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University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2013 8-15-2013 University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series

Rule of Law (and Rechtsstaat)

Martin Krygier
University of New South Wales

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Martin Krygier, "Rule of Law (and Rechtsstaat)" (August 2013). University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2013. Working Paper 53. http://law.bepress.com/unswwps-flrps13/53

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RuleofLaw(andRechtsstaat)
MartinKrygier GordonSamuelsProfessorofLawandSocialTheory,Universityof NewSouthWales AdjunctProfessor,RegulatoryInstitutionsNetwork,Australian NationalUniversity. Tel:+61(0)293852240 Email:m.krygier@unsw.edu.au JELClassification:K10,K19,K40 KEYWORDS:ruleoflaw,Rechtsstaat,arbitrarypower,state,common law,governmentunderlaw,governmentbylaw,moralityoflaw
Thisistheauthorsmanuscriptofanentrythatwillappearinthe2ndeditionoftheInternational EncyclopediaoftheBehavioralSciences,Elsevier

ABSTRACT
Inallitsmanyversions,theruleoflawhastodowiththerelationshipbetweenlawandtheexercise ofpower,particularlypublicpower.Asanideal,itsignalsthatlawcananddoeswelltocontributeto articulating,channeling,constrainingandinformingratherthanmerelyservingsuchexercise. Beyondthat,whatitrulesout,whatitallows,whatitdependsonandindeedwhatitis,areall mattersofdisagreementsthatstemfromdifferencesamongpoliticalandlegalhistoriesand traditions,butalsoreflectdilemmasandchoicesthatrecur,indifferentformsandweights,inmany suchhistoriesandtraditions.Thisentryisconcernedwiththeseenduringthemes,dilemmasand choices,astheyoccurwithinparticulartraditions,especiallythecommonlawruleoflawtradition, ontheonehand,andtheContinentalRechtsstaattradition,ontheother.

Fromthelastquarterofthetwentiethcentury,theruleoflawhascometooccupyan increasingamountofdiscursivespace,notonlyamonglawyers,forwhomithadbeenanold theme,butalsoamongpromotersofeconomicdevelopment,humanrights, democratization,statebuilding,andpoliticalandlegalreform.Increasingly,itisalleged,the ruleoflawisakeyingredientintheattainmentofallthesegoodthingsandothers.Asone authorhasobserved, Amongaplethoraofdevelopmentandsecurityagencies,anewruleoflaw consensushasemerged.Thisconsensusconsistsoftwoelements:(1)thebeliefthat theruleoflawisessentialtovirtuallyeveryWesternliberalforeignpolicygoal humanrights,democracy,economicandpoliticalstability,internationalsecurity fromterroristandothertransnationalthreats,andtransnationalfreetradeand investment;and(2)thebeliefthatinternationalinterventions,betheythrough money,people,orideas,mustincludearuleoflawcomponent.(Call,2007,4) Inthistransformation,theruleoflawhasgainedagreatdealinmodishnessbutless, actuallynothing,inclarity.Butclaritywasnevertheconceptsstrongsuit.Likemanyother importantmoral,politicalandlegalideals,amongthemdemocracy,justiceandliberty,its meaning,scope,conditionsandsignificanceareallhighly,perhapsessentially,contested (Waldron,2002).Andlikethoseideals,notonlyarethereenduringcommonthemesbut alsocommonaxesofargumentanddisputationthatpervadediscourseontheruleoflaw. Assuggestedelsewhere(Krygier,2011,69),thesecontestsdonotrendersuchconcepts meaninglessoruseless.Onthecontrary,someofthemarethemostimportantwehave.We willnotresolvethosecontests,hereoranywhere,butitmightbepossibletoclarifyafewof themandsuggestwhytheyandtheruleoflawareimportant. Theconceptoftheruleoflawembodiesidealsthathavefiguredinpoliticaland constitutionaldiscourseatleastsinceAristotle,whocontrastedtheruleofthelawwith thatofanyindividual.Thoseidealshavevaried,sotoothestrategiestoachievethemand theverbalformulationofthem.Theyrevolvearoundenduringthemesandconcerns,
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however,thecharacterofwhichisnicelycapturedbyOttoKirchheimerslaconic observationthat: forallthedifferencesinhistoricalrootsandparticularlegaltraditionstheircommon denominatorliesinthesimplethoughtthatthesecurityoftheindividualisbetter servedwhenspecificclaimscanbeaddressedtoinstitutionscountingrulesand permanencyamongtheirstockintradethanbyrelianceontransitorypersonal relationsandsituations.Beyondthat,agoodpartoftheircommonsuccessprobably liesinthemixtureofimpliedpromiseandconvenientvagueness.(Kirchheimer, 1992,firstpublished1967,244) Inallversions,theruleoflawhastodowiththerelationshipbetweenlawandtheexercise ofpower,particularlypublicpower.Asanideal,itsignalsthatlawcananddoeswellto contributetoarticulating,channeling,constrainingandinformingratherthanmerely servingsuchexercise.Thattakesussomedistancefromthosewhoseelawsimplyasone ofthemeansbywhichpowerisexercised,neitherbetternorworsethananyother.For therearelotsofwaystoexercisepower;partisansoftheruleoflawinsistthatithelpsus blocksomeofthem,includingmanyoftheworstofthem(seeRundle,2007),andto channelothersinsalutarydirectionsandways.Butwhatitrulesout,whatitallows,whatit dependsonandindeedwhatitis,areallmattersofdisagreement.Thisissoforseveral reasons,oftenstemmingfromdifferencesamongpoliticalandlegalhistoriesandtraditions, butalsoreflectingdilemmasandchoicesthatrecur,indifferentformsandweights,inmany suchhistoriesandtraditions. 1. LawandState Thesedays,andincontemporarylanguage,thewordslawandstatearerarelyfarapart. However,itwasnotalwaysandeverywhereso,andevennowitmakesadifference whethertheconnectionisseenasnecessaryorcontingent,evenmoresowhetheritisseen asaconceptualratherthananhistoricalconnection.Acluetothiscomesfromtheterms usedinvariouslanguages.Inparticular,thereisanobvioussemanticdifferencebetween ruleoflaw,thetermusedinEnglish,andthosefoundinmanyEuropeanlanguagesto coversome,butnotall,ofthesameterrain.Eachofthesehasacontextandahistorythat cannotbeignoredorsimplyelided,butinahostofEuropeanlanguagesthereisonething commonlybuiltintotheconcept,whichismissingfromtheEnglishphrase:theState. WhetheritisRechtsstaat(German:(stateoflaw;lawgovernedstate)),tatdedroit (French),stattodiritto(Italian),estadodederecho(Spanish),pastwoprawa(Polish)or pravovoegosudarstvo(Russian),lawisinextricablyconnectedtothestate.Itisthesubject grammaticallyandontologicallyofeachrendition.However,theruleoflawdoesnot mentionthestate.Thisisnotanaccident. TheconceptofthestateisnotpartofEnglishconstitutionaljurisprudence,whileinAustralia andtheUnitedStatesitreferstowhatGermanswouldcallLnder(seeMacCormick,1984,
