Pubcorp: Batch 4

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. FACTS: 1. Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land 2. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. 3. RTC: authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. 4. VM REALTY filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging in the main that: a. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and 5. Trial court nullified the order and dismissed the case. 6. Contention of the petitioner: A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant. HELD: Petition is NOT meritorious. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. Indeed, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

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HEIRS OF JBL REYES VS CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Petitioners acquired a favorable judgment of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso. In 1998, the said judgments became final and executory. Consequently, writs of execution were issued. During the pendency of the complaints for unlawful detainer, respondent City filed a case for the expropriation of the same properties involved in the ejectment cases. The trial court allowed respondent City to take possession of the property; it denied the motions for intervention and injunction, and, after allowing respondent City to oppose the motion to dismiss, dismissed the complaint for expropriation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that respondent City properly exercised its right to expropriate the subject properties. Petitioners appealed the CA decision to this Court. Thereafter, on motion of respondent occupants, the Court of Appeals issued protective orders that required the parties to maintain the status quo (prohibiting any ejectment) pending this Courts resolution of the appeal. Petitioner now questions the legality of the CAs expropriation order and the propriety of its act enjoining the execution of the final judgments in the ejectment cases. beneficiaries LGU give budgetary priority to on-site devt of Govt lands Sec. 10 Modes of Land Acquisition include: - Community Mortgage - Land swapping - Land assembly/consolidation - Land banking - donation to the Govt - Joint venture agreement - Negotiated purchase - Expropriation Provided: - Only resort to expropriation when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted - Exempt parcels of land owned by small property owners - Revert and escheat abandoned property to the State in a proceeding analogous to Rule 91, Rules of Court Filstream vs. Court of Appeals - the above-quoted provisions are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. - expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. - Compliance with these conditions are mandatory as they are the only safeguards of private property owners against violation of due process Respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners which must accordingly be rectified. It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good. States right to expropriate private property for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However, the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection. The exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended to property owners. Due to the fatal infirmity in the Citys exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation must necessarily fail. The complaint for expropriation is DISMISSED.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent City may legally expropriate the subject properties?

HELD: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law depends on whether it complied with the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. A local government unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature since it is only a mere creation of the latter. Basis of Manila Citys expropriation: Local Govt Code: Sec. 19 Eminent Domain. RA 409 (Revised Charter of the City of Manila): Power of Manila City to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the conditions and standards prescribed by RA7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Sec. 9 Priorities in Land acquisition Acquire lands for socialized housing in the following order: (a) Those owned by Govt, subdivisions, instrumentalities + GOCCs and subsidiaries (b) Public, Alienable lands (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands (d) Those w/in declared areas Areas of Priority Devt, Zonal Improvement Sites, & Slum Improvement Sites not yet acquired (e) BLISS (Bagong Lipunan Improvement Sites & Services) not yet acquired (f) Privately-owned lands Priorities not apply when on-site devt is found more practicable & advantageous to

MASIKIP v. PASIG G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by statute FACTS: Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

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On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property HELD: Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided: (1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted; (2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. Levy D. Macasiano Vs. Judge Roberto Diokno, Municipality of Paranaque, and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992 Respondent Municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus. After issuing a TRO, the trial court later issued an order upholding the validity of the ordinance and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. Macasiano appealed. Issue: Whether the establishment of the flea market is lawful. Held: NO. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension, and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of the Municipality, subject to absolute control of the Congress. The Municipality have no authority whatsoever over the public properties. Moreover, under the CC, properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man, and are therefore cannot be the object of a private contract. The legal provision which gives authority to local govt to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. Moreover, the ordinance cannot be validly implemented for the same cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions imposed for its approval (not used for vehicular traffic, no opposition to its establishment, time designation or schedule). Every Local government has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare. In this case, the Solicitor General pointed out that 1) the streets along Baclaran are congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets; 2) in cases of emergency, fire trucks and ambulances have to maneuver and look for other better streets instead of the more accessible streets used by the market; 3) school children suffer for the normal transportation flow is disrupted when they go to and from their school or have to get off at a distance far from their schools and walk; 4) vendors left their garbage and litter at the end of the day. Facts: The Municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance which authorize the closure of certain streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon, The ordinance was approved by the municipal council and the Metropolitan Manila Authority but the latter subjected it to certain conditions (relevant: streets are not used for vehicular traffic, majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the vending areas, the time which the vending area is to be used is designated, and it shall be temporary). Through a resolution passed by the municipal council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operation, maintenance, and management of a flea market with respondent Palanyag. A month thereafter, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction of said stalls. Macasiano wrote Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the stall shall be dismantled.

