Thomas H. Kean DoD DOCUMENT REQUEST NO.

_
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (the "Commission") requests that the Department of Defense
Richard Ben-Veniste
(DoD or the "respondent") provide the Commission with a copy of
Fred F. Fielding the following document no later than January 15, 2004 (the
Jamie S. Gorelick
"production date"):

Skde Gorton 1. A classified DoD report on the war on terrorism authored by the
Bob Kerrey
Pentagon consultant Richard H. Shultz, Jr., a scholar at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Shultz
John Lehman report is cited in a January 5, 2004 Washington Post article entitled
Timothy J. Roemer "Military Split On How to Use Special Forces in the Terror War"
by Gregory L. Vistica.
James R Thompson
Among other subjects, the report considers why Special Mission
Philip D. Zelikow Units were never used to respond to the 1993 attack on the World
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Trade Center, the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, or
the 2000 attack on the USS Cole; as such, it clearly falls within the
Commission's purview.

The Commission requests that the document requested above be

provided as soon as it is available.

If the requested document is withheld from production, even

temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other
reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date, provide the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a
meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of the

requested document but has information about where it may be
located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such
information as soon as possible and in no event later than the
production date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the

interpretation of this request, the Commission requests that any such
questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as
possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to
the production date.

January 8, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
 Page 1 of 1

Marquittia Coleman
From: Marquittia Coleman
Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 12:10 PM
To: Steve Dunne; Dianna Campagna
Cc: Mike Hurley
Importance: High

Steve:

Please find attached a DoD document request for your immediate review and transmission.
Please contact Mike Hurley (x4077) if you should need any additional information re this
request.

Thanks,

Marquittia

1/8/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 11:28 AM
To: Marquittia Coleman
Cc: Steve Dunne; Stephanie Kaplan; Chris Kojm; Philip Zelikow; Warren Bass; Mike Hurley
Subject: FW: New DoD Document Request

With attachment this time!

Mike

Original Message
From: Mike Hurley
Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 11:25 AM
To: Marquittia Coleman
Cc: Warren Bass; Steve Dunne; Mike Hurley; Stephanie Kaplan; Chris Kojm; Philip Zelikow
Subject: New DoD Document Request

Marquittia:

I've attached a new DoD document request that I drafted at Philip's specific request.
Please review if for format. Please note that it was done on the old letterhead, that still
has Max Cleland's name on it. Please paste the text on our new letterhead and forward
it to Steve Dunne for review and transmission to DoD today

Many thanks,

Mike

1/8/2004
Thomas H Kean DoD DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. xxxx
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (the "Commission") requests that the Department of Defense
Richard Ben-Veniste
(DoD or the "respondent") provide the Commission with a copy of
MaxQeland the following document no later than January 15, 2004 (the
Fred F. Fielding
"production date"):

Jamie S. Gorelick 1. A classified DoD report on the war on terrorism authored by the
Skde Gorton
Pentagon consultant Richard H. Shultz, Jr., a scholar at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Shultz
John Lehman report is cited in a January 5, 2004 Washington Post article entitled
Timothy J. Roemer "Military Split On How to Use Special Forces in the Terror War"
by Gregory L. Vistica.
James R. Thompson
Among other subjects, the report considers why Special Mission
Philip D. Zelikow Units were never used to respond to the 1993 attack on the World
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Trade Center, the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, or
the 2000 attack on the USS Cole; as such, it clearly falls within the
Commission's purview.

The Commission requests that the document requested above be

provided as soon as it is available.

If the requested document is withheld from production, even

temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other
reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date, provide the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a
meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of the

requested document but has information about where it may be
located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such
information as soon as possible and in no event later than the
production date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the

interpretation of this request, the Commission requests that any such
questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as
possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to
the production date.

January 8, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
Monday, January 5, 2004

Look at Philip's schedule. See if there's time to go to the DoD

SCIF to look at documents. Check with Stephanie Brewer to go
to the SCIF.
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 11:25 AM
To: Marquittia Coleman
Cc: Warren Bass; Steve Dunne; Mike Hurley; Stephanie Kaplan; Chris Kojm; Philip Zelikow
Subject: New DoD Document Request

Marquittia:

I've attached a new DoD document request that I drafted at Philip's specific request.
Please review if for format. Please note that it was done on the old letterhead, that still
has Max Cleland's name on it. Please paste the text on our new letterhead and forward
it to Steve Dunne for review and transmission to DoD today