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65).Moredeeply,theEnglishtraditionwaslongpluralisticinitsconceptionsofthesources oflaw(Rosenfeld,2001),withmultiplecumulativeandcompetingauthoritativesources, amongthemcustom,courtdecisionsandstatutes.Indeed,whilethecommonlawcourts werelongagentsoftheCrown,someofthemythologicallymostpowerfulcontestsinthe Englishruleoflawtradition,particularlytheconstitutionalstrugglesoftheseventeenth century,pittedthemagainstsuccessivewearersofthatCrown,evenatthecostofthehead ofoneofthose(CharlesI);whatmightinothercountriesbecalledtheheadofState. Accordingtothecommonlawtradition,popularcustom,anancientcollectionofunwritten maximsandcustoms(Blackstone[17659]1979,vol.1:17)waslongseenasaprimary sourceoflaw,and[t]heonlymethodofproving,thatthisorthatmaximisaruleofthe commonlaw,isbyshowingthatithathbeenalwaysthecustomtoobserveit(Blackstone [17659]1979,vol.1,68).Thatcustomwasevidenced(ratherthanmade,itwasclaimed) byanothernonlegislativesource,thejudgmentsofcourtsinparticularcasesbroughtto them.Thiswasthecommonlaw(Krygier,1998),whichseventeenthcenturypartisansof theruleoflawpreferredtothecommandsoftheKing;Lawestablishedbycustomary practice,lawthatwasnotthecreationofwill,command,orsovereignty,wasarestrainton governmentarestraintondiscretionarypower(Reid,2002,12).True,thecourtswerethe Kingscourts,butthelawtheyadjudicatedwasnot,inthemain,consideredtobetheKings creation.ItwasnotjustaninstrumentwithwhichtheCrownandthestatecoulddirect activitiesandcontrolpublicpolicy.FortheKing,likehissubjects,wassubjecttothelawof theland. Deliberate,secular,purposeguided,prosaic(notsacred)legislation,asMaxWeber observed,isacentralanddistinctivecharacteristicofmodernityinlaw(seeWeber1968, 76068).Today,ofcourse,initsexponentialrushsincetheeighteenthcentury(see Lieberman,1989),legislationhasswampedcustomandevenjudicialdecisionsasa quantitativelyprimaryandincreasinglyimperioussourceoflaw,inthecommonlawworld aselsewhere.However,thenotionthattheruleoflawdrawsuponsourcesotherthan legislativefiat(i.e.anorderforanacttobecarriedout),thatthejudiciaryisafundamental guardianofit,andthatall,eventhemostpowerful,areandshouldbesubjecttoit,goes deepinthecommonlawtraditionandhasnotlostresonance.Itwasexpressedinmany waysovercenturies,butthecanonicalconnectionbetweenthetermruleoflawandthose thoughtscametodisplaceotherdescriptors,primarilyasaresultofthehugelyinfluential latenineteenthcenturyworkbyA.V.Dicey(Dicey,1959(firstpublished1885)).Diceys formulationsdistilled(andinsomerespectsdistorted)averyoldEnglishlegaltradition. NoparallelexistedinthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyRechtsstaat.Thetermwas coinedonlyattheveryendoftheeighteenthcentury(Heuschling,2002,29),tocapturea newphenomenon,themodernStatewithitsmonopolyofforce.Thatstatewasthesubject ofthisconcept,andalsothelegalsourceoflaw.TheRechtsstaatruledbyorthroughlaw, whereasotherstates,suchastheMachtstaat(stateofpower)orPolizeistaat(policestate)
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(seeRaeff1983)mightdispensewithitandexercisepowerinotherways.Whatwas distinctiveofaRechtsstaatwasnotthatthestatewassubjecttolawthathadothersources andindependentguardians,butthatitactsinarechtlich(lawful,legal)way;accordingto somenineteenthcentury(andearlytwentiethcentury)constructions,thereisarelationof nearidentitybetweenthestateanditslawwithinthesystemofrulethelawisthestates standardmodeofexpression,itsverylanguage,theessentialmediumofitsactivity(Poggi, 1978,102).ThatishowwerecognizeitasaRechtsstaat,asdistinctfromanyothertypeof state.TherewasnoconceptualspacetosaytotheStatewhatSirHenryBractonalready saidinthethirteenthcentury: Thekinghasasuperior,namelyGod.Alsothelawbywhichheismadeking.Alsohis curia,namelytheearlsandbarons,becauseifheiswithoutbridle,thatiswithoutlaw, theyoughttoputthebridleuponhim.(quotedinReid,2002,11,andseePalombella, 2010,passim) Thatisanimportantruleoflawclaim. 2. Arbitrarypower:uncontrolledorunruly Thatthelawshouldruleevenoverthemostpowerfulpeopleandinstitutionsisaveryold themeintheEnglishlegaltradition.Theruleoflawiscommonlycontrastedwitharbitrary exerciseofpower;that,aboveall,istheevilthattheruleoflawissupposedtocurb.This leadstoanotherdifference,thistimemaskedratherthanrevealedbysemantics.For arbitrarinessisitselfanambiguousconcept.Isit,forexample,uncontrolledinterferenceor interferencethatisnotsubjecttoestablishedrules(Pettit,2012,58)?Thesearetwoof several(seeRichardson,2002,chapter3)conceptionsoftheconcept.Theyhaveparticular relevancetolaw;theformercommonlybeingreferredtoasgovernmentunderlaw,the latterasgovernmentbylaw.Ifonehadtochoose,therearestrongargumentstofavorthe formeroverthelatter(seePettit,2012),butideallyonewouldencounterthefirstalways, andinexercisesofpublicpowerthesecondaswell.Noteveryoneopposedtoarbitrary powerhashadboththesesensesinmind,however. Aswesaw,thecommonlawtradition,fromatleastthethirteenthcenturyuntilwellinto theeighteenth,maintainedthatthekingwassubjecttoalawthathehadnotmade,indeed thatmadehimking.Fortheking,foranyone,toignoreoroverridethatlawwastoact arbitrarily(seeReid,2004,Palombella,2010).Liberties,andprocedurestoprotectthem suchashabeascorpusanddueprocess,wereenshrinedinthatlaw,andencroachmenton suchlibertieswasbarred,eventothemonarch,bythelaw.Thatthatlawwasoftennot expressedinclear,prospective,generalrules(seeMaitland,1965,firstedition1908,383), todayregardedastheessenceoftheruleoflaw,wasnottothepoint(Reid,2002).Indeed, giventhecustomary,dynamic,fluxful,andevolutionarycharacterofthecommonlawas theorizedbyitsadepts,itwasbesidethepoint(seePostema,1986,chap.1).Theissuewas thatitwassuperior.
