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Asian Ethnicity
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Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity in Indonesia

Amy Freedman
a a

Franklin and Marshall College, United States Version of record first published: 27 May 2010.

To cite this article: Amy Freedman (2003): Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity in Indonesia, Asian Ethnicity, 4:3, 439-452 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1343900032000117259

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Asian Ethnicity, Volume 4, Number 3, October 2003

Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity in Indonesia

AMY FREEDMAN
(Franklin and Marshall College, United States)

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Under Suharto, Indonesian politics and institutions attempted to force ethnic Chinese to assimilate, while continuing to identify them as different from indigenous Indonesian groups. Yet Suhartos downfall brought with it a myriad of political changes. New political parties quickly formed, some of which were ethnically based or were pointedly created to promote ethnic cooperation. New laws were enacted to allow Chinese to revert to Chinese family names, publish Chinese-language books and periodicals, and to put an end to coded identication cards that marked one as Chinese. This paper looks specically at how these legal and institutional changes have shaped Chinese ethnic identity. The focus here is on political changes within and outside government, while the essay also examines the new political bodies being established by Chinese groups, and what this may mean for the future of Chinese Indonesians.

Introduction: The relationship between politics and ethnic identity

On 21 May 1998, after more than 30 years in power, Suharto resigned as president of Indonesia. Vice President B.J. Habibie took over and, to the surprise of many people, the entire political system began to shift. B.J. Habibie was not particularly well-respected prior to his ascendancy in May 1998. Domestic and international leaders feared that, at best, he would be beholden to military interests and business cronies of Suharto and, at worst, he could turn Indonesia towards economic nationalism and risk billions in dollars of aid money. Instead, Habibie set Indonesia on a path towards much greater political freedom. Very early in his tenure Habibie stated that he would not try to nish Suhartos term but would bring forward parliamentary elections (and later presidential elections) to 1999. He ended Suhartos three-party system, allowed a myriad of parties to form, and he allowed a vote on independence to take place in East Timor. Proving far more courageous than anyone anticipated, Habibie allowed almost a complete restructuring of the political system to begin. The premise of this paper is that politics and identity formation are linked and that an opening of the political system will affect Chinese communal activities, their position relative to the indigenous majority of Indonesians, and their self-identication. Ethnic identity is formed from internal dynamics within a group, as well as being shaped and affected by the larger social, political and cultural environment in which a group lives, as discussed by Turner (this issue). There is a great deal of anthropological and sociological work on ethnic identity and assimilation (or acculturation).1 It is clear from much of this
1 Most of this literature will not be discussed here. However, one of the more helpful works is Milton Gordons Assimilation in American Life: The role of race, religion, and national origin (Oxford University Press, New York, 1964). Gordon differentiates acculturation from assimilation, but nds that acculturation may be a rst step to greater assimilation. Assimilation occurs when a group becomes a part of dominant cliques, clubs and institutions, ISSN 1463-1369 print; 1469-2953 online/03/030439-14 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1343900032000117259

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literature that cultural practices often change when confronted with new stimuli such as television, newspapers, radio, the internet, global commerce, urbanisation, and through more traditional interactions with other groups. For Chinese overseas, communal (or even individual) identity is also shaped by displacement, migration and transculturation. Diasporic peoples are viewed in contrast to the territorially based indigenous inhabitants, whose identity and culture are often designed, or at least reinforced by nation-states.2 Thus, Chinese in Indonesia may have their identity shaped by their relation to the discursive and sometimes legal categories of pribumi or native/indigenous, versus non-pribumi (generally meaning Chinese); citizen (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI, a term that literally means Indonesian citizen and is used to specically mean Chinese who have acquired Indonesian citizenship) as opposed to non-citizen Chinese; or orang asli or native born (like pribumi) versus keturunan asing foreign descent.3 Even within the Chinese community, ones identity can be peranakan (an ethnic Chinese who has been in Indonesia for several generations and who is fairly well assimilated) or totok (rst or more recent generation) Chinese.4 These terms and assigned identities have served to dene who is a legitimate member of the nationwho belongsand who is an outsider. Such distinctions have been codied in decrees and policies that at once urged the Chinese to assimilate and rid themselves of differences from the indigenous majority, while labeling the Chinese as perpetually non-pribumi, outsiders. Of course the Chinese community in Indonesia is quite heterogeneous, allowing for a wide variety of self-identication. Divisions exist within the community according to religion, socio-economic status, profession, education level, locality, generation in Indonesia, gender, and so on.5 The focus of this paper, however, is the argument that ethnic identity in Indonesia has long been a political category and a way of keeping the Chinese community from fully participating in politics and decision-making. The Suharto government (and they were not alone in this) manipulated the idea of a national cultural community, which was then used to legitimate Suhartos political order. This goal was enshrined in the idea of Pancasila. Literally translated as the ve principles, Pancasila became the ofcial Indonesian state ideology under Suharto, and it continues to be a dening aspect of the state. Pancasila designates Bahasa Indonesia as the national language, and it requires citizens to pledge support for a national identity as Indonesians. The national slogan, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, unity in diversity, was used to promote assimilation and support for Suhartos New Order regime.6 Pancasila was, in part, a way of forcing assimilation with the Javanese-dominated society. In addition, more specic policies and regulations evolved from Pancasila ideology and were intended to have an impact on how Chinese Indonesians related to the rest of indigenous society. First, the use of Bahasa Indonesia was mandated as the medium of instruction for all schools (with the exception of international schools, from which Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian children were largely excluded). This forced the closing

