Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Public
•
Hearing
U.S. Cour
Team 3
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Briefing Intent
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Hearing Overview
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DIPLOMACY
• Madeleine Albright
• Colin Powell
THE MILITARY
• William Cohen
• Donald Rumsfeld
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Diplomacy:
The Big Questions
Diplomacy:
Staff Findings
U.S. officials employed a range of measures to pressure the
Taliban to cease harboring Bin Ladin. However, the
Taliban held firm both before or after 9/11.
The United States pressed the UAE to break ties with the
Taliban and enforce Security Council sanctions. However,
these efforts achieved little before 9/11.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Diplomacy:
Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines"
Lines of Inquiry
• Strategy; How did the diplomatic strategy against al Qaeda
terrorists change after the embassy bombings of August 7, 1998?
• Key Decisions: What factors influenced State Department
thinking on key foreign policy decjsions, such as containing the
influence of the Taliban in the region?
• Taliban: How did we pressure the Taliban to hand over Bin
Ladin?
• Pakistan: What efforts were taken to enlist Pakistan's support for
pressuring the Taliban to expel bin Ladin, or cutting its ties?
Saudi Arabia; How well did Saudi Arabia cooperate with us in
jring th
pressuring the ~ "'
Taliban . . . . .off support. for
or cutting - al
. Qaeda?
- . _
mlts of Diplomacy: At what point was it clear that diplomacy
H
alone would not end the Afghan safe haven for Bin Ladin?
• Hindsight; What forms of diplomatic pressure the United States
did not use before 9/11 that, in hindsight, should have?
Red Lines
. Criticism of allies
• Private sensitive discussions of friendly foreign officials
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The Military:
The Big Questions
What were the Pentagon's military strategies and plans for
defending the nation against the al Qaeda threat before
9/11?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
The Military:
Staff Findings
From August 1998 until after 9/11, the U.S. mijitary did not
conduct operations against al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon prepared options to use force in Afghanistan,
however operational and policy considerations led to
reliance on the "default option of cruise missile strikes.
Military officials were reluctant to conduct Special
Operations in Afghanistan due to its difficult operational
conditions.
Senior officials set aside cruise missile strikes against bin
Ladin on three occasions due to lack of suitable
intelligence, unacceptable collateral damage, and other
unwelcome consequences for U.S. interests in the region.
The consensus of U.S. officials is that a large-scale military
invasion of Afghanistan did not have the support of either
the Congress or the American people before 9/11.
After the attack on the USSCole, neither administration
ordered a military response against al Qaeda.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
The Military:
Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines II
Lines of Inquiry
• Strategy: What was the Pentagon's military strategy to defeat
the al Qaeda terrorist threat before 9/11?
• Kev Decisions: What factors influenced senior officials on using
force, including criticism of the cruise missile attacks of August
20,1998? Why was there no response following the USS Cole?
• Military Planning: What was the state of military planning to
conduct military operations in Afghanistan before 9/11 to
support the administration's policy to destroy al Qaeda?
• Actionable Intelligence: Why was this an recurring problem?
What actions did the military take to get the intelligence needed
for conducting a stand-off attack against bin Ladin?
• Reluctance: Why was the Pentagon reluctant to use Special
Forces to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
• Support to Diplomacy: What efforts did the military take to
strengthen the credibility of the threat against the Taliban?
Red Lines
• Specific capabilities and deployments of military forces
• Current intelligence and jnlJJiii^gHfft^tions against al Qaeda
Clandestine & Covert Action:
The Big Questions
How did the CIA implement U.S. counterterrorism policy through
the conduct of clandestine and covert action programs against
Bin Ladin in Afghanistan before 9/11?
Did the CIA have the authorities to effectively attack Bin Ladin
and al Qaeda?
Did the CIA have the capabilities to effectively attack Bin Ladin
and al Qaeda?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Red Lines
• Open discussion of capture vs. kill authorities
• Operational details of covert action programs
• Problems in current bilateral relations
• Revealing sources and methods
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
• What were the key policy decisions before 9/11? What factors
influenced senior officials in making them?
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National Policy Coordination:
Staff Findings
The national coordinator for counterterrorism understood
the gravity of the al Qaeda threat to the U.S. and spurred
several initiatives to combat terrorism in the government.
Plan Delenda, prepared by the national coordinator, was a
national strategy to eliminate the Bin Ladin threat.
Although never formally adopted, it guided the national
coordinator's efforts to destroy al Qaeda before 9/11.
The Clinton administration relied on a "Small Group" of
cabinet principals to formulate national policy.
The Millennium celebration marked a dramatic increase in
threat warnings in December 1999 and exceptional
national policy coordination and information-sharing.
Neither administration responded to the Cole attack.
The Bush administration relied on the Deputies Committee
to formulate national policy on counterterrorism.
Bush administration principals first met on September 4,
2001 to approve a three-year strategy to destroy al Qaeda.
Counterterrorism funding grew in the years before 9/11
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Red Lines
• Private advice to the President
• Specific discussions of covert action
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Desired Outcomes