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Fromtheeighteenthcentury,however,lawcametobeviewedincreasinglyasthedirector indirectproductofthepoliticallegislator,thesovereign,andinEnglishlawtherewas,at leastarguablyuntilveryrecentlyasaresultofEUmembership,nolegalsuperiortothe sovereignlegislator.Theconceptionoftheruleoflawgraduallybecamemorepreoccupied withthecharacteroftherulesthatthesovereignenacted:theyshouldbeclear, prospective,consistent,etc. Shockedbythisdowngradingofthenotionofalawsuperiortothesovereign,andbywhat theyregardedastheirownarbitrarytreatmentbytheBritishsovereignParliament(Reid 2002),theAmericancolonistsfirststagedarevolution,andthenapathbreakinginnovation: awrittenconstitutionbindingonthelegislator,andinduecourseroutinelyoverseenbyan independentSupremeCourt,whosedecisionsalsocametobeseenasbindingonthe legislator.Thiswasanovelwayofvindicatingaveryoldprinciple.InEngland,old conceptionspersevered,butinincreasingtensionwiththelegislativebiasofmodernity. OntheContinent,thingsweredifferent.ARechtsstaatwasnotjustanysortofstate,aswe haveseen,butonewhichoperatedonthebasisoflegalrulesconfiguredinparticularways. [S]ituatedattheheartofthetheoryoftheRechtsstaatisthequestionofthearbitrariness ofpower,ofthepotentialviolenceinscribedinallrelationsofdomination,whetherprivate orpublic(Heuschling,2002,42).However,partisansoftheRechtsstaatdidnotenvisagea lawsuperiortothestate,abasisforappealtosomehighernotionorothersourceoflaw. LawwasacharacteristicoftheRechtsstaat,butitwasalsoitsproduct.Thenonarbitrary rechtlichqualityofthestatewasamatterofthedegreetowhichitsedictstooktheformof generalrulesthatconformedtospecificformalcriteriaandweresupposed,inparticular,to guaranteecertaintyandpredictability.Inthisunderstanding,[t]heRechtsstaatmeansthat thelawisthestructureoftheState,notanexternallimitationtoit.Libertyisa consequencenottrulyapremiseofthelaw.Theauthorityvestedinthisconservative aristocraticstateprotectedcivillibertiesasaserviceofferedthroughtheState(Palombella, 2010,1112). ThenotionthatstateagenciesmustcomplywithalawabovetheState,onlycamewiththe developmentofwrittenandlegallybindingconstitutions,particularlyinreactiontotheNazi calamityinthemiddleofthelastcentury.Untilthen,althoughitwasinthestatesinterest topromoteitsselflimitationthroughselfbindingtolegalnorms(Loughlin,2010,320),and thepeoplesinteresttoo,itwasuptothestatetobinditself(Selbstbeschrnkung). Whereasthecommonlawtraditionfrequently,andintheseventeenthcenturyvociferously, conceivedofindividualrightsasprotectedbythecourtsagainsttheCrown,nosuch oppositionexistedintheGermanconceptionoftheRechtsstaat(seeRosenfeld,2001, 1319),which,asLeondardKriegershows,projectedoldernationalassumptionswhich madetheideaoflibertynotthepolarantithesisbutthehistoricalassociateofprincely authority(Krieger,1957,5).Thecontrastisdeep.AsGozziobserves:

InGermanythedoctrineoftheRechtsstaatprecludesthepossibilityofthe primacyoflawoverthestate.Indeed,itispreciselyintherelationshipbetweenlaw andstatewhichintheGermancaseissettledwiththeprimacyofthestatethat themostsignificantfeatureofthedoctrineoftheGermanRechtsstaatemerges. Conversely,theEnglishdoctrineofthegovernmentoflawismostclearly distinguishedbygroundingtheruleoflawonthesuperiorityoflawasproclaimedby thecourtsofjustice.(Gozzi,2007,238) Fromthepointofviewofthosesubjecttotheexerciseofpower,bothitscontrolandits mannerofexercise,governmentunderandbylaw,areimportant.Buttheyarenotthe same.Astatecouldbecontrolledbutactunderdecreeswithquiteparticulartargets,kept secretfromcitizens,orinconsistentwitheachother,orretrospective,orwithoutany decrees,letalonelaws,atall.Itcould,conversely,beuncontrolledbutactthrough promulgated,clear,consistentetc.laws.Ineithercase,somethingsignificantwouldbe lacking.Forwherearbitrarinessineitherofthesesensesislinkedwithsignificantpower,it attheveryleastraisesthereasonableapprehensionthatitwilltendto:threatentheliberty ofanyonesubjecttoit;generatereasonableandenduringfearamongthem;anddeprive citizensofsourcesofreliablesourcesofexpectationsof,andcoordinationwith,eachother andwiththestate.AndasLonFuller(1969)andJeremyWaldron(2011a)haveemphasized, itthreatensthedignityofallwhofindthemselvesmereobjectsofpowerexercisableatthe whimorcapriceofanother. Thesearefourgoodreasonstovaluereductionofthepossibilityofarbitraryexerciseof power(seeKrygier2011,7981).Theremaywellbemanyothers,suchasthosethat commendthemselvestomanyeconomists,havingtodowiththeallegedcontributionofthe ruleoflawtoeconomicdevelopment(Dam2006).Totheextentthattheruleoflawcanhelp deliversuchreductions,thisisreasontovalueit.Thisisnot,ofcourse,merelyanegative matterofremovingevils,butcanbeexpressedpositively.Asocietyinwhichlawcontributes tosecuringfreedom,confidence,coordinationanddignity,issomegreatandpositive distancefrommanyavailablealternatives.Thereareotherthingswewantfromlaw,and manymorethingswemightwantinagoodsociety,butwaysofservingthesevaluesare goodsimmeasurablyhardertoattainwithoutinstitutionalizingconstraintsonarbitrariness, inboththesesenses,intheexerciseofpower. Forsomethinkers,speculatinginthesewaysaboutwhatgoodmightflowfromreducing arbitrarinessintheexerciseofpower,whatitmightbefor,takesusbeyondtheanalytical taskofunderstandingwhattheruleoflawis;forothersitdoesntgetusclosetowhat matters.Theformerfavorthinaccounts;thelatterlardtheiraccountsoftheruleoflaw withmoreingredientsandofdifferentkinds.Theseareoftenknownintheliteratureas thickaccountsoftheruleoflaw. 3. Thinorthick

