THIRD DIVISION VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, Petitioners, G.R. No. 171726 Present: - versus BRION,* J.

, Acting Chairperson, BERSAMIN, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. ABAD,** VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: February 23, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION VILLARAMA, JR. J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution[2]dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the April 28, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in LRC No. P-115, LRA Rec. No. N-68012, which granted petitioners application for registration of title over two parcels of land, denominated as Lots 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre. The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: On March 22, 1949, petitioners father, L. Yu Chang[4] and the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, through its then Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property[5] wherein the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece of land located in San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the property thus obtained and erected a residential house and a gasoline station thereon. He also declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 01794[6] and 01795[7] and paid the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the property and succeeded in the possession of the property.

On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation[8] of their rights over the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein petitioners. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and subdivided into two lots, Lot 2199[9] and Lot 2200[10] of Plan SWO-05-000888, Pili Cadastre. Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 02633[11] and paid the real property taxes thereon. On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition[12] for registration of title over the aforementioned lots under the Property Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100 years [13]; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of owners. Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance and registration of title in their names. In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following documents, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Agreement to Exchange Real Property; Deed of Transfer and Renunciation; Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199; Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200; Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044 for Lot 2199 Cad. 291; and Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043 for Lot 2200 Cad. 291 Pili Cadastre.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition [14] to the application, alleging, inter alia, that: (1) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation. No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an Order of General Default was issued by the trial court.
[15]

After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. The fallo of the trial courts decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Confirming the imperfect title of the herein applicants Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang over the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph two (2) page 2 of the Petition, particularly Lot 2199, Plans S0-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre and Lot 2200, Plan SWO-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; both Filipino citizens, residents of #14 Joaquin St., Corinthian Garden, Quezon City and San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur respectively; 2. Ordering the dismissal of the application in the Cadastral proceeding with respect to Lots 2199 and 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre under CAD Case No. N-9;

3. After finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority to the herein applicants above-mentioned. SO ORDERED.[16] The Republic appealed the decision to the CA on the ground that the court a quo erred in granting petitioners application for registration of Lots 2199 and 2200 despite their failure to show compliance with the requirements of the law. In addition, the Republic asserted that the land was classified as public forest land; hence, it could not be subject to appropriation and alienation. As aforesaid, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on August 26, 2005, and dismissed petitioners application for land registration. The CA considered the petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not able to present incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are alienable and disposable.[17] The CA relied on the testimony of Lamberto Orcena, Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to October 30, 1986, the entire area encompassing the right side of the NagaLegaspi Highway, including the subject properties, was classified as forest land. According to the CA, even if the area within which the subject properties are located is now being used for residential and commercial purposes, such fact will not convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land.[18] The CA stressed that there must be a positive act from the government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[19] Additionally, the CA noted that the lands sought to be registered were declared disposable public land only on October 30, 1986. Thus, it was only from that time that the period of open, continuous and notorious possession commenced to toll against the State. Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court via the present appeal, raising the sole issue of whether the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even government structures existing and standing on the land.[20] In their Memorandum,[21] petitioners point out that the original owner and possessor of the subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was established in 1930. The land was originally part of the municipal ground adjacent to the Municipal Building located at the right side of the Naga-Legaspi National Highway.[22] From 1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the property through barter and up to the filing of petitioners application in 1997, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual physical and material possession of the land in the concept of an owner, notorious and known to the public and adverse to the whole world. The Republic, through the OSG, for its part, maintains that petitioners failed to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots for the period of time required by law. The OSG also submits that the subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. We deny the petition for lack of merit.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, under which petitioners application was filed, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Property Registration Decree, to wit: xxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. x x x x[23] Under this provision, in order that petitioners application for registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[24] Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.[25] In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is hardly the proof required under the law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,[26] a forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. [27] Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[28] As aptly held by the appellate court: [T]he fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is being used for residential and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land. It is fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest

