEGAS: As I stated in my sponsorship speech, 99 percent of the cases indicated that taking care of the health of the mother is taking care of the child and vice versa. Because of the progress of medical science, the situations when a moral dilemma exists are very, very few. The intention behind the statement is precisely for the State to also make sure that it protects the life of the pregnant mother. She goes to all sorts of trouble as we have discussed in the provisions on health. Protecting the life of the mother, giving her all the necessary social services will protect the child. So it happens only in very, very few instances which we mentioned, like ectopic pregnancies when the fertilized ovum is implanted outside of the uterus. I repeat, medical science has made the situation very, very exceptional. And we said that even in those instances, which I consider to be less than one percent of the situation, there is a moral principle which we referred to as the principle of double effect in which if one has to save the life of the mother in an operation, it is morally and legally permissible to so operate even if the child will have to be indirectly sacrificed. There is no murder involved there because one does not intend the death of the child. One is correcting a medical aberration of the mother. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. Suppose it is the other way around. Do we have to save the child as against the life of the mother? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: Although I do not want to sound dramatic, it could very well happen. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, it could. MR. SUAREZ: In a situation like that, how would this equality provision be operational? MR. VILLEGAS: It is the same principle of double effect. If you are not killing the mother directly, if the operation is to save the child and there is the indirect effect of the mother's life being sacrificed, then I think the principle of double effect also applies. MR. SUAREZ: So we do not lay moral and legal liability or responsibility as well upon the doctor who will determine and make the judgment accordingly. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: That is clear, Madam President. In other words, notwithstanding this mandate appearing in our proposal that the State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception, we would not lay the blame upon the doctor who is called upon to make the judgment? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. This matter of the protection of the unborn from the

moment of conception may have a little problem with respect to the application of the laws. Our Vice-President has already called attention to the fact that we have laws against abortion, whether willful, deliberate or induced. Is the committee not satisfied with the provisions now existing in the Revised Penal Code that it goes farther and give protection even to the unborn from the moment of conception? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. As Commissioner Padilla already said, it is important that we have a constitutional provision that is more basic than the existing laws. In countries like the United States, they get involved in some ridiculous internal contradictions in their laws when they give the child the right to damages received while yet unborn, to inheritance, to a blood transfusion over its mother's objection, to have a guardian appointed and other rights to citizenship; but they do not give him the right to life. As has happened after that infamous 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision, babies can be killed all the way up to 8 and 8 months. So precisely this basic provision is necessary because inferior laws are sometimes imperfect and completely distorted. We have to make sure that the basic law will prevent all of these internal contradictions found in American jurisprudence because Filipino lawyers very often cite American jurisprudence. MR. SUAREZ: Madam President, there is another legal point, but I hope the Commissioner and I can thresh this out together for the benefit of the other Commissioners. In our Civil Code, whenever we speak of a child, we speak in the context of a born child so much so that we have what are known as legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated, spurious and adulterous children and children born out of rape incidents. These all speak in terms of a born child, and these born children necessarily enjoy legal rights pursuant to the constitutional provision that every person has the right to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: Going to these unborn children who will be given protection from the moment of conception, does the Commissioner have in mind giving them also proprietary rights, like the right to inheritance? MR. VILLEGAS: No, Madam President. Precisely, the question of whether or not that unborn is a legal person who can acquire property is completely a secondary question. The only right that we want to protect from the moment of conception is the right to life, which is the beginning of all the other rights. MR. SUAREZ: So, only the right to life. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, it is very clear, only the right to life. MR. SUAREZ: That is the only right that is constitutionally protected by the State. MR. VILLEGAS: That is right, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: And that right to life, unfortunately, collides with the right to life of the mother. MR. VILLEGAS: In very, very few instances, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: In most instances, I suppose. MR. VILLEGAS: In most instances they collide? MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because it could very well mean that if there is a miscarriage or if an abortion is induced, it could jeopardize the life of the mother. So, in those situations, they collide because what the Commissioner is saying is the right to life of the unborn child. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, the right to life, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: In other words, to be born or to get out of the womb of the mother and become a child in the real sense of the word, legally, conceptually and everything? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: So what kind of protection does the Commissioner have in mind in order that we can give life to this unborn child from the moment of conception? MR. VILLEGAS: "Protection" means any attempt on the life of the child from the moment of conception can be considered abortion and can be criminal. MR. SUAREZ: So, principally and exclusively, if I may say so, what the Commissioner has in mind is only an act outlawing abortion. MR. VILLEGAS: Exactly, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: So that is the real thrust and meaning of this particular provision. MR. VILLEGAS: That is right. MR. SUAREZ: Can we not just spell it out in our Constitution that abortion is outlawed, without stating the right to life of the unborn from the moment of conception, Madam President? MR. VILLEGAS: No, because that would already be getting into the legal technicalities. That is already legislation. The moment we have this provision, all laws making abortion possible would be

unconstitutional. That is the purpose of this provision, Madam President. MR. SUAREZ: I thank the Commissioner. That is all, Madam President. MR. RAMA: Madam President. I have only a few questions which I would like to clear up inasmuch as most of these sections had already been the subject of extended interpellations. Section 9 on page 3 states that: The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. The State, therefore, is committed to protect the life of a fetus from the beginning of conception. Is that right? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. MR. NATIVIDAD: There is no quibbling about how many months old the fetus is, but for as long as conception has started, is the fetus entitled to protection? MR. VILLEGAS: That is precisely the reason we have to say "from the moment of conception" because if we do not protect life at its beginning, there is no reason why we have to protect it at any other period. MR. NATIVIDAD: Madam President, I rose to ask these questions because I had the impression that this provision of the Constitution would prevent future Congresses from enacting laws legalizing abortion. Is my perception correct, Madam President? MR. VILLEGAS: Exactly. Congress cannot legalize abortion. It would be unconstitutional. MR. NATIVIDAD: In what way will it collide with this provision? MR. VILLEGAS: Any direct killing of the unborn from the moment of conception would be going against the Constitution and, therefore, that law would be, if Congress attempts to make it legal, unconstitutional. MR. NATIVIDAD: As written here in the draft, the right of the mother is written in the same sentence as the right of the unborn. What is the legal significance of this? MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, as I said in response to the question yesterday of Commissioner Suarez, 99 percent of the cases related to protection of the mother's health, making sure that she is in the right working conditions and that she is not subjected to stress, show that there are so many things that can endanger the life of the unborn because the health of the mother is not sufficiently cared for. This is really a prolife provision which emphasizes the fact that in most instances, protecting the life of the mother is also protecting the life of the unborn. MR. NATIVIDAD: I am not really certain if these questions had already been asked, but I promised the groups in the public hearings and those who came here to see us that I would do so. The lawyers who came here say that husbands also have the right to participate in the discussion of this provision. They cited the case of a mother who started to bleed and was brought to the hospital. The hospital tried to stop the bleeding but this could not be stopped; the doctor said that the only way to save the life of the mother was to terminate the pregnancy. The husbands told me that in such a case and considering the provision of this draft Constitution, the doctors would hesitate to terminate the pregnancy for fear of colliding with or violating this provision, and of being criminally charged according to our Penal Code. Is this a correct view of those who fear this probable happening? MR. VILLEGAS: That is not exactly correct, as we reiterated in the sponsorship speech yesterday. In a situation where the mother needs medical operation to treat a certain illness but where indirectly the life of the unborn is sacrificed, that is not in any way considered part of this provision because there is no direct intention to kill the unborn. This is covered by the moral principle called the principle of double effect. The intention here is to save the mother and therefore a medical operation has to be performed; and if indirectly, the baby's life is sacrificed, that is not abortion. What is abortion would be a direct intent on the life of the unborn because it is unwanted either it is the result of rape, in very, very few cases, or the result of incest, or because the baby might come out malformed. In all of these instances, there is absolutely no moral justification for killing the child. LLphil MR. NATIVIDAD: I am trying to draw from my own experiences in the CIS when, during my time, we investigated cases of criminal abortions. Invariably in many of these cases, the records of the clinics dealing with abortion showed that the mothers were brought there already bleeding. The doctors claimed that they only performed a "D & C" dilatation and curettage on the patient which in effect terminated the pregnancy. The treatment had to be given because the mother was already bleeding, or the father was

not available, because in many instances, she is an unwed mother. But if we investigate the case and look at the records of the clinic, it is exactly as the Commissioner has said: The woman was brought to the clinic bleeding; there was no way to stop the bleeding, so the doctor terminated the pregnancy to save the life of the woman. This in effect was made an excuse for criminal abortion. We cannot file any case because there are no witnesses. The subject of the case, the woman herself, would be the last person to testify because she would be a coprincipal in the crime of criminal abortion. Another instance in the records of the doctors state that they removed a growth I do not remember the exact medical term but invariably it says removal of the growth inside, which could not be removed except by terminating the pregnancy. So, in fine, would not the Gentleman's statement as to the exceptions to this protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception open the floodgates to the insidious practice of criminal abortion in this country? I am basing my question on the response of Commissioner Villegas that the exception to the rule is when the mother's life is endangered and therefore the Pregnancy can be terminated. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, if there is no direct killing of the baby or if the intention is to operate. The cases enumerated by the Gentleman are instances where either the law has to be perfected, and these are very good examples of how imperfect laws are, and therefore should not be the bases for our writing the Constitution, or that the implementation of the law has to be perfected. I think all of these are precisely instances which we have to work on in perfecting the law and perfecting its implementation. MR. NATIVIDAD: I subscribe to Commissioner Villegas' view and I was merely testing the validity of his statement. My question, I believe, becomes a question of evidence because it is really hard to convict in a case of abortion when the woman herself would not testify, neither would the boyfriend nor the husband, because they are all coprincipals to the crime just committed. So, based on my own experiences in the actual criminal investigation of these offenses, the fact that the woman would not testify is a loophole in the campaign against criminal abortion. In fact, under the law, even accidental abortion is a punishable offense, especially on the part of the doctor. LLphil For the record again, what is the perception of the committee in cases where, for example, a couple comes to know that the child is deformed? By scientific examination, the unborn child is determined to be facing a life of difficulties because it is deformed or is lacking in organs. What is the perception of the honorable Commissioner on this? MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, there is absolutely no moral reason for that baby to be killed because there is no reason why we should assume that only those who can enjoy life or who can find pleasure in life should be allowed to live. The moment we start playing God and start saying that those who cannot enjoy life should be killed, then we know what can happen we can have all sorts of cripples, handicapped, mongoloids and idiots killed a la Hitler. Precisely, that argument could be a very dangerous argument the moment we say that a baby should be killed because he is deformed and would not be able to enjoy life like every normal person. That is one of the most dangerous, hard-cased exceptions that could open the floodgates not only to abortion but to euthanasia. MR. NATIVIDAD: I suppose the Commissioner would have the same view when it comes to multiple rape. This is when the woman cannot stomach the prospect of having a child whose father cannot be identified. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, because it is not the fault of that person that people have done her wrong. But we should not right a wrong by another wrong. This is one time when society has to be very caring. There are many institutions and charitable groups that can make life pleasant for that victim of rape and let her give birth to her unwanted baby. There are so many people looking for children to adopt anyway. Besides, we very well know that babies are now being created in test tubes. There is always a caring concern which society can give to that poor victim, but definitely, murder is not a solution. MR. NATIVIDAD: The Gentleman has just mentioned test tube babies. Are they also protected by this Constitution? MR. VILLEGAS: I have not worked out the legal implications. As we know, that is a very new phenomenon and even in industrialized countries, the moral and other legal implications of test tube babies have not yet been worked out. MR. NATIVIDAD: But they are already conceived. MR. VILLEGAS: My tentative answer is that definitely, they should also be protected. MR. NATIVIDAD: There is life already; they are conceived although the parties may be unknown. The fetus is already a subject of protection. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, may I comment on the unwanted babies. I was reading this little book on a study of unwanted pregnancies and the interesting thing is this: In practically all cases, unwanted pregnancies became wanted babies. In fact, there were more unwanted pregnancies that became wanted babies than wanted pregnancies in the beginning which turned sour. So I would just like to point out that what initially may be an unwanted pregnancy may, in the course of the days and the months before delivery, turn into a desire for the baby. MR. NATIVIDAD: Will the kind bishop give an example? BISHOP BACANI: I was trying to look for the data on that particular experiment which I will show Commissioner Natividad in a few minutes. MR. NATIVIDAD: I just want to ask another question on Section 4 but I will not be very tedious about this. This Constitution is not just for one season; it will not be just for a decade. In fact, we expect and we hope that it will last much longer than that. But through the corridors of time, developments may come whereby nuclear weapons might be more common than they are now. Suppose the nation is faced by assault from abroad or from whatever source, and the only solution is for us to defend ourselves against hordes of invaders through nuclear weapons which, at that point in time, are already common, would we deny our nation the use of such a weapon to defend ourselves by postulating now that no nuclear weapons shall ever be deposited, stockpiled or used in this country? This Constitution is not for now only but for decades and decades to come. Are we going to deprive our future generations of a weapon of self-defense in the future? Who among us can foresee this? The way nuclear weapons are being developed now, they will not be as common as the present Magnum .357. At the time Nagasaki was bombed, the atomic bomb was a highly top-secret bomb. Now, even a university engineering student according to what I read when I was in the United States was able to draft on his own the formulation of an atomic bomb. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rigos is recognized. REV. RIGOS: I just want to ask the committee and Commissioner Bacani whether it is safe to say that in order to prevent Congress from making any law legalizing abortion, we better constitutionalize this first moment of conception. Is it safe to say that? BISHOP BACANI: That can help Congress later on; besides, the provision is a very positive one to protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. It is very important that we have this provision. REV. RIGOS: Can we not just say that the State shall protect the life of the unborn child, without saying "from the moment of conception"? MR. VILLEGAS: May I answer that, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Villegas is recognized. MR. VILLEGAS: As I have said, we must prevent any possibility of legalized abortion, because there is enough jurisprudence that may be used by Congress or by our Supreme Court. Let me just read what happened after the Roe v. Wade decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. After that 1973 decision, during the first three months of pregnancy, the court ruled: "States cannot prohibit voluntary abortions, making abortions on demand possible." The court further said that the decision should be left completely to the woman and her doctor. Then during the remaining six months of pregnancy, "States may regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related to maternal health." And during the final ten weeks of pregnancy, there is still a door open "States may," not shall, "prohibit abortion, except where doctors find that the pregnancy endangers the mother's life." So, these are the floodgates that are open. REV. RIGOS: Which are? MR. VILLEGAS: As I said, American jurisprudence looms large on Philippine practice and because it is a transcendental issue, we have to completely remove the possibility of our Congress and our Supreme Court following this tragic trail. REV. RIGOS: Which means that if we, for instance, do not like Congress to legalize the Communist Party in the Philippines, we better say so in the Constitution. If we do not like Congress to legalize gambling, we better state this in the Constitution. If we do not like Congress to legalize divorce, we better put it in the Constitution. Is that the idea, Madam President? MR. VILLEGAS: As I said, life is the beginning to every other right whether it be rights violated by Marxism, rights violated by the wrong marriage laws. We are just talking about the beginning of all

rights. So, I do not think the argument is correct. MS. AQUINO: Madam President, may I make some corrections. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: I would like to correct the misinterpretation of Commissioner Bacani in his dissertation of St. Thomas' study of the right to life. The Thomistic concept of hylomorphism precisely operationalized the question of complementarity of matter and form, saying that there is a decent requirement for a decent standard of form and organization before a soul can be effectively infused into life. This brings forth the discussion of organic life as against human life. Every organism has life. There is no debate on that. But is this the organic life that is deserving of value, safeguard and protection that is due a human person? Is there enough contingency of state interest to precisely get into the act of debating on whether the baby of a victim of a multiple rape is entitled to state protection by prohibiting abortion? What I am saying is there is no proof and jurisprudence is not settled even with the decision in Roe v. Wade that the state has sufficient contingent interest in the life of the unborn. By what right has the State then to meddle in bodily integrity which is basic in dignity and self-determination? I am not advocating abortion, but these are questions which are bound to be raised on matters of testing the jurisprudential cogency of a law on abortion. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, but Commissioner Quesada has been standing there and she would like to contribute to this. MS. QUESADA: Thank you, Madam President. I would like to be involved in this debate, although I am one of those who earlier proposed one provision on the right to life. I am speaking in behalf of women who will not be here to represent some of their positions, their views on the matter of the right to life. I am not a celibate; I am a mother of six, so, I know how it is to be pregnant, to go through nine months of pregnancy. I have worked as a nurse in urban poor communities and in rural areas. I can feel what it is to go through the period of conception, particularly, in a situation where one has to grapple with life and death the struggle for survival for many women carrying their young or their unborn. I would really like to clarify some of the drift I was able to pick up from the discussion of the proponent, and that is, this particular provision seems to have focused mainly on the protection of the right to life, that it is only a token provision to guarantee the equal rights of women, a protection from the State. It appears that when there is this conflict between the life of the mother and of the unborn, it is the right of the unborn that is given the predominance only when there is the threat to life. I am bothered by the thought that when we talk about life of the mother, we are talking only of physical life we are not talking about the emotional and the mental life of the mother. They are part of her life and are affected by a case, let us say, of multiple rape. It is very easy for men who are not raped or who will never be raped to talk about a caring society who will take care of a child who is the product of multiple rape. I mean it is very easy for us to say this, but what right have we to make a choice for women who are the victims of multiple rape and what it does to them for the rest of their lives, that if she becomes mentally insane because of this, then we can pass moral judgment and say: "You have no right to your body and the choice you make about the product of multiple rape and even of incest"? I think there is some kind of split-level morality here. We talk about a kind of morality for the unborn, but we have no consideration for the right of the mother who has a soul that will have to suffer in hell when she has to live through the agony, the suffering of having gone through a multiple rape, because it appears from the discussion that only in case of ectopic pregnancy when the life of the mother is at stake that we will now morally sanction as being right for her to undergo abortion or a therapeutic abortion, as we call it in medical language. So, I feel that there are some issues here that seem to have bemuddled my concern because as a nurse I think about the totality of the care of the mother and child, not only from the time of conception. That is why I have compromised in this particular provision that it should equally protect the mother and child, not just at the time of the conception, but throughout because what is the good of having a child born and not to have the equal protection up to the time a child is able to survive? We know for a fact that in the Philippines, there is a high infant mortality rate; 58 per 1,000 live births. That means that before reaching the age of one, these unborn children that we care for are born, but then they end up dying, because these children get connected with the kind of society which we want to be caring but is very unjust and inhuman. They die from communicable diseases, from malnutrition, from gastro-enteritis, from the poverty that is so predominant in many of our communities, not only here in Manila, but throughout the Philippines.

We have this kind of health situation that I, as a health worker, care about because women are making decisions. With this kind of provision, it will be a moral decision versus a practical decision which many women will have to make. They will make the decision and so they end up going to Quiapo, buying all the herbal plants that will cause them to have abortion. They will seek whatever means because they feel that it is more morally wrong to bring up children whom they will not be able to care for, to nurse and to feed in order to become truly developed human beings. We have many cases in hospitals of incomplete abortions. According to the records of Philippine General Hospital, Ospital ng Maynila, Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, Manila Doctors Hospital, and many of these hospitals, these are not women who are of the middle class and the educated type; they are women who really suffer and these are the practical issues they have to deal with. MR. OPLE: Madam President, will Commissioner Quesada, and maybe Commissioner Villegas, eventually yield to just one or two questions? MS. QUESADA: Gladly, Madam President. MR. OPLE: I am glad that Commissioner Quesada has raised from concrete experience some profound observations on this issue of the right of the unborn child. I have a very imperfect recollection of the American Supreme Court decision that Commissioner Villegas has put forward time and again. But I think in the case of Roe v. Wade, we had a shopgirl who was the victim of gang rape. Is that correct? MR. VILLEGAS: I am not very sure about the circumstances, Madam President. MR. OPLE: Yes. And in the case of the U.S. Supreme Court which discriminates very strongly on cases, it would accept for jurisdiction that the luck of this girl who was a victim of gang rape actually was remarkable. In a docket already heavy with so many cases, and out of thousands of cases brought before the Supreme Court for adjudication, this was chosen by the Supreme Court. And in this case, I think Commissioner Quesada is right. I read a portion of this decision. It described the anguish of the mother who was a gang rape victim. It happened in a small town where the culture is very censorious about this sort of thing so that the girl was actually at the point of becoming a social outcast. That was what impelled her in the first place to avoid the fate of being a social outcast in a small community to seek the help of the Supreme Court. Since Commissioner Quesada has spoken from experience of many cases of such women wronged by society in terms of having been exploited and abused as victims of gang rape, will the committee now respond frontally to this argument and tell us whether they still believe that the mother, in this case, should not be autonomous and should be subject to a constitutional restraint on her right to live her own life according to her best likes? Should the Constitution interpose itself between this mother and there might be thousands of them so that she is denied the right to a life of peace and serenity and her own pursuit of happiness because there is a constitutional provision that prevents her from correcting or rectifying a socially imposed wrong that had been committed against her? Thank you, Madam President. MR. VILLEGAS: I can just repeat the transcendental reasons that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong; a very good end never, never justifies an immoral means. I am very glad that the Gentleman brought up the circumstances of the Roe v. Wade case. It was precisely because of this argument about compassion to the woman, a hard-cased situation, that this specific decision of the U.S. Supreme Court opened two million abortions every year in the U.S. That is exactly the trap that we want to avoid using all sorts of feelings, compassion, emotions. There are many other ways of taking care of a multiple rape victim other than taking the life of an innocent child and not going through the due process of law. As I said, that poor child had absolutely nothing to do with the people who were responsible for victimizing the lady. Why blame the child? His only fault is that he is unwanted by the poor victim, the woman. LLphil So let us look for many other ways of giving guidance and counselling, of taking that woman out of that parochial setting, of using orders like the Order of the Good Shepherds. There are so many possible ways. Let us exhaust all the possible humane ways of helping that agonizing woman, and I am not in any way belittling the agony of the woman. But as I said, we cannot right a wrong by another wrong. That is the most transcendental statement that we can quote from St. Thomas Aquinas. MS. QUESADA: But does not the Gentleman think that he is also denying the woman the equal protection of the law, the due process of law? The Gentleman is giving the due process to the unborn but not to the woman; that is, that she makes a choice. MR. VILLEGAS: No, Madam President, there is no right to murder. There is absolutely no right to

murder and, therefore, that woman has absolutely no right to murder the child. MS. QUESADA: Madam President, I am not for abortion, but I am just thinking of this possibility where a woman's life, not physical life, is being threatened I mean her mental and social dimension because we think of life in its totality, not just the physical threat to her survival. MR. VILLEGAS: But as I said, as a health worker, the Commissioner knows there are so many psychological solutions that can be taken. It is just a matter of looking for alternative solutions. MR. ABUBAKAR: Madam President, may I take the floor for a few minutes? THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Abubakar is recognized. MR. ABUBAKAR: The proponent of the measure is very eloquent in his expression of defending both the right of the mother, as well as that of the child. In this Constitutional Commission, we perhaps have people who are very well acquainted with the advanced scientific knowledge regarding the very topic we are discussing now. My only concern is, as science moves forward, as the economy of the nation changes, and as the thinking in religion plays its component part in the setting of all societies, would it not be in the interest of wisdom to coincide the discussion with the progress of the times and science; that we should not insert this in the Constitution and instead let the judgment of our legislature, in accordance with the latest advancements in science, technology, population and economy, decide by legislative act on this particular provision of the right of the mother and the child? Why should we constitutionalize it? To constitutionalize it is to make it difficult for us to reach for any amendment or for any modification that is safe, not only by society but by the economic situation of the country, by the educated and by so many other factors that make a society not only vibrant but even to push forward. Who knows, such a civilization, and history can attest, may even disappear from our society and this earth? So, instead of constitutionalizing this provision in just simple terms, can we not just leave this to the wisdom of our people when they elect their representatives who will then enact a particular provision affecting this very issue that we are discussing now? I think wisdom dictates that the Members of the Constitutional Commission should not appropriate to themselves the wisdom of settling this issue. The future is far; we cannot read it. Even the scientists do not know how society would be in 20 or 30 years. Maybe man would live, or even woman would live, for 150 years, depending on how science will progress. But I think we owe it to ourselves not to let this evolve as the nation moves forward. The matter of protecting the life of the unborn should be left to legislation instead of constitutionalizing it in the Constitution. Religion belongs to different sects and economies. We have different classes of society, the rich and the poor. In geography, we have Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. We are a people united by our sense of patriotism and history. Would the matter not be in the interest of our future generation? I do not know whether or not we in this Commission will live for 20 years, but the children of tomorrow will live for 100 years. Why impose this in the Constitution? Why not just say in simple words that the unborn are entitled to life and protection and let the future decide 10, 20 or 100 years from now? What is Philippine society? What is the regard of the future concerning the unborn child in the mother's womb? At this juncture, the President relinquished the Chair to the Honorable Regalado E. Maambong. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I ask that Commissioner Regalado be recognized on the same subject. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Regalado is recognized. MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. Actually, I registered for a more thorough interpellation, but since we are precisely on this particular point, I would like to interject at this posture. Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to direct this question to Commissioner Villegas because of a number of telephone calls and letters I received from lawyers, law students and medical practitioners with respect to his position reported in the Manila Journal, September 15, 1986 issue. The report says, and I quote: Pushing the controversial section is Constitutional Commission Member Bernardo Villegas, a lay Catholic leader. He said that under the present Revised Penal Code, killing the fetus after seven months is penalized as a crime, which is called abortion, but killing of life before seven months is not considered the same as killing human life after seven months. That sets me back thinking whether or not we are on the right legal or jurisprudential track, because there is nothing under the Revised Penal Code, Articles 256 to 259, which provides that abortion is possible only if the fetus has had an intrauterine life of more than seven months. The only mention about seven months in our laws is in the Civil Code, but that is only for civil law purposes, for civil personality whether or not such a fetus could be the subject of legal relations. The new Civil Code provision I think it is obvious to

all lawyers here, although there may be some nonlawyers may also help to point out by combining Articles 40 and 41; it merely says that birth determines personality, and we are talking only of personality. LLphil But a conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided it be born completely alive from the time of its complete delivery from the maternal womb. However, if the child had an intrauterine life of less than seven months and this is the only time we speak of seven months then it is not considered born if it dies within 24 hours after its separation from the maternal womb. But this is only for purposes of civil personality whether or not the child or the fetus can be the subject of legal relations, lapacidad juridica. It has nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of the fetus because a fetus, regardless of the intrauterine life, if expelled illegally by the act of the mother, maternal grandparents, a third person or even by a doctor, a midwife or a pharmacist, will always be considered abortion under Articles 256 and 259 of the Revised Penal Code. I also received a series of calls and a few letters regarding what appeared also in that same publication which says, and I quote: Finally, abortifacient means of contraception will automatically be rendered illegal and their use criminal. The IUD, the morning-after pill and hormonal injections are some examples of abortifacient contraceptives. They are not, strictly speaking, contraceptives since they act after fertilization will have occurred. My readings of medical jurisprudence, as well as medical books on obstetrics, specifically state that these intrauterine contraceptive devices are actually contraceptives and not abortifacient. Since we are on this topic, I suppose Commissioner Villegas can give us some clarifications on the legal aspects which bother legal practitioners and law students, and the medical aspects which bother some medical practitioners and medical students, considering the number of calls I have been receiving for a clarification of this publication. MR. VILLEGAS: I thank Commissioner Regalado very much. As regards the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, we have already heard, and I completely defer to him, the opinions rendered by Commissioner Padilla. I think that journalists extrapolated wrongly some of the statements. Definitely, I did not pretend to be an expert on the legal aspects. That is why we had Commissioner Padilla clarify what are the actual provisions right now in the Revised Penal Code about abortion. As regards the issue of what types of contraceptive devices are abortifacient, I think it is a question of fact and this can be best left to Congress and the courts to decide on. There have been articles by medical experts which expressed the opinion that some types of IUDs and hormonal injections are actually abortifacient. But I think this is a question best left to the law-implementing agencies and the courts actually deciding on the facts presented whether or not this opinion should be followed. So I am not, in any way, making a categorical statement that all these contraceptive devices mentioned in that question-and-answer series are abortifacient. I think it is a matter of fact that has to be established. MR. REGALADO: So for the record and to allay the fears or apprehensions of these medical practitioners, we agree that these different types of intrauterine devices will be determined by Congress on a case-to-case basis whether they are completely contraceptive and, therefore, there is nothing wrong if administered in the womb of the mother or they are abortifacient and, therefore, will be prohibited. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, the Commissioner is correct. MR. REGALADO: I thank the Commissioner very much, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. GASCON: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as it is proposed right now, states: The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm. MR. GASCON: Therefore, that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know of today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of these so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so-called contraceptives should be banned. LLphil

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what we call abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision. MR. GASCON: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. MR. VILLEGAS: That is right. As I said in answer to Commissioner Regalado, it is a question of fact. If it is established by proper science that it is abortifacient, then it can be ruled as unconstitutional. But as Commissioner Regalado was saying, he may know of specific IUD devices which actually prevent fertilization. MR. GASCON: Yes, that is another thing. These are contraceptives. Those which prevent fertilization are contraceptives. MR. VILLEGAS: That is right, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. GASCON: Mr. Presiding Officer, in relation to that, how does the Commissioner relate this proposed provision to that provision in the 1973 Constitution which is also proposed in the General Provisions Article as Section 139 it states: It shall be the responsibility of the State to adopt population policies most conducive to the national welfare. It shall, however, be the right and duty of parents to determine the number of their children and in the exercise of this right and duty, they shall not be compelled to use means of birth limitation that shall be against their informed conscience and religious convictions. I believe this provision as found in the 1973 Constitution led to the development of population control programs, the Population Commission and others which promote certain contraceptives which, if this provision is approved, would therefore be determined as abortifacient. What would, therefore, be the position of the honorable Commissioner with regard to this provision as contained in the 1973 Constitution and as it is proposed now? MR. VILLEGAS: I thank the Commissioner very much for asking that question. At the appropriate time, I personally, together with other Commissioners, will move for the total deletion of that very unwanted provision in the General Provisions Article. We cannot give the State the role of playing God by telling it to determine what is the optimum level of population. It has been proved by so many researches that all the expenditures on family planning have been disastrous. They have been going down the drain. As the present Minister of Social Services, Mita Pardo de Tavera, has been saying, we should use all of that money for population welfare and for helping the poor people attain a more humane existence, rather than putting it in the questionable programs of population control. It has also been shown by economists that the best solution to mass poverty is economic development and social justice. Population control is repudiated as a means towards attaining economic development and social justice. So I think it is very counterproductive to retain the 1973 provision. I think this provision was in the 1973 Constitution because of a very strong lobby in the seventies composed of foreigners who were very much convinced that Third World countries had to limit their population. As we probably already know, that specific opinion has been repudiated by, among others, President Reagan who, in a conference on population in Mexico, announced the Reagan doctrine on population. The best cure to population problem is economic development and social justice. Automatically, the birth rate will decline as we start developing the country. Mr. Presiding Officer, there are so many evidences that population control is at best a questionable approach to economic development and at worst a tremendous waste of very scarce resources. MR. BENGZON: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is Commissioner Gascon through? MR. GASCON: Not yet, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. BENGZON: But, Mr. Presiding Officer, the Commissioner just interjected because of that point brought up. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Chair would like to inquire from the Floor Leader what the parliamentary situation is now. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, there is an important point of information to be given by the chairman of the Steering Committee. I ask that he be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The chairman of the Steering Committee is recognized.