footnote contined

2 3 4 5 6

and when cultural and behavioural traits become more in line with those of the broader societys. Nevertheless, acculturation (adaptation and some integration with the dominant group) may occur without assimilation ever taking place. Amy Freedman, The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas Acculturation: The case of Malaysia, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 35, issue 2 (2001), p. 414. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr, Citizenship, Inheritance, and the Indigenizing of Orang Chinese in Indonesia, Positions: East Asia cultures critique, vol. 9, no. 3 (2001), pp. 50133. Ibid. Gungwu Wang, Dont Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese (Times Academic Press, Singapore, 2001). See chapters 4 and 9 on issues of identication. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, development and pressure for change (Routledge, New York, 1993).

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of a large network of Chinese vernacular schools.7 Secondly, written and artistic materials concerning ethnic, religious and racial topics were suppressed on the grounds that such materials could be offensive to other groups. Hence, Chinese-language newspapers and radio shows were effectively shut down. Thirdly, there were immigration restrictions on the entry of foreign religious instructors (hurting Buddhist and Christian faiths as they had limited access to materials and teachers from outside Indonesia). In addition, all Indonesians were required to refrain from involvement in the internal politics of foreign states. This was clearly aimed at ethnic Chinese who followed or were involved in Chinese or Taiwanese politics.8 While some of these specic policies have been overturned (signicantly the rst and second mentioned here), the overarching framework of Pancasila remains intact. Pancasila is still a critical part of national discourse in Indonesia. Political parties must agree to abide by Pancasila if they want to compete in elections. As Nonini argues, transnational practices of modern Chinese persons cannot be understood separately from the cultural politics of identities inscribed on them by such regimes.9 As such, in the case of Indonesia, as well as the concepts mentioned earlier, identity is also shaped by a range of political factors: specic policies and legal dictates; government and electoral institutions; the nature of organisations within society; and the internal dynamics and practices of the community itself. Obviously, since 1998, cultural politics have been undergoing massive changes in Indonesia, and we have only begun to see what might emerge. With all the changes since 1998, Chinese in Indonesia may now have the ability to identify themselves in a variety of ways. They may nally be allowed to achieve a signicant degree of assimilation while, at the same time, they may also be able to assume a more distinct and proud identity as Chinese Indonesians. While too little time has passed to know for sure what the ethnic landscape will look like, there are some changes that have occurred that are sure to shape future notions of identity, and this article argues that changes in the political environment may have a great impact on communal identity.10

Political and Governmental Changes since 1998

A close association of race and class in Indonesia since pre-colonial times has plagued Chinese Indonesians. As an economically dominant minority in Indonesia, the Chinese have pinned their hopes on market liberalisation and democracy to bring about greater tolerance and acceptance. However, in many ways, these two changes together may only bring additional hatred and ethnic strife in Indonesia. As Amy L. Chua describes, there is a paradox in instituting political and economic liberalisation.11 First, freeing-up markets could increase the economic dominance of the Chinese, since they already have established networks and business connections in place that will make it difcult for indigenous entrepreneurs to catch up easily and compete successfully against them. So, instead of creating a more level economic playing eld, as many hope, the Chinese may continue to
7 Charles A. Coppel, Patterns of Chinese Political Activity in Indonesia, in Mackie, J.A.C. (ed.), The Chinese in Indonesia (Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia, 1976), pp. 1976. 8 Leo Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics (Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1998). 9 Donald M. Nonini, Shifting Identities, Positioned Imaginaries: Transnational Traversals and Reversals by Malaysian Chinese, in Ong, Aihwa and Donald Nonini (eds), Underground Empires: The cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism (Routledge, New York, 1997), pp. 20328. 10 Gungwu Wang, Dont Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese and Leo Suryadinata, Peranakans Search for National Identity: Biographical Studies of 7 Indonesian Chinese (Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1993). 11 Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free-Market Democracy: Indonesia and the Problems Facing Neoliberal Reform. A paper from the Project on Development, Trade, and International Finance (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2000) obtained on CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online).