Many thanks,

Mike

1/8/2004
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/20/2008

BOX: 00001 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 5 DOC ID: 31206512

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2

ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Document Requests - Drafts

DOCUMENT DATE: 11/06/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: Daniel Marcus

TO: DoD

SUBJECT: DoD Document Request No. 14

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
THOMAS H Page 1 of2

DoD DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 10

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
"Commission") requests that the Department of Defense (DoD or the
"respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following
documents no later than October 22, 2003 (the "production date"):

Thomas H. Kean 1. Documents or presentations on Usama bin Laden (UBL), al Qa'ida,

Afghanistan (including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), or relating
HAIR to counterterrorism issues in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Yemen, or
Sudan given by DoD officials, including the Chairman or other senior officers
ee H. Hamilton of the Joint Staff, to the National Security Advisor, the Deputy National
Security Advisor, and/or the National Coordinator for Terrorism from January
1, 1998 through September 20, 2001, including briefing materials on military
VICE CHAIR options that the Chairman of the JCS gave to the National Security Advisor in
late 2000 and the strategy materials that the J3 gave to the National
Richard Ben-Veniste Coordinator for Terrorism in late 2000.
Max Cleland The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as
soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be
Fred F. Fielding provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production.

Jamie S. Gorelick
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily,
Slade Gorton based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission
requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the
John Lehman production date, identify and describe each such document or class of
documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.
Timothy J. Roemer
If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requestec
James R. Thompson documents but has information about where such documents may be located,
the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon
Philip D. Zelikow as possible and in no event later than the production date.
EXECUTIVE If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or
DIRECTOR scope of these document requests, the Commission requests that any such
questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so
that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the production
date.

October 8, 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel

DOD Document Request No. 7

Page 2

http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmaMmp/view.php?Horde=3fd27c2al4a52b56bl5b08e814... 10/9/03
 Commission Sensitive But Unclassified
DRAFT 6/27/03 4:54 PM

Department of Defense
Document Request No.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission")
requests that the U.S. Department of Defense (the "respondent") provide the Commission with
copies of the following documents no later than 2003, (the "production date"):

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared or compiled by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for use by the Secretary of
Defense and/or the Deputy Secretary of Defense and/or their designee, or the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and/or the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or their designee, in
preparation for or to be presented to the Principals' (including the "Small Group"), or
Deputies' Committee farjitvi;r>r*"'TniTfiiii1f rr ri in, f^milm'ty al-Qa'ida, Usama bin Ladin
(UBL), Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban), PakistanjSaudi
Arabia, Yemen and Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20, 2001
following: -'

a) The range of military responses considered after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings,
including the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strikes in the. .Sudan
, V^>-^'-i .
and Afghanistan,
w
. _
i I X
including any^igipfi^ant1 after-action reports; (j/u {,/-

The use of ground troops in Afghanistan, including planning for the use of bases; changes
in military readiness, posture or capabilities that would enable the use of ground troops "**
and/or commando units; or actions undertaken with respect to any of these;

c) Attempts to target UBL and/or other senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including discussions of the
use of cruise missile attacks, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the arming of UAVs, or
other military means;

d) The use of Special Operations forces against UBL and al Qa'ida, including in
Afghanistan;

proposals for ^disinformation operations in Afghanistan; s

- L—• ' •-•"
f) Military retaliatory measures after the October 12, 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
including OSD and JCS recommendations;

g) The May 2001 decision to raise the threat condition of U.S. troops in the Gulf to Delta,
and the July 2001 decision to lower that alert level;
Commission Sensitive but Unclassified
 h) OSD and JCS participation in the 2001 interagency review of the arming of proxy forces
to fight al-Qa'ida, and/or support for Northern Alliance.

2. Strategy papers, option papers, or recommendations papers prepared by Commander, U.S.

Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Central Command for the Secretary of
Defense and/or Chairman of JCS regarding the use and readiness of JSOC forces against the
Al-Qa'ida presence in Afghanistan or other countries from January 1, 1998 to December 31,
2001.

3. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared by OSD and JCS on counterterrorism,
particularly al-Qa'ida, UBL, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the
Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team
and incoming Bush-Cheney officials, including written conclusions from these meetings.

4. OSD, JCS and CENTCOM documents regarding the decision to move the Fifth Fleet out of
harbor in Bahrain in June 2001 in response to warnings of a possible terrorist attack.