MR. BENGZON: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would just like to put the record in the proper perspective. Yesterday morning, Proposed Resolution No. 545 was read before the body and was referred to the Steering Committee. In the Record of the Commission, it appears that Proposed Resolution No. 545 is now pending with the Steering Committee. However, as everybody knows, there was a caucus of this Commission and the Steering Committee waived its right and jurisdiction over Proposed Resolution No. 545, unanimously without any objection from its members, and threw this matter to the caucus for deliberations. As everyone knows, there was a vote taken and this proposed resolution was defeated in the caucus assembled. However, Mr. Presiding Officer, everything happened merely in the caucus and nothing has been officially recorded in our Journal. Therefore, in behalf of the Steering Committee just so the record would be complete, I would now like to put on record the fact that this matter has been taken up in caucus, that the Steering Committee with the consent of all its members has waived its jurisdiction in favor of the Commission and that it has taken action on this matter. I would like this to be put on record so that at this point in time, this matter is settled and that the Steering Committee is free from any obligation on this Proposed Resolution No. 545. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Before the Chair acts on the manifestation of the chairman of the Steering Committee, is it not a fact that on motion of Commissioner Villacorta before, all proceedings in our caucus are on record and they are supposed to be part of the proceedings of this Commission? MR. BENGZON: Mr. Presiding Officer, all proceedings of caucuses are recorded, but I did not take that to mean that those would form part of the official Journal. I thought we would have a record of the proceedings of our caucuses separate from the record of the official plenary sessions. And since that proposed resolution was read in the official plenary session and officially referred to the Steering Committee, our Journal must, therefore, contain what has happened in the caucus. This is the reason for my manifestation just so the Steering Committee is cleared. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Will the Chair, therefore, suggest to the chairman of the Steering Committee that instead of a manifestation, the same be introduced as a motion so that the body can act on that motion. MR. BENGZON: I so move, Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is there any objection to the motion of the chairman of the Steering Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the motion is approved. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer, just for a point of clarification. In the past, I remember that when we did have some caucuses, it was really meant to cut down the discussions and to come into some kind of agreement or consensus, but it did not preclude further discussions on the floor. There is a lot of difference between discussing very vital issues in caucus and bringing them forward in plenary sessions. So I would oppose such a procedure where all the issues we discussed are just made part of the record during the caucus and not deliberated on at all in plenary sessions. MR. BENGZON: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The chairman of the Steering Committee is recognized. MR. BENGZON: I believe that it was agreed upon during the caucus yesterday that after the Steering Committee waived its jurisdiction and threw the whole matter to the Commission, if the decision of the Commission in caucus was to accept the proposed resolution, then it would be thrown to the plenary session for discussion, and if that proposed resolution was defeated, that was going to be the end of it. LLphil That was the agreement in our caucus yesterday. I am just rising to put this matter on record so that the referral to the Steering Committee which was officially recorded in our Journal would not be kept hanging. Of course, in the past we made decisions in caucus and we came to the plenary hall and reenacted, so to speak, our decisions in the caucus. MS. QUESADA: Are we now, in effect, Mr. Presiding Officer, changing the procedure? MR. BENGZON: Mr. Presiding Officer, we are not changing the procedure because there was that agreement in the caucus yesterday that if the result of the decision in the caucus were positive, then the resolution would take its normal course, so that this proposed resolution would be calendared. But if the resolution were to be defeated, that was going to be the end of it, unless the body would want to change its mind and rehash the whole thing and discuss it. That is what I understood as the agreement yesterday. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Chair would like to go over the record on whether or not the agreement mentioned by the chairman of the Steering Committee was, in fact, entered into in that caucus yesterday. The Chair would like to know now from Commissioner Quesada whether or not she is

questioning the decision made by the Commission in such caucus in order that we can abbreviate the issue. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I said "inquiry," meaning, I would want to know now whether or not this is going to set the precedent to all future caucuses that we will have the same procedure of agreeing in caucus and that it will just be mainly resorted here. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Chair would like to clarify that in previous caucuses that we held, when we try to get the consensus of the body, it was always on the agreement that whatever consensus we enter into will be brought forward in the plenary session. In the caucus yesterday, however, the Chair recalls that the agreement was that the decision that will be reached will bind the Commission. So I will now repeat the question to Commissioner Quesada on whether or not she is questioning the decision which was reached by the Commission in that caucus. MS. QUESADA: That is not my intention, Mr. Presiding Officer. I just wanted to know whether or not this is going to set the precedent. I am glad that it only refers to yesterday's caucus. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Yes, Commissioner Quesada. MS. QUESADA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer, for the clarification. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Thank you very much, Commissioner Quesada. The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: I ask that Commissioner Bengzon be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is the Commissioner still speaking as chairman of the Steering Committee? MR. BENGZON: No, I am now speaking as an ordinary Member of the Commission, Mr. Presiding Officer. I would like to address some questions to Commissioner Villegas. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Bengzon may proceed. MR. BENGZON: I agree with Commissioner Villegas in his explanation of all the issues that have been discussed here and I share his position. I would just like to clarify certain matters. Firstly, and most of all, if this provision is approved, this will not preclude Congress from passing a law that would allow or legalize in certain instances abortion for medical reasons or for reasons as Congress may deem fit such as, for example, if it should appear from researches and data that it would be for the good of the citizens of this country and for their mental and physical well-being. Am I correct, Mr. Presiding Officer? MR. VILLEGAS: The only possibilities are those situations which we described in which we can apply the principle of double effect when we have to save the life of the mother through an operation and sacrifice the life of the child or vice versa. But those are the only situations that may be permitted if this specific provision is included in the Constitution. MR. BENGZON: Does the Commissioner mean that in a situation, as described by Commissioner Quesada earlier, where the mental well-being of the pregnant woman is at issue, such kind of circumstance would not qualify under the law that would be passed by Congress? MR. VILLEGAS: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because that would involve a direct killing of the fetus. MR. BENGZON: I see. And the Commissioner's position, therefore, is that in such a case, there are other remedies and government agencies that would take care of preserving the physical and mental well-being of the person involved? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. BENGZON: It is only for certain medical reasons that Congress would be able to pass laws that would allow abortion. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. BENGZON: Also, I would just like to state that there should be no more debate as to when life begins because even our present laws, the Civil Code of the Philippines and Articles 256 and 259 of the Revised Penal Code, recognize that a fetus has life and is protected by our laws. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. VILLEGAS: I thank the Commissioner. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer, before we end, will the committee put on record the scope of state support for the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception so that it is not limited to just a very specific period of life I refer the range of the maternal and child health consideration because otherwise it becomes a very limited provision. I would like this to encompass the life of the mother and of the child up to a time that the child will be taken care of by other provisions, like

the provisions on the youth, because this is the only provision that would protect the life of the child not only from the moment of conception but up to the time that the other agencies will no longer cover the care for this child. Will the Commissioner enumerate some of these. What are these specific state support for the mother and child? LLphil MR. VILLEGAS: Actually, if it is not going to be a redundance, since there is already a provision in the Bill of Rights that no one shall be deprived of life without due process of law, I would even expand that statement that life should be protected from the moment of conception up to natural death. Actually, that is the most important principle that the pro-life are supporting that life has to be protected from the moment of conception up to natural death. What are all these possible stages from the moment of conception up to natural death? Some of them are enumerated in the provisions on health: taking care of the working conditions of the pregnant woman, making sure that she is not subjected to all types of hazards that could injure her health and also that of the child and making sure that the appropriate medicine is available. MS. QUESADA: Could the Commissioner include centers for victims of rape? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, definitely. As I said, there are charitable organizations right now, some of which are run by religious orders that take care precisely of pregnant women with unwanted children. They take very specific measures so that these unwed mothers can be taken care of in a very humane way and can actually go through the psychological anguish with the least harm possible. MS. QUESADA: Could we also include the strengthening of maternal and child health services in the Philippines? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, definitely. MS. QUESADA: I thank the Commissioner, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: I ask that Commissioner Regalado be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Regalado is recognized whenever he is ready. MR. REGALADO: I will continue, Mr. Presiding Officer, my interpellation because I have to put the matter of protection of the unborn child in the proper posture and from the maelstrom of the discussion earlier. I will go back to some of my interpellations, but first let me start on a general interpellation. I notice that the vice-chairman is not here, but I think the members of the committee can answer the questions. It has been observed yesterday by Commissioner Rigos that a number of these provisions in the Article on the Declaration of Principles are also repeated in the other articles, like on social justice and national economy and patrimony. Of course, we cannot fault the committee for such seeming duplication because we know that at the time they were deliberating on the Article on the Declaration of Principles, the other committees, like the Committees on the National Economy and Social Justice, were working along the same time frame, so there may not have been any opportunity for coordination. Although I remember during the proceedings on the Article on National Economy and Patrimony when the matter of the same topic having been incorporated in the Article on the Declaration of Principles was mentioned, it was stated by the members of the Committee on the National Economy and Patrimony that there will be a realignment later to see to it that there will be no duplication, and that in the Article on the Declaration of Principles, they will just be stated in a broad form, whereas those in the particular articles will be more specific. ISHOP BACANI: I thank the Commissioner very much. And perhaps later on, we will shorten the other part of the provision. May I now go to Section 9. I would like to ask Commissioner Villegas. First, would I be right in saying that the aim of Section 9 is for the State to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception? I will concentrate only on the life of the unborn from the moment of conception but recognizing the very important part that the first part plays, which seems to be noncontroversial at present and admitted by all. Mr. Presiding Officer, am I correct in thinking that this particular sentence is meant to be a constitutional shield against the abolition of our present abortion laws? MR. VILLEGAS: The intention, Mr. Presiding Officer, is to make sure that there will be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court. BISHOP BACANI: Is it the intention of this provision to make sure, especially because of the abortion that is already happening in the United States, that abortion shall be forbidden or forestalled?

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. That is the ultimate evil that has to be completely forestalled. BISHOP BACANI: Is it further the intention or the necessary implication of this that viability is not going to be the rule in the determination of the existence of human life? MR. VILLEGAS: It will not be the rule, Mr. Presiding Officer. BISHOP BACANI: I thank the Commissioner very much. May I, at this point, interject some comments in response to some questions this morning which are also in support of this particular sentence. I consider this very important because the question has been raised as to when human life begins. Actually, I believe that if we say, "The State shall protect the life of the unborn from the moment of conception," we can allow Congress to determine when conception begins. But they will have to ask the doctors when conception begins, and I am afraid it will not be such an exciting search for them anymore because they will find the answer rather easily. Mr. Presiding Officer, among those that I wanted to quote this morning is Dr. Lily, who is called the Father of Fetology. By the way, there is now fetology so that the fetus is now considered a human patient and not an animal, which is an interesting development. I would like to quote him partly: Seven days after fertilization, the young individual in command of his environment and destiny, with a tenacious purpose, implants in the spongy lining and, with a display of physiological power, suppresses his mother's menstrual period. This is his home for the next 270 days and to make it habitable, the embryo develops a placenta and a protective capsule of fluid for himself. He also solves single-handedly the homograft problem, that dazzling beat by which fetus and mother, although immunological foreigners who could not exchange skin grafts nor safely receive blood from each other, nevertheless, tolerate each other in parabiosis for nine months. We know that he moves with delightful easy grace in his bouyant world that fetal comfort determines fetal position. He is responsive to pain, touch, cold, sound and light. He drinks his amniotic fluid more if it is artificially sweetened, less if it is given an unpleasant taste. He gets hiccups and sucks his thumbs. He wakes and sleeps. He gets bored with repetitive signals but can be taught to be alerted by a first signal or a different one. And finally, he determines his birthday, for unquestionably the onset of labor is a unilateral decision of the fetus. This then is the fetus we know. This is the fetus we look after in modern obstetrics, the same body we are caring for before and after birth who before birth can be killed in diagnosis and treatment just like any other patient. The Commissioner is defending this sentence. He is described as a Catholic leader. Is this a Catholic position? MR. VILLEGAS: Definitely but not exclusively Mr. Presiding Officer. Actually, in the sponsorship speech, I made it very clear that even before Christianity came to this country, our ancestors already considered the baby in the womb of the mother as a human being by the use of the word "nagdadalangtao" and our Muslim brothers here have exactly the same opinion. And there are doctors who are not Christians who confirm the fact that human life begins at the moment of conception. BISHOP BACANI: Yes. Also, I would like to confirm that all orthodox Jews, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism reject abortion. May I name some big names among Protestants who adhere to the same opinions: Karl Barth, perhaps the greatest Protestant, not only Protestant theologian of the century; Deitrick Bonhoffer, martyred under Hitler; Professors Otto Piper of Princeton and Helmut Thielicke, a Lutheran professor of religion at the University of Hamburg. So I would like to concur with that and support that as a statement of fact. Thank you very much, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. ABUBAKAR: Mr. Presiding Officer, may I interpellate the speaker. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Before anything else and before the Chair recognizes the Floor Leader, in the spirit of liberality of our Rules, the Chair would now like to acknowledge the presence of high school students from the Western Philippine Colleges. The Chair is hopeful that they will benefit from our discussions of the Article on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: With the indulgence of Commissioner Abubakar, there are about seven interpellators here. They have been waiting for their turn to speak. I ask that Commissioner Villacorta be recognized. MR. ABUBAKAR: Am I to speak, Mr. Floor Leader? MR. RAMA: Commissioner Uka has just said he will have two words. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Uka is recognized. MR. UKA: Mr. Presiding Officer, as a Muslim, I am against abortion in any form. It is against the law

of Almighty God, as expressed in the Talmud, the Holy Bible, and the Holy Qur'an. The fertilized ovum or conceived child is already a human being, a very young human being in the first stage of life, created through the power of Almighty God. Abortion is pure and simple murder, and this is against one of the Ten Commandments of God which says, "Thou shalt not kill." Whether we are Jews, Christians or Muslims, we must follow this law. Let us not murder the innocent conceived child. Jesus said in the Holy Bible: "Suffer little children, and forbid them not to come unto me: for of such is the Kingdom of heaven." Let us follow what Jesus said, because I am sure all of us also want to go to heaven. I repeat, let us not kill our children by aborting them, especially considering that the Philippines is predominantly a Christian country with a sizeable number of Filipino Muslims. LLphil Thank you very much. MR. VILLEGAS: Thank you. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): May the Chair ask the Floor Leader if Commissioner Abubakar is scheduled to interpellate the committee so that the Chair can properly recognize him. MR. RAMA: He is not scheduled, but he has already spoken. So, may I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized. MR. ABUBAKAR: This is just an interpellation; I am not going to speak. MR. RAMA: No, the Commissioner can interpellate after Commissioner Tan. We give preference to the ladies. MR. ABUBAKAR: I agree. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is that all right, Commissioner Abubakar? Commissioner Tan is recognized. SR. TAN: Mr. Presiding Officer, it will only take one minute to say what I have to say. I am against abortion in all stages of conception. But I would entreat the men in this Commission to go slow in making laws for us women, particularly the highest law of the land, on vital, personal and extremely delicate matters of which they have no personal experience. We, women, have suffered enough from the laws made by men. Men will never comprehend the extreme anguish women have to struggle with for years and the nervous and psychological disorders they have to suffer because they sometimes bear, for a lifetime, the burden of guilt caused by this inability to obey the laws made by men due to psychological or material reasons or by their noncompliance of these laws. I feel that a law is written to help us out, to free us and to liberate us. I feel men have no right to consciously or subconsciously write laws which add more burden to women. They may do this only for themselves. Thank you. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. VILLEGAS: May I just reply to that. MR. RAMA: May I ask that Commissioner Villegas be recognized. MR. VILLEGAS: This is just a very shalt reply. These laws are not being made by men for women. Precisely, the very core of the issue is that there is already another human being in the womb of the woman, so we are making laws for that human being whose life begins at conception. And if the Commissioner is going to take a very feminist approach to it, the chance of that human being, being male, is 50-50 from the statistical point of view. So, this is not a law being made by men to torture women. This is a law which is made precisely to protect the life of an innocent human being who just happens to be captive in the womb of the mother. SR. TAN: Yes, I understand that. I do not mean to be personal. I am truthfully against abortion. I am just saying that we go slow about writing into the Constitution the right to life. MR. VILLEGAS: That is the point. If one is against abortion, he will be against the possibility of it ever being legalized. As I have shown enough empirical evidence. the moment one starts appealing to compassion or to feminist views, then we open up the possibility of two million abortions in the country as they did in the United States. SR. TAN: These are not feminist views. These are human views. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I ask that Commissioner Abubakar be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Abubakar is recognized. MR. ABUBAKAR: We have heard arguments from every sector of society religion, science, commerce and finance from which each speaker could draw inspiration, whether he is for or against this proviso in the Constitution. We have had several constitutions like the Malolos Constitution and the 1935 Constitution but this proviso never appeared in any of the articles of the past constitutions. I understand

