Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan Nuez assails

s the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each

member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting) Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people. Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial. Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption

can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6670

August 4, 1988

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS AND TERMS USED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO INSTITUTE A MODIFIED PERFORMANCE BUDGET SYSTEM Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Section 13 of P.D. 1177 is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 13. Submission of the Budget. The President shall, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, submit to the Congress within thirty (30) days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the General Appropriations Bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. Additional appropriations proposals may be submitted which correspond to part of the expenditure estimates submitted as part of the budget proposal: Provided, That continuing appropriations may be enacted for public works, highways and other infrastructure projects which require more than one year for construction. In such cases, revenue estimates for the future years shall be used in the evaluation of funding availability. "The President may transmit to Congress, from time to time, such proposed supplemental or deficiency appropriations as are, in his judgment, (a) necessary on account of laws enacted after the transmission of the Budget, or (b) otherwise needed in the public interest." Section 2. Section 24 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 24. Appropriations for Personal Services. Appropriations for personal services shall be considered as included in the amount specified for each budgetary program and project of each department, bureau, office or agency, and shall be itemized. The itemization of personal services shall be prepared by the Secretary for consideration and approval of the President as provided in Section 30 hereof: Provided, that the itemization of personal services shall be prepared for all agencies

of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches and the Constitutional bodies down to the division chief level and in the case of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police down to the rank of second lieutenant, except as may be otherwise approved by the President for positions concerned with national security matters: Provided, further, That appropriations for casual and/ or temporary employees shall be in lump-sum based on the number of man-hours to be rendered." Section 3. Section 26 of the same decree is hereby repealed. Section 4. Section 27 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 27. Infrastructure and Other Bills. The public works, highways and other bills requiring appropriations may be filed at any time during the sessions of the Congress and shall be considered by the Congress upon their being reported out by the corresponding Committees." Section 5. Sections 28 and 29 of the same decree are hereby repealed. Section 6. Section 30 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 30. Content of the General Appropriations Act. The General Appropriations Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project, including statutory provisions of specific agency or general applicability. The General Appropriations Act shall contain an itemization of personal services which shall be prepared by the Secretary before enactment of the General Appropriations Act." Section 7. The following words, phrases or terms wherever they appear in Presidential Decree No. 1177, as amended, are hereby amended to read: (a) "Ministry of the Budget" shall read "Department of the Budget and Management"; (b) "Minister of Budget" shall read "Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management"; (c) "National Assembly" and "Batasan" shall read "Congress"; (d) "Ministry" and "Ministries" shall read "Department" and "Departments," respectively; and (e) "Minister" shall read "Secretary." Section 8. All laws, decrees, executive orders, and letters of instruction inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the Constitution are hereby repealed, superseded and/or modified.

Section 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: August 4, 1988.

Garcia v. Mojica Posted on October 3, 2012 G.R. No. 139043 September 10, 1999 Facts: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-990132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation Issues: 1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable. 2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local Government Code. Held: 1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate

could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not. 2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)

filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed: x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. xxx Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NO. 160261 NOV. 10, 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada

filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the

bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over

congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME114 SCRA FACTS:The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions:1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable. 2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply fora judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title. 2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized. 3.Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is contingent on the judicial confirmation of title. RULING:1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14of the

1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA. 2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by Not finished..

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES: 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc 1. YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law 2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares