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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Nothing, Something, Infinity Author(s): Joseph Almog Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, No. 9 (Sep., 1999), pp. 462-478 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: . Accessed: 10/04/2012 19:54
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argument, suggested by a the effect that, if passage in Plato's there is such a to number as 1, then 1 has Parmenides, not identical with being; but 1 is being, and therefore 1 fore there is sucll a and being are two, and thereus a class of three number as 2, and 2 together with 1 and being gives terms, and so on. This 138). argument is fallacious (ibid., p.

a memorable passage,BertrandRusselll instructsus that: Tllere is an

In spite of its alleged fallaciousness,I the shall try to justify a Parmenides argument. SpeciElcally, I am after a proof form of ditional: of the con(Illf) If there exists at least one thing in the world, there world infinitely many exist in the things

Read contrapositively, (Inf ) assertsthat, if the worlddoes not inElnitely many things in it, there have is nothing in it. stark choice: there cannot be We are left with a in the world only a is either tnere something;it inElnity or nothing. I. THE ONE-REALM The formulation of (Inf) speaks PRINCIPLE of 'the world' and This callsfor some 'things' in it. discussionof whatI intend by these phrases. Traditional metaphysical tween realsand ideals. Realsanalysesdistinguish,among beings, be(for example, long in the material world, often alluded toorcas and diamonds) beas the first belong elsewhere,in "other realms." How many other realm.Ideals such realms?
last few years, I published a trio of World," Journalof Philosothical interrelated papers: "Logic Logic,XVIII ( 1989): How," and the this JOURNAL, 197-220, "The What LXXXVIII, 5 (May II," and the 1991): Nous, xxx,4 (1996): 413-33. 225-44, and "The What and the How The trio in theand world investigated the kinds of which, if any, applying itself to the question the world must have. The present things there are of just how many paper is a sequel The paperhas been things there must be delivered in the last four in the world. grateful for these years at various discussions. Individually, Bricker, I owe thanks to institutions. I am Tyler Burge, Edmund Gettier, John Torin Ali Kazmi, Calvin Normore, Heintz, Ignacio Jane, Alter, Philip David Kaplan, Special thanks for objections Seana Shiffrin, Sten Lindstrom, and Byeong-uk Yi. discussed in section rv Andrew Hsu, Tony Martin, are due to and Dominik Guy Rohrbaugh, . low) Sklenar (on whose work on kinds, see l beIntroduction to Mathematzcal sell not does (London: Unwin, 1919). mean a linguistic PhilosofAzy By 'term', Rusitem but an object (entity, thing). 0022-362X/99/9609/462-78 (C) 1999 TheJournal of Philosophy, Inc.
8 the In



Some (for example, George Berkeleyand David Hume) opt for an exclusivelymental ("psychological") realm, often referred to nowadays as the secondrealm. Yet others (for example, Gottlob Frege) speak of an additional thirdrealm of nonpsychological,reputedlyobjective, abstracta,such as thoughts (Sinne), functions, and "logical objects"(for example, numbers). It is against the backgroundof realm proliferationthat we are to read our one ur-principle: (OneRealm) Thereis onlyone realm of being,the realworld. Our ur-principlepropounds a uniElcation of all beings in one receptacle the real universe generated by the "BigBang"a few billion yearsago. Whateveris be it material,mental, or abstract is a real historicalbeing, one that came to be and existed in this one cosmic realm.2 One realm, then. The proof of (Inf) is about it: if there is in the real universeat least one thing (for example, Nastassja Kinski),then there are in it infinitely many real things. But from Aristotle to ThomasAquinas,from G. W. Leibniz to ImmanuelKant,and all the wayto our logicallysophisticatedend of Millennium,it has been repeated that the concrete (sometimes: "the sensible") pluralities of the world are merely Elniteor, at any rate, not provablyinElnite. As long as our focus is pluralitiesof concreta (actresses,orca whales,or diamondstones), there is no provingtheir inElnitude. Let this much be granted: (Infc), 'There are inElnitely many concrete things', is unprovable. But what about our project, proving 'There are inElnitely many real things' (InfR)? It is presumed that the unprovability of (Infc) transfersto that of (InfR). What lies behind the exclusion of a categoryof nonconcrete ("abstract") worldly things? I.1. Theworldly abstracta dilemma.For our paradigm of concrete subjects,consider a mischievousPuget Sound orca, Godiva,and the resplendent diamond on Liz's ring, Shine. Each such concrete object is both (i) objectiveand (ii) worldly(wirklich).Call the conjunc2 A more canonical gloss of the adjective 'worldly' ('real') shows up later in the paper (see 'the reality quintet'). At this point, I follow this 'do-not-define-it-use-it' procedure because I find the appeal of the notion worldly, real independent of my own specific annotations. For example, Frege's gloss of 'real' ('zviaklich')suits us very well: "The world of the real is a world in which this acts on that, changes it and again experiences reactions itself and is changed by them. All this is a process in time. We will hardly recognize what is timeless and unchangeable as real""The Thought," in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosothical Logi.c(New York: Oxford, 1967) p. 37.