that even different governments, from the 14th to the 17th century or even as old as the European continent, have no such proviso in their constitutions or in their common laws. This proviso did not appear in the constitutions of South American countries, the majority of whom are Roman Catholics. There are Protestants as there are Muslims and many other people of different faith. This proviso has elicited salient comments not only from our fellow Commissioners but also from the others. Our own experience dictates and points to us that in all our constitutions, there is no proviso to this effect. We are a divided House not because of differences in religion, financial status or intellectual thinking or approach but because we cling to our own views and conception. As I am saying, I do not care if 60 or 105 countries in this globe do not have provisions on the right of the mother or the child that is conceived. We have no such proviso in our laws. So, I hope our distinguished colleagues will share my view that we should not provide this concept or belief in the Constitution. If we want to raise this matter, we can always bring it before the legislative body which will be formed after the Constitution is ratified. To put it in the Constitution because it is a belief, it touches religion and it touches our own free thinking and intellectual conception would provoke a divided House. Regardless of how we put this proviso in the Constitution, regardless of how we vote here, our people individually and collectively would adhere to what they believe is the way for them and the way they think is right. I am sure the proviso will be constantly violated. So, in our wisdom, should we not trust our individual Filipino brothers or sisters who are in the church and let them decide the right moment to bring this child into the world? This may be an unwanted child, but I believe that the right of the unborn from the moment of conception is not an issue between the mother and the child. I would, therefore, suggest, even if it is out of the ordinary discussion, that this particular proviso be deleted from the Constitution. We love our Constitution; we will fight to defend that Constitution. But with a divided people, that Constitution in a state of promoting unity will divide us regardless of our goal. Each will follow the practice we believe is correct. Therefore, why put a proviso that will cause division, that will not be accepted and make the Constitution a mere scrap of paper to be violated rather than to be observed? We never had this proviso before in our past constitutions. We Under our organic law, we have progressed and we are enlightened. So, why put a factor that may not even be accepted by the women of the Philippines? We ourselves doubt its wisdom and practicality. Thank you. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I ask that Commissioner Villacorta be recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Villacorta is recognized. MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I just have a few clarificatory questions addressed to the committee, if the committee will allow it. This is with respect to Section 9 which states: The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. I think the main proponent is Commissioner Villegas. Would this provision contemplate roving teams sponsored by the State to monitor the activities of women to make sure that they do not abort the fetus within their bodies? MR. VILLEGAS: I do not think that is the idea. We will not have any intrusion into the privacy of any person. I am sure Commissioner Natividad can, if he wants, add information on how specific crimes of abortion are actually proved by the State. But I do not think it is a matter of monitoring. MR. VILLACORTA: With this mandate that the State shall protect the life of the unborn, would it not be incumbent upon the State, assuming that this is approved, to ensure such a protection by organizing monitoring teams or task forces? MR. VILLEGAS: That is already in the implementation, but I do not think that would be the intention. It depends on people who have the evidence to report, but I think the Commissioner is bringing it to an extreme. I do not think that is the intention of this specific provision. MR. VILLACORTA: Realizing that the intention of the committee is that this should not be carried to the extreme, would it not be possible to add the phrase to make sure that an extreme implementation of this duty of the State to protect the life of the unborn will not happen? MR. VILLEGAS: It may not be necessary because it is precisely incumbent upon Congress and the other divisions of government to be prudent in the implementation of this provision. I do not think the Commission would have to actually tell the people that they should be prudent. MR. VILLACORTA: Our recent political experience proves that the government can be imprudent and extremist in applying the force of the law. This is one of the fears of those who have reservations or

misgivings about this provision. I myself have nothing against protecting the life of the unborn. What I am more worried about is the extreme application of this provision once the State is given the mandate. It depends really, as the Commissioner is implying, on who will implement this provision. If we have a bigot to implement this, then we might be inviting trouble. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, but I do not think the Constitution should start making provisions for bigots and tyrants in this specific case. There will be other ways of safeguarding this. There are a lot of articles like the Bill of Rights which talk about the right to privacy. There are just enough safeguards as far as the Commissioner's fears are concerned. MR. VILLACORTA: We have provisions, not just in this Constitution but in the other constitutions, in which the State has the duty to protect the lives of its citizens. MR. VILLEGAS: That is right. MR. VILLACORTA: That is why we have police forces or armed forces. In the same manner, we are giving the State the duty to protect the life of the unborn. So it is only logical that certain monitoring groups be formed by the State in order to protect the life of the unborn. Anyway, the contemplation has been clarified, and perhaps at the proper moment this Representation will propose an amendment. On Section 10, lines 13 to 15, about the protection of children, this Representation, along with four female Commissioners as well as four male Commissioners, sponsored Resolution No. 355 and the title of that resolution is: "Resolution Providing for the Equality of Women and the Protection of the Rights of Women, Children and the Family." Looking through the list of resolutions that this committee considered, we do not find our Resolution No. 355. However, we are happy to note that our proposed sections giving women equal rights in all fields of life, as well as the right of the family to develop its capabilities, were incorporated in the draft article. There are two provisions which we consider important but were not incorporated in the draft article; for example, the section that says: "Marriage must be founded on the free consent and equality of both spouses." I do not know the member of the committee who is concerned with the rights of women and children. It may be Commissioner Rosario Braid or Commissioner Aquino. We would like to know whether or not this is part of the intendment of the committee's provision. I skipped Section 11; then I will go back to Section 10 with the Commissioner's indulgence. Section 11 has to do with the role and participation of women in nation building and the right of women to equal protection. In behalf of my cosponsors, I would like to ask this question: Is the provision "Marriage must be founded on the free consent and equality of both spouses " included in the contemplation of Section II? MS. ROSARIO BRAID: Since we were concerned with the general principle here, to which the Commissioner can include a phrase, the said resolution has been referred to the section about the family. MR. VILLACORTA: I see. MS. ROSARIO BRAID: So, we only considered a very general resolution for inclusion in this Article on the Declaration of Principles. MR. VILLACORTA: But just the same, since the Commissioner is talking about the right of women to equal protection in all spheres of life, would she still include this principle that marriage is founded on the free consent and equality of both spouses? MS. ROSARIO BRAID: We will entertain the Commissioner's amendment to this provision during the period of amendments. MR. VILLACORTA: In other words, at present it is not included in the sense of Section 11 and, therefore, an amendment would have to be introduced? MS. ROSARIO BRAID: This is very general and we could take it as when we say "equal protection." The Commissioner could include that in the section dealing with family life. If the Commissioner will present his amendment on the family, which will be considered after this article, we will welcome it. MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you. MR. NOLLEDO: May I be permitted to ask a question. What do we mean by "on the free consent and equality between spouses?" The marriage law which is now found in the Supreme Court of the Philippines requires that marriage must be voluntary and free. There is no problem about that. But about the word "equality," I have some reservations. May I be enlightened on what we mean by "equality"? MR. VILLACORTA: This simply means that in a marital relationship, both the husband and the wife have equal rights in that relationship, it is not a superior-subordinate relationship in which the wife or in some cases the husband will be inferior in status and in rights compared to the other spouse. MR. NOLLEDO: May I inform the Commissioner that there is a provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines

that the father and the mother jointly exercise parental authority over their children. But in case of conflict, it seems to me that the rule is that the decision of the father shall prevail. Would the Commissioner agree with me, if I say that that provision should not be institutionalized in the sense that it should be governed by the Civil Code or by the civil law? MR. VILLACORTA: I cannot speak on behalf of the other sponsors but from my point of view, if that Civil Code provision will be retained, then it will go against the principle that women should enjoy equal rights with respect to men in all spheres of economic, political, civil, social and cultural life including family life. I am quoting from Section 11 of the draft article. MR. NOLLEDO: I think Section 11 will cover the word "equality." If we talk of "consent," that is unnecessary. It should not be placed in the Constitution anymore because all marriage laws in civilized countries require consent before marriage is celebrated. MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you for explaining that. But what we really mean when we speak of "equality of both spouses" is not just the consent but the maintenance of equal status between the two partners in marriage throughout the marital life. Therefore, what the Commissioner quoted from the Civil Code that the father has precedence over the mother in parental authority would probably go against the provision in Section 11. MR. NOLLEDO: What I mean is that when we talk of social and cultural life, then we are embodying the spirit of the Commissioner's resolution with respect to equality. As far as equality between husband and wife is concerned, in case of conflict, how can we resolve the conflict? We have to go to court. So, the provision that the decision of the husband should prevail is, more or less, designed to preserve harmony in the family because if we let either party go to court, then they will be fighting each other and there might be friction in the family. MR. VILLACORTA: I think a case involving conflict between two human beings should not be decided on the basis of gender or a hierarchy of priority. In other words, if there is a conflict between husband and wife, the case should be decided on the merits of the case who committed the wrongdoing and not on the basis of who is the woman and who is the man. I think this is the intendment of Section 11 and, therefore, am I correct in interpreting Section 11 as leading to the repeal of that particular provision in the Civil Code and in other marriage laws that are discriminatory to women? MR. NOLLEDO: I would agree with the Commissioner. MR. VILLACORTA: Is that the sense of the committee? Is the committee unanimous on that? MR. NOLLEDO: I cannot bind the committee but that is my personal opinion. MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): With the indulgence of the two Gentlemen on the floor, the Chair recognizes Commissioner Aquino to help in the debate. Maybe it will take a woman to solve the problem. MR. VILLACORTA: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, I am answering on behalf of the committee. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Commissioner may proceed. MS. AQUINO: The intention in Section 11 is to provide for a self-implementing provision that would itself repeal all discriminatory and antifeminist laws in the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code. We made a research on the laws in the Civil Code and in the Revised Penal Code. For example, discrimination would amount to an imbalance in parental authority, discretion in the matter of family rights and the imbalance in the management of the conjugal partnership of gains. On the matter of political rights, by way of linguistic limitation or maybe by habitual assumption that the female gender is already included in the person or in the reference to a "he," it cannot be disputed that the major fields of politics, economy, culture and social sciences are firmly controlled by men. Therefore, with the passing of this provision, it is our intention that all these laws shall be considered repealed. We do not ask for absolute equality or sameness. Even the law would recognize that sex provides a justifiable and valid classification; that is, in the context of the equal protection of the law clause. But what we want is for us to rid ourselves of the very comfortable notion that women are just to be protected in a pedestal, since we have always considered them to be belonging to a pedestal. The law has done very little except to perpetuate the myth that women are helpless and, therefore, should be put on a pedestal. The fact is, the pedestal is a cage, constricted by social systems and hemmed in by archaic and anti-feminist laws. In the same vein that Commissioner Nolledo would mention the law on joint parental authority, there is also a provision in the Civil Code which says in Article 117 that a husband may object to his wife's exercise of a profession or occupation or her engaging in business, if his income is sufficient. There is also a provision in the Civil Code, which has been echoed in a lot of civil law cases, that even as a Constitution guarantees the liberty of abode and travel, it

cannot be impaired except for specific causes, like in the constitutional provision. The wife's mobility however is subordinate to her husband's choice of residence. On the provisions on conjugal partnership of gains where each partner gets equal shares upon its dissolution, the rights of management are not equally shared. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, while the wife, consistent with her assigned role of wife and mother, is given management of the household. This is the kind of myth that is being perpetuated by the law, as if it is the law of the Divine Creator that the women should fulfill the noble offices of being a wife and a mother. This is the problem that this provision attempts to address itself to. MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you. So, it is clear that the sense of the committee is that antifeminist laws will be repealed, if this provision is approved. MR. OPLE: Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask Commissioner Aquino a question? Commissioner Villacorta may supplement her answers, if he desires. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): With the indulgence of the two Commissioners in debate, Commissioner Ople is recognized. MR. OPLE: I have a very positive reaction to Section 11, until this is elaborated in the interpellations to become a veto or a fiat actually against existing laws on family relations that are construed to be unaligned or inconsistent with Section 11. To what extent will this precipitate massive dislocations in family life, when we completely disregard the cultural matrix in which these relations now flourish and the uniqueness of families in the sense that they probably have their own attributes and properties not readily susceptible to being measured by legal standards of this nature? In effect, are we not treating families in the Philippines like a Procrustes' bed on which we lay down the body of the patient and if there are protruding limbs, we chop them off? Will that not be the result? What about the sociological and the anthropological points of view? There are societies that are inherently matriarchal. Good examples are the Keralan culture in India, the Minangkabau culture in Indonesia and the Negris-Simbilan culture in Malaysia. There are cultures that are dominantly patriarchal. Even in this country, I think there are variations. Are we now going to fit them onto a legal bed of Procrustes under Section 11? And if their limbs protrude because they do not fit the constitutional bed, we are going to chop them off? MS. AQUINO: It may not be exactly painless for the men, but that would be the effect. MR. OPLE: So, it is going to be a constitutional bed of Procrustes. MS. AQUINO: The onus and the burden of this provision when approved will fall primarily on the provisions on family relations in the Civil Code, but then, of course, it would also include the discriminatory laws in terms of undue evidential burden, as on the laws of concubinage and adultery. MR. OPLE: So, this will have the effect of repealing all of these laws that are considered prejudicial to family equality established in Section 11. I think I am right now experiencing a change of mind about Section 11. That is just a manifestation, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. AZCUNA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Azcuna is recognized. MR. AZCUNA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. On behalf of the committee, as I am the acting chairman right now, I just would like to point out that perhaps, it is not necessary to maintain that anything protruding will be cut off under Section 11, considering that what Section 11 really says, as Commissioner Aquino has pointed out, is that the right given to women is that of equal protection. It does not say they have equal rights. They have a right to equal protection. That does not mean that they will have equal or identical rights, but what equal protection means is that whatever rights are given to them are entitled to equal protection. So, I believe that they are still within the ambit of a reasonable classification since we cannot erase the differences between men and women. In fact, as the French said, "Vive le difference," or let the difference live long. It is possible for the law to treat different matters differently, and men and women being different, they are to be treated differently without violating the equal protection clause. Unless we subscribe to the formulation, like in the UP draft, that men and women are equal in law and in fact, which is not what Section 11 says, then we can still maintain that certain protuberances can survive Section 11. MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, may I be allowed to some clarification. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: Initially, we manifested that the intention in Section 11 is not to advocate absolute equality or sameness. We have to concede to certain biological differences which, by the law of the Creator, are