Apartfromquestionsofcontrolversuscharacteroflaw,writersontheruleoflawoften distinguishbetweenthinorformal,ontheonehand,andthick,substantive,or materialconceptionsofit,ontheother.Theformerlimitthemselvestoformalproperties oflawsandlegalinstitutions,thatarepurportedtoconstitutetheruleoflaw.Thelatter requiresubstantiveelementsfromalargervisionofagoodsocietyandpolitydemocratic, freemarket,humanrightsrespecting,orsomesuchtobepresent. Thefirsttrackisfavouredbymodernanalyticaljurists.Theyhaveoftenadopted(Hart,1969, 27374)orextended(Raz,1974;Walker,1988)LonFullerseightprinciplesofwhathe calledthemoralityoflawasdefiningcharacteristicsoftheruleoflaw,evenwhenthey disagreedwithhimoverwhethertheydeservedtobecalledmoralprinciples.Accordingto Fuller(1969),thesecharacteristicswerethattheremustberules,theserulesmustbe publiclyavailable,prospective,understandable,consistent,possibletoperform,sufficiently stableforcitizenstoorienttheiractionsbythem,andadministeredinwayscongruentwith theirterms.Thereiscontroversyoverwhetherthereisanyreliableconnectionbetween suchthinprinciplesandsubstantivevaluesbeyondthem(seeKrygier,2010,11420)but whatevertheviewonthat,onathinconceptionthosefurthervaluesaresomethingother thantheruleoflaw. Again,theRechtsstaathasoscillatedbetweenthickandthinthroughits200yearsof evolution.ItwasfirsttheorizedbyGermanliberalconstitutionalandadministrative theorists,prominentamongthemKarlRotteck,KarlTheodorWelckerandRobertvonMohl, seekingtocharacterizealegalorderintermsofvaluesitserved(thosevaluesintheirturn toberealizedinandnotagainstthestate).ThepostNaziRechtsstaatreturnedto,and richlyamplified,anormativecharacterizationbasedonthefundamentalvalue,inscribedin thefirstarticleoftheGermanBasicLawof1949,ofhumandignity.However,inbetween times,afterthefailureofthe1848revolutionsandparticularlyunderandafterBismarck,its latenineteenthcenturyandearlytwentiethcenturyversionswereparedofnormative adhesions,andstrictlydevotedtoelaboratingtheformalcomponentsofalegalorderthat mightproperlybecalledaRechtsstaat. Notonlylegalphilosophers,butalsolegalcomparativists(seePeerenboomed.,2004)tend tofavourthinversionsoftheconcept,whatmightbecalledruleoflawlite:easierto identifyandabletotravelfurther,becauseitcarrieslessbaggage.Manygovernments,too, particularlyauthoritarianones,prefertobeassessedagainstthinformalcriteria,easierto satisfythanthickmorallydemandingones.Todayinternationalbusinessmen,unwillingto buyintocontroversialquestionsaboutdemocracy,humanrightsandotherlargevaluesin, say,SingaporeandChina(withbothofwhichtheymightwanttodobusiness),oftenprefer aformal,thin,conceptiontoo. Many,however,findthinconceptionsquiteinadequate.RonaldDworkin,forexample,was skepticalofconventionalrulebookconceptionsoftheruleoflaw,whichinsistthatsofar asispossible,thepowerofthestateshouldneverbeexercisedagainstindividualcitizens
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exceptinaccordancewithrulesexplicitlysetoutinapublicrulebookavailabletoall... Thosewhohavethisconceptionoftheruleoflawdocareaboutthecontentoftherulesin therulebook,buttheysaythatthisisamatterofsubstantivejustice,andthatsubstantive justiceisanindependentideal,innosensepartoftheidealoftheruleoflaw(Dworkin, 1985,11).He,bycontrast,regardedtheruleoflawasincorporatinganidealandan eminentlypositiveandsubstantiveone,theidealoftherulebyanaccuratepublic conceptionofindividualrights(Dworkin,1985,1112). ThesociologistPhilipSelznickhadamorecomplexcombinationofthinandthick.Heagreed withthosepoliticalrealistswhostressedtheimportanceofstrictlegalityasarestrainton, andsawtheruleoflawasapreciousprotectionagainstabuseof,power(Selznick,1992, 174).Ontheotherhand,heinsistedthattherewasalargerpromiseoftheruleoflaw,and thisthicker,morepositivevisionspeakstomorethanabuseofpower.Itrespondstovalues thatcanberealized,notmerelyprotected,withinalegalprocess.Theseincluderespectfor thedignity,integrity,andmoralequalityofpersonsandgroups.Thusunderstood,therule oflawenlargeshorizonsevenasitconveysamessageofrestraint(Selznick,1999,26). InGermany,thecircumstanceswhichmovedprevailingconceptionsoftheRechtsstaatfrom thintothickweremoredramaticthanthosethatpreoccupiedDworkinandSelznick.Indeed theyweretragic.AlreadyintheWeimarRepublic,HermannHellerrejectedthelegal positivist,formalistic,conceptionoftheRechtsstaatascrystallizedbyhiscontemporary, HansKelsen,whichcouldaccommodateanystate.Hearguedforonethatinsistedthatonly ademocraticstatethatdependeduponandtheninstitutionalizedfundamentalethical