History HL

Internal Assessment

Tuo Li (002159-001)

Candidate Name: Tuo Li Candidate Number: 002159-001 Date:

History HL Internal Assessment:

To what extent did the post as the General Secretary of the Communist Party help Stalin to rise to power as the leader of the USSR by 1929?

Word count: 1995 Number of Pages: 14

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History HL

Internal Assessment

Tuo Li (002159-001)

Table of Contents

Section A: Plan of the investigation.3 Section B: Summary of Evidence4 Section C: Evaluation of Sources.6 Section D: Analysis7 Section E: Conclusion.9 Section F: Bibliography10 Appendices.11

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History HL Section A: Plan of the Investigation

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

The aim of this investigation is to assess the significance of Stalins post as the Communist Partys General Secretary in his rise to power by 1929. The investigation uses both primary and secondary sources to compare and contrast several key causes of Joseph Stalins defeat of his major political opponents, some of whom were more well-known and popular than him inside and outside the party. In this investigation two key sources will be examined in depth and evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations: Letter to Congress (a.k.a. Lenins Testament) by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and Russias Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System by historian Robert V. Daniels. This scope of the investigation will focus from the time Stalin became General Secretary in 1922, it will assess neither Stalins activities in the Russian Communist Party (RCP) prior to 1922, nor his roles in the October Revolution or Civil War.

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History HL Section B: Summary of Evidence

Internal Assessment

Tuo Li (002159-001)

The rights and power the post of General Secretary gave Stalin: In this position, he recorded and conveyed Party Policy. This enabled him to build up personal files on all the members of the Party. Nothing of note happened that Stalin did not know about.1 Stalin had the power to appoint the Regional Secretariescould appoint, promote and demote the top 5,500 officials in the Soviet Unionhad unrivaled knowledge of party members.2

Lenins concerns about Stalin abuse of his power as the Partys General Secretary: Lenin alone could see that Stalin was emerging at his most likely successor so he secretly dictated a damning Testament demanding his dismissal.3 Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution.4 Stalin is too rude and this defectbecomes intolerable [as] a Secretary-GeneralI suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post.5

Ideological split between Stalin and Trotsky: These two qualities of the two outstanding leaders of the present Central Committee can inadvertently lead to a split, and if our Party does not take steps to avert this, the split may come unexpectedly.6 This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. Butthe relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a minor detail, but it is a detail which can assume decisive importance.7

Stalins use of his post in the establishment of his supporters: I favor a third model, which I term the circular flow of powerpolitical power in the USSR has been based on the hierarchy of Communist Party secretaries, nominally elected by the provincial and local organizations of the party, but actually appointed by the central party Secretariat.8

1 2

Lynch, Michael J. Bolshevik and Stalinist Russia 1918-56. London: Hodder Murray, 2005. Print. p. 50 Staniforth, James. AQA As History Totalitarian Ideology in Theory and Practice, C.1848-1941. Cheltenham: Gardners, 2008. Print. p. 23-24 3 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. London: Phoenix, 2004. Print. p. 36 4 56 7 Ulyanov Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Letter to the Congress. 1922-23. 89 Daniels, Robert Vincent. Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Print. p. 21 10 Todd, Allan. The European Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. p. 55

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

The circular basis of powerwas established by Stalin during the course of his rise to power in the 1920she found the practice well-established of the central party leadership recommending individuals to the provincial organizations to serve as their secretaries.9 As the administrative apparatus grew, so did Stalins power to appoint, at both national and local level. As a result, bureaucracy increased, which enabled Stalin to control party congresses, the Central Committee, and the Politburo itself.10 Stalin had already used the massive patronage of the Secretariat to promote his allies, Molotov, Voroshilov and Sergo.11

Stalin as a shrewd politician: [Stalin] exploited his position as General Secretary to outmanoeuvre and outdistance his colleagues.12 His success is seen as depending not only on his political shrewdness and ruthlessness, but also on the weaknesses and mistakes of his rivals.13

1921 Ban on Factions, which Stalin constantly used as a weapon against his rivals: The limited revival of capitalism and the shock of the Kronstadt Rising also led the 10th Party Congress to introduce a ban on factions within the Communist Party and a ban on opposition parties in the sovietsLenin later stated it was a temporary measure.14

Stalin established his image as Lenins true successor: Against the wishes of Lenin and his family, Stalin orchestrated the effective deification of the leader and his embalming like an Orthodox saint in a Mausoleum on Red Square. Stalin commandeered the sacred orthodoxy of his late hero to build up his own power.15

Stalin was regarded as the person who could provide stability for the USSR: communist leaders were forced to recruit former Tsarist bureaucrats, who had administrative experience but lacked initiative, and had contempt for people and a supine attitude to authority.16 he also supplied an encouraging and realistic alternative to Trotskys insistence on European revolution: Socialism in One Country.17