historically and biologically determined. However, the idea behind Section 11, and I would fully concur with Commissioner Azcuna on that, would be to address itself to imbalances in law and jurisprudence, as well as in the conferment of civil rights between men and women, without saying that men and women can be equal absolutely in all spheres of their lives. For example, we are burdened perennially, and that cannot be challenged, with the responsibility of bearing children and carrying them for nine months before birth. These are the biological differences that we have to concede to and recognize. MS. ROSARIO BRAID: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Rosario Braid is recognized. MS. ROSARIO BRAID: Yes, in behalf of the committee and this is just for the record, let me cite some constitutional provisions that show we are behind many countries in terms of women's rights. In Poland, an article states that women in "The Republic" have equal rights with men in all spheres of public, political, economic, social and cultural lives. In France, it says, and this is in the Preamble: "The law guarantees women's rights with men in all domains." In the Federal Republic of Germany, it says: "Men and women shall have equal rights." In the German Democratic Republic, it says: "Men and women have equal rights." In Italy, it is the same that they would have the same rights in employment; and even in Japan, which is considered a place where women are subordinates, it says: "Law shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes." I will not bother the body with other provisions but there are many provisions which do attest to the equality of women not only in terms of protection but equality in all domains. Thank you. MR. PADILLA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Padilla is recognized. MR. PADILLA: I concur with the view of Commissioner Azcuna that if there be equal protection of the rights, that is all what the law or even the Constitution can provide. Due to the natural differences between man and woman, it is only a woman who can give birth to a child, and that is a very great privilege. In fact, it is the female who is more valuable than the male. There are some provisions in the Revised Penal Code which favor women; for instance, one of the aggravating circumstances is the disrespect or the disregard of respect due the offended party by reason of his rank, age or sex. This is a recognition of the natural differences between man and woman. If the offended party is a female, except in crimes against chastity where it is an inherent element of the offense, that fact, if it constitutes disrespect or disregard of the respect due the offended party by reason of her sex, by being a woman, is an aggravating circumstance. Whereas, there is no such provision in favor of the male or man. Also, when a woman and a man are separate, both have equal rights. But when they get married, there is not only a contract; there is also a sacrament. I believe they Civil Code properly governs the relations between husband and wife. The fact that the Civil Code provides that, as a general rule, it is the husband then who becomes the head of the family. He chooses the family domicile. He is the administrator of the conjugal property. That is not an attack on the rights of the wife. These are important for the unity and harmony within the family. But as a matter of actual fact, not of law, most families prosper where it is, in effect, the woman who acts as the head or the administrator of the family fortunes. As Senator Recto once said: "La mujer reina pero no gobierna." Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: I ask that Commissioner Villacorta be recognized. He is not yet finished. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Before Commissioner Villacorta proceeds, frankly speaking, the Chair is itself confused about the interpretation of the committee on Section 11. So, may the Chair suggest to Commissioner Villacorta to probably ask more questions so that the committee will make a definite statement on the right of women which is supposed to be equal with men and to be insured under Section 11 so that probably we can get a definitive statement from the acting chairman without any contradictory statements from any other members. The Commissioner may go ahead, please. MR. VILLACORTA: I agree with the Presiding Officer that we are getting different signals from the different members of the committee. So may we request the acting chairman of the committee to restate once more the consensus of the committee, unless he would like to suspend the session and consult the other members of the committee. MR. AZCUNA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.

MR. AZCUNA: Mr. Presiding Officer, the sense of the committee is that what is afforded here is the right to equal protection which does not mean uniformity in everything. There is equality insofar as the difference is not relevant. That is what equal protection means. We cannot treat it differently where the differences are irrelevant for the purpose of the law for that particular purpose. Where sex is irrelevant, then that should not be the basis for a different treatment. But it does not mean that the law will always treat them the same way. For where and when their differences are relevant, then it is valid for the law to treat them differently. MS. AQUINO: Yes. There is actually no difference, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the interpretation of Section 11 between Commissioner Azcuna and the committee. MR. NOLLEDO: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. Protection to women just as we also give protection to men should not mean equal rights to both in the absolute sense. For example, in the case of conjugal partnership, under the Civil Code, it is the husband who manages the conjugal property because the wife is supposed to take care of the household chores and may not have time to manage the conjugal property. In that case, the wife is not denied the right to object to a mismanagement by the husband. The wife may even ask the court to transfer the management of the conjugal partnership to the wife if the husband abuses his powers of administration. In this case, there is some sort of equality. However, I will cite one instance where there is a complete discrimination against women in the case of adultery and concubinage cited by Commissioner Aquino. This is the case of really patent discrimination. Under the Revised Penal Code, the husband is guilty of concubinage under three expressly stated instances: 1) Maintaining a paramour in the conjugal dwelling; 2) Maintaining a paramour in a place other than the conjugal dwelling; and 3) Having sexual intercourse with the woman not his wife under scandalous circumstances. In the case of a woman, the woman is guilty of adultery as long as she has carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with a man not her husband under any circumstance. In the case of the husband, there are only three instances mentioned by law. So if a husband brings a woman to a hotel close to the prying eyes of everyone, that is not concubinage and he is not criminally liable. So, that is a clear case of discrimination against the women. In that case, I think the law should be amended. I agree with Commissioner Aquino that there is a discrimination in that respect. LLphil Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. TADEO: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): With the indulgence of the Gentlemen, the Chair would like to recognize Commissioner Tadeo. MR. TADEO: Sandali lang po ito. Mga 30 segundo lamang. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Tadeo may proceed. MR. TADEO: Sa Section 11, makabubuti sigurong tingnan natin kung paano nilikha ang babae. Saan ba siya hinugot? Hinugot siya sa tadyang ng lalaki. Ang ibig sabihin partner or equal. Hindi siya kinuha sa huling bahagi ng lalaki upang maging katulong at hindi rin naman siya kinuha ng Panginoon sa unang bahagi para mauna sa lalaki; hinugot siya sa tadyang upang maging partner. Ang ibig sabihin ay kabalikat siya sa pampulitika, pang-ekonomiya't pang-kulturang pakikibaka. Kasabay nating nilalansag ang feudal relation sa pagitan ng babae at lalaki, kaya kaisa ako rito sa Section 11. Ang ibig sabihin ng babaeng hinugot sa tadyang ay kabalikat sa pagbabago. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): With that "tadyang" explanation, can we now proceed, Commissioner Villacorta? MR. VILLACORTA: I think Commissioner Bengzon wanted to ask a follow-up question. MR. BENGZON: Just to clarify, Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Bengzon is recognized. MR. BENGZON: I address the question to Commissioner Azcuna. With the interpretation that was articulated by Commissioner Azcuna after the exchange of dialogue between Commissioners Aquino and Ople, I want to ask this question: Under the interpretation of Commissioner Azcuna, does it mean then that if Section 11 is passed, all laws in the Civil Code which are contradictory to Section 11 will be automatically repealed? MR. AZCUNA: Yes, because the Constitution will repeal a statute if it is absolutely irreconcilable and contradictory. But as we stated, not everything that treats men and women differently would go against Section 11; only if that different treatment is irrelevant or based on an irrelevant distinction will it be

contrary to Section 11 because it would violate the equal protection clause. MR. BENGZON: In which case, the courts of law will be the one that will determine which will be in conflict with the Constitution or not. MR. AZCUNA: Yes, or Congress can itself revise or go over the Civil Code and perhaps align it with the new Constitution. MR. BENGZON: Thank you. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Villacorta still has the floor. MR. VILLACORTA: I would like to go back to Section 10 with respect to the provision on children. It says here: "The State shall protect children from all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. . ." This is negatively stated. I wonder if the committee would consider having a more positive statement or stipulation of said protection, something that our resolution proposed: "CHILDREN SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROPER CARE, NUTRITION, A RELEVANT NON-SEXIST AND QUALITY EDUCATION, AS WELL AS PROTECTION FROM EXPLOITATION AND MENTAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE." MR. AZCUNA: The committee will gladly consider an amendment along those lines at the proper time. MR. VILLACORTA: Thank you. MS. QUESADA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA: This is just to enrich some concepts on Section 11 related to family life. It will not just be changes in the existing laws but also changes in curriculum as well. For example, in family life, there will be some implications in the curriculum of schools whereby home economics and responsibility of being members of the family will now be taught, because we like equality of women and men in relation to household responsibilities. Hence, it will not be mainly women who will now be domesticated but that everybody will have the opportunity to serve and work in the domestic chores. So I think that will be one implication that will arise as a result of this equality in family life. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is there any response from the committee? As I mentioned in my speech on the U.S. bases, I am definitely pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer. I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception," we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me? MR. AZCUNA: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped. MR. GASCON: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So, if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized. MR. AZCUNA: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. GASCON: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. My second question is with regard to the population program. How would this provision affect the existing population program being implemented by the Population Commission? Second, if there is an approval of this provision here, because Commissioner Villegas said that he shall make a motion for deletion of that provision on population at the proper time, does it necessarily mean that the provision in the General Provisions Article on population will have to be deleted? MR. NOLLEDO: Mr. Presiding Officer, not necessarily because family planning is consistent with the provision in Section 9 that there should be protection to the unborn. Before this proposed provision was formulated, taking into account the pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution, family planning would include preventive pregnancy and even killing the fertilized ovum. But now, if we adopt the second sentence of Section 9, family planning would refer respectively only to preventive pregnancy as stated by Commissioner Azcuna. LLphil MS. ROSARIO BRAID: Also, at the proper time, in the General Provisions we will discuss the population policy. The Commissioner will note it is no longer population control but population policy, which means

that there are other ways of limiting population such as economic development, improving the education of women which is an indirect means of population control; or as in the case of Singapore, at one time it had a 1-2 child policy, but today they realize that they need to increase their population. And so, their population policy now is to have more children, whereas, 10 years ago they were limiting; they are now increasing. So, population policy would, therefore, mean that at a certain time when our population shall have stabilized, we can even have a policy towards increasing population. We will discuss this at the appropriate time in the General Provisions. MR. GASCON: So, Mr. Presiding Officer, what this provision merely implies is that there will be certain programs as they are being implemented now which will have to be stopped, but not the whole program itself. I have one last point on the issue of abortion, Mr. Presiding Officer. Have there been studies made with regard to the issue of the legalization of abortion being directly proportional to the population rate of other countries? I notice that in the past, about five or ten years ago, the trend was towards world population control program in industrialized countries; but now because they have succeeded, in one way or another, through population control programs or through legalization of abortion, they have a problem of a lull in their birth rate to the point that they are, as mentioned already, encouraging more births than discouraging births. MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, with respect to population policy, the studies have been made but the correlation coefficient is not conclusive. Suffice it to say that what is known as ZPG, zero population growth, is somewhere at 2.2 percent, the .2 percent being what is required to replace in addition to the father and the mother who do not reproduce, like the celibates. At 2.2 percent, population is maintained at its present level regardless of natural attrition. So, if a country falls below 2.2 percent in population growth, then it is actually decreasing in number. It is below zero population growth. Also, what is important in demography is what is known as the net reproduction growth rate; that is, the number of girls who will be born and who will bear children. That is very important. Is the net reproduction growth rate the number of girls that are born and will bear children. MR. GASCON: So, abortion does not have any direct relation to population growth. MR. AZCUNA: As I said, the studies are not conclusive on the correlation coefficient. MR. GASCON: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. Section 10 provides: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. For this purpose, the State shall inculcate in the youth nationalism, patriotism and involvement in the affairs of the nation. I have filed a resolution containing this essence. I do not hope the resolution was one of those considered when the committee discussed this provision. One additional concept which I have included in my resolution which is not here is "representation." It reads: "The State shall inculcate in the youth nationalism, patriotism and involvement in the affairs of the nation AND SHALL FURTHER GUARANTEE THEIR REPRESENTATION IN THE POLICY-MAKING BODIES OF GOVERNMENT." If we analyze seriously the number of youth in our country today between ages zero to 24, they comprise 61 percent of the total population; 31.75 million, in fact, of the 52 million in 1983, or 61.06 percent. If we are to be true to the idea that indeed the youth plays a vital role in nation-building and as future leaders of our country, their representation must be granted. It might be said that guaranteeing representation to the youth would mean that representation should also be given to other sectors and I have no arguments there. But considering the reality that our population is a very young population should we not include in our Declaration of Principle on the provision on the youth a guarantee that they shall be represented, Mr. Presiding Officer? MR. AZCUNA: We will entertain proposal that effect during the period of amendments, Mr. Presiding Officer? MR. NOLLEDO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would say that because I am the author of the second paragraph of Section 10 representation of the youth should already be deemed covered by or included in the involvement in the affairs of the nation. MR. GASCON: So long as that is clear, Mr. Presiding Officer. When we speak of involvement, that is an assurance to the youth that they shall be adequately represented and shall be consulted in the affairs of the nation. Perhaps, we could include categorically "involvement and representation" in the affairs of the nation. MR. NOLLEDO: That concept is included. MR. AZCUNA: We will welcome a proposed amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. GASCON: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. With regard to Section 12: The State affirms the primacy of labor as a social and economic force and shall foster their welfare and protect their rights, subject to the corresponding claim of capital to reasonable growth and returns. When we speak of the primacy of labor in relation to capital, what does the committee contemplate when it used the words "subject to the corresponding claim of capital" if indeed we are to be true to that basic statement that there is primacy to labor? MR. AZCUNA: Mr. Presiding Officer, the words "subject to" are being deleted. We refer the Commissioner to yesterday's Journal, page 11. MR. GASCON: I see. Thank you. MR. NOLLEDO: The members of the committee have decided to delete those words. MR. GASCON: So, how does it read now, Mr. Presiding Officer? MR. AZCUNA: It shall be a period after "rights." MR. GASCON: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. That is all for the moment. MR. AZCUNA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, there are no more registered interpolators except one reservation. So, before we adjourn, I move that we close the period of sponsorship and debate and interpellations with one reservation. Commissioner Ople would like to speak tomorrow. He is too tired now. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Is there any objection to the motion with the reservation? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the motion is approved. The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. GASCON: Mr. Presiding Officer, does that mean that outside of Commissioner Ople, no one else can ask questions? What if tomorrow there are new questions which may arise? MR. RAMA: In the period of amendments. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): That is the understanding of the Chair. As a matter of fact, the Presiding Officer is listed in that list of the Floor Leader. But with that motion that has been approved, it is only Commissioner Ople who will speak tomorrow ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer, I move for adjournment until tomorrow at nine-thirty. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): There is a motion to adjourn. Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the session is adjourned until tomorrow morning at the usual hour. Reportedly, typhoon signal no. 2 has been raised in Manila. It was 6:34 p.m. The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. There have been some lengthy debates on this subject and we need not repeat the arguments today. However, I propose to delete the words "from the moment of conception" and add the word "CHILD" after "unborn" so that the sentence will read: "The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn CHILD." THE PRESIDENT: Is the committee ready to respond? MR. TINGSON: Madam President, the member of our committee who is the chief articulator of this particular section is Commissioner Villegas. May I ask that he be recognized to answer questions along this particular section. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Villegas is recognized. MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, the position of the committee is that the phrase "from the moment of conception" is completely indispensable in order to protect the life of the unborn from its very beginning. We are sorry to say that we cannot accept the amendment. REV. RIGOS: Madam President, as already articulated in this hall, a good number of the Commissioners are very unhappy about the words "from the moment of conception." Anyway, we believe that giving protection to the life of the unborn is sufficient enough to be in the Constitution. In order not to prolong the discussion on the subject, I request that we vote on this resolution. MR. NOLLEDO: Madam President, may I interpellate Commissioner Rigos?

