NSA Rice "Day of 9/11 Questions

Suggested Topics:

I. Conversation with President after WTC I

Dr. Rice, as I understand it, you spoke to President Bush before he went into the
classroom in Florida about the first strike on the World Trade Center. Do you
recall what information you conveyed to him? Specifically, did you tell the
President that it was a commercial aircraft that had struck the World Trade
Center? (see below)

Background Information:

Interview of NSA Rice by Evan Thomas, Newsweek (Nov. 1, 2001)

"I had heard before I left here that the first plane had crashed into the World
Trade Center. And I thought to myself: what an odd accident. And had called
the President to tell him about it. And he said, what kind of plane. And they said,
well, they said it's twin engine, and then a few minutes later they said no, it's a
commercial plane. And I said, that's all we know right now, Mr. President."
(emphasis added)

Interview of NSA Rice by Bob Woodward (October 24, 2001)

"So I got a hold of Deborah, she got the President. I said, Mr. President, a plane
crashed into the World Trade Center. And he said, that's a strange accident. I
said, I'll let you know if I know anything more. And right about then Tony said,
they think it was a commercial plane. And I said, they think it was a commercial
plane. And that's all I knew." (emphasis added)

II. Reaction to World Trade Center 2

In an interview with Bob Woodward you described your reaction upon hearing
about the second plane that crashed into the World Trade Center: You stated that
your immediate reaction was "it's a terrorist incident." (p. 361)

(1) Was that view based in any way on specific intelligence information? Was
that view based in any way on general intelligence information? Would you say
that view was shared by others in the Situation Room?

(2) What did you view your role as National Security Advisor to be in the
situation you faced, i.e., with the country under attack? What steps did you take
to fulfill that role?
 (3) What were your priorities during this time? Specifically, what actions did you
take and what decisions did you make or participate in between the time of the
second strike at the WTC (0903) and the time the Pentagon was hit (0937)?

(4) How quickly, as National Security Advisor, were you able to learn the nature
and source of the attacks and brief the President?

III. Situation Room Secure Video Teleconference — SVTS

As I understand it, after the second hit on the World Trade Center the Situation
Room convened a secure video teleconference with the leadership of key
agencies, including DoD and the FAA. This video teleconference was initiated
around 0925, and continued throughout the afternoon.

(1) Who made the decision to initiate the video teleconference?

(2) Were you involved in the teleconference - either while you were in the
Situation Room or after you moved down to the PEOC? What information and
decisions were made on the teleconference?
(3) Was it your decision whether to lead the teleconference? If so, why did you
decide not to lead the teleconference? Did you ask Dick Clarke to lead the
teleconference?

Background Information:

Situation Room Log Entry

"0925 CSG convened - chaired by Clarke
Participants: CIA, State, FBI, DOJ, FAA, OSD & PEOC

Interview ofNSA Rice by Bob Woodward (October 24, 2001)

"Q: You thought terrorist? [re report of second strike]
Rice: Immediately. Immediately. I think I kind of stopped mid-sentence with
whomever I was talking to, and I got - Anna was in the staff meeting and I just -
so I got up and I said, find Dick Clark, who is the counter-terrorism guy."

IV. Decision Making on 9/11

Who was in charge of the White House response to the attacks on the morning of
9/11? What decisions were made, by whom? What decisions did you make that
morning?

Background Information:
Based on our investigation, the following is a list of decisions made by various
persons at the White House on the morning of 9/11:
(1) Initiation of SVTS\CSG
(2) Evacuation of WH
(3) Evacuation of the Vice President
 (4) Request for fighter coverage for DC
(5) Request for fighter coverage for API
(6) Decision to implement continuity of government measures
(7) Decision to ground all commercial aircraft
(8) Shoot down authorization
(9) Decision to raise defense level to DefCon 3
(10) Closing the borders
(11) Implementation offeree protection measures
(12) Request to Russians to call off the exercises

Times to the PEOC:

"0950: Condi to bunker" (Notes of Mathew Waxman)
"1000: NSA Rice confirmed to be in WH bunker with VPOTUS" (USSS
Timeline)

V. Threat to AF1

(1) We have heard a good deal about the Threat to Air Force One that was
circulated that morning. Could you describe what you knew of the threat that
morning?

(2) In terms of sequence of events, the report of a threat to AF1 was

communicated to you and the Vice President AFTER you had decided not
to bring the President back to Washington, is that correct?

Background Information:
In an interview with Evan Thomas on November 11, 2001 Rice stated that
AFTER the Vice President urged the President not to return to Washington and
"put the phone down" "a communicator from down in the bunker came over and
said, there's a named threat to Air Force One." "So if there was ever at that point
any thought that the President might come back, it was now gone, because we
knew we didn't want him to land at Andrews." (p. 390-91)

(3) After September 11th, what did you learn about this threat and its origin?
When did you learn that the threat was not credible?

Background Information:
Evan Thomas Interview, November 1, 2001:
"Q: Let me pull the string back, if I can, on this, because there's been so much
written about this throughout. Did you guys ever figure out how this got into the
system, how this gremlin crept in there?

Dr. Rice: The best we can tell, there was a call that talked about events -
something happening to the President on the ground in Florida. And that
somehow got interpreted as Air Force One. And by the time it got to me, it was
Air Force One. And that maybe
 Q: Did they call it a crank call?
Dr. Rice: I - we don't - look. I don't know. I don't know if it was a crank call
or a real threat or — I don't think we're going to ever know.
Q: I mean, how did they know about the code name?
Dr. Rice: That's why we still continue to suspect it wasn't a crank call. - But who
would have even known the code name is still beyond -
Q: The threat, as far as the President on the ground, maybe they weren't using
the code. Is it possible that your own communicators stuck the code in?
Dr. Rice: It's possible the communicators stuck the code in. But you talk about
the fog of war..." (pp 390-91)

VI. Shoot Down Order

In a press interview with Newsweek Magazine on November 1, 2001, you offered

this description of the circumstances in the PEOC surrounding the shoot down
order:

"And Rumsfeld had - you know, the fighters had scrambled by that time. And he
asked the Vice President, he said to the Vice President, I have to have a decision
on rules of engagement. And the Vice President talked to the President and said,
we have to talk about rules of engagement. What if the plane doesn't respond?

And I wasn't on that call; I was around. My memory of it is that the Vice
President said, so, sir, do you want to give them the authority if it doesn't
respond, to shoot it down. The President said, yes." (page 394)

Our understanding is that Secretary Rumsfeld was not initially involved in the
shoot down decision; he learned of the decision from the Vice President and later
became involved in trying to sort out the specific rules of engagement that pilots
would follow.

Could you clarify for us your recollection of how and when the issue of
authority to shoot down commercial aircraft was first raised with the Vice
President?