principleswasaRechtsstaat(forthedebatesbetweenCarlSchmitt,HansKelsenand HermannHeller,whichcentredonthenatureoftheRechtsstaat,seeDyzenhaus,1997). ThoughHellerdiedin1933,healreadysawfascismasthegreatthreattosuchastate.His nightmarebecamerealintheensuingyears. IntheperspectiveofGermanpostNaziretrospectionandintrospection,thinconceptions cametoseemnotmerelyinadequate,butontheirownpositivelydangerous.The RechtsstaatembodiedinpostWarGermanjurisprudencethusembodiesastrong commitmenttofundamentalrightsandtothedignitarianpremiseofits1949Grundgesetz orBasicLaw(seeGrote,1999),groundedinitsunamendableArticleI.Thisproclaimsthat Humandignityshallbeinviolable.Torespectandprotectitshallbethedutyofallstate authority.ParticularlythroughtheinterpretationsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt,this hasspawnedarichjurisprudenceoffundamentalrightsthatcharacterizesthemodern GermanunderstandingoftheRechtsstaat,orasitisfrequentlyexpanded(andattimes complicated)tojointhesocialwelfarestate(Sozialstaat),thesozialerRechtsstaat. Thereareproblemsattheextremes.Whatisgainedbydefiningdownaconceptthatbears somuchnormativeresonance,intermsthatignoreanyinterrogationofwhatitspointmight be,andsimplyfocusonthecharacteristicsofinstitutionsandpractices?Particularlywhenit isnotclearwhetherthecharacteristicschosenbythintheoristsrelateasmuchtowhatlaw
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doesandshoulddointheworld,astheydotolawyersunevenlyinformedintuitionsand guessesaboutthesematters.Again,whatoftheexerciseofpowerbyextralegalforces, socialnetworks?Iftheyarefreetoactarbitrarily,capriciously,whateverthelawsays,does itmakesensetoinsistthatneverthelesstheruleoflawexistsbecausecertainformal elementsofalegalorderarepresent?Excessivelythinconceptionsoftenseemurgentlyin needofafeed. Yet,conversely,accountsthatpurporttobethinasarakeareoftenratherplumperthan intended,particularlywhereasisfrequentlythecaseinwellintentionedfirstworld interventionsinbenightedcountriestheyembodyparochialsuggestionsastowhat featuresoffamiliarlegalordersgenerateruleoflawfriendlyresults.Whenpackagesof legalbricbracareaskedtotravel,itoftenturnsoutthattheyworkverydifferentlyornot atallwheretheyland(seeKrygier2011).Itmightalsoturnoutthatinstitutionsand practicesofsortsnotknowninthehomesofconfidentruleoflawexportersperform adequatelyintheirownhomes,eveniftheylookquitestrangetovisitors.Whethertheydo ornotshouldbeamatterofinvestigation,notoverbearinglegalisticassumption.Toooften, however,importedassumptionsabouttheworkingoflegalinstitutions,basedondistant histories,traditions,institutionsandpractices,havebeensmuggledinandthenresoldas thoughofuniversalapplicability.Whentheyfailtotakeisitbecausetheruleoflawisa falseideal,orbecausewhathasbeenexportedisnottheruleoflawitselfbutparochial institutionstakentobenecessaryforvaluesthatmightyetbereached,andneedtobe reached,inotherways? Partisansofthinversions,ontheotherhand,oftenassociatethethicknessinsistedonby moralistswithacombinationofparochialismandimperialismaboutvaluesandinstitutions. Whyshouldweassume,eitherasamatteroffactorofvalue,thatallculturesvaluethe samethingsfromlaw?Metaethicaldisputesthisraisesaretoolargetoberesolvedhere, butthereisanotherworryabouttoothickanaccountoftheruleoflaw.AsJosephRazhas argued,thickconceptionshaveatendencytowashawayalldistinctionbetweentheruleof lawandanythingelsewemightwant.Thatlaysthemopentothecriticismthat[i]ftherule oflawistheruleofthegoodlawthentoexplainitsnatureistopropoundacompletesocial philosophy.Butifsothetermlacksanyusefulfunction.Wehavenoneedtobeconverted totheruleoflawjustinordertodiscoverthattobelieveinitistobelievethatgoodshould triumph(Raz,1979,211). Suchcriticismpointsupanotherinadequacyofthechoiceonoffer:thedichotomybetween aspareandformalisticthinness,ontheonehand,andapudgyconfectionofeverything wedliketofindinagoodsociety,doesnotexhaustthefield.Thereisspaceforvalues particularlyassociatedwiththeexerciseofpower,whatmightbecalleddistinctivelylegal valueswereitnotforthefactthatthedifferencesbetweenthemandothervaluesare unlikelytobecategorical,butrathermattersoffocus,shadesanddegree.Manylegalorders bearandtransmitlonghistoriesofobservation,experienceandreflectionuponthe