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Does the Commissioner agree with me that from the time of conception, there is already life? REV. RIGOS: Even before the time of conception there is life. MR. NOLLEDO: I think the Commissioner will qualify his answer if I ask the second question. Is the life human? REV. RIGOS: It is human. MR. NOLLEDO: Not before conception, because the sperm has life by itself. The egg has life also and the moment they unite, there is already life. LLphil REV. RIGOS: Yes. MR. NOLLEDO: Then that life is human? REV. RIGOS: Yes. MR. NOLLEDO: Does it have personality? REV. RIGOS: That is the debatable point. It depends now on one's authority. There are those who wait until two months before they speak of the personality of the child, and we do not have the time to debate on that in this Commission MR. NOLLEDO: As a lawyer, I would like to tell the Commissioner that there is a presumptive personality because under Articles 40 and 41 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for all purposes favorable to the fetus, it is considered born, and, therefore, one can make a donation to him or to her, and it can also succeed. Does the Commissioner agree with me? REV. RIGOS: Yes, that is the debatable portion of the article here. MR. NOLLEDO: If from the time of conception it has life and it is human, and if there is any move to put an end to that life, would we consider that murder aside from being called abortion because the fetus is helpless? REV. RIGOS: Even under the Penal Code, that would be murder, intentional or unintentional. MR. NOLLEDO: In the Penal Code, it is called abortion, but from the layman's point of view, it is murder. Would the Commissioner agree with me? REV. RIGOS: I agree with the Commissioner. MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, would the Commissioner agree with me that the words "from the time of conception" should not be deleted in order to protect the human being inside the womb of the mother? REV. RIGOS: If we just say "the life of the unborn," it is up to Congress to define whether it should begin from the time of conception or two weeks or eight weeks after that. But here we are trying to be very specific by saying "from the moment of conception." MR. NOLLEDO: Shall we deny ourselves the opportunity to protect life even at that stage because if we will leave it to Congress, then Congress might adopt some legal aspects derived from the ruling of the Supreme Court that the life becomes viable only after, say, four months? Why do we not decide in this Commission now? REV. RIGOS: I would not preempt the wisdom of the Congress composed of the Representatives elected by the people. MR. NOLLEDO: Therefore, if we leave it to Congress, we consider also the possibility that Congress may reinstate the words "from the time of conception." REV. RIGOS: Congress probably would listen to the sentiments of their constituents. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you. Madam President, on behalf of the committee, considering that the amendment covers a transcendental question and although we have a quorum, can we not suspend the voting on this question until after the other Members of the Commission shall have come? This is with due respect to Commissioner Rigos, if he will be kind enough to agree with the suspension of the voting. REV. RIGOS: Madam President, I agree with the suggestion of Commissioner Nolledo. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE: May I be clarified on certain points made by Commissioner Rigos. Did I get him correctly as having said that life begins even before the moment of conception? REV. RIGOS: Yes. I said that. MR. DAVIDE: So what really is the Commissioner's contemplation on the commencement or the beginning of human life?

REV. RIGOS: It is too specific. It does not give way to the opinions of other authorities. MR. DAVIDE: But the Commissioner believes that at the moment of conception there is human life. REV. RIGOS: I will leave that to Congress to define, but in Congress they have more time to consider other views. MR. DAVIDE: The Commissioner said that life begins even before the first moment of conception and now he is saying that he is not so sure whether at the first moment of conception there is life. REV. RIGOS: I said that there is life even before conception. MR. DAVIDE: That is exactly the point. If the Commissioner believes that life begins even before the first moment of conception, why would he propose that we delete the words "moment of conception"? REV. RIGOS: The view that there is life even before conception is one of the various views, and there is life at the moment of conception; other authorities would wait until two weeks; others would wait until eight weeks. MR. DAVIDE: May we be favored with an authority regarding the existence of life even before the first moment of conception? REV. RIGOS: Dr. Gloria Enriquez, head of the Zoology Department of the University of the Philippines and whom I consulted on this matter, told me so when I interviewed her during my research on this subject. MR. DAVIDE: But anytime before the first moment of conception, there is no fertilization yet, there is no meeting of the sperm and the ovum. REV RIGOS: But the sperm and the egg are supposed to be alive. That is what Dr. Enriquez believes by life even before conception. MR. DAVIDE: We are talking about fertilization. We cannot speak of life independently of the ovum and independently of the sperm. REV. RIGOS: We are talking of the unborn here. MR. DAVIDE: Precisely. So, insofar as the unborn is concerned, life begins at the first moment of conception. Therefore, there is no need to delete. There is no need to leave it to Congress because that is a matter settled in medicine. REV. RIGOS: No. MR. DAVIDE: That life begins at the moment of conception? REV. RIGOS: As Commissioner Quesada related here a few days ago, there are cases in the life of the mother that should be considered in the question of abortion. MR. DAVIDE: Those are totally different. We are talking about the right of the mother, not the right of the unborn child from the first moment of conception. So, if the Commissioner's proposal is precisely to provide possible protection to the mother, that is an entirely different matter. The section provides for protection to the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. REV. RIGOS: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception." MR. DAVIDE: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So, we should not give any doubt to Congress. too. Thank you, Madam President. (Applause) MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, since there was the suggestion that we postpone the voting on this move to delete, can we take up other amendments that have been suggested on Section 9? MR. PADILLA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Padilla seeks to be recognized, I suppose, on this point. MR. PADILLA: On the unborn, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Padilla is recognized. MR. PADILLA: I would like to ask Commissioner Rigos a question. After the word "unborn," instead of deleting the phrase "from the moment of conception," will the Commissioner agree if we delete the words "the moment of," so it will read: ". . . protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception"? On the question of what is the precise moment of conception or days before or after, maybe we could keep the committee report by deleting the words "the moment of" and just say "the life of the unborn from conception." REV. RIGOS: Commissioner Aquino, my adviser on this subject, has just arrived; I have to consult her on whether or not we can accept that.

MR. PADILLA: I wonder whether Commissioners Villegas and Bacani would consider my suggestion, although there is a need to delete "the moment of," that we say: "the life of the unborn from conception." MR. VILLEGAS: We have discussed this already, and we will accept that amendment. MR. TINGSON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Tingson is recognized. MR. TINGSON: According to the records I have here, Commissioner Bernas likewise presented an amendment on Section 9 which is also to delete the phrase "from the moment of conception." We would like to have a clarification from Commissioner Bernas. FR. BERNAS: The amendment I had is to substitute the phrase "from the moment of conception" with "FROM ITS BEGINNING." MR. RAMA: I see. FR. BERNAS: That is from the language of God and human's best. But I would accept also the Padilla amendment. MS. AQUINO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: I would reiterate the motion of Commissioner Rigos for the deletion of the phrase "from the moment of conception," meaning, the wording should be "the life of the unborn." There is enough law and jurisprudence to protect a fetus. In fact, even in Articles 40 and 41 of the Civil Code, a fetus is considered born for all purposes favorable to it, subject to the conditions in Article 41. I would like to address this problem with objectivity and prudence and I sincerely hope that we do not exploit our imagined fears on the possibility of a statutory fiat for abortion. The issue of abortion is at best diversionary. Culturally, we are not predisposed to legalizing abortion such that the imagined fear is, I would say, off-marked. MR. VILLEGAS: Let me just summarize very briefly the arguments why we have to say "from conception." I think there are enough Commissioners here, therefore, we can already vote, Madam President. Precisely, we are basing the argument on pure objectivity because natural scientists who are the most objective in studying positive sciences have come to the conclusion that life begins at conception. Human life begins at conception. I quoted yesterday the authoritative findings of this conference in Washington on abortion where they decided and the ratio was 19:1 that human life begins at conception. This included the five percent who remained in doubt. This is where we should use the moral principle already articulated by Bishop Bacani. When there is doubt even by a very small percentage, the moral principle is "Do not kill," because the awesome risk of taking the life of a human being is there. And so, whether we are in the majority among the 19 or whether we are in the five or one percent, the conclusion is: We have to protect human life from conception. MS. AQUINO: Madam President, I have no quarrel with the fact that a fertilized ovum or a zygote has life, but my question is: Would the deletion of the phrase "from the moment of conception" legalize abortion? We do not, one bit, intend to give statutory fiat to the legalization of abortion by deleting "the moment of conception." I would think that we are overreacting to possible natural fears, but as Commissioners, should we abide by that kind of a fear in drafting this Constitution? MR. VILLEGAS: Let me just answer that. The fears are based empirically on observation of human beings not only in the United States but even here who precisely are willing to cite American jurisprudence to allow the killing at two months or at three months. There are enough individuals who are actually articulating the jurisprudence now existing in the United States. So the fears are not unfounded; they are based on empirical observations of specific individuals who are moving towards the American disaster. MS. AQUINO: Madam President, this will be my last intervention and we would rest our case according to the decision of the Commission. The drift of the argument of Commissioner Villegas is that when we delete "the moment of conception," we are sanctioning murder or killing. This is not at all justified under the premises presented in the interpellations and in this intervention now, and I would have to take exception to that kind of a suggestion. MR. NOLLEDO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Nolledo is recognized. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you. In addition to the statements of Commissioner Villegas, I think Commissioner Villegas is fully justified in making that implication. That implication is a possibility although Commissioner Aquino said that abortion is sufficiently punished under the Revised Penal Code. We must admit that the Revised Penal Code is a

mere statutory enactment and can be repealed at any time while we are raising the issue against abortion to the constitutional level. If we can protect the unerring adult by abolishing that penalty, how much more of an innocent child in the womb of the mother, the cherished gift and loving gift from God. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bacani is recognized. BISHOP BACANI: This is just a minor intervention for the retention of the phrase "from conception." Let me just put this in the context of the present Constitution which has really been for the defense and the enhancement of life. In fact, the clinching argument for us in the Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights, for the abolition of capital punishment was formulated very beautifully by Commissioner Bernas when he said: "It is not proven that the taking away of life saves life." Therefore, he said: "Why should we insist on imposing the death penalty?" There was a doubt one way or the other that we favored life, but our provisions are for the enhancement of the quality of life. Hence, let us be consistent, let us be prolife. Should there be the slightest iota of doubt, then let us still affirm life. Second, the drift of this Constitution has been for the underprivileged, for the defenseless and certainly, nobody is as defenseless as the fetus in the womb of his mother. And so, this is the first time I beg this Commission to make an affirmation for life for this is one of the more beautiful things that will come out in this Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Ople spoke of setting a moral tone by means of this Constitution and I think this is a privileged moment for that. Thank you, Madam President. MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized. MR. SARMIENTO: So that I can vote intelligently on this issue, may I address one question to Commissioner Bacani? BISHOP BACANI: Yes, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Commissioner may proceed. MR. SARMIENTO: Thank you. According to the latest statistics, we have 20,000 abortions in Metro Manila a year; 500,000 abortions committed every year in the Philippines; 15,000,000 abortions committed around the world. In the midst of these abortions, we have two positions: One position is that the right of the unborn begins from the moment of conception. This is supported by Gaudi'um et Spes, Mater et Magistra, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, the Sacred Congregation for a Doctrine of Faith and Aposto'cae Sedis issued by Pius IX. But we have also this position which is advanced by another member of the church, Fr. Dancel of the Society of Jesus. He said: There can be no mind before the organism is ready to carry one and no spirit before the mind is capable of receiving it. I feel certain that there is no human soul, hence, no human person during the first few weeks of pregnancy as long as the embryo remains in the vegetative stage of its development. So may we be clarified on this point, Commissioner Bacani. What is the official church position? There seems to be two contrasting church positions on this point. BISHOP BACANI: Even in the Catholic Church, there would be one out of a thousand who does not agree. But let me cite to the body an article from two textbooks. One of them a liberal one, written by Philip Keane, is entitled: Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective. This is considered a liberal Catholic textbook. Let me read also from another textbook used here in the Philippines, written by Fr. Henry Peschke, S.V.D. It is good the body brought that out, because one of the papers given us pointed out that there is no Catholic consensus on this. There is certainly a consensus that abortion is wrong and that life should be protected from the moment of conception but that the argument really revolves on the moment of ensoulment, as they say. Let me read a paragraph from this article entitled "The Enduring Consensus" by Philip Keane. Perhaps one of the most significant facts about current Roman Catholic moral theology is that it has consistently insisted on the moral evil of abortion, in spite of the pluralism that has entered into so many other aspects of moral theology. The tradition of the right to life has been sacred in Western thought for centuries. Catholic moralists do not seem at all ready to abandon this tradition in the area of abortion. They are not ready on any widespread basis to concede that the evil in abortion is an ontic but not a moral evil. Hence, the Church's stand on abortion remains a basically unified one. . . And then from Fr. Peschke: On the background of these biblical doctrines and also influenced by the inheritance from Judaism, the young Christian Church formulated its judgment on abortion. From the earliest times it was one of decided

rejection. The condemnation developed in sharp opposition to the attitude of the Greco-Roman world, in which abortion and infanticide were not viewed as serious moral offenses. Throughout the centuries Christianity continued to consider abortion as a crime. Grave sanctions were issued by the Church against Christians who would dare to commit this sin already in the first centuries. Vatican II once more takes a severe stand against it. It writes: "From the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care, while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes." The intrinsic reasons for the abjectness of abortion are the same as those which militate against the crime of murder and the killing of an innocent in general. So that is just to assure the Members of this Commission of the unity in this tradition. MR. SARMIENTO: Thank you, Madam President, and I also thank the Commissioner. MR. BENNAGEN: Madam President, may I be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bennagen is recognized. MR. BENNAGEN: In making a decision as to which life takes priority, the life of the mother or the life of the unborn, what criteria are contemplated by the committee on which to base the decision? MR. VILLEGAS: We have articulated this moral principle called the principle of double effect. Whenever there is need, for example, to perform a surgical operation on the mother because of a disease or some organic malfunctioning, then the direct intention is to save the mother. And if indirectly the child's life has to be sacrificed, that would not be abortion, that would not be killing. So, in those situations which we said are becoming rarer and rarer because of the tremendous advance of medical science, the mother's life is safe. MR. BENNAGEN: That is only insofar as the physiology is concerned. Does it take into account also the psychological status of the mother, the socioeconomic circumstances that surround the state of the mother? MR. VILLEGAS: As we have said during the interpellations, there are thousands of other ways of helping the mother economically, psychologically, culturally. Precisely, it is the responsibility of society, private individuals, religious and charitable organizations and the State to apply all of those positive means to help the mother psychologically, socially, culturally, but definitely, not to opt for undoing a wrong by another wrong. We can never right a wrong by another wrong. MR. BENNAGEN: Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Floor Leader is recognized. MR. RAMA: May I ask that Commissioner Suarez be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Suarez is recognized. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. May I take up some interesting legal points with Commissioner Nolledo in order that all of us can be properly guided. I take it that the Commissioner concedes that this provision will affect not only our criminal laws but also our civil laws governing the rights of children. Is my understanding correct? MR. NOLLEDO: I did not say it will affect; it will confirm our civil law and criminal law on the matter. Abortion is now criminally punished under the Revised Penal Code and that under Article 40 in relation to Article 41 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to that child who is not yet born, there is accorded a presumptive personality, subject to being born under the conditions required by law, basically the separation from the maternal womb while alive. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you for the clarification. May I concentrate first on the criminal law implications of this provision. The Commissioner is right in calling attention to the fact that under the Revised Penal Code, there are already provisions governing abortion, and if I remember it correctly, there is a crime known as intentional abortion and unintentional abortion, plus abortion attended with some violence, et cetera. If we are going to approve this particular provision from the criminal standpoint, then the offense of abortion after the moment of conception would be considered a crime of a higher category like murder. Would the Commissioner not agree with me? MR. NOLLEDO: Not necessarily, although we categorize that as murder, because the child cannot defend himself. MR. SUAREZ: Yes. There is a crime known as infanticide which contemplates a situation where the mother could kill her own child. There is a specific provision in the Revised Penal Code governing that kind of crime. In this particular case, if we approve this constitutional provision, how would we classify this incident where a mother commits an intentional abortion which is tantamount to killing the unborn child

after the moment of conception? Would we consider that infanticide or murder? LLphil MR. NOLLEDO: It is called abortion, subject to a mitigating circumstance which will lower the penalty if the mother killed the fetus in order to hide her dishonor. In the case of infanticide, if my memory serves me right, the child is already born, and that the child has less than three days of life. MR. SUAREZ: So what we are saying is: This constitutional provision would not materially affect, alter or revoke the provisions governing abortion under the Revised Penal Code. MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner is absolutely right. In that case, Congress may increase or decrease the penalty depending on the circumstances. But if we adopt this provision, Congress cannot abolish the laws against abortion. MR. SUAREZ: So, in the same manner, all of the accomplices, like the attending physician, the midwife, the pharmacist who may have given these abortives would be affected. Their respective criminal liabilities would not at all be affected by this constitutional provision because their crimes are already covered by the present provisions of the Revised Penal Code. MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner is correct. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you. May we go now to the civil aspects, since the Commissioner mentioned Articles 40 and 41. I take it that the Commissioner and I are agreed that it is birth which gives legal personality to the fetus or unborn child or conceived child or whatever we call it. Is that proposition acceptable to the Commissioner? MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, that is expressly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. MR. SUAREZ: When we speak of birth, we mean that that child must get out of the womb of the mother and breathe some oxygen from this world. Is that the correct interpretation in layman's language? MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner is right. That is upon the cutting of the umbilical cord. MR. SUAREZ: Right. And so, if we are going to respect the rights of the unborn child from the time of conception, that is going to affect not only our codal provisions governing this birth or personality but also hereditary and successional rights. Is my conclusion correct? MR. NOLLEDO: Even if we do not adopt this, the Civil Code provision already gives right to an unborn child. If we adopt this, we talk only of protection against possible ending of the life of the child. The civil aspects would not be affected in any way. MR. SUAREZ: Would I be, therefore, correct in assuming that this constitutional provision, notwithstanding the codal provisions governing legitimacy, successional rights, hereditary rights, would not be affected materially or substantially? MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner is absolutely right. MR. SUAREZ: Thank you for the clarification. MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you for the questions. MS. QUESADA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA: This is still on the future practical implications should this particular provision be approved by this body. What would now be the implication in the practice of certain contraceptive methods, like the use of IUD, which according to the report of Commissioner Villegas, is an abortifacient? Will this now be banned? MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner will notice that when we talk of protection to life, we do not talk of preventive pregnancy. Preventive pregnancy can still be covered under what we call "population control policy." But the moment there is life, I think it is our duty to God and country to protect that life. MS. QUESADA: The presentation of Commissioner Villegas and contained in the documents or materials which have been given to us, shows that some of these methods are abortifacient in nature because there is already the fertilization of the ovum. It is the implantation of the fertilized ovum that is prevented by the use of the intrauterine device. MR. NOLLEDO: Commissioner Villegas will answer the Commissioner's question. MR. VILLEGAS: This was the subject of interpellations of Commissioner Regalado and we made a distinction, if it can be scientifically proved that some contraceptives are abortifacients, and that they actually kill the fertilized ovum. Then, definitely those types of contraceptives will be declared unconstitutional, once we have this specific provision. MS. QUESADA: Would this mean that the law will run after the producers of these contraceptive devices? MR. VILLEGAS: Exactly, yes. MS. QUESADA: And this covers also those who import these particular methods?