5. Documents or correspondence related to efforts to increase the amount of "actionable"

intelligence on the whereabouts of UBL or other senior Al-Qa'ida leaders, collateral damage
at possible strike sites, or other information that would increase the chances of successful
military strikes from January 1, 1998 to September 11, 2001.

6. Excerpts from the Secretary of Defense's Budget Justification Books sufficient to detail the
scale and priority of counterterrorism efforts within DoD from 1998 through 2001.

7. Memoranda and summaries of meetings with Senior level officials from the United
Kingdom's Ministry of Defense from January 1, 1998 to September 11, 2001, regarding joint
military operations against al-Qa'ida and/or UBL in Afghanistan.

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence

8. The intelligence annex to the Ballistic Missile Defense Commission report, which Secretary
Rumsfeld often references regarding his views on the organization, structure and
effectiveness of the Intelligence Community.

9. Documents related to the establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence,

particularly any documents relating to (a) the Undersecretary's authorities with respect to the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the DDCI for Community Management, (b)
oversight of National Foreign Intelligence programs, (c) budget formulation responsibilities,
(d) financial execution responsibilities, and (e) the establishment of intelligence priorities
within the Department of Defense.
2
10. Reports, audits, findings and recommendations produced by OSD, JCS or the DoD Inspector
General from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001 regarding:

a) The effectiveness of DoD's counterterrorism and force protection activities.

b) Management of the Defense Department's intelligence components.
c) The relationship between, and the shared authorities of, the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intelligence over intelligence activities.
d) DoD's intelligence priorities, including the need for intelligence support for
military operations.
e) DoD's intelligence requirements concerning counterterrorism and force
protection.

11. Correspondence from the Secretary of Defense notifying Congress of his intent to transfer,
reprogram, or seek supplemental funds for counterterrorism or force protection within the
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community from January 1, 1995 to the present.

12. Correspondence between OSD or the JCS and the DCI on (a) the conduct and effectiveness
of counterterrorism intelligence collection and reporting, (b) future terrorist threats to the
United States, (c) overseas force protection from terrorist threats, and (d) warning of terrorist
attacks from January 1, 1998 to the present.

13. The agendas of meetings between the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, and any supporting material concerning Counterterrorism and/or the
management of the Intelligence Community from January 1, 1998 to the present.

14. Directions, tasking, or guidance from the Secretary of Defense to intelligence agencies or
components, combatant commands and military departments regarding counterterrorism and
force protection from January 1, 1998 to the present.

15 s n m c J n i s h e d intelligenceraroducts produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

from January 1, 1998/tothepresent^oncerning terrorism, including possible connections
between al-Qa'ida ana Iraq.

16. Documents detailing the intelligence requirements of the combatant command for
counterterrorism and force protection activities from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001.

The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through
means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such
document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but
has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these
document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with
the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior
to the production date.

June , 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
 Commission Sensitive But Unclassified
DRAFT 6/27/03 4:54 PM

Department of Defense
Document Request No.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission")
requests that the U.S. Department of Defense (the "respondent") provide the Commission withj,jy
copies of the following documents no later than 2003, (the "production date"):

Office of the Secretary of Defense

1. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared or compiled by the Office, of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and/or the Joijnt Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for use by the-Stci-e,tary of
,-Jtefense and/or the Deputy-Secretary
i j j of Defense
Y and/ui thui designs,
o ~ ui UK, Cluiimaii,' Juiiil

•Chiofs of Staff and/or the Vice Chairman] Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or their dcsignee^n-
prcparation for or to be prcscntedto the Principals' (includingthe^SjriajljGjpurj^or
Deputies' Committee regarding•counterterrorism> particularl^al-Qa'ida, UsamabnTEadin
(UBL), Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen and Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20, 200rrcgording the

a) The\ange of military responses considered after the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings,
includmg the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strikes in the Sudan and Afghanistan,
including\ny significant after-action reports;

b) The use of grohnd troops in Afghanistan, including planning for the use of bases; changes
in military readiness, posture or capabilities that would enable the use of ground troops
and/or commando uriks; or actions undertaken with respect to any of these;

c) Attempts to target UBL and/or other senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including discussions of the
use of cruise missile attacks\Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the arming of UAVs, or
other military means;

d) The use of Special Operations force\against UBL and al Qa'ida, including in

Afghanistan;

e) JCS proposals for disinformation operationsin Afghanistan;