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maintain their economic pre-eminence for a long time to come. When this is combined with an open political system based on some sort of majority rule, it opens the door for ethnic resentment to translate into ethno-national movements or race baiting as a campaign tactic. Chua predicts that this can lead to three (non-mutually exclusive) outcomes: 1. an anti-market backlash targeting the market-dominant minority (for example, through ethnically targeted nationalisations or economic restrictions); 2. actions aimed at eliminating the market-dominant minority (for example, through expulsion or atrocity); 3. a pro-market retreat from democracy.12

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Chua illustrates that these have all happened to some degree in Indonesia. During Habibies brief tenure in ofce, the government advanced a proposal for a Peoples Economy (Ekonomi Rakyat) which was a plan to break up Chinese-dominated enterprises and transfer them to the masses. This plan never came to fruition, however Habibie did pursue ethnically targeted market intervention, cancelling rice distribution contracts with Chinese merchants and awarding the contracts to new state-run rice cooperatives. This was a brief and disastrous experiment. It contributed to a looming food crisis and provided new outlets for corruption (for example, one ofcial was accused of trying to export illegally 1,900 tons of rice to Malaysia, while his own constituents were starving).13 The riots and assaults in 1998 and the fact that there has been little attempt to nd and prosecute the aggressors make some feel that this sort of violence is all too likely to reoccur. Similarly, democracy is only weakly consolidated in Indonesia, and it is easy to imagine a retreat from democracy in the name of economic (and/or national) security. If one agrees with Chuas arguments, and this author nds them persuasive, then one needs to ask how Chinese identity will be shaped in this new precarious environment. While various branches of government have undergone structural changes, the more pronounced shifts have occurred within the executive branch, arguably the least democratic part of the state. In the immediate aftermath of Suhartos departure, a number of new political parties and advocacy groups began to form. The next two sections of this paper will look at these sets of changes, those within the government and those occurring in society.

Changes in State Institutions

Under Suharto, a preponderance of power resided in the executive. Political parties were extremely weak and subservient to the ruling party, Golkar. The two strongest institutions of government were the bureaucracy and the military, both controlled by Suharto. Political participation or mobilisation was only signicant to the extent that people were greatly encouraged to show their support for Golkar. From 1971 until May of 1998, regular elections were held, but they were carefully orchestrated to achieve a two-thirds majority for Golkar. Parliament (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR, or Peoples Representative Council) was fairly passive, and the bureaucracy carried out the economic and nation-building goals of Suharto. The DPR comprised 500 seats. Of these, 425 were elected, and 75 seats were reserved for military appointees. Parliament met several times a year to approve legislation and the executive-proposed budget. There was also a super parliament, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) or the Peoples Consultative Assembly. This body was made up of all 500 DPR members, plus 500 additional appointees. The MPR would meet every
12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 14.

Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity 443

ve years to elect the president and vice president. Most conict over policy occurred within Suhartos cabinet, while parliamentary institutions simply served as legitimising agents of the regimes will.14 Although the system was gerrymandered to favour Suhartos party, Golkar, two other parties were allowed to contest elections, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). These parties were fusions of nine other parties that existed prior to Suhartos New Order. Party leaders were handpicked or vetted by government ofcials. Yet Golkar was more than just a vehicle for electionsin many ways it was the electoral arm of the military. As elections would near, Golkar would hold mass rallies throughout Indonesia to mobilise peoples support for the upcoming elections. Many businesses encouraged their employees to attend the rallies and, in fact, business owners themselves were given positive and negative incentives to do so.15 Chinese Indonesians were not treated differently within this institutional structure, nor did candidates or political parties distinctly target them for support in elections. In part, this is because elections were used almost symbolically as a tool to illustrate popular support for the regime; in this sense, there was no need to distinguish Sino-Indonesians from the rest of the population. However, toward the end of his rule, Suharto paid more attention to Islam, and the Chinese suffered from a backlash against earlier associations with the Partai Katolik and other non-Islamic groups.16 Although Habibie was initially seen as weak and illegitimate, he oversaw a signicant number of reforms to government institutions and electoral conditions. Habibie called the MPR into session in November of 1998, and the Assembly enacted a number of signicant changes. First, the MPRs internal rules were amended to allow elected representatives of new parties to sit in that body and in parliament. Secondly, the leadership of the two assemblies was separated while, thirdly, the president and vice president would be limited to a maximum of two ve-year terms. In addition, fourthly, the Assembly decreed that parliamentary elections should be held in May or June of 1999 and that all parties meeting the legal requirements would be allowed to compete. Fifthly, it declared that the number of appointed seats reserved for the military would gradually shrink based on laws to be enacted later, and nally, the Assembly established an independent General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) to oversee the elections. New election laws were passed in January of 1999 to try to create open and fair elections, and they codied the changes to the national and local representative bodies.17 Under the new laws, the parliament will stay at 500 seats but the militarys appointments will shrink from 75 to 38. The MPR was reduced from 1,000 seats to 700; 500 of those seats will still be the members of the DPR, while an additional 135 members will be chosen by provincial legislatures, and the last 65 members will be appointed to represent social organisations.18 The possible signicance of these changes will be discussed shortly.

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14 Amy Freedman, Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States (Routledge, New York, 2000). See chapter 4 for a discussion of political institutions and the implications of these arrangements on the ethnic Chinese. 15 Ibid., p. 104. 16 Ibid. 17 Information on electoral and institutional changes comes from Edward Masters, Indonesias 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy, working paper prepared for the Asia Society, May 1999. Obtained on CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online). 18 Under the election law, the new election monitoring commission would determine which groups are eligible to have representatives appointed. Edward Masters, Indonesias 1999 Elections: A second chance for democracy.