MR. VILLEGAS: Definitely. MS. QUESADA: And would this mean that the practitioners the family planning program implementors, the Ministry of Health, the Population Commission, private practitioners, et cetera will now be held liable for the use of such abortifacient contraceptive methods? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, if they are accomplices to the use of these abortifacients. MS. QUESADA: Would this mean that the law will also run after the "arbularyos" and the sellers of herbs in downtown Quiapo market, and the stallowners around Quiapo Church who acknowledgedly are selling herbs which contribute to abortion? Would these be the implications of the decision that we shall make here? MR. VILLEGAS: Definitely, yes. MS. QUESADA: Thank you. MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the interpellations of Commissioner Quesada, may I ask a follow-up question? THE PRESIDENT: The Commissioner may proceed. MR. BENGZON: In connection with these questions asked by Commissioners Quesada and Villegas, which would lead to possible liability and prosecution of those persons that she mentioned, I assume that such possible liabilities and prosecution would only come to play if it is proven that such acts were deliberately done and if such methods were used deliberately to abort a fertilized ovum. Then, those liabilities would possibly attach. Am I correct? Therefore, if such methods are used by these persons involved such as the health workers, social workers, et cetera, without their knowing that there was in fact a fertilized ovum already existing in the womb, then there is no liability at all that would attach. Am I correct? MR. VILLEGAS: There would not be, but of course, the informal campaign should be there for us to be aware. MR. BENGZON: Thank you. MR. RAMA: Madam President, may I ask that Commissioner Maambong be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Maambong is recognized. MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, I just want to ask a follow-up question. I do not mind saying that I am in favor of this protection which had been articulated by Commissioner Villegas, but as lawyers, we have to put our feet on the ground. When we go to court to present a case against a perpetrator of an alleged abortion, there are certain things we have to present before the judge, and one of these is proof that the woman is in fact pregnant. I will not ask this question of Commissioner Nolledo because this is not a legal question; it is actually medical. Under the present medical advances, at what point of conception I am talking of weeks or months can a doctor or a hospital certify that the woman is in fact pregnant? There are varying answers to this. Some say that medical science has advanced to such an extent that a doctor can actually provide a medical certification that the woman is pregnant from the moment of conception or from two weeks. Some say it is two months; then there are some who say about the frog test, I have nothing against this text. I think that is not a very correct indication of pregnancy. What is the present medical science on this, Madam President? LLphil MR. VILLEGAS: Manuals on pregnancy precisely state that normally, the woman realizes that she is pregnant when she misses her period. By that time, the human life in her womb shall have been present for approximately two weeks. MR. MAAMBONG: All right, just one more point on this. Suppose a woman has gone to the hospital and let us assume, for purposes of argument, that she has in fact been pregnant for two weeks. At the present stage of our medical science when she gets examined after fertilization of two weeks, can a doctor in a hospital or a hospital anywhere in Manila or in the Philippines certify that a woman is already pregnant two weeks after fertilization? MR. VILLEGAS: It would depend on the expertise of the doctor and the possible equipment that she or he has. MR. MAAMBONG: That is precisely my point. Let us suppose that we go to the Makati Medical Center, which is the best equipped in the Philippines, and let us suppose that they have the best equipment. Can Makati Medical Center present truthfully a certification that a woman has been pregnant two weeks after fertilization? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. Given the present status of medicine, that certification can be given, of course, with statistical probability that is always contained in such a certification.

MR. MAAMBONG: I am not questioning the Commissioner's answer. But is this answer documented by facts? I ask so, because as of the moment, I am of the impression that under the so-called "frog test," "rabbit test" or whatever it is, it has to be at least two months from fertilization before a doctor or a hospital can issue that certification. MR. VILLEGAS: This statement about the woman being pregnant from the time she misses her period and the human life in her womb being approximately two-weeks old has been made by medical experts and that is where the scientific evidence can be found. But I think the details of when certification can be made precisely are details that should be left to Congress to determine if and when it is questioned. MR. MAAMBONG: I can understand that. MR. COLAYCO: Madam President, may I intervene. MR. MAAMBONG: Yes. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Colayco is recognized. MR. COLAYCO: Thank you, Madam President. Essentially, the problem presented by Commissioner Maambong really involves legal evidence. It all boils down as whether the evidence presented by the government, taking into account the evidence presented by the counsel for the defense, will be accepted by the court or not. Commissioner Villegas has tried to prove that his conclusions are supported by available scientific data. But whether there has been really life when the attempted or alleged abortifacient or whatever method is used to abort a child is present, that involves a question of evidence. MR. MAAMBONG: I can agree with that. That is precisely why I premised my question on the fact that as lawyers, we have to put our feet on the ground. MR. COLAYCO: Yes, that is true. MR. MAAMBONG: When we go to court, the court will always ask: "All right, you are charging somebody with abortion. Where is your certification to the effect that the woman was pregnant?" It is just like in physical injuries. To my layman's thinking, I understand that the pregnancy of a woman can be proven only from two months. That is why I am asking Commissioner Villegas if we have medical facilities to show that a woman can be proven pregnant two weeks after pregnancy. If that is so, then we can now have that medical certificate and present it to the court. That is the only point. MR. COLAYCO: But let us not forget that the principle which is established in this section is nothing but a principle. MR. MAAMBONG: Yes. MR. COLAYCO: That is all. MR. MAAMBONG: I am satisfied with the Commissioner's answer. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Aquino be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: Madam President, I am apprehensive that when this provision is adopted, the exploration of knowledge on an issue that is so complex will be brought to a stop even before it has begun. The provision has been a source of conflicting opinions. An important issue such as this and which elicits diverse and complex responses should be more productively addressed by legislation, which has a better chance of concretely addressing our hidden fears and possibly providing a more manageable consensus on the issue. Madam President, I would submit that this issue belongs properly to the domain of legislation. THE PRESIDENT: Are we ready now for a vote? MR. VILLEGAS: I think we are ready to vote, Madam President. MR. GASCON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Gascon is recognized. MR. GASCON: Before we vote, I would like to be clarified on the parliamentary situation. Commissioner Rigos made a motion to delete. THE PRESIDENT: We are going to vote on Commissioner Rigos' amendment. MR. GASCON: So, it will not be on Commissioner Padilla's amendment to the amendment. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Padilla's amendment to the amendment. MR. VILLEGAS: The motion to delete will be the first, then later on we can take Commissioner Rigos' amendment. MR. RAMA: It is Commissioner Rigos' amendment to his anterior amendment. THE PRESIDENT: The amendment of Commissioner Rigos is to delete the phrase "from the moment

of conception." MR. VILLEGAS: That is right. THE PRESIDENT: In other words, Commissioner Rigos' amendment is on line 2 of page 3, which reads: "The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn CHILD." Did I state it correctly, Commissioner Rigos? REV. RIGOS: Yes, Madam President. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, it will be clear that if we vote "yes," it is for the deletion of the phrase "from the moment of conception." If we vote "no," it is for the retention. Madam President, may I ask for a nominal voting. MR. PADILLA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Let us settle first Commissioner Rigos' motion to delete the phrase "from the moment of conception " without prejudice to Commissioner Padilla's amendment. MR. PADILLA: My proposal, Madam President, is just to delete the words "the moment of." MR. VILLEGAS: That is accepted, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Which one, Commissioner Rigos' amendment? MR. VILLEGAS: No, Commissioner Padilla's amendment. THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but we have here the amendment of Commissioner Rigos which we have to dispose of, first, unless Commissioner Rigos is withdrawing his amendment. REV. RIGOS: I am not withdrawing my proposed amendment. THE PRESIDENT: It is very clear. MR. REGALADO: Madam President, just a parliamentary inquiry. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Regalado is recognized. MR. REGALADO: Will we follow the procedure that we had yesterday, that if the motion to delete is carried, that is without prejudice to the filing of another amendment? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, to whatever remains. MR. REGALADO: Embodying the proposal of Commissioner Padilla? THE PRESIDENT: That is right, because the committee report will remain as is, so it can be subject to another amendment. MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Are we ready now or shall we have more introductions? BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, if it is retained, will the amendment of Commissioner Padilla still be acceptable? MR. VILLEGAS: That is right. The body is ready to vote, Madam President. NOMINAL VOTING THE PRESIDENT: All right, what is to be voted upon is the deletion of the phrase "from the moment of conception," on lines 2 and 3 of page 3, Section 9, and there is a request for nominal voting. So, if the vote is "yes," it is to delete "from the moment of conception." If the vote is "no," then that means to say that the phrase "from the moment of conception" remains. Will the Secretary-General please call the roll? THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading: Abubakar Maambong No Alonto Monsod No Aquino Yes Natividad No Azcuna No Nieva No Bacani No Nolledo No Bengzon No Ople Bennagen Yes Padilla No Bernas No Quesada Yes Rosario Braid No Rama No Calderon No Regalado No Castro de No Reyes de los No Colayco No Rigos Yes Concepcion No Rodrigo No Davide No Romulo No Foz Rosales Garcia Yes Sarmiento No

Gascon No Suarez Yes Guingona No Sumulong No Jamir No Tadeo Yes Laurel Tan No Lerum No Tingson MR. TINGSON: Madam President, I am voting yes because I believe that this would better be taken care of by legislature later on. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading: Treas Villegas No Uka No Muoz Palma No(Applause) Villacorta THE PRESIDENT: There should be no clapping or booing, please. SECOND ROLL CALL THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General will conduct a second call for those who have not registered their votes. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading: Abubakar Ople Alonto Treas Foz Villacorta Laurel THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rosales has just entered. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading. Rosales No THE PRESIDENT: The results show 8 votes in favor and 32 against; so, the proposed Rigos amendment is lost. MR. RAMA: Madam President, may I ask that Commissioner Padilla be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Padilla is recognized. MR. PADILLA: Madam President, my proposal is just to delete the words "the moment of," so the phrase will read: "the life of the unborn from conception." I think this was accepted by the committee. MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, the amendment is accepted by the committee. THE PRESIDENT: This amendment has been further enhanced by Commissioner Bernas' amendment which added the words "from conception"? MR. VILLEGAS: "From conception," Madam President. VOTING THE PRESIDENT: Are we ready to vote on the amendment which has been accepted by the committee? The proposed amendment reads: "The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception." As many as are in favor of the amendment, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised left hand.) As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.) As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (Four Members raised their hand.) The results show 33 votes in favor, 3 against and 4 abstentions; the sentence, as read with that amendment of Commissioner Padilla, is approved. LLphil MR. RAMA: Madam President, may we take a vote on the provisions of the whole section, as amended. THE PRESIDENT: We will first read Section 9. Is there any other amendment? MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE: I have a proposed amendment to the first paragraph of Section 9. It is a very minor amendment to add the words "AND MARRIED" after "family." So the first sentence will then read: "The State recognizes the sanctity of family AND MARRIED life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution." THE PRESIDENT: What does the committee say? MS. AQUINO: Madam President, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the amendment, precisely on the premise that family life is premised on married life. MR. DAVIDE: So, when the committee therefore used the words "family life," it is deemed to include married life.

MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. MS. AQUINO: That is the consensus in the committee. MR. DAVIDE: With that explanation and clear intention, I am not insisting on my proposed amendment. MS. AQUINO: Thank you. MR. VILLEGAS: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other amendment? Commissioner Bennagen is recognized. MR. BENNAGEN: Since there was the question whether or not family life includes married life, does it also include instances where there is no marriage but there is family life? Is that also the understanding in the committee? There are cases of family life without necessarily having to get married. MS. AQUINO: It is included. MR. BENNAGEN: Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I just want to add the words "AND PRIMARY" after the word "natural" on line 3, page 3 of Section 9. This would harmonize with the section on Education that was introduced by Commissioner Aquino. So it will read: "The natural AND PRIMARY right and duty of parents." MS. AQUINO: The committee accepts the amendment. THE PRESIDENT: How will it read? MS. AQUINO: Section 9, lines 3 to 6 on page 3, will now read: "The natural AND PRIMARY right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the government." MR. COLAYCO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Colayco is recognized. MR. COLAYCO: May I ask if Commissioner Monsod will entertain an amendment. MR. MONSOD: May we hear it first. MR. COLAYCO: I suggest to put "PRIMARY" before the word "duty" on line 3, so it will read: "The natural right and PRIMARY duty." The word "natural" is necessarily primary. MR. MONSOD: We use the word "PRIMARY" to denote the superior right of the parents as against the State. MR. COLAYCO: I will not insist; I was just thinking. MR. GASCON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Gascon is recognized. MR. GASCON: I have another amendment to the same sentence. On line 5, delete the words "aid and," so it will read: ". . . development of moral character shall receive the support of the government." I feel that the words "aid and" are already covered by the word "support." THE PRESIDENT: What does the committee say? MR. TINGSON: We accept the amendment. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bacani is recognized. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, I want to ask a question regarding the interpretation of Commissioner Aquino on what Commissioner Bennagen meant when he mentioned "no marriage at all" or "no civil marriage." What does the Commissioner mean? Are they the same? cdasia MR. BENNAGEN: No. I contemplate on the possibility of consenting adults plus children living a family life. BISHOP BACANI: Yes, but together they have a mutual and a stable compact. MR. BENNAGEN: Yes. BISHOP BACANI: I see. I was wondering if it was something, at least, less than that, then the State shall strengthen that type of living-in situation. That is not the idea. Thank you. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I move that we vote on the whole Section 9. THE PRESIDENT: Will the chairman please read Section 9, as amended. MR. TINGSON: Section 9, as amended, reads: "The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. IT SHALL ACCORD EQUAL PROTECTION TO life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural AND PRIMARY right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the government." MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Maambong is recognized. MR. MAAMBONG: Before we vote, I just want a clarification on the last phrase "development of moral character." I would like to know from the committee if this is well considered, considering that with the insertion of the phrase "development of moral character," it would appear that the right and duty of parents is limited to development of moral character and I do not think that is the intention. I just want a one-sentence explanation on this. MR. TINGSON: It is not limited to that, but the committee felt that that is of primary importance; that it deserves to be mentioned because the morality of a young man covers, more or less, the whole plethora of his personality. MR. MAAMBONG: I ask this because this phrase "and the development of moral character" does not appear in the 1973 Constitution. However, I will not insist on my clarification, with the assurance that the words "development of moral character" do not limit the duty and right of parents. MR. TINGSON: The phrase does not appear in the 1973 Constitution but we want to make our Constitution better than the 1973 Constitution. MR. MAAMBONG: Does this not really limit the right and duty of parents only to the development of moral character? MR. TINGSON: No. MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. MR. REGALADO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Regalado is recognized. MR. REGALADO: May we request Commissioner Tingson to read again the second sentence of this section. It seems to be a little different from that in the copies we have. MR. TINGSON: There was a little mistake there a while ago. The second sentence reads: "It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception." MR. REGALADO: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Are we ready now? SR. TAN: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Tan is recognized. SR. TAN: May I just ask the committee how the State will give the family aid for moral character? MR. TINGSON: We already deleted that upon the amendment suggested by Commissioner Gascon. The word "aid" is eliminated; it will now be "shall receive the support of the government." SR. TAN: May I know how the government shall support the moral character of a family in Tondo? MR. TINGSON: I will ask Commissioner Aquino to say something on that. MS. AQUINO: The forms and modalities of state support are varied. It may take the form of welfare services and social services in the fields of education. It may take the form of scholarships and other incentives to enforce the spiritual and moral formation of the citizens. SR. TAN: In other words, this is an emphasis on the support for moral development, but it does not mean that it would not help physically or materially because nothing is said about material help. One cannot preach about God to a hungry stomach. That is what I mean. MS. AQUINO: Madam President, over and above the other provisions of the article on state support, material support is already included. The committee is of the sense that a complete development of moral character also partakes of the need and requisite for material support from the State. It is not excluded. SR. TAN: Thank you for that explanation. MR. RAMA: The body is ready to vote, Madam President. MR. TINGSON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Tingson is recognized. MR. TINGSON: This may not be very, very important but I just want to ask Commissioner Villegas or our committee. I am, of course, disturbed by the fact that in the United States and other places, there is sympathy towards defining a family as including an effeminate man living with another man. We just want to make sure that when we speak of "family," we are speaking of the normal conservative definition of family, and that is, a man and a woman married together. I know we understand that, but I, personally, would like to say that for the record. MR. VILLEGAS: Madam President, both the natural law, the age-old traditions in the Philippines and religious values affirm that normal family life relationship, not conservative, is between a man and a woman. MR. RAMA: We are ready to vote, Madam President.

VOTING THE PRESIDENT: Section 9 has been read by the chairman. As many as are in favor of Section 9, as amended, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.) As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.) As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (Few Members raised their hand.) The results show 34 votes in favor, none against and 4 abstentions; Section 9, as amended, is approved. MR. RAMA: Madam President, we approved Section 3 piecemeal last night. We have not voted on it as a whole section, so I move that we vote on Section 3 as a whole section, as amended. MR. TINGSON: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Tingson is recognized. MR. TINGSON: The formulation that the committee remembered last night was: "THE STATE SHALL PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. WHEN ENTERING INTO A TREATY, THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION SHALL BE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION." THE PRESIDENT: Is there the word "and" between "SOVEREIGNTY" and "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY"? MR. TINGSON: There is no "and," Madam President. MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized. MR. SARMIENTO: Before we vote on the proposed amendment, may I ask Commissioner Bacani who fathered this amendment one clarificatory question. THE PRESIDENT: Which one? We are on Section 3. MR. SARMIENTO: This section to be voted upon by the body, Madam President. I understand it was fathered by Commissioners Romulo and Bacani. THE PRESIDENT: Please proceed. MR. ROMULO: Yes, I will share the paternity. MR. SARMIENTO: Last night, Madam President, Commissioner Romulo stated that a military bases agreement or any treaty concerning military bases would be excluded from the concept of treaty. But after that was clarified, Commissioner Bacani informed this Representation that it was his intent that the concept of treaty covers agreements or treaties governing military bases. So, may I be clarified on this point. MR. ROMULO: Commissioner Bacani talked to me this morning and he now agrees that it is a general provision. He was confused yesterday. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, when I introduced this formulation, together with Commissioner Romulo, what I intended was that it should be as general as possible. The sentence says: "WHEN ENTERING INTO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION SHALL BE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION." That should be a general statement and nothing should be excluded from it, I believe. MR. SARMIENTO: We are now confused, Madam President, because the position of Commissioner Romulo is that treaties governing military bases could be excluded from the concept of treaty under that section. But here comes Commissioner Bacani saying that it should be understood to mean a general provision, a concept governing all treaties, without exceptions. THE PRESIDENT: Does Commissioner Romulo see any contradiction between his statement and that of Commissioner Bacani's, as stated, so that this can be explained or clarified? MR. ROMULO: My intention was to exclude foreign bases from treaties; I should say treaties regarding foreign bases. As I explained yesterday, the Transitory Provisions formulated by us excludes the concept of foreign bases other than the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, all I am trying to say is that when we do enter into treaties and other international agreements, the paramount consideration shall be what is mentioned here. On the other hand, whether or not the body intends to exclude the foreign bases from this treaty is another question. Whether they are included or excluded, if treaties are made with any other nation, then these conditions should be of paramount interest. I think that is the sense of it. cdasia THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question? MS. AQUINO: Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: This is not on behalf of the committee. This is just a personal observation. May I inquire from Commissioner Romulo the intent of the provision as interpreted by him? Am I correct in understanding that the interpretation of his provision, dovetailed with the provision that has been approved for the Transitory Provisions, is that any and all treaty arrangements on foreign bases will not be allowed anymore? MR. ROMULO: Yes, except for. . . MS. AQUINO: Except that which pertains to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in the Transitory Provisions. In effect, does it not mean that we are reserving only for the Americans the use of the national territory for any kind of foreign bases? MR. ROMULO: Only if the Chief Executive decides to enter into a new treaty. That is up to the Chief Executive and the Congress. MS. AQUINO: Assuming that the Chief Executive decides, we cannot allow anymore any other kind of foreign bases, for example, as cited by Commissioner Azcuna, the possibility of a joint ASEAN foreign base in the Philippines or in Indonesia or in Malaysia. Would that be the effect? MR. ROMULO: That is our thought because we hope to dismantle the U.S. bases as soon as possible and thereafter we do not want any other bases here. MS. AQUINO: Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: We are ready to vote, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Bennagen is recognized. MR. BENNAGEN: In the contemplation of the committee, how are the criteria for paramountcy of national sovereignty, integrity, national interest and right to self-determination determined? May I ask the proponents. THE PRESIDENT: I beg the Commissioner's pardon? MR. BENNAGEN: I would like to ask the proponents how the paramountcy of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and right to self-determination be determined in deciding on an international treaty. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Romulo is recognized. MR. ROMULO: We believe that the Chief Executive and Congress in entering into these agreements shall try as realistically as possible always to uphold our interests, our rights on a truly mutual, beneficial and reciprocal basis; and that with regard to territorial integrity, of course, no part of our territory will be compromised. And above all, our national interest, which should be perceived by the Executive and Congress, shall prevail. MR. BENNAGEN: Would this include also consultation with a broad sector of the Philippine population? MR. ROMULO: I suppose so, because Congress will have to be involved, and so is the Executive as in relation to our section on social justice regarding consultation with the people. MR. BENNAGEN: Will it include referenda and plebiscites? MR. ROMULO: I think I will leave that to the proper authorities that would either be Congress or the President. MR. BENNAGEN: Thank you, Madam President. MR. RAMA: We are ready to vote, Madam President. MS. QUESADA: Madam President, just a clarification before we vote. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Quesada is recognized. MS. QUESADA: Yesterday I do recall that when we talked about the Transitory Provisions, the treaty is transient, which means that it will end. Whatever principle we put there will actually not be operational until after it shall have been implemented. Therefore, when we talk about a principle placed in the Declaration of Principles, it should be something that shall guide us in our future decisions. Therefore, when we say we exclude the matter of foreign bases in this particular executive agreement or treaty that the State will get into, then we will not be governed by any principle in such future transactions, because we are, in effect, saying that there will be no change in the present situation. So, the interpretation was just given by Commissioner Romulo. He clarified that we are giving a special place for the foreign bases when, in fact, international agreements would consider a vital issue as allowing bases in the future. MR. MONSOD: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. MONSOD: I am also one of those who helped draft that and perhaps we can settle it by saying that

the subject of the US military bases is covered by the Transitory Provisions, not only because it is transient, but because it can also be a contingent event. cdasia With respect to the principle, the principle of foreign policy in Section 3 says that all treaties shall be governed by the principles of national sovereignty. But Commissioner Romulo also read into the record that in the first place, treaties on any foreign base other than those in the Transitory Provisions are not contemplated as within the area that can be entered into. Therefore, that is the reconciliation between the opinion of Commissioner Bacani and Commissioner Romulo. In the first place, we will not enter into any treaty on foreign bases except in the contingent and transitory possibility after 1991 which is covered by the Transitory Provisions. In all other treaties which are allowed, then those principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and self-determination will apply. MR. AZCUNA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Azcuna is recognized. MR. AZCUNA: I would like to propose an amendment that will reconcile all the views. Instead of "WHEN ENTERING INTO A TREATY," we just say: "IN OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, THE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION SHALL BE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY . . ." It ties up also with foreign policy. It is the broad field of international relations. MR. RAMA: Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized to present an amendment to Section 4. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. MONSOD: I would like to present an amendment to Section 4. At this juncture, the President relinquished the Chair to the Honorable Regalado E. Maambong. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, we just approved the section protecting the unborn. A few weeks ago, we approved the section protecting life by abolishing the death penalty, subject only to certain exceptions. Our amendment to Section 4 is a continuation of our affirmation and commitment to life for all our people from the scourge of nuclear weapons. Yesterday, we also voted to give some options on the questions of the bases. It is even more important now to affirm the sense and commitment of this Commission with respect to nuclear weapons. We are happy to say that this is probably one of those proposals of the committee and the body where we have, I believe, unanimity, where we can all get together because we all share that same concern. I would like to propose that the section be reformulated to read as follows: "THE PHILIPPINES SHALL, CONSISTENT WITH CONSIDERATIONS SOLELY OF NATIONAL INTEREST, PURSUE A POLICY OF FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS TERRITORY." This was codrafted by Commissioner Azcuna, who is the prime author and may I read the names of the coauthors: Commissioners Rigos, Romulo, Colayco, Rama, Regalado, Tingson, Davide, Villegas, Gascon, Bernas, Concepcion, Sumulong, Bacani, Sarmiento, Calderon, Muoz Palma, Tadeo, Ople, Natividad, Nieva, Rosales, Maambong, Tan, Quesada, Bengzon, Treas, Foz, Uka, de los Reyes, Guingona, Rodrigo, Jamir, Suarez, Rosario Braid, Nolledo, Aquino, de Castro and myself. MR. TINGSON: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): The chairman of the committee is recognized. MR. TINGSON: Inasmuch as our committee is involved in the formulation of this amendment and that practically everyone is a coauthor of this amendment, our committee joyfully accepts the amendment. MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Aquino is recognized. MS. AQUINO: This is not on behalf of the committee but may I request a clarification on how the committee would operationalize the term "SOLELY" on the basis of national interest? MR. MONSOD: The formulation as it is merely asserts that the national interest is paramount. Therefore, the principle or the policy that Commissioner Azcuna defined in his sponsorship and the nonabsolutist character are adopted by this proposal. "National interest" is defined by the executive and the legislative and this means that we are making a declaration that this is a policy of the State and that it must be consistent with the national interest. If there are by-products or other interests that may be served, then those are incidental and secondary. Unless the national interest is served first, then there shall not be any modifications or exceptions. MS. AQUINO: I appreciate some kind of an inconsistency between cognition and the formulation of that provision because when one says "SOLELY" in the national interest, it is as if to say that it is the exclusive ground upon which we will adopt this kind of a policy; whereas, the Commissioner is also articulating that it

seems to approximate the idea that it is the primary concern. I would suggest that we delete "SOLELY." I would say there is a cognitive dissonance. MR. MONSOD: Let me ask the committee because it has accepted the proposal. The intent is that unless the national interest is served and when deciding it, one should not think of other considerations other than the national interest. If, however, there are other benefits that may arise for example, it is an ASEAN agreement then that is something that comes as a by-product. As far as we are concerned, what is important is that the decision is based solely on our national interest. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Before we proceed with the details of this formulation, the Chair would like to know from the committee if it has in fact accepted the proposal. MR. TINGSON: I am speaking for the majority members of the committee. We are accepting the amendment. MR. GUINGONA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Guingona is recognized. MR. GUINGONA: I am one of the cosponsors of this proposed amendment and this amendment is in consonance with a statement that I made that we are all in favor of this anti-nuclear stand, but it should be declared as a policy rather than one that would be immediately implementable. With respect to the question of the honorable Commissioner Aquino, as pointed out by Commissioner Monsod, the national interest could still be the sole consideration even if other interests are observed because the other interests are secondary. In other words, they are incidental. For example, if the interest of the ASEAN or some other country is affected because of our agreement with these entities or countries, still the primary, fundamental and exclusive consideration will be the national interest which includes the national security and the consideration of the very existence of the State. MR. GARCIA: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Garcia is recognized. MR. GARCIA: As a member of the committee, we would like to welcome the overwhelming support which the Members of the Commission have given to the nuclear weapons provision in Section 4. At the same time, I understand that this definitely means that we are against the presence of nuclear weapons in our country, and also the entry and transit of nuclear-armed and nuclear-capable vessels and aircrafts in the country and the dumping of nuclear wastes, all of which present very clear and present danger to the survival of our people. MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Maambong): Commissioner Monsod is recognized. MR. MONSOD: I just wanted to respond to that, because in the formulation of this amendment which represents a reconciliation of wide and divergent views, we precisely focused ourselves only on nuclear weapons, and we adopted the Azcuna explanations with respect, for example, to ships docking. We did not include the uses of nuclear medicine or nuclear plants for that matter. This is purely nuclear weapons. MR. GARCIA: Yes. MR. MONSOD: I would just like to clarify that we will not be agreeable to reading into the minutes of these proceedings an amplification beyond the intent and the letter of the amendment. MR. GARCIA: Precisely, Mr. Presiding Officer, if we do not allow nuclear weapons in the country, we must have a mechanism of verification s THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo): Commissioner Tingson is recognized. MR. TINGSON: Mr. Presiding Officer, only yesterday we finally approved the Article on the Declaration of Principles. Section 9 says: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception. This means that if we protect the life of the unborn, naturally the mother's life is similarly protected. Furthermore, it says: The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency in the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the government. Section 10 states: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.

BISHOP BACANI: Yes. There is a guideline that is inserted here already; that is, the policy that is "most conducive to the national welfare. " It is conceivable that, perhaps, somebody will propose other guidelines after due consultation. There is also a guideline that has been supplied already by the protection of the State for the life of the unborn. So, that would eliminate abortion. Then the second sentence provides an additional guideline which should be observed in the formulation of population policies. It states: It shall, however, be the right and duty of parents to determine the number of their children and in the exercise of this right and duty, they shall not be compelled to use means of birth limitation that shall be against their informed conscience and religious convictions. For the first time, the new Charter upholds the right to life of the unborn from conception. We believe that to destroy human life in the womb of the mother not only violates the sacredness of a living, growing and developing human being but also attacks society by undermining respect for all human life. cdrep