group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.[29] Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic presented a Report [30] of Rene Gomez, Land Investigator/Inspector, CENRO No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots applied for by the petitioners were classified as alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393 and released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A Compliance[31] dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OICCENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court also stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291 were verified to be within Alienable and Disposable area under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the then Bureau of Forestry. Evidently, therefore, the subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners possession of the subject forest land prior to the date when it was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.[32] To reiterate, it is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not be considered as possession in the concept of owner.[33] The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared and alienable.[34] Much as this Court wants to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distr ibution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.[35] Here, petitioners failed to present well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to prove their compliance of the requirements under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing their application for confirmation and registration of title. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAO MANALO as Corporate Sole Respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case In t his Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the Philippines assails the October 11, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348, which affirmed the April 26, 2005 Decision2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in Land Registration Case No. 762-C for Application for Registration of Title, entitled Iglesia Ni Cristo, Trustee and Applicant with its Executive Minister Erao Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the Philippines as oppositor. The Facts Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre, particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec. No. ______) situated in the Barrio of Baramban, Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by the National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the SW. & NW., along lines 2-3-4 by lot 3946, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching, Bernardo Badanguio; on the NE., along line 4-1 by lot 3947, portion, Cads-562-D; (Pacita B. Lazaro) and lot 3948, Pacita B. Lazaro, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching x x x containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND ONE (4201) SQUARE METERS. x x x On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were thesepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot,3 the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,4 Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080265 covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale6executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application. The Ruling of the Cadastral Court After the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing ensued where the INC presented three testimonial witnesses,7 the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, rendered its Decision on April 26, 2005, granting INCs application. The decretal portion reads:

Wherefore, the application for registration is hereby granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order be issued directing the Land Registration Authority to register and issue an Original Certificate of Title to the applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as Corporation Sole, with official address at No. 1 Central Avenue, New Era, Diliman Quezon City. SO ORDERED. The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with. It was established during trial that the subject lot formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio Sabuco. On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in 1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built. Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.8 In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale9 was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of INC, testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot and the issuance of TDs covering it as declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited it from his parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject lot. On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot under his name. This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in 1965 and continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that the ownership and possession of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were never disturbed. Subsequently, TD 648510 was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale. This was subsequently replaced by TD No. 40605611 in 1974, TD 508026 in 1980, and TD 605153 in 1985. For the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201 square meters. With the presentation of the requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, technical description of the subject lot, Geodetic Engineers Certificate, and Report given by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office special investigator showing that the subject lot is within alienable and disposable public zone, the MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC, were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot. Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85348. The Ruling of the CA On October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the April 26, 2005 MCTC Decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. In denying the Republics appeal, the CA found that the documentary and testimonial evidence on record sufficiently established the continuous, open, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject lot in the concept of an owner by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the conveyance of the lot to INC. Hence, we have this petition. The Issue THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT THE LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MAY 16, 1993, OR FIVE (5) YEARS BEFORE THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ON NOVEMBER 19, 1998.12 The Courts Ruling May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole issue to be resolved. The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised is not novel. The Republics Contention The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said date, the subject lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation, and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-in-interests possession and occupation cannot confer ownership or possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession."14 The Re\public maintains further that since the application was filed only on November 19, 1998 or a scant five years from the declaration of the subject lot to be alienable and disposable land on May 16, 1993, INCs possession fell short of the 30-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Argument of INC Respondent INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Naguitcase), in which we held that what is merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be registered [is] already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed." 15 Moreover, INC asserts that the Herbietopronouncement quoted by the Republic cannot be considered doctrinal in that it is merely an obiter dictum, stated only after the case was dismissed for the applicants failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication.

Necessity of declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 16 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC. Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the parties contradictory positions. Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title when the declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of possession cannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529. In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed. A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court shows that the pronouncement in Herbieto has been applied to Buenaventura v. Republic,17 Republic v. Diloy,18 Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,19 and Preciosa v. Pascual.20 This Courts ruling in Naguit, on the other hand, has been applied toRepublic v. Bibonia.21 Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan),22 the Court upheld Naguit and abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto. Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides: SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that "the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed."

The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with the latter law specifically operationalizing the registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the registration of property. We cited Naguit and ratiocinated: Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessorsin-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.lavvphi1.net Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained: [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter. Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the States policy Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation of Naguit in Malabananas regards the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the reckoning of possession vis--vis the declaration of the property of the public domain as alienable and disposableis indeed more in keeping with the spirit of the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529. These statutes wer e enacted to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice.23 The statutes requirements, as couched and amended, are stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for registration of title over alienable and disposable public land. The application of the more stringent pronouncement in Herbieto would indeed stifle and repress the States policy. Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the doctrine that the period of possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable, thus: We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows: (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject lot.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.24 This is applicable to the instant case. The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INChad been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents witnesses. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No costs. SO ORDERED.