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Case #5 BUNYE v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 122058 May 5, 1999 Ponente: PURISIMA Petitioners were charged with a violation of Sec. 3 par. e of RA 3019. On or about August 1988, the accused, all public officers, including then Muntinlupa Mayor Ignacio Bunye, enacted Kapasiyahan Blg. 45, and on the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of the New Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over the operation and management of the aforesaid public market starting August 14, 1998, despite the fact that, there was a valid and subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, between the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the former Municipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda sa Bagong Paminlihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. Petitioners posted a Motion to Dismiss stating that unless and until declared to be unconstitutional and expressly annulled, Resolution No. 45 deserves the p resumption of constitutionality and therefore is entitled to obedience and respect. However, the motion was denied by the respondent court on September 23, 1992. The Sandiganbayan then found petitioners guilty of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on its July 26, 1995 ISSUE Whether the unilateral revocation of subject lease contract was effected with evident bad faith. HELD Sec.149, paragraph (3) of BP 337 explicitly requires a public bidding before a government contract may be awarded, and the term of the contract is not to exceed 5 years. Thus, the 25year term of the lease contract violates the BP 337 provision. As stated in Spouses Terrado vs Court of Appeals, since Ordinance No. 8 granted fishery privileges without the benefit of public bidding and for a period exceeding 5 years, the said ordinance and the contract of managementwere null and void ab initio xxx. There is tenability in petitioners submission that subject lease contract was grossly disadvantageous to the Government. The Court, mindful of economic realities, perceives that the projected monthly rental of P51, 243 in 1990 would have greatly reduced by 2015 when the lease contract would have ended if not earlier rescinded. Also, KBMBPMs failure to comply with the contractual stipulations under the Health and Sanitation clause of the contract cannot be overlooked. In finding and concluding that petitioners acted in bad faith in the implementation of said directives, the respondent court equated legal steps to legal actions, so much so that petitioners failure to sue the Cooperative for rescission of the contract was adjudged by the Sandiganbayan as non-compliance with the MMC and CoAs directives. Prior to the takeover of the new public market, posters announced the municipalitys intended takeover in the vicinity of the market place where the KBMMPMs offices were located. The cooperative also participated in the public hearing of Resolution No. 45. Thus, respondents were duly notified of the intent to takeover by the municipality. Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 provides that causing any undue injury to any partythe discharge of his official administrative pr judicial function constitute a violation of the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. There is no clear evidence as to the exact nature of the amount since the witness failed to produce any document as evidence. Records also reveal that the stallholders business interest has never been adversely affected, and no market vendor was displaced or prevented from operating in the new Muntinlupa public market, as a result of the implementation of Resolution o. 45. Thus, no undue injury was caused by petitioners to subject market vendors or to the KBMBPM. There is no sustainable basis for requiring the Municipality to reimburse. Absent any damage/injury, the fourth element of the charge is wanting. The evidence cannot hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.

G.R. No. L-23052; January 29, 1968 CITY OF MANILA, petitioner vs. APPEALS, respondents CONCEPCION, C.J.: FACTS:

GENARO

N.

TEOTICO

and

COURT

OF

At 8pm of 27 January 1958, Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Ave, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. Upon alighting, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole. His head hit the rim, breaking his eyeglasses, piercing his left eyelid. Bystanders brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. He suffered many other complications and was made to pay P1,400 for further medical treatment by a private practitioner. Teotico filed with CFI Manila a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms. He was also associated with several civic organizations. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost income, was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends, and was always in fear for his minor children who are dependent on him. Defense presented evidence that it was vigilant in covering up manholes and prompt of replacing them when stolen. CFI dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed but the City of Manila was sentenced to pay damages: P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by certiorari from the City of Manila. ISSUE: Whether the present case is governed by Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) which exempts the city from liability due to the failure of its officers to enforce laws or ordinances, or by Article 2189 of the NCC which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. HELD: Civil Code applies. Insofar as territorial application is concerned, R.A. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions, Sec. 4 of R.A. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" while Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

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The City had admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. The contention that it was in the national highway did not preclude it from the control and supervision of the City, as expressly provided in Sec. 18 of R.A. 409. This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted. Decision appealed from AFFIRMED. G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978 LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978 MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. MUOZ PALMA, J.: Facts: On Oct. 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 159 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21-23, 1959. It also passed Resolution No. 182 creating the 1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee which in turn organised a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The Council appropriated P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the zarzuela and another for the cancionan. Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage. The zarzuela entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla, one of the performers who was at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneath and was taken to San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon the following day. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint with CFI Manila to revoker damages. Named partydefendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, Municipal Council of Malasiqui, and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. The municipality invoked inter alia the principal defines that as a legally and duly organized public corporation, it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any its agents. The councillors in turn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta hence they are not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit, furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. Judge Gregorio Lantin dismissed the complaint ruling that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment. The Fontanillas appealed to the CA. CA reversed the decision to pay the heirs of Fontanilla P12,000 by way of moral and actual damages, P1200 attorney's fees, and costs. Issue: Whether the celebration of a town fiesta authorised by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality. Held: PROPRIETARY. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private. proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be, had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly or maliciously. Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. The general rule is that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations fall within this law and are liable accordingly to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. THE HOLDING OF THE TOWN FIESTA BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI WAS AN EXERCISE OF A PRIVATELY OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTION OF THE MUNICIPALITY. Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council. This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to a celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. HENCE, THE MUNICIPALITY IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE DEATH OF FONTANILLA pursuant to Art. 2176 and 2180 of the NCC. The removal of the principal braces and leaving the front portion of the stage practically unsupported is negligence. CA dcision affirmed.

