Brandi Cruz History 220T Dr. Jordine Corum Precis James S.

Corum, in The Roots of Blitzkrieg, explores the development of Germanys tactical doctrine by the Reischswehr and its application in the areas of weapons, organization, and planning.1 Corums study is focused on the interwar period of 1919 to 1926 when Hans von Seeckt was in control of the military. Corum argues that the Reischwehr under von Seeckt was of central importance in the development of a superior military strategy that would become blitzkrieg. Corum supports his argument by first explaining the development of military thought through the immediate study of WWI tactics. The author writes that German Army leaders, on their own initiative, began to analyze the lessons of that war carefully, and they set out to create a military system that would be a great improvement on the admittedly impressive one of the old Imperial Army.2 For instance, officers studied the capability and how weapons were utilized during the war in order to develop more efficient use in the future. Corum provides the example of air force deployment against the British. He explains that the German high command quickly learned the use of planes for bombing campaigns was inefficient use of them because the maintenance of the planes exceeded their utility as bombers since they could carry only a 200kilogram bomb load for long-range flights.3 The Germans abandoned strategic bombing whereas Allies continued such campaigns. In addition, the Reischwehr published manuals that

James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1992), ix. 2 Ibid, ix. 3 Ibid, 16.

presented the effective use of planes as ground support for infantry to make up for the lack of tanks. Corum also supports his argument by examining the German army's push to train its officers and soldiers. According to Corum, the training of soldiers was necessary because it made the army command flexible and since the Treaty of Versailles limited the military, the training was crucial to officers being able to command a higher rank if necessary.4 The German had learned from WWI that flexibility of command was more effective than the rigid control over subordinates. Von Seeckt wanted to maintain this strength and therefore modified his elite army concept to pertain tto a smaller force that could "expand quickly to a twenty-one division highquality, professional army."5 Corum utilizes archival sources, which include books, military manuals, and government documents in order to present a comprehensive understanding of the military doctrine developed by the General Staff. The author uses the manuals to demonstrate the creation of mixed divisions and the tactical cooperation between groups such as the air force and infantry. Corum also provides statistics about weapons, training, and battle outcomes. He uses these stats as means to show the superiority of the German army as compared to the allies in the education of soldiers as well as the effective organization of divisions and weapons. Corum supports his argument well through the use of primary and secondary sources. In addition, the author makes a clear connection between the lessons learned by the Reischwehr leaders under von Seeckt and the evolving changes that occurred in the tactical doctrine because of those studies of WWI campaigns.

4 5

Ibid, 68. Ibid, 68.