11 12

Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Op. Cit. p. 36 Overy, Richard. The Dictators: Hitlers Germany, Stalins Russia. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Print. p. 47 13 Todd, Allan. Op. Cit. p. 54 14 Todd, Allan, and Sally Waller. Authoritarian and Single Party States. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print. p. 15 15 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Op. Cit. p. 36 16 Todd, Allan. Op. Cit. p. 55 17 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Op. Cit. p. 36

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

Thus Stalins rise can be seen as a genuine political response by the centre to steer a midway policy course.18 Historians consider Stalins ability to gauge public opinion and to give the people what they want to be one of the important methods he used to establish himself in power.19

18 19

Todd, Allan, and Sally Waller. Op. Cit. p. 22 Mimmack, Brian, Eunice Price, and Daniela Senes. History. 20th Century World. Oxford: Pearson Education, 2010. Print. p. 109

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

Section C: Evaluation of Sources

Ulyanov Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Letter to the Congress (a.k.a. Lenins Testament). 1922-23. Letter to the Congress is a document written by the USSRs first Premier Vladimir Lenin during the last few weeks of December, 1922 and the first week of January, 192320. The letter was created with the purpose to recommend who he thought should be his successor, warn the Soviet leadership about the danger of ideological splits21 and propose means to stabilize the RCP, particularly the Central Committee. Lenin also suggested, in his addition, removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the communist party, because he doubted whether Stalin will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution22. The source is valuable as it provides descriptions of Stalin and his political rivals personal qualities and the internal problems that the RCP faced at the time from an insiders23 point of view. This can assist historians to analyze the origins of the political and human factors that preceded the struggle for power. The sources primary limitation is the time when it was written. Lenin dictated the letter after he suffered his second stroke and the heated debate between his wife Natalya and Stalin, raising the question whether the nature of the letter was a thoughtful examination or merely a spontaneous reaction. Daniels, Robert Vincent. Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Print. Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System is a book by American historian Robert Vincent Daniels, who specializes in the history of the Soviet Union, published in 1998. Russias Transformation was written with the purpose to provide a moving picture of the [Soviet] system as it appeared from moment to moment24 with the focus on top level politics in Moscow25. Daniels seeks to justify his belief in the rise of Stalin was as a direct result of his clever usage of the RCPs bureaucratic structure, creating a circular flow of power26 that gradually increased and consolidated Stalins authority inside the party. This source is valuable as it not only includes Daniels opinion, but also compiles a collection of articles and observations27 made by other Sovietologists such as Norton Dodge and John Strong. Furthermore, because the articles are contemporary sources28, the book provides the historians with an opportunity to evaluate the rise of Stalin from various perspectives that are of different time periods in the 20th century. The limitation of this source is whether Daniels mostly or only selected the articles that support his view, which can be a source of confirmation bias.
20

Originally planned to be released on the XIII Congress of the RCP in May 1924, yet due to the intervention of Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev, the document was only published in 1925 by American intellectual Max Eastman. 21 The splits, according to the Power Politics historians, serve as the primary reason why Stalin was able to defeat his rivals separately. 22 Ulyanov Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Op. Cit. 23 Being one of the initiators of RCP, Lenin had been working with Stalin and his opponents for many years till 1922: Stalin (16 years), Trotsky (20 years), Kamenev (20 years), Zinoviev (19 years) and Bukharin (10 years) 24 25 27 Daniels, Robert Vincent. Op. Cit. p. ix 26 Daniels, Robert Vincent. Op. Cit. p. 21 28 no attempt has been made to correct or update [the articles] content. Daniels, Robert Vincent. Op. Cit. p. ix

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History HL Section D: Analysis