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Electoral Changes
In addition to the changes made to the political institutions themselves, there were signicant alterations made to the electoral and political party system. While contestation was opened up to allow the formation of a plethora of new parties, constraints were placed on groups that wanted to compete. In order to run in the 1999 election, and in future elections, a party had to have branches in half the districts in nine of Indonesias 27 provinces. If these requirements were met, a party was allowed to run candidates anywhere in Indonesia. To run in subsequent elections, a party had to have won 2 per cent of seats in parliament. Under Suharto, parliamentary representatives were chosen by proportional representation; voters selected a party and the party determined who took ofce from national party lists in proportion to that partys percentage of the total vote. Under the new laws adopted in 1999, parliamentary seats are still determined by a system of proportional representation by province, but each party must list its candidates at the district and municipal levels, and winners are determined with consideration to largest votes obtained by that particular political party in the districts.19 While voters are still voting for parties over individuals, lists of candidates will be posted at polling stations so that (at least for local elections) some of the candidates may be familiar to voters.20 There are several reasons why Habibie allowed and seemingly encouraged these changes. One might be tempted to view the reforms as a democratic response to the 1998 protests and criticism of Suharto, but this is only a small part of the answer. Habibie desired to enhance his own weak position and to hold on to power. He could only do this if he minimised potential threats to his rule. He acted to reduce the role of the military in politics and to create a system which controlled contestation or competition. He hoped that this might provide the best chance for his own political survival. While Habibie was not able to hold on to power after the 1999 elections, he created a system that failed to address some of the problems left over from Suharto (namely corruption and a powerful military bureaucracy), yet also provided for many new opportunities for political participation and expression.

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Ethnic Chinese Reactions

The new laws prompted a great deal of immediate political activity by the Chinese community. During the second week of June 1998, ethnic Chinese formed two new political parties: the Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party) became the rst group to break the long-standing ban on Chinese political activity. The Partai Pembauran Indonesia, or Parpindo (the Assimilationist party), led by H. Junus Jahaja and Jusuf Hamka, was formed on 10 June 1998.21 In addition to these groups, other civil rights types of organisations were formed. Christianto Wibisono created the Citizens Forum for Reform to guarantee minority rights. Yet, despite all this civil society activity, only one small Chinese party participated in the 1999 elections: Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI) led by Nurdin Purnomo, a Hakka Chinese. PBI did reasonably well in Kalimantan and won three seats in parliament, yet it did not do well in urban areas such as Jakarta. PBI, like other parties established by Chinese Indonesians in the wake of the 1998 upheaval, is not an exclusively Chinese party. It was set up by Chinese and non-Chinese, and its platform highlighted three goals:
19 Election Law, article 68. 20 Edward Masters, Indonesias 1999 Elections: A second chance for democracy. 21 Amy Freedman, Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States, p. 92.

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abolition of discriminatory laws; nding a solution to the economic crisis; and greater support for the unemployed.22 Ironically, the rst two Chinese parties to form (The Chinese Indonesian Reform Party and Parpindo) were not able to participate in the 1999 election, because they were not able to eld enough candidates in sufcient districts to participate.23 Perhaps some of the most interesting features of the 1999 election results were the voting patterns of Chinese Indonesians. According to estimates of the election results, a large majority of the Chinese Indonesians who exercised their right to vote voted for Megawati Soekarnoputris party, PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle, rather than for a Chinese party. Possible reasons for this political behaviour include the prominence of the economist Kwik Kian Gie (an ethnic Chinese) as a close adviser to her campaign, and Soekarnoputris campaign promises to grant ethnic Chinese equal status and rights. In addition, much of Megawati Soekarnoputris popularity (among Chinese and other Indonesians) is based on nostalgia for her father, Soekarno.24 Under his rule, there was a sense of greater equality and respect for ethnic minorities such as the Chinese. Chinese may also have voted for PDI-P, because it was one of two leading parties that promised a secular, pluralist state, the other being Wahids National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). Nevertheless, Chinese support for various parties varied greatly by region. In West Kalimantan, Chinese Indonesian votes went to all the major parties, including Islamic ones such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). By contrast, in Surabaya many Chinese joined PKB, Wahids moderate Islamic party, while Chinese in many urban areas joined PAN and Golkar.25 On 7 June 1999, parliamentary elections were held under the new rules described previously. Megawati Soekarnoputris PDI-P won the largest share of votes, about 34 per cent of the popular vote, and at the time it seemed that she would be the lead candidate for the presidential election to be held later in the autumn. In order for this to happen, she needed to garner coalition partners to secure a majority in the electoral college system of the super parliament. However, when the 700-member body was convened in October, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), leader of PKB, was chosen to be Indonesias next president.26 This new political system has resulted in several signicant effects for the political position of Chinese Indonesians, their political incorporation and their communal identity. First, what the initial urry of ethnic Chinese political activity seemed to indicate was that a number of community leaders view themselves as Chinese Indonesians and that they believe communal interests are best articulated from an ethnically based party organisation. They appear to feel that none of the larger, secular and pluralist parties would be able to really represent the needs and interests of ethnic Chinese, since these parties had larger bases of support. Yet what voter behaviour reects is that Chinese Indonesians are not a homogeneous entity, there being considerable variation in Chinese support for many different parties. This shows how hard it will be to politically organise and/or make appeals to Chinese Indonesians based only on ethnic identity. What the electoral changes mean politically is that, under proportional representation, party organisations will remain