\) Military retaliatory measures after the October 12>
including OSD and JCS recommendations;

g) The May 2001 decision to raise the threat condition of U.S\troops in the Gulf to Delta,
and the July 2001 decision to lower that alert level;
Commission Sensitive but Unclassified
 /
h) OSD and JCS participation hvthe^OOl interagency review of the arming of proxy forces
to fight al-Qa'ida, and/or support for^Nprthern Alliance. M A
/dm ^
1 - i f . Strategy papers, option papers, or recommendations papers prepared by Comm3
Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Central Command for tbe^ecretaryg
Defense and/or Chairman uf JCS regarding the use and readiness of JSOC forces against the
Al-Qa'ida presence in\Afghanistan or other countries from January 1, 1998 to December 31,
2001-

2f. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared by OSD and JCS onjcounterterrorism,
-Qa'ida, UBL, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the
Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Sudan for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team
and incoming Bush-Cheney officials, including written conclusions from these meetings.
''
OSD, JCS and CENTCOM documents regarding the decisioi^tp move the Fifth Fleet out of
harbor in Bahrain in June 2001 in response to warnings of a possible terrorist attack.

5. Documents or c75rtesp_pndence related to efforts to increase the amount of "actionable"

intelligence on the whereaBOtrts^jfUBL or other senior Al-Qa'ida leaders, collateral damage
at possible strike sites, or other inforrriatiorrthat would increase the chances of successful
military strikes from January 1, 1998 to Septefrifeeo^l 1, 2001.

6. Excerpts from the Secretary of Defense's Budget Justification Books sufficient to detail the
scale and priority of counterterrorism efforts within DoD from 1998 through 2001.

1. Memoranda and summaries of meetings with Senior level officials from the United
Kingdom's Ministry of Defense from January 1, 1998 to September 11, 2001, regarding joint
military operations against al-Qa'ida and/or UBL in Afghanistan.

Officez .oiEctne Undersecretary of Defense^r Intelligence

~7 \ \ \ \ ' \ ?
8. The intelligence annex to the Ballistic Missile Defense Commission report, which Secretary
Rumsfeld often rciuuiics itigaidin^his views on the organization, structure and
effectiveness of the Intelligence Community.

9. Documents related tothe establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence^}

partieulari} ni iila i dating the Undersecretary's authorities with respect to the
Director of Central Lite ligence (DCI) and the DDCI for Community Management, (b)
oversight of National F Teign Intelligence programs, (c) budget formulation responsibilities,
(d) financial execution esponsibilities, and (e) the establishment of intelligence priorities
within the Department f Defense.
10. Reports, audits, findings and recommendations produced by OSD, JCS or the DoD Inspector
General from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001 regarding:

a) The effectiveness of DoD's counterterrorism and force protection activities.

b) Management of the Defense Department's intelligence components.
c) The relationship between, and the shared authorities of, the Secretary of Defe
and the Director of Central Intelligence over intelligence activities.
d) DoD's intelligence priorities, including the need for intelligence support for
military operations.
k) j$ DoD's intelligence requirements concerning counterterrorism and force
protection.

11. Correspondence from the Secretary of Defense notifying Congress of his intent to transfer,
reprogram, or seek supplemental funds for counterterrorism or force protection within the
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community from January 1, 1995 to the present.

12. Correspondence between OSETbr the JpS*^! the DCI on (a) the conduct and effectiveness
of counterterrorism intelligence collection and reporting, (b) future terrorist threats to the
United States, (c) overseas force protection from terrorist threats, and (d) warning of terrorist
attacks from January 1, 1998 to the present. / noli^/ LOtft
.s' qC/K/** /""l jM //'
13. The agendas of meetings between the Secretary of Deffense or Deputy Secretary of Defense^ Q )
and the DCI, and any supporting material concerning (2bunterterrorisnAnd/or the ? U B L ~ . ^
•management of tho Intelligence Conmiuuftyvfrom January 1, 1998 to the present. A&>L<LJit sdfaA
V°l(C<f c^ ^
14U Directions, tasking, or guidance from the Secretary of Defense to intelligence agencies or
^components, combatant commands and military departments regarding counterterrorism and
force protection from January 1, 1998 to t4*o pirsait. „_ ^ _ _ ( «*) t .. A
j

finished intelligence products produced^by/tJ*e (Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

to the present concerning ncluding poiioiblc connections
between al-Qa'ida and Iraq.
^^e
16. Documents detailing the intelligence requir^ combatant command for
counterterrorism and force protection 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001.