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pathologiesofunconstrainedand/orcapriciousexerciseofpowerandonwhatmightbe donetoavoidormoderatesuchpathologies.Legalorderstypicallyembodyandgenerate valuesrelatedtowhattheydo,bothintheiranimatingprinciplesandideals,andinthe complaintstheyprovokewhentheirpracticesfloutthesourcesoftheirlegitimacy(see Selznick,1999;Waldron,2011a).Thesehaveincludedsuchvaluesasdueprocessornatural justice,idealsoffairtreatmentandnotice,andinparticularlegaltraditionsmuchmore. Theyhavetodowithtreatingasubjectofpowerwiththerespectduetoaperson,rather thanarabidanimaloradilapidatedhouse(Waldron,2011a,16).Theruleoflawmightwell bearguedtobeincompletetotheextentthatsomesuchpowerrelatedvalues,thathaveto dowithhowtoarrangeandtransactpotentiallyharmfulinteractionsbetweenitandits subjects(toooftentreatedasobjects),aredishonored.Attemptstovindicatesuchvalues, oftenimplicitinmanylegalprinciplesandtraditionsifnotalllegalrules,mightbe consideredaservicetotheruleoflaw,eveniftheygobeyondpurelyformalaspectsoflaws andnotwithstandingthattheymightfallshortofjusticemoreholisticallyconceived.Onone view,thespecialdisease,towhichtheruleoflawispartofaremedy,isthepropensityof powerunconstrainedtobeexercisedinarbitraryways.Itisawidespreaddisease. 4. Anatomyorteleology Morefundamentalthancontestsoverthefleshinessoftheruleoflawisoneoverwhether weshouldbeginwithfocusonitsanatomytheinstitutionalfeaturesoneshouldexpectto findinsuchacreatureoritspointthereasonsoneisconcernedwiththisratherthan somethingelse.Thelongcommonlawtraditionwasnotfixatedonspecificinstitutions,even lesstheprecisecharacteroflegalrules.AsReiddemonstrates,itwasalltoomurky: Ironically,themedievalconstitutionallawoutofwhichtoday'sruleoflawdevelopedwould nothavemettherequirementsofclarityorprecision.Therewasalwaysanairof indefiniteness,asmokyvaguenesssurroundingthisallembracingrestraining"law"of Englishconstitutionalism.Evenitsauthorityaslawwasshroudedinimmeasurability(Reid, 2002,16).Butthecommonlawtraditionwasclearononething:Itwas,Viscount Bolinbrokesaidintheeighteenthcentury,amatterofcurbingpowerandnotofthetype andstructureofgovernment.Whetherpowerwasvestedinasinglemonarch,in"the principlePersonsoftheCommunity,orinthewholeBodyofthePeople,'wasimmaterial. Whatmatteredwaswhetherpowerwaswithoutcontrol.SuchGovernmentsare GovernmentsofarbitraryWill,'hecontended(Reid,2002,42).Bolinbrokewouldlikelybe puzzledbytheruleoflawtoolkitscarriedbyUNandWorldBankruleoflawpromoters throughouttheworldtoday;uniformincharacter,diverseinapplication,apparently universalinapplication.Whyarethoseparticularinstitutionssacrosanct?Whatisthepoint? Howhasthepointinfluencedthekit?Evenforthoseofuswhohaveleftthemythologies andhagiographiesofcommonlawtheorylongbehind,thesearenotbadquestions. SimilarchoicesarealsofoundintheRechtsstaattradition.Theearlypropagatorsofthe conceptwerenotlegalanatomistsbutprotoliberalsinthemain,manyinfluencedbyKant,
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seekingtoestablishanorderofcitizensequalbeforethelaw,whosepersonalautonomy andpropertywereprotectedbythelaw.AstatewasaRechtsstaattotheextentthatit achievedthesetasks,notbecauseithadthisorthatparticularform.AsvonMohlputit,the objectiveoftheRechtsstaatisnotlogicallyentwinedwithaparticularformofgovernment; onthecontrary,everyarrangementofpublicpowerwhichguaranteestherightandthe developmentofallhumanactivities,isadmissible(quotedinHeuschling,2002,59;my translationfromHeuschlingsFrench).Thesewriterswereexplicitthatwhatmatteredwas achievingwhattheyconceivedtobethepointoftheruleoflaw,notwhetheritexemplified aparticularformofinstitutionalarchitecture.Thatunderstandingdidnotcontinuethrough thenineteenthcentury,butwassupplantedbyaformalistic,anatomizingconception, stressingthepositivisticallycharacterizedfeaturesofastate,thatqualifiedittobedeclared aRechtsstaat. Ontheteleologicalaccount,however,theruleoflawcannotadequatelybeexplicatedbya listoffeaturesoflegalinstitutions,rulesorpractices.Fortheruleoflawoccurswhenandto theextentthatthereisasocialachievementtowhichlawcontributes.Ifwesay,for example,thattherewerelotsoflawsunderStalinandalotofrule,buttherewasnotmuch ruleoflaw,wearenotsayingsomethingcontroversial,andyouwouldnthavetoknow muchaboutDiceyorFullertoagree.Soatleastamongthelegallyandphilosophically unwashed,theruleoflawhassomethingtodowithwhatthelawdoes,ratherthansimply withwhatithasbeensomewheredeclaredtobe. Moreover,ifthelawisenlistedtodothingsweassociatewiththeruleoflawbutthe missionfails,wemightsaythattherewasanattempttoachievetheruleoflaw,butitwas unsuccessful:lawswereofthesortsweassociatewiththeruleoflaw,everyonewastrying, buttheywereoverborne,forwhateverreason.Tosaytheruleoflawexistsinasocietyisto implyanaccomplishment;amongitspartisansavaluedaccomplishment:anidealtowhich lawistakentocontributehasbeenapproached. Onthisview,theruleoflawisnotanaturalentitylikeatree,simplyawaitingscientific description,orevenamanmadecontrivancelikearuleoflawinastatutebook,which mightbeidentifiedbypointingtoit.Itexiststotheextentthatacertainstateofaffairs,one inwhichpowerisexercisedinrelativelynonarbitraryways,existsintheworld.Lawis supposedtocontribute,thoughitwillneverdosoonitsown.Theaspirationoridealis satisfiedonlyinsofarassomepurposeorgoalforlawisrealized.Whilesuchanachievement couldinprinciplebethoughtvalueneutralorevenvalueless,andhasbeen,theruleoflaw alsohaspartisanstodayperhaps,eventoomanywhothinkitvaluable,anidealforlaw.If wevaluethatidealweshouldofcourseseektoidentifywhatmightbenecessaryto generateit.Butthatisasecondstep.Withoutsomeprincipleofselectionevenifonlytacit, wewontfindabunchoflegalbitsandpieceswaitingoutthereandrecognizableasthe ruleoflaw.

