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COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al. G.R. No.

102223 August 22, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as Representative Agreement. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in the Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a License Agreement entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi -Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines). One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITECs products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs own, and offering them to ITECs former customer. The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied. Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: 1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration? 2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience? HELD: petition dismissed. 1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or doing business in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country.

Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity. In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary arrangements between the parties. 2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier. Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts disposition to gi ve due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA 4691998FACTS:Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant for petitioner SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by Thamer and Allah AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing in their hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was rescued. After twoweeks of detention the accused were both deported to Saudi and they werereinstated by Saudia. She was pressured by police officers to make a statementand to drop the case against the accused; in return she will then be allowed toreturn to Manila and retrieved her passport. For the second time, she was askedby her superiors to again appear before the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she was already tried by Saudi court together with the accused andwas sentenced to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes in connection withJakarta rape incident. The court found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to adisco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.ISSUE/S:WHETHER OR NOT the QC Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction tohear and try the civil case based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code or theKingdom of Saudi Arabia court though there is the existence of foreign element.RULING:The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact thatone party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident foreigncorporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. Theforeign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contractis an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of oneState involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreignelement may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign elementconsisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippinenational, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, byvirtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flightstewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel acrossnational borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact thatone party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident foreigncorporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. Theforeign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contractis an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreignelement may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign elementconsisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippinenational, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, byvirtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flightstewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel acrossnational borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreignelement, the problem could present a conflicts case. Where the factualantecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agreewith petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case. A factualsituation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of aforeign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals andassociations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.

G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008LOPEZ VS COMELEC y

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippinesunless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing thecertificate of candidacy.

FA CTS: C ivil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution

and (2) Omnibus Order of the C ommission on Elections( C OMELE C ), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay C hairman.Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of C hairman of Barangay Bagacay, SanDionisio, Iloilo C

ity in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is anAmerican citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,

petitioner argued thathe is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,otherwise known as the C itizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.

He returned to the Philippinesand resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay C hairman.After the votes for Barangay C hairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.On February 6, 2008, C OMELE C issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an effectiverenunciation of foreign citizenship.HELD: R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenshipmay run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities .

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenshipunder this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities andresponsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding suchpublic office as required by the C onstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificateof candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before anypublic officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that shouldone seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and allforeign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the C OMELE C observation on thispoint:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino C itizenship by virtue of the Dual C itizenship Law when he took hisoath of allegiance before the Vice

C onsul of the Philippine C onsulate General's Office in Los Angeles, C alifornia, thesame is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that acandidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship

before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show thatrespondent complied with the provision of R. A . No. 9225 . Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent torun for Barangay C hairman of Barangay Bagacay.For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who isauthorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he isrenouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failureto renounce his A merican citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove thecontrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law . Forfailure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this C ommission holds himdisqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay C hairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutionaland statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity

Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.

Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.

The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189 AASJS Calilung v. DatumanongFacts: Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanongfrom implementing R. A. 9225 arguing that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as itviolates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegianceof citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Issue: Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. Held: R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet topass upon the issue of dual allegiance. The court held that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provisionin Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship fromnatural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinocitizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalizationas citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dualallegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the personimplicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. ActNo. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted theburden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance tothe concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship wasnot made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of apolicy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has toenact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with thestatus of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countriesof origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate todraft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dualallegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicialdepartment, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dualallegiance COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 on February 12, 2009 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514. The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009, petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.

Issue: Does the Comelec have discretion to fix other dates for continuing registration? Held: The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436. In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. Belen v. ChavezFacts: The petition originated from the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against petitioners, spouses Belen, filed by private respondent spousesPacleb before the RTC of Rosario, Batangas. The complaint alleged that respondentssecured a judgment by default rendered by a certain Judge John W. Green of theSuperior Court of the State of California, which ordered petitioners to pay privaterespondents the amount of $56,204.69, representing loan repayment and share inthe profits plus interest and costs of suit. The answer by the petitioners claimed thatpetitioners liability had been extinguished via a release of abstract judgment issuedin the same collection case since the petitioners were really residents of the USA. On5 August 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs.On 24 November 2003, private respondents sought the execution of the RTCdecision to levy real properties belonging to defendants. Petitioners filed a Rule 65petition before the Court of Appeals, imputing, among others, the RTC grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction (1) in rendering its decisionalthough it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons in view of theimproper service of summons; and (2) in considering the decision final and executoryalthough a copy thereof had not been properly served upon petitioners; Issues: (1)Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitionersthrough either the proper service of summons or the appearance of the lateAtty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners; and(2)Whether or not there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision onpetitioners. Ruling: (1)YES, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants throughappearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners. In an action strictly

in personam , personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service,that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If thedefendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within areasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. Whilesubstituted service of summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in characterand in derogation of the usual method of service. Records of the case revealthat herein petitioners have been permanent residents of California, U.S.A.since the filing of the action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantarafiled an answer purportedly at the instance of petitioners relatives, it has beenconsistently maintained that petitioners were not physically present in thePhilippines. That being the case, the service of summons on petitionerspurported address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna was defective and didnot serve to vest in court jurisdiction over their persons. Nevertheless, the Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs COMELEC (2006) (Political Law) Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 162759 | August 4, 2006 Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as overseas absentee voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution.

When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,

observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot and academic?

Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which however, remains unresolved.

The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.] Election Laws MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999) G.R. No. 135083Facts: Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati Cityduring the May 11, 1998 elections.

A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano isan American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent. COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano onMay 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local GovermentCode from running any elective position. Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even after the election. The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by the private respondent. On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of theCOMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vicemayor of Makati. Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati. Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and todeclare private respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.Issues:1.WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original partyin the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.2.WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?3.WON there was a valid election of citizenship?Reasons: 1. Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave toFile Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local

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