tion of traitsthe mundane conjunction, with both meanings of 'mundane' in mind: the in-the-world and the run-of-the-mill characterof the conjunction of traits. But mundane as the combination is for Shine and Godiva, it appears intrinsically impossible for the abstractamanifestedby this pair. With these abstracta,it is either/or. Make it (the number Two, the species Orca, the substanceDiamond, the colors Blackand Blue) objective,as Platonistshave, and it is banished awayto another, otherworldly and acosmic,third realm. Alternatively, we mayfollow the nominalistand (like, for example,John Locke) make each such abstractuminto an individualmental abstraction.Less "individualistically,"we may view such abstractaas essentiallydependent on our linguistic use of the classificatory predicates '...are two' and ' an orca' and ' blue'. Either way,we have brought the abstractum back into the world the psycholinguistic second realm but at the cost of losing its objectivity. This then is our problem: the abstractum(say, the species Orca) cannot co-exist in the first cosmic realm with the concreta (Godiva, Gieronimo,and the like) that realizeit, make it real. The problem is metaphysical and is not to be confused with Paul Benacerraf's dilemma,which is essentiallyepistemic. Our problem does not concern sensory access and forms of knowledge;it arises for an omniscient being like God: even He cannot make abstractobjects bear the mundane conjunction, be both objective and in the cosmos. Even for Him it is either/or, what I shall call the worldly abstracta dilemma. I.2. Theworldly infinitydilemma.The worldlyabstractadilemma is our root problem. It leads to a derivativequandary: no pluralityof things may be both of worldlyconstituentsand yet contain infinitely manyitems. It is again either/or. The choice we are forced to make may be impressedon us by considering two classicalargumentsfor (Inf), one due to Frege,the other to RichardDedekind. Frege's argument first. He begins with an ideal, off-worlditem, the predicative concept (Frege speaking here) 'not identical to itself', Fo We now assign Foa yet higher (second) level predicative concept, a number concept, ZERO. Still on logical grounds,we now "take" the extension of ZERO. This is by Frege'slights a pure "logical object,"the number 0. We existentially generalize:there existsat least one object and 0 is it. Frege now ascends back to the realm of predicatesand considersthis time the concept F1,'be identical to 0'. Correlatedwith it is a number concept (namely,ONE) the number of things falling under F1. The extension of ONE is a new object, the



number 1. By now, Frege can prove the existence of two logical objects, 0 and 1. And so it goes: the processyields infinitelymanyitems when Frege provesby induction on n that the extension of 'number of items smalleror equal to n' is alwaysn+ 1. What has Frege proved? The infinitude of what he calls logzcal objects, predicative concept derivatives,items that have it built into their veryidentitythat they are extensions of concepts. Therein lies Frege's version of our dilemma: insist on wirklich subjects, and no proof of (Inf ) is forthcoming;shift to off-world predicativeabstracta, and a proof becomes available. A similarmessage is impartedby the main other classicalproof I am familiarwith, Dedekind's. In section 66 of his WasSindund Was Sollendie Zahlen?3 Dedekind tries to prove that there exists at least one infinite "systemS' of objects. On his way,he argues that there is an infinite pluralityof objects. Dedekind locates the infinite pluralityin his Gedankenwelt. His urobject is his Ego. He then goes on to applyto this realm of thought a one-one map a that is not onto. The informalgloss offis 'can be the object of my thought'. We are told without further ado thata is one-one. And obviouslyit is not onto: Ego is not got as a result of the map. This much makes the realm of these Gedanken-objects Dedekind-infinite, hence infinite simpliciter. But there remainsthe question:Whatpreciselyis provedby Dedekind? Russell'scommentarysaysit all:
We are then to suppose that starting say with Socrates, there is the idea of Socrates, and so on adinf: Now it is plain that this is not the case ill the sense that all these ideas have actual empirical existence in people's minds. Beyond the third or fourth stage they become mythical. If the argument is to be upheld, the "ideas" intended must be Platonic ideas laid up ill heaven, for certainly they are not on earth (op. cit., p. 139).

The worldlyinfinitydilemma,all over again.


Consider again the map used in Dedekind's proof. Instead of his original 'can be the object of my thought', substitute'set of'. This operation is one-one: if xWy,then {x}${y}; and it is not onto; whatever it exactly is, 'meine eigenes Ich' is surely not a set. We thus have on hand a (Dedekind)-infinitepluralityof real items. Was the aboveallusionto dilemmas much ado about nothing? I shall not rest lny case on the categoly of sets. Granted,sets, as characterized by Dedekind, Georg Cantor, and eventually Ernest

3 Braunschweig: Viewey,1960, eighth edition. I am gratefulin this section to AndrewHsu and GuyRohrbaugh.



Zermelo, are not mere predicativeprojections, like Frege's extensions or Russell'spropositionalfunctions. Nonetheless, sets are not what I here targetby 'real things'. It is thus time to set out in detail what I intend by real (worldly,cosmological,wirklich) items, why sets will not do and which abstracta will. Five marksof the real suggest themselves,what I shall call henceforth the reality quintet:

(1)Noprefabricated individuation (2)Noreduced identity (3)Historicity I:constitutional challge (4)Historicity II:predicative change (5)Historicity III: counterfactual developments
Considerfirst the principle of no prefabricatedindividuationcriteria. With real itetns (for example, Godiva), it is the actual existence of the entity,its coming into historyand developmentin it that Elxeswhateveris distinctive about it. No set of antecedent conditions prior to the historicalitem may define or dictate what it is to be this specificorca whale Godiva. A very different reading of individuationprinciplesapplies to sets and Goodmaniansums. Here, we do have axioms of extensionality that regulate in advancewhat it is to be this specific construction(the set Xor the sum Y)in termsof membersor parts. The fact that such a principleis formulablefor sets and G-sums (as for other "constructions"like aggregates,tropes, and the like) is, for me, an indication that we do not have on hand a genuinely historical subject, produced by the autonomousforces of cosmic evolution. Let us now turn to a third category of items: for example, the species Orcaand the ManchesterUnited soccer team. Do we get the profile of Shine and Godiva,or that of sets and G-sums?The species and the soccer team are historicallyreal phenomena: it is only their actual emergence in history that fixed the distinct identity of the item that emerged. We date the emergence, namely, the origination of the species and the foundingof the team: the species did not exist five billion yearsago and the team did not exist in Rene Descartes's time. No prefabricatedset of criteriacould legislate into existence this species or this soccer team. The second mark no reduced identity is related. A set (Goodnzaniansum, aggregateof parts,trope) just is (is identical to) an ensemble of "atoms" makingit up. As such, the identityof the "higher" entity is reducible to a constructional operation of "composition" (set of, aggregateof, and so on) on more basic ingredients. In con-



trast, Godivaand Shine are not so reducible to "constructions" out of ingredients. We find the species and the soccer team sharingthis profile. Even though both the species and the soccer team have a multiplicityof tnaterial"members," neither is identical to a logical constructionout of the membership. This logical point regardingidentityis manifestedover the temporal dimension,when we consider the manner in which the pertinent entities endure in history. The set and G- sum would not exist, if it were not for their "ingredients" (for example, {Godiva, Shine}did not exist before planet earth did). But once in history,the continuing existence of the assembledentity is tied intrinsicallyto this specific constitution;there is no wayfor this set or G- sum to persist except through the persistenceof this specificconstitution. Not so for Godivaand Shine. Their survivalthrough historydepends on constitutionalchange: the higher entity goes on existing, as its constitutingmatterchanges, only because it is realizedin a different materialbasis. Again, the species and the soccer team follow this mould: the evolution in time of this single species and soccer team presupposes changes in membership; it is only because the higher entity can sustain itself by having other members that it endures. Constitutionalchange leads us to another form of change: predicative change. Real subjects like Godiva and Shine constantly change the properties they bear. Such is also the profile of the species and the soccer team:each ages, evolves,scatters,becomes endangered all properties borne by the higher subject and not reducible to properties borne individually by its present members. Not so with constructions. Doubtless, the set-theoretic pair may change: it had a member (Godiva)that was hungryand now it has a member that is bellyful. But such predicativechanges are essentially by proxy,analyzable via changes in the intrinsicingredients. The availability of an actualhistoryleads us to a final characteristic mark of mattersreal the potential for alternativedevelopmentsof that history. Such counterfactualdevelopmentsare surelyenvisageable for Godivaand Shine and, in turn,for the species and the team. No such counterfactualdevelopments are open to abstractaof the constructionalkind. Just as they lack a genuine actualhistory,they are not subjectto alternative evolutionsof that history. Our realityquintet sets apart"blueprint" constructed abstracta from those which are historically real. Two observations are suggested by this separation.First,we haveseen examples(the speciesOrcaand the ManchesterUnited soccer team) of genuine worldly abstracta,



and cosof the mundane conjunction; each is both objective bearers regardSecond, one. false Our root dilemma thus turns to be a mic. items for: look to what know the worldly infinity dilemma, we ing which of but species and are in the world like soccer teams which are infinitely many. there argument.5 We are is proved below is a form of the Parmenides What item: the the existence of one (purportedly the first) concrete given a variety Godiva.6 By its very primal existence, Godiva generates orca the biokOval*, the shape-kind ofreal kinds: the color-kind kBlackk, further One the kind of bodily-organ kBraink. logicalspecies kOrcak, is most She kOne*. generated by Godiva is the arithmetical kind kind one also is she but on, definitelya black thing, an orca-thing, and so thing;at that, the first among all ones. Godiva and an So now we have on hand an ordered two-some: exist two real kOnek and item she generated, kOnek. Both Godiva is turn, kTwok in exists; things. Thus, the first real instance of kTwok Gothings: real ordered, generated. We now have on hand three diva,kOne*,and kTwok.The kind kThreekis generated. a pluralThe foregoing generation of the finite ordinals produces has plurality The kTwo&,... kOne*, ityof the following form: Godiva, kind the ordinal, infinite first the -many members. This generates kTwok,.... Once it exists, we have on hand the plurality: kOnek, k(,)k. the genPast +1. ordinal the for basis *(,)k. Here lies the generative
we anyvariantof (Inf) may seem passe to many a reader; The idea of "proving" meant here is what clarify me Let infinity. of should rather state it as an "axiom" by"proof." one infinite system (set, First, I am not out to prove that there exists at least present account aims the nor Dedekind neither Second, on. so and proper class), logic deducsecond-order) or firstgeneralized it (be to prove (Inf) inside a formal (Inf) is ex(where systems logic formal such tive system. It is a familiarfact that pressible) affordmodels with finite domains. at that (InfR) is actually What is offered here is an informal proof that (Inf) by standardset-theopursued is what than ambitious more not true. This much is ZF. The austandard say, axiomatization, an such retic axiomatizations. Consider axioms are the why student the to thor of the axiomatizatioll(textbook) explains and so on. Such an exunion, pairing, of axioms the to also applies much This taque. infinite set. After all, set theoplanationmust also be given for (I) there exists an we not give a "proof"of (I)? do or we do So, available. are ries explicitlydenying (I) assertionof (I) with the distheir up back The answeris that most carefulauthors naturalnumbersin the Zerplayof an infinite set usuallythe one representingthe facto proof. Indeed, such de textbook the is This systems. Neumann von melo or that the aforemenargued is it For ours. than result ambitious proofs seek a more set. Our argument infinite single a turn in forms sets of finite tioned infiniteplurality is anythingwrongwithit). does not takethe laststep (thoughI do not believethere to make clear I speak of the entity, kOrcah 6 In what follows, I use the notation Orcas. of kind the zoological




eration of kOne*, we use two further generativeprinciples the very two used by Cantor (before he gave up on ordinalsas primitiveand reduced them to sets): the addition of one item to a given ordinal pluralityand the "takingof a limit"of an unending pluralityof ordinals, as in the case of k(])k. III.1. Annotations to the argument. (i) Generation versusinstantiation. We should separate the item(s) that bring a kind into being from item(s) that, once the kind exists, count as its instances. Suppose Adam is the f1rstbeing in the world. His existence generates that of kOnek.Later,Eve showsup. She counts as an instance of kOnek, not as its generator. And so it goes. When Adam generates kOnek, he and kOnek, the two things that they are, generate kTwok. Later, Eve showsup. Adam and Eve, the two-somepluralitythey make, provide an instance of kTwok.Still, they are not the generatorsof kTwok, a role reservedfor Adamand kOnek. On the present account, any n-some plurality,whether of numbers, cabbages, or kings, may serve as an instantiation Of knk. But only the preceding sequence of ordinal numbers, up to knk, can generate knk. In all, it is suggested both that (i) only a non-number, a prenumber concrete object, can generate kOnek and (ii) from then on, only numberscan generate their successors.7 (ii) Ordinals versus cardinals.The procedure described above generates first the (finite) ordinals. The ordinal is the prior existent. The equivalence class that it is, cardinal Card(kTwok) rests on the subsequent truthof the predication:'pluralityhaving as many items as the one that generated this existent, the ordinal (kTwok)'. In this respect,Card(kTwok) is ratherlike the biologicalkind-predicate 'is an orca' which I read as 'is an instance of the kind kOrcak'. In turn, the objectualordinal kind kTwok is the analog of the objectual kind kOrcak. In both cases, the kind-as-object precedes the predicate 'being a member of that kind'.8
On both (i) and (ii), see more in the annotationsthat follow. In the context of infinite llumbers, the difference between generation and instantiation,ordinals and cardinals,is quite clear. The ordinal *(Jjk iS generated first, then *(,+l*. By quite a different existence principle, *(JJk gives rise to the cardinal number btov Now, the instances of *(JJk and *(,+lk are quite different:all pluralities of the order type X are instances of the former; one more item in the pluralityor an order change will be required to make a pluralitythat instantiatesthe second ordinal kind. But now when it comes to instances of the first infinite cardinal,all such instances,regardlessof their order type,would do as instances. The ordinal/cardinal distinction shows up clearly for infinite numbers; it also shows up with Zero. On the present account, Zero is not an ordinal. What "defines" Zero into existence is predication:it is the number of thillgs falling under empty predicates. With, for example, Card(*Two*), we test for one-one correspon7 8