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Theteleologicalcontentionis,then,thattounderstandwhattheruleoflawrequireswe needtostartbyreflectingfirstonitspointratherthan,asismorecommon,withan enumerationofpurportedlydefininglegalinstitutionalfeatures,whethertheybeparticular institutionssuchascommonlawcourts(Dicey1959),particularformalqualitiesofrules, suchasprospectivity,clarity,etc.,oreventraditionsandprocedures,suchasdefences, habeascorpus,andsoon(Waldron2011a),thoughthelastisgettingclosertoexplicit concernwiththespecificpointoftheruleoflaw. Atfirstblush,thislookslikearepetitionofthedistinctionbetweenthinandthick,anditis truethatanatomicalaccountsoftheruleoflawareoftenthin,sincetheyfocuson delineatingthecharactersoflegalinstitutions.Buttherearetwodifferences.First, particularlyamongruleoflawpromoters,itisrarethatanyonehasthinambitions,more commonlytheyjusthaveconfusedideasofwhattheruleoflawisabout.Ruleoflaw promotion,afterall,isostensiblyanattempttoenlisttheruleoflawtodogoodinthe world,notjusttobuildreplicasofinstitutionsfromhome.Howeverruleoflawpromoters areoftenrestrictedbytheconventionalidentificationoftheruleoflaw,orRechtsstaat, withaparticularboxoftricks,andproceedtotrytovindicatesomepurposewithanapriori catalogofwhatisneededtoachieveit,ratherthananopennesstothepossibilitythatthey mightneedtolearnsomenewtricks.Awarenessthatoneshouldstartwiththeend,asit were,ratherthanpurportedmeans,mightavoidalotofgriefovertransplantsthatfailtodo whatisexpectedofthem:promotetheruleoflaw. Moreover,thedistinctionsbetweenthinversusthick,ontheonehand,andanatomical versusteleological,ontheother,donotoccupythesameplane.Ateleologicalaccountis notnecessarilynormativelythick;itmightoccupyitselfwithasmallpoint,saypredictability inthelegalenvironment.Hownormativelyenrichedthepointoftheruleoflawmightbeis alegitimatematterofdebate,butitisadebateontheteleologicalplane.Onthatplane, thequestionisnot,firstofall,howmuchnormativeweighttheconceptcarriesbutwhere oneshouldstarttothinkabouttheruleoflawbyenumeratingasetofpurported(and typicallyuniversal)featuresorbyaskingwhatitismightbegoodfor.Sinceitishardtoknow whatfeaturesmatterunlessonehassortedoutwhattheyarefor,thesuggestionhereisto startwiththeend. 5. LegalorSociolegal Ifoneisconcernedwithunderlyingvaluesthatinspirecommitmenttotheruleoflaw,this hassignificantandsomewhatparadoxicalimplicationsforwhereoneshouldlookto vindicatewhateveronedecidessuchvaluestobe.Forthesearchtoredeemthemislikelyto decenterlawitself.Afterall,itisinprincipleanopen,andlikelyvariable,matterwhatinthe worldbestminimizesarbitrarinessintheexerciseofpower,andthesamemightbesaidof anyothervaluesthatweimaginelawhelpsvindicate.Yetifendsmatter,thenitisnotclear thatoneshouldassumethatlawisalwayskeytoachievementoftheanimatingvaluesof theruleoflaw,evenlessthestate.Thisisso,whateverthevaluesonehasinmind,andit
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willbeallthemoresoasonerampsupthevaluesoneassociateswiththeruleoflaw.A goodsocietyisquiteanachievement,andlawonlyasmall,ifprecious,contributor. Thisappliesatvirtuallyeverylevel.Ifarbitrarypoweristobefeared,thenwhereverpower ispowerfulenoughtobefearful,ruleoflawconcernsarerelevant.Thus,preoccupation withthestateisnotalwaysappropriate,incircumstanceswheremanyofthesourcesof restraintonarbitrarypower,manydangersflowingfromit,andmanyofthegoods accomplishedbyitscurtailment,lieoutsidethestate,andmanyofthemeansofachieving thosegoodslieoutsidethelawaswell(seeKrygier,2011,8591). Ifthatisthecase,itisnotobviousthatthefamiliarinstitutionsassociatedbylegal anatomistswiththeruleoflawwillalwaysbethebesttowield.Lawwillneveraccomplish muchintheworldonitsown,andakeyaccompanimentofinvestigationoftheruleoflaw shouldbe,butrarelyhasbeen,studyofwhatelseisneeded,besideandbeyond,law,to attainitsends. Onthisview,lawshouldbeviewed,notasthealwaysnecessarycenterpieceofpower tamingpolicytowhichothermeasuresaresubordinateorsupplementaryaddenda,butas oneimplementamongseveral,ofvaryingsignificance,insomerespectsandcircumstances ofpotentiallyuniqueimportance,butdependentforitssuccessonmanyotherthings,and perhapsnotmoreimportantfortheachievementofitsowngoalthanthey.Similar reflectionsapply,butallthemore,totheStateoftheRechtsstaat. Thereissomethingtobesaidforthelegalpluralismembodiedintheoldcommonlaw tradition,andsqueezedoutbytheriseofthecontemporarystate:inprincipleinthe Rechtsstaat,andbythestatophilictendenciesofmodernitymoregenerally.Evenwithits dominance,andespeciallywhereitisfailed,fragileortransitional,thestateisneverthe onlygameintown.Thatisasociologicalplatitude,butitshouldhavemorebearingonlegal platitudesthanithas.Lawyerswillnaturally,habitually,focustheirattentiononstateand legalagencies,butthoseinterestedinpromotingthevaluesthatunderpintheruleoflaw andmakeitworthwhilewillneedtolookfurtherafield. Iftheforegoingconsiderationsareplausiblewithinexistingnationstates,theymustbeall themorecompellingforanyonewhowants,asmanytodaydo,tospeakaboutanemerging internationalruleoflaw(Palombella,2009;Waldron,2011b).Forwhateverthatmight mean,thereisnointernationalStaattobeitslawgivingandenforcingsource.Itmightbea matterofargumentwhetheritisagoodideatoseektoextendtheruleoflawtothe internationalsphere,butitwouldseemastrangetruncationoftheargumentsimplytorule outanonstatecenteredruleoflawbydefinition. Thissuggeststheneedforasociologicalawarenessandsensibilitynotespeciallycommon amonglawyers,whetherruleoflawyers,orrechtsstaatlichones.Therewillbeothersectors ofasocietyaltogetherthatinfluencetheextenttowhichthevaluesattheheartoftherule