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22 Ignatius Wibowo, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Indonesian Chinese after the Fall of Soeharto, SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 16, no. 1 (2001), p. 140. 23 Amy Freedman, Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States. p. 92. 24 Aan Suryana, Ethnic Chinese Urged to Enter Political Arena, The Jakarta Post (29 April 2002). 25 I. Wibowo, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Indonesian Chinese after the Fall of Soeharto, pp. 1412. 26 Seth Mydans, Indonesian Leader Forms Mix-Master Cabinet, New York Times (27 October 1999).

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powerful entities, controlling which candidates run in which districts. If Chinese elites were to take the route of joining and being active in key parties, they would be subject to the partys calculations about if and how many districts might plausibly elect a Chinese Indonesian representative. Parties will have to have a wide enough base of appeal to run candidates in the rst place, and they will have to win a critical mass of votes to send at least 2 per cent of representatives to parliament. These factors will probably act to limit direct Chinese political power in parliament. If ethnic Chinese parties do not succeed in winning seats under this system (and it seems doubtful that they will win many), then one can imagine that the leaders of these parties and community activists may well put their energy and organisation skills into secular, pluralist parties with a broader base of appeal. They will therefore most likely seek to build coalitions that can help give them access to power, even if that power is constrained.

Current Status of Discriminatory Regulations and Legal Changes

Much has changed in Indonesia since May 1998, yet much has not. While the political system is clearly more open to different forms of contestation, parties and advocacy groups, and while several noteworthy statutes have been repealed (such as Decree No. 14/196727 issued by Suharto to ban Chinese cultural, linguistic and religious activities), and new laws have been passed to allow the use of Chinese ethnic surnames and the publication of Chinese-language materials, and to end the practice of coded identication cards, many discriminatory policies remain in place. This is either because no ofcial action has been taken, or because reforms that have occurred have not been enforced.28 One of the deepest roots of discrimination in Indonesia is the Constitution itself. Codied in 1945, Article 26 of the Constitution classies the population into indigenous Indonesians and people of other races. The implementation of such differentiation appears in subordinate regulations and touches all aspects of life from education, the economy, and issues of state administration.29 One issue that still illustrates the explicit discrimination against Chinese Indonesians is the difculty they face in obtaining a wide array of ofcial documents. Chinese Indonesians must have a document called a Certicate of Citizenship (SBKRI). The SBKRI must be produced to apply for other ofcial documents such as birth certicates and ID cards and passports. In turn, a birth certicate is needed to obtain a range of other documents, including university entrance papers, passports, business and/or bank licences, and so on. These additional documents can still be difcult and expensive to obtain. The following anecdote reveals the discrimination that still exists for Chinese Indonesians. An interfaith couple, the husband Chinese and Christian, the wife pribumi and Muslim, had a baby at a respected Jakarta hospital and wanted to get a birth certicate for the new-born. A brochure at the hospital explained that the fee for Muslim and Christian Indonesian citizens requesting birth certicates was Rp. 150,000. For Indonesian citizens of Chinese decent the fee was Rp. 300,000. Worse:
the ethnic Chinese were required to provide a citizenship document, or Surat Kewarganegaraan and Surat Ganti Nama (SBKRI), an ofcial document regarding the change of their Chinese into Indonesian names. Meanwhile, Muslim and Christian citizens were only required

27 Tempo Interaktif, The Losing Battle against Discrimination, and Putting Nativity out of the Prerequisites both from Tempo Interaktif, no. 18 (814 January 2002), (www.tempointeraktif.com/jajalah/eng/law-1.html) 28 Ibid. 29 Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, Government Declares Imlek as National Holiday, Jakarta Post (18 February 2002).

Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity 447 to bring in photocopies of general documents such as marriage certicates, birth certicates, and family cards.30