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

When Stalin was selected to become the General Secretary of the RCP in 1922, many top party members considered the job to be very boring due to its administrative nature. Very few anticipated the power and authority the position would give Stalin: unlimited access to party members personal profiles, unrivaled knowledge about the meetings and plans inside the Party and most importantly, the power of patronage29. With patronage, the position of the Party General Secretary had undoubtedly become Stalins primary tool for gaining supporters during his rise to power. During the civil war many party officials were captured and shot, allowing Stalin to fill these job vacancies with his potential supporters, many of whom were ex-Tsarist bureaucrats, who had administrative experience but lacked initiative, and had contempt for people and a supine attitude to authority30. Robert Daniels suggested that the Stalin established a circular flow of power31, where Stalin provided jobs for the bureaucrats in exchange of their support in the Party Congresses, the Central Committee and the Politburo. This theory also gives an explanation to the phenomenon of Stalins power increased as the Partys administrative organizations grew: the reliance of the bureaucrats and careerists on Stalin. However, it can be argued that Stalin was only able to achieve the circular flow of power with the mistakes of his rivals32, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev, who underestimated his threat33 and thus provided him with sufficient time to obtain supporters. Soon after Stalin was assigned as the General Secretary, he was able to appoint, promote and demote the top 5,500 officials in the Soviet Union34. This rapid increase in Stalins power eventually alerted the USSRs Premier Vladimir Lenin. As his health condition worsened after his second stroke, Lenin wrote his Letter to Congress to warn the RCP about the unlimited authority concentrated in [Stalins] hands35 and suggested the party had to think about a way of removing Stalin from that post.36 This source clearly shows how quickly Stalin gained power from his post, because Lenin wrote the testament in December 1922 (only a few months after Stalin became the General Secretary), yet he already considered this position as decisive in the battle between the two outstanding leaders of the present Central Committee37. On the other hand, it can be argued that the post would not have been so useful for Stalin if he lacked political skills. Richard Overy holds the opinion of Stalin employed the position as the General Secretary to outmanoeuvre and outdistance his colleagues38. The word outmanoeuvre implies that Stalin extensively planed and manipulated others to defeat his political rivals, rather than merely increasing the number of his supporters. For example, after Lenins death Stalin gave the wrong date of

29 30

The authority to appoint the candidates for the Party and governments official posts Todd, Allan. Op. Cit. p. 55 31 Daniels, Robert Vincent. Op. Cit. p. 21 32 Todd, Allan. Op. Cit. p. 54
33
34

They did not realize the potential power of Secretary General Staniforth, James. Op. Cit. p. 23 35 35 Ulyanov Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Op. Cit.

37 38

Stalin and Trotsky Overy, Richard. Op. Cit. p. 47

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

the funeral to Trotsky39, which successfully raised the party members suspicion about Trotskys absence and therefore further weakened Trotskys influence. The importance of Stalins political shrewdness, rather than the post of General Secretary, in his rise to power can also be seen in his manipulation of the RCPs 1921 Ban on Factions. Originally intended to be a temporary measure, the Ban was passed on the RCPs 10th Party Congress to consolidate the communist regime after the Russian Civil War and to present united front40. However, during the power struggle Stalin extensively attacked his opponents, such as Trotsky and Bukharin, by using the Ban to classify them as factionists. By doing so, Stalin aimed to establish an impression of himself as the true successor of Lenin, who he deified as an Orthodox saint, which could help to build up his cult of personality. At last, it is also worth mentioning the opinion of Stalin was a product of the USSRs political, social and economic environment in the early 1920s. Russia had greatly suffered from the First World War and the Russian Civil War, and as a result people and officials desperately wanted to regain a stable life. Therefore, as Simon Montefiore correctly pointed out, Stalins Socialism in One Country sounded much more encouraging and realistic 41 than Trotskys interpretation of the traditional Marxist ideology of Permanent Revolution. This viewpoint argue that Stalin rose to power mainly due to his political proposals were seemingly a source of stability for the new-born state of the Soviet Union.

39

Stalin was the middleman between the Politburo and the government, with access to party files, and recording and conveying information Staniforth, James. Op. Cit. p. 24 40 The leadership of RCP faced a lot of opposition (both inside and outside the party) after the introduction of the NEP in 1921 41 Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Op. Cit. p. 36

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History HL Section E: Conclusion

Internal Assessment

Tuo Li (002159-001)

After the analysis and evaluation of sources, it can be concluded that the position as the General Secretary of the RCP greatly assisted Stalins rise to power by 1929. Stalin was not only able to get access to the information of meetings and the party members profiles but also use his patronage power to attract potential supporters, who were often ex-Tsarist bureaucrats and careerists. The post helped Stalin to establish a circular flow of power, which in long-term increased and consolidated his authority inside the Party. However, it must be also noted that although the position played a key role in his rise, Stalin would not have been able to defeat his opponents without his political shrewdness that allowed him to effectively use the power of the post. Similarly, the political, social and economic environment of the USSR at the time (bureaucratization inside the Party and the State after the war, people seeking stability and peace) significantly contributed to the rise of Stalin to be the sole leader of the USSR.

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History HL Section F: Bibliography Books:

Internal Assessment

Tuo Li (002159-001)

Daniels, Robert Vincent. Russia's Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Print. Lynch, Michael J. Bolshevik and Stalinist Russia 1918-56. London: Hodder Murray, 2005. Print. Mimmack, Brian, Eunice Price, and Daniela Senes. History. 20th Century World. Oxford: Pearson Education, 2010. Print. Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. London: Phoenix, 2004. Print. Overy, Richard. The Dictators: Hitlers Germany, Stalins Russia. London: Allen Lane, 2004. Print. Staniforth, James. AQA As History Totalitarian Ideology in Theory and Practice, C.18481941. Cheltenham: Gardners, 2008. Print. Todd, Allan, and Sally Waller. Authoritarian and Single Party States. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print. Todd, Allan. The European Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. Ulyanov Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Letter to the Congress. 1922-23. Internet: "First Encounters: When Lenin Met Trotsky." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2013. <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/first-encounters-when-leninmet-trotsky-1523773.html> "Lev Kamenev." Spartacus Educational. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2013. <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSkamenev.htm> "Gregory Zinoviev." Spartacus Educational. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2013. <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSzinoviev.htm>

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

Appendices

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History HL

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Appendix A: Extract from Lenins Testament Continuation of the notes. December 24, 1922 By stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke above, I mean measure against a split, as far as such measures can at all be taken. For, of course, the whiteguard in Russkaya Mysl (it seems to have been S.S. Oldenburg) was right when, first, in the whiteguards game against Soviet Russia he banked on a split in our Party, and when, secondly, he banked on grave differences in our Party to cause that split. Our Party relies on two classes and therefore its instability would be possible and its downfall inevitable if there were no agreement between those two classes. In that event this or that measure, and generally all talk about the stability of our C.C., would be futile. No measure of any kind could prevent a split in such a case. But I hope that this is too remote a future and too improbable an event to talk about. I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a split in the immediate future, and I intend to deal here with a few ideas concerning personal qualities. I think that from this standpoint the prime factors in the question of stability are such members of the C.C. as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make up the greater part of the danger of a split, which could be avoided, and this purpose, in my opinion, would be served, among other things, by increasing the number of C.C. members to 50 or 100. Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of the People's Commissariat of Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work. These two qualities of the two outstanding leaders of the present C.C. can inadvertently lead to a split, and if our Party does not take steps to avert this, the split may come unexpectedly. I shall not give any further appraisals of the personal qualities of other members of the C.C. I shall just recall that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, no accident, but neither can the blame for it be laid upon them personally, any more than non-Bolshevism can upon Trotsky. Speaking of the young C.C. members, I wish to say a few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my opinion, the most outstanding figures (among the youngest ones), and the following must be borne in mind about them: Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist of the Party; he is also rightly considered the favorite of the whole Party, but his theoretical views can be classified as Miras International School, Astana 14

History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of the dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it). December 25. As for Pyatakov, he is unquestionably a man of outstanding will and outstanding ability, but shows too much zeal for administrating and the administrative side of the work to be relied upon in a serious political matter. Both of these remarks, of course, are made only for the present, on the assumption that both these outstanding and devoted Party workers fail to find an occasion to enhance their knowledge and amend their one-sidedness. Lenin December 25, 1922 Taken down by M.V. Addition to the above letter Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealing among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may appear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the standpoint of what I wrote above about the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky it is not a minor detail, but it is a detail which can assume decisive importance. Lenin Taken down by L.F. January 4, 1923

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History HL

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Tuo Li (002159-001)

Appendix B: Extract from Russias Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System by Robert V. Daniels, p. 21-22 To work towards a more realistic view of Soviet politics I favor a third model, which I term the circular flow of power. Ever since Stalins rise to power in the 1920s, political power in the USSR has been based on the hierarchy of Communist Party secretaries, nominally elected by the provincial and local organizations of the party, but actually appointed by the central party Secretariat. The provincial and local secretaries dictate the actions of their respective organizations and control the selection representatives to the higher echelons and to the All-Union Party Congress, itself made up mostly of secretaries. When the congress formally elects the Central Committee, it actually confirms a list made up mostly of central and provincial party secretaries plus ministers in the central government. Finally, as the Central Committee elects the Politburo, the party Secretariat, and the First Secretary, the circuit is closed: The First Secretary is confirmed in office by a circular process that ultimately he himself controls or can control. The circular basis of power in the CPSU was established by Stalin during the course of his rise to power in the 1920s. At the time he became General Secretary in 1922 he found the practice wellestablished of the central party leadership recommending individuals to the provincial organizations to serve as their secretaries. Stalin simply took over control of this activity and made the assignment of provincial secretaries virtually a matter of his own personal appointment, with a powerful patronagebased political machine resulting. By the spring of 1923, when the Twelfth Party Congress was convening, Stalin was able, through his secretaries, to dominate the selection of delegates to the congress, and at the congress itself he was able to expand the Central Committee and to control the selection of new members for it. In 1925, when his rivalries with Trotsky and Zinoviev had broken out into the open, Stalin began to use his power in the Central Committee to remove oppositionists from that body and from the Politburo. By 1930, after his victory over Nikolai Bukharin and the Right Opposition, Stalin had completed the process and perfected a party machine entirely of his own choosing. He controlled the body that nominally elected him, and was in a position to use all the instruments of political control, from ideological manipulation to police terror, to maintain himself in power until his death.

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