(iii) Thereality quintet. (iii.1) Identity craterza. Firston our list of marks wasthe subject'saffordingnoprefabracated individuation. Classical conceptions of number supplysuch individuationcriteriain, for example, the Frege-Russell vein: the number of Fs and the number of Gs are one and the same if and only if the classes (concepts) of Fs and Gs are in one-one correspondence (lately known, under the influence of the late GeorgeBoolos, as "Hume'sprinciple" and universally viewedas "logical," or at the veryleast "analytic" and "defining"). On the present account, it may turn out of such a (biological, chemical, arithmetic,and the like) kind that some fundamentalfeature of its generation process is uniquely true of it; thus, different persons (rivers,species, chemical elements, numbers), differentgenerativehistories. But these are ex post facto historacalfacts, not prefabricated regulative conditions. It may thus well turn out that differentordinal numbershave differentgenerativehistories (different numbers, different ancestors)but this much is simplya description of how each came to be, not a stipulatedconvention. (iii.2) No reduced identity. The reduction would amount to the number's being just a certain ensemble of more basic ingredients (parts,sets, concepts). Our number-kinds are not reducible to their members. The existence of members is critical for the generation and ongoing existence of the kind but the kind itself is never exhaustedby this or that membership. (iii.3) Historicity I: constitution change. Consider the difference between our kind kTwok and, for example, von Neumann's set sTwos= {Godiva, One} (s-quotes are to remind us the object is a set). First, regardingidentity:von Neumann's sTwosis a specific two-membered set. Benacerraf'sother problem "Whatnumbers could not be"strikes:Why is the number Two identified with this set and not any other two-membered set? In contrast,our kind kTwok is at the right level of generality: it comprehends all two-item pluralities as instances (the instancesof the kind are two-somepluralities(for examdence with the ur-two-some plurality that generated the ordinal kTwo*.In the case of Zero, we cannot so test, for there exists no such ur-exemplar and no generated ordinal. All there is is the one - one correspondencebetween all empty predicates. We may feel here, with Frege, that Zero is an adjective that has grown capitals (for example, 'there are no (zero) unicorns') . The foregoing relates to a referee's question whether we could use our realnumber-kinds (for example, kTwo*)to number third-realm items (for example, two forms in Plato's heaven or two Fregean extensions). The answer tracks back to my above (one realm) principle: all beings exist in this one real cosmological realm. What is not is not zvirklich cannot be numbered. Only reals can enter real relations be numbered by with a real like the number kTwo*.On which, see more in annotation (iii.4).



ple, me and you), not the subsequentunity (the two-membered set {me, you}) ). Second, regarding existence. von Neumann's sTwosis perilously dependent on the existence of Godiva:no Godiva,no sTwos.In contrast,the kind kTwok, like kOrcak, goes on existing while its members change. The number-kinds(again, like biological ones) were generatedby a specific ur-item the historically firstconcretum. But to go on existing, all they need is to be instantiated by some any oldinstances.9 (iii.4)Historacity II:predicative change.kOrcak and kDiamondk change through history. But do numbers ever change? At first blush, the differencebetween the cases seems striking. But let us have a closer look. Granted,9 is fixedly odd and greaterthan 7. But this fixidity, just as with the temporallystable features of kOrcak, concerns features fixed by (and at the time of) the very generation of the item. On the other hand, 9 also numbersthe coins in my pocket. This is a feature gained by 9 after its generation and thus subject to change. When we say the next day '9 used to number the coins in my pocket but it no longer does', we make a claim of derechange: some specific reswasone way,now it is not. The question is:Whatresis that? The natural answer seems to me: the number of the coins. Of course, at firstblush, we think the change is, to speak loosely, "inthe coins,"not in the number. But what does it mean the change is "in the coins"? It could not be a de re change in the nine membered set (cl, c2, ..., c9}. This set cannot survivethe addition or subtractionof a coin. Nor is it a change in the aggregateor the Goodmaniansum. I submit that the change in the coins induces a change in the number but it is not identical to it the change in the number may have taken place in other ways (instead of adding c10, I may have added
9 What if we added to the reality quintet a sixth condition: all reals must at one time or another cease to be? Would this not make the existence of an infinity of our kind of numbers ephemeral? My answer is twofold. First, quite apart of numbers (and other real abstracta), I would not add the purported sixth mark of being real. Generation as a mark of the real is not "symmetric" with corruption. Many generated abstracta (including individuals, not just kinds) may go on existing by replenishing the materials that realize them. This gives such real subjects as opposed to sets of such material ingredients a long lease on life. Second, regarding numbers. Once there was one concrete thing, there were numbers. Amd if per impossibile there were nothing concrete, there would be nothing at all. As will become clear in the next annotation, I believe that once there existed something concrete, there always (and of necessity) continued to be some concrete item. In time, the infinite generating sequence, with the specific Godiva at its basis, will be gone, because Godiva will corrupt. But the numbers (the second place in this sequence, kOnek,the third, kTwok,...)are forever.