In February 2002, a group of activists proposed using the principle of jus soli (citizenship by birth within the nations territorial borders) to determine citizenship, rather than jus sanguinis, where citizenship is determined by the citizenship status of the babys father. Activists met with legislators to submit their ideas on revising two laws on citizenship: law no. 3/1946 and law no. 62/1958. Law no. 62/1958 follows the jus sanguinis system whereby children take on the nationality of their parents, usually the father, and Indonesian-born Chinese must have documents not required for indigenous Indonesians.31 Other statutes which discriminate and which have not been repealed include Presidential Decree No. 240/1966 obliging all those of Chinese descent to adopt Indonesian names; Presidential Instruction No. 37/1967 limiting the education and economic opportunities for Chinese Indonesians; and Home Ministry Instruction No. 455.2360/1968 regulating the construction of Chinese temples.32 At the time of writing no revisions had yet been made to overturn these laws. In early 2002, the Indonesian government declared that Chinese New Year would be an alternate or optional holiday. Businesses and schools had the option to close or stay open. During the 2002 festivities, President Megawati Soekarnoputri announced that the next Chinese New Year (Imlek, in Indonesian) would be a state holiday.33 This decision was greeted with much rejoicing in the Chinese community, although most see it as a symbolic change, whereas repealing discriminatory statutes such as those discussed above would mark more real progress. The changes that have taken place so far prompt several interesting questions: rst, why has there been some signicant change while other areas of discrimination have been left unreformed? The reforms that have transpired reect both what is possible politically, and what is useful to current powerholders to maintain support from critical allies. Despite President Wahids rhetoric about pluralism and inclusiveness within Indonesia, he showed little serious commitment to more drastic changes. We can speculate that this may have been due to his need to placate different political constituents. He wanted to reassure wealthy Chinese elites and foreign investors that Indonesia was taking steps to prevent renewed violence such as occurred in 1998. Thus, we do see meaningful change in both political institutions and with the repeal of certain discriminatory regulations. It was less risky to repeal laws on surnames, Chinese publications, and the like, than to call into question fundamental ideas about who is Indonesian. To challenge and change policies as critical as those that reect denitions of national character and identity and who has access to limited university places and government jobs (particularly within the military) might threaten the support of some of the Muslim groups that any president of Indonesia needs to remain in power (a concern that has applied to all three post-Suharto leaders: Habibie, Wahid and Soekarnoputri to varying degrees). In addition to the political liabilities that might be at stake in moving too quickly on further reforms, why else might it be difcult to change discriminatory statues? In undergoing such rapid political change over the last ve years, Indonesia has not had the chance to rethink its national identity, values and culture. Under Suharto, these dening elements of national character were highly manipulated by the state.34 In order to arrive at a more pluralistic, tolerant polity, political and community leaders will have to convince
30 31 32 33 34 Alexander Irwan, An Old Tale of Pluralism and Discrimination, Jakarta Post (9 September 2002). Kurniawan Hari, Activists Propose Revised Law on Citizenship, Jakarta Post (15 February 2002). Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, Government Declares Imlek as National Holiday. Ibid. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, development, and pressure for change.

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their constituents that their interests will still be promoted or protected in an open, inclusive nation. Even for statutes that have been repealed and in areas where the national government is trying to combat discrimination, there is still the huge problem of enforcing these changes at the local level. Much of the corruption and discrimination against Chinese is happening in local bureaucracies by government employees who either use every opportunity to enrich themselves, or who do not know about (or care about) changes in regulations. A recent article in Suara Pembaruan Daily describes this problem exactly.35 Regional government authorities in Garut decided to hold the entire local Chinese community responsible for the misdeeds of one Chinese Indonesian. Acun, the owner of an illegal bank was ordered by the local courts to repay Rp. 4.2 billion to depositors for failing to generate interest dividends to his clients. When he failed to pay, the Garut government held a census of all shops owned by ethnic Chinese. Four hundred business owners were invited to a meeting at which government authorities requested that the Chinese community pay back Acuns debt. Otherwise, according to the authorities, if this matter was not quickly resolved, it was insinuated that this would result in interethnic conict, i.e. an anti-Chinese riot!36 The assembled business owners rejected the request, and several civil rights organisations have stepped in to condemn the Garut government authorities. Both the National Committee for Human Rights, and Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB) have brought this discrimination to light and have sent letters to other authorities in Garut. SNB commented:
criminal cases do not have collective consequences The intentions and the actions of the Government Authorities to hold a census of Chinese stores and shops is an act of discrimination to induce and result in collective fear. This initiative can also be construed as a manifestation of racial prejudice.37

It is clear that politics at the local and national level must be reformed, and it is local problems that will be harder to address because of parochial interests.

Communal Activism by Non-Governmental Organisations

A non-governmental organisation (NGO), Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (Inti), recently convened a discussion forum to address discrimination against Chinese Indonesians. One of the recurring themes of the meeting was that Indonesians of Chinese descent need to gain inuence in the decision-making process of the country in order to combat discrimination. In order to do this, ethnic Chinese must become better represented in politics so that they may confront discriminatory legislation. By entering politics, they could gain signicant bargaining power in the decision making process in the country, lawyer Frans Hendra Winarta told the participants.38 Since open political contestation did not exist under Suharto, there was no option to form broader interest groups or political parties. Now such organisations are legal, but while many have formed to assert Chinese Indonesians rights and interests, it is unclear how politicised or mobilised the Chinese community is. Other vocal NGOs include Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB), the rst group to speak out against the 1998 riots. As also discussed by Giblin (this issue), Ester Jusuf, an attorney of Chinese ancestry, formed the organisation legally to address the crimes committed against Chinese Indonesians in 1998.
In July 1998 the SNB, along with four other NGOs, led a lawsuit against the government and demanded a compensation of 2.5 trillion rupiah for immaterial losses and 50 trillion rupiah for
35 36 37 38 Suara Pembaruan, Regional Authorities in Garut Discriminate Against the Chinese Community (22 July 2002). Ibid. Ibid. Aan Suryana, Ethnic Chinese Urged to Enter Political Arena, The Jakarta Post (29 April 2002).

Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity 449 material losses They argued that it was not enough for the Indonesian government to apologise; it also had to be held responsible for all the looting, burning, and rapes that took place during the May riots. Although the case was defeated, it was the rst time that such a legal action was led against the Indonesian government in connection to riots against the Chinese39

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SNB has also been active ghting against the discriminatory laws and regulations that still exist. Despite all the efforts of Chinese Indonesian leaders within and outside government, there still seems to be overt racism to combat. The only Chinese Indonesian representative in parliament is Alvin Lie of the reform faction of PDI-P. In November 2001, Gusti Basan Burnia (also of PDI-P) became annoyed with Lies questioning of improprieties in the state-owned workers social insurance company. Lie claims that Gusti said, As a Chinese, you should not overact (meaning Lie should not be so persistent in his questioning). Gusti said that he referred to his fellow representative as a keturunan (descendant) and that there was nothing racist about that term.40 Regardless of the terminology used, one gets the sense from such an incident that some political leaders feel that the Chinese have no right to be politically active. It is also of concern to note that, at the time of the incident, the House Code of Ethics had no provisions for racist behaviour so Gusti was not censured in any way. Now that there are multiple paths to affecting the political system, Chinese Indonesians will have to pursue different avenues for promoting their interests. Even though institutions and some regulations have been reformed, it will take more than ve years to change attitudes and values. Since Chinese Indonesians are a small, but economically signicant, minority they may be able to play a role in Indonesian politics akin to a strong interest group. NGOs can affect policy decisions on a narrow range of topics through advocacy, lobbying and direct connections to elites in power, but the Chinese community as a whole is neither large enough, nor homogeneous enough, to do more than nudge parties and/or candidates towards more moderate positions.

Shifts in Chinese Ethnic Identity

While it is too soon to know with any certainty what the shape of ethnic politics and ethnic identities will be in a more democratic and open Indonesia, with the changes that have already taken place and with an understanding of the Chinese communities in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, I offer some possible scenarios here. First, Chinese in Indonesia could organise and identify themselves as increasingly more distinct from indigenous ethnic groups, that is, emphasising the Chinese aspect of being Chinese Indonesian. One possible model for this would be the Chinese community in Malaysia. While there is of course considerable diversity among Malaysian Chinese, there is generally a clear distinction made regarding how people identify themselves in the country: primarily as Malay, Chinese or Indian.41 There are active vernacular media outlets: Chinese and Tamil language TV stations, newspapers, radio stations, as well as books and magazines, all of which contribute to a distinct ethnic identity for the Chinese and Indian
39 Gugatan Lim LSM tak Diterima, Kompas (25 February 1999); cited in I. Wibowo, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Indonesian Chinese after the Fall of Soeharto, p. 137. 40 Bambang Nurbianto and Abu Hanifah, PDI Perjuangan Apologizes for Racism Incident, Jakarta Post (1 December 2001). 41 Collin Abraham, Manipulation and Management of Racial and Ethnic Groups in Colonial Malaya: A case study of ideological domination and control, in Raymond Lee (ed.), Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Malaysia (Center on Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University Occasional Paper, no. 12, 1986).

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communities in Malaysia. Similarly, there are Chinese and Tamil language schools in Malaysia that are accredited and part of the national system of schools, so that some parents can choose to educate their children in the language associated with their community.42 Malaysian politics also provides signicant incentives for individuals and communities to self-identify along ethnic lines. The three dominant political parties in the ruling coalition are organised along communal lines: UMNO, the United Malay National Organisation; MCA, the Malaysian Chinese Association; and MIC, the Malaysian Indian Congress. These parties were created in the period just prior to independence in the 1950s in order to channel ethnic demands and interests to the state. A coalition was formed between these parties (and others) in order to win a broad mandate in elections and a consociational system was envisioned whereby ethnic leaders would make decisions for their constituents and hopefully mute ethnic demands and rivalries. A result of these political arrangements is that Chinese have maintained a political identity as a separate community within the Malaydominated nation.43 While there were riots and violence against the Chinese in 1969, and while there have been periods of tension between Malay and Chinese, the political system with its power-sharing arrangement has somewhat dampened impulses towards ethnic violence in more recent times. Ethnic Malays have been mostly satised that the New Economic Programme (a wide-reaching afrmative action programme designed to improve the economic, social, educational and professional status of ethnic Malays) begun in the early 1970s has raised both their economic status and their political power, thus the ethnic Chinese are not resented to the degree that they were in Malaysia before 1970 or the way they are in Indonesia today. Malaysias political system rewards and incentivises identication along ethnic lines and, as such, there are distinct advantages and disadvantages to the system.44 On the positive side, it has mostly kept ethnic conict to a minimum. However, the system is highly gerrymandered to keep the Malay community in rm control of the political system. Ultimately, it seems unlikely that Indonesia would develop into this sort of system. The Chinese community is too small to be able to impact the political system if it were reorganised along ethnic (or religious) lines. Thus, it is hard to imagine that they would support such a close coupling of ethnicity and politics. While some Chinese Indonesians may favour greater choice in educational opportunities and access to Chinese-language press options, the number who might take advantage of such offerings will initially be quite small. Since the number of Chinese Indonesians who speak or read Chinese is very small,45 it is hard to imagine that such media outlets will be as powerful and inuential as they are in Malaysia. While in Indonesia, over the longer term, a Chinese-language press and Chinese schools will no doubt become part of the variety of options that should increasingly exist within a democratic environment, I do not foresee the larger political system being based on ethnic distinctions. A second possible scenario would be that Chinese Indonesians become more assimilated. With the lifting of discriminatory regulations specically targeting Chinese, there may be fewer and fewer barriers to Chinese feeling increasingly like equal citizens. This could
42 Vernacular education and the status of Chinese and Tamil schools is a complex issue. For more information see Amy Freedman, Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United States. 43 Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992). 44 Donald Horowitz, Incentives and Behavior in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia, Third World Quarterly (October 1989), pp. 1835. 45 Unfortunately, there is a dearth of statistical information about different ethnic groups and their characteristics in Indonesia. Information on Chinese language ability comes from anecdotal evidence gathered from interviews and eld work in Indonesia in 199697.