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MONDANO V. SILVOSA FACTS: Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst Exec Sec, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor can exercise the power of control. HELD: The executive departments of the Government created and organized before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise. The Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If general supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . . . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by sec10(1), Article 7, of the Constitution. Hence, the charges preferred against the petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in Sec.2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Consequently, the suspension of the petitioner, as Mayor of the Municipality of Mainit, is unlawful and without authority of law.

Sultan Maminta M. Radia vs Review Committee under E.O. No. 17 G.R. No. 78973 January 29, 1988 Facts:Petitioner was appointed as City Engineer of Marawi City on 1 May 1985. On 1 April 1986, respondent Basman, OIC of the City Mayors Office of Marawi City, issued a Memorandum addressed to all Heads of Offices and Personnel directing the immediate transfer & delivery of all office equipment to, and directing all personnel, to hold office at the New City Hall, Bangon, Marawi City effective April 2, 1986.

On 4 April 1986, Basman issued a Memorandum directly addressed to petitioner stating that he had been reliably informed that most of the City Engineering Equipment had been intentionally destroyed by some bad elements. He directed petitioner to transfer immediately all equipment to the present City Public Works and Highway Engineers Office with the warning that failure to comply would constitute malfeasance and serious insubordination and that petitioner would be held responsible for any further loss of or damage to the said City Equipment. On 30 April 1986, respondent Basman terminated petitioner from his position and designated Pangadapun as OIC of the Office of the City Engineer of Marawi City. ISSUE: (1) Whether the termination of petitioner as City Engineer and the designation of Pangadapun as OIC City Engineer by respondent Basman valid?

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(2) Whether or not the Review Committees Resolution affirming the termination of petitioners appointment is valid? In the instant case, petitioner appealed to the respondent Review Committee established under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 17 precisely to pass upon all petitions for reconsideration filed by any official or employee separated from the service in the course of implementing Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. The Review Committee held that petitioners persistent failure to comply with lawful orders of respondent Basman fell within Ground No. 5 of Executive Order No. 17. The petition was DISMISSED. All elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. Andaya vs RTC 319 SCRA 696 (G.R. No. 126661) February 13, 2004

HELD: Article III (2) of of the Provisional Constitution provided as follows:

The above organic provision did not require the existence of any cause for removal/termination of any of the elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution. This being so, petitioner was lawfully terminated from his position as City Engineer upon the designation/appointment and qualification of respondent Pangadapun as his successor. Respondent Basmans authority, as OIC of the Office of the City Mayor of Marawi City, to appoint/designate the City Engineer cannot be seriously questioned in review of the provisions of Section 185 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 (LGC) which amended the provisions of the City Charter of Marawi City, originally lodging that authority in the President of the Philippines.

FACTS: On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of police) became vacant after P/Supt. Antonio Enteria was relieved of command. Thereafter, petitioner Andaya submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles from which the latter would choose and appoint as the new chief of police. However, the mayor did not choose anyone from the list because P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento was not included therein. Petitioner Andaya refused the Mayors request to include Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of police officers for appointment since he was not qualified for the position under NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 95-04.

ISSUE: WON Mayor of Cebu City may require the inclusion of his protg in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended to him by the Regional Police Dir., Regional Police Command No.7, for his selection of the the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any ground/cause for removal, the Government, in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the Career Civil Service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New Government, issued EO No. 17 which enumerated certain grounds for the separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. These grounds were: 1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; [and] 5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service. In case of disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the question shall be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within 5 working days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chief of Police shall be final and executory. It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5 eligibles from a pool of eligible officers, screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and Selection Board, without interference from local executives. The National Police Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 9504 to implement RA 6975. Memorandum Circular 95-04 provides qualifications for Chief of Police of highly urbanized cities: (1) completion of the Officers Senior Executive Course (OSEC) (2) holding the rank of Police Superintendent

HELD: No. RA 6975 Sec.51 deputizes the Mayor of Cebu City as representative of the National Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction - grants the Mayor of Cebu City authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7 The City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct command & control of the PNP Regional Director, and is equivalent to a provincial office.

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As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to be named the chief of police. The actual power to appoint the Chief of Police is vested in the Regional Director. As such, the mayor cannot require the Regional Director to include the name of any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of 5 to be submitted to him. This is to enhance police professionalism and to isolate the police service from political domination

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