The Commission requests that the^do'cuments requested abota be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be [provided at the same time, through
means of a "rolling" prodv

'
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such
document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but
has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these
document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with
the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior
to the production date.

June , 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
 Department of Defense
Document Request No.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Commission) requests
that the U.S. Department of Defense (respondent) provide the Commission with copies of the
following documents no later than 2003, (production date):

1. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared or compiled by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for use by OSD and/or
JCS representatives attending the Principals' (including the "Small Group"), or Deputies',
Committee Meetings discussing Usama bin Laden (UBL), al Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including
the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban), or general counterterrorism policy, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20, 2001.

2. Other substantive policy memoranda or guidance documents going to or from the Secretary
of Defense or the Chairman of the JCS regarding general counterterrorism policy, UBL,
al Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20, 2001. This would
include documents going to or from the Secretary or Chairman's top staff or military
assistants for or on behalf of their principals. L-

3. Strategy papers, option papers, or recommendations papers prepared by Commander,^J.S.

,, 'Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Central Command for the OSD/or the
Joint Staff regarding the use and readiness of JSOC forces against the al Qa'ida presence in
Afghanistan or other countries from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001.

4. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared by OSD and JCS on general
counterterrorism policy, UBL, al Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or
the Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Sudan for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team
and incoming Bush-Cheney officials, including written conclusions from these meetings.

5. OSD, JCS and CENTCOM documents sufficient to show how and why the decision was
made to move the Fifth Fleet out of harbor in Bahrain in June 2001 in response to warnings
of a possible terrorist attack.

6. Excerpts from the Secretary of Defense's Budget Justification Books sufficient to detail the
scale and priority of counterterrorism efforts within the DoD from 1998 through 2001.

7. Memoranda and summaries of meetings with senior level officials from the United
Kingdom's Ministry of Defense from January 1, 1998 to September 11, 2001, regarding joint
military operations against al Qa'ida and/or UBL in Afghanistan.
8. The intelligence annex to the Ballistic Missile Defense Commission report in which
Secretary Rumsfeld discusses his views on the organization, structure and effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community.

9. Documents on the establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence that

describe (a) the Undersecretary's authorities with respect to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and the DDCI for Community Management, (b) oversight of National
Foreign Intelligence programs, (c) budget formulation responsibilities, (d) financial execution
responsibilities, and (e) the establishment of intelligence priorities within the DoD.

10. Reports, audits, findings and recommendations produced by OSD, JCS or the DoD Inspector
General from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001 regarding:

a) The effectiveness of DoD's counterterrorism and force protection activities; and

b) DoD's intelligence requirements concerning counterterrorism and force
protection.

1 1 . Correspondence from the Secretary of Defense notifying Congress of his intent to transfer,
reprogram, or seek supplemental funds for counterterrorism or force protection within the
DoD and the Intelligence Community from January 1, 1995 to the present.

12. Correspondence, if any, between the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the JCS and the
DCI on (a) the conduct and effectiveness of counterterrorism intelligence collection and
reporting, (b) future terrorist threats to the United States, (c) overseas force protection from
terrorist threats, and (d) warning of terrorist attacks from January 1, 1998 to the present.

13. The agendas of meetings between the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, and any supporting material concerning general counterterrorism policy,
counterterrorism intelligence, UBL, or Afghanistan^ anuary 1, 1998 to the present.

14. General policy directions, tasking, or guidance from the Secretary of Defense to intelligence
agencies or components, combatant commands and military departments regarding
counterterrorism and related force protection from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001,
and those now in force.

nificant finished intelligence products produced in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
by the Defense Intelligence Agencymom September 11, 2001 to the present concerning
terrorism, inoludirtg possible state sponsorship or involvement in the 9-11 attacks including
relevant connection between al Qa'ida and Iraq.

16. Documents detailing the intelligence requirements of the combatant commandj-for

counterterrorism and force protection activities from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001.
2
The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through
means of a "rolling" production.

If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such
document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but
has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these
document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with
the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior
to the production date.