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open the door to greater political and social integration, intermarriage and so forth. Thus, Chinese Indonesians could actually lose the cultural or religious distinctions that now separate them from the larger Muslim community. This type of assimilation has occurred to a large extent in Thailand. Most Chinese in Thailand have adopted Thai names, rates of intermarriage are extremely high, and Chinese hold prominent positions in most areas of government and society. However, like the rst scenario discussed, I do not foresee this degree of assimilation happening in the near or medium-term future in Indonesia. The economic, religious and political differences between Chinese and pribumi Indonesians are still too vast and the resentment against the Chinese community is too signicant for this sort of assimilation to occur. The third, and most likely, scenario for Chinese identity in Indonesia is a gradual transformation taking place so that the Chinese could become more accepted and equal members of a multiethnic, pluralist Indonesian nation. In many ways, this is a process of integration, rather than assimilation. In this vision, Indonesia remains at least semi-democratic, and ethnic Chinese are allowed to identify themselves in a variety of manners: as Indonesians, as Chinese Indonesians, as Orang Tionghoa or Orang Cina (both phrases translate from Bahasa Indonesia as Chinese but the word Cina has a more pejorative connotation for some).46 Alternatively, a new word or phase could evolve to describe self-identication, such as has occurred in the Philippines where some Chinese Filipinos coined the term Tsinoy to express their unique (dual) identity. What is important to note here, in the Indonesian case is that, as Mely G. Tan reports:
the label has become an issue among the ethnic Chinese themselves. With the passing of the New Order, Chinese persons for the rst time in their history [in Indonesia] can openly debate the issue of their self-designation as part of the broader struggle for the emancipation of Chinese Indonesians.47

This scenario presupposes however, that there is no violent backlash against the Chinese, either from the state dramatically harming Chinese economic interests, or from a populist movement based on ethnic or religious nationalism.

Conclusion
Changes thus far in Indonesia have opened the door to new forms of political and ethnic expression. Much more needs to be done, since democratisation in Indonesia has not yet transferred a preponderance of power from the executive branch to the more democratic legislative institutions. Yet, while I agree with Amy Chua that the risks of having a quasi-democratic48 regime in place without constitutional protections of minority rights for Chinese Indonesians are signicant, I am more (cautiously) optimistic. First, since Chinese Indonesians are still powerful economically, it would be a risky move for any Indonesian president to expel or victimise the Chinese community in too overt a manner. If democracy becomes consolidated in Indonesia, then ethnic Chinese can play a meaningful role within interest groups and NGOs to assert their diverse interests. More hopefully, perhaps as pluralism gains supporters, there will be greater acceptance over time for broader respect for civil rights. Thus, there will be a greater chance of the Chinese becoming equal
46 For a much more comprehensive discussion of the linguistic and semantic differences of these terms see Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr, Citizenship, Inheritance, and the Indigenizing of Orang Chinese in Indonesia (2001). 47 Cited in ibid. p. 512. 48 I use the term quasi-democratic because democracy in Indonesia seems weakly consolidated at best. And, because free elections have only been held once thus far, so it is hard to know what electoral conditions and contestation will be like in the future.

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members in the nation, integrated but still distinctly different in many aspects from other ethnic groups in Indonesia. Perhaps there will be programmes (like Malaysias NEP) aimed at redistributing wealth and assets to impoverished Indonesians, but this could be done on a scale where ethnic Chinese are not the only targets and where the latters community livelihood and safety are not jeopardised. In fact, if done in a judicious manner and supported by the more wealthy Chinese, a programme that aims to improve life for the poor (pribumi and Chinese Indonesians) would improve the chance that Chinese Indonesians could be seen as an integral part of, and an asset to, the nation. Clearly, such programmes would have to be radically different from those proposed by Suharto in the past, and they would need to have the broad support of the Chinese community, as well as others.

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