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oflawwillbeattained.Paradoxically,inordertoreachthosevalueswewillhavetolookfar beyondtheinstitutionswehavemostconventionallyassociatedwiththem. Thatdoesnotmakeeitherthelaworthestateunimportant.However,itmightenableusto seetheirimportanceinperspective,givedueweighttootherphenomenathatmightneed enlistingtoservesuchgoals,andreleaseusfromtheholdofamantra,whetherruleoflaw orRechtsstaat,whichintheirmodishubiquitythreatentoobscurethevaluable,indeed preciouspurposesforwhichtheywerepushedintothefray,insteadpromiscuouslytoserve virtuallyanypurposeyouwanttoname. References: Blackstone,William,1979,CommentariesontheLawsofEngland,Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress Call,CharlesT,2007,IntroductiontoCall,ed.,ConstructingJusticeandSecurityafterWar, Washington,D.C.,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress Dam,KennethW.,2006,TheLawGrowthNexus:TheRuleofLawandEconomic Development,Washington:BrookingsInstitutionPress Dicey,A.V.,1961,IntroductiontotheLawoftheConstitution,10thedition,London: Macmillan Dworkin,Ronald,1985,PoliticalJudgesandtheRuleofLaw,inAMatterofPrinciple, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress Dyzenhaus,David,1997,LegalityandLegitimacy.CarlSchmitt,HansKelsenandHermann HellerinWeimar,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress Fuller,LonL,1969,TheMoralityofLaw,revisededition,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress Gozzi,Gustavo,2007,RechtsstaatandIndividualRightsinGermanConstitutionalHistory, inPietroCostaandDaniloZolo,eds.,TheRuleofLaw.History,TheoryandCriticism, Dordrecht,SpringerVerlag,23759 Grote,Rainer,1999,RuleofLaw,RechtsstaatandEtatdedroit,inChristianStarck(Ed.), Constitutionalism,UniversalismandDemocracy:AComparativeAnalysis,BadenBaden: NomosVerlagsgesellschaft,269306 Hart,H.L.A.,1967,ProblemsofPhilosophyofLaw,in5TheEncyclopediaofPhilosophy, 26476 Heuschling,Luc,2002,tatdedroit,Rechtsstaat,RuleofLaw,Paris:NouvelleBibliothque deThses,ditionsDalloz

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Kirchheimer,Otto,1967,TheRechtsstaatasMagicWall,inWilliamE.Scheuerman,ed.,The RuleofLawunderSiege.SelectedEssaysofFranzL.NeumannandOttoKirchheimer, California:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996,24363 Krieger,Leonard,1957,TheGermanIdeaofFreedom,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress Krygier,Martin,1998,CommonLaw,RoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,10volumes, ed.EdwardCraig,London:Routledge,volume1,44046 Krygier,Martin,2010,TheHartFullerDebate,TransitionalSocietiesandtheRuleofLaw,in PeterCane,ed.,TheHartFullerDebateintheTwentyFirstCentury,Oxford:HartPublishers, 10734 Krygier,Martin,2011,FourPuzzlesabouttheRuleofLaw:Why,What,Where?AndWho Cares?inJamesE.Fleming,ed.,GettingtotheRuleofLaw,NewYork:NewYorkUniversity Press,64104 Lieberman,David,1989,TheProvinceofLegislationDetermined,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress Loughlin,Martin,2010,FoundationsofPublicLaw,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress MacCormick,D.Neil,1984,DerRechtsstaatunddieruleoflaw,50Juristenzeitung50,65 70 Maitland,F.W.,1965TheConstitutionalHistoryofEngland,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress Palombella,Gianluigi,2009,Theruleoflawbeyondthestate:Failures,promises,and theory,7,3ICON,442467 Palombella,Gianluigi,2010,TheRuleofLawasInstitutionalIdeal,inL.MorlinoandG. Palombella,eds.,RuleofLawandDemocracy,Brill,Leiden Peerenboom,Randall,ed.,2004,AsianDiscoursesoftheRuleofLaw,London: RoutledgeCurzon Pettit,Philip2012,OnthePeoplesTerms.ARepublicanTheoryandModelofDemocracy, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress Postema,Gerald,1986,BenthamandtheCommonLawTradition,Oxford:ClarendonPress Raeff,Marc,1983,TheWellOrderedPoliceState:SocialandInstitutionalChangeThrough LawintheGermaniesandRussia,16001800,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress Raz,Joseph,1979,TheRuleofLawanditsVirtue,inTheAuthorityofLaw,Oxford: ClarendonPress
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Reid,JohnPhilip,2004,TheRuleofLaw,DeKalb:NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress Richardson,HenryS.,2002,DemocraticAutonomy.PublicReasoningabouttheEndsof Policy,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress Rosenfeld,Michel,2001,TheRuleofLawandtheLegitimacyofConstitutionalDemocracy, 74SouthernCaliforniaLawReview,130752 Rundle,Kristen,2009,TheImpossibilityofanExterminatoryLegality:Lawandthe Holocaust,59UniversityofTorontoLawJournal65125 Selznick,Philip,1992,TheMoralCommonwealth,Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress Selznick,Philip,1999,LegalCulturesandtheRuleofLaw,inMartinKrygierandAdam Czarnota,eds.,TheRuleofLawafterCommunism,Ashgate/Dartmouth,Aldershot,2138 Waldron,Jeremy,2002,IstheRuleofLawanEssentiallyContestedConcept(InFlorida)? 21,2LawandPhilosophy,13764 Waldron,Jeremy,2011a,TheRuleofLawandtheImportanceofProcedure,inJamesE. Fleming,ed.,GettingtotheRuleofLaw,NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,331 Waldron,Jeremy,2011b,AreSovereignsEntitledtotheBenefitoftheInternationalRuleof Law?22,2TheEuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,315343 Walker,GeoffreydeQ.,1988,TheRuleofLaw.FoundationofConstitutionalDemocracy, Carlton:MelbourneUniversityPress Weber,Max,1968,EconomyandSociety,vol.II,NewYork,BedminsterPress.

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