June , 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
 X v

Commission Sensitive But Unclassified 0a

DRAFT 6/30/03 6:51 PM cr -

ac
Department of Defense
Document Request No.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

requests that the U.S. Department of Defense (the "respondent") provide the Commission with
copies of the following documents no later than 2003, (the "production date"):

1. Documents, briefing papers and presentations prepared or compiled by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for use by OSD and/or
JCS representatives attending the Principals' (including the "Small Group"), or Deputies',
Committee Meetings discussing general countortorroriom policy, aLQalidte Usama bin
(UBL)/Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban),^akistan, Saudi
ia, Yemen or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20,
e'1>Co\n Se

Other substantive policy memoranda or guidance documents going to or from the Secretary
s\ I). \ of Defense or the Chairman of the JCS regarding general counterterrorism policy, al-Qa'ida,
( Usama bin Lading UBlJf, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance and/or the Taliban),
<^\
<>^.> c Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 through September 20, 2001.
This would include documents going to or from the SecreJ;ar^^,^CJiairj]^aii^sJpp^staff or
military assistants for or on behalf of their principals.

3. Strategy papers, option papers, or recommendations(papers)prepared by Commander, U.S.

Special Operations Command and Commander, U.S. Central Command for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and/or the Joint Staff regarding the use and readiness of JSOC forces
against the Al-Qa'ida presence in Afghanistan or other countries from January 1, 1998 to
December 31,2001.

4. Documents, briefing papers ancrpresentations

\^ v
prepared by OSD and JCS on general
,,- counterterrorism policy, al-Qa'ida, UBL, Afghanistan (including the Northern Alliance
L and/or the Taliban), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen or Sudan for the Bush-Cheney Transition
C Team and incoming Bush-Cheney officials, including written conclusions from these
meetings.

5. OSD, JCS and CENTCOM documents sufficient to show how and why the decision was
made to move the Fifth Fleet out of harbor in Bahrain in June 2001 in response to warnings
of a possible terrorist attack.

6. Excerpts from the Secretary of Defense's Budget Justification Books sufficient to detail the
scale and priority of counterterrorism efforts within DoD from 1998 through 2001.
 Memoranda and summaries of meetings with (Junior level officials from the United
Kingdom's Ministry of Defense from January 1, 1998 to September 11, 2001, regarding joint
military operations against al-Qa'ida and/or UBL in Afghanistan.

8. The intelligence annex to the Ballistic Missile Defense Commission report in which
Secretary Rumsfeld discusses his views on the organization, structure and effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community.

9. Documents on the establishment of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence that

describe (a) the Undersecretary's authorities with respect to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and the DDCI for Community Management, (b) oversight of National
Foreign Intelligence programs, (c) budget formulation responsibilities, (d) financial execution
responsibilities, and (e) the establishment of intelligence priorities within the Department of
Defense.

10. Reports, audits, findings and recommendations produced by OSD, JCS or the DoD Inspector
General from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001 regarding:

a) The effectiveness of DoD's counterterrorism and force protection activities* »-~A-

b) DoD's intelligence requirements concerning counterterrorism and force
protection.

11. Correspondence from the Secretary of Defense notifying Congress of his intent to transfer,
reprogram, or seek supplemental funds for counterterrorism or force protection within the
Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community from January 1, 1995 to the present.

12. Correspondence, if any, between the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the JCS and the
DCI on (a) the conduct and effectiveness of counterterrorism intelligence collection and
reporting, (b) future terrorist threats to the United States, (c) overseas force protection from
terrorist threats, and (d) warning of terrorist attacks from January 1, 1998 to the present.

13. The agendas of meetings between the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, and any supporting material concerning general counterterrorism policy,
counterterrorism intelligence, UBL, or Afghanistan January 1, 1998 to the present.

14. General policy directions, tasking, or guidance from the Secretary of Defense to intelligence
agencies or components, combatant commands and military departments regarding
counterterrorism and related force protection from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001,
andjhose now in force.

15. Significant finished intelligence products produced in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
of by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DLA) from September 11, 2001 to the present
 concerning terrorism, including possible state sponsorship or involvement in the 9-11 attacks
including relevant connection between al-Qa'ida and Iraq.

16. Documents detailing the intelligence requirements of the combatant command for
counterterrorism and force protection activities from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001.

The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through
means of a "rolling" production.

If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such
document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but
has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these
document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with
the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior
to the production date.