cll). Likewise, there may have been, in the concrete coins, the following change: the addition of one blue coin c10 (the original nine are red). But it would be a mistake to identit the change thus induced in the numberof coins with the change in the color. Although actually realized via the addition of c10, the change in number and color might have occurred separately. One may question the foregoing emphasis on the intuition of de re change. Thus runs what I call the no-changeobjection:
Consider "The president used to be George Bush and now it is Bill Clinton." Rather than a change in the state of a single underlying entity, we have replacement of one entity by another: Bush was the president and another individual, Clillton, is now the president. In a similar vein, we may suggest for the above claims that no number, color, and so on has really changed. We have instead replacement: one color, green, was the leaves' in the spring, now it is another, yellow; one number, 9, was replaced by another 10, as the number of coins in my pocket.l

In response to the no-change objection, I shall say this. First,we should separate in this discussion syntactic and metaphysical issues. Grammatically, we have on hand a uniformity between 'Bert's girlfriend (the U. S. president) is changing', 'The color(number) of the coins is changing'. Metaphysically, going by the present paper's outlook, species, temperatures, colors, and numbers are real kinds, coming in and out of cosmic history independently of our verbal activities. In contrast, the "roles"of being the American president and Bert's girlfriend are induced by predications of ordinary individuals. I shall attend here to real kinds and leave to the aforementioned linguistic companion piece the proper analysisof 'Bert's girlfriend (the president) is changing'. Second, let us ask now: When I speak of "the number (color) of coins is changing" as involving de re change, in which res is the change to be located?
' The no-change objection has been made to me by a variety of commentators in the University of California/Los Angeles Language Workshop dedicated to the Partee-Montague puzzle regarding the sentence 'The temperature of LA is ninety and it is rising'. It was also made by FrancaoisRecanati. I view Montague's original analysis of 'The temperature is rising' as in the nochange objection vein. He lets the prime semantic value of 'the temperature' be a function from times to numbers. He then speaks of that function as "changing" ("rising"). In truth, the function does not change (rise) at all. It is as fixed as any thing could be, the set of ordered time-number pairs that it is. What is actually encoded by the function is replacement: the replacement of one extension (90 degrees) by another (91 degrees) as the extension of 'the temperature'. I discuss in detail Montague's analysis, the no-change objection, and the syntax-semantics of such constructions in my "The Subject-intransitive Verb Class" (in press) .



The question cannot be answered without understanding the prechangekind of fact reportedin the likes of 'The species of Godiva is orca' or 'The color of leaves is green'. Some (for example, RichardMontague) regard the claims as having the form of identity statements. With this, I disagree. We have identity claims in the likes of 'Furze is Gorse' (species identity), the bilingual 'Green is Verde' (color identity), '34=XXXIV' (numberidentity). In contrastto an identity, 'The species of Godivais Orca' has the two-sorted relationalform: R (c,A) where c indicates the concrete relatum, A the abstract relatum. Idem for 'The number of coins is 9', whose form I view as the relational:Has-number (coins in my pocket, 9). I read much importance into the genitive form of our constructions, namely,the abstractum mentioned is of- the-concretum(a): its color, temperature,species, or, in the plural, their number. Generalizing, I would like to call such assignments of a concretum-to-akind kind-membership reports. Now, when we report change in such membershiprelations,we report change in a relation. The primary change is in the concrete relatum. But its (their) failure to stay related on a given dimension (color, temperature,number, and so on) to the kind (red, 90 degrees Fahrenheit,9, and so on) induces a change in this second relatum the kind. Here, the change regards what the color, temperature,and number are oyS 11 (iii.S) Historicity III: counterfactual developments. Nine actuallynumbers the coins in my pocket but it might have failed to number them, just as Nastassja Kinskiwasactuallythe leading actressof Tess but she might have failed to be if she resisted Roman Polanski'spressures. Whatmakesthese 'might have' claimstrue? 'x might havefailed to F ' is true at a moment t in the actualhistory of the worldif and only if there is in the actualhistoryof x an earlier moment tt at which x could have gone on to be not E There are such moments pre-1976 for Nastassjaand prior to my filling my pocket with these nine coins for the parking meter. For concrete subjectslike her, the necessity of bearing a trait would amount to
11It has been sometimes objected to me that this is a mere "Cambridge change" in the species, color, and so on. Not on the present view of kinds. We saw earlier that, for example, species identity and existence depend on (i) whatanimals the specieswas generated by, and on (ii) there beingsuchanimalsto generate it. In contrast,when I Cambridge-change because you had a hamburgerfor dinner, nothing relatingto my veryexistence and identitydepends on your feeding behavior.



there being no wayherhistory could have gone otherwise. And in the same vein, this is our groundingof arithmeticnecessities:although 9 might not have numbered the coins in my pocket, it could not have failed at any point in its history to be odd or greaterthan 7. Not only do we unifyNastassja and Nine in the same cosmic realmof existents;we also apply a unitarynotion of de re necessity cosmic necessity to both Nastassja's being laumanand 9's being odd. (iv) Thenecessary existence of infinitely manythings. The idea of cosmological necessityassumesthrough and through that there is only one world the real world. For a traitFto be necessaryof the real world, we look for all the possible developments of the world past the moment of its actual origination. Now, looking at Nastassja, we do not consider among her alternativedevelopments, a consistent story about someindividual looking like Nastassjaand having the same genetic endowment as she does but living, to begin with, in Descartes'stinae. In the same vein, we do not consider among the alternativedevelopmentsof the historyof this cosmos, consistent stories about some universethat would look (by now) like ours. A story that makes the world have a radicallydifferent historyto begin with (for example, a Big Bang 500 billion yearsago, a substantially different rate of expansion, or, followingAristotelians,no beginning moment at all) isjust that-a story ("theory") . It is importantto separatethe conception of cosmic necessityfrom the more familiar"parallel worlds"conception of necessity. A sense of the difference in the case of numbers may be gleaned from the analogousand much rehearsedexample of God. On the "parallel worlds"conception, God's necessaryexistence is secured by his antecedent acosmic essence (definition). A plurality of possible worldsis given of which this historically real world is just one (one among many of a kind). It now turns out that in any arbitrary world zv,something bears the divine essence at w and that something exists at w; furthermore,what bears it in some world w, bearsit in everyother world (shadesof the ontologicalargument). In contrast,the cosmologicalnecessityof God's existence does not proceed from essence to transworld existence. We ratherseek to establishwhy,among actualexistents,His is special:whereasother real existents may be subtractedfrom the history of the real world, He standsin a special position in the actual cosmic historyand may not be subtracted. His necessitylies in His insubtractibility from the historyof this one and only worldof ours. So it is for God and so it is for the numbers. On the "parallel worlds"conception, our Parmenidean argument secures it that in



any arbitrary world w, if there is one thing, there are in w infinitely many things. But, alas, I do not know how to argue for "parallel worlds" (given disjointly and point-like) that, to begin with, each must have something in it. On the cosmologicalconception, we startwith the actualfact that the world itself is. This world is not a "point"or an index of evaluation or a set of propositions;it is simply this real evolvinguniverse. So, something is. But is its existence necessary?There is a point in the historyof the world in which it could have gone on to develop without Nastassja Kinski,the Nanga Parbat,or planet earth. But is there a point in the historyof the world at which it could have gone to be such that it did not exist in the first place? With the necessity of some real thing thus secured, our Parmenideanargumentcarries us all the wayto the necessityof infinitelymanyreals. (v) Thegeneration of Some readerswill want to grant that the sheer emergence of Godiva generates certain kinds (for example, kOrcak) but not the purportedkind kOnek, simplybecause this last is not a genuine kind. There is no genuine "commonnature"or "unifying essence"behind all ones. The present account of real kinds (for example, of biology and chemistry)is this. A process in historyproduces items of the pertinent kind and it is thus and only thus that the species and the substance come into history. Such is the worldlypicture of kOrcak and kDiamondk and such is the intended account of kOne*. First,a concrete existent bringsinto the world this other, more abstract,kind of existent, the ordinal kOne1. Eventually,all numbers are so generated, not "from above," by a third or second realm, defining predicationbut "frombelow,"by in-history,preceding real existents. There is an intrinsicdifference between (i) the first number, kOnek, which can only be generated by a non-number,and (ii) all remaining numberswhich can be generated only by other numbers, each by its predecessor. We should note that in (i)-(ii), we have a nice metaphysical reflection of the familiar (PeanoDedekind) axioms:the ur-number(for Dedekind and for us) 1 is intrinsically nota successor;all others are intrinsically successors. In the present framework,predecessornumbers actuallyprecede the next number in the historicalorder of existence. Thus, the familiar fact that 16 is "after"(succeeds) 12 is not a truth got "from above,"as if after 16 and 12 have been separatelydefined by predication, it turned out that a pluralitywith the cardinalnumber 16 has "moreitems"than one with 12 items. When it comes to our generated ordinals,we have here a "frombelow"fact about the historikOne*. also



cal order of generation: 12 is among the ancestors of 16. This is meant not as a "metaphor" or "logicalanalog"of real ancestryrelations. Not at all. Without the existence of 12 in history, 16 would not emerge. One final repartee and a forceful one at that the separate begznnings objection. Take to heart the foregoing claim that kOnek is as generable as ordinarynatural kinds, and it is from the frying pan into the fire:
Considerthe spatiotemporally separateDobbin and Bertrand,the first horse-like(in looks and DNA) animals. Byyour ( JA's) own lights, the two generate two distinct biological kinds. But you say that numberkindsare like biologicalkinds. So, either you predict that (i) the world must have at most one primal concrete item or else (ii) if there were two (or more) simultaneousprimal objects (for example, Electra (E) and Fidelia (F)), the two would breed two distinctkindskOne*. This is an odd result.l2

The source of the separatebeginningsobjection lies in misinterpreting the analogybetweenarithmeticand biologicalkinds. I would like to explainin whatwaythey are similarand in whatwaythey are not. Biologicalkinds (for example, kHorses*) make prominent two separatefeatures:
(Generability) For a kind to exist, it has to have concrete generators. (Membership connectedness). To be a (late) memberof kind K (for example, a contemporaryhorse), x has to come from Ks (for example,from horses).

The point to notice is that (generability)and (membershipconnectedness) are logically independent. I definitely asserted above (generability) for any real kind whatsoever. But is (membership connectedness) also true of kinds in general or is it something peculiar (even if essentialto) biologicalspecies? One might be led to think that I submit (membershipconnectedness) for all kinds simply by confusing it with (generability). But
12 The objection that follows has been made to me early on by Martin, then by Normore, Shiffrin, and Dominik Sklenar at UCLA andJane in Barcelona. The discussion of kinds that follows owes much to conversations with Sklenar about his 1996 UCLA Ph.D. "Being of a Kind"; a published version of his interesting ideas is forthcoming. I should like it noted that the objection has the form of a disjunction: either the world must have at most one primal item or else if there were more than one such, then.... I believe the first disjunct is true. The remarks in the previous annotation about the necessary existence of the world itself give a hint of the argument I would submit. But in what follows, I shall assume with my opponent that there could be more than one primal item.



even without such a confusion, one may reason as follows regarding the separatequestion of kind-membership. The critical question to consider is this: What unifies two items x,y in a given kind K? Either the unification is "from below" or "fromabove." If it is "frombelow" due to a cosmological factthe model must come from the unification operative in biological species, namely, via historical connectedness between members. If not, the only alternative unifier is an idea (Sinn, form) in another "realm"(for example, Locke's second, Frege's third, or Plato's "heaven"). This either/or I shall call the unification dilemma. Driven by the dilemma, our objector may well reason thusly:the present approach would not allow unification by a second-or-third realm template. Therefore, the one intended must be unificationas in the biological case by historicalconnectedness. By hypothesis, there is no connectednessbetween Electraand Fidelia. Thus, we are led to two number-kinds kOne*. My answer is that the unification dilemma is a false dilemma. There are other "frombelow"ways (aside of historical connectedness) of unifying things in the cosmos. A pertinent example is provided by chemical elements, to which I now turn. What makes any old atom x a member of the kind kGermanium*? Let us assume that the emergence of this chemical element in the cosmos (so many (many) seconds after the Big Bang) is the result of two simultaneous but causallyseparate supernovas. Each supernova produces from electrons and protons by a similar process an atom with the structure of atomic number 72. The one Germanium atom call g8, the other atom g88. In my view, both are of the kind kGermanium*. Yet surely, they are not historically connected. What unifies gt and g88 in the kind is neither (i) historical connection nor (ii) satisfaction of an apriori third-(second-) realm template. What makes an atom a Germanium atom is the type of cosmic process by which it came to be: electrons/protons at the right temperatures (and so on) coming together to form a unity. Let me drawfrom the foregoing a general conclusion. Whatmattersfor membershipat the general level of all kinds is this:
(1bl) what makes x and y co-specific is that the processes by which they each came to be are fundamentally similar (in the pertinent respect: chemical, biological, and so on) and essential to x(y)'s very coming into being.



(M) is true of the historically bound tigers x,y; the historically disconnected germaniumatoms gt and g88; and lastly,the separatesimultaneousprimalsElectraand Fidelia. It is essentialto each and everyobject's (including Electraand Fidelia) processof coming into being that it would come to have unity, that it would become one thing. The coming together of the unity might involve the bonding of electrons and protons, DNA molecules, starsin a galaxy,and other more complicatedmodes of formation, depending on the specific kind of item concerned. But over and above specificitiesdue to varyingkinds, each object'svery coming into being has essentiallythis much in it: the coming into being of one thing. We might well say:no entitywithout numerical identity. Physically, Electraand Fidelia may or may not be of the same kind. But this much is given about the two as about any other emergent being: Electraand Fidelia are of a common arithmetic kind, the one and only kOne*, because in both we have the fundamentallysimilar processof a coming into being of a distinctnew entity.

I have argued that there can be no existence of a mere something, be it a single initial something or a pluralityof such primals. Eacll such primal being (as any other object) cannot exist without being one thing, a number that itself could not come into being without havinga generatinginstance,some one concrete thing. So: no number one without a concrete generator; but also, no such concrete generatorwithout the number one. Verywell then: coming into the worldwith each such primalentity is the number one; and with that two-some,the primalentity and one, comes into the world the number two;and so on. We can sum it all thusly:there is no real infinity withoutreal being and no real being withoutreal infinity.

University of California/LosAngeles