June , 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
 - ^ • •. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests that the U.S.
|_ 0 Department of Defense (the "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no later
than 2003, (the "production date"):

ODS/JCS: Briefing papers to principals and deputies, including strategy papers and options presented; any
minutes taken at these meetings including any lists of participants, summaries and conclusions reached; and
guidance provided by Principals or Deputies to OSD/JCS regarding the following:

The August 20, 1998 U.S. military strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, including all discussions of
avenues of response to the 1998 embassy bombings;

Discussions in 1998 regarding the use of group troops in Afghanistan;

The 1999 - 2000 discussions regarding attempts to target UBL during, including deliberations on the
use of cruise missile attacks on UBL;

Discussions regarding the use of the Predator in Afghanistan, 2000-2001;

The November 2001 Predator strike that killed Muhammad Atef, including after action report;

Discussions regarding the use of Special Forces and other operations against UBL, including
evaluations of strengths and weaknesses of drones, troops, and missiles.

2001 attacks on Afghanistan, including war plans

Recaj'l: military budg^tfe to fight terrorism, what was the military posture, what was the readiness for
, what was the/basing before 9/11, what infrastructure changes? Did the Pentagon accept the
ion?

A. Documentation reflecting my JSC considerations of Presidential requests to JCS to consider

commando attacks on al Qaida.
B.
C. cument; related to the JCS, SOCOM and CINCENT options and considerations on the
advisability of combat ^options in Afghanistan.
D. Files of theUDOD and JCS representatives to the Counterterrorism Sub Group concerning the
al Qa'ida terrorist threat to the U.S. since 1993.
E. File used by General Newbold when interviewed the Joint Inquiry Staff on military options.
F. The strategy referred to by General Newbold when interviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff.
G. Military operation plans against terrorist targets before 9-11:
1. Response to the USS Cole and Khobar Towers attacks
2. Military action against UBL or Al-Qa'ida
3. Development of capabilities to target UBL
4. Range of military responses considered after the 1998 Embassy bombings.
A. Evaluations of military strikes against terrorist targets, including but not limited to the strike
against
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the 1993 strike against Iraq.
B. All strategy papers, options, discussions and preparatory orders regarding the use of
overt/covert force
in Sudan from 1991 to 2002.
C. All documentation relating to discussions between CINCENT and Pakistan officials
requesting
Pakistan to raise the issue of Usama bin Laden with the Taliban.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests that the U.S.
Department of Defense (the "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no later
than 2003, (the "production date"):

A. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding the June 26, 1993 U.S. military
strike on Iraqi intelligence HQ.
B. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding the August 20, 1998 U.S.
military strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, including all discussions of avenues of response to the 1998
embassy bombings.
C. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding attempts to target UBL during
the 1999-2000 time frame, including the deliberations of cruise missile attacks on UBL.
D. Discussions and conclusions reached by the JCS regarding ground troop options in
Afghanistan in 1998, including pre-decisional documents.
E. Documentation reflecting any JSC considerations of Presidential requests to JCS to consider
commando attacks on al Qa'ida.
F. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding 2000-2001 discussions of the
use of Predator in Afghanistan.
G. Documents related to the JCS, SOCOM and CINCENT options and considerations on the
advisability of combat options in Afghanistan.
H. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding the use of Special Forces and
other operations against UBL, including evaluations of strengths and weaknesses of drones, troops, and
missiles.
I. All strategy papers, options and conclusions reached regarding the Nov. 2001 Predator strike
that killed Muhammad Atef, including after-action report.
J. Files of the DOD and JCS representatives to the Counterterrorism Sub Group concerning the
al Qa'ida terrorist threat to the U.S. since 1993.
K. File used by General Newbold when interviewed the Joint Inquiry Staff on military options.
L. The strategy referred to by General Newbold when interviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff.
M. Military operation plans against terrorist targets before 9-11:
1. Response to the USS Cole and Khobar Towers attacks
2. Military action against UBL or Al-Qa'ida
3. Development of capabilities to target UBL
4. Range of military responses considered after the 1998 Embassy bombings.
A. Evaluations of military strikes against terrorist targets, including but not limited to the strike
against
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the 1993 strike against Iraq.
B. All strategy papers, options, discussions and preparatory orders regarding the use of
overt/covert force
in Sudan from 1991 to 2002.
C. All documentation relating to discussions between CINCENT and Pakistan officials
requesting
Pakistan to raise the issue of Usama bin Laden with the Taliban.
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/20/2008

BOX: 00001 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 6 DOC ID: 31206513

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3

i ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Document Requests - Drafts

DOCUMENT DATE: 06/04/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Profs Notes)

FROM: Bonnie Jenkins

TO: Steve

SUBJECT: Correct attachment

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Personal Privacy

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE